A.C. No.

4103

September 7, 1995

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS,

and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the

respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other
offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this
complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically
allege:

1.
That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No.
CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid
Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our
attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence
in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid
case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high
on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act
accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the
sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we
were deduced [sic] in default.

2.
That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in
order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the
incessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us.
Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because according to
him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated
August 17, 1993.

3.
That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost
the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only
proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his
profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was
cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately
denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing
cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff
therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was
declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he
unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake
but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion
case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union
(FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his
attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent
then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his
failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument
that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they
were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they
have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and

Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino
Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his
expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared

illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate
Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges
appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants
herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said
case on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the MedArbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was
involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and
ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration,
however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required
the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of
fifteen days from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of
Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both
denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were
declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence exparte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop
the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein
to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as
moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and
P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this
Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were
illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter
were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of
the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for

every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he]
instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred,
dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to
honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not
an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on
the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in
his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to
volume and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress
upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his
failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default
order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly
invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work,
while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the
trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal
work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first
presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an
answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court
had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order
reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in
denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely
based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the
respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial
court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued
refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in
the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the
said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order.
Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that
the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the
judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court
either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's
inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the
complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof
which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for
damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the
complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is
a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so
convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably
informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand

why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon
initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he
meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the
complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They
could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or
that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any
blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable
negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED

to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED

VALERIANA U. DALISAY,
Complainant,

-versus-

ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 5655

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 23, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding
Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months.

A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents

services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc.,
complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of
documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from
complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she

terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her

money and documents, but respondent refused.

On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that
for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been
taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged
conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office.
She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of
P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be
dismissed.

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarros Report and
Recommendation.

On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.

Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I,
Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned
of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax
declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the
Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a
Sworn Affidavit Complaint[1] against complainant charging her with violations of
Article 171[2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised Penal Code. He
alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044.
She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for
declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree.

Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as
August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he
was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about
it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case,
preventing him from doing his job.

And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004,
prompting him to file falsification cases against her.

In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent

violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he
filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her
money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents
earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her
money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt.

We deny respondents motion for reconsideration.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for

every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client
relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.
[5] From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion.[6]

Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of

P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044.
Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have
ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that
he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in
Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to
show that he initiated new petitions.

With ingenuity, respondent now claims that complainant did not engage his
services for Civil Case No. 00-044 but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of
two new petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability.
Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully disassociate himself as

complainants counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any

dereliction of duties.

But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound
by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,
[7] he categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case
No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:

4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.

4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano
is a bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044.

4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano did not inquire the reason
for the referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred
because Atty. Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better
position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.

xxxxxx

5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and
demanded that he provides her with free legal service.

xxxxxx

5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044)
would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the
services of Atty. Oliver Lozano.

5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she
and her lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein.

5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in

Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on
the factual and legal matters surrounding the said case.

5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant

became even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case
No. 00-044.

5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular
client is she insists in retaining his services.

5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees.

5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that
he will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may
have to be prepared and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case.
xxxxxx

5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said
Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that
the acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced.

xxxxxx

5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20,
2001. The latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver
Lozano and his (respondents) decision to reduce the acceptance fee.

5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two
simply because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced
acceptance fee.

Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondents Memorandum[8]

filed with the IBP.

Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his

previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early
what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the
proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules,
but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.[9] The
present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents
previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No.
00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its
consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents
inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.

At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents

services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still,
his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed
any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should
immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we
held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the
client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee,
but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client
on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is
yet to return the money.

Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil
Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction.
After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to
enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have
returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing
nothing.

In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the

blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents
vital to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This
is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied
representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability
to handle the case.[11] As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of
the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its
own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating
that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for

his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and

taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant.

In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary
evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against
her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil

Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not.
First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated
fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law,
Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he

should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent
representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship
with her.

Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because

there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant
because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This
brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The
pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant
had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active
search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of
fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after
the news of his suspension spread in the legal community. To our mind, there is
absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or
omission that is fait accompli.

Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was

motivated by vindictiveness.

In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her
retainer.[12] It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is
highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential
character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.[13] If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession.[14] Indeed, law is an exacting goddess demanding of her
votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision

dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report
immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED

VIRGINIA VILLAFLORES,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS,

Respondent.

A. C. No. 7504
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 23, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by complainant Virginia

Villaflores against respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, charging the latter with Gross
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
Complainant Virginia Villaflores is the defendant in Civil Case No. 1218-BG
entitled, Spouses Sanchez represented by Judith Medina vs. Spouses Villaflores,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33.

Receiving an unfavorable judgment, complainant sought the help of the Public

Attorneys Office (PAO) to appeal her case to the Court of Appeals. The PAO filed
for her a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.

On 1 September 2004, complainant received a copy of a Notice[2] from the Court

of Appeals requiring her to file her appellants brief within 45 days from receipt
thereof.

Immediately thereafter, complainant approached respondent, who had previously

handled her sons case, to file on her behalf the required appellants brief. Since
respondent agreed to handle the appeal, complainant handed to respondent on 8
September 2004 the amount of P10,000.00 as partial payment of the latters
acceptance fee of P20,000.00, together with the entire records of the case. The
following day, on 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of
respondents acceptance fee in the amount of P10,000.00. These payments were
duly receipted and acknowledged[3] by the respondent.

On 21 September 2004, an Employment Contract[4] was executed between

complainant and respondent whereby the former formally engaged the latters
professional services. Upon the execution of said contract, complainant again
paid the respondent the amount of P2,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses.[5]

On 14 January 2005, complainant received a copy of a Resolution[6] dated 6

January 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals dismissing her appeal for failure to
file her appellants brief within the reglementary period. Thus, on 17 January
2005, complainant went to respondents office but failed to see respondent.

