cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

available at www.sciencedirect.com

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cortex

Special issue: Research report

Apophenia, theory of mind and schizotypy: Perceiving

meaning and intentionality in randomness
Sophie Fyfe, Claire Williams, Oliver J. Mason and Graham J. Pickup*
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology, University College London, UK

article info

abstract

Article history:

Impaired ability to correctly infer others mental states (Theory of Mind ToM) and the ten-

Received 2 November 2006

dency to perceive meaning in unrelated events (apophenia) have been implicated in

Reviewed 1 March 2007

vulnerability to schizophrenia. Sixty-three healthy participants completed three experi-

Revised 27 July 2007

mental tasks that provided indices of ToM and apophenia. The first task (Contingency) re-

Accepted 31 July 2007

quired participants to rate the strength of relationship between the movements of two

Published online 5 June 2008

shapes; in some conditions the movements were unrelated, in others the movement of
one shape was contingent on that of the other. In the second task (Stories), participants an-

Keywords:

swered questions on short stories with random, physical or ToM themes. The third task

Theory of mind

(Triangles) required participants to view and then describe the movement of triangles on

Schizotypy

a computer screen in random, physical and ToM conditions. Participants completed

Psychosis-proneness

questionnaire measures of psychosis-proneness (the Schizotypal Personality Scale STA)

Delusional thinking

and delusional thinking style (Peters et al. Delusions Inventory PDI-21). Little evidence

Apophenia

was found on any of the tasks for an association between a specific deficit in ToM accuracy
and any aspect of psychosis-proneness. On the Triangles task, schizotypal and delusionprone participants spontaneously reported perceiving a greater number of associations in
the random condition (apophenia). On both the Triangles and Contingency tasks, overmentalizing was found to be associated with delusional thinking but not with general schizotypy. We speculate that over-mentalizing may be underpinned by a hyper-associative
cognitive style, linked to an exaggeration of the normal human tendency to attribute mental
states, rather than to dysfunction in the assessment of causality. Perceiving meaning in randomness and, more particularly, attributing mental states where none are indicated, may
be important factors in the formation of paranormal and delusional beliefs.
2008 Elsevier Srl. All rights reserved.

1.

Introduction

Studying social cognition can inform understanding of individual differences relevant to both psychopathological symptoms, such as those of schizophrenia, and unusual
phenomena in healthy individuals, such as paranormal or

creative experiences. The present study investigated Theory

of Mind (ToM; Premack and Woodruff, 1978) and the propensity to see connections between unrelated stimuli or events
(apophenia; Brugger, 2001) in relation to putative traits of
psychosis-proneness (often termed schizotypy). Schizotypal
traits are argued to predispose a person towards psychotic

* Corresponding author. Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK.
E-mail address: g.pickup@ucl.ac.uk (G.J. Pickup).
0010-9452/$ see front matter 2008 Elsevier Srl. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2007.07.009

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

breakdown when adverse physical, social, or environmental

triggers are encountered (e.g., Claridge, 1994). However, high
schizotypy does not usually lead to a psychopathological outcome; such traits are also associated with a variety of alternative (and in some cases adaptive) phenomena, including
psychic and out-of-body experiences (McCreery and Claridge,
2002), creativity (Gianotti et al., 2001), and belief in the paranormal (Lawrence and Peters, 2004). Schizotypy is now widely
understood to be multi-dimensional with positive symptoms
of schizophrenia, and belief in magical or psychic phenomena, relating most strongly to traits tapped by unusual perceptual and cognitive experiences (so-called positive schizotypy)
and delusional thinking style (e.g., Peters et al., 2004). Studying
schizotypal traits in the non-clinical population has the advantage of avoiding the possible confounding effects of factors
associated with psychiatric illness, such as poor motivation or
attention, or the use of anti-psychotic medication.
ToM, or mentalizing, refers to the ability to represent the
mental states (e.g., thoughts, intentions, beliefs) of others, and
to use these representations to predict and understand their
behaviour (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). There is considerable evidence from functional neuro-imaging and studies of
brain-damaged patients that ToM recruits a distributed neural
network including posterior superior temporal sulci and the
adjacent temporo-parietal junction, the temporal poles bilaterally and the medial prefrontal cortex and adjacent paracingulate cortex (e.g., Apperly et al., 2004; Frith and Frith, 2006;
Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Frith
(1992) proposed that a range of symptoms characteristic of
schizophrenia could be explained in terms of impaired ToM,
and recent reviews found good empirical evidence for ToM
deficits in people with schizophrenia relative to controls
(Brune, 2005; Harrington et al., 2005). It is as yet unclear
whether this impairment constitutes a vulnerability present
prior to the onset of the disorder; moreover, the nature of
the ToM deficit requires clarification.
Most ToM tasks assess only the presence or absence of ToM
and do not enable identification of other differences in mentalizing (Frith, 2004). Several workers have suggested that
some symptoms of schizophrenia (especially paranoid features) may be associated with a tendency to show hyperToM or over-mentalizing (i.e., inferring mental states when
none are obviously suggested; Abu-Akel, 1999; Abu-Akel and
Bailey, 2000; Frith, 2004). Russell et al. (2006) explored this
issue by administering the Triangles task (Abell et al., 2000;
Castelli et al., 2000) to individuals with schizophrenia and
non-clinical controls. In this task, participants watch triangles
move around a screen in random, goal-directed or ToM
conditions, the latter involving, for example, one triangle hiding from or tricking another. Russell et al. found that
patients with behavioural signs of schizophrenia, and those
with paranoid symptoms, were poorer than patients with
other symptoms, or controls, at describing the triangles
movements in the ToM condition. In addition, the paranoid
subgroup tended to use more mental state terms than other
groups to describe the movements in the random condition.
These results are consistent with an association between
ToM impairment and paranoid symptoms or behavioural
signs of schizophrenia, and with the notion that ToM difficulties in paranoid patients are related to over-mentalizing.

