G.R. Nos.

L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. L-21938
against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively
praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and
11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No.
6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's
omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both
special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and
consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent
Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this
Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to
declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan
Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in
failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be
rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said
court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution
deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the
merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the
respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter,
he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the
same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date
for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record
discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the abovementioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in
the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said
intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the
alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same
pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963,
petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said
orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros
Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having
been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was
approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled
Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938,
bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to
petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court,
asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said
special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente
Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his
compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well
as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan
Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to
qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila
Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate
appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court
on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment
of said proceedings.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by
Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila
Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and
petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the
Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction
over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons
whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of
venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that
of a non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts
province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner
argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that
consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the
probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for the
probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 or
was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted said
will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the
orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place,
when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain,
of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the
alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition
for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in

his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for
probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the
latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of
the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition
to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396
an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the
exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a
case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he
was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case
No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings.
If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to
do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the
decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally
determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening
if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural
child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II
Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in
view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is
successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking
from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful
purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said
orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a
result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as
G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs
against petitioner.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS RULE 90Uriarte vs, Court of First Instance33 SCRA 252May 29, 1970

Facts of the Case:

Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to
be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that
there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested. Then, the nephews filed a settlement
of the estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the
settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating that the court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement In the CFI of
Negros. Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate settlement in the CFI of
Negros.
Issue:
Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Case:
The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the settlement of
estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate
settlement was filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to
give priority to the testate proceeding.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21
November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by
his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed
Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late
senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he
left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and
ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of
Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March
1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the
same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a
special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the
following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover,
copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the
issuance of letters of administration. 2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in
the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court
an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of
Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its
resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the
petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither
excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing
probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate
and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that the
residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The
pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads
as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the
time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed
with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of
Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not
mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in
Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu
City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this
Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of
the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City
at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate
of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a
resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the
former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences,
the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home
or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this
Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the
probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting
its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a
second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was
called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the
Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had
opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did
not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with
and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental
witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of
the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the
decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court
in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case
No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against
the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been
filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court
which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did
not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the
petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898).
The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI,
instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the
Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was
"not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,
it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and
determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain
perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said
respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and

respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965;
hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will
and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express
wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City
court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the
petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari
proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue,
to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due
execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate,
both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of
venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which
otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule
provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province
in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as
follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the
deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this
view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good
faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties,
however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the
case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said
court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of
jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect
shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in

court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court
of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of
justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206,
December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and
again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs.
Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5
confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the
Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first
filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction
indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be
actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer
to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate
petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court,
awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was
duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes'
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the
Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon
City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus
indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City
court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within
its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of
the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore,
as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate,
with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of
said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the
will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitionerwidow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.

12

with facts analogous to the

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his
will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that
in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to,
this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although
opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding
or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the
latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner
has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite
since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.
6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to
appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the
proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other
court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of
residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by

the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said
Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked,
had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record
otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while
recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the
exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court.
Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring
both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his
residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading
and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and
deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the
proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for
both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court that Quezon City was the actual
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no
applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held
applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when
the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and
respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court
should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to
allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76,
section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts"
in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his
having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem.
The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a
will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding
the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitionerwidow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for
supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with
Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the
decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must
be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not
the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice"
of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings

only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too
obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a
petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1
provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so
and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be
set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who
can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and
in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his
surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would
they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite
the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by
a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters
testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled
under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate
either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when
under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will
and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on
jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court
everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage
has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered
and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that
petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City
court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu
court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in
Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal estate with the
decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate
proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will,
since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the
intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari
or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon
City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit
the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse
of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its
testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of
venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to
probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the
said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it
may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the

Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and
its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond
in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be
approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary
evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts

FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon
City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in
Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on
the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue,
considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss
were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:

Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but

merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to
exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, BONIFACIO
CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Regino Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE CANONOY, TEODULO
CANONOY, REGINO CANONOY, JR., MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOY BASA, respondents.
Brought to focus in this petition are the following issues: (a) whether the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a
petition for letters of administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the
petitioner therein is an "interested person," and (b) whether the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a
petition for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after having appointed an heir of the
decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate
Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as Shell), filed on 8
January 1973 a petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino Canonoy, Petition for
Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzalez, Petitioner" with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate of the
deceased Regino Canonoy. The case was docketed as SP PROC. No. 343 and was raffled to Branch II of the trial court.
On 27 January 1973, Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. of Branch II issued an Order (1) setting the hearing on the petition for
23 March 1973 at 8:30 a.m.; (2) directing that the order be published, at petitioner's expense, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper with a nationwide circulation published regularly by a government agency or entity, or
in any newspaper published and edited in any part of the country which is in operation during the existence of the present
national emergency and of general circulation in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City, if any there be; and
(3) ordering that copies of the order be sent by registered mail or personal delivery, at the petitioner's expense, to each of
all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy, within the periods prescribed by Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court. 1
In their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to Gonzalez filed on 21 March 1973, 2 private respondents,
who are heirs of Regino Canonoy, allege that: Gonzalez "is a complete stranger to the intestate estate" of Regino
Canonoy; he is "not even a creditor" of the estate; he is a resident of Davao City and thus if appointed as administrator of
the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, "he would not be able to perform his duties efficiently;" and he is an
employee of Shell Philippines, Inc., an alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he would not be able to properly and
effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that since Bonifacio
Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, he
should "be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the corresponding letters of administration be issued in
his favor."
On 25 July 1973, after due hearing, the trial court appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of
Regino Canonoy, 3 having found him competent to act as such. None of the parties moved to reconsider this order or
appealed therefrom. On 23 November 1973, herein petitioner Shell, then known as Shell Philippines, Inc., filed its claim
against the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed on 9
October 1974 a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell 4 which the latter contested by filing an Opposition. Shell likewise filed
an amended claim against the estate. 5 On 12 May 1975, the administrator filed his Reply to the Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss. 6 On 25 May 1975, he filed an Answer to the amended claim filed by Shell. 7 In the said Answer, he interposes
compulsory counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell
Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants, sales commission due the
deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim.
Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao,
set the pre-trial for 15 August 1975. 8 This was later re-set to 23 September 1975. 9

On 18 August 1975, petitioner filed a motion to require the judicial administrator to file an inventory of the properties of the
deceased. 10
At the pre-trial held on 23 September 1975, counsel for the administrator requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the
case. In an Order issued on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion; opposing counsel was
likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of the same to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to file, after which the
motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 11 The motion was filed on 30 September 1975. It alleges that the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not
the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. 12 Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion
on 16 October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of
administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If
at all, Gonzalez' lack of interest in the estate of the deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator.
In an Order dated 8 November 1975, respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious, dismissed
the case. 14 The motion for its reconsideration having been denied by the trial court on 23 January
1976, 15 Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In the Resolution dated 6 December 1976, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition; 16 the latter
complied with the same on 31 January 1977. 17 Thereafter, on 7 February 1977, this Court resolved, inter alia, to treat the
petition for review as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and require the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda; 18 petitioner filed its Memorandum on 4 April 1977 19 while the respondents filed theirs on 3 June
1977. 20
The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be granted.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
SP PROC. No. 343 after having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. That said dismissal was
predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since
such interest is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case, serves only to compound
the error.
1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
xxx xxx xxx
The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. 21 These
facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate and of his residence
within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest,
and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, and none

came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration in any county. 23 Clearly,
the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person, does not fall within the
enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be
filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 24 where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration
was affirmed because the petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct
interest in her estate." 25 In the said case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and
direct, not merely indirect or contingent. 26
The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to a petition for letters of administration on that
ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.
Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity
to sue; 27 they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely
opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to
the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the deceased Regino Canonoy,
be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the
above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a motion,
except for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if
a motion to dismiss had been filed. 28 Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (a) failure to state a cause
of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at
the trial on the merits; and (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, 29 subject to the exception as
hereinafter discussed.
In Insurance Company of North America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., 30 this Court ruled:
Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It
is now too late to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss
filed by defendant below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus
motion.
By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in
fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the latter.
In Eusebio vs. Valmores, 31 We held that:
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally
adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under
ordinary circumstances, such defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view
of the fact that the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saquitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not
objected to the application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the appointment of
the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right as surviving spouse to be
appointed as such administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving spouse of the deceased,
therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the

petition for the appointment of an administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the
surviving husband, Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed.
2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over SP PROC. No. 343. Immediately after the
filing of the case, the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the Order dated 27
January 1973. At the initial hearing on 25 July 1973, petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional requirements by
submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the
qualifications and competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator and finally directed that
letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his oath of office after putting up a surety or property bond in
the amount of P5,000.00. 32
It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a
motion to dismiss petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and an
Answer to the petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim, 35 praying thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to dismiss the above-mentioned
"Amended Claim Against the Estate" and to order the claimant to pay into the intestate estate of Regino
Canonoy the said sum of P659,423.49, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from
the date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs;
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, in the event that any sum is found due from and payable by the said intestate
estate of Regino Canonoy in favor of the said claimant, the said amount be deducted from the abovementioned sum and, thereafter, to order the claimant to pay the balance remaining unto the said intestate
estate of Regino Canonoy, together with interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from date hereof, the
reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs.
Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies
in their favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez' prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio
Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's amended claim against the estate, and (d) the granting of the
counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it may be true that
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
In Tijam, et al. al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., 36 this Court held:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether (sic) the court had jurisdiction either of the subjectmatter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication,
but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease
vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S.
127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
The respondent Judge should have lent his ears to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy instead of peremptorily granting the motion to
dismiss in an Order which does not even care to expound on why the court found the said motion to be meritorious. He
exhibited undue haste in removing the case from his docket and in abdicating judicial authority and responsibility.
Howsoever viewed, he committed grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 8 November 1975 in SP
PROC. No. 343 is hereby SET ASIDE. The court below is further ordered to hear and decide petitioner's claim against the
estate in said case, unless supervening events had occurred making it unnecessary, and to conduct therein further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Court until the case is closed and terminated.
Costs against private respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-9282. May 31, 1956.]

EMILIO ADVINCULA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, and ENRIQUE A. LACSON, Respondents.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Emilio Advincula seeks a writ of certiorari, to annul certain orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
Said Petitioner was, on November 22, 1954, appointed, special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Josefa
Lacson Advincula, in special proceeding No. 3245 of said court. In due course, he was, on February 12, 1955, appointed
regular administrator of said estate. After Advincula had qualified as such, the brothers of the deceased, who left no issue,
submitted to the court, for allowance, a document purporting to be her last will and testament. Petitioner opposed the
probate thereof upon the ground that it did not bear the signature of the deceased; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the
signature thereon, if hers, was secured through fraud and duress; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, the instrument had
not been executed with the requisite formalities. On May 4, 1955, Respondent Enrique Lacson, one of the brothers of the
deceased, filed a motion praying that he be appointed administrator of said estate, in lieu of Petitioner herein, for the
reason that said Respondent is the executor named in the aforementioned alleged will. On or about May 16, 1955, Attys.
Jose Y. Torres and Antonio Lozada, as counsel for Advincula, filed an opposition to said motion. When the latter was
called for hearing on May 18, 1955, Atty. Lozada was served, in open court, copy of an amended motion, of Respondent
Lacson, for change of administrator, dated May 14, 1955. It was alleged therein, in addition to the ground set forth in the
first motion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5. That the present administrator is incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he being foreign
to the estate, and without changing or removing him as such would be disastrous to the estate and to the heirs named in
the will of the decedent.
Atty. Lozada asked a postponement of the hearing upon the ground that Advinculas main counsel, Atty. Torres, was in
Manila, but his request was denied. Then, after hearing the argument of opposing counsel, the court, presided over by
Respondent, Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., Judge, issued, on the same date (May 18, 1955), an order the pertinent parts
of which read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court, after hearing the oral arguments of both parties, finds the motion for postponement not well-taken and hereby
denies the same; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand finding the motion dated May 4, 1955 as amended by the amended
motion dated May 14, 1955, well-founded and the opposition thereto dated May 16, 1955 not well-founded, said motion is
hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the preservation of the property for the heirs, the appointment of Emilio
Advincula as administrator is hereby revoked and in his stead, the Oppositor, Enrique A. Lacson, is hereby appointed
administrator of this intestate estate, and same may qualify by filing a bond in the sum of P5,000 and taking and

