Doctrine of expressiouniusest exclusion alterius

of BOC is unconstitutional as it was not confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments. Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the
appointment of Mison is constitutional pursuant to Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.

[When applied:]
a.Lerum v. Cruz 87 Phil. 652;
FACTS:
This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum
andFernando filed a petition to test the sufficiency and probative value
of a testimony in a bigamy case by former Judge Cruz regarding the
issuance of a divorce decree.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the BOC
which was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments is
unconstitutional.
RULING:

Issue: Whether the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief

regarding the sufficiency and probative value of former Judge Cruz
testimony?
Ruling:
No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. According to
Section 1 of Rule 66 of the Rules of the Court, declaratory relief may only
be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance, or who is interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument. The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony,
which is subject for the declaratory relief in the case, is not included in
the enumeration.
Doctrine of Expressiouniusestexclussioalterius - a principle in statutory
construction, when one or more things of a class are expressly
mentioned others of the same class are excluded.
Sarmiento v. Mison 156 SCRA 49;
Doctrine of expression uniusest
applied)

exclusion

alterus

(When

FACTS:
This is a petition to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Officer of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of Budget,
from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner

No. The appointment of Mison was constitutional. Section 16, Article VII
says:
The President shall nominate and with the consent if the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by the law to appoint, The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the department, agencies,
commissions or boards.
In the 1935 Constitution, all presidential appointments are required to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, under 1973 Constitution
the president has absolute power of appointment, while under 1987
constitution which serves as the middle ground on both previous
constitutions, expressed that only the first group of appointments
requires confirmation of Commission on Appointments. First group would
be the positions enumerated in the first sentence of the provision
whereas, clearly, head of bureaus is not included as they are lower level
than executive department so it was suggested to be excluded in the
first group. Therefore, the Appointment of Mison I constitutional.
DOCTRINE: Express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated. The duty of the court is to construe the applicable
constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or

the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance

with what they say and provide.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term
religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.
Issue:
Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in
its broadest sense so as to include the religious purpose.

Ruling:
No, the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest
sense.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos 236 SCRA 197;

Topics:
Doctrine
applied:]

of

expressiouniusest

exclusion

alterius

([When

Facts:
The petitioners, officers of SamahangKatandaanngNayonngTikay, a civic
organization, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in
Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman, approached and
solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a
contribution of P1, 500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). As a
consequence, Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioner for
violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes
shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of
Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan.
The trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating sec. 2 of the
Solicitation Permit Law.

The Court ruled on the negative since Sec. 2 of P.D. 1564 merely stated
charitable or public welfare purposes, indicating that the framers of
the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious
purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would
not have so stated expressly. Further, the term charitable should be
strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for religious purposes.
Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all
penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would
favor the accused.
Doctrine:
Expressiouniusest exclusion alterius [When applied:]
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
This
rule
is
expressed
in
the
familiar
maxim
expressiouniusestexclusioalterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.

San Pablo Manufacturing

Internal Revenue

Corporation

vs

Commissioner

of

FACTS:
SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling,
manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It
was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency
miller's tax and manufacturer's sales tax, among other deficiency
taxes,for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller's tax was imposed on
SPMC's sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM)
while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible
oil as manufactured products.It opposed the assessments insisting on
the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition,
SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller's tax. It maintains that the crude
oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an
ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller's tax
pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two
exemptions from the miller's tax: (a) the milled products in their original
state were actually exported by the miller himself or by another person,
and (b) the milled products sold by the miller were actually exported as
an ingredient or part of any manufactured article by the buyer or
manufacturer of the milled products. The exportation may be effected by
the miller himself or by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled
products. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC's milled products,
subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from
the miller's tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SPMCs interpretation is correct.
HELD:
No. The legal maxim ExpressioUniusestExclusioAlterius
applies. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded
therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.
The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

In this case, the language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the
1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the
exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and
dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient
or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or by the miller himself.The language of the
exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC.
Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of
the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer
of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption.
Since SPMC's situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was
subject to the 3% miller's tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987
Tax Code. Thus, the petition is denied.

[When not applied:]

Manabat VS De Aquino
Doctrine : inclusion unius est exclusion alterius is well known, but the
maxim is not more than the auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored
where other circumstances indicated the enumeration was intended to
be exclusive.

