Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C.

Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Legal Ethics : Definition
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the
sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent
Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because
the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately
the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is
a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired
of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened
with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.
Ratio:
The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section
32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he
did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as
Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new

counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76,
February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of
an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is
fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs.
Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a
counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31,
1930)
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
July 30, 1979
Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975
and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who
had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional firms name; there is no custom
or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the
name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm? NO
Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages
and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will
have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old

firm, can initially ride on that old firms reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association
for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property. Thus, it has been stated that the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos
seeks the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on
grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their
witnesses who were residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said
province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts
of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St.,
Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and first year in college she came to
know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house
being a friend of her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the
General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and

subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at

Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of
the usherettes in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to
30, 1973 and, she told respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which
respondent did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served as
usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up from her residence every
morning and took her home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and
invited her for a joy ride with the permission of her mother who was a former
classmate of respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then
they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which respondent proposed his
love to her; that respondent told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her
within six (6) months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she
would think it over first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their house
almost every night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her
decision on respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted
respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his usual visitations almost
every night thereafter; they agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119,
tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of
her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent
fetched her from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id);
that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but
before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and took her to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where
there were no houses around; that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep,
respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing her
downward and his hand kept on moving to her panty and down to her private parts
(pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered:
"Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded her also that "anyway,
December is very near, the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then
he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated
his promise and assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty; that she told
him that she was afraid because they were not yet married, but because she loved
him she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with him at the back seat of the
jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again reiterated his
promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he would marry her; and at
about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).

After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the
Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times a week, after
which he would take her to the airport where they would have sexual intercourse;
that they had this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of
two or three times a week, and she consented to all these things because she loved
him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her
menstruation which usually occurred during the second week of each month did not
come; she waited until the end of the month and still there was no menstruation; she
submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent
and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but she objected and
respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they would
get married within one month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage
(pp. 129-132, tsn,id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her
parents about their marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in
Manila so as not to create a scandal as complainant was already pregnant;
complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while
respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in
the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at
Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he could not marry complainant
because he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and
said: "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in
Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant not
to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years and he
would work for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant
(p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and
assured her of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to
Dipolog City and actually sent the promised support; he came back to Manila in
January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked about the annulment of his
previous marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142,
tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March 1974 and told complainant the
same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when
she delivers the child, but her mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody
would be left in their house in Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to
Cebu City which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her
sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a
baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the
child was registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).

In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact
respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was ashamed she
just stayed in their house; she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for
medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did not come
to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative
case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the case
was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was
dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the
birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as follows:
that he was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married
Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old; that
because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in
1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952
because he was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother because they
were former classmates in high school; that he became acquainted with complainant
when he used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became friends
and often talked with each other, and even talked about their personal problems; that
he mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her
parents he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the
arrangement was for him to fetch her from her residence and take her home from the
convention site; that it was during this occasion that they became close to each other
and after the convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a
week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he used to invite her
(pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a
headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to
have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the airport; that when
they were at the airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they
were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they made love; that
before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse
many times whenever they went on joy riding in the evening and ended up in the
airport which was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of
her pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal
and respondent would take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the

parents of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married
but estranged from his wife; that when complainant was already in Manila, she asked
him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, otherwise,
he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his
marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant
consented to have sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did
not resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed
against him by complainant because of his failure to give the money to support
complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to meet
complainant's medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was
about 20 years and 7 months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, having been born on December 23, 1952; while
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del
Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said relationship,
having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that
the marriage ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and
that said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time
of his relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime,
having been a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former
classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City;
that he became acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually
with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit
Norma at her residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became a
close friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the
usherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to
30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the morning and took her
home from the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant
accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973,
complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about
10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before going home, they went to
the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where there

were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport
where they used to make love twice or three times a week; that as a result of her
intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's
parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where she
went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th
and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that
respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again
in February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in
Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and
her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on
June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu
City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974 she
went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City,
the respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an administrative case
against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; which complaint,
however, was dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings
against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing,
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent
attorney of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented
himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and
dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first
marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said
marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a
ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying
in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends
as though he was never married much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone
belies respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the
very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to
deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in
accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is,

her father being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have an
affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when
he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209,
January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense
is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v.
Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and
their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could
enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p.
15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported
by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the
finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he
was already married and would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January
13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now
claiming, why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent
himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having been married in a civil
ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into another civil ceremony without
committing bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13,
1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem
convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have
sexual intercourse with complainant because he knew the existence of a legal
impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious
claim that he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has
amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
is in order. Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule
138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification
which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar,
179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395
[1992]):

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a

condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A.
Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney
to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he
is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains
the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who
convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was
still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his
studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs.
Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the
child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards
of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained
to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality.
The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439,
[1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also
behave himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo,
7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued
membership in the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct
unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record
of respondent Daarol.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Tuanda (181 SCRA 682)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this
Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000
for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces
of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks
weredishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made
noeffort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was
acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The AntiBouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law,
on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is
nowappealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing
that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to
her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends
no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not
guilty of the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which
she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what

grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents orbrokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of

First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the
last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not

practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22
violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of
which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court.

QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is
an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of
years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958,
signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant
submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of
respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth
to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to
show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute
grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the
former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the
Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the
special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is
already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of court states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it
is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and

to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993
Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law. The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of
the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject
of the advertisements herein complained of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of practice of law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of

computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of
the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
In Re Cunanan (94 Phil 534)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;

Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past
few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for
the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration
of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in
place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not
included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2
of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955)
is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to
1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5%
w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)

TAN VS SABANDAL (legal profession)

FACTS:
Unauthorized Practice of Law- GUILTY; barred from taking OATH
Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that
he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law.

Calling himself ATTORNEY

Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending administrative complaints filed against him
regarding instances when he called himself attorney knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not
allowed to take the lawyers oath. Oppositors evidence sufficiently show that respondent had held himself out as an attorney in
the agrarian, civil and criminal cases and he was paid for his legal services

He then filed a petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. In a resolution
promulgated on November 29, 1983 respondent petition was denied. Respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and
benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyers
oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.

Judge: Not aware of any acts of disqualification but civil cases were filed.
Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a
comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his
comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar.
However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court.

The case for cancellation/reversion proceedings includes:

Sabandal (respondent) working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands alleged to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land.
It turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the
bank.

The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land
since then.

The case settled through amicable settlement.

The said amicable settlement

canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank;

provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation;

reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from
exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land.

Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3)
testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.
(IBP Zamboanga, Members of IBP and RTC)

HELD:
His petition must be denied.

NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT PRIVILIGE BESTOWED

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

THE MANIPULATIVE CHARACTER; MANIFESTATION OF GROSS DISHONESTY: cannot be erased by dismissal of case because of
settlement
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his
procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was
manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the
public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was
made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Amicable settlement amounts to admission of guilt of the respondent.

Failure to include the civil case: Lack of Candor and Truthfulness

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that
he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

Finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is
RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is not a matter of right.

No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
FACTS:
Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the
finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous
petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is
domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance
therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the
respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has
a pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then
working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage
was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed
the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled
the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain
the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of
possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan
and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already

submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been
terminated.

HELD:
His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but
have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by
the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit
has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack
of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including
at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor.