Plato, Republic 9.

585c-d
Author(s): G. R. F. Ferrari
Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2002), pp. 383-388
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3556468
Accessed: 16-10-2016 16:49 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Cambridge University Press, The Classical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to The Classical Quarterly

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

SHORTER

NOTES

383

dashes in the Oxford text,10 will c

report of the death scene (and will
conceit, mentioned above, which wo
touching or squeezing his stiffenin
purpose. Gill has summarized what
toxicology, about the effects of he
its

effects

on

Socrates.'1

Plato,

he

conc

apparently choosing not to include t

by Nicander and verified by modern

choking, and convulsions.'2 He sug

Socrates' stamina and stoicism in t
details from his depiction of the d
Socrates' gradual loss of sensation, h

his presentation in Phaedo of death a

from Gill's paper with evident appro

pleasant effects of the poison'; the

warden has 'taken hold' of Socrates
suggest,

however,

underline

the

fact

that
that

friends to help the

poisoning: 'he alone

the

words

there

were

Ka
no

warden hold him

actually was hol

As for the presumed misplacement

regularly find themselves suffering
Kal rendered this one especially vuln

Brooklyn College, CUNYand Penn State University ARCHIBALD ALLEN

archibaldallen@msn.com
10 KaTEKAl7v t1TTLOS-- OTw' ydp EKELEV 6 &vOp On o9-KaL &a (ll17e5); . . . KC

EKKaAvgdL
,yap--EtrEv-.-O
~ S reAeraiiov bY,~yaro-- (118a6-7).
" C. Gill, 'ThevOS--fVEKEKUdAv
death of Socrates', CQ rr'o
23 (1973),
25-8.
12 Burnet, in Appendix I of his edition (above, n. 4), confesses that 'it is disturbing to be told,
as we are by some authorities, that hemlock-juice would produce quite different symptoms', that
is, from those described by Plato. But of course there was never any assurance that the death
scene in Phaedo is historically accurate. There is no guarantee that even Socrates' celebrated last
words, as recorded in the dialogue, are truly 'historical' (pace G. W. Most, 'A cock for Asclepius',

CQ 43 [1993], 96-111).
13 On EKLV)'07) (Socrates' final movement), which Rowe also thinks may allude to the poison-

ing's grimmer effects, see W. D. Geddes, Platonis Phaedo (London, 1885), 188: 'Probably not more
than "he quivered". Convulsion in articulo mortis was, when violent, indicated by aSa8ac?w.'

PLATO, REPUBLIC 9.585c-d

The sentence that appears in the best MSS at Republic 585c-'H oyv d'e d/Lolov
ovula ovlat rL "pi&AAov 4 7 rTl7 r37/A7 tLerXiEl;--makes no satisfactory sense in the
context of the argument of which it is part. Many emendations have been proposed,
but in recent decades this effort seems to have petered out. In general, we are slower

to propose emendations these days; and in particular, modem translators of the

Republic may have been swayed by the authority of Burnet's Oxford Classical Text,
which prints the sentence unemended. At any rate, they translate the sentence as it

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

384

SHORTER

NOTES

stands in Burnet, and without indicat

In my edition of a new translation of
emend the text at 585c. Our modern
when the text is one on which the bes
to refrain from emending a text, an

Even if the emendation adopted in

without its own problems, as one
has proven a persistent crux-still it
reminding scholars that a problem ex
The fundamental problem with the
about the covariance of being, know
relevant to the conclusion at which t
not

that

bad

the

transmitted

arguments

on

text

offers

occasion,

and

bad

Plat

generated

rather by the fact that the o

at 585b-e is straightforward, and has
what ought to occupy the position in

at

585c;

but

the

transmitted

text

do

doing the job. That is the problem.

The undisputed aim of the argumen
soul is superior to bodily satisfaction.

that

the

objects,

more

of

that

more'

is

more

that

genuine

quality

fact

soul

those

the

really,

naturally

fulfilment,
fulfilment

food

(p.dAAov

for

the

devaL,

is

more

satisfy

it

is

for

its
then ar

its

part

soul-knowled

585c3),

is

more

In this argument, knowledge takes th

not the role it plays in the problemat
being or substantiality-the being of t
translations, the argument at this poin
'And
knowledge?'

does

the

being

of

that

which

'Not at all.'