Facts:
The peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac in decision ordered Sps. Manabat to pay
the Sps. Roxas an amount of P 1,261.74. Felt aggrieved on the decision,
Sps. Manabat filed a notice of appeal to the Court of First Instance thru
registered mail. The timeline of the case is indicated herein
1.
September 7, 1951
- Sps Manabat received the order
2.
September 22, 1951
- Sps. Manabat filed a notice of appeal
thru post mail
With corresponding postal money order
3.

September 24, 1951

- Court of Tarlac received the petition

Subsequently Sps Roxa filed motion to dismiss the motion as the court
received the petition on September 24 or 2 days late after the deadline
(15 days from the receipt of the order).

petition on the ground that the respondent being an officer of peace is

not one of the officers listed in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

According to the Sps. Manabat, they filed the appeal on time as the
Rules of court under Section 1 Rule 27 allow that the date of mailing is
deemed to be the date of filing. As a rebuttal, Sps. Roxas stated that the
rule is not applicable as it is not included in Sec 19 which enumerates
the applicable rules for inferior courts.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of
peace is within the scope of Section 54. A second petition was filed by
the respondent citing Court of Appeals decision in People vs. Macaraeg,
where it was held that a justice of peace is excluded from the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Lower court granted second
appeal and dismissed the petition based on case cited by the
respondent. Hence, this appeal.

The Court of first Instance dismissed the appeal papers so late filing. Sps
Manabat filed a mandamus asking the Supreme Court to direct the
inferior court to give due course on the appeal.

Issue:

Issue:

Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

Whether or not the appeal has been filed on time

Held:

Decision :
Yes, the appeal was filed on time. According to the Supreme Court, if
Sec 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, lower court may also disregard other rules
that are not included in Sec 19 which at present being used.

People v. Manantan 5 SCRA 684;

Facts:
In the petition filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance of the province, Guillermo Manantan was charged for
violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary inquiry
was done by the court which found probable for the crime charged
against the respondent. Thereafter, the trial started upon the
defendants plea of not guilty, the defense then moved to dismiss the

Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The
application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from
a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its
most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice
of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The
intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from
its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of
peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the
more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of
judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of
Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and
justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial
court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

g.

Coconut Oil Refineries Association v. Torres 465 SCRA 47, 75)

2.
a.

Rules of reddendo singular singulis

(Lim v. Laguio455 SCRA 308;

FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)
is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.
On March 30, 1993, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signedOrdinance 7783
entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. The Ordinance basically
prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke
bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns from
operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red
light district harboring thrill seekers. The City likewise emphasized that
the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. Forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are
used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community are prohibited. Owners and operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business
operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said
businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also
provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the
erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is
invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places
offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC
also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot
prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid

exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. Owners and

operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to
wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside ErmitaMalate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the
area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTDC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that
the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for
several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police
power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
Held:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons. The
Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its
sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had
no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and
void.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are
different from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs,
day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls.
Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as
legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim
reddendosingulasinguliswhich means that words in different parts of a
statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each
in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none
of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction
demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear

in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same

principle applies.(DOCTRINE)
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was
AFFIRMED.
b.

Fortich v. Corona 312 SCRA 751, 766)

3 Doctrine of last antecedent/Ad proximumantecedens fiat

relatio nisi impediatursentencia
a.
Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, 98 Phil. 959;

This is a petition to compel the PNB to accept the backpay certificate of

petitioner Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines, to
pay an indebtedness to the PNB in the sum of P6,800 secured by a real
estate mortgage on certain properties.
This involves the legal provision of section 2 of R.A. 897 which provides
that:
obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory
Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or
to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or
controlled by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to
any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.
Accordingly, the petitioners assert that the clause who may be willing
to accept the same for settlement in the above-mentioned provision
only refers to its last antecedent any citizen of the Philippines, or to any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.
In that case, the respondent PNB as a Government instrumentality is
required to accept payment by the petitioner through backpay
certificate.
Whether the qualifying clause "who may be willing to accept the same
for settlement" refers to all antecedents "the Government, any of its
branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by
the Government, etc., or only the last antecedents "any citizen of the
Philippines, or any association organized under the laws of the
Philippines."

