SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 166676

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan

filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before
the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

Present:
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus CARPIO MORALES 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth
TINGA,
but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
VELASCO, JR., and
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
BRION, JJ.
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Promulgated:
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
Respondent.
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age
September 12, 2008
six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
- -x
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
DECISION
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
QUISUMBING, J.:
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the

testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is

known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female

but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents
uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones,
and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change
of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to
her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records,

voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent
records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing
corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision

dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION

CONSIDERING THAT:
I.

The Court is convinced that petitioner has

satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It
was medically proven that petitioners body produces male
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is
a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and
identified as a male.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE

RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil

Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a)
By changing the name from Jennifer
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b)
MALE.

By changing the gender from female to

II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE,
WHILE
RESPONDENTS
MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in

ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent
to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of
her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to
Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective

for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a
quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further
contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to
state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where
the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. [7]

SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name

shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident
of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the

Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party
in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order
to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually
a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to
reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed
under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. [11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in

form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty
(30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after
the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on
the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause
appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge

that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of

the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered
in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing
the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in
the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The

court shall also cause the order to be published once a week

for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective

for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local
civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the
correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party
without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
[12]
Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short
of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons

who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6, [15] Rule
1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the
Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule
108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In
this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision

was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 [17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and

correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations;
(5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article

407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. [20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes
the early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more
male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as
the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH
is
one
of
many
conditions[21] that
involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot
be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia,intersexuality is the state of
a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.

controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally

negates such rigid classification.

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different

cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected
to conform to either a male or female gender role. [23] Since the rise of
modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people
with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
modified to resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a
disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated,
whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to
mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either
male or female.

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls

for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for
those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female. [25] The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person
be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a

female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
and
scientific
development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in th
e

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed

(neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of
a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was
born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a
male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps,
like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as
ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not
to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of
his sexual development and maturation.In the absence of evidence
that respondent is an incompetent [27] and in the absence of evidence
to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature

has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital

condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his
life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of
respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes
his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his
birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

The family is the basic and the most important institution of

society. It is in the family where children are born and molded either
to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate
and fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to
their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to

questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This

SECOND DIVISION
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No 176556
Present:

comes

before

us via Petition

for

Review

on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner

seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order [2] dated January 8,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining the net
BRION,
profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal
PEREZ,
separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of

- versus -

RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C.

QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 4, 2012
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:

case

Article 176 of the Civil Code.

Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita)
filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido
B.

Quiao

(Brigido).[3] Subsequently,

the

RTC

rendered

Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which

provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendantrespondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not
be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the
three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all
surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the
plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties
already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, namely:
1.
coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan
del Norte;
2.
coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del
Norte;
3.
corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del
Norte;
4.
coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5.
a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square
meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6.
a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5
hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7.
a parcel of land with an area of 84 square
meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8.
Bashier
Bon
Factory
located
in
Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and
[petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children
and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children.

He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the

sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.[5]

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal

within the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule
on Legal Separation.[6]
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for
execution[7] which the trial court granted in its Order dated December
16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the
same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for
the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ
of Execution[9] which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels
of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made
the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic],
together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in
the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found
whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then
we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said
[petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required
by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule
39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said
proceedings immediately after the judgment has been
satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. [10]

The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the

execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]

On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the

petitioner paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00,
representing the following payments:

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the
conjugal share;

the RTC issued another Order[18] dated November 8, 2006, holding

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.

Motion for Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently,

[11]

that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final
and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the

because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net

promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a

profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006
is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which
is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common
children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par.
4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.[20]

Motion for Clarification,[12] asking the RTC to define the term Net
Profits Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC
issued an Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase
NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts.[14] The Order further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to
Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. [15] The
dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the
sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after
deducting the payments of the debts for only separate
properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to
him which he has none.

On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the
Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,
[22]

the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the

respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated

November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August
31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on
February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues

10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was

IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT

LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE
HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF
LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC)
OF THE FAMILY CODE?

filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the

II

The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on
July 7, 2006.

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED

BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF
EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT
MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS
SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING
VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE
IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF
THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling

finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently

discuss the matters that we can clarify.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of
the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.
In Neypes

v.

Court

of

Appeals,[25] we clarified

that

to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would
be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall

While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the

also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial

applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents

Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to

have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October

the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial

agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to

the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to regiment or

within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can

make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the

arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a

order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration

judgment that became final.[28]

(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. [27] In other

The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a

words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-

void judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be

day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order

disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the

denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure

decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a void

to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for

judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be

reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final

a source of any right nor any obligation. [29] But what precisely is a

and executory.

void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes

In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on

void?

October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for

A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it

reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or

had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject

after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the

matter or over the parties or both. [30] In other words, a court, which

respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or

does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction

after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of

over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or

execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed,

a coram non judice.[31]

the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his

The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of

Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits

a void judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case

earned.From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his

involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers

right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270

upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive

days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had

original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or

already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed

petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the

his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final

husband and wife or those living together.[32] The Rule on Legal

and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the

Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal separation] shall be

reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected

filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or

the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the

petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question

date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he

the trial court's decision, which has become immutable and

may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. [34] In

unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question

the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in

raised below and nothing more.

Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of

For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore

filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the

be disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already

respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired

become immutable and unalterable, to wit:

jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that

summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served
upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein
petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001.
[35]

Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned

judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the

since he cohabited with a woman who is not his wife; [38]

(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation
of respondent Rita;[39]
(c)

The

dissolution

and

liquidation

of

the

conjugal

partnership;[40]

parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005
judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was
rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the
same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant
to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law.[36] In fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the public
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
[37]

(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse

(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the

net profits earned by the conjugal partnership; [41]
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's
custody;[42]
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from
inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession; [43]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse; [44]
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is

Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October

conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the

10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an

Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether

appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the

acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless

the contrary is proved;[45]
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and

(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents

the sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses
of P5,000.00.[54]

personal properties while they were living together;[46]

(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which

After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision

dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the
enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.

must be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita
was the one who took charge of the administration of these
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to

Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is governed by the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.

matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it

conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the

applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He

income generated by these properties;[49]

confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other

properties;[48]

(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing
whether the petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his
share for the support of the family;[50]
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article
129(7);[51]

provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned
subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005
held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We
agree with the trial court's holding.

(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to

First, let us determine what governs the couple's property

any encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the

relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the

petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's

respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the

legitime;[52]

time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil

(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits

Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree

earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the

on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the

common children;[53]and

petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or

conjugal partnership of gains.[55] Article 119 of the Civil Code

provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.

Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of
the common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the
trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles
63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what

impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired

governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent

vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being

is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the

owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family

husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their

Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of

separate property and the income from their work or industry.[56] The

authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder

husband and wife also own in common all the property of the

of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights

conjugal partnership of gains.[57]

acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. [59] In other words,

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner

the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the

and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the

spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable

under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half

law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and

of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to

liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to

Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the

Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable

conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband

because according to Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code shall

and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties

have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair

covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right

vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other

over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the

law.[58]

Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family

Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of

the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of the Family

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be

Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.

However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one
which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define
and explained vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and
natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal
or equitableto the present or future enjoyment of property.
[62]
(Citations omitted)

deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to
due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in
her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
[65]

In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court

divide the community assets between the petitioner and the

respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being

In

our en

banc Resolution

dated

October

18,

2005

for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v.

The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,

[63]

we also

explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes
not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
[64]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

deprived of his right to due process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the
petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions of
the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is
like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the
guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said
provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty
spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of
both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property
came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the

wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate

property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse
shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right
has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil
Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if
he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and
after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the
petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil
Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our
long-standing ruling that:

the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's

decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from
disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and
executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this
Court.[71]
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code
clearly applies to the present case since the parties' property relation
is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained
finality and immutability.

[P]rior
to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a
mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears
that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement.The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest
until
the
dissolution and liquidation ofthe conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that,
after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets
left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already
decided in its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable
law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.

did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus,

[70]

The petitioner

The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the
forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists
that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the
computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains
the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute
community?
Now, we clarify.

First and foremost, we must distinguish between the

When

couple

enters

into

a regime

of

absolute

applicable law as to the property relations between the parties and

community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all

the applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier

the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse

discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property

brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage

relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the

(except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the

succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of

common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's

the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net profits, we cannot

marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided

but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly

between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the

provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to

proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value

forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article

each one may have originally owned.[73]

102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be the increase in

Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of

value between the market value of the community property at the

marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the

time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the

properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of

time of its dissolution.[72]Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4)

each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are

applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime

paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's

under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the

properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the

conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left

Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the

of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net

processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community

remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be

regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes

divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of

used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under

computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the

Article 129 of the Family Code.

increase in value between the market value of the community

Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between

the absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:

property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.[74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits
requires that we first find the market value of the properties at the

time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market

be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. However,

value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of

in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the

the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net

half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use

remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which

Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case),

we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage,

nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their

which then results to the net profits.[75]

marriage without bringing with them any property.

Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

instant case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both

Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal

husband and wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining

Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the

properties in the list above are all part of the absolute

Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of

community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the

defining net profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits

absolute community constitutes the market value at dissolution.

in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute

community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for

(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were
legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for
the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and
obligations will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.

under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions
on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the

(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been

husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their

paid from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the

separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide

net remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the

equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,

petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at

the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse

the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality

during the marriage.[76] From the foregoing provision, each of the

constitutes the net profits.

couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not

(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate

properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will

intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties

between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of

capitals.[77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved
under the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the
liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately
all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in
payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse
shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of
his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal
partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties,
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article
121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of
the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from
whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used
for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even
due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the
conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage

settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or

forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance
with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in
the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate
properties.[78]In the instant case, the trial court found that the
couple has no separate properties when they married. [79] Rather,
the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters
located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares
located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the

conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount

conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate

property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

to the assets of the conjugal partnership; [81] and if the community is

enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse,

In the discussions above, we have seen that in both

a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners

instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus,

shall be made.[82]

we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the

(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay

the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation

trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the

Order dated January 8, 2007.

of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate

properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the

its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties

Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting

shall be solidarily liable.[83]

on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive

properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of
them.[84] In the instant case, since it was already established by
the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,
[85]

there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties

above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,

ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be
divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
[86]

However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,

his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code.Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the

Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is
herebyCLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.

NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

(now DR. ALCESTIS M. GUIANG),

Petitioners,

-versusPromulgated:
July 14, 2008

YASUYUKI OTA,

Respondent.
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
84945[2] datedNovember 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated October
19, 2003.[4]
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

The facts are as follows:

Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a
Filipina, who has continuously resided in the Philippines for more

THIRD DIVISION

than
BOARD OF MEDICINE,
DR. RAUL FLORES
(now DR. JOSE S. RAMIREZ),
in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board, PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION,
through its Chairman,
HERMOGENES POBRE

10

years. He

graduated

from Bicol Christian College of

Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine.

G.R. No. 166097[5]
After successfully completing a one-year post graduate internship
Present:

training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an

application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain

QUISUMBING,*
a medical license. He was required by the Professional Regulation
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would

not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists

into the practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and

between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the

that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of

practice of medicine.

[6]

Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the

substantially complied with the requirements under the law.[12] The

Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul

RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the

[7]

General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; thus,

corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice

he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August

medicine in the Philippines.[13]

1992, which he subsequently passed.[8]

The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA,

In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in

stating that while respondent submitted documents showing that

a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a

foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not

license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the

shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are

Board believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of

practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was

Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice

not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to

there.

[9]

Respondent

regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not

then

filed

Petition

ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.[14]

for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of
Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. [15]

14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman.[10]

contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.)

Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY
IN
THE
PRACTICE
OF
MEDICINE
BETWEEN
THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.[16]

No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate

Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent

right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his great damage

and conclusive evidence that reciprocity in the practice of medicine

and prejudice.[11]

exists between the Philippines and Japan. While documents state

On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that

that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not

respondent had adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan

similarly show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said

allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted

country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant. There is

In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and
the PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration
and/or license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear

no reciprocity in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine

Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists between

in Japan are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with.

the Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said

There are also ambiguities in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan,

laws clearly state that both countries allow foreigners to practice

which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what are the provisions

medicine in their respective jurisdictions as long as the applicant

of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister

meets the educational requirements, training or residency in

of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic

hospitals and pass the licensure examination given by either country.

and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same or

Consul General Yabes in his letter dated January 28, 1992 stated

better than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can

that the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice

actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical

medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements. The

Examination. Consul General Yabes also stated that there had not

fact that there is no reported Filipino who has successfully

been a single Filipino who was issued a license to practice medicine

penetrated the medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is

by the Japanese Government. The publication showing that there

no reciprocity between the two countries, since it does not follow that

were foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which respondent

no Filipino will ever be granted a medical license by the Japanese

presented before the Court, also did not specifically show that

Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen

Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said profession.

of one of the contracting countries can demand its application, it is

[17]

necessary that the interested citizens country has previously granted

Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De

Guzman,

[18]

the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and

the same privilege to the citizens of the other contracting country.

control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate

[21]

admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine,

1959[22] indicates the mandatory character of the statute and an

which power is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not

imperative obligation on the part of the Board inconsistent with the

compellable by a writ of mandamus.[19]

idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who

Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be

successfully passes the examination and has all the qualifications

reversed and set aside, that a new one be rendered reinstating the

and none of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of right to the

Board Order dated March 8, 1993 which disallows respondent to

issuance of a certificate of registration or a physicians license, which

practice medicine in the Philippines, and that respondent's petition

right is enforceable by mandamus.[23]

before the trial court be dismissed for lack of merit.[20]

Petitioners filed a Reply[24] and both parties filed their respective

In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the

memoranda[25] reiterating their arguments.

Medical Practitioners Law of Japan and Section 9 of the Philippine

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

Respondent further argues that Section 20 of the Medical Act of

There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a

privilege or franchise granted by the government.

[26]

It is a right that is

activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the

guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.[29]

earned through years of education and training, and which requires

R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in

that one must first secure a license from the state through

Section 9 thereof that:

Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates
for Board examinations shall have the following
qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any
foreign country who has submitted competent and
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his countrys
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice
medicine under the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof;
xxxx

professional board examinations.[27]

Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power
to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises
of
governmental
power. Similarly,
the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements
i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized
medical school for admission to the medical profession, has
also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state.[28]
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature
cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license
on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license
legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a
license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223[30] also provides in

Section (j) thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may,
upon the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve
the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate
of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who
is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That
the requirement for the registration or licensing in said
foreign state or country are substantially the same as those
required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines
and that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the
same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or
citizens of such foreign state or country: Provided, finally,
That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws
permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession
under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe

additional requirements or grant certain privileges to

foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same
privileges are granted to or some additional requirements
are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the
same certificates in his country;
xxxx
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of

does not show that conditions for the practice of medicine in said
country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since
the requirements arepractically impossible for a Filipino to comply
with, there is no reciprocity between the two countries, hence,
respondent may not be granted license to practice medicine in the
Philippines.
The Court does not agree.

the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly authenticated by the

Consul General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan, which
provides in Articles 2 and 11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical
practitioner must pass the national examination for medical
practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health and
Welfare.
xxxx
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical
Examination except persons who conform to one of the
following items:
1.
Persons who finished regular medical courses
at a university based on the School Education
Laws (December 26, 1947) and graduated from
said university.
2.
Persons who passed the preparatory test for
the National Medical Examination and practiced
clinics and public sanitation more than one year
after passing the said test.
3.
Persons who graduated from a foreign medical
school or acquired medical practitioner license in
a foreign country, and also are recognized to
have the same or more academic ability and
techniques as persons stated in item 1 and item
2 of this article.[31]

R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for

the medical board examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to
submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed
by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his
countrys existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice
medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens
thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent
of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation
of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a
certificate of registration with or without examination to a foreigner
who is registered under the laws of his country, provided the
following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the
registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are
substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the
laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or
country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession
on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or
citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant

Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of

shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence,

Japan allows foreigners to practice medicine therein, said document

confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's existing laws permit

citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules

and regulations governing citizens thereof.

While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the

conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e., the

The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized

provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister

to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to

of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic

foreigners

same

and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same

privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are

as or better than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and

required of citizens of the Philippinesin acquiring the same

who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National

certificates in his country.