'Any more than it does in truth?'

'Again, no.'

' In an appendix to Book 9 of his edition, in which he justifies his own emendation, Adam
reviews alternative proposals (J. Adam, The Republic of Plato 2 [Cambridge, 1902 (1963)], 381-3).
He lists emendations by Hermann, Miller, Madvig, Baiter, and Stallbaum. (Stallbaum, however,
confined his proposal for emendation to a note; he did not include it in his text.) Older editors

and translators other than Burnet who refrain from emendation include Schneider,

Schleiermacher, Ast, and Jowett and Campbell. Hermann's emendation (see n. 3) is followed in

Paul Shorey's Loeb translation of 1935, and a close variant of it is followed in the Italian

translation of G. Fraccaroli (1932), in the French translation of E. Chambry (1948), and in the
German translation of R. Rufener (1950). The Spanish translation of J. Pabon and M. Galiano
(1949) follows Adam. Cornford in his Oxford translation of 1941 recognizes that the passage at
585c is problematic but chooses (in a footnote) to emend a different sentence from the one in

question here. In the final paragraph of this article I acknowledge those scholars whose

emendations are closest to the one I propose; but I have not attempted systematic criticism of
alternative proposals.
2 G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), Plato: The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge, 2000).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

is

alwa

SHORTER
'And

if

it

shared

less

in

NOTES
truth,

385
would

'Necessarily.'

'H ov & E 6oIov oia..a ov.r.as TL p aAAov '"E a "JL77aJS "ETEXEL;

TV 8'; &404Et~a;
O'SXE 70To0.

El 8U 'AOlqdas rTrov, od Kat O3al'aS;

A-vdyK?7.

This is a sudden and inexplicable turn of reasoning. The lines immediately preceding these offer a criterion by which to decide which has more being, the soul's or
the body's proper objects. In general, 'that which is connected with what is always
the same, immortal and true-itself possessing these qualities, and being found
in the context of things with these qualities' (7r 70ro dELt 60olov EXOPVOV KO a
Oava'rov Kat &AEas, Ka aT TOLOV"TOV Vat K 'v &TOLOVCT YLYVdOfEVOV) Will
have more being than 'that which is connected with what is never the same, and
mortal-itself possessing those qualities, and being found in the context of things
with those qualities' (To / /L78EorT ooE /oLOV Kat OVqT70o, KaL a~TO TOLOVTOV OV Kat EV

roLodV 7O YLYVopvov). The lines immediately following the disputed portion of the
argument present a conclusion:

'As a general rule, then, will the kinds of things involved in care of the body have a smaller share
both of truth and of being than the kinds involved in care of the soul?'
'Much smaller.'

OiKOiV
ra d TEpL'rrov
t'rvJA26ELa'
oO- aa4grE
roqo%
yi'v' -rcov yEVC(V ai 'r(3v r.Ept
ri
!9v ij OAw~
g OEpa7mrlav
KaL OEpa7rEtav
Oi aoat aIETEXEL;
HoAv yE.
The intervening passage, accordingly, ought to establish that the soul's proper objects
rather than the body's meet the criterion for having more being, and ought also to
link the share of being possessed by those objects with their share of truth.
But how could the traditional text be pressed into this service? Although it does
make the link between a thing's share of being and its share of truth, the subject whose

share of being and of truth is in question is 'the being of that which is always the
same', and not, as we would expect, food for the soul in contrast to food for the body.
And rather than establish that it is food for the soul that meets the criterion for having

more being-presumably by establishing its connection to what is always the samethe traditional text takes what is always the same as its topic, and asks, pointlessly,
after its share of being, knowledge, and truth.3

Clarity and point return if the text at 585c7-8 is emended thus:

oZV .. LEL .P.olou oV'alaIa TL iAAov 7 7'-E'7taJ7Jp a EIJE'XEL;

'Well, does anything have a greater share in the being of what is always the same than

knowledge does?'