1317

Apophenia refers to the perception of connections or

meaning in unrelated events. While not necessarily a social
phenomenon, it may be related to over-mentalizing, as personal or social sources of meaning are often invoked when
individuals perceive new connections or meanings. Brugger
(2001) suggested that apophenia may underlie some of the
unusual experiences common to psychosis, psychic phenomena and creativity. Blakemore et al. (2003) used an animated Contingency task that enabled exploration of
apophenia in patients with or without persecutory delusions
and non-clinical controls. Participants were presented with
brief films in which shapes moved in either connected (contingent) or unconnected (non-contingent) ways. Controls
and non-persecuted patients rated the relationship between
the movements of shapes as stronger in contingent than in
non-contingent conditions, whereas patients with delusions
of persecution tended to rate the relationship as equally
strong in both conditions, suggesting over-attribution of
contingency (i.e., apophenia) in the deluded group. These
data and those of Russell et al. (2006) suggest a need for detailed investigation of apophenia and over-mentalizing in
both psychotic patients and healthy individuals who vary
in schizotypy.
Within the schizotypy literature, evidence has been found
for associations between high schizotypy and poorer performance on ToM conditions of a picture-sequencing task
(Langdon and Coltheart, 1999) and a perspective-taking task
(Langdon and Coltheart, 2001), although findings were inconsistent with regard to which schizotypy factors were associated with ToM deficits. Meyer and Shean (2006) found that
higher scores on a measure of the positive schizotypal trait
magical ideation (MI; Eckblad and Chapman, 1983) were associated with poorer ToM performance on the Character Intention Task (Sarfati et al., 1997) and the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Pickup (2006) assessed
mentalizing using the Stories task developed by Fletcher et al.
(1995), which asks participants to answer questions about two
categories of stories: those in which mental states need to be
considered in order to understand events (ToM condition)
and those requiring understanding of physical causality.
Pickup found that although poorer scores on the ToM condition were not associated with total schizotypy, they were predicted specifically by positive schizotypal traits. Thus, there is
some evidence that high (especially positive) schizotypy is associated with impaired ToM; however, there has been no investigation to date of the relationship between schizotypy
and other differences in ToM, such as over-mentalizing.
The relationship between schizotypy and apophenia was
explored by Brugger and Graves (1997) using the MI scale
and a computer task in which participants responses were
reinforced without relation to the motor strategy they used.
High MI scorers developed a greater number of (illusory) beliefs relating their own motor behaviour to points earned during the game, and the authors concluded that positive
schizotypal traits reflect a Type I error bias in hypothesis testing. There is now considerable evidence that high schizotypes
and believers in paranormal phenomena show a greater tendency to see patterns in random configurations and perceive
meaning in coincidental events, than do low schizotypes or
disbelievers. This apophenia has been linked to possible right

1318

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

hemisphere (RH) overactivation (Brugger and Taylor, 2003;

Leonhard and Brugger, 1998). As discussed by Brugger and
Taylor (2003), the RH semantic network of stored conceptual
knowledge is more diffuse than that in the left hemisphere;
RH overactivation is likely to be associated with widespread
activation of this diffuse network, with co-activation of
more distantly related concepts giving rise to an appreciation
of meaningful connections between random stimuli. Interestingly, this hypothesis links well to the literature on schizotypy, associative processing and creativity (e.g., Fisher et al.,
2004; Gianotti et al., 2001; Green and Williams, 1999). For
example, Gianotti et al. (2001) found that strong believers in
the paranormal produced a greater number of original
(unique) associations between unrelated word pairs than did
strong sceptics; within a signal detection framework they suggested that believers adopt a looser response criterion .
when confronted with semantic noise (p. 595).
The current study aimed to investigate ToM (in particular over-mentalizing) and apophenia in healthy individuals
who vary in schizotypy. In addition to a schizotypy scale
(the Schizotypal Personality Scale STA; Claridge and
Broks, 1984), we used a measure of delusional ideation
(PDI-21; Peters et al., 2004), as delusions are conceptually
more specific than schizotypy, and are theoretically related
to impaired ToM and over-mentalizing in Friths (2004) neuropsychological model of schizophrenia. We used three of
the tasks discussed earlier: the Triangles task (Abell et al.,
2000; Castelli et al., 2000), the Contingency task (Blakemore
et al., 2003) and a modified version of the Stories task
(Fletcher et al., 1995), in which a set of random stories
was added to the existing ToM and physical stories. Intelligence Quotient and executive function were controlled for
using the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTARUK; Wechsler, 2001) and Hayling (Burgess and Shallice, 1997) tests, respectively, although in a previous study Pickup (2006) found
that neither IQ nor executive function mediated the relationship between schizotypy and ToM. On the basis of
Friths (1992, 2004) model, we predicted that individuals scoring high in schizotypy and delusional ideation would show
poorer accuracy of performance in the ToM conditions of
the Triangles and Stories tasks than those scoring lower on
these scales. In line with Brugger (2001), we expected that
high schizotypy and delusional ideation would predict
greater apophenia, i.e., a tendency to see connections
between non-contingent movements in the Contingency
task and between unrelated movements or statements in
the random conditions of the Triangles and Stories tasks, respectively. Finally, we predicted that high schizotypy and delusional ideation would be associated with over-mentalizing
(e.g., Abu-Akel, 1999; Frith, 2004) in the random conditions of
the Triangles and Stories tasks, and in the non-contingent
conditions of the Contingency task.