Medical Examination respondent, however, presented proof that

seeking

registration

in

the Philippines if the

Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant

must show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said
country arepractical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated

foreigners are actually practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not
precluded from getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese

that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license

Government

and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a

showing that there are a number of foreign physicians practicing

foreign

in

medicine in Japan.[32] He also presented a letter dated January 28,

the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and

1992 from Consul General Yabes,[33] which states:

Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993,
concerning your request for a Certificate of Confirmation for
the purpose of establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the
practice of medical profession relative to the case of
Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes
to inform you that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and Welfare as well as
Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:
1.
They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was
granted a license by the Japanese Government to
practice medicine in Japan;
2.
However, the Japanese Government allows a
foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after
complying with the local requirements such as
holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking the
medical board exam, checking the applicant's

applicant

may

be

given

license

to

practice

P.D. No. 223 is that:

[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing
laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x(Emphasis
supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a
Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to
prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and is
actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements provided
for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.

publication, Physician-Dentist-Pharmaceutist Survey,

qualifications to take the examination, taking the

national board examination in Japanese and
filing an application for the issuance of the
medical license.
Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single
Filipino physician who was issued by the Japanese
Government a license to practice medicine, because it is
extremely difficult to pass the medical board
examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors
here are only allowed to work in Japanese hospitals as
trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On
certain occasions, they are allowed to show their medical
skills during seminars for demonstration purposes only.
(Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government
allows foreigners to practice medicine therein provided that the local
requirements are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or
the prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the absence
of Filipino physicians holding licenses and practicing medicine in
Japan, but the difficulty of passing the board examination in the
Japanese language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who has
been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean
that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power
to

issue

licenses

by mandamus.

is

discretionary,

hence,

not

compellable

The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De

Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the
principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this
case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about the integrity and
validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular school
which garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the
applicants satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements.
[34]

And as there was no definite showing that the requirements and

conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been

satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ of mandamus may not
be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative
will.[35]
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the
law and the licensing authority.[36]
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 20[37] of the Medical Act
of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word shall with
respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus,
the petitioners [PRC] shall sign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with
the requirements of the Board. In statutory construction the
term shall is a word of command. It is given imperative
meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physician's license, the
Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register
him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par.
(1) ofSection 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.[38]

In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and

qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical degree
from Bicol ChristianCollege of Medicine. He completed a one-year
post

graduate

internship

training

at

the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital.

OFFICER OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.[G.R.

135826. February 27, 2002]

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and PORT MANAGER, and

PORT
DISTRICT
OFFICER
OF
DAVAO
CITY, petitioners, vs.
TERMINAL
FACILITIES
AND
SERVICES CORPORATION, respondent.

Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given

on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores
higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the
alleged failure of respondent to prove that there is reciprocity
between the laws ofJapan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners
into the practice of medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any
reversible error in rendering its Decision dated November 16,
2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 135639. February 27, 2002]

TERMINAL
FACILITIES
AND
SERVICES
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE
PORTS
AUTHORITY and PORT MANAGER, and PORT DISTRICT

No.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review, one filed
by the Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation (TEFASCO)
(G.R. No. 135639) and the other by the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) (G.R.
No.
135826),
of
the
Amended
Decision[1] dated September 30, 1998 of the former Special Second
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47318 ordering
the PPA to pay TEFASCO: (1) Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten
Thousand
Thirty-Two
Pesos
and
Seven
Centavos
(P15,810,032.07) representing fifty percent (50%) wharfage dues
and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06) representing
thirty percent (30%) berthing fees from 1977 to 1991, which amounts
TEFASCO could have earned had not PPA illegally imposed one
hundred percent (100%) wharfage and berthing fees, and (2) the
sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as attorneys
fees. No pronouncement was made as to costs of suit.
In G.R. No. 135639 TEFASCO assails the declaration of validity
of the government share and prays for reinstatement in toto of the
decision of the trial court. In G.R. No. 135826 PPA impugns the
Amended Decision for awarding the said two (2) amounts for loss of
private port usage fees as actual damages, plus attorney's fees.
TEFASCO is a domestic corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with principal place of business at
Barrio Ilang, Davao City.It is engaged in the business of providing
port and terminal facilities as well as arrastre, stevedoring and other
port-related services at its own private port at Barrio Ilang.

Sometime in 1975 TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for

the construction of a specialized terminal complex with port facilities
and a provision for port services in Davao City. To ease the acute
congestion in the government ports at Sasa and Sta.
Ana, Davao City, PPA welcomed the proposal and organized an
inter-agency committee to study the plan. The committee
recommended approval thereof and its report stated that TEFASCO Terminal is a specialized terminal complex. The
specialized matters intended to be captured are: (a) bananas in
consideration of the rate of spoilage; (b) sugar; (c) fertilizers; (d)
specialized movement of beer in pallets containerized handling
lumber and plywood.
3.2 Limitations of the government facilities The government port facilities are good for general cargoes
only. Both ports are not equipped to handle specialized cargoes like
bananas and container cargoes. Besides the present capacity, as
well as the planned improvements, cannot cope with the increasing
volume of traffic in the area. Participation of the private sector,
therefore, involving private financing should be encouraged in the
area.
3.3 Project Viability 3.3.1 Technical Aspect - From the port operations point of view, the
project is technically feasible. It is within a well-protected harbor and
it has a sufficient depth of water for berthing the ships it will
service. The lack of back up area can be supplied by the 21-hectare
industrial land which will be established out of the hilly land area
which is to be scrapped and leveled to be used to fill the area for
reclamation.
3.3.2 Economic Aspect - The international port of Sasa and the
domestic port of Sta. Ana are general cargo type ports. They are
facing serious ship and cargo congestion problems brought about
mainly by the faster growth of shipping industry than the
development of the ports. They do not possess the special cargo

handling facilities which TFSC plans to put up at the proposed

terminal.
xxx The proposed project expects to get a 31% market slice. It will
service domestic and foreign vessels. Main products to be handled
initially will be bananas in the export trade and beer in the domestic
traffic. Banana exporters in Davao, like Stanfilco and Philippine
Packing Corporation have signified their intentions to use the
port.Negotiations between TFSC and banana exporters on whether
the former or the latter should purchase the mechanical loading
equipment have not yet been formed up xxx.
Easing the problems at these two ports would result in savings on
cost of the operation as cargo storage and on damages and
losses. It would also give relief to passengers from time-delay,
inconvenience and exposure to hazards in commuting between the
pier and ship at anchor.
Furthermore, it would redound to better utilization of the government
piers, therefore greater revenue from port operations.
At the bigger scale, more economic benefits in terms of more
employment, greater productivity, increased per capita income in
the Davao region, and in light of the limited financial resources of the
government for port development the TFSC proposal would be
beneficial to the country.
On April 21, 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution
No. 7 accepting and approving TEFASCO's project proposal. PPA
resolved to xxx [a]pprove, xxx the project proposal of the Terminal Facilities and
Services Corporation, Inc. for the construction of specialized port
facilities and provision of port services in Davao City, subject to the
terms and conditions set forth in the report of the Technical
Committee created by the Board in its meeting of January 30, 1975,
and to the usual government rules and regulations.

PPA relayed its acceptance of the project terms and conditions

to TEFASCO in the letter [2] dated May 7, 1976 of Acting General
Manager Mariano Nicanor which affirmed that We are pleased to inform you that the Board of Directors, Philippine
Ports Authority, approved the project proposal of the Terminal
Facilities and Services Corporation to construct a specialized port
facilities and provision of port services in Davao City as follows:
1) Docking Facilities for Ocean Going and Interisland
vessels with containerized cargo.
2) Stevedoring and Arrastre for above.
3) Warehousing;
4) Container yard and warehouse for containerizing
cargoes or breaking up cargoes for containers.
5) Bulk handling and silos for corn, in cooperation with the NGA.
6) Bulk handling for fertilizer.
7) Bulk handling or conveyor system for banana exports.
8) Bulk handling for sugar.

The enclosure referred to in the letter above-quoted stipulated

the "Terms and Conditions of PPA Board Approval of the Project
Proposal,"[3] particularly (1) That all fees and/or permits pertinent to the construction
and operation of the proposed project shall be paid to
and/or secured from the proper authorities.
(2) That the plans shall not be altered without the prior
approval of the Bureau of Public Works in
coordination with the PPA.
(3) That [any] damage to public and private property arising
from the construction and operation of the project
shall be the sole responsibility of the applicantcompany.
(4) That the Director of Public Works shall be notified five
(5) days before the start of the construction works
and that the Director of Public Works or his
representative shall be authorized to inspect the
works and premises while the work is in progress and
even after the completion thereof.
(5) That the applicant shall construct and complete the
structure under the proposed project within eighteen
(18) months after the approval of the permit,
otherwise the permit shall be null and void.

9) Bonded warehousing.
The approval is subject to the terms and conditions set forth at
enclosure.
You are hereby authorized to start work immediately taking into
account national and local laws and regulations pertaining to the
project construction and operation.

(6) That the facility shall handle general cargoes that are
loaded as filler cargoes on bulk/container ships
calling at the facility.
(7) That the applicant shall build up its banana export traffic
to replace the probable loss of its container traffic five
(5) years from now because of the plan of PPA to put
up a common user type container terminal at the port
of Sasa.

(8) That all charges payable to the Bureau of Customs will

continue to apply upon take over of port operations by
the PPA of the Port of Davao from the Bureau of
Customs and direct control and regulations of
operations of private port facilities in the general area
of that port.
Under the foregoing terms and conditions, TEFASCO
contracted dollar loans from private commercial institutions abroad to
construct its specialized terminal complex with port facilities and
thereafter poured millions worth of investments in the process of
building the port. Long after TEFASCO broke ground with massive
infrastructure work, the PPA Board curiously passed on October 1,
1976 Resolution No. 50 under which TEFASCO, without asking for
one, was compelled to submit an application for construction
permit. Without the consent of TEFASCO, the application imposed
additional significant conditions (1) This Permit to Construct (PTC) will entitle the applicant to operate
the facility for a period of fifteen (15) years, without jeopardy to
negotiation for a renewal for a period not exceeding ten (10)
years. At the expiration of the permit, all improvements shall
automatically become the property of the Authority. Thereafter, any
interested party, including the applicant, may lease it under new
conditions; (2) In the event that the Foreshore Lease Application
expires or is disapproved/canceled, this permit shall also be
rendered null and void; xxx (7) All other fees and/or permits pertinent
to the construction and operation of the proposed project shall be
paid to and/or secured from the proper authorities; xxx (9) Unless
specifically authorized, no general cargo shall be handled through
the facility; (10) All rates and charges to be derived from the use of
said facility or facilities shall be approved by the Authority; xxx (12)
An application fee in the amount of one-tenth or one percent of the
total estimated cost of the proposed improvement/structure shall be
paid upon advice; (13) Other requirements of the law shall be
complied by the applicant.
NOTE: Subject further to the terms and conditions as approved by
PPA Board under Resolution No. 7 of 21 April 1976, except that PPA

shall take over the role of the Bureau of Public Works and of the
Bureau of Customs stipulated in the said approval.
TEFASCO played along with this needless exercise as PPA
approved the awkward application in a letter stating We are returning herewith your application for Permit to Construct
No. 77-19 dated 18 October 1977, duly approved (validation of the
original permit to construct approved by the PPA Board under
Resolution No. 7 of 21 April 1976), for the construction of your port
facilities in Bo. Ilang, Davao City, subject to the conditions stipulated
under the approved permit and in accordance with the attached
approved set of plans and working drawings.
It is understood that this permit is still subject to the terms and
conditions under the original permit except that this Authority takes
over the role of the Bureau of Public Works and of the Bureau of
Customs as stipulated thereon.
The series of PPA impositions did not stop there. Two (2) years
after the completion of the port facilities and the commencement of
TEFASCO's port operations, or on June 10, 1978, PPA again issued
to TEFASCO another permit, designated as Special Permit No.
CO/CO-1-067802, under which more onerous conditions were
foisted on TEFASCOs port operations. [4] In the purported permit
appeared for the first time the contentious provisions for ten percent
(10%) government share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross
income and one hundred percent (100%) wharfage and berthing
charges, thus Pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 857, otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine Ports Authority, and
upon due consideration of the formal written application and its
enclosures in accordance with PPA Memorandum Order No. 21
dated May 27, 1977, PPA Administrative Order No. 22-77
dated December 9, 1977, and other pertinent policies and guidelines,
a Special Permit is hereby granted to TERMINAL FACILITIES AND
SERVICES CORPORATION (TEFASCO), with address at Slip 3,
Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila to provide its arrastre/stevedoring

services at its own private wharf located at Barrio Ilang, Davao City,
subject to the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Grantee shall render arrastre/stevedoring services on
cargoes of vessels under the agency of Retla
Shipping/Transcoastal Shipping, Solid Shipping, Sea
Transport and other commercial vessels which
cannot be accommodated in government piers at
PMU-Davao due to port congestion which shall be
determined by the Port Manager/Harbor Master/Port
Operations Officer whose decision shall be
conclusive;
3. Grantee shall promptly submit its latest certified financial
statement and all statistical and other data required
by the Authority from time to time;

6. Grantee shall settle with the Authority its back accounts

on the 10% government share from the start of its
arrastre/stevedoring operation plus 6% legal interest
per annum as provided by law;
7. That cargoes and vessels diverted to TEFASCO wharf
shall be subject to 100% wharfage and berthing
charges respectively;
8. Grantee shall hold the Authority free from any liability
arising out of the maintenance and operation
thereof;
9. Grantee shall not in any manner pose a competition with
any port or port facility owned by the government.
Rates of charges shall in no case be lower than
those prevailing at the Government Port of Davao.
xxx xxx xxx

4. Grantee shall strictly comply with all applicable PPA

rules and regulations now in force or to be
promulgated hereafter and other pertinent rules and
regulations promulgated by other agency of the
government and other applicable laws, orders or
decrees;
5. Grantee shall remit to the government an amount
equivalent to ten (10%) percentum of the handling
rates chargeable on similar cargo in government
piers/wharves within the jurisdiction of PMU-Davao
on or before the 5th working day of every month
provided, however, that in case of delay, grantee
shall pay a penalty of one (1%) percentum of the
accumulated total amount due for every day of
delay; provided, further, that said rate shall be
reasonably adjusted if and when warranted by the
financial conditions of the Grantee;

This Special Permit is non-transferable and shall remain valid from

the date of issuance hereof until December 31, 1978; provided,
however, that at any time prior to the expiration thereof, the same
may be revoked for violation of any of the conditions herein set forth
or for cause at the discretion of the PPA General Manager or his duly
authorized representative.
Subsequent exactions of PPA included: (a) Admin. Order 09-81,
s. 1981,[5] notifying all arrastre and stevedoring operators, whether
they do business in government owned port facilities, that special
services income be subjected to "government share" equivalent to
ten percent (10%) thereof; and, (b) Memo. Circ. 36-82, s. 1982,
[6]
mandating an assessment of one hundred percent (100%)
wharfage dues on commercial and third-party cargoes regardless of
extent of use of private port facilities and one hundred percent
(100%) berthing charges on every foreign vessel docking at private
wharves loading or discharging commercial or third-party
cargoes. TEFASCO repeatedly asked PPA for extensions to pay
these additional obligations and for reduction in the rates. But the
PPA's response was final and non-negotiable statements of arrears

and current accounts and threats of business closure in case of

failure to pay them.[7] The trial court summed up the documentary
evidence on this point xxx [w]hen TEFASCO requested for the structuring of its account of
P3.5 million, resulting to a memorandum, issued by PPA General
Manager to its internal control, to verify the specific assessment of
TEFASCO, coming out in the specific amount of P3,143,425.67
which became a subject of TEFASCO various and series of lettersprotest to PPA, for reconsideration of its ultimatum, to enforce
TEFASCOs back account, dated June 1, 1983, marked Exh. 32 for
defendant, after a series of letters for reconsideration of TEFASCO
and reply of PPA, marked Exh. 26 to 31 for the defendants, an
ultimatum letter of PPA was issued followed by another series of
letters of protest, reconsideration and petition of TEFASCO and reply
of PPA, correspondingly marked Exh. 40 51 for the defendants, until
ultimately, the execution of a memorandum of agreement, marked
Exh. 52 for the defendant, dated February 10, 1984.
Most alarming was the receipt of defendants communication by
TEFASCO, in its letter dated June 1, 1983, a cease and desist order
of PPA for TEFASCO, to stop its commercial port operation xxx. [8]
On February 10, 1984 TEFASCO and PPA executed
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing among others for (a)
acknowledgment of TEFASCO's arrears in government share at
Three Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred SixtyThree Pesos and Seventy-Five Centavos (P3,807,563.75) payable
monthly, with default penalized by automatic withdrawal of its
commercial private port permit and permit to operate cargo handling
services; (b) reduction of government share from ten percent (10%)
to six percent (6%) on all cargo handling and related revenue (or
arrastre and stevedoring gross income); (c) opening of its pier
facilities to all commercial and third-party cargoes and vessels for a
period coterminous with its foreshore lease contract with the National
Government; and, (d) tenure of five (5) years extendible by five (5)
more years for TEFASCO's permit to operate cargo handling in its
private port facilities. In return PPA promised to issue the necessary
permits for TEFASCOs port activities. TEFASCO complied with the
MOA and paid the accrued and current government share. [9]

On August 30, 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA Port

Manager, and Port Officer in Davao City for refund of government
share it had paid and for damages as a result of alleged illegal
exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%) berthing and
wharfage fees. The complaint also sought to nullify the February 10,
1984 MOA and all other PPA issuances modifying the terms and
conditions of the April 21, 1976 Resolution No. 7 above-mentioned.
[10]