3 A similar objection applies to the text as emended by Hermann. He changes the subject from

4 EL d~,olov o(ala to " d&vopolov oa'la. The variant adopted by several translators (see n. 1) is

77 deL voplolov ovaca. But it is just as pointless in context to take the being of what is not, or
never, the same and ask after its share of being, knowledge, and truth as it is to ask this question
of what is always the same.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

it

no

386

SHORTER

NOTES

Consider the run of argument at 58

criterion for deciding whether what
satisfies the body's, and then asks, in

knowledgeKnowledge
does. Theis,phrase
dEl 6dPolov
otiala p-EEXEL
up the
of that
criterion.
par excellence,
connected
with whattakes
is always
thefirst
same,part
itself
possessing that quality and being found in the context of things with that quality; for
knowledge that is worthy of the name is itself permanent and unvarying, and is
associated with the unvarying forms, among which it belongs (cf. Phaedrus 247d), and

which it takes as object. (I understand the phrase Kal a' Tro TOLOTOV OV K L' EV
roTo0L0Vr YyvoLevov as an explanation of EX0dLEvov rather than as introducing new

factors.) Glaucon, who back in Book 5 had volunteered enthusiastic praise of

knowledge over mere opinion (477e: 'How could anyone with any sense ever regard
what is infallible as the same as what is not infallible?'), is happy to confirm the exalted
rank that Socrates suggests for it here.

Socrates proceeds to the second part of the criterion for deciding what has more
being:
T( 8'; darl'das~ < sc. L PiAAov - g6TL'Tr7r-qLp PEEXEL >;
'Does anything have a greater share in truth than knowledge does?'4

Again the answer is no, for knowledge, being infallible, is par excellence both itself

true (ar'3 -roTorOrov v) and associated with what is true (Kal 'v 'VTOLO&-W

yLyvdoevov). The two questions about knowledge should both of course be understood to exclude from comparison the objects in which it shares. That is, 'anything'
implies 'anything other than the ever-same itself' and 'anything other than the truth
itself'.

Socrates is engaged in ranking what nourishes the soul against what nourishes the
body. Knowledge, so far as its connection with the ever-same and with truth goes, is

representative of the whole range of appropriate foods for the soul mentioned at
b14-cl. If nothing has a greater share than knowledge in what is always the same and
in truth, then what satisfies the body will certainly have a lesser share, and so have less

being. Socrates gets to this conclusion by asking

El 8' &SAOEtas Jrrov <sc. (ErE'XEL rt>, o0 Kait o'ataS;

'And if anything has a smaller share in truth, doesn't it also have a smaller share in being?

'Necessarily.'

This had been left implicit at c2-6--where &AWO ea, unlike -3 dEl opotov and 'or
aOdvarov, is not matched with an opposite-and is worth making explicit now.
Socrates arrives at the interim conclusion:

4 There is a third term in the criterion stated at 585cl-5: in addition to the connection with
what is always the same and with the truth Socrates mentions a connection with 'the immortal',

aOwva'rov. This does not reappear. It is presumably to be thought of as included under the

concept of that which is always the same, and is mentioned chiefly for the sake of the contrast
with Tio 'E p ro-7re olo' v Kao LGv~TOUVo <CEXdOLevov>, 'what is never the same, and mortal'.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

SHORTER

NOTES

387

OVKO0,V OAWC T' 7TEpL 7 V TOvo acol

%i'v 'i-k iUbiS7 OEpa TEtav 'jTTov &A'qe
'As a
both

general rule, then, will the kinds of

of truth and of being than the kind

turn

Platonic

now

Socrates'
perEXEL;)

The

may

and

philosophic

without

question

EVpots;.6
otlaa)

from

usage

is

much

Republic

absence

seem

odd,

Theaetetus

to

lin

difficulty

of

but

485c10

the
is

207c3

ar

also

(dEctr

involving a double genitive as in the

indeed be unusual if it were simply
expresses a broader concept. To 'share
simply to possess its quality but, as d
things with this quality. The more co
complex phrase.

Probably the most awkward aspect of

the adverbial phrase that it is, almost
predominantly in prose of the fifth an

phrase

in

Plato

182e3,

0JTVE

(omitting

the

spuria),

(once with pt7j) preceding; another

adverbial interrogative phrase t' pi
dpa

6pdv

rpoap')qdov

'Nor then should anything be called se

mean 'Nor then should it be called see

however,

is

unequivocal:

TO

S'

tAoao

ap/ldrTTroL Ka tEf LEAeUaTE'pW

'XOL
something like this, would suit him be

not

precise

parallel,

does

at

least

de

indefinite -r next to tiAAov without

Moreover, if the emended text is corr
adverbial reading would likely have c
'

Strictly

being

speaking,

possessed

585bl2-and not
the ground for

by

Socrates

the

should

two

conce

kinds

of

also with their share of tr

the ultimate conclusion th

true (vnrwg TE K at dAqEaET'pwS, 585el).