population by SF and CW. Ninety-three respondents were

initially screened for inclusion in the study. Inclusion criteria
were age in the range 1850, English as a first language and no
history of diagnosed mental illness or head injury. In order to
ensure that participants ranged widely in schizotypy, the
sampling method employed by Pickup (2006) was used: the
STA scale of the Schizotypy Traits Questionnaire (STQ;
Claridge and Broks, 1984) and Lie Scale (Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire Revised; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1991) were
used to screen participants. Participants were excluded if
they scored more than 1 SD above the population mean for
their age and sex on the Lie Scale; on this basis, five of the original 93 respondents were excluded. Respondents were then
selected on the basis of their STA scores in an attempt to recruit roughly equal numbers of high (>1 SD above mean,
N 20); low (>1 SD below mean, N 16); and medium
(within 1 SD of mean, N 27) schizotypes. The 25 participants
excluded at this stage were all medium schizotypes; they
were not given the experimental tasks as enough participants
had already been recruited into the medium group by that
point in the study. At the data analysis stage, a further two respondents (one high and one medium schizotype) were excluded as, due to technical difficulties when recording
responses, Stories and Triangles data were unavailable for
one, and Contingency data were unavailable for the other.

2.

Method

2.3.

Experimental tasks

2.1.

Participants

2.3.1.

Contingency task (Blakemore et al., 2003)

Sixty-three participants [30 male, 33 female; age 1842 years,

mean (SD) 24.5 (5.1) years] were recruited from the normal

2.2.

Assessment instruments

2.2.1.

STQ (Claridge and Broks, 1984)

The STA of the STQ was used. This 37-item self-report questionnaire is based on DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) criteria for Schizotypal Personality Disorder.
Participants answer yes or no to questions such as, Do
you believe in telepathy? and Do you often have vivid
dreams that disturb your sleep? The STA is an extensively
used scale with good criterion validity and testretest reliability (Jackson and Claridge, 1991). Factor analytic studies of the
STA have usually reported three factors in general population
samples, namely magical thinking, unusual perceptual experiences and paranoid ideation and suspiciousness (Hewitt
and Claridge, 1989; Joseph and Peters, 1995).

2.2.2.
2004)

Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-21; Peters et al.,

The PDI-21 is a 21-item standardised questionnaire designed

to measure delusional ideation in the normal population.
Participants indicate whether or not they have experienced
particular delusional ideas and rate levels of distress, preoccupation and conviction associated with those they have
experienced. The scale has good internal consistency, test
retest reliability and convergent validity, and produces a normal distribution of responses, making it an appropriate
instrument for use in population samples (Peters et al., 2004).

In this task participants view simple, computer-generated

animations (Quicktime software for Personal Computer).
Each 4 sec animation includes two objects: a Prime Mover,

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

which moves across the screen at a constant speed, and a Reactive Mover, whose movement varies according to four conditions (each consisting of five animations). In the AnimateContingent (AC) condition the Reactive Mover rotates and appears to see (animacy cue) the Prime Mover as it passes the
gap in a wall. In the Animate Non-contingent (AN) condition
the Prime Mover is out of sight (animacy cue) of the Reactive
Mover when the Reactive Mover moves. In the Inanimate Contingent (IC) condition the Prime Mover collides with the Reactive Mover, which appears to be launched into motion (no
animacy cue). In the Inanimate Non-contingent (IN) condition,
the Prime Mover moves across the screen, passing the Reactive Mover, which remains stationary (no animacy cue).
Participants were initially shown an example from each
condition. Each test stimulus was then presented twice (items
were presented in a pseudo-random order). After the first presentation of each stimulus, participants were asked to watch
the film again and respond Yes or No to the question,
In your opinion, was there a relationship direct or indirect
between the movements of the two shapes? After the second
presentation, participants responded to this question and
were then asked to rate the strength of relationship between
the movements of the two shapes on a scale from 0 to 10, to
provide a contingency rating variable. Finally, participants
were asked, What do you think was happening in the animation you just saw? In an addition to the methodology used by
Blakemore et al. (2003), responses to this final question were
transcribed verbatim and an over-mentalizing score was calculated for each condition (AC, AN, IC, IN). Participants scored
1 for a given condition if they elaborated their answer to any of
the five items with an attribution of agency and/or intention
(e.g., it twisted in preparation to block the other shape from
getting through the gap) or animacy (e.g., the green shape
moved across the blue shapes path of vision so the blue one
turned to look at it). If none of their answers were elaborated
in this way, they scored 0 for that condition. Scoring was carried out blind to ratings on all other measures. A second rater,
blind to the study hypotheses, scored a sub-set of 20 data sets;
agreement between raters was good (90%).

2.3.2.