The RTC, Branch 17, Davao City, in its decision dated July 15,
1992 in Civil Case No. 19216-88, ruled for TEFASCO, (a) nullifying
the MOA and all PPA issuances imposing government share and one
hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees or otherwise
modifying PPA Resolution No. 7, and, (b) awarding Five Million
Ninety-Five Thousand Thirty Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P5,095,030.17) for reimbursement of government share and Three
Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-Four
Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06) for thirty percent (30%)
berthing charges and Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos (P15,810,032.07) for fifty
percent (50%) wharfage fees which TEFASCO could have earned as
private port usage fee from 1977 to 1991 had PPA not collected one
hundred percent (100%) of these fees; Two Hundred Forty-Eight
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven Pesos (P248,727.00) for
dredging and blasting expenses; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
in damages for blatant violation of PPA Resolution No. 7; and, Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for attorneys fees, with
twelve percent (12%) interest per annum on the total amount
awarded.[11]
PPA appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court in its original decision recognized the
validity of the impositions and reversed in toto the decision of the trial
court.[12] TEFASCO moved for reconsideration which the Court of
Appeals found partly meritorious. Thus the Court of Appeals in its
Amended Decision partially affirmed the RTC decision only in the
sense that PPA was directed to pay TEFASCO (1) the amounts of
Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos and
Seven Centavos (P15,810,032.07) representing fifty percent (50%)
wharfage fees and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand
Nine Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06)

representing thirty percent (30%) berthing fees which TEFASCO

could have earned as private port usage fee from 1977 to 1991 had
PPA not illegally imposed and collected one hundred percent (100%)
of wharfage and berthing fees and (2) Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) for attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals held
that the one hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees
were unenforceable because they had not been approved by the
President under Secs. 19 and 20, P.D. No. 857, and discriminatory
since much lower rates were charged in other private ports as shown
by PPA issuances effective 1995 to 1997. Both PPA and TEFASCO
were unsatisfied with this disposition hence these petitions.
In G.R. No. 135639 TEFASCO prays to reinstate in toto the
decision of the trial court. Its grounds are: (a) PPA Resolution No. 7
and the terms and conditions thereunder constitute a contract that
PPA could not change at will; (b) the MOA between PPA and
TEFASCO indicating the schedule of TEFASCO arrears and
reducing the rate of government share is void for absence of
consideration; and, (c) government share is neither authorized by
PPA ResolutionNo. 7 nor by any law, and in fact, impairs the
obligation of contracts.
In G.R. No. 135826 PPA seeks to set aside the award of actual
damages for wharfage and berthing fees and for attorneys fees. PPA
anchors its arguments on the following: (a) that its collection of one
hundred percent (100%) wharfage and berthing fees is authorized by
Secs. 6 (b, ix) and 39 (a), P.D. No. 857, under which the imposable
rates for such fees are within the sole power and authority of PPA;
(b) that absence of evidentiary relevance of PPA issuances effective
1995 to 1997 reducing wharfage, berthing and port usage fees in
private ports; (c) that TEFASCO's lack of standing to claim alleged
overpayments of wharfage and berthing fees; and, (d) that lack of
legal basis for the award of fifty percent (50%) wharfage and thirty
percent (30%) berthing fees as actual damages in favor
of TEFASCO for the period from 1977 to 1991, and for attorneys
fees.
In a nutshell, the issues in the two (2) consolidated petitions are
centered on: (a) the character of the obligations between TEFASCO
and PPA; (b) the validity of the collection by PPA of one hundred
percent (100%) wharfage fees and berthing charges; (c) the

propriety of the award of fifty percent (50%) wharfage fees and thirty
percent (30%) berthing charges as actual damages in favor
of TEFASCO for the period from 1977 to 1991; (d) the legality of the
imposed government share and the MOA stipulating a schedule of
TEFASCO's arrears for and imposing a reduced rate of government
share; and, (e) the propriety of the award of attorneys fees and
damages.
Firstly, it was not a mere privilege that PPA bestowed upon
TEFASCO to construct a specialized terminal complex with port
facilities and provide port services in Davao City under PPA
Resolution No. 7 and the terms and conditions thereof. Rather, the
arrangement was envisioned to be mutually beneficial, on one hand,
to obtain business opportunities for TEFASCO, and on the other,
enhance PPA's services The international port of Sasa and the domestic port of Sta. Ana are
general cargo type ports. They are facing serious ship and cargo
congestion problems brought about mainly by the faster growth of
shipping industry than the development of the ports. They do not
possess the special cargo handling facilities which TFSC plans to put
up at the proposed terminal.[13]
It is true that under P.D. No. 857 (1975) as amended, [14] the
construction and operation of ports are subject to licensing
regulations of the PPA as public utility.[15] However, the instant case
did not arise out of pure beneficence on the part of the government
where TEFASCO would be compelled to pay ordinary license and
permit fees. TEFASCO accepted and performed definite obligations
requiring big investments that made up the valuable consideration of
the project. The inter-agency committee report that recommended
approval of TEFASCO port construction and operation estimated
investments at Sixteen Million Pesos (P16,000,000.00) (1975/1976
price levels) disbursed within a construction period of one year [16] and
covered by foreign loans of Two Million Four Hundred Thirty-Four
Thousand US Dollars (US$2,434,000.00) with interests of up to Ten
Million Nine Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Five
Pesos (P10,965,465.00) for the years 1979 to 1985. [17] In 1987 the
total investment of TEFASCO in the project was valued at One
Hundred Fifty-Six Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand Seven
Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos (P156,251,798.00).[18] The inter-agency

committee report also listed the costly facilities TEFASCO would

build, and which in fact it has already built xxx The terminal complex will provide specialized mechanical cargo
handling facilities for bananas, sugar, beer, grain and fertilizer, and
containerized cargo operations. The marginal wharf could
accommodate two ocean-going ships and one inter-island vessel at
a time. The essential structures and facilities to be provided are: (1)
400-meter concrete wharf; (2) Back-up area (3.8 hectare reclaimed
area plus a 21-hectare inland industrial zone); (3) Two warehouses
with total floor area of 5,000 sq. meters; (4) mechanized banana
loading equipment; (5) container yard.[19]
With such considerable amount of money spent in reliance upon
the promises of PPA under Resolution No. 7 and the terms and
conditions thereof, the authorization for TEFASCO to build and
operate the specialized terminal complex with port facilities assumed
the character of a truly binding contractbetween the grantor and the
grantee.[20] It was a two-way advantage for both TEFASCO and PPA,
that is, the business opportunities for the former and the
decongestion of port traffic in Davao City for the latter, which is also
the cause of consideration for the existence of the contract. The
cases
of Ramos
v.
Central
Bank of
the Philippines[21] and Commissioner of Customs v. Auyong
Hian[22] are deemed precedents. In Ramos, the Central Bank (CB)
committed itself to support the Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) and
avoid its liquidation in exchange for the execution of a voting trust
agreement turning over the management of OBM to CB and a
mortgage of its properties to CB to cover OBMs overdraft
balance. This agreement was reached in CBs capacity as the
regulatory agency of banking operations. After OBM accepted and
performed in good faith its obligations, we deemed as perfected
contract the relation between CB and OBM from which CB could not
retreat and in the end prejudice OBM and its depositors and creditors
Bearing in mind that the communications, xxx as well as the voting
trust agreement xxx had been prepared by the CB, and the wellknown rule that ambiguities therein are to be construed against the
party that caused them, the record becomes clear that, in

consideration of the execution of the voting trust agreement by the

petitioner stockholders of OBM, and of the mortgage or assignment
of their personal properties to the CB, xxx the CB had agreed to
announce its readiness to support the new management in order
toallay the fears of depositors and creditors xxx and to stave off
liquidation by providing adequate funds for the rehabilitation,
normalization and stabilization of the OBM, in a manner similar to
what the CB had previously done with the Republic Bank xxx. While
no express terms in the documents refer to the provision of funds by
CB for the purpose, the same is necessarily implied, for in no other
way could it rehabilitate, normalize and stabilize a distressed bank.
xxx
The deception practiced by the Central Bank, not only on petitioners
but on its own management team, was in violation of Articles 1159
and 1315 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines:
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has
been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law.[23]
Auyong Hian involved an importation of old newspapers in four
(4) shipments under a "no-dollar" arrangement pursuant to a license
issued by the Import Control Commission. When the last shipment
arrived in Manila, the customs authorities seized the importation on
the ground that it was made without the license required by Central
Bank Circular No. 45. While the seizure proceedings were pending
before
the
Collector
of
Customs,
the
President
of
thePhilippines through its Cabinet canceled the aforesaid license for
the reason that it was illegally issued "in that no fixed date of
expiration is stipulated." On review, this Court held xxx [W]hile the Cabinet, acting for the President, can pass on the
validity of a license issued by the Import Control Commission, that

power cannot be arbitrarily exercised. The action must be founded

on good ground or reason and must not be capricious or whimsical.
This principle is so clear to require further elaboration.
xxx In fact, if the cancellation were to prevail, the importer would
stand to lose the license fee he paid amounting to P12,000.00, plus
the value of the shipment amounting toP21,820.00. This is grossly
inequitable. Moreover, "it has been held in a great number of cases
that a permit or license may not arbitrarily be revoked xxx where, on
the faith of it, the owner has incurred material expense."
It has also been held that where the licensee has acted under the
license in good faith, and has incurred expense in the execution of it,
by making valuable improvements or otherwise, it is regarded in
equity as an executed contract and substantially an easement, the
revocation of which would be a fraud on the licensee, and therefore
the licensor is estopped to revoke it xxx It has also been held that the
license cannot be revoked without reimbursing the licensee for his
expenditures or otherwise placing him in status quo.[24]
For a regulatory permit to be impressed with contractual
character we held in Batchelder v. Central Bank[25] that the
administrative agency in issuing the permit must have assumed such
obligation on itself. The facts certainly bear out the conclusion that
PPA passed Resolution No. 7 and the terms and conditions thereof
with a view to decongesting port traffic in government ports
in Davao City and engaging TEFASCO to infuse its own funds and
skills to operate another port therein. As acceptance of these
considerations and execution thereof immediately followed, it is too
late for PPA to change the rules of engagement with TEFASCO as
expressed in the said Resolution and other relevant documents.
The terms and conditions binding TEFASCO are only those
enumerated or mentioned in the inter-agency committee report, PPA
Resolution No. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7, 1976 and its
enclosure. With due consideration for the policy that laws of the land
are written into every contract,[26] the said documents stand to be the
only source of obligations between the parties. That being the case,
it was arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair for PPA to add new burdens
and uncertainties into their agreement of which TEFASCO had no
prior knowledge even in the context of regulation.

Lowell v. Archambault[27] is persuasive on this issue. In that

case, the defendant was engaged in the business of an undertaker
who wanted to erect on his land a stable to be used in connection
therewith. He then applied to the board of health for a license to
permit him to occupy and use the building when completed for the
stabling of eight (8) horses. His application was granted and a
license was issued to him permitting the exercise of this
privilege. Upon receiving it, he at once had plans prepared and
began the erection of a stable on a site from which he had, at a
pecuniary loss, removed another building.After the work had begun
but before its completion, the board of health acting on a petition of
residents in the immediate vicinity rescinded their former vote and
canceled the license. The court held xxxUpon application for permission to erect a stable, which, in the
absence of a restricting statute, would be a legitimate improvement
in the enjoyment of his property, the applicant is entitled to know the
full measure of immunity that can be granted to him before making
the expenditure of money required to carry out his purpose. A resort
to the general laws relating to the subject, or to ordinances or
regulations made pursuant to them, should furnish him with the
required information. When this has been obtained, he has a right to
infer that he can safely act, with the assurance that, so long as he
complies with the requirements under which it is proposed to grant
the privilege, he has a constitutional claim to protection, until the
legislature further restricts or entirely abolishes the right bestowed. A
license should not be subjected to the uncertainties that constantly
would arise if unauthorized limitations, of which he can have no
knowledge, are subsequently and without notice to be read into his
license, at the pleasure of the licensing board. Besides, all
reasonable police regulations enacted for the preservation of the
public health or morality, where a penalty is provided for their
violation, while they may limit or prevent the use or enjoyment of
property except under certain restrictions, and are constitutional,
create statutory misdemeanors, which are not to be extended by
implication. xxx. It was not within the power of the board of health,
even after a hearing, in the absence of an authority conferred upon
them by legislative sanction, to deprive him of the privilege they had
unreservedly granted.[28]

The record shows that PPA made express representations to

TEFASCO that it would authorize and support its port project under
clear and categorical terms and conditions of an envisioned contract.
TEFASCO complied with its obligation which ultimately resulted to
the benefit of PPA. And the PPA accepted the project as completed
and authorized TEFASCO to operate the same. Under these
circumstances, PPA is estopped from reneging on its commitments
and covenants as exclusively contained in the inter-agency
committee report, PPA Resolution No. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7,
1976 and its enclosure. As this Court explained in Ramos v. Central
Bank of the Philippines - [29]
xxx[A]n estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even
though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise
should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal
to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or
would result in other injustice. In this respect, the reliance by the
promisee is generally evidenced by action or forbearance on his part,
and the idea has been expressed that such action or forbearance
would reasonably have been expected by the promisor. xxx
But even assuming arguendo that TEFASCO relied upon a
mere privilege granted by PPA, still the terms and conditions
between them as written in the documents approving TEFASCO's
project proposal should indubitably remain the same. Under
traditional form of property ownership, recipients of privileges or
largesses from the government could be said to have no property
rights because they possessed no traditionally recognized
proprietary interest therein.The cases of Vinco v. Municipality of
Hinigaran[30] and Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal [31] holding that a
license to operate cockpits would be a mere privilege belonged to
this vintage. But the right-privilege dichotomy came to an end when
courts realized that individuals should not be subjected to the
unfettered whims of government officials to withhold privileges
previously given them.[32] Indeed to perpetuate such distinction would
leave the citizens at the mercy of State functionaries, and worse,
threaten the liberties protected by the Bill of Rights. Thus in Kisner v.
Public Service Commission[33] wherein the US Public Service
Commission reduced the number of vehicles which appellant Kisner

was authorized to operate under his certificate of convenience and

necessity when no limit was stipulated therein, it was ruled It appears from the record in this case that after the issuance of the
initial certificate the appellant took steps to procure vehicles in
addition to the one he already owned. He changed his position in
reliance upon the original certificate authorizing him to operate an
unlimited number of vehicles. xxx For the purpose of due process
analysis, a property interest includes not only the traditional notions
of real and personal property, but also extends to those benefits to
which an individual may be deemed to have a legitimate claim of
entitlement under existing rules and regulations. xxx The right of the
appellant in the case at bar to operate more than one vehicle under
the certificate of convenience and necessity, as originally issued,
clearly constituted a benefit to the appellant and that benefit may be
deemed to be a legitimate claim of entitlement under existing rules
and regulations.
Even if PPA granted TEFASCO only a license to construct and
operate a specialized complex terminal with port facilities, the fact
remains that PPA cannot unilaterally impose conditions that find no
basis in the inter-agency committee report, PPA Resolution No. 7
and PPA letter dated May 7, 1976 and its enclosure.
Secondly, we hold that PPA's imposition of one hundred percent
(100%) wharfage fees and berthing charges is void. It is very clear
from P.D. No. 857 as amended that wharfage and berthing rates
collectible by PPA "upon the coming into operation of this Decree
shall be those now provided under Parts 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Title VII of
Book II of The Tariff and Customs Code, until such time that the
President upon recommendation of the Board may order that the
adjusted schedule of dues are in effect." [34] PPA cannot unilaterally
peg such rates but must rely on either The Tariff and Customs
Code or the quasi-legislative issuances of the President in view of
the legislative prerogative of rate-fixing.[35]
Accordingly, P.D. No. 441 (1974) amending The Tariff and
Customs Code fixed wharfage dues at fixed amounts per
specified quantity brought into or involving national ports or at fifty
percent (50%) of the rates provided for herein in case the articles
imported or exported from or transported within the Philippines are

loaded or unloaded offshore, in midstream, or in private wharves

where no loading or unloading facilities are owned and maintained
by the government. Inasmuch as the TEFASCO port is privately
owned and maintained, we rule that the applicable rate for imported
or exported articles loaded or unloaded thereat is not one hundred
percent (100%) but only fifty percent (50%) of the rates specified in
P.D. No. 441.
As regard berthing charges, this Court has ruled
in Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals [36] that "subject
vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the Port of
Kiwalan, which was constructed, operated, and continues to be
maintained by private respondent xxx are not subject to berthing
charges, and petitioner should refund the berthing fees paid by
private respondent." The berthing facilities at Port of Kiwalan were
constructed, improved, operated and maintained solely by and at the
expense of a private corporation, the Iligan Express. On various
dates, vessels using the berthing facilities therein were assessed
berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which were paid by private
respondent under protest. We nullified the collection and ordered
their refund The only issue involved in this petition for review is: Whether a
vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately owned
wharf or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge under
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 34, reads:
Sec. 2901. Definition. - Berthing charge is the amount assessed
against a vessel for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulk-headwharf, river or channel marginal wharf at any national port in the
Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or
for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal
under the jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty
(50%) per cent of rates provided for in cases of piers without cargo
shed in the succeeding sections. The owner, agent, operator or
master of the vessel is liable for this charge.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs contends that the government

has the authority to impose and collect berthing fees whether a
vessel berths at a private pier or at a national port. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the right of the government to
impose berthing fees is limited to national ports only.
The governing law classifying ports into national ports and municipal
ports is Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1936 (O.G. Vol. 35, No. 6,
pp. 65-66). A perusal of said executive order discloses the absence
of the port of Kiwalan in the list of national ports mentioned therein.
Furthermore, Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 72 expressly
provides that the improvement and maintenance of national ports
shall be financed by the Commonwealth Government, and their
administration and operation shall be under the direct supervision
and control of the Insular Collector of Customs. It is undisputed that
the port of Kiwalan was constructed and improved and is operated
and maintained solely by and at the expense of the Iligan Express
Corporation, and not by the National Government ofthe Republic or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities. xxx The port of Kiwalan not
being included in the list of national ports appended to Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor in Executive Order No. 72, it
follows inevitably as a matter of law and legal principle that this Court
may not properly consider said port as a national port. To do
otherwise would be to legislate on our part and to arrogate unto
ourselves powers not conferred on us by the Constitution. xxx
Plainly, therefore, the port of Kiwalan is not a national port. xxx
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code prior to its amendment
and said section as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34 are
hereunder reproduced with the amendments duly highlighted:
Sec. 2901. Definition. - Berthing charge is the amount assessed
against a vessel for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkheadwharf, river or channel marginal wharf at any port in the Philippines;
or for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or for coming or
mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal under the
jurisdiction of any port of the Philippines (old TCC).

