1. Mirror Doctrine (Locsin vs. Hizon, G.R. No.

204369,
September 17, 2014)
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another persons claim.16 As such, a defective titleor one the
procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentationmay be the
source of a completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an
innocent third person who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.17
Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule
that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way
obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.18 The recognized exceptions to this rule are stated as follows:

[A] person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts
to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
1 | Page

certificate.

One

who

falls

within

the

exception

can

neither

be

denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good

faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

2. Nuisance per se vs. Nuisance per Accidens (Aquino vs.

Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29,
2014)
Nuisance per se
Nuisance
under
any
and

Nuisance per Accidens

all That which depends upon certain

circumstances, because it constitutes conditions and circumstances, and its

a direct menance to public health or existence being a question of fact, it
safety, and, for that reason, may be cannot be abated without due hearing
abated

summarily

under

the thereon in a tribunal authorized to

undefined law of necessity.

decide whether such a thing does in

law constitute a nuisance.

Additional Info:
Nuisance - as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or
property, or anything else that
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses;
(3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
(4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or
2 | Page

(5) hinders or impairs the use of property. (Article 694 of the Civil Code)

3. Twenty four percent (24%) per annum penalty

unconscionable

4. No need for republication in cases of amendment petition for

registration (Republic vs. San Mateo, G.R. No. 203560,
November 10, 2014)
The amendment of the technical description of the property, or the
reduction of the area from 12,896 to 12,776 square meters, does not require a
republication of the technical description, because the amended area was
already included during the first publication. As this Court held in Republic v.
CA and Heirs of Luis Ribaya:17

x x x only where the original survey plan is amended during the

registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously
included in the original plan, should publication be made in order
to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the
area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if
the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary,

3 | Page

a reduction of the original area that was published, no new

publication is required.

The amendment of the area was not a result of any substantial

amendment in the property to be covered by the petition for registration, but
was done merely to conform to the cadastral mapping of Taguig.18 Suffice it to
say, therefore, that the amendment did not result in an addition of land not
previously included in the original plan. Thus, no republication is necessary.

5. Equitable Mortgage vs. Pactum Commissorium

Equitable Mortgage
Pactum Commissorium
one which although lacking in some "a stipulation empowering the creditor
formality, or form or words, or other to appropriate the thing given as
requisites demanded by a statute, guaranty for the fulfillment of the
nevertheless reveals the intention of obligation in the event the obligor fails
the parties to charge real property as to live up to his undertakings, without
security for a debt, and contains further formality, such as foreclosure
nothing impossible or contrary to law
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES

proceedings, and a public sale."

ELEMENTS

1. That the parties entered into a (1)

there

should

be

property

contract denominated as a contract of mortgaged by way of security for the

sale;

and

payment of the principal obligation,

and

2. That their intention was to secure (2) there should be a stipulation for
an

existing

debt

by

way

of

a automatic

appropriation

by

the

creditor of the thing mortgaged in case

4 | Page

mortgage. (Matanguihan vs. Court of

of

Appeals, G.R. 115033, July 11, 1997)

obligation within the stipulated period.

non-payment

of

the

principal

(Sps. Edralin vs. Phil. Veterans Bank,

G.R. No. 168523, March 09, 2011)

6. Issued OCT as condition precedent in reconstitution cases

- a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for obvious reasons.
Section 15 of RA No. 26:
Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents
presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and
proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title,
and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest
therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of
title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. x x x
As explicitly stated in the above-quoted provision, before a certificate of
title which has been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be
proved by the claimants that said certificate of title was still in force at the time
it was lost or destroyed, among others. (Republic vs. Heirs of Spouses Sanchez,
G.R. No. 212388, December 10, 2014)

5 | Page

7. Surname, choice of illegitimate child (Grande vs. Antonio,

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014)
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all
other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514

which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)

6 | Page

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of
the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction
or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and
an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the
mother; hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes
to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate
children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of
surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want
to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein

7 | Page

respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the

right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free
from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be
given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondents
position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,
therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word may is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon
the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of
childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the
use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon
v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to
continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate
father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her
from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in
Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of
the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs
surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
8 | Page

8. Right of repurchase under Commonwealth Act No. 141 = five

(5 years)
The question to be determined is whether the period of five years which
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows a homesteader to repurchase
a homestead sold by him should be counted from the date of the sale even if
the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the
land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the
homesteader's failure to repurchase it.
Section

119

of

Commonwealth

Act

No.