The Court held that the qualifying clause is limited only to the last
antecedent. Not only by mere reason of grammatical construction noting
that there is a comma before the words or any citizen, etc but due to
the fact that to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates
obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not
government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would
render section 2 of the Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it
would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by
compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory to note
payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than
the current or even the legal one.
Moreover, as the Congressional Record reflects that the intention of the
law is to make the government and its agencies compelled to accept the
payments through backpays.

Roldan v Villaroman
G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939)
FACTS:
Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent
Cuevas
became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the
Petitioner,
denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of
illness of Cuevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused
to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the
accused. Respondents then instituted a certiorari proceeding in the
Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning the decision of the
judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The CA
then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from
continuing with the trial.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. HELD:
No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely
principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of
Laguna, which

held that the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction only refers to its
proximate
antecedent and to all other auxiliary writs and process. This ruling is in
conjunction
with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be
understood as
referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the
interpretation applied is
in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional
phrases found
in a law, but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention
of the law is
to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision,
the same
should be made extensive to the whole.

Issue: Whether a stepparent having a legitimate child may adopt a step

child?
Ruling:
No. According to the doctrine of statutory construction, negative words
and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory. Art. 355 were phrased in a negative
manner cannot adopt. While Art.338 is positive, The following may be
adopted. Moreover, Art. 335 and Art 338should be considered in
relation to each other. That a parent can adopt a stepchild is limited by
Art.355. One principle behind the limitation is to protect the successional
rights of the legitimate child. (bakalangitanongnya)
b.
Fule v. Court of Appeals 162 SCRA 446)
Use of negative words
FACTS:

4.

Use of negative words

McGee vs. Republic

Facts:
McGee, an american citizen married to LeonardaCrisostomo, wants to
adopt Leonardas children on her first husband. However hes barred
from doing so because McGee have legitimate child in accordance to
Article 335 of New Civil Code those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction
cannot adopt.Regardless, the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption,
invoking Article 338 which states that a step-child, by the stepfather
ore step mother can be adopted.

Manolo Fule was convicted of Violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 (The

Bouncing Check Law) on the basis of Stipulation of Facts. Petitioner
herein, waived his right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof,
submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial
Court convicted the petitioner and on appeal. Appellate Court upheld the
Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgement of conviction. Hence,
this petition contending that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the
RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold
facts that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation
of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not
signed by the accused, nor by his counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the decision of RTC based on the
stipulation of facts without the signature of the accused, nor his counsel.
RULING:
Yes. CA erred in convicting the accused based on the unsigned
stipulation of facts. Under Sec. 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or

admission made or entered during pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by
him and his counsel. By its very language, the rule is mandatory. The
omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. Further, penal statues whether substantive and remedial or
procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused. Therefore, the CA
erred in affirming the decision of RTC based on the unsigned stipulation
of facts.

Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated

Reorganization Plan.

DOCTRINE:

Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in

its broadest sense so as to include the religious purpose.

Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory whiles

those in the affirmative are merely directory. The term shall further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

The trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating sec. 2 of the
Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term
religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.
Issue:

Ruling:
No, the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include religious purposes.

5.
a.

Or v. And
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos 236 SCRA 197

Facts:
The petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, a
civic organization, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their
chapel in Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman, approached
and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a
contribution of P1, 500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). As a
consequence, Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioner for
violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes
shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of

The Court ruled on the negative on the ground that all contributions
designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature,
since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary
contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with
the expression "charitable purpose. It will be observed that the present
Constitution, as well as several other statutes treatthe words
charitable and religious separately and independent of each other,
thus, making use of the disjunctive or. In its elementary sense, or as
used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often
connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either.
When or is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be
taken separately.* Accordingly, charitable and religious, which are
integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive or should be
given different, different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no
compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of these
words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1564.
* - doctrine

b.

