12.

DUMLAO V COMELEC
Facts: Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from
his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for re-election to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas PambansaBlg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign. (Not relevant to Dumlaos case)
Ruling: Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable
classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The
need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant
is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such
denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class.
34. ICHONG V HERNANDEZ
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
A prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are
not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade aliens actually
engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their

licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical
persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. Citizens and juridical
entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
Provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
Provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected
by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process
The subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
The Act violates international and treaty obligations
The provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of
the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen,
which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is
this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely
on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien
may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a
monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.

38. TAXICAB OPERATORS V BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the
City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 7742 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to
nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum
circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
39. LUTZ V ARANETA
Facts:
A Walter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, sought to
recover the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes from the Commissioner under Section E of
Commonwealth Act 567 (the Sugar Adjustment Act), alleging that such tax is unconstitutional as it levied
for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is in his opinion not a public purpose.

Issue:
Whether the tax is valid in supporting an industry.
Held:
The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, i.e. to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of
the threatened sugar industry. The act is primarily an exercise of police power, and is not a pure exercise
of taxing power. As sugar production is one of the great industries of the Philippines; and that its
promotion, protection and advancement redounds greatly to the general welfare, the legislature found that
the general welfare demanded that the industry should be stabilized, and provided that the distribution of
benefits therefrom be readjusted among its component to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase
in tax that it had to sustain. Further, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental
stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products, etc., as well as to the
improvement of living and working conditions in sugar mills.

42. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the
E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public
safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power
of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private

property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
47. TIO V VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code provided that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate,
as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any
motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty
percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractors specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby
resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie
industry.
Issue: Whether the tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: Yes. Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of the 30% tax is
for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and
the proliferation of pornographic videotapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution, which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are

virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors permit and municipal license fees are required to
engage in business.

52. YNOT V IAC

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626).
To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling
that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from
one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they
can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions
and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
55. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUESON V ERICTA
Facts: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically
provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC
justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking

without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
57. CITY OF MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY
Facts: On Dec. 11 1916 presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands used
by the Chinese Community as their cemetery be expropriated for an extension of Rizal Avenue.
The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila alleged that if expropriation would take effect, it would
disturb the resting places of the dead, and would require a large sum of money to transfer the
bodies; furthermore, the expropriation was unnecessary as a public improvement. Plaintiffs
theory however is that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to
expropriate land, it may expropriate anyl and it may desire; that the only function of the court in
such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask
any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the
land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the
method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with
the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that
the courts have the right to inquire into.
59. REPUBLIC V PDLT
FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT tenable government offices
to call private parties. Their subscription agreement prohibits the public use of the service
furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to
the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT,
and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. On 7April 1958, the defendant
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau
of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented
trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but
even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the
PLDT. Soon after, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Republic
commenced suit against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in
its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through
the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a

writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the
existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
ISSUE: Whether the courts may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic.
HELD: We agree with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract
where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract.
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and
by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But
the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT
to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course,
the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property
is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the
Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require
a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both
telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.
80. LLADOC V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Facts:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the then
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the
construction of a new Catholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On
March 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donors gift tax return. Subsequently, on April 1960, the CIR issued an
assessment for donees gift tax in the amount of P1,370 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly
from May 1958 to June 1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental of which Lladoc was a priest.
Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then appealed to the CTA, in his petition
for review, he claimed that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest, thus, he is not liable.
Moreover, he asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would
not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the Constitution (exempt ang church etc from taxes).
The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON donees gift tax should be paid
Held:
Yes.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries,churchesand
parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and alllands,buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated,
as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector

assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon
general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just
mentioned. Agift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift
inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt
from taxation," as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of Lladoc, the
exemption herein must be denied.
However, the Court noted the merit of Lladocs claim, and held as liable the Head of Diocese for being
the real party in interest instead of Lladoc who was held to be not personally liable; the former manifested
that it was submitting himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he presented Lladocs brief,
by reference, as his own and for allpurposes.

96. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATOR V CITY OF MANILA

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorities. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated
the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the

statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard ofdue process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right
to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license
fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the
full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."

129. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSN V PRADO

Facts: Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC)
to withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court processes).
Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the
judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need
is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained
in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all
at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including
those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not
solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of
age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.