After several unsuccessful attempts to talk to the respondent, complainant went

to Manila on 18 January 2005 to seek help from another lawyer who agreed to
handle the case for her. On 19 January 2005, complainant went back to the

respondents office to retrieve the records of her case. Respondent allegedly

refused to talk to her.

Aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainant filed the instant

administrative complaint against respondent.

In her Answer,[7] respondent admitted her issuance of the acknowledgment

receipts for the aggregate amount of P22,000.00, the execution of the
Employment Contract between her and complainant, and the issuance by the
Court of Appeals of the Notice to File Appellants Brief and Resolution dated 6
January 2005. She, however, denied all other allegations imputed against her.
Respondent argued that the non-filing of the appellants brief could be attributed
to the fault of the complainant who failed to inform her of the exact date of
receipt of the Notice to File Appellants Brief from which she could reckon the 45day period to file the same. Complainant allegedly agreed to return to respondent
once she had ascertained the actual date of receipt of said Notice, but she never
did. Complainant supposedly also agreed that in the event she could not give the
exact date of receipt of the Notice, respondent would just wait for a new Order or
Resolution from the Court of Appeals before she would file the appropriate
pleading. Respondent further contended that she had, in fact, already made
preliminary study and initial research of complainants case.

Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, on 17 June 2005.

On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his

Report and Recommendation,[8] finding respondent liable for gross negligence
and recommending the imposition upon her of the penalty of one year
suspension, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be declared
guilty of gross negligence in failing to file the required appellants brief for which
act she should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Also, it is recommended that the respondent be ordered to return the amount of
P22,000.00 that she received from the complainant.

Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution[9] No. XVII-2006-584

dated 15 December 2006, approving with modification the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents gross negligence in
failing to file the required appellants brief, Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with Warning that a
repetition of similar conduct will be dealt with more severely and ORDERED TO
RETURN the amount of P22,000.00 she received from complainant.

The core issue in this administrative case is whether the respondent committed
culpable negligence in handling complainants case as would warrant disciplinary
action.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
and, thus, sustain the same. Respondents conduct in failing to file the appellants
brief for complainant before the Court of Appeals falls below the standards
exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their clients cause.

The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.
[10] To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his
profession.[11]

It must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent already agreed

to take on complainants case, receiving from the latter partial payment of her
acceptance fee and the entire records of complainants case. The very next day, 9
September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance fee.
Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for the legal
services she is to render to complainant and P2,000.00 for the miscellaneous
expenses she is to incur in handling the case, and the subsequent execution of
the employment contract between her and complainant. Hence, it can be said
that as early as 8 September 2004, respondents rendition of legal services to
complainant had commenced, and from then on, she should start protecting the

complainants interests. The employment contract between respondent and

complainant already existed as of 8 September 2004, although it was only
reduced into writing on 21 September 2004. In short, respondents acceptance of
the payment for her professional fees and miscellaneous expenses, together with
the records of the case, effectively bars her from disclaiming the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between her and complainant.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.[12] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney
who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that
is, until the case becomes final and executory.

As ruled in Rabanal v. Tugade[13]:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession.

Respondents defense that complainant failed to inform her of the exact date
when to reckon the 45 days within which to file the appellants brief does not
inspire belief or, at the very least, justify such failure. If anything, it only shows
respondents cavalier attitude towards her clients cause.

A case in point is Canoy v. Ortiz,[14] where the Court ruled that the lawyers
failure to file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code.
There, the Court ruled that the lawyer could not shift the blame to his client for
failing to follow up his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client of
the status of cases.

Respondent cannot justify her failure to help complainant by stating that after
receipt of part of the acceptance fee, she did not hear anymore from
complainant. The persistence displayed by the complainant in prosecuting this
complaint belies her lack of enthusiasm in fighting for her rights, as alleged by
respondent.

This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the perspective of
the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.[15]

A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner;
and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers
generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to
be his clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or
that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the
business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or
do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to
discharge his obligations diligently.[16]

Respondent has obviously failed to measure up to the foregoing standards.

It may be true that the complainant shares the responsibility for the lack of
communication between her and respondent, her counsel. Respondent, however,
should not have depended entirely on the information her client gave or at the
time the latter wished to give it. Respondent, being the counsel, more than her
client, should appreciate the importance of complying with the reglementary
period for the filing of pleadings and know the best means to acquire the
information sought. Had she made the necessary inquiries, respondent would

have known the reckoning date for the period to file appellants brief with the
Court of Appeals. As a lawyer representing the cause of her client, she should
have taken more control over her clients case.

Respondents dismal failure to comply with her undertaking is likewise evident

from the fact that up until 19 January 2005, when complainant retrieved the
entire records of her case, and more than four months from the time her services
were engaged by complainant, respondent still had not prepared the appellants
brief.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In this case, by reason of respondents negligence, the complainant suffered

actual loss. Complainant faced the risk of losing entirely her right to appeal and
had to engage the services of another lawyer to protect such a right.

This Court will not countenance respondents failure to observe the reglementary
period to file the appellants brief. Counsels are sworn to protect the interests of
their clients and in the process, should be knowlegeable about the rules of
procedure to avoid prejudicing the interests of their clients or worse,
compromising the integrity of the courts. Ignorance of the procedural rules on
their part is tantamount to inexcusable negligence.[17] However, the matter
before us does not even call for counsels knowledge of procedural rules, but
merely her managerial skills in keeping track of deadlines for filing necessary
pleadings, having difficulty with which, she could have always opted to timely
withdraw from the case in order not to prejudice further her clients interest.