San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council 52 SCRA 43;

FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing beer and other products with a subsidiary manufacturing
plant in Mandaue, Cebu, since December, 1967, paid the taxes
prescribed in the aforesaid ordinance, protest thus: P309.40 on January
22, 1968 and P5,171.80 as of July 18, 1968, computed respectively "on
the basis of 70,412 and 2,203.070 cases of beer manufactured and
removed from said Mandaue plant, multiplied by P7.60 which is the
prevailing market price (wholesaler's price) per case of beer at the time
of the removal".
Claiming that it is adversely affected by the ordinance, which in its view
was beyond the power and authority of the municipality to enact,
petitioner brought and action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch VI, for the annulment of said ordinance.
Petitioner contends that (1) the phrase "gross value in money or actual
market value" employed in the questioned ordinance clearly referred to
"sales or market price" of the articles or commodities manufactured
thereby indicating a manifest intent to impose a tax based on sales, and
(2) that to impose a tax upon the privilege of manufacturing beer, when
the amount of the tax is measured by the gross receipts from its sales of
beer, is the same as imposing a tax upon the product itself.
ISSUE:
WON the phrase gross value in money or actual market value
refers to sales or market price which would mean that the challenged
ordinance has transcended the exceptions and limitations imposed by
section 2 of Republic Act 2264.
HELD:
YES. Well settled is the rule that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, technical or commercial terms and phrases, when
used in tax statutes, are presumed to have been used in their technical
sense or in their trade or commercial meaning. The term "gross value in
money" of articles sold, bartered, exchanged or transferred, as used in
Sections 184, 185 and 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code, has
been invariably used as equivalent to "gross selling price" and has been

construed as the total amount of money or its equivalent which the

purchaser pays to the vendor to receive or get the goods. The "actual
market value" of property, for purposes of taxation, therefore means the
selling price of the article in the course of ordinary business.Considering
that the phrase "gross value in money" is followed by the words "or
actual market value", it is evident that the latter was intended to explain
and clarify the preceding phrase. For the word "or" may be used as the
equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same
significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is
sometimes interpretative or expository of the preceding word. Certainly
We cannot assume that the phrase "or actual market value" was a mere
surplusage, for it serves to clarify and explain the meaning and import of
the preceding phrase. In any event, it is the duty of the courts, so far
reasonably practicable, to read and interpret a statute as to give life and
effect to its provisions, so as to render it a harmonious whole. Such
being the case, the court declared the ordinance null and void.

c.

Park v. Choi 515 SCRA 502, 512

Park VS Choi
Facts:
Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of BP 22 for drawing an
insufficient check amounting to 1,875,000.00. In the arraignment Choi
pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution presented their case and
evidences, Choi filed a demurrer of evidence alleging that the prosecutor
failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence the
presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did
not arise. Metropolitan Trial Court granted the demurrer and dismissed
the case.
Hyun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of the case before the
RTC, the court ordered Choi the amount of check with legal interest.
Upon motion for reconsideration of Choi, the RTC remanded the case to
MeTC for further proceedings.
Felt aggrieved in the decision of the RTC, Park appealed the decision to
remand the Case to Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the petition for the
following reasons:
1.
The verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached to the petition does not fully comply with Section 4,
as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of

Court, because it does not give the assurance that the

allegations of the petition are true and correct based on
authentic records.

Park, filed a petition in the Supreme Court to assail the CA decision

Issue :
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the case on the grounds that the
petition does not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition
are true and correct based on the authentic records.
Held and discussion
No. Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in his
petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and
correct of my own personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of
authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be
interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as "and," or
vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.
A reading of Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified
under either of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of the
allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either ones own
personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The
use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a
sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of
both sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and
conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction
that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy
of any one of the alternatives standing alone
Contrary to petitioners position, the range of permutation is not left to
the pleaders liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the
allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely
on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both
sources.
6.
a.

May v. Shall
Republic Planters Bank v. Agana, Sr. 269 SCRA 1;

Facts:

Respondents filed in court a petition for an action for specific

performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of
stock with a face value of P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest
thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and
conditions of the certificates of stock. The court rendered judgment in
favor of Private Respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank
to redeem the respondents preferred shares?
Held:
Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares
in question, stated that, On the question of the redemption by the
Defendant of said preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the
terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same.
What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock
certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested
in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is clearly the type
known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set forth
therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory
construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect.
b.

Yasin v. Judge, Sharia District Court 241 SCRA 606;

Case Title: Yasin vs. Judge, Sharia District Courts

FACTS:
Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a
"Petition to resume the use of maiden name in view of the dissolution of
her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of divirce granted in
accordance with the Muslim law. The respondent court ordered
amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and

substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the

residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names
by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is
not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to
resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution
of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another
woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to
rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in
the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.

This is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.