6 Here -L is object rather than subject. Fo
is subject, see Republic 609c2. (All searche
databank of the TLG, CD-ROM #D, usin

At

Republic

374b4

there

is

even

an

ex

aKVTLK'q9 SEE 1.Lov K-q8Ecrat K 7TOAEtI

8 A partial parallel that involves the inte

v VoLSo o0v 8LaCoELpoLELv TOLS tLEYlo

po?7Odev q vopoOOiErTv;. Here the type
the interrogation
from Aristotle's

emendation, except that

The following two cases

A'E-irat

(115b3),

'if

anything

is

describe

-owrovT rAoS (151a12), 'or if anything is

genitive after ~pAAov as in the proposed e

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

388

SHORTER

NOTES

The

first

step

have

been

the

of

variants

along

the

path

by

misinterpretation

to

ov'Yla

otailas.

which

of

j4

Finally,

/ETErXEL all too readily became E'ImtT

The emendation proposed here is in t

and by Garrod"- both of whom grasp

585c7-8 was 'does anything have a gre
the

'x'

in

question,

for

them,

is

oatl'a

si

makes for a less satisfactory connec

Another ancestor who should be me
proposes

makes

oiv

similar

de'

ol'ov

sense

of

aia

the

pihAAh

argument,

University of California, Berkeley G. R. F. FERRARI

gferrari@socrates.berkeley.edu

9 I owe the reasoning in this paragraph to Donald Mastronarde-whom I also t

helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this piece.

10 Otto Apelt, review of J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, Wochenschriftfiir klassisc

13 (1903), 338-50, at 348-50.

" H.W. Garrod, 'Two passages of the Republic', CR 20 (1906), 209-12, at 210-1
12 R. G. Bury, 'On Plato, Republic IX. 585c-d', CR 13 (1899), 289-90.
13 Karl Vretska, 'Platonica III', WS 71 (1958), 30-54, at 52-4.
14 Both Bury and Vretska claim that the use of jAwsg at 585dl indicates that so
bodily food has been previously mentioned. But a sufficient contrast between

general is also set up, on my proposal, by the question 'and if anything [i.e. if any par

has a smaller share in truth, doesn't it also have a smaller share in being?' Adam

his own
Bury's,
since itof
too
makes
r'La-rt117q
(torespects
be exact,
t
subject
ofproposal
LTE'XEL. to
The
shortcomings
Adam's
proposal
in other
are9we
by Apelt (n. 10). In revising this article I have benefited from the criticism of an
reader for CQ and from objections to my emendation contained in an as yet unpub
Paul-Jon Benson and Jay Elliott.

NEW LIGHT ON AN OLD CRUX:

PLATO, PHILEBUS 66a8*

H q v 8r) O'ab)EL3, WP` JrcbapXEj 15 TTE diYY,'WV ld,47Twv Kat rrapovat Okp6 wv,
t Sovl KT IrfLa o0K 3UTrt 7rpC rov oXS'" at 8Ev'rEpov, AAd r7Tpd^rov piv 1r-) 7rpp%

/L.Tpov KatL r .Trptov Kat KaLpov Kat rravra o'rroaa Xp-q 'rotara vvo/LELVt, riTv f

dlt'tov *7p aOat. (Phil.66 a4-8)

a8 7rqv &aiSov BTW, Eusebius, PRE. 14.21.6, Stobaeus,

rvd t 7"1sov yp. W in marg. ?jpraOata (np- B) BW, St

Eusebii ON (Oaaolv): dp^aOat d,,oatv Parisinus 1812 (e

This is the manuscript evidence. I have checked Di

photographs in my possession; for B I have used

* It is a pleasure to record here my indebtedness to Pr

Cambridge) and to Professor Jean Irigoin (College de

mented on a first draft of this note, which I dedicate to t

1 Plato, Codex Oxoniensis Clarkianus 39 phototypice edi

1898-9).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Sun, 16 Oct 2016 16:49:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms