Appeal Brief 11-14-2016 ERIC MUATHE ET AL Vs HONORABLE KURTIS LOY ET AL Kansas Court of Appeals

No.
16-116284-A
________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
_______
ERIC M. MUATHE, ET AL,
Appellants-Plaintiffs
vs.
HONORABLE KURTIS LOY, ET AL,

Appellees-Defendants
_______
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
_______
_______
Appeal From the District Court of Crawford County
Honorable Jack L. Burr, Senior Judge,
District Court Case No. 15CV79P
Eric Muathe,
P.O. Box 224,
Pittsburg, Kansas, 66762
Phone: (913) 980 7286
James Beckley Jr.,

P.O. Box 224,
Phone: (620) 249 2880
Kasey King,
P.O. Box 224,
Phone: (620) 875 6494
Travis Carlton,
P.O. Box 224,
Pittsburg, Kansas,
66762
Phone: (620) 875 4207
Appellants - Pro Se
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE .........................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .........................................................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ................................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................4
I.
UNDER K.S.A. 60-241, APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS HAD THE RIGHT TO DISMISS

THEIR SUIT WITHOUT NEEDING THE APPROVAL OF THE COURT OR THE
DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO THE DEFENDANTS FILING OF AN ANSWER OR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
- THE COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE CASE THEN GRANTING
RESTRICTIONS THEREAFTER WHEN IT HAD LOST ITS JURISDICTION.
STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................................................4

Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009) ...................................4
Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 395, 204 P.3d 562 (2009) ...............4
ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................................................4
K.S.A. 60-241 (a)(l) .....................................................................................................................4,5,6,7,8
Smith v. State, 22 Kan. App.2d 922, 926 (1996) ....................................................................5,7,9
State v. Edwards, Supreme Court of Kansas, No. 101,198 (2010) .......................................5
Ireland, James Ireland, and Allyson R. Reed, Case No. 101,739 (Kan. App. January 22
,2010) ..............................................................................................................................................................5
See Sumner v. Law Offices of Jerry Berg, P.A., 20 Kan. App. 2d 572, 574, 890 P.2d 742
(1995) .............................................................................................................................................................6
Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1976) .............................................................7
Sanchez v. Vaughn Corporation, 282 F. Supp. 505, 506-07 (D. Mass. 1968) ....................7
Wilson Co. v. Fremont Cake Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900, 902-03 (D. Neb. 1949) ................7
State v. Mejia, 20 Kan. App. 2d 890, Syl. 3, 894 P.2d 202 (1994) ......................................7
K.S.A. 60-1507..........................................................................................................................................7,8
28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 (1994) ..................................................................................................7

Fed.R. Civ. Proc. 41(a) ..............................................................................................................................7
Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1410-11 (10th Cir. 1993) ...........................................................7
Hurd v. Mondragon, 851 F.2d 324, 328-29 (10th Cir. 1988) ...................................................7
Kramer v. Butler, 845 F.2d 1291, 1294 (5th Cir. 1988) .............................................................7
Estep v. United States, 251 F.2d 579, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1958) .................................................7
Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1981) .....................................................................................7
In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997) ...............................8
Smith v. State 22 Kan.App.2d 922, 924(Kan. Ct. App. 1996) .............................................8,9
II.
APPELLANTS QUESTION WHETHER THIS COURT HAS BEEN CONFERRED

PROPER JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL GIVEN THAT POST JUDGMENT
PLEADINGS WERE IGNORED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW...........................................................................................................................9
State v. Dixon, 279 Kan. 563,615, 112 P.3d 883 (2005) ............................................................9
In re Marriage of Zodrow, 240 Kan. 65, 68, 727 P.2d 435 (1986) .........................................9
In re Adoption of B.G.J., 281 Kan. 552, 563-64, 133 P.3d 1 (2006) .......................................9
Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc., 293 Kan. 285, 292, 263 P.3d
767 (2011) ....................................................................................................................................................9
ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................................................9
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 133(c)(1) .........................................................................................10
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 170 ..................................................................................10,11,12,15
Re Luther quoting Kincade v. Cargill, Inc., 27 Kan.App.2d 798, 800, 11 P.3d 63, rev.
denied 270 Kan. 898 (2000) ..............................................................................................................12
Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 200 P.3d 467 (2009) ..............................................................13
In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997) ............................13
Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Simmons, 274 Kan. 194, 205, 50 P.3d 66
(2002) ..........................................................................................................................................................13
Davila v. Vanderberg, 4 Kan. App. 2d 586, 588, 608 P.2d 1388 (1980) ...........................13
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14..............................................................................................................13
Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 (Kan. 1997) ................................................13
Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994) ...................................................13
Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 601B Canon 1, Rule 1.2 ...................................13,14
Judicial Ethics Opinion, JE 167 March 9, 2009 ...........................................................................14
Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 601B Canon 1, Rule 2.1 ..........................................14
Gannon v. State of Kansas, Kansas Supreme Court case number 113,267 (2015) ......14
Byrd, Appellate Court Jurisdiction: An Update, 58 J.K.B.A. 21, 24 (January 1989) .......14
United Steelworks v. Kan. Commission on Civil Rights 17 Kan. App. 2d 863 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1993) .................................................................................................................................................14
III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ORDERING FILING RESTRICTIONS WHEN

PLAINTIFFS HAVE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT
RULE 223.
STANDARD OF REVIEW........................................................................................................................16
767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................16
Babe Houser Motor Co. v. Tetreault, 270 Kan. 502, 506, 14 P.3d 1149 (2000)..............16
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................16
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 223 ............................................................................19,20,23,25,26
Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 601B Canon 1, Rule 2.16(B) ................................22
Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 601B Canon 1, Rule 1.2 ..........................................23
Jarvis v. Drake, 830 P.2d 23 (Kan. 1992) .......................................................................................23
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 [, 20 L.Ed. 646] (1872) ...........................................................24
Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 [1868] ..............................................................................24
Pierson v. Ray,386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967) ..................24
Clear Water Truck Co., Inc. v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc.,214 Kan. 139, 142-143, 519 P.2d
682 ................................................................................................................................................................24
Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993 ............................................................................24
Weil v. Lynds,105 Kan. 440, 185 Pac. 51. .) 1 Kan. App.2d at 194 ......................................24
Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128 (3d Cir.1987) ......................................................................24
Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671, cert. denied 350 U.S. 887 (1955) .............24
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SIGNING AN ORDER THAT COMPLETELY IGNORED

ITS OWN, ON THE RECORD, RULING AND DIRECTIVE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................25

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................26
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................27
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 170 ......................................................................................................27
Bill Johnsons Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB 461 U.S. 731 (1983) .................................................27
BE&K Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (01-518) 536 U.S. 516
(2002) 246 F.3d 619 ..............................................................................................................................27
767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................29
In re Robertson, 280 Kan 266, 120 P.3d 790 (2005) ...............................................................29
V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ASSEMBLY LINE OF CHAPTER 61

SMALL CLAIMS CASES BEING COMBINED WITH A CHAPTER 60 CIVIL CASE.

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................30
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................30
In re Robertson, 280 Kan 266, 120 P.3d 790 (2005) ...............................................................31

Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 601B Canon 1, Rule 1.1, Rule1.2, Rule 1.3, Rule
2.2, Rule 2.2, Rule 2.4, Rule 2.5, Rule 2.6, Rule 2.7, Rule 2.8, Rule 2.9, Rule 2.10, Rule
2.11, Rule 2.15 ..................................................................................................................................31,32
REPORT OF SUPREME COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS .......................................................................32
VI.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT A

CORPORATION IN A CHAPTER 61 SMALL CLAIMS CASE - IN THE ABSENCE OF
BOTH PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT - THAT WAS COMBINED WITH A
CHAPTER 60 CIVIL COURT CASE.

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................33
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................33
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 3 ...........................................................................................................33
K.S.A. 61-2707 ....................................................................................................................................33,34
K.S.A. 60-1206 ..........................................................................................................................................34
K.S.A. 1202(1)(2)(4)(5) .......................................................................................................................34
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) Rule 1.1 .........................................................34
K.S.A. 20-311f ...........................................................................................................................................34
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 5.1(a)(b)(c)(1)(2) ...................................34
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.5 ...................................................................35
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.10 ................................................................35
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.16 ................................................................35

Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 3.3(a)(1)(4) ...............................................36
State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012) ..................................37
Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 200 P.3d 467 (2009) ..............................................................37
Kelly v. VinZant, 287 Kan. 509, 526, 197 P.3d 803 (2008) ....................................................37
VII.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY EXPEDITING COURT CASES SET FOR HEARING
IN THE AFTERNOON TO EARLY IN THE MORNING WITHOUT A CHANGE OF
HEARING NOTICE BEING SENT TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES JUST SO THE
JUDGE COULD LEAVE EARLY.

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................38
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corporation, 293 Kan. 633, 637, 270
P.3d 1074 (2011) ....................................................................................................................................38
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................38
State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012) ..................................39
Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 267 Kan. 865, 868, 988 P.2d 235 (1999) .................................39
Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, Syl. 1, 295 P.3d 542 (2013) .................................39
Cf. Friedman v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 287 Kan. 749, 752, 199 P.3d 781
(2009) ..........................................................................................................................................................39
State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 57, 331 P.3d 544 (2014) ...................................................................40
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) ........................................................40
re Robertson, 280 Kan 266, 120 P.3d 790 (2005) .....................................................................40
City of Neodesha v. BP, Corp. 295 Kan. 298, 287 P.3d 214 (2012) .....................................40
VIII.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING MOTIONS TO BE HEARD THAT

WERE NOT FILED IN THE COURT FILE BUT WERE FILED IN A DIFFERENT
COURT CASE.
9

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................41
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................41
In re Robertson, 280 Kan 266, 120 P.3d 790 (2005)...................................................................42
IX.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM ITS

GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY NOT SUBJECTING FILING RESTRICTIONS
AGAINST ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS AFTER IT HAD ALREADY ORDERED FILING
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF EVEN WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAD
NOT FILED ANY POST JUDGMENT RELIEF PLEADINGS - AND WITHOUT A
HEARING.