Stories task (Fletcher et al., 1995)

This task comprises 16 stories, eight ToM and eight physical, each followed by a question. The ToM stories describe
scenarios including double bluff, white lies and persuasion,
in which participants must infer the mental state of a story
character to answer the question correctly. Happe (1994)
found these stories to discriminate between high-functioning
autistic participants (who passed standard false-belief tasks)
and non-autistic controls. The physical stories were matched
for difficulty to the ToM stories in a non-clinical adult sample
(Fletcher et al., 1995). Like the ToM stories, they involve people, and participants are required to integrate story information. However, correct responding requires only inference
about physical causation rather than mentalizing. An additional eight random stories were developed for the purpose
of this study (a full list is available from the authors). These
were matched in length to the original stories, were based
around comparable themes and involved the same number
of story characters. Each passage described a series of unrelated events and was followed by a question (e.g., Why did

1319

Amy wear her red shoes?) to which no obvious answer could

be inferred from the story. In a pilot study, respondents gave
a range of responses to each random story item.
In line with Pickups (2006) suggestions, the stories and
questions were played aloud to participants from audiotape.
Participants listened to one practice story and question, followed by the test stories presented in a pseudo-random order.
Responses were recorded onto audiotape for later transcription, and accuracy in the ToM and physical conditions were
scored using standard criteria (maximum score 16 for both
story types; Fletcher et al., 1995). An apophenia score was calculated by summing the number of connections and elaborations given in responses to the random stories. Any statement
that referred to a connection between two segments of a random story constituted one connection, and each point made
(in addition to stating the lack of question-relevant information in the story) constituted an elaboration. An over-mentalizing score was also calculated by adding the number of
random condition items in which reference was made to the
thoughts, beliefs, feelings or intentions of story characters.
Scoring on the Stories task was carried out blind to schizotypy
scores, and a second rater, blind to the study hypotheses,
scored a sub-set of 20 data sets. Agreement between raters
was good for both accuracy (83%) and apophenia/over-mentalizing scores (90%).

2.3.3.

Triangles task (Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000)

This task was designed to measure on-line mental state attributions, and has potentially greater ecological validity than
stories tasks, which, in addition to ToM, require intact memory and other cognitive functions for correct responding.
The task has been shown to differentiate high-functioning autistic children who passed standard false-belief tasks from
non-clinical controls and participants with general intellectual impairment (Abell et al., 2000). It comprises 12 short, computer-presented animations showing one large, red and one
small, blue triangle moving around the screen. There are three
conditions: random, goal-directed and ToM. In the random
animations, the triangles move about purposelessly and do
not interact with each other. The goal-directed animations
involve one triangle responding to the others behaviour;
there is no implication that either triangle is reading the others mind and the animations are likely to evoke direct descriptions of interaction (e.g., fighting or dancing). The ToM
sequences, in contrast, show one triangle reacting to the others mental state (e.g., trying to persuade the other to let it
free) and are designed to provoke explanations that refer to
these mental states. For the purposes of this study, the
goal-directed condition will be termed the physical condition as it is broadly analogous to that in the Stories task.
Participants were shown two practice items, one physical
and one ToM, followed by the test animations (in a pseudorandom order). After viewing each test item, participants
described what they perceived to be happening in the animation. Responses were recorded onto audiotape, transcribed,
and scored for accuracy according to standard criteria (maximum score 8 for each animation type; Abell et al., 2000). An
apophenia score was calculated by summing the number of
connections and elaborations given in responses to random
items. Any statement that referred to a connection between

1320

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

the movements of the two triangles in the random condition

was counted as a connection, and each point additional to
a simple description of random movement constituted an
elaboration. An over-mentalizing score was calculated by
summing the number of random condition items in which reference was made to the thoughts, feelings, beliefs, intentions
or goal-directed behaviours of either triangle, or to any purposeful interaction between the triangles. Scoring was carried
out blind to schizotypy scores. A second rater, blind to the
study hypotheses, scored a sub-set of 20 data sets; agreement
was good for both accuracy (85%) and apophenia/overmentalizing scores (90%).

2.4.

Control tasks

2.4.1.

WTARUK (Wechsler, 2001)

The WTARUK requires participants to read aloud 50 words that

have atypical grapheme to phoneme translations. The test has
been co-normed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence ScaleIIIUK test of general intelligence, enabling effective prediction
of Full-Scale IQ and its components, taking account of age
and demographic data. Verbal and Performance IQ (VIQ and
PIQ) were calculated from the Wechsler (2001) normative data
and conversion tables.

2.4.2.

Hayling test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997)

This is a short sentence completion task measuring executive

function in the verbal domain. In part one, 15 sentences were
read aloud by the tester and participants were asked to provide
a word to complete each one (e.g., He posted the letter without a.; correct response stamp). In part two, participants
were asked to give a word that did not fit at the end of each
of 15 sentences (e.g., Most cats see very well at.; correct response banana or other word unrelated to night). Participants were told to respond as quickly as possible and
a stopwatch was used to record response latencies. The stopwatch was started as soon as the tester finished speaking a sentence, and stopped as soon as the participant began their reply.
Response latencies were recorded in whole sec units, with no
rounding up (e.g., .99 sec 0 sec). Repeating the same word in
all trials on part two was not permitted (Burgess and Shallice,
1997). On the first repeat of a response the tester drew attention to the repetition, and requested that a different word be
used for each of the remaining items. Errors could either be
Type A (clearly incorrect sentence completions) or Type B
(words related in other ways to the sentence, e.g., opposites
or semantic relations of the correct word). Raw scores for total
response time on each part of the task and total number of errors on part two were recorded and converted to scaled scores,
which were then combined to give an overall scaled score, using the Burgess and Shallice (1997) norms. The overall scaled
score was used in analyses as a measure of executive function.

2.5.

Procedure

Participants gave written, informed consent to take part in the

study, which was approved by the Research Ethics Committee
of University College London. They were tested individually in
a quiet room, and were paid 10 for taking part. Measures
were administered in the following order: STA (as part of the

initial screening procedure), Contingency task, Stories task,

WTARUK, Hayling test, Triangles task, PDI-21.

3.

Results

3.1.