Sec. 2901. Definition. - Berthing charge is the amount assessed a

vessel for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river
or channel marginal wharf AT ANY NATIONAL PORT IN THE
PHILIPPINES; for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or
for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal
under the jurisdiction of ANY NATIONAL port of the Philippines;
Provided, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE LAST INSTANCE, THE
CHARGE SHALL BE FIFTY (50%) PER CENT
OF RATES PROVIDED FOR IN CASES OF PIERS WITHOUT
CARGO SHED IN THE SUCCEEDING SECTIONS. (emphasis in the
original).
It will thus be seen that the word national before the word port is
inserted in the amendment. The change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had
(Agpalo, supra, p. 76). The insertion of the word national before the
word port is a clear indication of the legislative intent to change the
meaning of Section 2901 from what it originally meant, and not a
mere surplusage as contended by petitioner, in the sense that the
change merely affirms what customs authorities had been observing
long before the law was amended (p. 18, Petition). It is the duty of
this Court to give meaning to the amendment. It is, therefore, our
considered opinion that under Section 2901 of The Tariff and
Customs Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, only
vessels berthing at national ports are liable for berthing fees. It is to
be stressed that there are differences between national ports and
municipal ports, namely: (1) the maintenance of municipal ports is
borne by the municipality, whereas that of the national ports is
shouldered by the national government; (2) municipal ports are
created by executive order, while national ports are usually created
by legislation; (3) berthing fees are not collected by the government
from vessels berthing at municipal ports, while such berthing fees
are collected by the government from vessels moored at national
ports. The berthing fees imposed upon vessels berthing at national
ports are applied by the national government for the maintenance
and repair of said ports. The national government does not maintain
municipal ports which are solely maintained by the municipalities or
private entities which constructed them, as in the case at bar. Thus,
no berthing charges may be collected from vessels moored at

municipal ports nor may berthing charges be imposed by a municipal

council xxx.[37]
PPA has not cited - nor have we found - any law creating
the TEFASCO Port as a national port or converting it into
one. Hence, following case law, we rule that PPA erred in collecting
berthing fees from vessels that berthed at the privately funded port of
petitioner TEFASCO.
It also bears stressing that one hundred percent (100%)
wharfage dues and berthing charges are void for failing to
comply with Sec. 19, P.D. No. 857[38]as amended, requiring
presidential approval of any increase or decrease of such dues.
In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines
v. CA[39] we ruled that PPA cannot override the statutory rates for
dues by lowering rates of pilotage fees and leaving the fees to be
paid for pilotage to agreement of parties, and further stated that There is, therefore, no legal basis for PPA's intransigence, after
failing to get the new administration of President Aquino to revoke
the order by issuing its own order in the form of A.O. NO. 02-88. It is
noteworthy that if President Marcos had legislative power under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution so did President Aquino
under the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution who could, had she
thought E.O. No. 1088 to be a mere political gimmick, have just as
easily revoked her predecessor's order. It is tempting to ask if the
administrative agency would have shown the same act of defiance of
the President's order had there been no change of administration.
What this Court said in La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v.
Capapas, mutatis mutandis, - may be applied to the cases at bar:
Was it within the powers of the then Collector Ang-angco to refuse to
collect the duties that must be paid? That is the crucial point of
inquiry. We hold that it was not.
Precisely, he had to give the above legal provisions, quite explicit in
character, force and effect. His obligation was to collect the revenue
for the government in accordance with existing legal provisions,
executive agreements and executive orders certainly not excluded.
He would not be living up to his official designation if he were

permitted to act otherwise. He was not named Collector of Customs

for nothing
Certainly, if the President himself were called upon to execute the
laws faithfully, a Collector of Customs, himself a subordinate
executive official, cannot be considered as exempt in any wise from
such an obligation of fealty. Similarly, if the President cannot suspend
the operation of any law, it would be presumptuous in the extreme for
one in the position of then Collector Ang-angco to consider himself
as possessed of such a prerogative[40]
Thirdly, PPA argues that the courts a quo wrongly awarded to
TEFASCO fifty percent (50%) and thirty percent (30%) of the
wharfage dues and berthing charges, respectively, as actual
damages representing private port usage fees from 1977 to 1991. It
claims that TEFASCO has no cause of action to ask for a portion of
these fees since they were collected from "the owner, agent,
operator or master of the vessel" for the berthing charge and "the
owner or consignee of the article, or the agent of either" for the
wharfage dues.
We find no merit in this argument. The cause of action of
TEFASCO is the injury it suffered as a result of the illegal imposition
on its clientele of such dues and charges that should have otherwise
gone to it as private port usage fee. TEFASCO is asserting injury to
its right to collect valuable consideration for the use of its facilities
and wrongdoing on the part of PPA prejudicing such right. This is
especially true in the light of PPAs practice of collecting one hundred
percent (100%) of the wharfage and berthing dues by cornering the
cargoes and vessels, as it were, even before they were landed and
berthed at TEFASCOs privately owned port. It is aggravated by the
fact that these unlawful rates were collected by PPA long after the
port facilities of TEFASCO had been completed and
functioning. Considering these pleaded facts, TEFASCOs cause of
action has been sufficiently alleged and proven. We quote with
approval the following ruling of the Court of Appeals xxx As earlier stated, TEFASCO is only trying to recover income it
has to forego because of the excessive collections imposed by
PPA. By doing what it was prohibited to do under an existing law,
PPA cannot be allowed to enjoy the fruits of its own illegal act. To be

sure, TEFASCO suffered real damage as a result of such illegal act

requiring indemnification xxx.[41]
There is also no basis for PPAs assertion that there was lack of
evidence to support the award in favor of TEFASCO of Fifteen Million
Eight Hundred Ten Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos
(P15,810,032.07) representing fifty percent (50%) wharfage dues
and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06) for thirty
percent (30%) berthing charges from 1977 to 1991. According to the
appellate court, the determination was based on the "actual
summarized list of cargoes and vessels which went through
TEFASCOs port, which were under obligation to pay usage fees,
multiplied by the applicable tariff rates." [42] The trial court explained in
more detail the preponderant evidence for the judgment Another harassment is the issuance of Memorandum Circular No.
36-82, authorizing collection of 100% wharfage fees, instead of only
50% and also 100% berthing fees, instead of only 70% as provided
for in PD 441, marked Exh. LL for plaintiff, and a copy of Letter of
Instruction No. 8001-A, marked Exh. NN for plaintiff, in the process,
the total collection of PPA for wharfage fees, amounted
to P10,582,850.00 and berthing fee, amounted to P6,997,167.00 in
the latter case, berthing fee collected was marked Exh. PP for
plaintiff, otherwise if PPA collected only 70% as provided, it could
have collected only P4,898,018.03, equally TEFASCO could have
earned the remainder ofP2,099,150.90 while in the case of wharfage
fee, if PPA collected only 50%, TEFASCO would have earned the
other half of P5,291,042.00, 50% by way of rentals. xxx
In cases of berthing and wharfage fees prior to the issuance of the
injunction order from this court, PPA charges 100% the totality or
summary of claims from PPA, from 1977 to 1991, was shown and
marked Exhibit KKK and submarkings, showing TEFASCO is
supposed to collect, if PPA collects only 50% wharfage, the other
50% goes with TEFASCO in case of berthing 70%, the remainder of
30% could have been collected by TEFASCO.[43]
Under Arts. 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of or in
recompense for loss or injury sustained. [44] They proceed from a

sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong done.
In Producers Bank of the Philippines v. CA [45] we succinctly
explain the kinds of actual damages, thusThere are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the
loss of what a person already possesses, and the other is the failure
to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him x x
x. In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages consisting
of unrealized profits, frequently referred as ganacias
frustradas or lucrum cessans, are not to be granted on the basis of
mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference to
some reasonably definite standard such as market value,
established experience, or direct inference from known
circumstances xxx.
It is not necessary to prove with absolute certainty the amount
of ganacias frustradas or lucrum cessans. In Producers Bank of the
Philippines we ruled that xxx the benefit to be derived from a contract which one of the parties
has absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent, a
matter of speculation, but the injured party is not to be denied for this
reason alone. He must produce the best evidence of which his case
is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has
been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable
certainty have anticipated but for the defendants wrongful act, he is
entitled to recover.[46]
Applying the test aforequoted, we find that TEFASCO has
proved with clear and convincing evidence its loss of wharfage and
berthing fees. There was basis for the courts a quo in awarding to
TEFASCO, as actual damages, the sums equivalent to fifty percent
(50%) and thirty percent (30%) of the wharfage dues and berthing
charges, respectively. It has not been denied that TEFASCO was
forced to reluctantly let go of such fees to avoid the unwise business
practice of financially overburdening the users of its port by requiring
them to pay beyond one hundred percent (100%) of such dues. It
has not also been disproved that this loss of TEFASCO was the
direct result of the collection of one hundred percent (100%)
wharfage and berthing dues by PPA, an imposition that left nothing
more for TEFASCO to charge for the use of its port and terminal

facilities. Consequently, there is merit in TEFASCO's claim that had

the PPA imposition been limited to the fifty percent (50%) wharfage
dues and seventy percent (70%) berthing charges, TEFASCO could
have received the remainder as port usage fees since the amounts
were disbursed by its clients for that purpose. Significantly, in regard
to
berthing
charges,
TEFASCO's
cause
of actionand evidence presented before the trial court as well as its
assigned error on appeal on that point were limited to thirty percent
(30%) of such charges.
Fourthly, we also declare void the imposition by PPA of ten
percent (10%), later reduced to six percent (6%), government share
out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income of TEFASCO. This
exaction was never mentioned in the contract, much less is it a
binding prestation, between TEFASCO and PPA. What was clearly
stated in the terms and conditions appended to PPA Resolution No. 7
was for TEFASCO to pay and/or secure from the proper authorities
"all fees and/or permits pertinent to the construction and operation of
the proposed project." The government share demanded and
collected from the gross income of TEFASCO from its arrastre and
stevedoring activities in TEFASCO's wholly owned port is
certainly not a fee or in any event a proper condition in a
regulatory permit. Rather it is an onerous "contractual
stipulation"[47] which finds no root or basis or reference even in the
contract aforementioned.
We stress that the cause of the contract between TEFASCO
and PPA was, on the part of the former, to engage in the business of
operating its privately owned port facilities, and for the latter, to
decongest port traffic in Davao City and concomitantly to enhance
regional trade. The records of the project acceptance made by PPA
indicate that the contract was executed not to earn income for PPA or
the government as justification for the subsequent and unfair
imposition of government share in the arrastre and stevedoring gross
income of TEFASCO. Hence this charge was obviously an afterthought conceived by PPA only after the TEFASCO port had already
begun its operations. The sharing scheme only meant that PPA
would piggy back unreasonably on the substantial investment and
labor of TEFASCO. As the scheme was subsequently stipulated on
percentage of gross income, it actually penalized TEFASCO for its

hand work and substantial capital expenditures in the TEFASCO port

and terminal.
Moreover,
PPA
is
bereft
of
any
authority
to
impose whatever amount it pleases as government share in the
gross income of TEFASCO from its arrastre and stevedoring
operations. As an elementary principle of law, license taxation must
not be "so unreasonable to show a purpose to prohibit a business
which is not itself injurious to public health or morals." [48] In the case
at bar, the absurd and confiscatory character of government share is
convincingly proved by PPA's decision itself to abandon the
disadvantageous scheme through Administrative Order No. 06-95
dated 4 December 1995, Liberalized Regulation on Private Ports
Construction, Development, and Operation.[49] The PPA issuance
scrapped government share in the income of private ports where no
government facilities had been installed and in place thereof
imposed a one-time privilege fee of P20,000.00 per annum for
commercial ports and P10,000.00 yearly for non-commercial
ports. In passing, we believe that this impost is more in consonance
with the description of government share as consideration for
the "supervision inherent in the upgrading and improvement of port
operations, of which said services are an integral part." [50]
We do not also agree that TEFASCO subsequently acceded to
paying the government share in its gross income from its arrastre
and stevedoring operations, and in recognizing arrears for such
charge. The Memorandum
of
Agreement (MOA)
which
it
subsequently signed with PPA did not give TEFASCO any benefit so
that we cannot conclude that there was indeed a voluntary
settlement between them. Rather it could be described aptly as an
imposition under actual threats of closure of TEFASCO's port. Verily
the MOA was meant to cloak semblance of validity upon that
particular charge since there was nothing in the original TEFASCOPPA contract authorizing the PPA to collect any share in the gross
income of TEFASCO in its arrastre and stevedoring operations.
The MOA is invalid for want of consideration and consent. [51] As
such, it is an invalid novation [52] of the original agreement between
TEFASCO and PPA as embodied in the inter-agency committee
report, PPA Resolution No. 7 and PPA letter dated May 7, 1976 and
its enclosure. Truly, the MOA was a set of stipulations executed

under undue pressure on TEFASCO of permanent closure of its port

and terminal. As the TEFASCO investment was worth millions of
dollars in loans and equities, PPA's posture of prohibiting it from
engaging in the bulk of its business presented it with no reasonable
freedom of choice but to accept and sign the MOA. Furthermore, the
MOA suffers from utter want of consideration since nothing more
could have been stipulated in the agreement when every detail of
port operation had already been previously spelled out and
sanctioned in the original contract. The belated MOA citations of
PPAs recognition of TEFASCO's facility as a private port and
provision of arrastre and stevedoring and repair services were all
part of the agreement from 1976 when the project proposal was
approved by the PPA Board. Under these circumstances, it cannot
be said that TEFASCO embraced voluntarily the unfairimposition in
the MOA that inevitably would cause, as it did, its own bankruptcy.
In sum, TEFASCO is entitled to Five Million Ninety-Five
Thousand Thirty Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P5,095,030.17)
for reimbursement of what PPA illegally collected as "government
share" in the gross income of TEFASCO's arrastre and stevedoring
operations for 1977 to 1991.
Fifthly, we affirm the award of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as attorneys fees. Attorneys fees may be awarded
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.[53] In the
instant case, attorneys fees were warranted by PPA's unfair exaction
of exorbitant wharfage and berthing dues from TEFASCO and
threats to close its port. These adverse actions correctly drove the
latter to institute the present proceedings to protect its rights and
remedy the unfair situation.
However, we set aside the award of Two Hundred Forty-Eight
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven Pesos (P248,727.00) for
dredging and blasting expenses. The trial court justified the award on
the ground that this activity was allegedly the responsibility of PPA
under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 857 [54] as amended which TEFASCO in
good faith undertook. This is not correct. More precisely, the law
obliged PPA to fund construction and dredging works only in "public
ports vested in the Authority." Clearly the construction of the
TEFASCO port was not the responsibility of the PPA and does not

fall under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 857. The dredging and blasting done
by TEFASCO augmented the viability of its port, and therefore the
same were part and parcel of the contractual obligations it agreed to
undertake when it accepted the terms and conditions of the project.
It is also erroneous to set legal interest on the damages
awarded herein at twelve percent (12%) yearly computed from the
filing of the complaint. InCrismina Garments, Inc. v. CA[55], it was held
that interest on damages, other than loan or forbearance of money, is
six percent (6%) annually computed from determination with
reasonable certainty of the amount demanded. Thus, applying that
rule in the case at bar, the interest would be six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of promulgation of the decision of the trial court
in Civil Cases Nos. 19216-88 on July 15, 1992.
To recapitulate: PPA is liable to TEFASCO for Fifteen Million
Eight Hundred Ten Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos
(P15,810,032.07) representing fifty percent (50%) wharfage fees and
Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06) for thirty
percent (30%) berthing charges from 1977 to 1991 and Five Million
Ninety-Five Thousand Thirty Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P5,095,030.17) for reimbursement of the unlawfully collected
government share in TEFASCOs gross income from its arrastre and
stevedoring operations during the same period. The said principal
amounts herein ordered shall earn interest at six percent (6%)
annually from July 15, 1992, date of promulgation of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao in Civil Cases Nos. 19216-88. The
PPA shall also pay TEFASCO the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) for and as attorneys fees.
Henceforth, PPA shall collect only such dues and charges as
are duly authorized by the applicable provisions of The Tariff and
Customs Code and presidential issuances pursuant to Sec. 19, P.D.
No. 857. PPA shall strictly observe only the legally imposable rates.
Furthermore, PPA has no authority to charge government share in
the gross income of TEFASCO from its arrastre and stevedoring
operations within its subject private port in Davao City.
TEFASCO's port operations including cargo handling services
shall be co-terminous with its foreshore lease contract with the
National Government and any extension of the said foreshore lease

contract shall similarly lengthen the duration of its port operations. It

is clear from the inter-agency committee report, PPA Resolution No.
7 and PPA letter dated May 7, 1976 and its enclosure that the
intention of the parties under their contract is to integrate port
operations of TEFASCO so that all services therein, including
arrastre and stevedoring operations, shall end at the same time. The
subsequent and onerous MOA did not change the tenure of its port
operations, there being no clear and convincing showing of
TEFASCO's free and voluntary amenability thereto. In no case,
however, shall such port operations of TEFASCO exceed fifty (50)
years which is the maximum period of foreshore lease contracts with
the National Government.
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 30, 1998 in case CA-G.R. CV No. 47318
is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is held liable and hereby
ordered to pay and reimburse to Terminal Facilities and Services
Corporation (TEFASCO) the amounts ofFifteen Million Eight Hundred
Ten Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos
(P15,810,032.07) and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One
Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos
(P3,961,964.06) representing fifty percent (50%) wharfage fees and
thirty percent (30%) berthing charges respectively, from 1977 to
1991, and the sum of Five Million Ninety-Five Thousand Thirty Pesos
and Seventeen Centavos (P5,095,030.17) representing PPAs
unlawfully collected government share in the gross income of
TEFASCO's arrastre and stevedoring operations during the said
period;
2. The said principal amounts herein ordered to be paid by PPA to
TEFASCO shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from
July 15, 1992, date of promulgation of the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17 of Davao City in Civil Case No. 19216-88; and
3. The PPA is also ordered to pay TEFASCO the sum of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for and as attorneys fees.
Costs against the Philippine Ports Authority.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Third
Division)
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the
full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But
even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that
"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little
regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which
society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would
endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of
the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State
to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic
collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a
new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the

imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the

process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the
skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision,
between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the
zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest
test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659, [2] wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all
of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by
petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs.
1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,

percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract
or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided
by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The

court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests
and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of
Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim.
Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use
Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary
to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were
only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation
of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law
under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the
Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause

for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants

for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21
June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments
on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving
the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of
the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in
RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to
the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it
is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection
for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is
based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has
passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are
in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial

restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of

the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In
construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon [4] we held that
as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the
case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law
into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the
organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive
commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can
be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will
hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation.Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation,

conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the

public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with
any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what
the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through
a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the
language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,

Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12
of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,

Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND

JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00),
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by
himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES;
(italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE
OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON
OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT
OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,

SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous
- as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly
show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely
informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare
for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for
the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the
key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is
not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in
an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that

words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,[7]unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process
of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as
to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one
after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to
be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080
or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of
plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say,
if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included, how about
a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be

combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination,

two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say

combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there
are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when
we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary
crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime
but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that
sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result
in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove
the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts
are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or
more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or
many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts
of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by
existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is

referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2)
or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of
the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve
said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method'
which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving
with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes
or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts
must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "voidfor-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the

offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary

intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that
are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standardthough defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of
the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details
in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court

that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do
not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First

Amendment."[16] InBroadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that

"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that
is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness
are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. [22] It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement
of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. [23] But, as
the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its

deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought,
and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required
line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined
in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. [27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity,
where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words
in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be
sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder
Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder
Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its
passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively
deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by
reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself
is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged
the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,

that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),
violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while
in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness.The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec.
3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate
or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate
reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal

provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private
party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in
its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the
section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme
or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use
of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the application of
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a

criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt

with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired
such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life
to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The
following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo
Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House
of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA
7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our
criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one
act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the
crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example,
Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by
the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of
jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for
which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs
of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what
is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the
element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering
that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has
to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was
able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of

extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now,

when we add the totality of the other acts as required under
this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it
is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of
proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to
prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example,
one essential element of the crime is that the amount
involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and
other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount
would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts
that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts
involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if
the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in
any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving
an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the
raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to
at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of

the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of

accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1,
par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense. There
would
be
no
other
explanation
for
a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of
Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of
the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it
contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime,"
such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be
convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4
on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual
crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not
plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the
crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of
Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the
Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays
down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of
Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on
the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two
pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no
way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying
Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4
contains a very important element of the crime of plunder
and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not
one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is
clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake
of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons
advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;

after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more
than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability
clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Actand the application
of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act
from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really
so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives
of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice
Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It
is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to
convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or
scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it

is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of
attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy
to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being
enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the
Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since
the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe,
however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in

se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring
to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that
are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital
crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death;
and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and seriousillegal detention, where
the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or
the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their
very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which
the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will
to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to

the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are
the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators
must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished
are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and
it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions
for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA
7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as
an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and
obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its
very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become
more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the
coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily
methodical
and
economically catastrophic looting of thenational
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if
left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder
Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to

ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of
this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount
of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall
from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a
virginal
statute. This
continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissensionamong our people that may
linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for
patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we
emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C.
LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. Esmso
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis
the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only
guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental
liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.
The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic
due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the
faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual
backdrop:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where
the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for
rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.

A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or

to defraud the United States; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,

representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition
Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a),
Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident
in the Requesting State). Kycalr

D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six

[6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the

Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted,
private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;

four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or
television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years
on each count);

E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of

another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical
evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the
documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official
English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached
to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to
be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private
respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and

papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to

comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at
least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States
Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a
period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a
reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent
only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of
the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending
evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of
the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty
between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted
as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned
documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused

in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not

available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition
when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition,
request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United
States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process
covered by strict secrecy rules under United States
law. The United States had to secure orders from the
concerned District Courts authorizing the United
States to disclose certain grand jury information to
Philippine government and law enforcement
personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said
information is not authorized by the United States
District Courts. In this particular extradition request
the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the subject information. This
Departments denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is
the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are

a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement and to be effective,
requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish
private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose,
the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request
impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed
to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). Scslx
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 9994684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court
stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9,
1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be
given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.

On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the

previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the
respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of;
from conducting further proceedings in connection
with the request of the United States Government for
the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court;
and from performing any act directed to the
extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall
issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by
the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August
17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. The
respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written
comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

BECAUSE: Slxs c
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO
REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO
THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A
COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE
REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN
EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED
FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER
THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE
PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN

ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his
comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining
order (TRO) providing: slxmis
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,
representatives or any person or persons acting in
your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to
CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed
order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this
17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after
which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and
substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as
well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent
entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An
affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the

trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially
the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would
call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated
August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process
leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional
trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is
adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a
breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that
the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between
private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected
to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside
peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the
petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999
by the trial court. Missdaa
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure.
The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on
November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine
Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the
instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual,
are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting

State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be
accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the
warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State
having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the
fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his
whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these
acts; Sda adsc
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of
said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law,
sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or
convention, he shall forward the request together
with the related documents to the Secretary of
Justice, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of
the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive
authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request
and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or
not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which
describe the identity and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history
of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential
elements of the offense for which extradition is requested;

9. A copy of the charging document.

(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see
to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the
request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State
(Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that
"[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the
Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated,
or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under
non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for

the offense; Rtc spped
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit
on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in
paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State,
would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if
the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other
competent authority; and

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the

extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and
complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize
an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a
written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or
city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). Korte
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the
petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order
summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue
a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice
(Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of
the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the
extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the
hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8
of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case
may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter
throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision
granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a
showing of the existence of a prima faciecase, or dismiss the petition
(Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory
(Section 12,ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the
aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file
brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in
the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual
criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RPUS Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not
the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one
(Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as
backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of
the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings? Sclaw
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty
of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the
request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the

Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized

to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and
under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the
ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would
appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition
request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June
17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the
Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly
evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The
statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign
Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post
office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the
Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the
Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities.
Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine
the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find
out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the
Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of
Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was
also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following:
(1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers;
(2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period
of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of
the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the
request. Kyle

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties
and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its
commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting
the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that
if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity
that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the
extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents
satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as
he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then
could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day,
make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper,
belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal
investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an
exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to
outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and
(c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999,
pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition
Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial
power. Ex sm
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking
and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the

evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision

supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text
and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304
U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasijudicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming
under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and
analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agencys performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court
had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with
the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions
and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings
in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or
merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of
power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of
the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Msesm
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no
power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to

determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the

law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final.
The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition
should be effected. That is the role of the court. The bodys power is
limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations,
the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities.
Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process.
Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides
that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he
shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for
a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is
silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is
forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph
[5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be
discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this
detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee
during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees
liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an
imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Sc lex

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the

evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a
"tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly
available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right
against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo
vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we
held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs.
Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of
ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of
unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under
Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled
that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the
administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier

case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court,
citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a
statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be
included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature,
although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from
the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it
cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not
involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature. x law
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of
deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this true, but
even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself
and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can
be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes
a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently
exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense,
the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since
both procedures may have the same result the arrest and
imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against
the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation
of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241
[1992]) (p. 8, Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is
neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioners
conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in

reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post

facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any
legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed noncompliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about
the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due
process protection to their respective citizens. Sc
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their
respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their
interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them
capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been
designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of
an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due
process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines
as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal
straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due
process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise"
(Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA
849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which

inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due
process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed.,
pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of
notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings,
but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be
notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon
notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their
side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory
proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondents basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.Scmis
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in
certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate
action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article
704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant
facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code,
B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters

showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate

threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a
passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is,
where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be
asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall
under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition
proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject
treaty involves the U.S. Government.Mis sc
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or
extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S.
Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition
proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the
asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding
state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given
a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to
effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state
in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the
requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must
appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the
person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the
offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is

charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has

been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate
(35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with
the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and
documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of
the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as
an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory
requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are
mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the
extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring
duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or
judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and
delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However,
the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right
mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256
S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d
853). Mis spped
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for
the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of
a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the
designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of
the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he
attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S.
extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed
by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic
channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an
individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of
Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the

event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is

transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine
extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the
Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that
under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are
covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the
documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal
statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition
hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or
magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence
offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person
arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also
determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and
jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and
(c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the
person sought and that he committed the offenses charged
(Ibid.) Spped
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify
extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in
the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted
that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary
examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the
guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are
present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and
conclusions of law and certifies the persons extraditability. The court
then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of
State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision
whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State
(18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions
concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his
extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State,
who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual
to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States,
extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State
which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of
State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of
Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the
request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned
(see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of
Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition.
Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant
case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of
Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as
well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting
the petition for extradition. Jo spped
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S.
Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due
process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He
emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible delay in
the evaluation process.

We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme

Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures
to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause, in particular, that they
were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same
interest as the Philippine Government that no right
that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights
of the Philippines Constitution but of the United
States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents
Memorandum.) Spped jo
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system
is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is
not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be
in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no

question that not even the strongest moral conviction

or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III
of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny him
that right (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is
a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for
extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked
proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not
always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the
basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty." Miso
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation
stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of
the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition,
the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of
mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387)
since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold
that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly
jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under
an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state
has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails
to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not
forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid
requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect
the extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice

exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements
of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government
of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are
in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that
are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice
Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which
cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing
can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness
of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic
of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee,
but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative
determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause
his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to
the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as
Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the
threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court,
but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the
provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law.
The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due
process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private
respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads: Nex old

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to
citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on
matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to
official records and documents. The general right guaranteed by said
provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In
its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise
conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations
as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A
Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can
protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents
letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of
the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private
respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with
public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by
the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if
the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his
right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition.
Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the
governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p.
336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the

public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530
[1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen
has "standing".Mani kx
When the individual himself is involved in official government action
because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either
cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the
basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not
exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an
accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to
information within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337).
Such information may be contained in official records, and in
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent
pertain to official government action from the U. S. Government. No
official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the
papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.
S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are
matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a
Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper
functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government has as yet been
done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in
contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under
matters of public concern, because our government by then shall

have already made an official decision to grant the extradition

request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of
the instant controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the
affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper
time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same.
We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of
notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.Maniks
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a
treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance
of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine
of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals
(or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions
of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to
be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for

the generally accepted principles of international law in observance

of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes
and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution (Ibid.). Manikan
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law
and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components
of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we
see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic
due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage
of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted,
after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and
hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However,
prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the
U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights.

Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex
parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of
fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice
and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights
from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents
from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be
supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the
Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality
argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be
obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S.
District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain
grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil
of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial. Oldmiso
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition
Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar
situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation
process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In
the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the
Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty;
Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners theory,
because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that
for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which
states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not
available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the
extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential
Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section
13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue
of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient
thereto? Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs.

NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278
SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by
which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the
enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting
State may have valid objections to the Requested States nonperformance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are
insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we
limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service
Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991])
and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997])
where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service
Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution,
Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for
Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System
in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707,
although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity
of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process
still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of
Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear
to us that an employee must be informed of the

charges preferred against him, and that the normal

way by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against
him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a
statute cannot dispense with and still remain
consistent with the constitutional provision on due
process. The second minimum requirement is that
the employee charged with some misfeasance or
malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to
present his side of the matter, that is to say, his
defenses against the charges levelled against him
and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. Ncmmis
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature,
yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself,
which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign
land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty
is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call
for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process
rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected
by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law
of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against

the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the

principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and
opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever
hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which
to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil
Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS

FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN

BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUA
CAUSING, Petitioners, v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS,
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
(CRAB), Respondents.
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, IN BEHALF OF CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, AND ON HER OWN BEHALF, PetitionerIntervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadets character as a leader rests on his personal
commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the
most critical and trying times, and at the most challenging
circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma between what is
true and right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and
comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that
[define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think
twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of and the Spirit of
the Honor Code it is championing truth and righteousness even if it
may mean the surrender of ones basic rights and privileges. 1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia,
acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet 1CL Cudia), and Berteni Catalua Causing filed
this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application
for extremely urgent temporary restraining order
(TRO).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution dated March 17, 2014, the Court denied the prayer
for TRO and, instead, required respondents to file their comment on
the petition.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf

of her son Cadet 1CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene,
attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention. 4 Per Resolution dated
March 31, 2014, the Court granted the motion and resolved to await
respondents comment on the petition.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014,
recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention and
adopting it as an integral part of their petition. 6 On May 20, 2014,
petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion for leave to
admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was relative to
CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and
Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in behalf of their
son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC) members and Major
Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet 1CL Cudias
rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to
adopt the submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation was
granted and the motion was noted by the Court in its Resolution
dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed
their Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion,
petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by
petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex A of the Reply was a copy of the
CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No.
2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same on August 11, 2014
and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit
the case for early resolution,15which the Court noted in a Resolution
dated August 11, 2014 and October 13,
2014.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
PMA, the countrys premiere military academy located at Fort
Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the A Company
and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners and
petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called petitioners,

unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with

honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber
as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign
of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air
Force 1CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations
Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr.
Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the
Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was
from 1:30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in
ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the
5th period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet
1CL Cudia because he was [l]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412
class x x x.17 Cadets 1CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas,
Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five
minutes.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical
Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical
Officers (CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days
later, Cadet 1CL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL
Cudia reasoned out that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We
were dismissed a bit late by our instructor
Sir.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj.
Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty
of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet 1CL Cudia
clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him
that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation
with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never dismissed her class
late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than
scheduled. When he expressed his intention to appeal and seek
reconsideration of the punishment, he was advised to put the request
in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1CL Cudia addressed his

Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin

L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO),
asserting:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our
4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is
ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4 th period class, I
went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his
comments on the request of Cadet 1CL Cudia and to indicate if there
were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj.
Leander pointing out that, based on his investigation, the 4 th period
class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the
penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1CL Cudia came to
know of the denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon
inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia was
informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC 21 for violation of
the Honor Code. The Honor Report
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written
appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended at 1500H that made
him late in the succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol
(Cadet 1CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report,
Cadet 1CL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindangs
conversations with their instructors and classmates as well as his
statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then
verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to answer
the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light
on the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet 1CL
Cudia, conveying:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told
me its a report dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no time
referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)

All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last
december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early bec its grp
work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets 1CL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr.
Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in the
same time reference when the latter asked her.

2. Statements of the respondents support my

explanation.

Later, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the

Honor Report. He averred:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sir,

3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for

reconsideration of meted punishment) further
supports my explanation in my delinquency report.

We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When

the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and
submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet
1cl Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the
deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our
question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our section
grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then
she came out of the room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet
Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to our 5 th period
class which is ENG412.

4. My understanding of the duration of the CLASS

covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom
instruction but includes every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students,
especially that in our case some cadets asked for
queries, and I am given instruction by which (sic)
were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction
and communication with our other classmates may
have already ended but ours extended for a little bit.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the

following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. How could this be lying?
2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why
did he come up to that honor report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be
reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor
code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to
deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and for the
following reasons:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already
settled and finalized given the fact that no face-to-

face personal conversation with Ms. Costales was

conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the
issue at hand.