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................42
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................43
State v. Pruett, 213 Kan. 249, 515 P.2d 1051 (1973) .................................................................45
X.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

OFFICE TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT JUDGES WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE HAD
PRIVATE COUNSEL BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IS WHERE
PLAINTIFF HAD FILED UNCOUNTABLE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE JUDGES
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE USED THAT INFORMATION AGAINST
THE SAME PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS; THE ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE
ATTORNEY - IN PARTICULAR ATTORNEY STEPHEN PHILLIPS - SHOULD HAVE
RECUSED FOR A CONFLICT OF INTEREST UNDER KRPC RULE 1.7.

767 (2011) .................................................................................................................................................47
10
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................47
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.6 (a)(b) ....................................................48
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.7(a)(1)(2)(b)(1)(2) .............................48
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC)
1.8(a)(1)(2)(3)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(1)(2)(3)(g)(h)(i)(j) .................................................................48
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.10(a)(b)(c)(1)(2)(d) ...........................48
XI.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING A CHANGE OF JUDGE MOTION

WITH AFFIDAVIT AND RULING ON IT.

767 (2011)..................................................................................................................................................48
ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................................48
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 112 (1921) .................................................49
Shaman, Judicial Conduct and Ethics 3.01 (1995) ................................................................49
State v. Starbuck, 239 Kan. 132, 134, 715 P.2d 1291 (1986) ...............................................49
CONCLUSION/ REQUEST FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................49
+ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal stems from an injunctive action that sought to preserve the
federally protected rights of due process and access to neutral Courts for local
residents who had previously filed a Grand Jury Petition in Crawford County to
investigate and oust local Judges for alleged violations of the Judicial Code of ethics and predominately for alleged disturbing conflicts of interests between Judges,
attorneys, "disciplinary" bodies, and a tiny select group of individuals.
The action sought an injunction preventing people who had signed the Grand
Jury Petition from ever having to go in front of the same judges they sought to be
investigated and ousted for what they still believe to be conflicts of interests among
Judges, attorneys, and Defendant/Appellee "disciplinary" entities.
On, or around, March 17th, 2016 before Defendants could file an answer, or
motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-241 (a)(l). During a hearing held on April 18th, 2016 the Court
dismissed the action, then thereafter ordered filing restrictions against ALL the five
(5) Plaintiffs/Appellants who had filed the action.
On May 16th, 2016 Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a timely objection to the
proposed Journal Entry Pursuant to rule 170 which - to date - still remains pending
and has not been ruled on, or addressed by the court.
12
A Court order dismissing the case and ordering across the board filing
restrictions for only four (4) of the five (5) Plaintiffs/Appellants was filed on June
15th, 2016. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on July 11th, 2016.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
UNDER K.S.A. 60-241, APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS HAD THE RIGHT TO

DISMISS THEIR SUIT WITHOUT NEEDING THE APPROVAL OF THE COURT
OR THE DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO THE DEFENDANTS FILING OF AN ANSWER
OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
II.

PROPER JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL GIVEN THAT POST
JUDGMENT PLEADINGS WERE IGNORED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
III.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT
RULE 223.
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SIGNING AN ORDER THAT COMPLETELY

IGNORED ITS OWN ON, THE RECORD, RULING AND DIRECTIVE.
V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ASSEMBLY LINE OF CHAPTER

61 SMALL CLAIMS CASES BEING COMBINED WITH A CHAPTER 60 CIVIL CASE.
VI.
VII.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT

A CORPORATION IN A CHAPTER 61 SMALL CLAIMS CASE - IN THE ABSENCE
OF BOTH PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT - THAT WAS COMBINED WITH A
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY EXPEDITING COURT CASES SET FOR
HEARING IN THE AFTERNOON TO EARLY IN THE MORNING WITHOUT A
CHANGE OF HEARING NOTICE BEING SENT TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES
JUST SO THE JUDGE COULD LEAVE EARLY.
13
VIII.

COURT CASE.
IX.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM

ITS GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY NOT SUBJECTING FILING
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS AFTER IT HAD ALREADY
ORDERED FILING RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF EVEN WHEN
THE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT FILED ANY POST JUDGMENT RELIEF PLEADINGS AND WITHOUT A HEARING.
X.

OFFICE TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT JUDGES WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE
HAD PRIVATE COUNSEL BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IS
WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD FILED UNCOUNTABLE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE
JUDGES AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE USED THAT
INFORMATION AGAINST THE SAME PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS; THE
ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE ATTORNEY - IN PARTICULAR ATTORNEY
STEPHEN PHILLIPS - SHOULD HAVE RECUSED FOR A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST UNDER KRPC RULE 1.7. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT JUDGE KURTIS LOY AND PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY MARK A.
WERNER DID NOT HAVE EX PARTE CONVERSATION(S).
XI.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING A CHANGE OF JUDGE

MOTION WITH AFFIDAVIT AND RULING ON IT.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On, or around, March 17th, 2016 Appellants/Plaintiffs filed a pleading
dismissing the case pursuant to K.S.A. 60-241 (a)(l) (R. Vol. IV at 1366).
Appellees/Defendants had not filed an answer, or motion for Summary Judgment.
During a less than 22 minutes long April 18th, 2016 hearing (R. Vol. V at
1590 lines 8 through 9), that was combined with three (3) other chapter 61 small
claims cases hours before these small claim cases were scheduled for hearing/trial and in the absence of the small claims parties, as the record shows on the transcript
14
(R. Vol. V), the District Court dismissed the case then, ordered filing restriction on all
five (5) Plaintiffs.
The final order (R. Vol. IV 1544) reflects that only four (4) Plaintiffs received
filing restrictions and this was done without any hearing, or Plaintiff's given any
opportunity to object to this changed Journal Entry.
The inescapable fact is that one of the Plaintiffs - James Beckley - has a
relatively tiny litigation case history where he is mainly a defendant as opposed to
the litigation history of Noah Day who was excluded from the June 15th, 2016 filing
restrictions order.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
UNDER K.S.A. 60-241, APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS HAD THE RIGHT TO

DISMISS THEIR SUIT WITHOUT NEEDING THE APPROVAL OF THE COURT
OR THE DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO THE DEFENDANTS FILING OF AN ANSWER
OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts
have unlimited review. Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130
(2009). The scope of review for questions of law is unlimited. See Kingsley v. Kansas
Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 395, 204 P.3d 562 (2009).
15
ANALYSIS
It is important to note that prior to granting the Defendants/Appellees
motion for sanctions the Court had already dismissed the entire case because
Plaintiffs/Appellants had already filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under K.S.A.
60-241 (a)(l) (R. Vol. IV at 1366).
"[W]hen a document seeking dismissal is filed within the time frame set out
in K.S.A. 60-241 (a)(I), it will operate as an automatic dismissal of the action upon
filing." Smith v. State, 22 Kan. App.2d 922,926 (1996).
See the transcript (R. Vol. V) where the Court dismissed the entire case prior
to imposing sanctions ( See R. Vol. V at 1551 of the transcript lines 22 - 24) where
the Court stated/ordered that:
"I'm going to find that this case, Case No. 15CV79P, has, in fact,
been dismissed."
This matter was, therefore, dismissed without prejudice on March 17, 2016,
and the Court by its own discretion found no reason to reinstate the action.
Since Appellees/Defendants concede (R. Vol. IV - 1371) that the case was
effectively dismissed on March 17th, 2016 upon filing of the Motion for Order of
Dismissal pursuant to K.S.A. 60-241 (by the Plaintiffs/Appellants) then the Court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on any other pending matter including the motion for
sanctions filed by the Defendants/Appellees.
16
In other words the Court had no Jurisdiction to enter anything other than a
dismissal of the case without prejudice since the District Court had lost its
jurisdiction according to the Kansas Court of appeals in similar if not identical
circumstances. See Ireland, James Ireland, and Allyson R. Reed, Case No. 101,739
(Kan. App. January 22 ,2010).
In Ireland, James Ireland, and Allyson R. Reed, Case No. 101,739 (Kan. App.
January 22, 2010) case it was stated that:
The day before the scheduled hearing on the defendants' motion,
Kimberly filed a Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice. The District Court
proceeded with a hearing on the defendants' motion and granted the motion,
concluding Kimberly had admitted all of its allegations since she had not filed
a written response.
The Court dismissed Kimberly's claims with prejudice. The Court
ordered the defendants to prepare the order of dismissal. Kimberly's
attorney did not agree with the form of the order and the judge scheduled a
further hearing to resolve that dispute. At that hearing, the District Court
adopted a Journal Entry mostly matching the proposed entry prepared by
defense counsel.
The District Court granted sanctions against Kimberly, finding her
objections had not been appropriate. Kimberly appealed the sanctions order.
Under K.S.A. 60-241, Kimberly had the right to dismiss her suit
without needing the approval of the Court or the defendants prior to the
defendants filing of an answer or motion for summary judgment. Here, the
defendants did not file an answer but a motion to dismiss. Kimberly
responded by filing a motion to dismiss her action without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals recognized prior case precedent which held
when a document seeking dismissal is filed within the time frame set out in
K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1), it will operate as an automatic dismissal of the action
upon filing even though it may be labeled a "motion to dismiss" rather than a
"notice to dismiss." The Court of Appeals ultimately found no good reason
that the caption of Kimberly's pleading should control over its content. As
such, it should have been dismissed upon her filing of the Motion to Dismiss.
17
Regarding Kimberly's appeal of the subsequent sanction order, the