It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only her maiden
name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article.
Justice Romero also provides a concurring opinion. He stated that the
introductory sentences of Art 370 uses the directory "may" instead of
the mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married
woman, if she chooses to, need not use her husband's surname. Clearly,
no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name and
surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even
as she uses her husband's family name during matrimony, as long as
there is disclosure and no fraudulent intent.

ISSUE:

DOCTRINE: The word may is optional, and the word shall is

mandatory.

Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname

is also a petition for change of name.
c.

People v. Court of Appeals 242 SCRA 645;

d.

Berces v. Guingona 241 SCRA 539;

HELD:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek
judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs."
before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to
her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil
Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as
in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the
Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation
of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as
the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for
her.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as "Mrs."
Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used,
indicating that the use of the husband's surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides that
the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage.

Facts
In this petition, Berces seeks that the Order of the Office of the President
(OP) which directed the stay of execution of the decision of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tibi.
This case started when Berces filed two administrative cases against the
said Mayor for dishonesty and abuse of authority through non-payment
of the accrued leave benefits in favor of the petitioner and for installing
a water pipeline operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality
to service the Mayors private residence.
Said cases were decided by the SangguniangPanlalawigan in andecision
which directed payment of the leave benefits and suspending the Mayor
for five months.
The Mayor then appealed the SangguniangPanlalawigans decision
before the OP which in return directed the stay of execution of the
decision pending the Mayors appeal.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.

Whether theterm shall in the provision of the Sec. 68 of the Local

Government Code which provides that an appeal shall not prevent a
decision from becoming final or executory is mandatory. The same
being the case, will merit this petition questioning the order of the Office
of the President.
No. The Court held that the term "shall" may be read either as
mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire
provision in which it is found, its object and the consequences that
would follow from construing it one way or the other. In the case at
bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as
mandatory.
Furthermore, execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in
the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing
officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can be
provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective
officials in administrative cases.

e.

AbakadaGuro Party List v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1;

f.

Enriquez v. Enriquez 468 SCRA 77, 85)

Enriquez vs. Enriquez

provided in Section 4 of Rule 41 is ground for dismissal. However,

petitioner averred that the governing rule on their payment of appellate
court docket fee is section 4 Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
underscoring the sentence Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or
the record on appeal. Petitioners maintain that the trial court must first
send them a notice to pay the appellate court docket fee and other
lawful feed within the period for taking an appeal. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the petition for failure of the
petitioners to pay appellate court docket fees?
Ruling:
Yes. The use of the word shall underscores the mandatory character of
the Rule. The term shall is a word of command, and one which has
always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is
generally imperative or mandatory. Petitioners cannot give a different
interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be
made only upon their receipt of notice from the trial court to pay. Also, it
is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. Indeed, petitioners cannot
deviate from the Rule.

7.
a.

Other words and phrases construed

Must (Republic of the Philippines v. Toledano 233 SCRA 9)

Facts:
The complaint involves a parcel of land that allegedly owned the
undivided portion of the property by Maximo Enriquez and that
petitioners have been residing in the premises without his knowledge
and consent, thereby depriving him of his share. RTC rendered a decision
ordering the petitioners to vacate the property and to surrender
possession thereof to respondents. A copy of the decision was received
by counsel for petitioners. They filed a notice to RTC and was approved.
The Court of appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure
to pay the appellate court docket fee.
The Court of Appeals cited Sec.1c, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court
that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as

Republic vs. Toledano

Other words and phrases construed: Must
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the RTC of Iba, Zambales
in favor of the spouses Clouse to adoot Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Alvin Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United Stated who married
Evelyn, a Filipino Citizen who later became a naturalized citizen of
United States. The decided to adopt Evelyns younger brother, Solomon
Joseph Alcala with the latters consent as well as their mothers consent.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the

Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the

petition for adoption. Finding that private respondents have all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that
the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor,
respondent judge granted the petition for adoption. However, petitioner
through OSG appealed contending that spouses Clouse are not qualified
to adopt under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt under Philippine
law.

The article stated above is mandatory in nature which requires the

husband and wife to jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before.
Therefore, Spouses Alvin and Evelyn are disqualified to adopt under the
Philippine law.
DOCTRINE:
Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. This article made use of the word
must to reiterate that it is mandatory in nature.