I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is

under my instruction to wait, and the other cadets
still have business with me, it is reasonable enough
for him to say that Our class was dismissed a bit
late (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute
particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it
ended on time (1500H).
(signed)
M. COSTALES
w/ attached certification

5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2minute delay and did not attempt to conceal anything
that happened or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULAWAN PA, the Tactical
Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I had a
conversation with regards (sic) to the same matter
for which he can give important points of my case.
7. Cadet 1cl DIAZ D Co can also stand as a witness
that I waited for Ms. Costales.24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet
1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as
Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL
Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members.25Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary
Investigation Report recommending that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1CL Cudia then ensued. The
Presiding Officer was Cadet 1CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine
(9) voting members were Cadets 1CL Jairus O. Fantin, 1CL Bryan
Sonny S. Arlegui, 1CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1CL Jeanelyn P.
Cabrido, 1CL Shu-Aydan G. Ayada, 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL
Renato A. Cario, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C.
Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire
proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico
A. de Jesus II.27 Those who observed the trial were Cadets 1CL
Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and
Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL
Umaguing.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and
lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia was
informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded Not
Guilty. Among those who testified were Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj.
Hindang, and Cadets 1CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second
night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia
again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with

Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath via
phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting
members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The
members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted
their accomplished ballot sheets together with their written
justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL
Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet 1CL Lagura) was the lone dissenter.
Allegedly, upon the order of HC Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the
Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber
adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After several
minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0
guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring
hours, was then informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty
of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA
Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia filed a written appeal
addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of which
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412
class, my explanation on this delinquency report when I received it,
is that Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly
from 4th period class... etc. Knowing the fact that in my delinquency
report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late
for two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic) to interpret it as I came
1502H during that class. This is the explanation that came into my
mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in
explaining that delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I
have no intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my
message as since I was not the only one left in that class, and the
instructor is with us, I used the term CLASS, I used the word
DISMISSED because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give
the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets
(1CL MIRANDA, 1CL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business
with her that made me decide to use the word CLASS, while the
others who dont have queries and business with her (ex: 1CL

NARCISO and 1CL DIAZ) were also around.

ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4 th period class, I

went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.

Note:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171.0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal
Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that Cadets shall not linger in the place
of instruction after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when
told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent
authority for official purposes.
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells
rang (indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for
about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to
decide to write a little bit late in my explanation. Truly, the class
ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms.
Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic schedule (to which I
am not in control of the circumstances, 4thPD class 1330H1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1600H), and since Ms. Costales, my
other classmates, and I were there, I used the word CLASS.
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits
and 13 Touring hours. Not because I dont want to serve punishment,
but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and
believing that my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I
approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and
ask why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor
and he even added that they have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15
minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances,
our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is

These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my

delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict in the schedule
and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it further
with these statements, my tactical officer said that since I was
reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in a written form.
Thinking that he already understood what I want to say, I immediately
made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in having
conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24,
2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and]
NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making
query about their latest grades in OR432 and/or
results of UE1 outside the ACADS office. The
following facts may explain their queries on 14
November 2013:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room
instead of room 104.
b. That OR432 releases grades every
Wednesday and cadets are informed during
Thursday, either in class or posted grades in
the bulletin board (grades released was [sic]
based on the previous LEs: latest LE before
UE was Decision Trees).
c.

That UE papers were already checked but

not yet recorded due to (sic) other cadets
have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed
to verify scores but not to look at the papers.

d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan

clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and
ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets

said that they verified something with me

after the OR432 class and they were with
Cadet CUDIA. That the statements of the
three (3) cadets are all the same and
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.

2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really

account for the specific time that I dismissed the
class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account
that is more than two (2) months earlier. According to
my records, there was a lecture followed by an LE
during (sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the
time of my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with
the other members of class I was handling on that
said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day,
January 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the
arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim
that the written appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the
petition-in-intervention.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the
Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal review to
check the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation,
Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge
of the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or
1505H), and that Cadet 1CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of
ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant,
and STO that the class started not earlier than scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the
Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for
review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez),
the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and
recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet 1CL Cudia for

violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to

Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special
Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet
1CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and
allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his
separation by the AFP-GHQ, barring him from future appointment
and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any
entrance requirements to the PMA.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation
to dismiss Cadet 1CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted a letter to the
Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement by
the PMA of his status as a cadet.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee), the sister of Cadet
1CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Facebook account. The day after,
the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj.
Gen. Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the
8-1 voting of the HC,35copies of which were furnished to the AFP
Chief of Staff and other concerned military officials. Subsequently,
Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet 1CL Cudias case.
The latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia made his personal appeal
letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff
ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of
Annavee demanding the intervention of the military leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1
was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia by
not talking to him and by separating him from all activities/functions
of the cadets. It is said that any violation shall be a Class 1 offense
entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement.
Cadet 1CL Cudia was not given a copy of the order and learned
about it only from the media.36 According to an alleged news report,
PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores)
confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia. Among his

offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting documents in the

social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to
resign, and smearing the name of the
PMA.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for
additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the ground
that his intended witnesses were in on-the-job training (OJT).38 As
additional evidence to support his appeal, he also requested for
copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents
pertaining to the case, and video footages and recordings of the HC
hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family engaged the services
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following:
(a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014;
(b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and (c)
guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr.
(Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet 1CL
Cudia that, pending approval of the latters request for extension, the
CRAB would continue to review the case and submit its
recommendations based on whatever evidence and testimonies
received, and that it could not favorably consider his request for
copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages
and recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the
appropriate nor the authorized body to take action
thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1CL Cudia wrote
a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his
request.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the
CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC
members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights
of Cadet 1CL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process, education,
and privacy of communication.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for
additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit
evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General
Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for immediate
directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL
Cudias requests.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab
Diwa Class, the following events
transpired:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief
Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the
CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of
Cadet 1CL Cudia.44chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez
stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudias requests for extension of
time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time already
given, and to be furnished with a copy of relevant documents
because of confidentiality and presumption of regularity of the HC
proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed an Appeal
Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal
Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was issued
by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to conduct
a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudias Appeal
Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just to find out
whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to
investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members of the
command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of
policy or regulations that had been violated by other cadets and
members of the HC.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney
had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez.

On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary
findings, which recommended the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect
and uphold the 8 Guilty 1 Not guilty
vote;chanrobleslaw
b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially
pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge
filed against him before the Honor
Committee;chanrobleslaw
c.

For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudias rights and

entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and
allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March
2014;chanrobleslaw

d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the

investigation of Cudias Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting
with Pres. Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND)
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they
put in writing their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According
to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1CL Cudia would not
join the graduation but it was without prejudice to the result of the
appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President
then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case,
with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting the
review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class graduation day, petitioner Renato
S. Cudia received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of
the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano
for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the CRABs denial of Cadet 1CL
Cudias appeal. It held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After review, The Judge Advocate General, AFP finds that the action
of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation is legally

in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt

and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your son
was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was
informed of the final verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision
of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the
PMA CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the
continued stay of your son at the Academy was voluntary. As such,
he remained subject to the Academys policy regarding visitation.
Further, there was no violation of his right to due process considering
that the procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA
CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the previous finding
and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your son,
subject Cadet guilty of Lying and recommending his separation
from the Academy is sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your
appeal for lack of merit.51
Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its
Final Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1CL
Cudias appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special
investigation board tasked to probe the case submitted its final report
to the President.53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals process,
the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the
Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the
case for purposes of DND review and recommendation for
disposition by the President.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution
with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and
recommending as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on
Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA
Honor Committee and certain PMA officials, specifically for violations
of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due
process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR
Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their

immediate appropriate action on the following

recommendations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the
9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty verdict against Cadet Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and void; to uphold and
respect the 8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty voting result and
make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in
favor of Cadet Cudia;chanrobleslaw
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President
in whose hands rest the ends of justice and fate of
Cadet Cudia, to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the
Philippine Military Academy;
2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree
of Bachelors of Science; and
2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript of his
academic records for his BS degree, without conditions therein as
to his status as a PMA cadet.

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

3. The Public Attorneys Office to provide legal services

to Cadet Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal
and civil suits against the officers and members of
the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation
of the Honor Code and System and the Procedure in
Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the
secrecy of the ballot, tampering the true result of the
voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of
substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which
are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet
Cudias fundamental rights to dignity, nondiscrimination and due process, which led to the
infringement of his right to education and even
transgressing his right to a good life.
Cdt 1CL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
Cdt 1CL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARIO, JR.
Cdt 2CL NIKO ANGELO C. TARAYAO

3.6 Cdt 1CL JEANELYN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.7 Cdt 1CL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.8 Cdt 1CL JAIRUS O. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.9 Cdt 1CL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.10Cdt 1CL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.11Cdt 1CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.12Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (recorder)
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA
competent authorities should investigate and file
appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P.
GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of
Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to
ensure the protection of the right to privacy of Cudia
who was then billeted at the PMA Holding
Center;chanrobleslaw
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA
competent authorities should investigate Maj.
DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and
ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a
competent Tactical Officer and a good father of his
cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure to
respect exhaustion of administrative
remedies;chanrobleslaw
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philppines, the PMA
Superintendent, to immediately cause the
comprehensive review of all rules of procedures,
regulations, policies, including the so-called
practices in the implementation of the Honor Code;
and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of
procedures and relevant regulations which are
human-rights based and consistent with the
Constitution and other applicable
laws;chanrobleslaw

7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the

enactment of a law defining and penalizing
ostracism and discrimination, which is apparently
being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in
this jurisdiction;chanrobleslaw

Honor Committee members was initially at 8 Guilty votes and 1

Not Guilty vote. The lone affidavit of an officer, based on his
purported conversation with one Honor Committee member, lacks
personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said Committee and
is hearsay at best.

8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to

certify as priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism
and/or anti-discrimination law; and

Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human

Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudias due process
rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature,
such recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an
8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent
evidence.

9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA

authorities to ensure respect and protection of the
rights of those who testified for the cause of justice
and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent
authorities on the foregoing CHR recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by
substituted service to the complainants (the spouses Renato and
Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents.
Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the
Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the
Philippines, The Public Attorneys Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings
of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which was
addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and
26 March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the decision of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of
your son, Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the
decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this
Office has found no substantial basis to disturb the findings of the
AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no
competent evidence to support the claim that the decision of the

In the evaluation of Cadet Cudias case, this Office has been guided
by the precept that military law is regarded to be in a class of its own,
applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes
an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from
that of civilians (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August
2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the
findings of the AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was
nothing irregular in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying great
weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the
findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution
are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR
COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE
ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents

regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia was deprived of his right to have access to
evidence which would have proven his defense,
would have totally belied the charge against him,
and more importantly, would have shown the
irregularity in the Honor Committees hearing and
rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely
informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor
Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
and the Philippine Military Academy

WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION

INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND
PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY
HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition,
respondents presented the issues
below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.

C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and

Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia
nothing but a sham trial

THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE

INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA
CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN
RENDERED MOOT.
II.

D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and

Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
violated their own rules and principles as embodied
in the Honor Code

THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY

FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.

E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and

Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy,
in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudias
case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor
Code so as to defy the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the
former should yield to the latter.
II

MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO

GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
IV.

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR

COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY
VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III

IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING

THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIAS
APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST
EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY
OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY
MATTERS.

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY
RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS
ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
VII.

The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on

the Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was
dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH

AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND
PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE
PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate
cadets despite the absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of
a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing
untruthful statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of
the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were
properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee,
by incorporating executive session/chambering, was adopted to
further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee.
Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from
the other voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.

Propriety of a petition for mandamus

Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition
praying that Cadet 1CL Cudia be included in the list of graduating
cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises was
already rendered moot and academic when the graduation
ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16,
2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie
to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v.
The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not
be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student to
continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a
right. In this case, there is a clear failure on petitioners part to
establish that the PMA has the ministerial duty to include Cadet 1CL
Cudia in the list, much less award him with academic honors and
commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case
ofUniversity of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is submitted
that the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who
may be admitted to study pursuant to its academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet
1CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014 commencement exercises
could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs
prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can
be ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a violation of a
constitutional right, and that the certiorari aspect of the petition must
still be considered because it is within the province of the Court to
determine whether a branch of the government or any of its officials
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a
ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be
performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act
specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act
whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform
the duty.61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, petitioners pray for, among
others:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue
a Writ of Mandamus to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of
graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
including inclusion in the yearbook;chanrobleslaw
2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in
the commencement exercises if he completed all the
requirements for his baccalaureate
degree;chanrobleslaw
3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the
academic honors he deserves, and the commission
as a new Philippine Navy ensign;chanrobleslaw

4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB

of the PMA all its records of the proceedings taken
against Cadet Cudia, including the video footage
and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting,
for the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct
intelligent review of the case of Cadet
Cudia;chanrobleslaw
5. direct the PMAs CRAB to conduct a review de
novo of all the records without requiring Cadet
Cudia to submit new evidence if it was physically
impossible to do so;chanrobleslaw
6. direct the PMAs CRAB to take into account the
certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new
evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military
officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted
not guilty revealed to this officer that this cadet was
coerced into changing his vote, and other new
evidence if there is any;chanrobleslaw
7. direct the PMAs CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right
to a counsel who is allowed to participate actively in
the proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations
during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses
against him; and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the
case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a
representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following
reliefs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A. x x x
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued
commanding:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold
the 8 Guilty - 1 Not Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce

Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before
the Honor Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudias rights and entitlements as a
full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards. 63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1CL Cudia in the
list of graduates of Siklab DiwaClass of 2014 and to allow him to take
part in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot
and academic when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on
March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1CL Cudia in the roll of
graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1CL
Cudias rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet,
including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine
Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus
on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more
detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are
within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic
freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide. 64 The
powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and
commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on
the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing
the words of Garcia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be
pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of
Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner
possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet
1CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable
requisite of amandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be
availed against an official or government agency whose duty requires
the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue,
petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded,
and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated.67chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being
sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB
proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of
a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a

specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of

discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which
is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law.68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must
proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to
settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1CL Cudia
from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually
require the Court to make findings of fact because it sets forth
several factual disputes which include, among others: the tardiness
of Cadet 1CL Cudia in his ENG412 class and his explanation thereto,
the circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his Honor
Code violation, the proceedings before the HC, and the allegation
that Cadet 1CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the
executive session/chambering.
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents
legal issues. Rather than determining which between the two
conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers
on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of a persons
rights to due process, to education, and to property; the
interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the
conclusion on whether Cadet 1CL Cudias explanation constitutes
lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of fact, petitioners
still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of
fact and law.
Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth
or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy

arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no

dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.69
The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the
Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more
importance is the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to
due process, to education, and to property in the context of the
Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the
extent or limit thereof. Notably, even respondents themselves raise
substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their
contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint and should
refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military
matters, they argue that Cadet 1CL Cudia has necessarily and
voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into
the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom
authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and punishment
as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA.
These issues, aside from being purely legal questions, are of first
impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical
ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the
petition pending President Aquinos resolution of Cadet 1CL Cudia
appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full
administrative process. While Cadet 1CL Cudia underwent the
review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level the
determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according to the
established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the
Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of
the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to
warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the
appellate review proceedings before the CRAB he still appealed to
the President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions
affecting the military. It is contended that the Presidents power over
the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is
recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in
Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The
National Defense Act"). As such, the President could still overturn the

decision of the PMA. In respondents view, the filing of this petition

while the case is pending resolution of the President is an
irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity
dictates that courts of justice should shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that
President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1CL Cudia.
They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek
reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the AFP officials
and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to,
during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended
by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet 1CL Cudias family the
night before, foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings
would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based on
the Corsiga v. Defensor72 andVerceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is that courts, for reasons of law, comity,
and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of,
have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. 74 In the
U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by
respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his
remedies within the military before appealing to the court, the
doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between
military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a
party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is
present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. when there is a violation of due process;

Courts interference within military affairs
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal
of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give
due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during
the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of
the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of
the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this
supervening event bars any objection to the petition based on failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.

Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger

v. Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial intervention
would pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there
should be a deferential review of military statutes and regulations
since political branches have particular expertise and competence in
assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v.
Willoughby79and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S.
Supreme Court that the military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. According
to respondents, the U.S. courts respect to the military recognizes
that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military context
than in civilian society as a whole. Such military deference is
exercised either by refusing to apply due process and equal
protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with
leniency.
In respondents view, although Philippine courts have the power of
judicial review in cases attended with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call
for the widest latitude of deference to military affairs. Such respect is
exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a
substantial consideration of legitimate governmental interest. They
suppose that allowing Cadet 1CL Cudias case to prosper will set an
institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a Pandoras box of
other challenges against the specialized system of discipline of the
PMA. They state that with the PMAs mandate to train cadets for
permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and
procedure necessarily must impose a different standard of conduct
compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the
States check-and-balance machinery, specifically mandated by
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the
government or any of its officials acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial non-interference in
military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They

cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as

well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on
account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of
constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this
Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power
to determine whether the AFP and the members of the court martial
acted with grave abuse of discretion in their military investigation.
Petitioners contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the
government, not the courts, with superintendence and control over
the military because the courts generally lack the competence and
expertise necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are illequipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular
intrusion upon military authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the
sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in
the U.S. cases cited by respondents are not on all fours with the
case of Cadet 1CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S.
case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who
were separated from the United States Military Academy due to
Honor Code violations. Following Wasson v.
Trowbridge86 andHagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the
power of the district courts to review procedures used at the service
academies in the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen.
While it recognized the constitutional permissibility of the military to
set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics,
it said that the courts have expanded at an accelerated pace the
scope of judicial access for review of military determinations. Later,
in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well settled that
federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim
that prescribed military procedures violates one's constitutional
rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually made major revisions
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly
providing, among others, for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme
Court of decisions by the militarys highest appellate
authority.89chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still

formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that
the duty of the courts of justice includes not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government even
if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.91chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of
the Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental activity. As
ruled in Andrews:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the
separation process at the Academy has been sufficiently formalized,
and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that committee's
activities within the definition of governmental activity for the
purposes of our review. While the Academy has long had the
informal practice of referring all alleged violations to the Cadet Honor
Committee, the relationship between that committee and the
separation process has to a degree been formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or
informal, the Honor Committee under its own procedures provides
that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a
"guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard choice of either
resigning or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse
finding there results not only in formal separation from the Academy
but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet through life.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting
not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby a cadet
can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor Code
and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the
committee's procedures and determinations on the separation

process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental

activity which may follow as to bring it properly under judicial
review.92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present
Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority
is, at all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances, the Court has been
entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of
any assailed legislative or executive
action.94chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

deciding Cadet 1CL Cudias case considering that these should not
be implemented at the expense of human rights, due process, and
fair play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they
can never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former
should yield to the latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that a
cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in
order for the Code and System to be implemented simply pertains to
what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or
women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices and
the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context
of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of
the right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets rights to
privacy and to remain silent.

Cadets relinquishment of certain civil liberties

We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet
is not the same as that of a civilian because the formers rights have
already been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and
necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v.
Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights
of persons in the military service may be curtailed by the rules of
military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the
duties required to be discharged under the law. Respondents remind
that, as a military student aspiring to a commissioned post in the
military service, Cadet 1CL Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and
political rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The
deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in
the cadets Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning
of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1CL Cudia, along with the
rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the
Honor Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights,
including the right to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the
provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, 96Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code
of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor
System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture.
They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in
bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in

Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to

subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the
educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree
than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor Code
and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, [as] a
training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society which has its own
norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his
subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires
the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the
group.100chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian,
which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from
the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected
private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process
is a must.101 For that reason, the PMA is not immune from the
strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause
must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe
sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction
which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer
and of probably being forever denied that

career.103chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do
not specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a
military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied
the petition that sought to annul the directive from then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which enjoined petitioners from testifying
before the Congress without her consent. We ruled that petitioners
may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a direct
order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr.,
this Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since the
conditions for his house arrest (particularly, that he may not issue
any press statements or give any press conference during the period
of his detention) are justified by the requirements of military
discipline. In these two cases, the constitutional rights to information,
transparency in matters of public concern, and to free speech not
to due process clause were restricted to better serve the greater
military purpose.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by
the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the
dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of
cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System do
not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed
from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are
gentlemans agreement that cannot take precedence over public
interest in the defense of the nation and in view of the taxpayers
money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on the
Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they
violate the law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public
safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose
disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent
with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express
provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably

written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants to the
President the authority of terminating a cadets appointment, such
power may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the
PMA has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules
and regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of
school discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3
(2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military
educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section
30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, 106 Chapter 9,
Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987?), the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom
guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was held
that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and
impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with Isabelo, Jr.
v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit
(and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of discipline and
honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly
assail the Honor Code as basis of the HCs decision to recommend
his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and
studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or should have been fully
aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the
corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in Isabelo,
Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be
exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the
1987 Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to choose
what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same does not go
so far as to deprive a student of the right to graduate when there is
clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case,
the right to graduate becomes a vested right which takes precedence
over the limited and restricted right of the educational institution.

While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of

respondents are more in line with the facts of this case.
We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in
nature. Once admitted, a students enrolment is not only semestral in
duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete
it.111 An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a
fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. 112 Such
contract is imbued with public interest because of the high priority
given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions.113chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. [It]
has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of
such kind it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with
education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and
regulations.114chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning,115 has been enshrined
in our
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court
espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated
the four essential freedoms of a university: To determine for itself
on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught,
(3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.118An
educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules
as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident
to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside
coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public
welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, academic
freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a

privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.

An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.121chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The schools power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed
in their academic freedom and that the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival.122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without
discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the
mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to
survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court has
always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary
sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students
who violate disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,125this Court elucidated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in
the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly
cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational
institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of
an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and
regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students,
faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student
discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in
the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop
discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and

nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden
scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for
the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and
develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the
community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline
more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has
the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also
has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon
whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the
withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends
even after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.
In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127We
upheld the universitys withdrawal of a doctorate degree already
conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual
dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing
new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise
provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to
"institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot
study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the
honor and distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was

obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or

withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom
of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student,
as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of
such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the
investigation of private respondent's case began before her
graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on
April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted
before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have
been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of
higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to
quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or
in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest
governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power
to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University
Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on
error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to
the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted
without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning
cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has
conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more
objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree
upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or
deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's
concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take
measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue
their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled
to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized. 128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to
develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty
values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you
will, of the total man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be

religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the
rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant duty to
learn under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a
right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.132chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational
institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic
freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations,
which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral
principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves
as the guiding spirit behind each cadets action. It is the cadets
responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout
a cadets stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It
binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the
member of the so-called Long Gray Line.
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets
character development. It defines the desirable values they must
possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of
trust so essential in a military organization; and it makes them
professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it
should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is best
adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside
as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the
PMA.134chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means
of achieving the cadets character development and as ways by
which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in
conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet
Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates
have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards
of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary
system as a whole is characterized as "correctional and educational
in nature rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to
teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all

that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above

self-interest or loyalty to friends or
associates."137chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more
appropriate in determining the minimum standards for the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the
guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1CL Cudia was
accorded due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the
PMA fell short in observing the important safeguards laid down
in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the
minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For
them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the due process
requirements outlined inAng Tibay as the Court merely stated that
the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are moreapropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue
as it held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal
with the requirements of due process, the latter case is
moreapropos since it specifically deals with the minimum standards
to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of
students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly
recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De
Letran.142chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)

they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be summary;145 that
cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or
hearing;146 and that the required proof in a student disciplinary action,
which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable
doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence
or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.147chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of
fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 148 As held
in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the
right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long
as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend
her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of
due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. To be heard does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be
heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative
proceeding conducted to investigate a cadets honor violation need

not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It

articulates that
The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and
assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal
precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the
Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for
loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the
system to their own advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize
Honor in a substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings of
the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit
of the Code for the reason that it can be used to make unlawful
attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can
be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for
the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet,
a member of the CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code and
System. Cadets actions are bound by the existing norms that are
logically applied through the Code and System in order to realize the
Academys mission to produce leaders of character men of integrity
and honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures
of the states Justice System but it does not demean
its Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list of
externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations
and loopholes arise through legalism and its
technicalities, the objective of building the character
of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public
Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor
System tries to examine both the action and the
intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards
undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military
academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is unique in
the sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight
wars should the occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing
military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to

accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex

due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and
timeliness. Investigations that last for several days or weeks,
sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and procedural
points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are
irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the
dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive
delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or
her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed
Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve
fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considering that the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia is one of first
impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with
the particular issue of a dismissed cadets right to due process, it is
necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some guidance.
Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army
and the U.S. military code produced a salutary effect in the military
justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws
interpreting the U.S. military code and practices have persuasive, if
not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that due
process is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each case of
a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural
protections as the particular situation
demands.156Hagopian opined:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In approaching the question of what process is due before
governmental action adversely affecting private interests may
properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a
rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to
any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which
depends upon thebalancing of various factors, including the
nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the
extent to which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the
severity and consequences of any action that might be taken,
the burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all or part
of the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of
other overriding interests, such as the necessity for prompt
action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full

context must therefore be considered in each case.157 (Emphasis

supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the
minimum standards of due process required in the dismissal of a
cadet. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it
may not proceed arbitrarily but must observe due process of law. x x
x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due
process of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules
developed in one context to entirely distinct forms of government
action. "For, though 'due process of law' generally implies and
includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to
answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial
proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to
determine in any given case what procedures due process requires,
the court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the
private interest affected and of the government interest involved,
taking account of history and the precise circumstances surrounding
the case at hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate concern with
the subject matter before it may validly affect private interests, in
particularly vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as
national security and military affairs, the private interest must yield to
a greater degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly
rest so exclusively within the discretion of the appropriate
government officials than the selection, training, discipline and
dismissal of the future officers of the military and Merchant Marine.
Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these young men
who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the face of
adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national
importance scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it
cannot be doubted that because of these factors historically the
military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary
procedures than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the
dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that he be
given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges
against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the

parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are

plain.The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges
against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to
present his defense both from the point of view of time and the
use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest,
however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when
demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered. The
hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be
adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held
that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in cases where
cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the
Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in
order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet
who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy must
be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against
him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her
defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses
and other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not
too far from what We have already set inGuzman and the
subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business
Administration160 andDe La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.161chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty
verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level from
the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to
the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the
opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings.

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias Honor Code

violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in
the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He
was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He
was informed about his options and the entire process that the case
would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed
after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was
assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and
given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his
behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he

As to the right to be represented by a counsel

It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and

expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under
their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative
tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court,
unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, We find no reason to
deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed
below seriatim:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1CL

Cudia the right to be represented by a counsel who could actively
participate in the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the
witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is
because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO
lawyer, the counsel was only made an observer without any right to
intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1CL Cudias
rights.163 According to them, he was not sufficiently given the
opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would
like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was
already nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance
of the PAO. Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in stating that
the erring student has the right to answer the charges against him or
her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.

On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v.

Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor General165 in asserting that the
right to a counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or
non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet 1CL Cudias
academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully
understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to be
represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim that
Cadet 1CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsels advice
in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim that Cadet 1CL Cudia is guaranteed the
right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation
for the investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in
participating fully in said hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987
Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer,
while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil
Service Commission,166 the Court held that a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with
counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function
of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is
non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not
adversarial and the government does not proceed through counsel,
where the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his
knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to develop the facts
adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects

of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not
require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to
representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in military
academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally
motivated by the policy of "treading lightly on the military domain,
with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military
establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of
constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary
proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be kept informal,
and that literate and educated cadets should be able to defend
themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of
informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the
cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel before the
Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the
training and education needed to understand his rights and express
himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so. 170 In the
subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access
to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself,
examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue
the case during the hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument
that an individual of a midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected
because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others,
often under difficult circumstances, and who has full awareness of
what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was deprived of due
process by being required to present his defense in person at an
investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that
Cadet 1CL Cudia was given the option or was able to seek legal
advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he
was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the
CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due
process is already satisfied since, at the very least, the counsel
aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and
even acted as an observer who had no right to actively participate in
the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-examination).
Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the offense
committed by Cadet 1CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the

hearings before the HC and the CRAB were investigative and not
adversarial; and that Cadet 1CL Cudias excellent academic standing
puts him in the best position to look after his own vested interest in
the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11,
2014 letter Cadet 1CL Cudias request for documents, footages, and
recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating
the regularity of the HC trial and supporting his defense have been
surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them,
the answers on whether Cadet 1CL Cudia was deprived of due
process and whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the
video and other records of the HC investigation. Respondents did not
deny their existence but they refused to present them for the parties
and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of
the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation
Report dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but
were not furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no
way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In their
view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean that it
would be adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents,

footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings are favorable
to Cadet 1CL Cudias cause, and, consequently, to rule that
respondents refusal to produce and have them examined is
tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process. They
are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any
documents, witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of facts
submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1CL Cudias
defense. The Court may require that an administrative record be
supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong showing of bad faith
or improper behavior' on the part of the agency," 173 both of which are
not present here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the
nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the reason for
withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1CL
Cudias guilty verdict would be overturned with the production and
examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be
further shown in the discussions below, the requested matters, even
if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1CL Cudias predicament. If at all,
such denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not
seriously prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA

For lack of legal basis on PMAs claim of confidentiality of records,

petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to submit
to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its
records of the proceedings, including video footages of the
deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMAs refusal to
release relevant documents to Cadet 1CL Cudia under the guise of
confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code,
which merely provides: A cadet who becomes part of any
investigation is subject to the existing regulations pertaining to rules
of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of secrecy.
Nothing shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with
authority (IV. The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet
Observer). This provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1CL
Cudia of his right to obtain copies and examine relevant documents
pertaining to his case.

To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and

evidence because Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014,
which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1CL Cudia, left him without
any opportunity to secure statements of his own witnesses. He could
not have access to or approach the cadets who were present during
the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result. It is argued that the Order
directing Cadet 1CL Cudias ostracism is of doubtful legal validity
because the Honor Code unequivocally announced: x x x But by
wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method of ostracizing Honor
Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating
means and shall only have the option to make known among its
alumni the names of those who have not sincerely felt remorse for
violating the Honor Code.

On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the
petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of the alleged Special
Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper
and misplaced because of petitioners admission that ostracism has
been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity
consistent with the trend in International Humanitarian Law that the
PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that said Order was
issued, respondents contend that it purely originated from the cadets
themselves, the sole purpose of which was to give a strong voice to
the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1CL
Cudias honor violation and breach of confidentiality of the HC
proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and
unlikely that Cadet 1CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets.
They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already
transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of billeting an
accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the Honor
Code Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the Holding
Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any business to
conduct therein. The cadets could not also ostracize him during
mess times since Cadet 1CL Cudia opted to take his meals at the
Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order
No. 1 was issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was
ostracized in common areas accessible to other cadets. He
remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he
voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free
to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1CL Cudia suffered from
ostracism in the PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by
respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA
Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise
confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them,
it does not matter where the ostracism order originated from because
the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets
themselves. There was a tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those
cadets responsible for ostracism would have been charged by the
PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia did not
choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not

allowed to leave the place. Petitioners opine that placing the accused
cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her presumed
innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full text copy or even a pertinent portion of
the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of
Cadet 1CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of
doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be
granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an
admission of Cadet 1CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon
consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct
Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet 1CL
Cudia.174 While not something new in a military
academy,175 ostracisms continued existence in the modern times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that
the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private interests,
primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory
the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty
by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies
the accused cadets protected rights to present witnesses or
evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed innocent until
finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1CL Cudias stay in the Holding Center, the Court
upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of
violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may
stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet
is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG Holding
Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of Boarders Ward is to
quarter those cadets who are undergoing separation actions.
Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered therein until
final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the
segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the
discretionary authority of Academy officials. It relied on the traditional
doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army authorities,
'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the military

domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the
military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad
confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the administrative segregation was held to be a
reasonable exercise of military discipline and could not be
considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions
It is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the
charge against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the
CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if
any, the information was unjustly belated and the justifications for the
decisions were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and
queries just to be apprised of what he was confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the guilty verdict,
Cadet 1CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor,
but Cadet 1CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would
still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed
Cadet 1CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their
recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters
sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no
decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing. The
PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written
decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from
the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously
delayed when the Cudia family received the same only on March 20,
2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with specificity the factual
and legal bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the
Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the
PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1CL Cudia, it
being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB,
whether the same is substantial, and whether the new evidence
submitted by him was ever taken into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMAs practice of
orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written document so
as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the

confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the Honor System.

Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated
March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1CL Cudia because it
was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who
were given a copy thereof.
Petitioners contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a
constitutional mandate stating that [no] decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based,179 such provision does not
apply in Cadet 1CL Cudias case.
Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of
a decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and
Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the matter.
Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a pointby-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the
parties are necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to him
late, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the reviewing body, assuring that it went through the
processes of legal reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it
was reached and he knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and is
able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A.
No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the
power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law
gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt
or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt
the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadets
dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA
blindly followed the HCs finding of guilt in terminating his military
service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de
novo of all records without requiring Cadet 1CL Cudia to submit new
evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds,
respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly

reviewed the HC recommendation and heard Cadet 1CL Cudias

side. As clearly stated in the letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant
General, [in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained
the findings and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It
also resolved the appeal filed by the subject Cadet. However, the
Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014.
While such report states that a report was submitted to the AFP
General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only on
March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the
same things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion
that the CRAB never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the
first time it came out with its report, and the Final Investigation
Report was drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of
written decision was pointed out by petitioners so as to remedy the
apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and
review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper
assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty
verdict against Cadet 1CL Cudia. They assert that the higher
authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the HC,
noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted by the
HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise, contrary to the
contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued with the review of
the case despite the absence of necessary documents, the CRAB
conducted its own review of the case and even conducted another
investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating
Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proof in showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary and considering further that petitioners
allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on the
part of the PMAs higher authorities is presumed and should,
therefore, prevail.

the responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in case of

breach, its task is entirely investigative, examining in the first
instance a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging selfdiscipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final
adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the function of identifying
suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners assertion, the HC does
not have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the
Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory
and have no binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like
an indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1CL Cudias case, the
PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined
that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor
Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions
had no effect other than to initiate de novo proceedings before a
Board of Officers."184chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Granting, for arguments sake, that the HC is covered by the due
process clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were in fact
committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that
procedural due process be afforded at every stage of developing
disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be
held before the final act of dismissing a cadet from the military
academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA,
the Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed
the HC findings. A separate investigation was also conducted by the
HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the
case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held hearings on
March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners
find it unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice and
suspect that it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the
first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere
conjecture that deserves scant consideration.