Court of Appeals found no authority for the District Court to enter sanctions
against Kimberly over a dispute that arose regarding how to document the
district court's rulings about other matters over which the District Court had
lost its authority because Kimberly had already properly dismissed her
action. The sanction order, entered without authority, was a void. judgment.
Reversed.
This is a simple matter and Appellees will attempt to convince this Court that
the Kimberly case is not identical to this present action but they are misguided since
more guidance as to a K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) voluntary dismissal being automatic
dismissals regardless of how the pleading is styled can be found in Smith v. State 22
Kan.App.2d 922,924(Kan. Ct. App. 1996) where this Court ruled that:
K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) is identical to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Sumner v. Law Offices of Jerry Berg, P.A., 20 Kan. App. 2d
572, 574, 890 P.2d 742 (1995). Under these circumstances, we have, in the
past, relied upon the federal court's interpretation of Rule 41(a) to guide us
in interpreting K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1). See 20 Kan. App. 2d at 574. We have
researched the federal decisions on this issue and find at least three
decisions which have concluded that under Rule 41(a) a notice of dismissal
captioned as a motion to dismiss operates as an effective dismissal at the
time of filing. These cases take a common sense approach to the issue and
conclude that once the document is filed within the time frame stated by the
statute, neither the Court nor the adverse party can prevent dismissal, and
the fact that the document is captioned "Motion" rather than "Notice" is
without legal significance. Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir.
1976); Sanchez v. Vaughn Corporation, 282 F. Supp. 505, 506-07 (D. Mass.
1968); Wilson Co. v. Fremont Cake Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900, 902-03 (D. Neb.
1949).
We believe the reasoning of the federal decisions on this issue is
sound. 1We can think of no good reason for concluding that the caption of a
pleading should control over its content. This is particularly true in the case
of a pro se pleading. Under these circumstances, we have long held that
substance must control over form. In reading petitioner's "Motion to
Dismiss," there is no doubt that petitioner wants to dismiss his motions filed
under K.S.A. 60-1507. The document was filed within the time frame in which
ex parte dismissal is permitted under 60-241(a)(1), and such dismissal is
18
automatic. To permit the substance of a pleading to be trumped by its caption

is neither legally sound nor supportive of judicial economy. We have in the
past indicated that the trial courts should consider certain pleadings as
motions filed under 60-1507 regardless of the caption or even the relief
sought by those motions. See State v. Mejia, 20 Kan. App. 2d 890, Syl. 3, 894
P.2d 202 (1994). These decisions recognize that something more than a strict
adherence to form is occasionally necessary in the interests of justice and
judicial economy. It is clear to us that in this case a great deal of confusion,
not to mention time, could have been avoided by recognizing the substance
of petitioner's motion to dismiss and by dismissing the action and allowing
him to start the process anew. The rule we announce in this case is designed
to give preference to substance over form in dealing with pro se motions
under K.S.A. 60-1507.
We also see no particular reason why K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) should not
apply to a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. It is true there are no Kansas
decisions which specifically say that it does, but that may be due more to the
obvious answer to the question than to its complexity. In federal habeas
corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 (1994), the federal
courts have routinely allowed the application of Fed.R. Civ. Proc. 41(a), at
least as to motions to dismiss without prejudice under 41(a)(2). See, e.g.,
Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1410-11 (10th Cir. 1993); Hurd v. Mondragon,
851 F.2d 324, 328-29 (10th Cir. 1988); Kramer v. Butler, 845 F.2d 1291, 1294
(5th Cir. 1988); Estep v. United States, 251 F.2d 579, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1958). It
is true that all of these cases deal with the application of 41(a)(2), although
Rule 41(a) is often quoted in its entirety without excluding the possible
application of 41(a)(1). However, Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1981),
concedes that there is a right to dismiss a habeas petition under Rule
41(a)(1).
We have no problem with concluding that K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) is
applicable to proceedings under K.S.A. 60-1507. The dismissal is, by statute,
without prejudice and, in the absence of other significant facts, should not be
considered, in and of itself, as evidence of an abuse of the process when a
subsequent motion is filed.
We hold that a proceeding pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 may be
voluntarily dismissed under K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1) by the filing of an
appropriate document. We further hold that when a document seeking
dismissal is filed within the time frame set out in K.S.A. 60-241(a)(1), it will
operate as an automatic dismissal of the action upon filing even though it
may be labeled "Motion to Dismiss" rather than "Notice to Dismiss." We
19
intend that the application of this rule should have principal application in
cases involving pro se proceedings under K.S.A. 60-1507.
The effect of our decision is that any holding made by the trial Court
after August 3, 1993, was made without jurisdiction and is void. Since a
dismissal is, by statute, without prejudice, petitioner is free to begin anew the
procedure under K.S.A. 60-1507.
This case is remanded with directions to dismiss case No. 93-C-1699
as of August 3, 1993. Reversed and remanded with directions.
"A void judgment is one rendered by a Court which lacked personal or
subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. A
void judgment is a nullity and may be vacated at any time." In re Marriage of
Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997).
In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997). "A
judgment is void if the Court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. A
void judgment is a nullity and may be vacated at any time." 261 Kan. at 862.
In Smith v. State 22 Kan.App.2d 922,924(Kan. Ct. App. 1996) this Court
noted that We can think of no good reason for concluding that the caption of a
pleading should control over its content so irrespective of the caption of
Appellants/Plaintiffs motion to dismiss it should have acted as an automatic
dismissal of the case since the Defendants had not filed an answer, or filed any
motion for summary judgment.
20
Similarly, as it did in Smith v. State 22 Kan.App.2d 922,924(Kan. Ct. App.

1996), this Court should remand this case with directions to dismiss and void the
filing restrictions entered by a Court that had lost its jurisdiction.
II.

PROPER JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL GIVEN THAT POST
JUDGMENT PLEADINGS WERE IGNORED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for failure to rule on post judgment motions is an
abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 279 Kan. 563,615, 112 P.3d 883 (2005); In re
Marriage of Zodrow, 240 Kan. 65, 68, 727 P.2d 435 (1986). Abuse is found when the
trial Court goes outside the framework of legal standards or statutory limitations, or
when it fails to properly consider the factors on that issue given by higher courts to
guide a discretionary determination. In re Adoption of B.G.J., 281 Kan. 552, 563-64,
133 P.3d 1 (2006). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action
(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is
based on an error of fact. Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc., 293
Kan. 285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
ANALYSIS
It is important for this Court to note that other pending and still unaddressed
post judgment pleadings include: the May 6th, 2016 letter from Appellant Travis
21
Carlton to Judge Jack L. Burr. (R. Vol. VI at 1597), and the May 8th letter from
Appellant James Beckley to Judge Jack Burr. (R. Vol. VI at 1618).
Additionally, On May 16th, 2016 Appellants asked Judge Jack Burr if their
objection to the Journal Entry (R. Vol. IV at 1414) would be filed in the case as a
result of the retroactive filing restrictions going back to September 28, 2015 (R. Vol.
IV at 1425). It should be noted that the District Court itself choose to file the
objection in the case (R. Vol. IV at 1414).
Plaintiffs/Appellants rule 170 Journal Entry objection objected to the
Proposed Journal Entry failing to assign a designee acceptable to all parties - as
ordered by the District Court - to be tasked with screening any of Appellants
pleadings. No consultation with Plaintiff/Appellants was ever done as regards
finding a designee acceptable to all parties as ordered by the District Court.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Journal Entry objection which requested oral
arguments pursuant to Kansas Supreme Court Rule 133(c)(1) was mailed to Judge
Jack Burr via certified mail with return receipt returned after it was signed for by
Judge Jack Burr himself.
The District Court has ignored this Journal Entry Objection from
Plaintiffs/Appellants with Defendants/Appellees arguing that the only remedy to
Appellants was via appeal.
22
The obvious question becomes then why did the Defendants, and the District
Court, send Plaintiffs/Appellants a rule 170 proposed Journal Entry with
opportunity to object to the proposed Journal Entry if there had no right or
opportunity to object. See the April 18th, 2016 hearing transcript (R. Vol. V at 1583
lines 2-16).
The June 15th, 2016 Journal Entry Dismissing Case and imposing Filing
Restrictions (R. Vol. IV at 1544 - 1556) failed to name any designee, or to assign a
third party to essentially predetermine if any pleadings filed by any of the
Plaintiffs/appellants had merit prior to filing in any Kansas District Courts.
Plaintiffs/Appellants have a right to object to any proposed Journal Entry as
evidenced by Defendants/Appellees Rule 170 Notice (R. Vol. IV at 1390). Here the
proposed Journal Entry was designed to prevent the Appellant litigants from having
any access to the Kansas Court system since it completely ignored the Courts
Ruling/Order to appoint a designee agreeable to all parties.
During the April 18th, 2016 hearing the District Court according to the
transcript (R. Vol. V 1573) the Court ordered that ( See page 9 of the transcript or R.
Vol. V 1581 lines 14 - 25):
So, I am going to grant your request, Mr. Phillips. I don't want to -- I
want to make sure you include in there the fact that it is not necessarily the
Administrative Judge, because he's also party to this action, so his designee
or the designee of the judicial system of the State of Kansas, I don't know how
you want to word it, but I want to leave enough leeway that someone gets to
23
make the determination -- and, of course, someone who apparently is

acceptable to the Plaintiff's and also acceptable to the Defense... But basically
I'm going to grant your request for sanctions."
In short the June 15th, 2016 did not follow the Court order as seen on the
transcript (R. Vol. V at 1581 of the transcript lines 14 - 25).
Restrictions was merely a "cut and paste" job by Attorney Stephen Phillips from the
Defendants/ Appellees motion for sanctions and more importantly did not follow
the Courts directive to assign a third party as a pre-filing pleadings reviewer that
was agreeable to both Plaintiffs/appellants and Defendants/ Appellees.
Defendants/ Appellees attorneys and more so - Attorney Stephen Phillips did not even bother to consult the Plaintiffs/appellants in regards to the Court order
that all parties find a third party "who apparently is acceptable to the Plaintiff's and
also acceptable to the Defense".
Clearly Plaintiffs/Appellants had a right to object but the Court failed to
acknowledge the Plaintiffs/Appellants rule 170 objection and to date this objection
that requested oral arguments has never been addressed by the Court and remains
pending.
Due to Plaintiffs/Appellants filing of a timely Journal Entry objection that
should have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal until the objection was set for
hearing, considered, and ruled on Appellant's believe this Appeal is premature and
24
that this Court should remain this case since this Court has not been coffered proper
jurisdiction.
An objection based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time, whether it be for the first time on appeal or even upon the appellate Court's
own motion. [Citation omitted.]" Re Luther quoting Kincade v. Cargill, Inc., 27
Kan.App.2d 798, 800, 11 P.3d 63, rev. denied 270 Kan. 898 (2000).
If a District Court lacks jurisdiction, an appellate Court does not acquire
jurisdiction on appeal". Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 200 P.3d 467 (2009). Without
jurisdiction, a default judgment is void. "A void judgment is one rendered by a Court
which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process. [Citations omitted.] . . . A void judgment is a nullity
and may be vacated at any time. [Citation omitted.]." In re Marriage of Hampshire,
261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997).
"Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a Court to hear and decide
a particular type of action. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Simmons, 274
Kan. 194, 205, 50 P.3d 66 (2002).
"Both personal and subject matter jurisdiction must be present to
establish jurisdiction". Davila v. Vanderberg, 4 Kan. App. 2d 586, 588, 608 P.2d 1388
(1980).
25
Void judgment is one rendered by Court which lacked personal or subject