The failure of respondent to file the appellants brief for complainant within the
reglementary period constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon,[18]
this Court held:

An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure
to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.
(People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious
lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban, 43
SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the
interest of complainant, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of
law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its
expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence of the public.
In People v. Cawili,[19] we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief
within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action.
People v. Villar, Jr.[20] characterized a lawyers failure to file a brief for his client
as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held that the filing of
a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the
court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon[22] reiterated Ford v.
Daitol[23] and In re: Santiago F. Marcos[24] in holding that an attorneys failure to
file a brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence.

In cases involving a lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleadings before an

appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the Bar
from the practice of law for three months,[25] six months,[26] or even
disbarment in severely aggravated cases.[27]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and

adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely. Furthermore, respondent is hereby ORDERED to return the
amount of Twenty-Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00), which she received from
complainant Virginia Villaflores.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED

March 3, 1923

In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,

Juan Sumulong for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance

Wislizenus for a period of one year, the case has been elevated to this court as
provided by law, for full investigation of the facts involved, and for the rendition
of the appropriate order.

The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at

Cebu, Cebu. On March 20, 1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia
Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property, including
twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the Philippine
Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he borrowed
P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter,
to guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National
Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. On April 13, 1921,
Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine
National Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, the shares of stock in question, to guarantee the payment of the loan
above referred to.

These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on
behalf of the respondent, which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him
from the legal profession. To quote counsel for the respondent, "the misconduct

of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares
belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his personal debt."

Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is this: Are
the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes
other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a
lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct?

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for
any of the causes therein enumerated. It will be noticed that our statute merely
provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or
suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these shall constitute
the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or
suspended for other reasons.

It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment

is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect.
Even where the Legislature has specified the grounds for disbarment, the
inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted.

The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion
that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer
for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is so phrased as to be broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.

Passing now to the second point as a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions.
The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through
misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional
honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe
person to manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a distinction
can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and
the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character.

The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. vs.
Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474). Here it was held, by a divided court, that where
property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his professional advice, and

he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he
claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the
property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of
client and attorney not being created by such trust, his conduct, however
censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee, is not such as to
warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name
from the roll of attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy
by suit. The Illinois court, however, admits that although the general rule is, that
an attorney-at-law will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional
capacity, but as an individual, there are cases forming an exception where his
misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require
his disbarment.

The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906], 73

Kan., 743). In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it was said:

It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the
cause for disbarment named in the statute. As will be observed, the statute does
not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be
revoked or suspended are those specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit the
common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by
excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. It merely
provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or
suspension of an attorney's license. (Gen. Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case
of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this statute is not an
enabling act, but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; that "it is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice; that it may be exercised without any special
statutory authority, and in all proper cases, unless positively prohibited by
statute; and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be
disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is authority in the
Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute
causes for disbarment, or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised
from time immemorial, it should not be deemed to have done so unless its
purpose is clearly expressed. It is generally held that the enumeration of the
grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of the court, but that attorneys may be removed for common-law
causes when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is
inimical to the due administration of justice . . . .

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing
the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person

of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license

or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.
So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of
Kansas are sound.

The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual
maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward.
The bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the
ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and faithfully to
discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our attention
that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint him the
guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado
que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc." (The undersigned attorney,
appointed testamentary guardian, etc.) which indicates that petitioner might not
have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same
time been a lawyer.

Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been
suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the only
blot upon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that the trial court has been
extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we sitting in first
instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.

Judgment affirmed. So ordered.

ADM. CASE No. 5252

May 20, 2004

PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.
DECISION

VITUG, J.:

On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged respondent Atty. Henry Adaza
with gross misconduct and as being unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a three-page complaint-affidavit complainant averred that respondent obtained
a loan from the former and, to secure the repayment thereof, drew and issued
two BPI Family Bank checks. When the first check (No. 0350973) was presented
for payment upon maturity, the same was dishonored for insufficient funds.
According to complainant, respondent, acting with malice and deceit, dated the
second check "January 24, 1996," so that, once presented for payment, it would
be, considering, in passing, that the loan was incurred on 23 November 1996, a
stale check. She alleged that, despite repeated verbal and written demands,
respondent had failed to make good his obligation.

Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent to comment thereon

within ten (10) days from notice. In a letter, dated 26 September 2000,
complainant asked that the complaint be now considered submitted for resolution
in view of the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply with the order of the Court
requiring him to file his comment. In a resolution, dated 06 December 2000, the
Court noted the letter of complainant, and it directed that the complaint be
thereby referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file his answer to the
complaint, respondent continued to ignore the matter. Finally, on 20 February
2002, the case was set for hearing by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The
complainant appeared. Respondent did not show up despite his having been duly
notified of the hearing by personal service effected on 12 February 2002.
Respondents failure to appear prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to
grant the request of complainant to allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte. An
order was issued setting the proceedings on 18 March 2002 for such reception of
evidence. A copy of the order was served on respondent on 28 February 2002 at
his given address.

On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter from Atty. Adaza, sent via
the facilities of PTT, requesting for a resetting of the hearing from 18 March to 18
April 2002, claiming that he was already committed to attend a hearing at the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20 March 2002.

The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception of complainants
evidence ex-parte was held, but the same was without loss of right on the part of
respondent to conduct, if desired, a cross-examination of the witness. The
evidence of complainant showed that complainant used to avail of the notarial
services of Atty. Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. In 1995,
respondent requested complainant, and the latter agreed, to be the primary
sponsor in the baptismal of his daughter. In November 1996, respondent
accompanied by a certain Arlene went to the residence of complainant to seek a
loan. The latter lent respondent the sum of P60,000.00 payable with interest at
5% a month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank Checks No. 35073 and
No. 35076, each for P31,800.00, dated 23 December 1996 and 24 January 1996,
respectively. When presented for collection Check No. 035073 was dishonored by
the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The other
check, Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24 January 1996, was not accepted
for being a stale check.

Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent but her efforts proved to
be futile. Several demand letters were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto
Jacinto, complainants lawyer, but these letters also failed to elicit any response.
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City for Check No. 035073. Finding probable
cause, the complaint was subsequently elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A
warrant of arrest was issued by the court, but respondent somehow succeeded in
evading apprehension. Sometime in November 2000, respondent went to the
house of complainant and promised to pay the checks within a months time.
Complainant agreed to have the service of the warrant of arrest withheld but,
again, respondent failed to make good his promise.

The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was set on 22 May 2002. The
stenographer was directed to transcribe the stenographic notes as soon as
possible for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An order was issued to this effect, and a
copy thereof was served upon respondent on 09 April 2002.

On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-examination but Atty. Adaza
did not appear despite due notice. In light of the manifestation of complainant
that she had no other witness to present and was ready to close her evidence,
she was given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a formal offer and
respondent was given a like period to thereupon submit his comment and/or
opposition thereto. The order, dated 22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza on
28 May 2002. The formal offer of complainants evidence was deemed submitted
for resolution on 25 June 2002 pending proof of service of a copy thereof upon
respondent and the filing of the necessary comment or opposition thereto by the
latter.

In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set the reception of

evidence for respondent on 13 November 2002 in order to give him another
opportunity to rebut the evidence of complainant. Respondent again failed to
appear on the date set therefor, prompting the Commission to rule on the
admissibility of Exhibits "A" to "D" with their submarkings. There being no
appearance on the part of respondent despite due notice, the case was
considered submitted for resolution by the Commission in its order of 26 February
2003.

The Commission submitted its report and recommendation, dated 28 May 2003,
recommending the suspension of respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, and that he be ordered to pay to complainant
the value of the two unpaid checks he issued to complainant.

The Court adopts the recommendation.

A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney

for any deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office.1 The word "conduct" used in
the rules is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance
of the lawyers professional duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although
not connected with his professional duties, that would show him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court
are not limitative2 and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including
dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.3 Such misdeed
puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law,4 in
serious doubt.

Respondents issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to

comply with his just obligation for nearly eight years is appalling5 and hardly
deserves compassion from the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty of gross misconduct, and

he is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon receipt hereof. This decision is without prejudice to the
outcome of the Criminal Case for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed
against him. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record in the Bar
Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA DIVINA CRUZ-VILLANUEVA,

Complainant,
A.C. No. 7123

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA and Promulgated:

ATTY. ALEXANDER P. SIMEON, JR.,

Respondents. November 20, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Maria Divina Cruz-Villanueva

(complainant) against Atty. Carlos P. Rivera (respondent Rivera) and Atty.
Alexander P. Simeon, Jr. (respondent Simeon, Jr.) for grave misconduct and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Sometime in January 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent

Rivera to prepare the documents, and to pay all the necessary expenses, relating
to the sale of complainants property to Samson B. Bautista (Bautista). As shown
by an acknowledgment receipt,[1] respondent Rivera received P80,000 from
complainant to cover expenses payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
the Register of Deeds, the City Treasurers Office, and others.

On Bautistas death in February 2004, complainant learned that the property had
been transferred in Bautistas name based on a Deed of Reconveyance[2]
executed by complainant. Bautistas widow also informed complainant that final
payment for the property would be withheld pending payment of all the
necessary taxes.[3] The BIR also directed complainant to explain why no tax
evasion charges should be filed against her for non-payment of taxes on the
transfer.[4]

Respondent Rivera then convinced complainant to file an adverse claim on the

property and to file cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22

against Bautistas widow. Respondent Rivera requested and received P13,000 as

acceptance fee and representation expenses.[5]

After repeated verbal requests, complainant wrote a letter[6] to respondent

Rivera to clarify the issue on the non-payment of taxes and the alleged Deed of
Reconveyance, which complainant claimed she did not execute. Complainant
likewise inquired about the adverse claim supposedly filed by respondent Rivera
on her behalf. Complainant also directed respondent Rivera to pay immediately
the necessary taxes to the BIR.
Complainant later learned that respondent Rivera had no notarial commission for
the years 2003 and 2004.[7]

Complainant also charged respondent Simeon, Jr., Regional Director, Registry of

Deeds, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, of conspiracy with respondent Rivera in
registering the property under Bautistas name based on the Deed of
Reconveyance without payment of the proper taxes. Complainant alleged that
respondent Simeon, Jr. allowed the registration despite knowledge that there was
a prior Deed of Sale[8] and that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of the
P80,000 to facilitate the transfer.

In an Order dated 18 October 2004, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondents to answer the complaint.
Respondent Rivera asked for an extension of ten days to file his answer.[9]
However, respondent Rivera did not file any answer.

In his Answer[10] dated 22 November 2004, respondent Simeon, Jr. denied

complainants allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against
him. On the registration in Bautistas name without payment of the required
taxes, respondent Simeon, Jr. claimed that he relied on the genuineness and
authenticity of the documents presented by respondent Rivera. Respondent
Simeon, Jr. denied that he received money from respondent Rivera to facilitate
the transfer. Respondent Simeon, Jr. also disavowed any knowledge of a prior
Deed of Sale.

IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco (Commissioner Pacheco) set the case for
mandatory conference on 11 March 2005. Only complainant and respondent
Simeon, Jr. appeared in the 11 March 2005 hearing. The hearing was canceled
and reset for 15 April 2005. Only complainant appeared in the 15 April 2005
hearing. Despite receipt of notices of hearing, respondent Rivera did not attend
any of the hearings.

Commissioner Pacheco required all the parties to submit their position papers
and documentary evidence. Complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. both filed
position papers. Respondent Simeon, Jr. submitted a reply to complainants
position paper. Respondent Rivera did not submit any position paper, thus
waiving his right to comment and participate in the investigation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-07 dated 28 January
2006 adopting with modification[11] Commissioner Pachecos Report and
Recommendation finding respondent Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and
serious violation of the Code. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the
imposition on respondent Rivera of a penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for two years.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent Simeon, Jr. for lack of merit.

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[12] of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent Rivera liable for violation of the lawyers oath and the
Code.

The Court agrees with the IBP that the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr.
should be dismissed.

Complaint Must be Supported by Substantial Evidence

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with

substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint.[13] Mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[14]

Aside from complainants bare allegations, complainant did not present any
evidence to prove that respondent Simeon, Jr. conspired with respondent Rivera
in registering the property in Bautistas name based on the Deed of Reconveyance
without payment of taxes. Likewise, complainant did not present any evidence to
prove that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of the P80,000 from respondent
Rivera for the registration. Hence, the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr.
should be dismissed.

Respondent Rivera Not Commissioned as Notary Public

A member of the Bar who notarizes a document when he has no authorization or

commission to do so may be subjected to disciplinary action. Notarization is not
an empty act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity and due execution.[15]

Respondent Rivera notarized the Deed of Sale and the Deed of Reconveyance
sometime in January 2004. However, the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, issued a certification that respondent
Rivera had no notarial commission for the years 2003 and 2004.[16] Respondent
Rivera did not present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, when respondent
Rivera notarized the two deeds, he had no authority to do so.

In performing notarial work without a commission, respondent Rivera violated the

lawyers oath to obey the law, specifically the Notarial Law, and to do no
falsehood. Respondent Rivera also violated Rule 1.01[17] of the Code because he
deceived complainant into believing that he was authorized to act as notary
public when he was not. Respondent Riveras conduct constitutes malpractice and
falsification of a public document.[18]

Respondent Rivera Failed to Account for the Money

He Received from Complainant

The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all funds of his client
that may come into his possession.[19] The Code further states that a lawyer
shall account for all money received from the client.[20]

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer must render an accounting to the client showing that the money was
spent for the intended purpose.[21] Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money
to the client.[22]

Respondent Rivera specifically received P80,000 from complainant for expenses

to the BIR, the Register of Deeds, the City Treasurers Office and other related
purposes. Respondent Rivera also received P13,000 from complainant as
acceptance fee and representation expenses for the filing of the adverse claim
and criminal charges against Bautistas widow. However, respondent Rivera did
not pay the taxes to the BIR and did not file an adverse claim. Hence, respondent
Rivera should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to
complainant.

Respondent Riveras failure to make an accounting or to return the money to

complainant is a violation of the trust reposed on him. As a lawyer, respondent
Rivera should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity because the Code exacts a high degree of fidelity and trust
from members of the bar.[23]

The Court also notes respondent Riveras lack of respect for the IBP and its
proceedings. After filing the Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer[24]
and despite receipt of the IBPs orders and notices, respondent Rivera did not
participate in the investigation. Respondent Riveras actuation shows a high
degree of irresponsibility which stains the nobility of the legal profession.[25]

On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Rivera

Notaries public who notarize documents without the requisite commission are
penalized with revocation of their notarial commission and are barred from being
commissioned as notary public.[26] Thus, respondent Rivera should be barred

from being commissioned as notary public for one year and his notarial
commission, if any, revoked.

On the other hand, lawyers guilty of violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the
Code are suspended from the practice of law for six months to one year.[27]
Considering respondent Riveras lack of prior administrative record, suspension
from the practice of law for one year and not disbarment, as prayed for by
complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the
legal profession.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera GUILTY of violation of the

lawyers oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 16, and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera from
the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this decision. Further,
respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is BARRED from being commissioned as notary
public for one year and his present commission, if any, is REVOKED. Furthermore,
respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is ORDERED TO ACCOUNT to complainant, within
20 days from notice of this decision, for the P80,000 and the P13,000.

We DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. Alexander P. Simeon, Jr.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorneys. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 6266

November 16, 2006

ESTELA ANASTACIO-BRIONES, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO A. ZAPANTA, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a disbarment complaint filed by Estela Anastacio-Briones against

respondent Atty. Alfredo A. Zapanta for abandonment and neglect of duties.

In her Complaint1 dated December 1, 2003, Estela Anastacio-Briones stated that

she engaged the services of respondent to file three civil cases involving a parcel
of land located in Antipolo City. The cases were then consolidated2 before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73.

Complainant averred that on October 25, 2002, she showed respondent a copy of
"Discharge and Appearance of Counsels with Ex-parte Motion to Cancel the
October 25, 2002 Hearing" she intended to file that day. She claimed that even
prior to the hearing, she informed respondent of her joint venture agreement with
a real estate developer who offered the services of its own counsel. Complainant
added that respondent requested her not to file it and he would submit a
withdrawal of appearance instead. Complainant also informed respondent that
she could not attend the hearing on January 6, 2003 because of other
commitments. Respondent allegedly assured her that he would be present in the
hearing.

On January 6, 2003, both respondent and complainant failed to appear in the

hearing. As a result, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to
present further witnesses and directed them to file their formal offer of evidence
within ten days from notice. The trial court noted that respondent received its
Order on January 24, 2003, but respondent did not act on it within the ten-day
period. Instead of filing a formal offer of evidence, respondent filed a withdrawal
of appearance on March 5, 2003. On March 10, 2003, the trial court dismissed the
case with prejudice.3

On May 5, 2003, complainant learned that the cases were dismissed and that
respondent did not attend the January 6, 2003 hearing and did not file a formal
offer of evidence.

Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for abandoning her case and
withdrawing his appearance as counsel without her knowledge.

In his Comment4 dated June 10, 2004, respondent countered that he was
discharged as complainants counsel after the October 25, 2002 hearing.
Respondent added that he prepared a withdrawal of appearance on October 30,
2002 but complainant ignored his several requests to sign it in his office.
Nevertheless, he claimed he filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003
without complainants conformity.