RULING:
No. They are not allowed to adopt under Philippine law. Article 184 of the
Family Code expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimated child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c ) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse relative by
consanguinity
of the
latter.
In this case, Alvin is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural-born
citizen of the United States of America. Second, the child to be adopted
is not the legitimate child of his spouse and third, when the spouses
jointly filed the petition to adopt the wifes Filipino brother (who is a
relative of the wife within 4th civil degree of consanguinity), Evelyn was
no longer a Filipino citizen. Even if she argues that she may be appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a), in cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by
the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except the ff cases:
(1)
(2)
other.

When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;

When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the

b.
Principally (Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines 97
SCRA 858)
Topic:
Other words and phrases construed: [Principally]
Facts:
Herein petitioner was registered in the local civil registrar and
was baptized in the name of Maria Estrella Veronica PrimitivaDuterte.
Her biological parents are FilomenoDuterte and Estrella Veronica
PrimitivaDuterte but taken care of by her uncle, Hector Alfon, and they
have been residing inMandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23)
years. Further, the petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name
Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate
show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up to
college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friendscall her by this
name she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated
and given a diploma under this name and, she exercised the right of
suffrage likewise under this name.
The above mentioned grounds were used in her petition for change of
name, from Maria Estrella Veronica PrimitivaDuterte to Estrella S. Alfon,
which was later on partly granted by the lower court. The petition insofar
as the first name is granted but denied with respect to the surname
pursuant to Article364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and

legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.To

allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is
equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname.

NHC is a govt owned corporation and jurisdiction over its employees is

vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHC in
turn appealed to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court should fully grant the
petition for the change of name.

ISSUE:
WON employees of the National Housing Corporations (NHC) are
covered by the CSC.

Ruling:
HELD:
Yes, the RTC should fully grant the petition for change of name. The only
reason why the lower court denied the petitioners prayer to change her
surname is that as legitimate child of FilomenoDuterte and Estrella Alfon,
she should principally use the surname of her father pursuant to Art. 364
of the Civil Code. But the word principally as used in the codal
provision is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is
not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable
ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

c.
172)

Every (National Housing Authority v. Juco 134 SCRA

National Housing Authority vs. Juco

FACTS:
The records reveal that private respondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a
project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from
November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. For having been implicated in a
crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214 pieces
of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation which was allegedly
committed on March 5, 1975. Jucos services were terminated by NHC
effective as of the close of working hours on May 14, 1975. On March 25,
1977 he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner (NHC)
but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the

YES.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically
"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned
or controlled corporation . . ."c
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify
the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. It means all
possible and all, taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case
refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled
entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the
government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment
on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this
Court.Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor
Code as amended, and the Civil Service Decree as amended and the
precedent in the Alliance of Government Workers decision, it is clear that
the petitioner National Housing Corporation comes under the jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.

d.

Previously (Rura v. Lopena 137 SCRA 121)

Rura VS Lopena

Facts :
Facts:
Teodula Rura was charged of five counts of estafa, the said cases were
jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983. Rura
appealed the decision of the lower court, but denied. When the decision
was remanded in the lower court Rura applied for a probation but the
Probation officer opposed the said application on the grounds stated
under Sec 9 of probation law
Section 9 thereof which disqualifies from probation those
persons:
(c) Who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and
or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.

Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority

(EPZA)
Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and
violations of Anti- Graft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the
Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints
of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the
Respondents jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: The EPZA in
the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones
shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and
administered by the Authority
Issue:

The application for probation was denied by the Court. According to the
lower court,
Though the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided by the court
convicting the accused thereof, yet the dates of commission are
different. Upon conviction he was guilty of said offenses as of the dates
of commission of the acts complained of. (Rollo, p, 58.)
But according to the Rura, the case was tried and decided jointly.
Issue :
Whether or not the denial of the application for probation is correct.
Held :
We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no
previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the
only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of
his application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction,
not to the date of the commission of the crime.

e.

Sole (Manikad v. Tanodbayan 127 SCRA 724)

Manikad vs Tanodbayan

Whether or not the Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent

from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone?
Held:
No, the use of sole in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although
the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is
not the only authority that may investigate complaints, especially those
which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

f.

Within one year after entry (Morales v. Paredes 55 Phil. 565)

Case Title: Morales vs. Paredes

FACTS:
Pedro, Rosendo, and PrudencioGavino applied for the registration of a
parcel of land situated in the Pangasinan, the application was granted
and a decision to that effect rendered. However, Baltazar Morales claims
to be the owner of the land, but he was not advised to the registration
proceedings and was not informed thereof until the early part of the
month of September, 1930. He thereupon filed a motion on September

18 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the reconsideration of

the decision of June 23 and as far as the record shows the motion may
still be pending. Without dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant
brought the present action praying that the aforesaid decision be set
aside and that a new trial be granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the petitioner to brought the case to higher
court without the final decree of the motion in the Court of First Instance
is correct.
HELD:

Whether Javellanas market is considered as a public market and subject

to the application of the provisions of the questioned Ordinances.

The plaintiff has mistaken his remedy. In case of fraud, the plaintiffs
proper remedy is to petition for review. No decree of registration has
been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a
petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be
filed " within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a
literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for
review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But
on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the
intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been
better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes
must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible
reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree
is entered before urging his claim of fraud. Thus, a petition for review
may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court's decision and
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of
registration.
g.
Proper action (Manila Herald Publishing Co. v. Ramos 88 Phil.
94)
h.

municipalities for 20 years under a Mayor's permit. In 1968, the City

Treasurer refused to accept Javellana's payment for a municipal license
due to the enactment of Ordinance No. 150 which prohibits the
establishment, maintenance or operation of a public market in that city
by any person other than the city government of Bago. Javellana, joined
later by the store owners and peddlers in his market, filed a petition
seeking the declaration of nullity not only of Ordinance No. 150 but also
of Ordinance No. 142 which requires vendors to pay inspection and other
market fees; and Ordinance No. 145 which requires prior inspection by
the City Health Officer of all foodstuff to be sold to the public. The trial
court dismissed the petition. Hence these appeals.

Public market (Javellana v. Kintanar 115 SCRA 627)

Facts:
Javellana is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Bago City which,
has served the general population of that city and the adjoining

Yes. The Court held that although the owner of a market is a private
person, the market is considered public market if it is dedicated to the
service of the general public. In other words, it is not ownership which
determines a market as public. In this case, Javellanas market, although
owned privately, is a public market. Hence the same is within the
contemplation of the Charter and Ordinance No. 150 because the test of
a "public market" is its dedication to the service of the general public
and not its ownership.
i.

Term (Aparri v. Court of Appeals 127 SCRA 231)

Aparri v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984)
FACTS:
R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors
to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to
approval of the President. On January 15, 1960, the Board approved
Resolution No. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA.
On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein the
President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent
General Manager up to March 31, 1962.

ISSUE:
W/N Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause.
HELD:
No, Petitioners term of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly
gives the
Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General
Manager. The word term describes the period that an office may hold
office and upon expiration of such term, his rights, duties, and authority
must cease. In this case, the term of office is not fixed by law, but by the
Board.

and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their
respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892 of the Civil Code, he
insisted that after deducting from the conjugal properties as the
conjugal share of Perfecta the remaining must be divided as follows:
for her and for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed
that besides her conjugal half. She was entitled under Art. 996 of the
New Civil Code to another of the remaining half. On other words, Claro
claimes of Pedross inheritance and Perfecta claimed . It was ruled
to have the remaining estate be divided into half for both parties. Hence,
this petition contending that Art 892 shall govern and opposed by
Perfecta that Art 996 shall govern.

j.

Laws (Taada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446)

ISSUE:

k.

Children (Santillan v. Miranda 14 SCRA 563)

Whether or not the plural word children include the singular word
child so as to determine what law should apply.

FACTS:

RULING:

Pedro Santillon died instestate leaving his only son, Claro Santillon and
his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several
parcels of land. About 4 yrs after his death, Claro file a petition for letters
of administration which was opposed by Perfecta Miranda who was
subsequently appointed as the administratrix of the estate. On March

Yes. Children include the singular word child. It is a maxim of statutory

construction that words in plural include the singular. Art 996 provides
that if the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving
soude has the same share as that of the child while Art 892 falls under
the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art 996 comes under
the chapter on Legal or Instestate Succession. In this case, it is clear that
Claro cannot rely on Art 892 to support his claim. Therefore, the
appealed decision is affirmed.

1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within 60 days, a

project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased
Pedro Santillon. Claro then filed for a Motion to Declare Share of Heirs

l.

Time (National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson29 SCRA 70)