Median splits on STA and PDI-21 scores

3.1.1.

STA scores

STA scores were normally distributed with no outliers; the

median score was 17. Thirty participants scored 16 or lower
on the STA, and 31 scored 17 or higher. With median split,
both distributions of STA scores were normally distributed,
with non-significant levels of skewness or kurtosis (low STA:
KolmogorovSmirnov statistic .146, df 30, p .101; high
STA: KolmogorovSmirnov statistic .133, df 31, p .176).
The two STA groups did not differ in age [t(59) .08,
p .94], sex [t(59) .90, p .37] or Hayling score [t(59) 1.40,
p .17]. However, the high STA group scored significantly
lower than the low group on both VIQ and PIQ [VIQ:
t(59) 2.00, p .05; PIQ: t(59) 2.00, p .05].

3.1.2.

PDI-21 scores

PDI-21 scores were also normally distributed with no outliers;

the median score was 65. Thirty participants scored 59 or
lower on the PDI, and 31 scored 65 or higher. With median
split, the low PDI scores were normally distributed, with
non-significant levels of skewness or kurtosis (Kolmogorov
Smirnov statistic .151, df 30, p .077). However, the high
PDI scores were significantly positively skewed (KolmogorovSmirnov statistic .201, df 31, p .003). The two PDI
groups did not differ in age [t(59) 1.45, p .15], sex
[t(59) .90, p .37], Hayling score [t(59) 1.40, p .17], VIQ
[t(59) 1.14, p .26] or PIQ [t(59) 1.16, p .25].
Scores for all participants (N 61) on all measures are
shown by median split groups in Tables 1 and 2.

3.2.

Experimental tasks

On the Stories and Triangles tasks, most of the dependent variables were normally distributed with no outliers. On the Stories
task, there was one low outlier (defined as a score greater than 3
SDs from the mean) in the ToM accuracy data for the high STA
and high PDI groups; the outlying score was changed to one
lower than the next lowest score (Howell, 1997). On the Stories
and Triangles tasks, there was one high outlier in the apophenia
scores for the high STA and high PDI groups; these were
changed to one higher than the next highest score. The distributions of apophenia scores on the Triangles task were positively skewed; a square root transformation was applied to
increase the normality of these distributions for subsequent
parametric analyses. All Stories and Triangles data were analysed parametrically, but the dependent variables on the Contingency task required non-parametric treatment. All reported
p values are two-tailed.

3.2.1.

ToM accuracy (see Tables 1 and 2)

3.2.1.1. STORIES TASK. Group differences between high and

low STA participants on the ToM and physical stories

1321

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

Table 1 Descriptive statistics for all measures by median split on STA scores
High STA

STA (raw score)

PDI-21 total
Contingency task
Contingency: AC
Contingency: IC
Contingency: AN
Contingency: IN
AN: over-mentalizing
IN: over-mentalizing
Stories task
ToM: accuracy
Physical: accuracy
Apophenia: random stories
Over-mentalizing: random stories
Triangles task
ToM: accuracy
Physical: accuracy
Apophenia: random triangles
Over-mentalizing: random triangles
Control tasks
VIQ
PIQ
Hayling (scaled)

Low STA

Mean (SD)

Range

Mean (SD)

Range

25.61 (5.07)
93.61 (39.36)

1736
16177

9.07 (4.43)
36.20 (26.57)

016
0104

Significance
of group
difference
p < .001
p < .001

5.20
9.32
3.59
.88
1.26
1.16

(2.12)
(1.25)
(2.24)
(2.08)
(.44)
(.37)

1.69.2
4.810.0
08.8
010.0
1.02.0
1.02.0

3.91
9.21
3.11
.57
1.17
1.20

(2.13)
(1.10)
(2.29)
(1.40)
(.38)
(.41)

010.0
5.810.0
010.0
05.6
1.02.0
1.02.0

12.93
11.45
16.10
3.29

(2.43)
(2.94)
(10.84)
(1.68)

3.016.0
5.016.0
5.057.0
07.0

13.70
12.03
12.77
2.77

(1.64)
(2.27)
(6.24)
(1.68)

1016.0
8.016.0
1.027.0
06.0

p .340,
p .558,
p .205,
p .256,

5.29
6.52
5.39
1.42

(1.44)
(1.18)
(5.90)
(1.23)

2.08.0
3.08.0
025.0
04.0

5.67
6.93
2.83
1.10

(1.52)
(.87)
(4.15)
(1.54)

3.08.0
5.08.0
014.0
04.0

p .169, ns
p .058, ns
p .010
p .189, ns

108.68 (4.85)
109.48 (4.28)
6.29 (1.01)

99117
100117
39

111.20 (5.02)
111.73 (4.50)
6.67 (1.09)

97119
99118
49

p .05
p .05
p .17, ns

ns
ns
ns
ns

Table 2 Descriptive statistics for all measures by median split on PDI-21 scores
High PDI-21

STA (raw score)

PDI-21 total
Contingency task
Contingency: AC
Contingency: IC
Contingency: AN
Contingency: IN
AN: over-mentalizing
IN: over-mentalizing
Stories task
ToM: accuracy
Physical: accuracy
Apophenia: random stories
Over-mentalizing: random stories
Triangles task
ToM: accuracy
Physical: accuracy
Apophenia: random triangles
Over-mentalizing: random triangles
Control tasks
VIQ
PIQ
Hayling (scaled)

Low PDI-21

Mean (SD)

Range

Mean (SD)

Range

24.16 (6.61)
100.26 (32.55)

836
65177

10.57 (6.92)
29.33 (17.34)

