Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 13


289 SCRA 568
Petitioners: Ildefonso Lines, Inc. and Eduardo Javier
Respondent: Court of Appeals
At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being
driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso
Lines, Inc. (hereafte+r, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia
Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking
the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September
18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a
case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy
as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00.
(1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said
criminal case?
(2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the
pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent
civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private
complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned
criminal case?
(1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for claiming damages
under the Labor Code but under the Civil Code. The Court was convinced that the
allegations were based on a quasi-delict or tort. It must be noted that a workers loss of
earning capacity and backlisting are not to be equated with wages, overtime
compensation or separation pay, and other labor benefits that are generally cognized in
labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasidelict or a similar cause within the realm of Civil Law. This provision is only a safety and
health standard under Book IV of the same Code.

(2) On the finality, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the court below cant be
raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, the issue being not brought to the attention of
the Court of Appeals first, this cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. It would be
equal to denial of the right to due process against the respondents to do so.


329 SCRA 600
Petitioner: Rafael Reyes Trucking
Respondents: People of the Philippines

In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left
Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of
empty beer Grande bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand
Domingo, his truck helper. At around 4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck was
descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela,
it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the trucks right
lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road
uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel
to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before
approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming
from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left
lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run
over it. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers, namely, Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly.
On October 10, 1989, Provincial
Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an amended information charging Dunca with
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. On
November 29, 1989, the offended parties filed with the RTC a complaint against
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Dunca, based on
quasi delict. Respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the
civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989,
respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict
against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused
driver. The RTC held that the driver was guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of
the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for
the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the
accused, which the lower court granted.
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be held
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action
against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended
parties against the employer of the truck driver; and

2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal
case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.
(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between
(a) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; and
(b) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of
any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.
(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a
separate civil action against the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court
in the criminal action is whether accused Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The injured party must choose which of
the available causes of action for damages he will bring.

397 SCRA 75
Petitioner: Light Rail Transit Authority
Respondent: Marjorie Navidad
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got
into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the
tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train
driver, (Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency
(Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for
damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the
train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for
compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between
Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was
caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed
by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having
presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped
the train on time.
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New
Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.


575 SCRA 310
Petitioner: Edsel Liga
Respondent: Allegro Resources
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership entered into a lease agreement with La
Paz Investment & Realty Corporation wherein the former leased to the latter its parcel of
land located in San Juan. La Paz constructed the Greenhills Shopping Arcade and
divided it into several stalls and subleased them to other people. One of the sub-lessees
was Edsel Liga (Liga), who obtained the leasehold right to Unit No. 26, Level A of the
GSA.As the lease expired, the stallholders made several attempts to have their
leasehold rights extended. Allegro Resources became the new lessee. As the new
lessee, Allegro offered to sublease Unit No. 26, Level A to Liga. They entered into a
lease agreement dubbed Rental Information in which Liga agreed to pay rental of P40K
monthly. She also agreed to pay the back rentals due Ortigas. Liga also gave P40K as
one month advance rental and another P40K as one month security deposit as provided
in the agreement. Liga failed to pay the subsequent due rent. Despite repeated
demands from Allegro, Liga had failed to pay her rentals for the subleased property, as
well as the back rentals from January to August 2001 due Ortigas.
(1) Whether or not Liga should pay to Ortigas back rentals covering the period 1
January 2001 to 31 August 2001.
(2) or not Liga should pay to Allegro back rentals in the amount of P40k a month
starting from 1 September 2001 until such time as she vacates the leased property.
(3) Whether or not Liga should pay to Allegro the amount of P20K as attorneys fees
and the costs of suit.
(1) Ortigas is not a party to this case, whether as plaintiff or otherwise. It is basic that no
relief can be extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a case.
(2) Allegro cannot justify the award as a legal representative by virtue of a provision in
its lease agreement with Ortigas. Allegro did not aver in its complaint that it was acting
as Ortigass legal representative and seeking the back rentals due Ortigas.
(3)There is no allegation or prayer in the complaint that Allegro was seeking the
collection of the back rentals due Ortigas.The Court cannot countenance the obstinate
refusal of Liga to pay P40K a month to Allegro since she had already acquiesced to pay
such rental rate when she signed the Rental Information.

It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change his mind
or deny and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice
of the other party. Likewise, it is settled that if the terms of the contract clearly express
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations would be
controlling. Having delivered possession over the leased property to Liga, Allegro had
already performed its obligation under the lease agreement. Liga should have exercised
fairness and good judgment in dealing with Allegro by religiously paying the agreed
monthly rental of Php 40,000.00


585 SCRA 120
Petitioner: Makati Stock Exchange
Respondent: Miguel V. Campos
SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 was instituted on 10 February 1994 by respondent
Miguel V. Campos, who filed with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing Department
(SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a Petition against herein
petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE) and MKSE directors, Ma. Vivian
Yuchengco, Adolfo M. Duarte, Myron C. Papa, Norberto C. Nazareno, George Uy-Tioco,
Antonio A, Lopa, Ramon B. Arnaiz, Luis J.L. Virata, and Antonio Garcia, Jr. Respondent,
in said Petition, sought: (1) the nullification of the Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the
MKSE Board of Directors, which allegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally
in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of corporations registered with MKSE;
(2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly deprived of, for which he would pay
IPO prices; and (3) the payment of P2 million as moral damages, P1 million as
exemplary damages, and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
On 14 February 1994, the SICD issued an Order granting respondents prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing
or enforcing the 3 June 1993 Resolution of the MKSE Board of Directors. The SICD
subsequently issued another Order on 10 March 1994 granting respondents application
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to continuously enjoin, during the pendency of SEC
Case No. 02-94-4678, the implementation or enforcement of the MKSE Board
Resolution in question. Petitioners assailed this SICD Order dated 10 March 1994 in a
Petition for Certiorari filed with the SEC en banc, docketed as SEC-EB No. 393.
On 11 March 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss respondents Petition in
SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, based on the following grounds: (1) the Petition became
moot due to the cancellation of the license of MKSE; (2) the SICD had no jurisdiction
over the Petition; and (3) the Petition failed to state a cause of action. The SICD denied
petitioners Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated 4 May 1994. Petitioners again
challenged the 4 May 1994 Order of SICD before the SEC en banc through another
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as SEC-EB No. 403.
(1) Whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not it was properly field as a class suit.
(3) Whether or not the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.

On 18 September 2001, counsel for respondent manifested to this Court that his client
died on 7 May 2001. In a Resolution dated 24 October 2001, the Court directed the
substitution of respondent by his surviving spouse, Julia Ortigas vda. de Campos.
etitioners want this Court to affirm the dismissal by the SEC en banc of respondents
Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 for failure to state a cause of action. On the other
hand, respondent insists on the sufficiency of his Petition and seeks the continuation of
the proceedings before the SICD. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.4 A complaint states a cause of action where it contains
three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

the legal right of the plaintiff,

the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these
elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to dismissal on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.

Given the foregoing, the issue of whether respondents Petition in SEC Case No. 02-944678 sufficiently states a cause of action may be alternatively stated as whether,
hypothetically admitting to be true the allegations in respondents Petition in SEC Case
No. 02-94-4678, the SICD may render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of
said Petition.
A reading of the exact text of respondents Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 is,
therefore, unavoidable.


594 SCRA 12
Petitioner: Diesel Construction
Respondent: UPSI Holdings
The petitioner, Cerila J. Calanasan Cerila), took care of her orphan niece,
respondent Evelyn C. Dolorita, since the latter was a child. In 1982, when Evelyn was
already married to respondent Virgilio Dolorita, the petitioner donated to Evelyn a parcel
of land which had earlier been mortgaged for Pl5,000.00. The donation was conditional:
Evelyn must redeem the land and the petitioner was entitled to possess and enjoy the
property as long as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the donation and its
terms in the same deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the property, had the title of
the land transferred to her name, and granted the petitioner usufructuary rights over the
donated land.
On August 15, 2002, the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J. Calanasan,
complained with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that Evelyn had committed acts of
ingratitude against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be revoked; in
their answer, the respondents denied the commission of any act of ingratitude.
The petitioner died while the case was pending with the RTC. Her sisters,
Teodora and Dolores J. Calanasan, substituted for her. After the petitioner had rested
her case, the respondents filed a demurrer to evidence. According to them, the
petitioner failed to prove that it was Evelyn who committed acts of ingratitude against
the petitioner; thus, Article 7654 of the New Civil Code found no application in the case.
(1) Whether or not the CA has the discretion, indeed the jurisdiction, to pass
upon the qualifications of the individual members of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal
and declare them to be non-technocrats and not exceptionally well-versed in the
construction industry warranting reversal and nullification of the tribunals
(2) Whether or not the CA may intervene to annul the findings of a highly
specialized agency, like the CIAC, on the ground that essentially the question to
be resolved goes to the very heart of the substantiality of evidence, when in so
doing, CA merely substituted its own conjectural opinion to that of the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunals well-supported findings and award.