141

provides: "Every

conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,

when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within the period of five years from the date of the conveyance,
regardless of its nature. The word conveyance is of American origin. It may refer
not only to an absolute sale but also to mortgage or any other transaction. It
has been defined as signifying "every instrument by which any estate or
interest in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned" (13 C. J.,
900; 18 C. J. S., 92). When the law is clear, it admits of no interpretation. It
follows therefore that the pretense of appellants to the effect that the 5-year
period should be counted from the date the ownership of appellees over the
land had become consolidated is untenable.
The above interpretation finds support in recent decisions of this Court.
In Blanco vs. Bailon, G.R. No. L-7342, April 28, 1956, the question raised was
whether the 5-year period of redemption began from the date of the execution
9 | Page

of the contract or from the date of its registration in the office of the register of
deeds, considering that the homestead was registered under the Torrens
system. This court held that it is the former because in so far as the owner of
the homestead is concerned, the conveyance mentioned in Section 119 of the
Public Land Law is the actual date thereof, and not the date of registration of
the deed of sale. (Citing Galasinao vs. Austria, 97 Phil., 82, 51 Off Gaz., 2874).
In Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, 50 Off. Gaz., 4213, the question that
arose was "whether the period to repurchase the land in question shall be
counted from the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase or from
the issuance of transfer certificate of title to the herein defendant" and the
Court held that appellant's title had already become absolute because of
appellee's failure to redeem the land within five years from the date of sale. The
Court added: "Both under Section 50 of the Land Registration Law and under
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, the owner of a piece of land is neither
prohibited nor precluded from binding himself to an agreement whereby his
right of repurchase is for a certain period starting from the date of the deed of
sale." In other words, the date of the sale is of paramount consideration.
(Monge vs. Angeles, G.R. No. L-9558, May 24, 1957)

9. Child Custody, no res judicata (Beckett vs. Sarmiento, Jr.,

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3692RTJ) | January 30, 2013)
Complainant has charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the
law. He states in this regard that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his
10 | P a g e

own Decision of September 25, 2006 which constitutes res judicata or a bar to
him to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jr's. custody, granted, via his March
15, 2011 Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision
adverted

to

refers

to

the

judgment

on

compromise

agreement.

The Court cannot go along with complainant's above posture.

Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in

favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more
appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15,
2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to
his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential
command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it
were, the matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,12 "is
not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted."
And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin,13 a custody
agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple
reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change,
such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter's
best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a
minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.

Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody

over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise.14 And if already over 7 years of age, the child's choice as to
which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless
11 | P a g e

the parent chosen proves to be unfit.15 Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals,16

We held that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child, as reflected in no less than the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child which provides that "in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration."

10. Requirement for valid compromise (Gaisano vs. Akol, G.R.

No. 193840, June 15, 2011)
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation, or put an end to one already
commenced Its validity depends on its fulfillment of the requisites and
principles of contracts dictated by law; its terms and conditions being not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.

11. Sales of shares of stock without authority null and void

(Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. East Asia Oil Company Inc.,
G.R. No. 184036 , October 13, 2010)
Sec. 7 of the SDAA does not apply to petitioners' obligations to thirdparty purchasers of their KKP shares under the "full cross to seller" obligation,
and certainly EIB could not use said provision for the repurchase of the KKP
12 | P a g e

shares. Indubitably, the sale of the DMCI shares made by EIB is null and
void for lack of authority to do so, for petitioners never gave their consent
or permission to the sale.

Moreover, Article 1881 of the Civil Code provides that "the agent
must act within the scope of his authority." Pursuant to the authority given
by the principal, the agent is granted the right "to affect the legal relations of
his principal by the performance of acts effectuated in accordance with the
principal's manifestation of consent." 35 In the case at bar, the scope of
authority of EIB as agent of petitioners is "to retain, apply, sell or dispose of all
or any of the client's [petitioners'] property," if all or any indebtedness or other
obligations of petitioners to EIB are not discharged in full by petitioners "when
due or on demand in or towards the payment and discharge of such obligation
or liability." The right to sell or dispose of the properties of petitioners by EIB is
unequivocally confined to payment of the obligations and liabilities of
petitioners to EIB and none other. Thus, when EIB sold the DMCI shares to
buy back the KKP shares, it paid the proceeds to the vendees of said shares,
the act of which is clearly an obligation to a third party and, hence, is beyond
the ambit of its authority as agent. Such act is surely illegal and does not bind
petitioners as principals of EIB.

12. Cadastral and quieting of title may proceed independently

(Luzurriaga vs. Republic, G.R. No. 168848 , June 30, 2009)
Petitioners' contention that a petition for relief from judgment and the
special civil action for quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without
solid basis. Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for quieting of title in Civil Case
13 | P a g e

No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can proceed independently.
The cause of action of the Republic's petition for relief from judgment of "double
titling" of the subject lot is different from DAALCO's quest for quieting of title.
From another perspective, DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of
OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs, while the Republic's
petition assails the grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of
land duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares, who
thereafter transferred the title to his heirs or assigns. In fine, both actions may
proceed independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases would be ideal to
obviate multiplicity of suits.

13. Process for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

(Republic vs. INC, G.R. No. 180067 | 2009-06-30
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.-The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

14 | P a g e

In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is

that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that "the more reasonable
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed."

The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to own alienable

and disposable lands of the public domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073, and PD 1529. The
Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are
virtually the same, with the latter law specifically operationalizing the
registration of lands of the public domain and codifying the various laws
relative to the registration of property. We cited Naguit and ratiocinated:

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and
his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the
OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June
1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

15 | P a g e

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires

the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of,
and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and

16 | P a g e

disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land

Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

14. Possession + Ownership = Imprescriptible

15. Art. 26 ( Bayot vs. CA, G. R. No. 155635, November 07,
2008)
- The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact
and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the
fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce
and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated
by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
- Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
- The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x

17 | P a g e

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability
of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2.

A valid

divorce

is

obtained

abroad

by

the

alien

spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.

16. Continuing Guaranty/Continuing Suretyship

- A continuing guaranty is one which is not limited to a single
transaction, but which contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a
series of transactions, generally for an indefinite time or until revoked. It s
18 | P a g e

prospective in its operation and is generally intended to provide security with

respect to future transactions within certain limits, and contemplates a
succession of liabilities, for which, as they accrue, the guarantor becomes
liable. Otherwise stated, a continuing guaranty is one which covers all
transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within the
description or contemplation of the contract of guaranty, until the expiration or
termination thereof. A guaranty shall be construed as continuing when by the
terms thereof it is evident that the object is to give a standing credit to the
principal debtor to be used from time to time either indefinitely or until a
certain period, especially if the right to recall the guaranty is expressly
reserved. Hence, where the contract of guaranty states that the same is to
secure advances to be made "from time to time" the guaranty will be construed
to be a continuing one. (Dino vs. CA, G.R. No. 89775 | 1992-11-26)
- Exception to the concept of continuing guaranty is a chattel mortgage.
A chattel mortgage can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage
is constituted and not those contracted subsequent to the execution thereof
(Belgian Catholic Missionaries, Inc. v. Magallanes Press Inc., et. Al. G.R. No.
25729, November 24, 1926).
- However, an exception to this is in case of stocks in department stores,
etc. (Torres v. Limjap, G.R. No. 34385, September 21, 1931).

17. Elements of Estoppel

The essential elements of estoppel are:
(1) conduct of a party amounting to false representation or concealment
of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts

19 | P a g e

are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert;
(2) intent, or at least expectation, that this conduct shall be acted upon
by, or at least influence, the other party; and
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. (Tanay Recreation Center
and Development Corp vs. Fausto, G.R. No. 140182 | 2005-04-12)

18.

Effect

of

non-inclusion

of

party

in

Compromise

Agreement
- The only legal effect of the non-inclusion of a party in a compromise
agreement is that said party cannot be bound by the terms of the agreement.
The Compromise Agreement shall however be "valid and binding as to the
parties who signed thereto." (Domingo Realty, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 126236,
January 26, 2007)

19. Adverse possession in Registered Property

- Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or
administrative proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. The certificate of title cannot be defeated by
adverse, open and notorious possession. Neither can it be defeated by
prescription. As provided under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land
in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. (Wee vs. Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, June 04,
2014)
20 | P a g e

20. Tender Age Presumption

- Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (Family Code)
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration (emphasis supplied)."[5] The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be
the

paramount

consideration.[6]

The so-called "TENDER-AGE PRESUMPTION" under Article 213 of the Family Code
may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother
is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease.[7] Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of
caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench
the child from the mother's custody. (Gamboa-Hirsch vs. CA, G.R. No. 174485 | 200707-11)

21. Reclaimed Land transferred to NHA = Patrimonial

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22. Land transfer is void if in violation of PD No. 27

- PD 27 provides for only two exceptions to the prohibition on transfer, namely,
(1) transfer by hereditary succession and (2) transfer to the 39 Government:
Torres v. Ventura40 explained the provision, thus:
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED
OWNER of the land in question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated
from the bondage of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess,
cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To
insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not,
under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by
hereditary succession, to his successors.
Yet, it is a fact that despite the prohibition, many farmer-beneficiaries like
petitioner herein were tempted to make use of their land to acquire much
needed money. Hence, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the
following Memorandum Circular:
"Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmerbeneficiaries of PD 27 havetransferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession
of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their
former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27
and therefore, null and void."

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This interpretation is reiterated in Estate of the Late Encarnacion V da. de

Panlilio v. Dizon,

42

where we ruled:

Thus, PD 27 is clear that after full payment and title to the land is acquired,
the land shall not be transferred except to the heirs of the beneficiary or the
Government. If the amortizations for the land have not yet been paid, then
there can be no transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned by the
Government. The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs
of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to
develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate
and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such objective will not
see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted
for non-agricultural purposes.
xxx
Anent the contravention of the prohibition under PD 27, we ruled in Siacor v.
Gigantana and

more

recently

in[Caliwag-Carmona]

v.

Court

of

Appeals, that sales or transfers of lands made in violation of PD 27 and EO 228

in favor of persons other than the Government by other legal means or to the
farmer's successor by hereditary succession are null and void. The prohibition
even extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or
transfers are void ab initio, being contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5
of the Civil Code that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibiting laws shall be void x x x." In this regard, the DAR is duty-bound to
take appropriate measures to annul the illegal transfers and recover the land
unlawfully conveyed to non-qualified persons for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. In the case at bar, the alleged transfers made by some if not all of
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respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. (G.R. No. 148777) of lands covered by PD 27

to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and void. (Abella vs. Heirs of San
Juan, G.R. No. 182629, February 24, 2016)

23. Biological parents may be beneficiaries of an adopted child

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