028
059

Significance
of group
difference
p < .001
p < .001

5.25
9.35
3.66
.74
1.32
1.23

(2.01)
(1.21)
(2.23)
(1.91)
(.48)
(.43)

1.69.2
4.810.0
08.8
010.0
1.02.0
1.02.0

3.86
9.17
3.05
.71
1.10
1.13

(2.21)
(1.14)
(2.29)
(1.65)
(.31)
(.35)

010.0
5.810.0
010.0
05.6
1.02.0
1.02.0

13.0
12.32
15.03
3.26

(2.42)
(2.37)
(10.36)
(1.75)

3.016.0
7.016.0
1.057.0
07.0

13.63
11.13
13.87
2.80

(1.69)
(2.78)
(7.39)
(1.61)

1016.0
5.016.0
3.036.0
06.0

p .321,
p .077,
p .793,
p .292,

5.39
6.55
6.42
1.81

(1.43)
(1.18)
(5.94)
(1.40)

2.08.0
3.08.0
025.0
04.0

5.57
6.90
1.77
.70

(1.55)
(.88)
(2.97)
(1.15)

3.08.0
5.08.0
011.0
04.0

p .639, ns
p .194, ns
p < .001
p .001

109.19 (5.22)
109.94 (4.57)
6.29 (1.13)

99119
100118
39

110.67 (4.86)
111.27 (4.39)
6.67 (.96)

97117
99117
59

p .26,ns
p .25, ns
p .17, ns

ns
ns
ns
ns

1322

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

were investigated using a mixed 2  2 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with VIQ and PIQ as covariates. There
was no main effect of subject group [F(1, 57) .96, p
.332], no main effect of story type [F(1, 57) .02, p .897],
no subject group  story type interaction [F(1, 57) 0,
p .977] and no significant effects of IQ. Group differences
between high and low PDI participants on the same tasks
were investigated using a mixed 2  2 analysis of variance
(ANOVA). This revealed no main effect of subject group
[F(1, 59) .78, p .381]. However there was a significant
main effect of story type [F(1, 59) 21.16, p < .001], reflecting
poorer performance of participants in the physical condition than the ToM condition. There was a significant
group  story type interaction [F(1, 59) 4.94, p .030],
which was due to the low PDI group performing worse on
the physical stories than on the ToM stories [t(29) 4.46,
p < .001], whereas the high PDI group performed comparably on both story types [t(30) 1.84, p .076].

3.2.1.2. TRIANGLES

TASK. As above, group differences between

high and low STA participants on the ToM and physical triangles were investigated using a mixed 2  2 ANCOVA, with VIQ
and PIQ as covariates. This revealed a significant main effect
of subject group [F(1, 57) 4.18, p .045], reflecting worse performance on the task as a whole by high STA participants compared to low STA participants. There was no main effect of
triangle type [F(1, 57) .01, p .932], no subject group  triangle
type interaction [F(1, 57) 0, p .965] and no significant effect
of IQ. Group differences between high and low PDI participants
on the same task were investigated using a mixed 2  2
ANOVA. This revealed no main effect of subject group [F(1,
59) 1.03, p .313]. However there was a significant main effect of triangle type [F(1, 59) 38.64, p < .001], reflecting the
fact that participants performed better in the physical condition than in the ToM condition. The group  triangle type interaction was not statistically significant [F(1, 59) .184, p .670].

3.2.2.

Apophenia scores (see Tables 1 and 2)

3.2.2.1. RANDOM STORIES. Group differences between high and

low STA participants on the apophenia variable were investigated using ANCOVA with VIQ and PIQ as covariates. There
was no significant effect of group [F(1, 57) 1.65, p .205],
and no significant effect of IQ [VIQ: F(1, 57) .11, p .742;
PIQ: F(1, 57) .12, p .733]. There was no significant difference
in apophenia scores between high and low PDI participants
[t(59) .26, p .793].
3.2.2.2. RANDOM

TRIANGLES. As above, ANCOVA with VIQ and

PIQ as covariates was used to investigate group differences
in apophenia between high and low STA participants. There
was a significant main effect of group [F(1, 57) 7.05,
p .010], reflecting the fact that high STA participants made
more connections and elaborations between the movements
of the random triangles than low STA participants. There
were no significant effects of IQ in this analysis [VIQ: F(1,
57) .40, p .531; PIQ: F(1, 57) .20, p .657]. Differences between high and low PDI participants in apophenia were highly
statistically significant: t(59) 4.31, p < .001, reflecting
greater apophenia in the high PDI group.

3.2.2.3. CONTINGENCY TASK. Data were analysed in the same way

as in Blakemore et al. (2003), to allow direct comparison with
the results of that study. It was predicted that there would be
no difference in contingency ratings between high and low
STA, or high and low PDI groups for the inanimate conditions
(IN and IC), with all participants rating IC as more contingent
than IN. However, we predicted a significant difference between ratings in the animate conditions (AN and AC), with
high STA and high PDI groups rating AN and AC as equally contingent, and low STA and low PDI groups rating AC > AN. Nonparametric statistics (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks
test for within-subjects comparisons and c2 tests for between-subjects) were used, as each participant used their
own subjective rating scale and the ratings were not normally
distributed (Blakemore et al., 2003).

3.2.2.3.1. Inanimate contingency ratings. As predicted, both

high and low STA groups rated the relationship between the
shapes movement in the IC condition as significantly stronger
than in the IN condition [high STA: Z(31) 4.82, p < .001; low
STA: Z(30) 4.82, p < .001], and the same pattern was found
for the high and low PDI participants [high PDI: Z(31) 4.81,
p < .001; low PDI: Z(30) 4.83, p < .001].