(3) Whether or not the CA erred in its findings, which are contrary to the findings
of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal.
(1) Whether or not portion of the Decision dated April 16, 2002 of the Honorable
CA denying additional expenses to complete the unfinished and abandoned work
of [Diesel], is null and void for being contrary to clean and convincing evidence
on record.
(2) Whether or not portion of the Decision of the CA finding delay of only forty five
(45) days is null and void for being not in accord with contractual stipulations
upon which the controversy arise.
(3)Whether or not the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals denying the
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and partially granting the
respondents motion for reconsideration is likewise null and void as it does not
serve its purpose for being more on expounding than rectifying errors
Diesels petition is partially granted and UPSIs Petition is denied with
qualification. The assailed Decision dated April 16, 2002 and Resolution dated August
21, 2002 of the CA are modified, as follows:
(1) The award for liquidated damages is deleted;
(2) The award to Diesel for the unpaid balance of the contract price of Php 3,661,692.64
is affirmed;
(3) UPSI shall pay the costs of arbitration before the CIAC in the amount of Php
(4) Diesel is awarded attorneys fees in the amount of Php 366,169; and
(5) UPSI is awarded damages in the amount of Php 310,834.01, the same to be
deducted from the retention money, if there still be any, and, if necessary, from the
amount referred to in item (2) immediately above.
In summary, the aggregate award to Diesel shall be Php 3,717,027.64. From this
amount shall be deducted the award of actual damages of PhP 310,834.01 to UPSI
which shall pay the costs of arbitration in the amount of Php 298,406.03. FGU is
released from liability for the performance bond that it issued in favor of Diesel.No costs.

32 SCRA 547
Petitioner: Francisco Chavez
Respondent: Raul M. Gonzales
On July 1963, Rosendo Chavez brought his typewriter to Fructuoso Gonzales a
typewriter repairman for the cleaning and servicing of the said typewriter but the latter
was not able to finish the job. During October 1963, the plaintiff gave the amount of
P6.00 to the defendant which the latter asked from the plaintiff for the purchase of spare
parts, because of the delay of the repair the plaintiff decided to recover the typewriter to
the defendant which he wrapped it like a package. When the plaintiff reached their
home he opened it and examined that some parts and screws was lost. That on
October 29, 1963 the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant for the return of the missing
parts, the interior cover and the sum of P6.00 (Exhibit D). The following day, the
defendant returned to the plaintiff some of the missing parts, the interior cover and the
P6.00. The plaintiff brought his typewriter to Freixas Business Machines and the repair
cost the amount of P89.85. He commenced this action on August 23, 1965 in the City
Court of Manila, demanding from the defendant the payment of P90.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P100.00 for temperate damages, P500.00 for moral damages,
and P500.00 as attorneys fees. The defendant made no denials of the facts narrated
above, except the claim of the plaintiff that the cost of the repair made by Freixas
Business Machines be fully chargeable against him.
(1) Whether or not the defendant is liable for the total cost of the repair made by Freixas
Business Machines with the plaintiff typewriter?
(1) No, he is not liable for the total cost of the repair made by Freixas Business
Machines instead he is only liable for the cost of the missing parts and screws. The
defendant contravened the tenor of his obligation in repairing the typewriter of the
plaintiff that he fails to repair it and returned it with the missing parts, he is liable under
ART. 1167.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the
obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done he undone.


587 SCRA 551
Petitioner: Polo S. Pantaleon
Respondent: American Express International, Inc.
After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American
Express Card to approve his credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster
store, Pantaleon commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary damages before the
RTC against American Express. He said that he and his family experienced
inconvenience and humiliation due to the delays in credit authorization. RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the award of damages in favor of
Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its obligations to Pantaleon, as the
purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.
(1) Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.
(2)Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.

(1)Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved within seconds,
there really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it
take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a customers purchase, much
less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase.
Even assuming that AmExs credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to
make a judgment, we see no reason why it could not have promptly informed Pantaleon
the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some
(2) Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx
incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to
the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at
Coster that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner
before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions gave
rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.