Respondent denied promising complainant that he would attend the January 6,

2003 hearing. According to him, complainant informed his secretary that her new
lawyer would attend. Respondent claimed further that complainants new lawyer
should be faulted for belatedly filing an entry of appearance and a motion for
reconsideration. Respondent claimed that he was merely being used as a
scapegoat for complainants own negligence in pursuing the cases.

In a Resolution5 dated September 20, 2004, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner Dennis
A.B. Funa of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for
negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel, and for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Funa recommended respondents
suspension for three months from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XVII-2005-104 dated October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Funa. On November 15, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors
forwarded the Report to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

On January 4, 2006, respondent filed with this Court a motion for reconsideration.
In its comment, the IBP, through Commissioner Funa, recommended the denial of
the motion.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent was remiss in performing his
duties as counsel of complainant. The Court finds respondent liable for
negligence and for violation of Canon 186 specifically Rules 18.037 and 18.048 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court9 provides the proper procedure for a
lawyers withdrawal as counsel in a case. Unless the procedure prescribed in the
abovementioned section is complied with, the attorney of record is regarded as
the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders and
pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case.10 For its part, the
court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such
counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.11

In Orcino v. Gaspar,12 we held that until a lawyers withdrawal shall have been
approved, he remains counsel of record and is expected by his client as well as
by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on
the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally
until there is a withdrawal of his appearance on record.

In this case, respondent admitted that he did not attend the January 6, 2003
hearing despite being notified by the court.1wphi1 His claim that he was already
discharged as counsel as early as October 25, 2002 is negated by the record that
he withdrew his appearance only on March 5, 2003. Until his dismissal or
withdrawal was made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon
his client even though as between them the professional relationship may have
been terminated.13 Thus, unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for
the conduct of the cases and his failure to attend the hearing and comply with
the trial courts directive to file a formal offer of evidence constitute inexcusable
negligence.

Moreover, respondents negligence is not excused by his claim that he had

prepared his withdrawal of appearance as early as October 30, 2002 but
complainant refused to sign it. In Macarilay v. Seria,14 with similar facts, we
rejected the counsels excuse for failing to file the complaints, although the
complaints were finished, due to his clients refusal to sign them.

Certainly not to be overlooked is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of the
developments of the case.15 We note that it was only on May 5, 2003 that
complainant learned that she defaulted in the case. As a lawyer mindful of the
interest of his client, respondent should have informed the complainant of the
courts order addressed to him, especially if he considered himself discharged in
order for complainant and her new counsel to be guided accordingly.

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound

judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. The penalties for a lawyers

failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment.16 In this case, this Court sustains
the recommendation of the IBP for respondents suspension of three months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo A. Zapanta is hereby found GUILTY of

negligence and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
THREE MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in this country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ABRAHAM ONG, G.R. No. 149200

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

CIBA GEIGY (PHILS.), INC.,*

Respondent. Promulgated:

July 14, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
[1]

This case began when respondent Ciba Geigy (Phils.), Inc. sued petitioner
Abraham Ong for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 132.[2] On July 17, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision[3] against
petitioner, ordering him to pay P564,851.01 plus interest, the cost of collection,
the cost of suit and attorneys fees. On August 12, 1998, petitioner, through
counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated
December 3, 1998, a copy of which petitioners counsel received on December
17, 1998.[4]

On December 28, 1998, 10 days after the lapse of the reglementary period,
counsel for petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Respondent moved to dismiss the
appeal for having been filed out of time. On February 16, 1999, the RTC issued an
order denying the notice of appeal.[5]

On April 6, 1999, petitioner, with the assistance of new counsel, filed a petition
for relief[6] from judgment before the court a quo, alleging that he only learned
of the December 3, 1998 order and the entry of judgment on March 1, 1999
because his counsel failed to inform him about them. On April 30, 1999, the trial
court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment for lack of
merit.[7]

On August 24, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.[8] On
February 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision and on
July 10, 2001, denied reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition.

The only issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioner was bound by the negligence of his
former counsel, Atty. Patria Generoso-Abella, to whom he attributes the loss of
both his case and his chance to appeal.

To prove his allegations of Atty. Abellas gross and inexcusable negligence in the
defense of his cause, petitioner cited two principal omissions on her part: (1) she
failed to file a notice of appeal before the lapse of the reglementary period,
thereby preventing petitioner from taking an appeal and (2) her gross negligence
during the trial, which allowed incompetent evidence to be adduced in favor of
the respondent and which prevented the trial court from appreciating material
and relevant evidence in petitioners favor which could have altered the outcome
of the case.

Specific instances of Atty. Abellas negligence during the trial included: (1) her
failure to question the competence of respondents sole witness who, according to
petitioner, was not even an employee of respondent but of a different company
altogether; (2) her failure to raise petitioners counterclaims in his answer; (3) her
failure to raise defenses and to present and highlight evidence that would have
proven that he had no outstanding obligation to respondent and (4) her gross
carelessness in the handling of vital documentary evidence for the petitioner,
which resulted in the impairment of the probative value of such evidence.

The general rule is that the client is bound by the actuation of his counsel in the
conduct of the case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the
litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In
criminal cases, as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact
that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the
proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel does not constitute a ground for new trial.[9] The
exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[10]

Having studied the records of this case and comparable jurisprudence, we

conclude that Atty. Abellas negligence, while quite regrettable, was not so gross
as to warrant a new trial. The fact that she committed most of her mistakes in the
course of her presentation of petitioners evidence instantly destroys the
parallelisms which petitioner is attempting to draw between the instant case and
the ones he cited.

In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we relieved petitioner of his lawyers

incompetence on the ground that, by filing a demurrer to evidence even after the
trial court had denied leave, counsel deprived petitioner of his chance to present
evidence that could have exonerated him.
In Tan v. Court of Appeals,[12] the issue was not even whether respondent DPG
Development & Management Corporation (DPG) was entitled to relief from its
lawyers incompetence but whether the rules on proper substitution of counsel
were followed. In pointing out that all the respondent had done was to secure
additional counsel, we explained that DPG was entitled to an additional lawyer
due to the negligence of the original one whose failure to file an answer despite
two extensions had resulted in DPG being declared in default.

In Ginete v. Court of Appeals,[13] counsel for petitioners therein failed to file their
appellants brief within the period given. Ginete is inapplicable because, in this
case, the Court of Appeals never even acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on
account of the failure to file a notice of appeal.

Clearly, none of the jurisprudence cited by petitioner supports his position, given
the wide disparity of facts by which we justified our decisions in those cases. As
grave as Atty. Abellas errors might have been, they still boiled down to
incompetence during the proceedings in the trial court which, by itself, did not
relieve petitioner from the consequences of her negligence.

Finally, Atty. Abellas failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not tantamount to
depriving petitioner of his day in court. In Producers Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals[14] where counsel for petitioner failed to file a timely notice of
appeal, we found the lawyers concerned guilty of mere simple negligence as
opposed to gross negligence. We said:
Indeed, by failing to file its appeal within the reglementary period, it could not be
successfully argued that petitioner was deprived of its day in court.

Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a
part of due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing
to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
The foregoing considered, we affirm the Court of Appeals finding that the
respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
petition for relief from judgment. In Taada v. Angara,[15] we defined grave abuse
of discretion in the following manner:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will
result in the dismissal of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

DANIEL MORTERA, TERESITA A.C. No. 4562

MORTERA, FERDINAND
MORTERA and LEO MORTERA
Complainants, Present :

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. RENATO B. PAGATPATAN,

Respondent. Promulgated:
June 15, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

How far may a lawyer go to ensure that he gets paid?

The answer to this question is stated clearly in Canon 16 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility for Lawyers[1] and in decisions[2] applying the same,
but it is apparently not plain enough to the respondent in this case. It therefore
behooves us to make an example of him for the improvement of the legal
profession.

This disbarment case originated from the execution of a judgment in a civil action
for rescission of contracts with a prayer for prohibitory mandatory injunction.[3]
In brief, the complainants, then the plaintiffs, sued their mother, one Renato C.
Aguilar and one Philip Arnold Palmer Bradfield for the rescission of a contract of
sale. They secured judgment under which Aguilar was to pay them P155,000 for
the property, which this Court affirmed.[4]

On April 15, 1994, respondent did the unthinkable. Under a secret agreement
with Aguilar, he accepted P150,000 from the latter as partial payment of the
judgment sum, issuing a receipt for the amount.[5] He then deposited the money
in his personal bank account without the knowledge of complainants.[6] Until
now, respondent adamantly refuses to surrender the money to complainants,
despite the successive Orders of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.[7]

For his part, respondent, in his comment[8] admits his secret agreement with and
receipt of the money from Aguilar, interposing as his defense the fact that the
complainants and their mother owed him the money he appropriated for services
previously rendered. They would not have paid him his fees had he not done
what he did.[9] In support of his argument, the respondent narrated his years of
service as counsel for the complainants and their mother. He alleged the
amounts they owed him although he presented no evidence of any agreement
between him and the complainants for the exact amount of his compensation.

Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated in Canons

15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The four rules governing this
situation were: he owed candor to his clients;[10] he was bound to account for
whatever money he received for and from them;[11] as a lawyer, he was
obligated to keep his own money separate from that of his clients;[12] and,
although he was entitled to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful
fees,[13] he was also bound to give prompt notice to his clients of such liens and
to deliver the funds to them upon demand or when due.

Respondent violated each and every one of these rules.

Respondent cited the need to protect the money from other persons claiming to
be heirs of Eusebio Montera[14] and from the volatile temperament of the
complainants[15] but did not present any evidence at all to prove either claim.
Thus, these claims should be ignored.

Because the respondent admitted concealing his clients money, the only question
in our minds is how severe his punishment should be.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved[16] to
suspend the respondent for one year.

We do not agree.

In Aldovino v. Pujalte,[17] respondent Atty. Pedro C. Pujalte similarly faced

disbarment charges for having withheld his clients money in violation of Canon
16. Pujalte alleged a lien for his fees over the contested amount but adduced no
evidence of this supposed lien.

In disposing of that case, we said:

Respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally, as lawyers lien, the

sum of P250,000, as attorneys fees. In fact, he did not adduce any proof of such
agreement. His mere allegation or claim is not proof. Obviously, his failure to
return the money to complainants upon demand gave rise to the presumption
that he misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. His act of
holding on to their money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack
of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something not his and to which he
had no right.

As a penalty for his infraction, Atty. Pujalte was suspended for a year.

However, in the more recent case of de Guzman Buado and Lising v. Layag[18]
which involved a violation of Canons 15, 16 and 17, the Court En Banc imposed
the much heavier penalty of indefinite suspension.
In that case, Atty. Eufracio Layag, the lawyer of the complainants Lising and de
Guzman, successfully prosecuted a case against Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland).
Pursuant to the judgment, Inland issued three checks, one payable to Layag, one
payable to Lising and one payable to de Guzman who had already passed away
by then. Layag received all three checks from the deputy sheriff but did not
inform the complainants. He then gave them to one Marie Paz Gonzales for
encashment on the strength of a special power of attorney (SPA) purportedly
executed by the late de Guzman appointing her as his attorney-in-fact. This SPA
authorized Gonzales to encash any check or bill of exchange received in
settlement of the case. Even after complainants learned of the issuance of the
checks two years later and demanded delivery of the proceeds, Layag refused to
do so.