matter jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due process, U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14 Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 (Kan. 1997).
Judgment is void if Court that rendered it lacked personal or subject matter
jurisdiction; void judgment is nullity and may be vacated at any time, Matter of
Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994).
Canon 1, Rule 1.2 provides A Judge shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. The
canons and Rules quoted above are in accordance with the Kansas Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 601B as adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court effective March 1,
2009. JUDICIAL ETHICS ADVISORY PANEL Judicial Ethics Opinion, JE 167 March 9,
2009.
It is noted in the Commentary of Rule 1.2 that public confidence in the
judiciary is eroded by conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety and that
this principal applies to both the professional and personal conduct of the Judge.
Rule 2.1 Commentary provides that to ensure that Judges are available to
fulfill their judicial duties; Judges must conduct their personal and extrajudicial
26
activities to minimize the risk of conflicts that would result in frequent

disqualification.
This case is in a similar situation and stage to that of Gannon v. State of
Kansas, Kansas Supreme Court case number 113,267 (2015) where it was ordered
that the "matter is remanded to the District Court for resolution of all pending
post-trial motions".
The following motions have been judicially determined to toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal: objections to a journal entry, motion for rehearing, motion
to vacate judgment, and motion to reconsider. Byrd, Appellate Court Jurisdiction: An
Update, 58 J.K.B.A. 21, 24 (January 1989). See United Steelworks v. Kan. Commission
on Civil Rights 17 Kan. App. 2d 863 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
Appellants believe that the District Court acted in manner inconsistent with
due process by first dismissing the case (which should have been automatic and
final), then ordering filing restrictions to all five (5) Plaintiffs and then completely
ignoring a rule 170 Journal Entry objection that asked for oral arguments before
substantially altering the Journal Entry without any notice to Appellants by
reversing its prior on the record order by not extending filing restrictions against
one of the Plaintiffs named Noah Day. The remaining Plaintiffs/Appellants allege
and believe that this was done as a self preservation act - described in detail later in
this brief - by the Judge Jack Burr District Court and the Defendant attorneys in an
27
attempt to mitigate obvious judicial and attorney ethical violations, and potential
monetary damages claims from how the April 18th, 2016 hearing was conducted.
This Court only need review the May 11th "self reporting" letter from
Attorney Stephen Phillips to Judge Jack Burr. (R. Vol. VI at 1600) to see why Plaintiff
Noah Day did not receive filing restrictions even though one of the Appellants James Beckley - has a far smaller Court history footprint, with almost all of his cases
being cases where he was sued, appeared as a Pro Se Defendant and got favorable
Court wins.
Appellant request this Court to reverse the filing restrictions order in its
entirety, or at the very least remand this case so that all pending motions can be
ruled on after oral arguments, and for any other just and proper ruling.
III.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE
223.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review here is that both a question of law and that of an
abuse of discretion.
A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based
28
on an error of fact. Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Taranto Group, Inc., 293 Kan.
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011)
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court's review is
unlimited. An appellate Court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of the
statute. Babe Houser Motor Co. v. Tetreault, 270 Kan. 502, 506, 14 P.3d 1149 (2000).
As stated in In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998):
ANALYSIS
This case is, for all practical purposes, one that was necessitated by
Plaintiffs/Appellants wanting an injunction against all the Defendants after
Plaintiffs/Appellants failed to get enough traction after years of filing untold
amounts of ethical complaints, individually and/or jointly, against area Judges,
attorneys, the attorney general's office, the Kansas Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, and the Attorney Disciplinary office.
It is an disputed fact as evidenced in detail in Plaintiffs/Appellants Class
Action Petition (R. Vol. I at 7 - 81), Plaintiffs/Appellants "Response To Motion of
Defendants Loy, Wachter, L. Fleming, R, Fleming, Jack Lynch, Russell, Smith, Sanders,
Hazlett, Grillot, and Schmidt For Sanctions With Memorandum Information +
Attachments" (R. Vol. III at 740 - 956, R. Vol. III-A at 957 - 1195, R. Vol. III-B at 1196
- 1341), and again in Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions Against Attorney Stephen
Phillips, Loy, Wachter, L. Fleming, R. Fleming, Jack, Lynch, Russell, Smith, Sanders,
29
Hazlett, Grillot and Schmidt For Sanctions with (R. Vol. III at 1346 - 1355) that
Plaintiff/Appellants had previously filed a Grand Jury Petition in Crawford County
District Court as case number 2015MR2 (R. Vol. III at 742) to oust all 11th Judicial
District Judges (who are also defendants in this case).
Appellants have filed uncountable - if not record breaking - ethical
complaints against the Defendant Judges spanning several years. It is also
undeniable that Plaintiffs have individually, or collectively, previously docketed,
sued or recused the named Defendant/Appellee Judges.
As an example Judge A.J. Wachter was docketed in Kansas Commission on
Judicial Qualifications Docket number 1114 (Exhibit #16, R. Vol. III-A at 957 - 1195,
R. Vol. III-B at 1196 - 1341), 1115 (Exhibit #17, R. Vol. III-A at 957 - 1195, R. Vol.
III-B at 1196 - 1341), AND 1116 (Exhibit #18, R. Vol. III-A at 957 - 1195, R. Vol. III-B
at 1196 - 1341) in the matter of Judge A.J. Wachter for his inappropriate use of the
word "Peanut Gallery" where he received a letter of caution after Plaintiff/Appellant
Kasey king (and others) filed a complaint against Judge Watchter.
Plaintiff Kasey King filed yet another complaint that was docketed by the
commission. See exhibit #70 ( R. Vol. III-B at 1196 - 1341).
All Appellants/Plaintiffs filed docketed complaints against Judge Lori
Fleming over an email she sent and that is why she is docketed in The Matter of
30
Lori-Bolton-Fleming from numerous complaints starting approximately with docket

number 1242 and ending with docket number 1273 which is Appellant James
Beckley Jr.s complaint. (R. Vol. III at 740 - 956).
All appellants are also part of a pending Kansas Federal Court case number
16-2108-JAR since February 18th, 2016 against Defendant/Appellee 11th judicial
District Judges Lori B. Fleming and Kurtis I. Loy and attorney Bill Wachter who is
brother to 11th Judicial District Judge Andrew James "A.J." Wachter. This lawsuit
was filed by an attorney on behalf of Appellants and 44 other defendants who have
also previous filed uncountable complaints against area Judges and attorneys including signing the Crawford County Grand Jury Petition - case number 2015MR2
(R. Vol. III at 742), and also attached to the Class Action Petition (R. Vol. I at 7 - 81).
Appellants allege that Appellant Carlton was a victim of Rule 223 immunity
from this case since he made a docketed complaint against Judge Timothy Fielder
and Defendant/Appellee A.J. Wachter, Kurt Loy, and Defendant/Appellee Robert
Fleming (R. Vol. III at 793).
Defendant/Appellee Judges Kurtis Loy and Lori B. Fleming also received an
informal letter of advice after Appellant Mr. Eric Muathes complaint for their
improper appearance of an active ongoing law practice in the area phone book(s),
and social media sites while they were sitting Judges. (R. Vol. III at 793).
31
Appellants allege that former member of Panel B and former chair person of
The Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications Judge Robert Fleming continued
to simply refuse to give due process in cases where he has/had conflicts of interest
and he should have properly recused which makes the entire judicial system look
flawed since he was the chair of The Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications
and his daughter in-law Lori Fleming has been a Judge for (3) years and had already
had 3 serious write ups from that same commission pertaining to a noted
complaint filed by a complainant (R. Vol. III at 804 - See exhibit #66), an informal
advice filed by Appellant Eric Muathe (R. Vol. III at 804 - See exhibit #8), and the
recent docketed email complaints (R. Vol. III at 804 - See exhibit #4).
Appellant Carlton had a docketed complaint against Appellant/Defendant
Judge A.J. Watchter's brother attorney Bill Wachter and 11th district Judge
Lori-Bolton-Fleming in The Matter of Lori-Bolton-Fleming Docket Number 1269 (R.
Vol. III at 818).
Appellants believe that Filing restrictions are not justified and only serve as
retaliation in this case because all Appellants/Plaintiffs, as shown above, had at teh
very least docketed ethic complaints on Lori-Bolton-Fleming and have several
examples of Improper Conduct where their complaints are listed as examples
against 11th District Court Defendant Judges who retaliated against them from the
32
previous complaints which violate Rule 2.16(B) of Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule
223 Immunity.
Appellants believe and allege that if the Kansas Commission on Judicial
Qualifications dockets some of Appellants complaints and used some of Appellants
complaints as examples for their own examples of improper conduct then no Judge
should be able to impose sanctions or ask for sanctions on any of the
plaintiffs/appellants because they have had numerous issues of ouster proceeding,
docketed complaints, reprimands, and uncountable legitimate recusals with the 11th
District Court that would make it a straight forward retaliation. (R. Vol. III at 820).
Using the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications Annual Report from
years 1998 to present. In those reports the Plaintiffs noticed that in 2009 there
were 29 docketed complaints on Judges in Kansas, 34 docketed complaints in 2010,
22 docketed complaints in 2011, 44 docketed complaints in 2012, and 30 docketed
complaints in 2013. Defendant /Appellant Judge Lori Fleming received no less than
41 docketed complaints on her e-mail issue alone!!! due to Appellants efforts to
exposure what they believe is confirmation of violation of Judicial code of ethics. (R.
Vol. III at 820).
Plaintiffs noticed that in 2002 there were 35 docketed complaints, 2003
there were 25 docketed complaints, 2004 there were the most docketed complaints
and that was 57, 2005 had 37 docketed complaints, and in 2006 there 38 docketed
33
complaints. Lori Flemings grotesque error by sending an inappropriate email has

