Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083, July 30,

1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and

healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May

3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I.

THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their
way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be
anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and
AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of
her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
lawless violence.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017
valid?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies
petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994
Facts :
Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors of North
EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment
of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social
services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or administration of the
government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the
vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and
supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to
engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to
dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580,
entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:

Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article
XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does
not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the
Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with
CHR Case No. 90-1580.

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the
teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether
or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the
merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.