In imposing upon Layag the penalty of indefinite suspension, the Court En Banc
considered his years of experience as a lawyer, his ignorance of the law,
specifically the Civil Code, and his violation of not one but three Canons.
Even though, on its face, this case has more in common with Pujalte than with
Layag, a one-year suspension seems too lenient for a number of reasons.

First, the respondent in this case has been a practicing lawyer since 1974[19] and
even runs his own small law firm. For all his vast experience, however, he claims
that he has done nothing wrong by concealing and withholding his clients money
from them.[20] Coming from a seasoned practitioner of the law, this attitude is
inexcusable.
Second, the respondent had other means of recovering his fees, having filed a
case for that purpose which was, however, dismissed for his failure to properly
implead an indispensable party.[21] In short, having botched his own effort to
recover his fees, he sought to simply subvert both law and proper procedure by
holding on to the money.
Clearly, the respondents actuations were thoroughly tainted with bad faith, deceit
and utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer. Thus, a heavier penalty than a
mere one-year suspension is definitely called for.
WHEREFORE, the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XV-2002-223 in
Administrative Case No. 4562, finding respondent liable for violation of Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that instead of a one-year suspension, Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatan
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years.

Respondent is further directed to turn over to the complainants, within five (5)
days from receipt of this resolution, the P150,000 he received in their behalf.

Respondent is also ORDERED to report to the Office of the Bar Confidant his
compliance herewith within 15 days from such compliance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Renato B.
Pagatpatan and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9310

February 27, 2013

VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA

MENDOZA, CELEDONIO ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a consolidated administrative complaint against herein

respondent, Angelita Villarin, for allegedly harassing complainants through the
demand letters he sent to them.

The facts are as follows:

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in
Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision against the subdivision's owner and developerPurence Realty Corporation and Roberto Bassig.

In the final adjudication of that case on 11 October 2000, the HLURB ordered the
respondents therein to accept the payments of the buyers under the old
purchase price. These buyers included some of the complainants in the instant
case, to wit: Florentina Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo
Villamin.

The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and
the Transfer Certificates of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not
evince any directive for the buyers to vacate the property.

Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it
final and executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution.1 It was at
this point that respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent
Purence Realty.2 Specifically, he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the

Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution3 for being null and void on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons on his
client. This motion was not acted upon by the HLURB.4

On 4 December 2003, respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.5

In all of these letters, he demanded that they immediately vacate the property
and surrender it to Purence Realty within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he
would file the necessary action against them.

True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for

forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Trinidad,6 Lander,7
Casubuan8 and Mendoza.9 Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an
administrative case against respondent.10 A month after, Alojado, Villamin and
Tolentino filed a disbarment case against respondent.11

As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)12 and affirmed by its
Board of Governors,13 complainants asserted in their respective verified
Complaints that the demand letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice
and intent to harass them. They insisted that the letters also contravened the
HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subdivision lots.

Considering that these two actions were related, Villarin moved for the
consolidation of the administrative cases, and his motion was granted by the IBP
commissioner.14

In his Position Paper,15 Villarin denied the allegations of harassment and claimed
that no malice attended the sending of the demand letters. He narrated that
when he inquired at the HLURB, he was informed that his client did not receive a
summons pertinent to the Complaint for specific damages. With this information,
he formed the conclusion that the HLURB Decision was void and not binding on
Purence Realty. Since his client was the lawful owner of the property, respondent
issued the ejectment letters, which were indispensable in an action for unlawful
detainer. Moreover, he insisted that the addressees of the letters were different
from the complainants who had filed the case with the HLURB.

Hence, the pertinent issue in this consolidated case is whether respondent should
be administratively sanctioned for sending the demand letters despite a final and

executory HLURB Decision directing, not the ejectment of complainants, but the
payment of the purchase price of the lots by the subdivision buyers.

Prefatorily, this Court affirms the factual finding of the IBP16 that of complainants
herein, only Florentina Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo
Villamin were listed as the subdivision lot buyers who were parties to the HLURB
case; and that Verleen Trinidad, Wally Casubuan and Minerva Mendoza were nonparties who could not claim any right pursuant to the Decision in that case.

Proceeding to the contested demand letters, we adopt the recommendation of

the IBP board of governors that the issuance thereof was not malicious.17
According to its Report,18 respondent counsel merely acted on his legal theory
that the HLURB Decision was not binding on his client, since it had not received
the summons. Espousing the belief that the proceedings in the HLURB were void,
Villarin pursued the issuance of demand letters as a prelude to the ejectment
case he would later on file to protect the property rights of his client.

As the lawyer of Purence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause

of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.19 This simply means
that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense20
including the institution of an ejectment case that is recognized by our property
laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, we held that in the full discharge of their
duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may
displease the general public.21

Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that

lawyers shall perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law.22 They
should only make such defense only when they believe it to be honestly
debatable under the law.23 In this case, respondents act of issuing demand
letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally
sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in
order to file an action for ejectment.24 Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or
chicanery prohibited by the Code,25 just to maintain his clients disputed
ownership over the subdivision lots.

Even so, respondent cannot be considered free of error.1wphi1 The factual

findings of the IBP board of governors reveal that in his demand letter, he
brazenly typified one of the complainants, Florentina Lander, as an illegal
occupant. However, this description is the exact opposite of the truth, since the
final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision

lot buyer who had a right to complete her payments in order to occupy her
property. Respondent is very much aware of this ruling when he filed an Omnibus
Motion to set aside the HLURB Decision and the appurtenant Writ of Execution.

Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded
the HLURB Decision, he thus advances the interest of his client through means
that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. What he does is clearly
proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that
they know is false.26

Considering the present circumstances, we agree with the 14 May 2011

Resolution of the IBP board of governors that the penalty of reprimand with a
stern warning is appropriate. Notably, no motion for reconsideration27 was filed
by either of the parties. Thus, by virtue of the rules for disbarment of attorneys,
the case is deemed terminated.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin is

REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.