now backed up The Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications because it seems
to be that the year of 2015 will result in the most DOCKETED complaints ever in
one (1) year with The Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications. (R. Vol. III at
826).
The appellants believe that one of the main reasons why the former
Appellate Clerk of the Court Heather Smith suddenly quiet her job in early 2016 is
because of the unprecedented number of complaints Appellants, and other local
residents, filed against defendant/Appellee Judges - and especially against Judge
Lori B. Fleming for her inappropriate email (R. Vol. IV at 1349). Appellants also
believe that the record volume of valid Judicial complaints sent by Appellants in the
year 2015 is why the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications has not been
able to release its 2015 annual report as of November 10th, 2016 (R. Vol. IV at
1351).
Appellants believe that any reasonable person can see that what we have
here is an attempt to retaliate against successful complainants filed by
Plaintiffs/Appellants who are simply exercising their federally protected right to
petition government by holding those who hold others accountable to the light of
day - which they can't seem to stand. (R. Vol. III at 826).
34
Plaintiffs had previously discovered that several Plaintiffs and other people
who signed the Grand Jury Petition had been used as Examples of ethic
complaints used in Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications annual report of
proper just outside committees jurisdiction, advisory, and improper conduct. For
example in the 2011 Annual Report Kasey Kings docketed complaint on A.J.
Wachter (R. Vol. III at 826 - See exhibit #40) for his inappropriate word choice of
peanut gallery resulted in an example under Improper conduct. The example says
A Judge, who made a disparaging comment about Courtroom spectators during a
hearing which was acknowledged by the Judge and reflected in the transcript, was
cautioned about future word choices. (R. Vol. I at 7 - 81, R. Vol. III at 826 - See
Exhibit #41).
Also in the same year at the bottom of the examples of conduct found to be
Improper there is another example from a local area Pro Se complaint (See exhibit
#42) of James Donald Russian which says A Judge who admitted to using language
occasionally which society might find offensive, was cautioned on the use of offensive
or inappropriate language and reminded of the importance of considering the publics
perception of the system. Rule 1.2 and Comment [3] were cited." (R. Vol. III at 827 See Exhibit #41).
35
As shown here in a summarized version Plaintiffs/Appellants have

collectively, and individually filed numerous attorney ethical complaints against
even the attorneys representing the Defendants/Appellees.
It is also worth mentioning that Defendants/Appellees are well aware that
Plaintiffs/Appellants maintain a website with an address of www.ConflictGate.com
meant to raise public awareness about the perceived ethical violations between
Judges, attorneys, the Attorney General's office and disciplinary bodies.
In fact a simple "Google" search of any of the Defendants/Appellees and/or
Attorneys of record will pull up some of the Complaints filed by Appellants that have
already been uploaded online. More filed complaints will be uploaded online in due
time.
The District Court entering filling restrictions against Appellants amounts to
blatant retaliation in violation of Kansas Supreme Court rule 223.
In Jarvis v. Drake, 830 P.2d 23 (Kan. 1992) the Kansas Supreme Court
stated (See exhibit number 67, R. Vol. III at 752):
"Complaints, reports, or testimony in the course of disciplinary
proceedings under these Rules shall be deemed to be made in the course of
judicial proceedings. All participants shall be entitled to judicial immunity
and all rights, privileges and immunities afforded public officials and other
participants in actions filed in the Courts of this state."
"The closest thing to absolute immunity to exist is judicial immunity.
36
"In discussing this rule with the Court, one of the things that we
wanted to do was to re-enforce the rights of a person, of a citizen, of the state,
to make complaints against attorneys to be handled by an agency of the
supreme Court.
"And the Court agreed this was, in fact, my suggestion to the Court,
and the Court did agree with that suggestion and did adopt it and put it into
the rule.
....
"And this is the kind of immunity that I believe the Court was
attempting to bestow upon all personnel connected with the disciplinary
all people connected with the disciplinary process, be the[y] complainants,
be the[y] respondent, attorneys, be they any of the investigators, of the or
the Kansas Board [for] Discipline that [make] the decision in regards to these
complaints as they go through the system."
Judicial immunity is a long- and firmly established common-law rule.
It was described by the United States Supreme Court in the following words:
"Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of Judges from liability for damages for acts committed within
their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the
doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 [, 20 L.Ed. 646] (1872). This
immunity applies even when the Judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly, and it `is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
Judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the Judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences.' (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 [1868],
quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 349; note, at 350.) It is a Judge's duty to
decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including
controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or
corruption. Imposing such a burden on Judges would contribute not to
principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Pierson v.
Ray,386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967).
"In Clear Water Truck Co., Inc. v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc.,214 Kan. 139,
142-143, 519 P.2d 682, the Court cited with approval the following rule of
absolute privilege in judicial proceedings referred to in Froelich v. Adair, 213
Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993:
37
`... Judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged communications, and

statements in the course of litigation otherwise constituting an action for
slander, libel, or one of the invasion of privacy torts involving publication, are
immune from such actions. They are privileged communications because of
the overriding public interest in a free and independent Court system. This
absolute privilege extends immunity to parties to private litigation and to
anything published in relation to a matter at issue in Court, whether said in
pleadings, affidavits, depositions or open Court. (Weil v. Lynds,105 Kan. 440,
185 Pac. 51.)'" (Emphasis added.) 1 Kan. App.2d at 194.
In Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128 (3d Cir.1987), a New Jersey
attorney challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey Supreme Court rule
similar to our Rule 223. The New Jersey rule created absolute immunity to
grievants and witnesses in ethics cases. The New Jersey Supreme Court in
1955 held that *652 the filing of a complaint against an attorney with the
county ethics and grievance committee was privileged so as to preclude an
action for malicious prosecution. Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671,
cert. denied 350 U.S. 887 (1955).
Therefore, the New Jersey Court adopted a new rule which provided
absolute immunity for grievants.
"In short, the New Jersey Supreme Court made a policy judgment that
the imposition of the absolute immunity rule for ethics complainants was
justified by the need to maintain and increase public confidence in the bench
and the bar.
"We cannot say that the position taken by the New Jersey Supreme
Court is irrational. The choice of the absolute immunity rule represents a
reasoned policy choice directed to the legitimate state goal of effective
regulation of attorney conduct. This is sufficient to uphold the Rule against
Edelstein's equal protection challenge." 812 F.2d at 133.
The same basic policy decision was made by this Court in amending
Supreme Court Rule 223, and the same analysis and reasoning applied in
Edelstein apply in the present case.
Our judicial system cannot survive without the public's trust in the
system and the belief that justice will prevail. The public is asked to place its
trust in a system dominated by attorneys. *653 To a great extent, that trust is
measured by how we, the bench and bar, implement and enforce the
disciplinary rules. The purpose of Supreme Court Rule 223 is to encourage
the members of the public to file complaints against attorneys who have
violated the rules of ethics. It is rationally related to the objective of
38
effectively regulating the conduct of the bar, which in turn protects the
public's interest. Thus, Supreme Court Rule 223 is not unconstitutional as a
violation of the equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution.
The Defendant Schmidt Attorney General's office, and Defendant Hazlett's
Disciplinary office cannot be accepting complaints in one breath and then turning
around and asking for filing restrictions against the same complainants over the
same issues complained about all along when complainants have absolute immunity
from retaliation.
Clearly Appellants/Plaintiffs have absolute immunity from retaliation from
Defendants and as such this Court should remand this case with instructions to void
the improper filing restrictions and to caution the Defendants/Appellees, and
adverse attorneys - especially those from the Attorney General's office - from such
improper practice.
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SIGNING AN ORDER THAT COMPLETELY