We agree with respondents.

As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a
limited role of investigating and determining whether or not the
alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code. 181 It is given

According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a

sham. The people behind Cadet 1CL Cudias charge, investigation,

and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive
and who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1CL Raguindin, who
was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1CL
Cudia in the Navy cadet 1CL, was part of the team which conducted
the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet 1CL Mogol, the HC
Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1CL Cudia with honor violation
allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring his
fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam)
but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a nonvoting member, he was in a position of influence and authority. Thus,
it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1CL Cudia to resort to the
procedure for the removal of HC
members.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was
given to Cadet 1CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one
of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was
advised to convince his son to resign and immediately leave the
PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also
categorically uttered to Annavee: Your brother, he lied! The CRAB
conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the
PMA never really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are
manifestations of PMAs clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CHRs allegation that
Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to
discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he paved the
road to [Cadet 1CL Cudias] sham trial by the Honor Committee is
an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was
given the DR of Cadet 1CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty awarded
because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded
penalties are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at
the instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed
at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the
circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudias tardiness.
Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against
Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll
Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1CL Narciso and Arcangel who also
arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1CL
Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively evaded

responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.

As to the CHRs finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise in bad
faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1CL] Cudia, for reasons of his
own because the former previously reported the latter for an honor
violation in November 2013, respondents argue that the bias
ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to note that
Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he
cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is
the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents
emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected from each
company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the
incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1CL Cudia
believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to
the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the
Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on
the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from graduating
because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his
dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic standing, the
separation militates against PMAs mission to produce outstanding,
honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent
some showing of actual bias, petitioners allegations do not hold
water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof isspeculative at
best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the challenge, specific
evidence must be presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual poses
such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be implemented. 187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are
to be awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an educator
who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels

from time to time as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it,
cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a
submitted work. A particular point or issue may be clarified. In this
case, the question asked of Cadet 1CL Cudia concerning his being
late in class is proper, since there is evidence indicating that a
breach of regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable
cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of
regulations.189chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely
on the non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., We do not
tolerate those who violate the Code. Cadets are reminded that they
are charged with a tremendous duty far more superior to their
personal feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help others by
guiding them to accept the truth and do what is right, rather than
tolerating actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are
presumed to be characteristically honorable; they cannot overlook or
arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or
subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1CL Mogol exactly did,
although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note
that even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes
that interpretation of ones honor is generally
subjective.193chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1CL
Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to
grind against Cadet 1CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter
what, the latters downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be
insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal
investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating
Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the
proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce because the
three personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying the
existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence,
independence, and integrity of the other members who constituted
the majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and substantial
evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this baseless
insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering

Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing

in the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia because two voting rounds took
place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1CL Mogol
ordered the voting members to go to a room without the cadet
recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet 1CL Lagura, was asked
to explain his not guilty vote. Pressured to change his vote, he was
made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1CL Cudia guilty. The original
ballot was discarded and replaced. There was no record of the
change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the HC formal
report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6,
2014 was submitted by petitioners since he purportedly recalled
Cadet 1CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his
not guilty vote after the voting members were chambered. In the
sworn statement, Commander Tabuada
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That after CDT 1CL CUDIA [was] convicted for
honor violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the date
but sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of
January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for
the renewal of my passport,CDT 1CL
LAGURA entered and had business with my
staff;chanrobleslaw
2. When he was about to leave I called him. Lags,
halika muna dito, and he approached me and I let
him sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told
and asked him, Talagang nadali si Cudia ah...
ano ba ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or magBisaya ka. He replied, Talagang NOT GUILTY
ang vote ko sa kanya sir, and I asked him, Oh,
bakit naging guilty di ba pag may isang nag NOT
GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied Chinamber ako
sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY
vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago
ko, sir. So, I told him, Sayang sya, matalino at

mabait pa naman and he replied oo nga sir.

After that conversation, I let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it
committed voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is required to
have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty.
There is nothing in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman to
order the chambering of a member who voted contrary to the
majority and subjects him or her to reconsider in order to reflect a
unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff or
the President sanctioning the HC procedure or approving any
change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The
HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles
as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the
established procedures, the second deliberation should be
considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote
involves a substantive right which cannot be unceremoniously
changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook. In their view, chambering
totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly
destroys the very essence and philosophy behind the provisions of
the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free
to vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one can
pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote. They
suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is
obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her
from the HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in
the Honor Code.195chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a distinction
must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code and the
Honor System. According to them, the former sets the standard for a
cadets minimum ethical and moral behavior and does not change,
while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the observance and
implementation of the Honor Code and may undergo necessary
adjustments as may be warranted by the incumbent members of the
HC in order to be more responsive to the moral training and
character development of the cadets. The HC may provide
guidelines when the Honor System can be used to supplement

regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously subject

to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict
automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The
voting members only write either guilty or not guilty in the voting
sheets without stating their name or their justification. However, this
situation drew criticisms since there were instances where a reported
cadet already admitted his honor violation but was acquitted due to
the lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice
that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically
sanction a jury type of discussion called executive session or
chambering, which is intended to elicit the explanation and insights
of the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the minority or
lone dissenter from prevailing over the manifest proof of guilt. The
assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by
the PMA Siklab DiwaClass of 2014 since their first year in the
Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are,
therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in place and
applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of
Cadet 1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote
rests solely on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without any
compulsion from the other voting members. There can also be no
pressuring to change ones vote to speak of since a vote may only be
considered as final when the Presiding Officer has affixed his
signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuadas statements, respondents raise the
argument that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned
Cadet 1CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made
under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the
Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible
not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending
our baseball game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was
about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our
Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I
approached him and he said: Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano
ba talaga ang nangyari? At first, I was hesitant to answer
because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang
ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. Then I answered: Ako
yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi
na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami,
nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi
kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to
Guilty Sir. He replied: Sayang si Cudia ano? And I said: Oo
nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. 196
Cadet 1CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit
executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR
wherein he attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for
Honor Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for lying. As a
voting member, we are the one who assess or investigate the
case whether the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted NOT GUILTY among
the nine (9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the case
of Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5. I initially voted NOT GUILTY for the reason that after the
proceedings and before the presiding Officer told the members to
vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered
some facts from the investigation to make my decision but for me
it is not yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I
decided to vote NOT GUILTY with a reservation in my mind that
we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 72. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be enlightened with
the others justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that
the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice and

as I predicted, we were told to go inside the anteroom for

executive meeting and to discuss our respective justifications. I
have been a member for two (2) years and the voting committee
will always go for executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1 or
7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that
enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign
and asked for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my
vote from NOT GUILTY to GUILTY and the voting members of
the Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine (9)
votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the
verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the
courtroom went back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by
Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: Bakit ka naman
nagpalit ng boto? I answered: Nasa process yan, may mali
talaga sa rason mo. They also asked who were inside the
Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That
was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the
Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is
possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be
attending our baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was
about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our
Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I
approached him and he said: Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano
ba talaga ang nangyari? At first, I was hesitant to answer
because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang
ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. Then I answered: Ako
yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi
na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami,
nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi

kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh

naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to
Guilty Sir. He replied: Sayang si Cudia ano? And I said: Oo
nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino.197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet
1CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in the
presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement with him,
gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the
records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented assuming
they actually exist, could have been the best way to ensure that he
was free to express his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and
stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1CL Lagura
failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet
1CL Cudia not guilty and what made him change his mind. His use
of general statements like he was confused of the case and saw
things that enlightened my confusions could hardly suffice to
establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the
admission of Cadet 1CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he
was the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the
chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only
submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found, the
announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC
came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1CL Lagura submitted
his accomplished ballot sheet.

Granting, for arguments sake, that the HC violated its written

procedure,199 We still rule that there is nothing inherently wrong with
the practice of chambering considering that the presence of
intimidation or force cannot automatically be inferred therefrom. The
essence of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is
in the heart and mind of the voting member is not necessarily diluted
by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted. As explained by
Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We rule for respondents.

The oral and written statements of Cadet 1CL Lagura should settle
the issue. Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body and the
CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by the other
voting members of the HC. His representation must be accepted as it
is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision
to change his vote. Being the one who was chambered, he is more
credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the
faith that Cadet 1CL Lagura observed the Honor Code, which clearly
states that every cadet must be his or her own Final Authority in
honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on him or
her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any
person can have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the
PMA will be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words
and ways are sincere and true.203chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code

tersely provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member
of the Board will call for the members to vote whether the accused is
GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY
decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating the Honor Code. 198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC
practice of conducting executive session or chambering is not at
all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in
actual cases taking into account the exigency of the times. What is
important is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes
in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code.

13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his

side and insights regarding the case at hand. The
other members, on the other hand, would be given
the chance to explain their votes as well as their
insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to
change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely
on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted
not to change his/her vote despite the discussion,
his [or her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor
Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere
allegation is definitely not evidence. It must be substantiated and
proved because a person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or
wrong and that official duty has been regularly
performed.201chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As to the other alleged irregularities committed such as not putting

on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Laguras bringing of
his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court
shall no longer dwell on the same for being harmless procedural
errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1CL Cudias alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1CL Cudia did not lie. According to them,
there is no clear time reference as to when was the actual dismissal
or what was the exact time of dismissal whether it should be the
dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after the section grade
was given by Dr. Costales in the minds of Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj.
Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting members. They claim
that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five
minutes before the class was set to end and the protocol of
dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When Maj.
Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1CL Cudia
perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he
did not state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention
whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the
scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1CL Cudias only business was to ask
Dr. Costales a query such that his business was already finished as
soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated
by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1CL Cudia must stay and wait for
the section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in control of
the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales never
categorically stated that Cadet 1CL Cudia was lying. She recognized
the confusion. Her text messages to him clarified his alleged
violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that she could
not exactly recall what happened in her class on November 14,
2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated
that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1CL
Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency
Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG
412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim

that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus, Cadet 1CL Cudia was not
late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were
of the view that what appears to have caused confusion in the minds
of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident
was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to
insinuate that Cadet 1CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to
hide the truth. Citing Merriam Websters Dictionary, petitioners argue
that dismiss means to permit or cause to leave, while class refers
to a body of students meeting regularly to study the same subject.
According to them, these two words do not have definite and precise
meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words class and
dismiss used by Cadet 1CL Cudia, which may actually be used in
their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said.
Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is
not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet 1CL Cudias explanations are evidently truthful
and with no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any
fact and was truthful of his explanation. His statements were clear
and unambiguous but were given a narrow-minded interpretation.
Even the Honor Code acknowledges that [e]xperience
demonstrates that human communication is imperfect at best, and
some actions are often misinterpreted.
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1CL Cudias transcript of
records reflects not only his outstanding academic performance but
proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy.
He has above-average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from
96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far
from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend
that Cadet 1CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the military
parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth.
He lied by making untruthful statements in his written explanation.
Respondents want Us to consider the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal
investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long
as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson
examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have
answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his
Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, We had an LE
that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell
rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my
instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia
submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed. Thus,
he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the
afternoon (1500H) or a bit late.
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to
his tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave
and attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with
Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was not under instruction by
Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her
written explanation. She explained that the instruction to wait is a
response to Cadet Cudias request and that it was not her initiated
instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for
Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was
them who wanted to meet with the instructor.
Third, contrary to Cadet Cudias explanation, his subsequent class,
ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the
informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the
HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as
scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1
CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that
their class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and
not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1CL
Cudia had no intention to mislead or deceive but merely used wrong
and unfitting words in his explanations. For them, considering his
academic standing, it is highly improbable that he used incorrect
language to justify his mistake.

Respondents arguments are tenable.

The issue of whether Cadet 1CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of
fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts,
cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze
and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of
administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality
by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions,
there is no evidence that the findings of the investigating and
reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the
findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in
this case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in
holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some
points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed
Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: We, the Cadets, do not
lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do.
The First Tenet of the Honor Code is We do not lie. Cadets violate
the Honor Code by lying if they make an oral or written statement
which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the
intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that every cadets word
is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true
without qualification; and that the cadets must answerdirectly,
completely and truthfully even though the answer may result in
punitive action under the CCPB and
CCAFPR.206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013,
Cadet 1CL Cudia justified that: I came directly from OR432 Class.
We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir. Subsequently, in

his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj.

Leander, he reasoned out as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our
4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is
ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4 th period class, I
went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1CL
Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor
Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has
been defined in one U.S. case as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his
listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or
telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to
deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an intentional
deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here,
instead of directly and completely telling the cause of his being late
in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1CL Cudia chose to omit
relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have
committed an honor violation are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.cralawred
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but
intent to commit or omit the act itself.209chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer
unequivocally are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the
honorable thing.210chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but
must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can only be
proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances

generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1CL Cudias intent to deceive is

manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the use of the words
dismiss and class. The truth of the matter is that the ordinary
usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational institution,
does not correspond to what Cadet 1CL Cudia is trying to make it
appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have definite
and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1CL Cudia, Miranda,
Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a class. The Court cannot
agree that such term includes every transaction and communication
a teacher does with her students. Clearly, it does not take too much
intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1CL Cudia should have been
accurate by pinpointing who were with him when he was late in the
next class. His deceptive explanation is made more obvious when
compared with what Cadets 1CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in
their DR explanation, which was: We approached our instructor
after our class.212chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November
14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of
class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness
for Cadet 1CL Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the FactFinding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already
dismissed when he passed his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the
Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to his
request to see the results of the UE1 and that she had reservations
on the phrases under my instruction and dismissed a bit late used
in his letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales
manifested her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1CL Cudia
of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after he
submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time because the
consultation, being cadet-initiated, is
voluntary.214chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was
initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1CL Cudia was asked to stay
and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given
such situation, a responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time
constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the invitation

and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet
1CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over
the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1CL Cudia cunningly chose
words which led to confusion in the minds of respondents and
eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter
of semantics and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is
manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful explanation
constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1CL Cudia. While
his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding
academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on
Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not
necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is
enough to say that evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or similar thing at another time.216 While the TOR may be
received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student,
it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet
accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants
separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet
Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a
violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1)
delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadets dismissal
from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1CL Cudia is,
therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does not
accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no
difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents
emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an
absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured themselves
ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System
seek to assure that only those who are able to meet the high
standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As held

in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military to set

and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics.
Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1CL Cudia forfeits his
privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet
breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her dismissal
since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold
the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They maintain though that in
Cadet 1CL Cudias case there is no need to distinguish between a
little lie and a huge falsehood since he did not lie at all. Absent
any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty
imposed on him is considered as unjust and cruel. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of dismissal is not
commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors
and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic
deficiency or an intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA nonacademic rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that
the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense.
Further, Isabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the facts of the case.
Cadet 1CL Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the only
means by which he may have a secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied
and his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the
ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more
dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet
1CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he entered the
Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in Andrews219 wherein it was held
that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and
not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted
the disposition of the district court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a
finding that he has violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets
even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a
Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the
part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and
tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an
unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe
method of preventing men who have suffered ethical lapses from

becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser

penalties for single violations might be more compassionate -- or
even more effective in achieving the intended result -- is quite
immaterial to the question of whether the harsher penalty violates
due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHRs
recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body
mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights, and to conduct
investigative monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights,
particularly of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it was contended
that the results of CHRs investigation and recommendations are so
persuasive that this Court, on several occasions like in the cases
of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources221and Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings
serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to
hear what an independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say
on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on
Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a recommendatory
body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of
any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are
merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court.
The reason is that the CHRs constitutional mandate extends only to
the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights.224 As held in Cario v. Commission on Human
Rights225 and a number of subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a
fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is
not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual
case or controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as
adjudication:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence

and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations

involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is
not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of investigate is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official
probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or
track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing.
2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or

matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties
of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to
pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasijudicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 227
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages
in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil
Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did not
effectively deprive him of a future. Clich though it may sound, being

a PMA graduate is not the be-all and end-all of his existence. A

cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to pursue military or
civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his
or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by respondents, DND-AFP
Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and
reenlistment in the AFP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b)
thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or
PAFFFS cadets.228 If the positions open does not appeal to his
interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved as a
PMA graduate, Cadet 1CL Cudia could still practice other equally
noble profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials,
competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that
choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First
Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.