1. Homeowners Assn. of Talayan Village, Inc. v. JM Tuason & Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos.

203883 & 203930, November 10,

2015
2. Milagros Reyes v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 196083, November 11, 2015
3. Jose Ang v. The Estate of Sy So, G.R. 182252, August 3, 2016
4. Sps. Orencia, et al. v. Vda. de Ravin, G.R. No. 190143, August 10, 2016
5. Anita Lorenzana v. Lelina, G.R. No. 187850, August 17, 2016
6. Elpidio Magno, et al. v. Lorenzo Magno, et al., G.R. No. 206451, august 17, 2016 | Peralta, J.
Facts:
Petitioners Elpidio Magno, heirs of Isidro M. Cabatic, namely: Jose Cabatic, Rodrigo Cabatic, and Melba Cabatic,
and Odelito M. Bugayong, as heir of the late Aurora Magno, (Elpidio Magno, et al.) are the successors-in-interest of
Doroteo Magno, who is the legitimate child of Nicolas Magno by his first wife, Eugenia Recaido. On the other hand,
respondents Lorenzo, Nicolas, Petra, Marciano, Isidro, Teodista, Estrella, all surnamed Magno, and Bienvenido M., Conchita
M., Silary M., Manuel M. and Manolo, all surnamed De Guzman, are the successors-in-interest of Nicetas Magno, Gavino
Magno and Nazaria Magno, (Lorenzo Magno, et al.), who are the legitimate children of Nicolas by her second wife, Camila
Asinger.|||
Gavino Magno, Nicetas, and Nazaria, 4 all surnamed Magno, (Gavino Magno, et al.), who are the predecessors-ininterest of Lorenzo Magno, et al., filed an Amended Complaint dated January 30, 1964 before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Alaminos, Pangasinan. In their complaint for partition with damages, Gavino Magno, et al. sought the
partition of the following properties left by Nicolas Magno who died intestate in 1907. In their Amended Answer to the
Amended Complaint with a Counter-claim 6 dated March 4, 1964, Teofilo Magno, Isidro, Herminio and Felicidad, all
surnamed Cabatic, Aurora, Elpidio, Tomas, Nicanor and Lolita, all surnamed Magno (Teofilo Magno, et al.), who are the
predecessors-in-interest of Elpidio Magno, et al., denied the material allegations of the amended complaint. By way of
counterclaim, Teofilo Magno, et al. also sought the partition of three (3) parcels of land originally owned by Nicolas
Magno||| CFI of Pangasinan, Branch VII, 8 granted the amended complaint of Gavino Magno, et al., but failed to include
in the dispositive portion of its Decision9 three (3) real properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249, and 13385
subject of the counterclaim of Teofilo Magno, et al.
On June 30, 1981, the Court of Appeals (CA), 9th Division, rendered a Decision 11 affirming the decision of the
CFI. The CA ruled, among other matters, that the lands covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249, and 13385 were
owned by the late Nicolas Magno and must be brought into the mass of his estate. But, the CA also failed to order their
partition in the dispositive portion of its decision||| In an Entry of Judgment 13 dated September 25, 1981, the Clerk of
Court certified that the CA Decision has become final and executory on September 22, 1981.
Meanwhile, on October 14, 1981, Gavino Magno, et al. filed a Motion for Execution, which the CFI granted.
Teofilo Magno, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which the CFI denied on October 19, 1981.
Aggrieved, Teofilo Magno, et al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court which issued a temporary restraining order against the CA and Gavino Magno, et al. on January 6, 1982. In a
Decision 14 dated July 31, 1987, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and lifted its restraining order. The
Court ruled that the CA committed no error in ordering the issuance of the entry of judgment, and that the CA decision
has become final and executory, there being no appeal taken therefrom.
Meanwhile, Elpidio Magno, et al., 16 the successors-in-interest of Teofilo Magno, et al., filed before the RTC of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, a Complaint 17dated May 24, 1990 for partition, accounting and damages. They alleged that
aside from the real properties subject of Civil Case No. A-413, Nicolas Magno also left three (3) real properties covered
by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385, which were in the possession of Gavino, Nazaria and Necitas, all
surnamed Magno, and now in possession of their respective successors-in-interest, Lorenzo Magno, et al. 18 Claiming
to be among the co-heirs of Nicolas Magno, Elpidio Magno, et al. averred that Lorenzo Magno, et al. refused to
partition the said three (3) properties, and to account for their fruits since 1957 up to present, despite repeated
demands.

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In their Motion to Dismiss 19 dated August 4, 1990, Lorenzo Magno, et al. contended that the cause of action
of Elpidio Magno, et al. is barred by a prior final judgment in Civil Case No. A-413, prescription and laches. In an
Order 20 dated April 3, 1991, the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
In their Answer with Counterclaim 21 dated September 3, 1991, Lorenzo Magno, et al. averred that their
refusal to partition the properties is founded on the open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession in the concept
of owner by their predecessor-in-interest, Gavino, Nazaria and Necitas, all surnamed Magno. By way of special defense,
Lorenzo Magno, et al. reiterated that the cause of action of Elpidio Magno, et al. is barred by res judicata, prescription
and laches. Aggrieved, Elpidio Magno, et al. filed this petition for review on certiorari.|||

Issue: WON the properties not included in the dispositive portion of the CA be included in the petition
Held:
Yes. Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.
In order for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be, as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter,
causes of action as are present in the civil cases below. 31 All four requisites of res judicata under the concept of
bar by prior judgment are present in this case.
Needless to state, when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.
The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. 38 The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial
controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on
indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time. 39 Be that as it may, there are three (3) recognized exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final and
executory judgments, namely, (a) the correction of clerical error; (b) the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; and (c) where the judgment is void.
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not
then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record
evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to
make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or
should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or
omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc
has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly
rendered, but which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter
judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish
the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)
xxx xxx xx The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment
and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously
rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial
errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render,
nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. (Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking
Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.) HDICSa

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A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have
effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission in the record
of action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672.)
xxx xxx xxx It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the transaction
occurred, even though the rights of third persons may be affected. But entries nunc pro tunc will not be ordered except
where this can be done without injustice to either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order is to supply on the record
something which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by the court . . . (15 C. J., pp. 972-973.) 41
Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the interest of justice would be best served if a nunc
pro tunc judgment would be entered in Civil Case No. A-413 by ordering the partition and accounting of income and
produce of the three (3) properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 4246, 4249 and 13385, under the same terms as
those indicated in the dispositive portion the CFI Decision dated October 5, 1972. It is undisputed that the said
properties are still undivided and considered as part of the estate of Nicolas Magno, pursuant to the final decision in
Civil Case No. A-413. There is also nodoubt that the CFI failed to include in the dispositive portion of its Decision.
Concededly, Elpidio Magno, et al. failed to raise the issue of nunc pro tunc entry at any stage of the
proceeding, in order to include the subject three (3) properties among the other real properties of Nicolas Magno
subject to partition, pursuant to the CFI's final decision in Civil Case No. A-413. The interest of justice, however, impels
the Court to consider and resolve an issue even though not particularly raised, because it is necessary for the
complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and it falls within the issues already found by
them. 44 Such omission on the part of Elpidio Magno,et al. does not preclude the Court from appreciating the said
issue, because to ignore the same would result in a situation where the said three (3) properties would remain under
co-ownership, despite the clear intention of the successors-in-interest of Nicolas Magno to partition them among
themselves.
Elpidio Magno, et al. and Lorenzo Magno, et al., as successors-in-interest of Teofilo Magno, et al. and
Gavino Magno, et al., respectively, cannot be compelled to remain in the co-ownership, pursuant to Article 494 45 of
the New Civil Code. There being neither an agreement or condition to keep the three (3) real properties undivided, nor
a law prohibiting partition of the said properties, much less a showing that any of the co-owners has acquired them by
prescription, each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the things owned in common, insofar as her
share is concerned. Noprejudice to any party would be caused by a nunc pro tunc entry in this case inasmuch as Article
494 of the same Code explicitly states that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and each coowner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Having
in mind the concept of a nunc pro tunc entry, it bears stressing that the said properties should be subject to partition
and accounting of fruits and income, strictly under the same terms as those applied to the other real properties of
Nicolas Magno.
On a final note, partition is a right much favored, because it not only secures peace, but also promotes
industry and enterprise. 47 The rule of the civil as of the common law that no one should be compelled to hold
property in common with another grew out of a purpose to prevent strife and disagreement, to facilitate transmission
of titles and avoid the inconvenience of joint holding. 48 The reason of the law in recognizing in favor of a co-owner the
right to ask under certain limitations the partition of the property held in common is that the good faith and harmony
which the law regards as necessary to exist among co-owners may sometimes be broken by one who, against the wish
of others, is opposed to the further continuance of the co-ownership. 49 By reason thereof, the law allows, as a general
rule, the pro-indiviso condition to cease and to proceed with the partition of the party, adjudicating as a result thereof
to each of the co-owners their respective interest in the community property.||| (Magno v. Magno, G.R. No. 206451,
[August 17, 2016])
7. Heirs of Liberato Castillejos, et al. v. La Tondea Incorporada, G.R. No. 190158, July 20, 2016 | Reyes, J.
Facts:
The respondent filed a Complaint 4 for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity and/or Nullification of Tax
Declarations and Damages against Liberato Castillejos (Liberato) who perished pending trial and was thus substituted by his
heirs, herein petitioners. It averred that it is the absolute owner of two parcels of land, with an area of 1,944 square meters,
more or less, and 184,354 sq.m., more or less, respectively, located at Barangay Bagbag (now Casilagan), Bauang, La Union.

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It alleged that on May 29, 1991, Liberato, through stealth, misrepresentation and deliberate fraud, maliciously executed an
affidavit of ownership over the subject properties and presented the same to the Provincial Assessor of La Union who, in
turn, issued in his name TD Nos. 26682 and 26683 on May 31, 1991. 6 Likewise, the respondent claimed that by itself and
through its predecessors-in-interest, it has been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the subject real
properties through time immemorial (year 1948).
Liberato, for his part, claimed that his land and the subject properties claimed by the respondent are different
from one another because they have different boundaries. He alleged that his land was tilled by his father-in-law since 1940
before he took possession thereof in 1962. He planted the land with different crops and trees and built a house thereon
where he and his family have continuously resided.
RTC granted the complaint for the reason that the respondent had older documents proving ownership. The
respondent's oldest TD was issued way back in 1948 while Liberato's TDs were dated 1982. 22 In Liberato's affidavit of
ownership, there was no mention as to how he acquired the land. RTC did not give weight to the cadastral record that
Liberato is the only claimant of Lots 20096 and 20097 because he did not notify the respondent when the survey was
conducted. 24 Finally, the RTC rejected the petitioners' argument that the respondent, being a corporation, is prohibited by
the 1987 Constitution from acquiring real estate and instead ruled that the respondent already had vested right to acquire
the land prior to the enactment of the constitutional prohibition. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. petitioners moved for
reconsideration 31 but it was denied in the CA Resolution. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: WON the action to quiet title by respondents will propser
Held:
No. "An action to quiet title to property or to remove a cloud thereon is a remedy or form of proceeding
originating in equity jurisprudence. The plaintiff in such an action seeks for adjudication that any adverse claim of title
or interest in the property in question is invalid, so that the plaintiff and those claiming under him or her may forever
be free from any danger of the hostile claim." 34 It is governed by Article 476 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 476. Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.
For the action to prosper, two requisites must concur, viz.: (1) the plaintiff or complainant must have a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 35
In this case, no clear and concrete evidence is extant from the records that the properties covered by
Liberato's TD Nos. 26682 and 26683 are the same parcels of land described in the respondent's TDs. The boundaries,
nature and classification of the land claimed by the parties appear to be different.
The respondent failed to illustrate, prove or even allege which portion of the land covered by its TD was
allegedly encroached upon by Liberato's TD Nos. 26682 and 26683. It did not submit a technical description or survey
report to identify the exact locations of the property it claims vis--vis the one claimed by Liberato.
Considering that the claim of overlapping has not been clearly established, the Court deems it appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC for the conduct of a verification/relocation survey under the direction and supervision of
the Land Management Bureau of the DENR. In the event that the respondent's claim of encroachment is found to be
correct, the corresponding adjustment in the metes and bounds of Liberato's property should be reflected in TD Nos.
26682 and 26683, which will then have to be partially, if not totally voided, and the corresponding amendment as to
the precise area and technical description be made.
8. Alicia Reyes v. Sps. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015 | Leonen, J.

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Facts:
On March 28, 2006, petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco, 4 filed a Complaint 5 before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses Francisco S.
Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of
land in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan, designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and covered by TCT No. T-343642(M). 7 The property used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B 8 and was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons. 9
Petitioner also alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property, and that it
was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. 10 A 113-square-meter portion of respondents'
property was also the "point least prejudicial to the [respondents]." 11 The easement sought was the vacant portion
near the boundary of respondents' other lot. Petitioner insisted that her property was not isolated because of her own
acts. 14 When her mother gave the property to her as part of her inheritance, there was no intention for the property
to have no outlet. 15 instead of limiting the conveyance to himself to 500 square meters of the property, he conveyed
the whole 1,500 square meters, including that which was supposed to be the access to the barangay road.||
Dominador was also her brother, whom she presumed would give her a right of way to the main road. Instead of giving
way, however, he closed the passage, causing petitioner's property's isolation. 19 Despite demands and willingness to
pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to petitioner's claims.
Respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner's property was due to her mother's own act of
subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her
tenants. 22 The property chosen by petitioner as easement was also the most burdensome for
respondents. 23 Respondents pointed to an open space that connected petitioner's property to another public road. 24
Upon agreement by the parties, the Branch Clerk of Court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises in
February 2007, in the presence of the parties. 25
After an Ocular Inspection Report 26 was submitted on March 2, 2007, the case was considered submitted for
decision. 27
On April 11, 2007, the trial court issued its Decision, 28 dismissing the Complaint for easement of right of way;
found that petitioner's proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the servient estate of respondents. 31 It
noted that the proposed right of way would pass through improvements, such as respondents' garage, garden, and
grotto. 32 The trial court also noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to the public
road. 33 However, the trial court pointed out that "[o]ther than the existing irrigation canal, nopermanent
improvements/structures can be seen standing on the subject rice land." 34 Moreover, the nearby landowner was able
to construct a bridge to connect a property to the public road. 35 Hence, "[t]he way through the irrigation canal would .
. . appear to be the shortest and easiest way to reach the barangay road."|||
Petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court's Decision, but CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: whether petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over respondents' property
Held:
No. The following requisites need to be established before a person becomes entitled to demand the
compulsory easement of right of way:58
1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

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The petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed
easement was the least prejudicial to respondents' estate. There is an adequate exit to a public highway.
This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos 61 that the convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not the basis for
granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement
Access to the public highway can be satisfied without imposing an easement on respondents' property. Based on
the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. In between her property and the
highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was
done by the owners of the nearby properties. There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents' property to serve
petitioner's needs. Another adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner
because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation canal before she can reach
the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on respondents' property because her
convenience is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement of right of way over another's property. 65
Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate."
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right of way, the
requirement of "least prejudic[e] to the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the dominant estate [and the]
public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least prejudice."
This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least prejudice" over distance of
the dominant estate to the public highway.

9. Sps. Mercader, Jr., et al. v. Sps. Bardillas, G.R. No. 163157, June 27, 2016 | Bersamin, J.
The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the
same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.|||
Facts:
May 11, 1992, the Clarita Village Association erected a concrete perimeter fence to close the exit point of the right
of way of the Spouses Bardilas from Lot No. 5808-F-2-B to the existing road within Clarita Village. The closure forced the
Spouses Bardilas to use the second exit to Buhisan Road, which is from their Lot No. 5808-F-3.|||The Clarita Village
Association explained that its closure of the right of way had been for the purpose of preventing individuals of
"questionable character" from using the right of way to enter the area to steal from the residents of the Clarita Village.
Upon learning of the encroachment on the portion of their property being used as right of way only from the
survey conducted by Engr. Batiquin of the Office of the Building Official in June 1992, |||Spouses Bardilas, through Atty.
Alfredo J. Sipalay, informed the Spouses Mercader of the encroachment by about 14 square meters of the latter's
residential house and fence on the right of way. Hence, they wrote that they were giving the latter two alternatives,|||1)
either to pay 30,000 phph for the 14sq meter encroachment of the house and wall fence that encroached on the property
or 2) to remove the same. Sps. Mercader. Through their counsel, insisting that as the owners of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A they
were equally entitled to the right of way; and that they were proposing to buy the equivalent portion of the right of way
to which they were entitled at a reasonable price. Finding the demand for payment of P30,000.00 by the Spouses Bardilas
to be unlawful, unwarranted and unfounded, the Spouses Mercader commenced on September 8, 1992 their action for
declaratory relief, injunction and damages against the Spouses Bardilas in the RTC in Cebu City; alleged that they were
the lawful and registered owners of adjoining lots and the Spouses Bardilas' Lots that had been subdivided and sold
separately to each of them; prayed that they be declared as having retained the ownership of the 63.33 square meters
where the easement of right of way had been established; that the merger of the rights of the servient estate owner and
dominant estate owner be declared their favor; 15 and that the Spouses Bardilas be made to pay damages. RTC held in
favor of the Sps Mercader.

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Then, Sps Bardillas, appealed on the CA insisting that the RTC committed reversible errors. the Spouses
Mercader sought the reconsideration of the decision, 34 stating that the CA had "erred in awarding the 3 meter road
right of way to the [Spouses Bardilas] and in ordering the respondent Mercader spouses, et al. to pay attorney's
fees." 35 They argued that because Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and Lot No. 5808-F-2-B used to be one lot denominated as Lot No.
5808-F-2 that had the same right of way leading to the Clarita Village, they "are also legally entitled to the other half of
the right of way" as owners of one of the subdivided lots;||| that, as shown in their Exhibit H, 37 Lot No. 5808-F-3 of the
Spouses Bardilas "has another 3 meter road right of way towards another point of Buhisan Road which is only about 4 0
lineal meters" 38from their property; and that the award of attorney's fees was "not proper there being no legal basis to
grant the award." 39 On March 16, 2004, 40 however, the CA denied Spouses Mercader's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal
Issue: WON Sps Mercader acquired their right to the road right of way by title
Held:
No. Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. Tabisula, 43 is "a real right constituted on another's property,
corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else
to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person." "It exists only when the servient and
dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land
but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to
another." 44
It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement 45 in the context of Article 622 of
the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes
of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers
to "the juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator." 46
A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A indicates that the phrase with existing Right of Way
(3.00 meters wide)referred to or described Lot No. 5808-F-2-B, 47 which was one of the boundaries defining Lot F-2-A As
shown in the subdivision plan of Lot No. 5808-F-2, 51 and based on the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B as
appearing in TCT No. 107915, 52 the right of way in dispute, which is "(B)ounded on the SW., along line 1-2 by Lot 5808-F1, Psd-07-01-004579; on the West along line 2-3 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cad.; on the North along line 3-4-5 by Lot 5725, Cebu
Cadastre" was part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas.
It is noteworthy that an encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No.
107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas. 53 As the owners of the servient estate, the Spouses
Bardilas retained ownership of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No.
5808-F-2-A of the Spouses Mercader. The latter could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because
Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion
on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the
easement."
With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the owners of the burdened property, the Spouses Bardilas
remained entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code, specifically: jus utendi, jus
fruendi, jus abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428 of the Civil Code recognizes that the owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 54 In that regard, the CA
cogently pointed out:55
Moreover, as owners of the three (3) square meter wide road in dispute, the appellants (referring to
the Bardilas spouses) may rightfully compel the petitioners-appellees to pay to them the value of the land upon
which a portion of their (petitioners-appellees) house encroaches, and in case the petitioners-appellees fail to
pay, the appellants may remove or demolish the encroaching portion of the petitioners-appellees' house. . . . .
10. National Housing Authority v. Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 183543, June 20, 2016 | Sereno, CJ.
Facts:

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NHA is the owner 4 of a 120-hectare piece of government property in Diliman, Quezon City, reserved for the
establishment of the National Government Center. 5 By virtue of Proclamation No. 1670 6issued on 19 September 1977,
President Ferdinand Marcos reserved a seven-hectare area thereof and granted Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc.
usufructuary rights over it. 7 Respondent occupied a total of 16 hectares, thereby exceeding the seven-hectare area it
was allowed to occupy. 8 It leased the excess to private tenants. 9
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 10 revoking the reserved status
of the remaining 50 hectares of the 120-hectare property. Petitioner was expressly authorized to commercialize the area
and sell it to the public through bidding. President Fidel Ramos subsequently issued Executive Order No. 58 11 on 15
February 1993 creating an inter-agency executive committee (Executive Committee) composed of petitioner and other
government agencies to oversee the comprehensive development of the remaining 50 hectares, therein referred to as
the North Triangle Property.
As respondent occupied a prime portion of the North Triangle Property, the Executive Committee proposed the
transfer of respondent to areas more suitable to its operations. Hence, On 12 August 1994, respondent filed before the
RTC a Complaint for injunction for the protection of its occupancy and possession of the property reserved for it
under Proclamation No. 1670. Petioner prayed that respondent be ordered to vacate the seven-hectare area and the
excess, and to pay rent therefor on top of exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.|||RTC held
granting a final injunction over the seven-hectare area in respondent's favor.
Issue: whether or not NHA is entitled to recover rent, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses|||
Held:
As for the rent, Yes. Since respondent had no right to act beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted
to it, and since it was fully aware of this fact, its encroachment of nine additional hectares of petitioner's property
rendered it a possessor in bad faith as to the excess. 36 While respondent may have been allowed by then Minister of
Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda to lease the excess to various establishments, such authority did not come from
petitioner, who is the owner. At any rate, even if petitioner tolerated the encroachment by respondent, that fact does
not change the latter's status as a possessor in bad faith. We have ruled that a person whose occupation of realty is by
sheer tolerance of the owner is not a possessor in good faith. 37
Under Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith has a specific obligation to
reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former received, and that the latter could have received had
its possession not been interrupted.38 The provisions state:
Article 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 546 and
in article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in bad faith; but he may remove the objects for which such expenses have been incurred, provided that the
thing suffers noinjury thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they may
have at the time he enters into possession.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying
the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person in their
production, gathering, and preservation. (Emphases supplied)
As provided in the law, respondent shall be made to account for the fruits it received from the time it took
possession until the time it surrendered the excess to petitioner. Respondent has admitted that it leased out the excess
to various establishments and earned profits therefrom. 39 Having done so, it is bound to pay the corresponding
amounts to petitioner. Respondent, however, shall be entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses it incurred.

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Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of the land occupied, 40 or those without which the land would
deteriorate or be lost. 41 These may also include expenditures that augment the income of the land or those that are
incurred for its cultivation, production, and upkeep.
We are constrained to deny petitioner's prayer for the award of exemplary damages. While respondent was a
possessor in bad faith, there is noevidence that it acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. 46 The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to petitioner is also improper. It was not forced to
litigate because of the unfounded claims of respondent. Rather, it was the latter that initiated the instant proceedings
by filing the complaint for injunction before the RTC. Respondent felt that its rights over the seven-hectare area
granted under Proclamation No. 1670 were being threatened by petitioner through the proposal for transfer.|||

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