IGNORED ITS OWN, ON THE RECORD, RULING AND DIRECTIVE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review here is that of an abuse of discretion.
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
39
ANALYSIS
The District Court had a hearing on April 18th, 2016 and where according to
the transcript (R. Vol. V,) the Court ordered that ( See 1581 of the transcript lines 14
- 25):
So, I am going to grant your request, Mr. Phillips. I don't want to -- I
want to make sure you include in there the fact that it is not necessarily the
Administrative Judge, because he's also party to this action, so his designee
or the designee of the judicial system of the State of Kansas, I don't know how
you want to word it, but I want to leave enough leeway that someone gets to
make the determination -- and, of course, someone who apparently is
acceptable to the Plaintiff's and also acceptable to the Defense... But basically
I'm going to grant your request for sanctions."
Restrictions (R. Vol. IV at 1544 - 1556) failed to name any designee, or to assign a
third party to essentially predetermine if any pleadings filed by any of the
Plaintiffs/appellants had merit prior to filing in any Kansas Courts.
Additionally, no procedure whatsoever was set up on how
Plaintiffs/appellants would appeal any adverse ruling that a pleading would not be
filed even if a designee acceptable to all parties had been named.
In short the June 15th, 2016 did not follow the Court order as seen on the
transcript (R. Vol. V, at 1581 of the transcript lines 14 - 25).
In Plaintiffs/Appellants rule 170 Journal Entry objection (R. Vol. IV at 1414)
they objected to the proposed Journal Entry failing to assign a designee acceptable
40
to all parties - as ordered by the District Court - to be tasked with screening any of
Appellants pleadings. No consultation with Plaintiff/Appellants was ever done as
regards finding a designee acceptable to all parties.
The Court order that is the subject matter in this appeal effectively - and
Appellants believe intentionally - was designed and knowingly with bad faith
intended to completely block and prevent the Plaintiffs/Appellants from using the
Kansas Court system even as some of the Appellants have ongoing pending Court
cases in Crawford County. This amounts to violation of fundamental rights to access
to the Courts and the Kansas legislature never intended this to ever be the case for
any litigant.
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in Bill Johnsons Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB 461 U.S. 731 (1983) set out the principle that the right of access to the courts
is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of
grievances.
In a June 2002 decision, BE&K Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board (01-518) 536 U.S. 516 (2002) 246 F.3d 619, the high court, though not ruling
on First Amendment grounds, nevertheless noted that it had long viewed the right
to sue in Court as a form of petition.
41
We have recognized this right to petition as one of the most precious of the
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, Justice Sandra Day OConnor wrote for
the Court, and have explained that the right is implied by the very idea of a
government, republican in form.Id.
OConnor further observed that the First Amendment petition clause says
nothing about success in petitioning it speaks simply of the right of the people to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.Id.
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances includes a
right to file suit in a Court of law. This right has currently been stripped given that
no acceptable designee as per Court order has been appointed to review any
potential pleading(s). Plaintiffs currently have no access to the Kansas District Court
- in contravention to the Court order.
Additionally, the Judge Jack Burr District Court has completely ignored all
requests from Plaintiff's to have pleadings - more so post judgment pleadings screened for merit before they could be filed in this particular case.
Judge Jack Burr has elected to completely not respond to
Appellants/Plaintiffs pleadings even then pleadings were sent via certified mail with
return receipt requested, or by priority mail.
42
The Jack Burr District Court has intentionally and knowingly blocked
Appellants/Plaintiff from accessing the Kansas District Courts and in effect denying
Appellants their due process rights, denied them their first amendment right to be
heard, and first amendment right to use the Court system, or petition government.
Appellants/Plaintiffs allege and believe that no reasonable person/Judge
would have explicitly ordered that a designee acceptable to all parties be appointed
to screen pleadings from Appellants/Plaintiffs then turned around and signed an
order without any mention of a designee even in the face of a timely rule 170
objection. As a result of this Appellants/Plaintiffs request this Court to come to the
simple conclusion that the District Court abused its discretion.
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
"[I]t would be very difficult to establish public confidence in the judicial
[decision]-making capacity when there's been such a severe lapse in . . . judgment."
In re Robertson, 280 Kan 266, 120 P.3d 790 (2005). (R. Vol. IV at, 800).
At the very least the Court should order that the District Court sign a revised
order, after hearings on the matter, with a named designee acceptable to all parties
43
and that the Court also institute an appeal procedure where any pleading(s) are
found to be without merit by the named designee including a timeline for such
decisions so as not to keep matters pending indefinitely.
Appellants believe that the most appropriate action for this Court to take is
to remand with instructions to void the order that was entered by a Court that
lacked subject matter jurisdiction after abusing its discretion.
V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ASSEMBLY LINE OF

CHAPTER 61 SMALL CLAIMS CASES BEING COMBINED WITH A CHAPTER 60
CIVIL CASE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
ANALYSIS
The first page of April 18th hearing transcript (R. Vol. V at 1573) shows that
the District Court abused its discretion by unbelievably and shockingly combining
and hearing four (4) cases (three of the cases were heard and ruled on hours before
their scheduling hearing and in the absence of concerned parties) simply because
44
the Judge Jack Burr District Court stated on the record that "I guess what I'm trying
to do is get out of town before this afternoon to be quite frank" (R. Vol. V at 1587 lines
5 through 7.)
No reasonable person/Judge would have taken the action taken by the
District Court as such it is self evident and undeniable that the District Court abused
its discretion.
Honorable Jack Burr did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case
due to an assembly line scheduling with 3 Chapter 61 small claims cases of 15SC70P,
15SC71P, and 15SC85P which did not comply with the 5th and 14th amendment right
to due process and equal protection. Additionally, Honorable Jack Burr did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the parties who were not even present (see
transcript record of appearances R. Vol. V at 1574 lines 1 through 25) since the
small claim cases were scheduled for later that day in the afternoon at 1:30 PM and
2:30 PM (R. Vol. VI at 1619) while this case was set for hearing at 10:00 AM in the
morning.
45
Plaintiffs also objected to the Journal Entry of judgment from the hearing on
April 18, 2016 because according to the Court transcript there was an ex-parte
conversation to give the attorneys Judge Burrs private home address in the judges
chamber after the hearing between Honorable Jack Burr and attorneys Stephen
Phillips and Dennis Depew (R. Vol. IV at 1415, 1420, 1421, and R. Vol. VI at 1600).
Plaintiffs allege and believe that Judge Jack L. Burr did not comply with Rule
601(B) Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules 1.1 Compliance with Law, 1.2
Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary, 1.3 Avoiding Inappropriate Use of the
Prestige of Judicial Office, 2.2 Impartiality and Fairness, 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and
Harassment, 2.4 External Influences on Judicial Conduct, 2.5 Competence, Diligence,
and Cooperation, 2.6 Ensuring the Right to be Heard, 2.7 Responsibility to Decide,
2.8(A) Decorum, Demeanor, 2.9 Ex-Parte, 2.10 Judicial Statements on Pending and
Impending Cases, 2.11(A) Disqualification, 2.15 Responding to Judicial and Lawyer
Misconduct, because he heard four (4) different cases at one time, in one hearing
and heard them all as an assembly line even though 3 of the cases were small claims.
According to the Code of Civil Procedure for Kansas this violates REPORT OF
SUPREME Court STANDARDS COMMITTEE-GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS which says Justice is effective when it is:
(A) Fairly Administered Without Delay, (B) Competent Judges, (C) Operating in a
Modern Court System without overlapping jurisdictions or multiple appeals, (D)
46
Under Simple and Efficient Rules of Procedure. Number (3) under letter (D) says
The ultimate judicial goal should be justice, not speed, in the disposition of cases.
Cases should be determined on an individual basis, not on an assembly line.
Clearly here there is a demonstrated grotesque abuse of discretion by the
Judge Jack Burr District Court with overlapping jurisdictions or potential multiple
appeals which robs the Court of subject matter jurisdiction and the ruling/order
from that hearing should be remanded and reversed/voided as a nullity.
VI.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT

A CORPORATION IN A CHAPTER 61 SMALL CLAIMS CASE - IN THE ABSENCE
OF BOTH PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT - THAT WAS COMBINED WITH A
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
ANALYSIS
The Journal Entry entered in this case on April 18, 2016 should be
overturned due to subject matter jurisdictional failing.
47
Plaintiff objected (R. Vol. IV at 1417, 1418) to the nature of such scheduling
in violation of rule 3 as per Rules Adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in relation
to Rules Relating to District Courts [which states that]:
The ultimate judicial goal should be justice, not speed, in the
disposition of cases. Cases should be determined on an individual basis, not
on an assembly line. Litigants and counsel should be afforded a reasonable
time to prepare and present their cases.
Plaintiffs objected to the Court considering Defendants motion for sanctions
along with 3 other small claims cases as this is assembly line scheduling and with
overlapping jurisdictions and different Court rules apply for chapter 60 civil and
chapter 61 which do not allow for attorneys under K.S.A. 61-2707(a) so attorney's
Stephen Phillips and Dennis Depew should not have been able to comment, or
enlighten the judge, or prepare orders in the small claims cases (R. Vol. V at 1573).
All of the Court cases were done on one Court transcript from around 10:00
AM to exactly 10:22 AM (R. Vol. V at 1590 lines 8 through 9) so all the orders of the
cases 15SC70P, 15SC71P, and 15SC85P should have been included with the Journal
Entry even though that is not allowed according to Chapter 60 Civil and Chapter 61
Small Claims. (R. Vol. IV at 1422-1423).
Plaintiffs attempted to do research on a class action and that is why they
attempted a grand jury petition and contacted the attorney general's office under
K.S.A. 60-1206 on an ouster complaint but the attorney general's office did nothing
at all even though Lori Fleming admitted she sent an inappropriate email. (R. Vol. IV
at 1423).
48
Attorneys Stephen Phillips and Dennis Depew usurped the attorney general's
office under K.S.A. 1202(1)(2)(4)(5) by intruding into a small claims case of
15SC70P Noah Day vs. My Town Media and should now have to forfeit their office
under K.S.A. 1205(1)(2) because Defendant attorney general Derek Schmidt did not
properly supervise Dennis Depew, Stephen Phillips, and Carrie Barney on April 18,
2016 by allowing Dennis Depew and Stephen Phillips to usurp the attorney
generals office and violate K.S.A. 60-1202(1)(2)(4)(5) by allowing them to violate
K.S.A. 61-2707(a), Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) Rule 1.1 by being
incompetent and intrude into a private small claims case of 15SC70P Noah Day vs.
My Town Media and prepare the Court order and make the ruling on change of judge
affidavit under K.S.A. 20-311f. (R. Vol. VI at 1597, R. Vol. IV at 1424).
Defendant Derek Schmidt violated KRPC Rule 5.1(a)(b)(c)(1)(2)
Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer Rule 5.5(a) by allowing Dennis
Depew and Stephen Phillips to enlighten Judge Jack Burr on that case and prepare
the small claims order for that case and to help talk Judge Burr into speeding up the
case from 1:30 PM on April 18, 2016 until 10:00 AM (R. Vol. VI at 1619) on an
assembly line with civil case 15CV79P and two other small claims cases of 15SC71P
and 15SC85P that were scheduled at 2:30 PM and not 10:00 AM Plaintiffs object to
never seeing the contract for the attorney general's office to represent My Town
Media and prepare small claims orders for My Town Media under KRPC Rule 1.5
Fees? It was a conflict of interest for the attorney generals office to represent My
49
Town Media and this violates KRPC Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest, and KRPC Rule
1.10(a) Imputed Disqualification General Rule. The attorney generals office should
have had to decline to represent, speak for, and prepare small claims orders for My
Town Media under KRPC Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation. The
Plaintiffs in the assembly line of 15CV79P, 15SC70P, 15SC71P, 15SC85P did not
receive due process and the following violations were due to the representation and
preparation of My Town Medias small claims order in the case of 15SC70P
violated KRPC Rule 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party and Counsel(a), KRPC 4.3
Dealing With Unrepresented Person, KRPC Rule 4.4 Respect for Right of Third
Person. (R. Vol. VI at 1597, R. Vol. IV at 1424).
Attorney general's office attorneys Stephen Phillips and Dennis Depew also
had an ex-parte conversation with judge Jack Burr about them receiving the judges
home address off the record but the plaintiffs in case number 15CV79P, 15SC70P,
15SC71P, and 15SC85P were not allowed the same information and Stephen Phillips
and Dennis Depew violated KRPC Rule 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party and
Counsel(a), KRPC 4.3 Dealing With Unrepresented Person, KRPC Rule 4.4 Respect
for Right of Third Person which is misconduct under KRPC Rule 8.4. (R. Vol. VI at
1597, R. Vol. IV at 1425).
Attorney Stephen Phillips also violates KRPC Rule 3.3(a)(1)(4) Candor
Toward the Tribunal because he lies to the Court and informs them that he last
heard from the Plaintiffs on last Thursday which is a LIE that was April 14, 2016
50
and he states in this order he did hear from us on April 2, 2016 because we filed a
motion for a continuance and he sent a response to our motion for continuance on
April 11, 2016 and titled it and filed it in the wrong case of 15CV75P titled AKCC
Management LLC vs. Two Big Fish LLC . (R. Vol. VI at 1597, R. Vol. IV at 1425). He
also lied again to the Court when he tells the Court he does not know the name of
our attorney that took the federal Court case and is representing us and his name is
attorney Adebayo Ogunmeno of Ogunmeno Law Firm of 155 S. 18th Street, Site 250
Kansas City, KS, 66102 to represent Plaintiffs in federal case number
2:16-cv-02108-JAR-GLR against Kurtis Loy, Lori Fleming, and My Town Media who
are the people that Dennis Depew and Stephen Phillips chose to not only represent
on April 18, 2016 but go so far in their representation to have intruded in a small
claims private case, have ex-parte conversations with the judge, and retaliate and lie
to the judge about not knowing our attorneys name which is a violation of candor
toward the tribunal and misconduct under KRPC when the attorneys name was put
in our SETTLEMENT OFFER to attorney Stephen Phillips which he declined to
accept and instead chose to usurp the attorney generals office and prepared small
claims orders for My Town Media and intrude into our other Court cases since he is
trying to get filing restrictions granted from every case since September of 2015 and
Plaintiffs do not agree with this since it violates chapter 75 article 7 duties of the
attorney general and so does representing My Town Media in case number
15CV70P. (R. Vol. VI at 1597, R. Vol. IV at 1425).
51
The other deputy assistant attorney general Carrie Barney simply just sat
there and watched 1 civil Court case get ran together with 3 small claims cases on an
assembly line while two of her co-workers chose to represent My Town Media and
enlighten the judge about the case and prepare the order for him but she never
reported Judge Jack Burr for violating the code of Judicial Conduct and never
reported Dennis Depew and Stephen Phillips for intruding into case number
15SC70P Noah Day vs. My Town Media which violates KRPC(a)(b) Reporting
Professional Misconduct. (R. Vol. VI at 1597, R. Vol. IV at 1426).
The party claiming that the District Court abused its discretion bears the
burden of showing that judicial discretion was abused. State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295
Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012). See Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 293, 200
P.3d 467 (2009) (party asserting abuse of discretion bears burden to establish such
abuse); Kelly v. VinZant, 287 Kan. 509, 526, 197 P.3d 803 (2008) ("An appellant has
the burden to designate a record sufficient to establish the claimed error; without
such a record, the claim of error fails.").
Here the Appellants have demonstrated without any doubt that the District
Court abused its discretion by allowing attorneys to appear in Small Claims cases
hours before the scheduled chapter 61 small claim trials/hearings and even allowed
the attorneys to prepare a Journal Entry in the absence of the concerned Small
Claims parties.
52
This Court should find that the District Court abused its discretion, and for
any other just and proper ruling - including taking disciplinary action against Judge
Jack Burr and Attorneys Stephen Phillips, Dennis Depew, Carrie Barney and
Defendant Derek Schmidt for failing to supervise.
VII.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY EXPEDITING COURT CASES SET FOR