3.2.2.3.2. Animate contingency ratings. Contrary to predictions, high STA and high PDI groups rated the relationship between the shapes movement in the AC condition as
significantly stronger than in the AN condition [high STA:
Z(31) 3.75, p < .001; high PDI: Z(31) 3.61, p < .001]. The
low STA and low PDI groups also rated the contingency of
AC as greater than AN, although unexpectedly there was
a smaller effect size here [low STA: Z(30) 1.98, p .047;
low PDI: Z(30) 1.93, p .053].
3.2.2.3.3. Comparison between groups. Following Blakemore
et al. (2003), the differences (AC  AN) and (IC  IN) were calculated for each participant, and a score of 0 or 1 was given to
each participant for the animate and inanimate conditions
according to whether or not they made a normal contingency
judgement (i.e., AC > AN or IC > IN). Scores were then compared for high and low STA, and high and low PDI groups using c2 tests. In all cases the group differences were not
statistically significant, reflecting the fact that the groups did
not differ in levels of normal responding [animate STA:
c2(1) 2.08, p .150; animate PDI: c2(1) .81, p .367; inanimate STA: c2(1) .98, p .321; inanimate PDI: c2(1) .98,
p .321].

3.2.3.

Over-mentalizing scores (see Tables 1 and 2)

3.2.3.1. RANDOM STORIES. ANCOVA with VIQ and PIQ as covariates was used to investigate group differences in over-mentalizing between high and low STA participants. There was no
significant main effect of group [F(1, 57) 1.32, p .256], and
no significant effects of IQ [VIQ: F(1, 57) .09, p .766; PIQ:
F(1, 57) .09, p .763]. No significant difference in over-mentalizing between high and low PDI participants was found
[t(59) 1.06, p .292].

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

3.2.3.2. RANDOM TRIANGLES. ANCOVA with VIQ and PIQ as

covariates was used to investigate group differences in
over-mentalizing between high and low STA participants.
The group difference was not statistically significant
[F(1, 57) 1.77, p .189], and there were no significant effects
of IQ [VIQ: F(1, 57) 1.66, p .203; PIQ: F(1, 57) 1.23,
p .272]. Differences between high and low PDI participants
in over-mentalizing were highly statistically significant:
t(59) 3.37, p .001, reflecting greater over-mentalizing in
the high PDI group.
3.2.3.3. CONTINGENCY

TASK. Participants were dichotomised

into those who made agency, animacy and/or intentionality
attributions in the AN and IN conditions of the task (N 13
and N 11, respectively) and those who did not (N 48 and
N 50, respectively). In the AN condition, there was no difference between high and low STA scorers in whether such attributions were made [c2(1) .76, p .384], however, high PDI
scorers were more likely to produce the attributions than
low PDI scorers [c2(1) 4.50, p .034]. In the IN condition there
was no difference between high and low STA or high and low
PDI scorers in whether such attributions were made [STA:
c2(1) .16, p .694; PDI: c2(1) .88, p .348].

4.

Discussion

The current study was designed to explore the relationship

between ToM, apophenia and schizotypy using both verbal
and non-verbal paradigms. In line with Friths (1992) cognitive
neuropsychological model of schizophrenia, it was predicted
that individuals scoring high in positive schizotypy on the
STA (Claridge and Broks, 1984), and those scoring high on
a measure of delusional ideation (PDI-21; Peters et al., 2004),
would perform less accurately on the ToM conditions of the
Stories and Triangles tasks than individuals scoring low on
these measures. In accordance with suggestions that some
symptoms of schizophrenia are associated with apophenia
(Brugger, 2001) and over-mentalizing (Frith, 2004), it was further predicted that high positive schizotypes, and those high
in delusional ideation, would be more likely to see meanings
and connections and/or attribute agency and intentionality
in situations where none was indicated, i.e., in the random
conditions of the Stories and Triangles tasks, and the noncontingent conditions of the Contingency task.
The predictions were only partially supported. Regarding
ToM accuracy, there was no evidence of an association between STA or PDI scores and ToM performance on the Triangles task. On the Stories task, there was no association
between STA score and ToM accuracy, which is consistent
with the absence of a relationship between high overall schizotypy and ToM performance in Pickups (2006) study using the
same task. The present study found weak evidence for an association between higher PDI scores and lower ToM accuracy
on the Stories task. This is in line with experimental predictions, and relates to Pickups finding of a relationship between
poorer performance on ToM stories and higher scores on positive schizotypy, as delusional ideation represents one aspect
of positive schizotypy.

1323

The Stories and Triangles tasks as presented were

intended to be more ecologically valid than Pickups (2006)
Stories task, and required on-line responses in real time.
However, the general lack of association found between
ToM and schizotypy is at odds with the findings of other published studies that used tasks demanding on-line responding (Langdon and Coltheart, 1999, 2001; Meyer and Shean,
2006). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that
ToM and schizotypy are linked, but that when the association
is measured using an index of accuracy of ToM attributions,
the effect is small and easily missed. This may account for
the weak association between PDI score and ToM accuracy
in the present study, the small effect sizes in Meyer and
Shean (2006) and Pickup (2006), and inconsistencies across
studies regarding which schizotypy dimensions are associated with poorer ToM accuracy (e.g., Langdon and Coltheart,
1999). It is possible that healthy participants responses to
ToM questions are partially dependent upon cognitive and/
or mood factors that need to be carefully controlled by researchers. We found here that IQ and executive function
were not related to ToM performance, but mood was not controlled for. Aspects of cognitive function implying reduced inhibitory processing in schizotypal individuals have been
shown to vary with anxiety (Braunstein-Bercovitz et al.,
2002), and it is possible that ToM too is affected when an individual becomes anxious. Future studies of ToM and schizotypy should take care to control for all potential confounding
factors, including mood.
The predicted association between high positive schizotypy and apophenia was again partially supported in the present study. On the Triangles task only, higher STA and PDI
scores were associated with greater apophenia. It is notable
that the finding of Blakemore et al. (2003) that deluded patients were more likely than controls to perceive contingency
in AN movements, did not extend to a healthy sample varying
in schizotypy or delusion proneness. Again it is possible that
the tendency to perceive connectedness when there is none
is a small effect in healthy individuals, and only detected in
certain conditions. One possibility is that the random condition of the Triangles task presented more ambiguity and opportunity for apophenia than the random stories and noncontingent conditions of the Contingency task, so only this
task/condition was able to reveal the effect. However, this is
a speculative post hoc explanation, and replication of the present results is needed, perhaps using random stimuli that
vary systematically in the degree to which they encourage
apophenia.
The finding of increased apophenia on the Triangles task
amongst high schizotypes may relate to the well-established
association between schizotypy, verbal creativity (Green and
Williams, 1999) and paranormal experiences or beliefs
(Brugger, 2001). Several studies have shown that high schizotypes provide a greater number of original responses than
low schizotypes on measures of divergent thinking, which
are argued to tap one aspect of creativity (Fisher et al., 2004;
Folley and Park, 2005). Folley and Park (2005) found that high
schizotypes generated more creative uses for conventional
and ambiguous objects and that the generation of such responses was associated with greater activation in the right
prefrontal cortex on near infra-red spectroscopy. It is easy to

1324

cortex 44 (2008) 13161325

see how the tendency to see meaningful explanations for random triangle movements might relate to both an ability to
generate more ideas and a tendency to impute an association
that is not obviously indicated. Although no data on
functional hemispheric differences are available for the present tasks, we would hypothesise a RH basis for the apophenia
findings consistent with the results of Folley and Park (2005)
and Brugger and Taylor (2003). It is important to note in this
context that we were not asking participants to make a cognitive effort to generate ideas, merely to report what spontaneously occurred to them perhaps tapping more genuine
apophenia than tasks with instructions to make associations.
The relationship between implicit and explicit measures of
apophenia could be tested in future studies by administering
the Triangles task and other tests of creative association and
pattern detection to a single sample of participants.
The predicted association between high delusion proneness and a tendency to over-mentalize in random situations
was supported on the Triangles and Contingency tasks, although no association was found between general schizotypy
and over-mentalizing. In the random condition of the Triangles task and the AN condition of the Contingency task, high
PDI scores were associated with more over-mentalizing. This
finding provides support for suggestions made by Abu-Akel
(1999), Abu-Akel and Bailey (2000) and Frith (2004) that the
positive symptoms of schizophrenia are associated with
over-mentalizing. An obvious next step would be to administer the tasks used in the present study to a sample of patients
with delusions, and to analyse responses for agency attribution in the same way as was done here. In a recent study using the Triangles task, Russell et al. (2006) found that
a paranoid subgroup of patients with schizophrenia tended
to use more mentalizing terms than other patient subgroups
and controls in the random condition of the task, a result
which is clearly consistent with our findings. Functional imaging studies of mentalizing abilities in healthy individuals have
shown that three brain areas are activated when ToM tasks
are performed: the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior
temporal sulci and the temporal poles bilaterally (Gallagher
and Frith, 2003). It has been suggested that the anterior paracingulate cortex in particular is involved in the attribution of
mental states to others (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), and one
possibility is that over-mentalizing involves overactivation
of this medial prefrontal region. The basis of our over-mentalizing findings remains speculative, and begs the question of
whether over-mentalizing is a consequence of a creative
hyper-associative style in the context of intact causal reasoning, or whether it involves some dysfunction in the assessment of causality. Evidence from a recent brain imaging
study (Satpute et al., 2005) suggests that associative and
causal processing involve both shared and distinct areas of
the prefrontal cortex. Left prefrontal cortical areas were implicated in causal processing, and the right superior temporal gyrus in associative processing. We would speculate that the
over-mentalizing evidenced in the present study is more likely
to relate to hyper-associative processing and apophenia (and
thus to the RH), than to a dysfunction in causal processing
(with its basis in the LH) per se, although causal attributions
may also be affected. In this sense, what we have termed
over-mentalizing should not be taken to necessarily imply

a pathological process, but rather a social cognitive style in

which the human tendency to attribute agency [which varies
with motivational and contextual factors (Pronin et al., 2006)],
is exaggerated. An accentuation of this cognitive style may
well be common among those possessing unconventional
paranormal beliefs.
To summarise this study, apophenia was predicted by both
high schizotypy and delusion proneness, whereas overmentalizing was predicted solely by delusion proneness. Our
findings require replication; however, they suggest that
over-mentalizing may play a role in the formation of delusions (and paranormal beliefs) over and above the contribution of heightened apophenia, which is implicated more
generally in psychosis, schizotypy, creativity and the belief
in psychic phenomena.

Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the Central Research Fund of the
University of London, and the Sub-Department of Clinical
Health Psychology, University College London. We are grateful
to Dr Sarah-Jayne Blakemore for allowing us to use the Contingency task, and to Dr Francesca Happe for providing us with
the Stories task and its scoring criteria. We are grateful to all
participants in the study.

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