HEARING IN THE AFTERNOON TO EARLY IN THE MORNING WITHOUT A
CHANGE OF HEARING NOTICE BEING SENT TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES
JUST SO THE JUDGE COULD LEAVE EARLY.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law subject to unlimited review.
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corporation, 293 Kan. 633, 637, 270
P.3d 1074 (2011).
ANALYSIS
As already demonstrated in this Appeal Brief the first page of April 18th,
2016 hearing transcript (R. Vol. V at 1573) shows that the District Court abused its
53
discretion by improperly combining and hearing four (4) cases (three of the cases which were Chapter 61 Cases- were heard and ruled on hours before their
scheduling hearing and in the absence of concerned parties) simply because the
Judge Jack Burr District Court stated on the record that "I guess what I'm trying to do
is get out of town before this afternoon to be quite frank" (R. Vol. V at 1587 lines 5
through 7.)
No reasonable person, let alone a retired senior Judge, would have taken the
improper action taken by the Judge Jack Burr District Court. It is self evident and
undeniable that the District Court abused its discretion. Appellants have
demonstrated that the District Court conducted an assembly line of cases from
different chapters which were all heard, decided and ruled on in less than 22
minutes (R. Vol. V at 1590 lines 8 through 9) in the absence of concerned parties and
with improper attorney representation in small claims for at least one private party
- My Town Media.
The party claiming that the District Court abused its discretion bears the
burden of showing that judicial discretion was abused. State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295
Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012).
See Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 267 Kan. 865, 868, 988 P.2d 235 (1999)
(objection based on lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time including for first
time on appeal or on appellate court's own motion). "Subject matter jurisdiction
54
refers to the power of a Court to hear and decide a particular type of action." Frazier
v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, Syl. 1, 295 P.3d 542 (2013). Cf. Friedman v. Kansas
State Bd. of Healing Arts, 287 Kan. 749, 752, 199 P.3d 781 (2009) (if District Court
lacks jurisdiction, appellate Court does not acquire jurisdiction over subject matter
on appeal).
ALSO, See State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 57, 331 P.3d 544 (2014). at 80-81. An
abuse of discretion can occur in one of three wayswhen the trial Court makes an
error of law; bases its decision on facts not supported by the evidence; or makes an
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable decision. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256
P.3d 801 (2011).
Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action is: (a) unreasonable, i.e., if no
reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. City of
Neodesha v. BP, Corp. 295 Kan. 298, 287 P.3d 214 (2012). (R. Vol. IV at, 800).
Without ever having sent out a change of hearing time and date the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to combine this case with other different chapter cases and
as such Plaintiffs/appellants believe this Court should find that this action was an
55
abuse of discretion by the District Court which deprived it of subject matter

jurisdiction.
VIII.

COURT CASE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs also objected to the responses filed by Defendants attorney on
April 11, 2016 in case number 15CV75P AKCC Management LLC vs. Two Big Fish
LLC because it was an Ineffective Stipulation under Rule 163 and therefore the
Defendants never responded to Plaintiffs motion for continuance, motion for
change of judge with affidavit, and motion to withdraw motion to dismiss. (R. Vol. IV
at 1416, 1420, 1423, R. Vol. VI at 1597).
Plaintiffs also requested a NOTICE OR RULINGS mailed to them in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule 134 which says whenever a judge shall make
a ruling on a motion or application of any kind and there are parties affected who
56
have appeared in the action but who are not present , either in person or by their
attorneys, the judge shall cause written notice of such ruling to be mailed to the
parties or attorneys forthwith. (R. Vol. IV at 1417).
Plaintiffs have not had any ruling mailed from the hearing on April 18, 2016
in case number 15CV75P, 15CV79P, 15SC70P, 15SC71P, and 15SC85P. Plaintiffs
also objected that there was never a new NOTICE OF HEARING in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule 131(a)(b)(c)(d) that changed the Court cases of 15SC70P to
10:00 AM and 15SC71P and 15SC85P to 10:00 AM along with chapter civil case
15CV79P. (R. Vol. IV at 1417).
Plaintiffs also objected that Dennis Depew never withdrew from enlightening
Judge Burr, or from preparing the order in case number 15SC70P when he should
have withdrew as attorney for private entity My Town Media under Supreme Court
Rule 117 and K.S.A. 61-2707(a). Plaintiffs objected that My Town Medias resident
agent never had to appear but the dismissal in case number 15SC70P that was
consolidated with 15CV79P says that Plaintiff did not appear and had Defendant
did not appear scratched out. (R. Vol. IV at 1417).
57
Appellants request that the District Court acted with such severe lapse in
Judgment that is abused its discretion.
IX.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM

ITS GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY NOT SUBJECTING FILING
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS AFTER IT HAD ALREADY
ORDERED FILING RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF EVEN WHEN
THE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT FILED ANY POST JUDGMENT RELIEF PLEADINGS AND WITHOUT A HEARING.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
ANALYSIS
The June 15th, 2016 order had also been substantially altered by Attorney
Stephen Phillips from the prior proposed Journal Entry without a hearing, with
objections from the Appellants/Plaintiffs and without consultation with
Appellants/Plaintiffs - it appears some consultation is alleged to have been done
with Attorneys Carey Barney and Jim Emerson as regards to the substantial change
of removing one of the Plaintiff's Noah Day from the final order.
58
According to the transcript (R. Vol. V 1573) the Court ordered that ( See page
9 of the transcript or R. Vol. V 1581 lines 14 - 25) all five Plaintiffs/Appellants
should receive filing restrictions yet the final order is missing one of the Plaintiffs Noah Day - without a hearing and without an opportunity for Plaintiff's/Appellants
to review the changed version of the proposed order and without proper authority,
explanation or any hearing.
Plaintiffs/Appellants believe that Attorney Stephen Phillips has no authority
to change a Court order.
As seen by a foot note (foot note #1) at the bottom of page three of the
attached June 15th, 2016 (R. Vol. IV at 1557) order Attorney Stephen Phillips
attempts to cure this defect by stating:
"At request of defense counsel Stephen Phillips, and without objection
by defense counsel Carey Barney and Jim Emerson, Plaintiff Noah Day is not
included in the filing restrictions."
As proof that the only reason why Noah Day was not made part of the June
15th, 2016 order and that the only reason he was excluded from the filing
restrictions order was to protect the Judge Jack Burr, Attorneys Stephen Phillips,
Carey Barney and Dennis Depew from potential monetary damage claims and
ethical violations issues arising from the improper April 18th, 2016 hearing(s) is the
fact that Appellant/Plaintiff James Beckley has a limited Court litigation history (and
59
where he mostly appears as a Defendant and wins most of Court cases) as compared
to Noah Day.
Appellants allege that clearly the motivation to exclude Noah Day from filing
restrictions has little to do with his litigation history because if that is the case then
Appellant James Beckley should have been the first one excluded from any filing
restrictions from the very beginning.
There are also serious allegations that Noah Day was threatened by the
Attorney General's office that if he did not cooperate with them that he would be
charged criminally and arrested for being a "domestic terrorist" just like - allegedly the remaining Plaintiffs were going to be charged criminally and arrested for being
"domestic terrorists" as stated to Noah Day by the Attorney General's office
attorney(s).
The "self reporting" letter of Stephen Phillips confirms that there were
obvious concerns about the ethical and monetary damages implications of how
Noah Day's small claims cases were handled and the obvious on the record issues of
ex parte Conversations with private off the record conversations between Judge
Burr and the attorneys. (R. Vol. VI at 1600).
Appellants have federally protected; freedom of speech rights, rights to a fair
trial, and rights to petition government among other rights.
60
Appellants believe their due process rights, first amendment right to be

heard, and right to use the Kansas Court system, or petition government are being
severely blocked and violated by the current order where they have no acceptable
designee as per Court order to ask if they can file any pleading(s).
Kansas practice is in conformity with this Standard. It was held in State v.
Pruett, 213 Kan. 249, 515 P.2d 1051 (1973) that the judge should be free of mind ,
disinterested in the conclusion, impartial as to the parties and independent.
The Court order that is the subject matter in this appeal effectively - and
Appellants believe intentionally - was designed and knowingly with bad faith
intended to completely block and prevent the Plaintiffs/Appellants from using the
Kansas Court system even as some of the Appellants have ongoing pending Court
cases in Crawford County. This amounts to violation of fundamental rights to access
to the Courts and the Kansas legislature never intended this to ever be the case for
any litigant. (R. Vol. III at 794-795).
See Exhibit #39'B' (R. Vol. III-B at 1201)which is a newspaper article
discussing the proposed BUT NOT YET approved guidelines quoted one of the
Judicial Branch's Access to Justice committee member - Judge Edward Bouker - who
stated: "The guidelines do not propose a blanket restriction on any party with a
history of malicious or repetitive filings". See Exhibit #39'B' (R. Vol. III at 797-798, R.
Vol. III-B at 1214).
61
The report said Kansas Court of Appeals framework for filing restrictions on
a persons access to the Courts didnt allow for blanket prohibitions on pro se filings.
That appellate Court found in 2013 a litigants nine meritless cases, though
burdensome and vexatious and packed with vile, insulting and threatening
language, must be managed by the district Court with reasonable restrictions.
Exhibit #39'B' page 1 paragraph #10. See Exhibit #39'B' (R. Vol. III at 797-798, R.
Vol. III-B at 1214).
Clearly Plaintiff have never filed vile, insulting and threatening language in
their pleadings and should not even be considered for retaliatory sanctions yet even
rare sanctions should still not be blanket prohibitions and should be managed by
the district Court with reasonable restrictions. (R. Vol. III at 797-798).
In other words currently imposed filing restrictions are not even allowed.
The guidelines don't address situations where Pro Se litigants - as is the case here have multiple successful Court wins or settlements, successful recusal of Judge
orders, successful judicial docketed ethic complaints, filed Grand Jury Petition(s)
against the Judges, and filed successful attorney complaints that at the very least
lead to docketed investigations. (R. Vol. III at 797-798)
any other just and proper ruling.
X.

OFFICE TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT JUDGES WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE
HAD PRIVATE COUNSEL BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IS
62
WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD FILED UNCOUNTABLE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE

JUDGES AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE USED THAT
INFORMATION AGAINST THE SAME PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS; THE
ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE ATTORNEY - IN PARTICULAR ATTORNEY
STEPHEN PHILLIPS - SHOULD HAVE RECUSED FOR A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST UNDER KRPC RULE 1.7.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
ANALYSIS
The Defendant Schmidt Attorney General's office, and Defendant Hazlett's
Disciplinary office cannot be accepting complaints in one hand and then turning
around and asking for filing restrictions with the other hand against the same
complainants over the same issues complained about all along when complainants
have absolute immunity from retaliation.
Appellants believe the attorney general's office should recuse itself from
accepting any complaints if/where they have a conflict of interest whenever
complaints are filed against individuals that the attorney general knows it might
have to defend in any lawsuit.
63
The fact that the attorney generals office is representing the same
Defendant/Appellee Judges in one hand and in another had pretending to accept
complaints from the public - and more so the Plaintiffs/Appellants - violates
numerous rules of Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct which include KRPC Rule
1.6 Confidentiality of Information(a)(b), KRPC Rule Conflict of Interest
1.7(a)(1)(2)(b)(1)(2), KRPC Rule 1.8(a)(1)(2)(3)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(1)(2)(3)(g)(h)(i)(j)
Conflict of Interest Prohibited Transactions, and KRPC Rule 1.10(a)(b)(c)(1)(2)(d)
Imputed Disqualification.
any other just and proper ruling - including taking disciplinary action against Judge
Jack Burr and Attorneys Stephen Phillips, Dennis Depew, Carrie Barney and
Defendant Derek Schmidt for failing to supervise.
XI.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING A CHANGE OF JUDGE

MOTION WITH AFFIDAVIT AND RULING ON IT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011).
64
ANALYSIS
The District Court had a hearing on April 18th, 2016 and where according to
the transcript (R. Vol. V at 1585 lines 5 - 15) the Court decided whether or not it
could hear a motion for change of Judge with affidavit with the help of attorneys
who are not allowed in small claims.
This amounts to abuse of discretion since according to K.S.A. 20-311d(b) it
should have been sent to another Judge to make a ruling of its legal sufficiency given
that K.S.A. 20-311d(b) states:
" If a party or a party's attorney files an affidavit alleging any of the grounds
specified in subsection (c), the chief judge shall at once determine, or refer the
affidavit to another district judge for prompt determination of, the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit. If the affidavit is filed in a District Court in which there is no other
judge who is qualified to hear the matter, the chief judge shall at once notify the
departmental justice for the district and request the appointment of another district
judge to determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavit."
It is an abuse of discretion for a Judge to hear or determine the legal
sufficiency of a change of affidavit motion filed against the same Judge as such this
Court should find it an abuse of discretion and the entire April 18th, 2016 hearing
does nothing to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
65
impartiality of the judiciary, and actually shows impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety by the Judge Jack Burr District Court.
CONCLUSION/REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Appellants respectfully request this Court to remand, reverse,
and void the filing restrictions entered in this case since it was entered by a Court
that had lost its jurisdiction, and for any other just and proper order/ruling.
66
67
68

Appeal Brief 11-14-2016 ERIC MUATHE ET AL Vs HONORABLE KURTIS LOY ET AL Kansas Court of Appeals

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Appeal Brief 11-14-2016 ERIC MUATHE ET AL Vs HONORABLE KURTIS LOY ET AL Kansas Court of Appeals

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No.

HONORABLE KURTIS LOY, ET AL,

James Beckley Jr.,

UNDER K.S.A. 60-241, APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS HAD THE RIGHT TO DISMISS

STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................................................4

28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 (1994) ..................................................................................................7

APPELLANTS QUESTION WHETHER THIS COURT HAS BEEN CONFERRED

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ORDERING FILING RESTRICTIONS WHEN

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SIGNING AN ORDER THAT COMPLETELY IGNORED

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................25

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ASSEMBLY LINE OF CHAPTER 61

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................30

In re Robertson, 280 Kan 266, 120 P.3d 790 (2005) ...............................................................31

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT A

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................32

Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 4.4 ...................................................................35

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................38

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING MOTIONS TO BE HEARD THAT

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................40

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM ITS

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................42

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................47

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING A CHANGE OF JUDGE MOTION

STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................................................48

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

UNDER K.S.A. 60-241, APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS HAD THE RIGHT TO

APPELLANTS QUESTION WHETHER THIS COURT HAS BEEN CONFERRED

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ORDERING FILING RESTRICTIONS WHEN

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SIGNING AN ORDER THAT COMPLETELY

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ASSEMBLY LINE OF CHAPTER

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING MOTIONS TO BE HEARD THAT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING A CHANGE OF JUDGE

UNDER K.S.A. 60-241, APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS HAD THE RIGHT TO

Regarding Kimberly's appeal of the subsequent sanction order, the

automatic. To permit the substance of a pleading to be trumped by its caption

Similarly, as it did in Smith v. State 22 Kan.App.2d 922,924(Kan. Ct. App.

APPELLANTS QUESTION WHETHER THIS COURT HAS BEEN CONFERRED

make the determination -- and, of course, someone who apparently is

Void judgment is one rendered by Court which lacked personal or subject

activities to minimize the risk of conflicts that would result in frequent

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ORDERING FILING RESTRICTIONS WHEN

Lori-Bolton-Fleming from numerous complaints starting approximately with docket

complaints. Lori Flemings grotesque error by sending an inappropriate email has

As shown here in a summarized version Plaintiffs/Appellants have

`... Judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged communications, and

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SIGNING AN ORDER THAT COMPLETELY

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ASSEMBLY LINE OF

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY EXPEDITING COURT CASES SET FOR

abuse of discretion by the District Court which deprived it of subject matter

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING MOTIONS TO BE HEARD THAT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM

Appellants believe their due process rights, first amendment right to be

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD FILED UNCOUNTABLE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING A CHANGE OF JUDGE

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