subscribing the corresponding oath of Office. Once said Enrique A. Lacson has qualified, let letters of administration issue
in his favor.
The former administrator, Emilio Advincula, is hereby ordered to submit within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, his final
account covering the entire period of his administration and should it appear that any deficiency has been incurred by him
during his incumbency, his bond shall answer for said deficiency.
Thereupon, Lacson gave the requisite bond, letters of administration was issued to him, and he tried to take possession of
the estate of the deceased. A reconsideration of said order of May 18, 1955, having been denied by another order, dated
May 30, 1955, Petitioner instituted the present action for certiorari, against Lacson and Judge Teodoro, to annul his
aforesaid orders of May 18 and 30, 1955, upon the ground that the same were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Upon the filing of a bond by Advincula, we issued, as prayed for in his petition, a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Respondent Lacson and his agents from interfering, molesting and harassing the Petitioner in the administration of the
estate of the deceased, during the pendency of this case.
The writ of certiorari prayed for is in order. Lacsons appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as administrator of the estate of
Josefa Lacson Advincula, is predicated upon the fact that the former is named executor in the alleged will of said
deceased. The provision therein to this effect cannot be enforced, however, until after said document has been allowed to
probate, for section 4 of Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as
executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules. (Italics supplied.)
Besides, the discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the appointment of
an administrator of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died intestate, does not ipso facto
nullify the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the revocation thereof, until the alleged will has been
proved and allowed by the court. Rule 83, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is plain and explicit on this point.
If after letters of administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his will is
proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the
administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, end render his account within such time as the court directs.
Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as hereinbefore provided.
(Italics supplied.)
The amended motion for change of administrator endeavored to justify the removal of Advincula by alleging that he is
incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he being foreign to the estate of the deceased. By
holding, in its order of May 18, 1955, that said motion is well-founded with nothing, absolutely nothing else, to indicate
the basis of this conclusion Respondent Judge has impliedly adopted the line of argument followed in the above quoted
allegation of the amended motion to change administrator. Said argument is, however, devoid of merit.
It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic and experience, because a stranger to deceased may be competent, capable
and fit to administer her estate, in much the same as a member of her immediate family could be incompetent, incapable
and unfit to do so. At any rate, Advincula is not a stranger, either to her or to her estate, he bring her surviving spouse and,
as such, one of her forced heirs (Arts. 887, 888, 892, 893, 894, 897 to 900, and 995 to 1001, Civil Code of the
Philippines), whether she died testate or intestate. What is more, he is prima facie entitled to one-half of all property
subject to the authority of the administrator of said estate, apart from his share of the other half thereof, as heir of the
deceased, for all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of which he is its
administrator (Article 165, Civil Code of the Philippines) unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife (See Articles 160 and 185, Civil Code of the Philippines). Lastly, Advincula has not been found guilty of any
specific act or omission constituting one of the legal grounds, enumerated in Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for
the removal of an executor or administrator. Hence, it is clear that Respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
removing Advincula and appointing Lacson as administrator of the estate of the deceased Josefa Lacson Advincula.
Wherefore, the aforementioned orders of Respondent Judge, dated May 8 and 30, 1955, are reversed, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in this case hereby made permanent, with costs against Respondent Enrique A. Lacson. It is
SO ORDERED.

Advincula vs. Teodoro R 82 1 99 phil 413

Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular administrator of his deceased wifes estate. After
he qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the deceasedd will. Emilio
opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the signature was not his wifes and even if it was, the same was
procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law, Enrique Lacson, prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed administrator in lieu
of Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to act as administrator

because Emilio is foreign to the estate. The court ruled in favor of Enriques motion. Emilio filed an MR but the same was
denied so he instituted the present action for certiorari to annul the lower courts order.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court acted with GADLEJ in granting Lacsons motion
HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that Lacson was named
executor of the deceasedd will. This provision, however cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted to probate. The
discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso facto nullify letters of administration already issued or even authorize the
revocation thereof until the alleged will is proved and allowed by the court. Further more, the lower court appears to have
followed
the
argument
of the
respondents
that
Emilio, being
foreign
to
the
deceaseds estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable because from the viewpoint of logic
and experience, a stranger may be competent, capable and fit to be administrator of the estate in the same way that a
family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. Besides, Emilio as the surviving spouse if a forced heir
of the deceased. He is entitled to of all property apart from his share of the other half thereof as heir of the deceased
since all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership

[G.R. No. L-33929. September 2, 1983.]

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, v. HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch VII, and CANDIDO RAMOS, Respondents.
Jose Diokno for Petitioner.
Romeo C . Carlos for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; INSUFFICIENT ASSETS
OF DEBTOR RAISES QUESTION OF PREFERENCE AS WELL AS QUESTION OF CONSEQUENCE IN
CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS. Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of
his property is subjected to the claims of several creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no questions of consequence
were the value of the property or the value of all assets of the debtor is sufficient to pay in fall all the creditors. However, it
becomes material when said assets are insufficient for then some creditors of necessity will not be paid or some creditors
will not obtain the full satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the question of preference will then arise, that is to say
who of the creditors will be paid the all of the others (Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p.
472).
2. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; ARTICLES 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
CONSTRUED. Under the system established by Article 2249 of the civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and
assessments upon immovable property enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining specified classes of preferred
creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no priority among themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion
to the amount of the respective credits.
3. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE; PAIL REQUISITE TO THEIR FULL APPLICATION
UNDER THE DE BARRETO CASE. Under the De Barreto decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249
demands that there must first be some proceeding where the class of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly
adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a decedents estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other
liquidation proceedings of similar import.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AND SETTLEMENT OF A DECEDENTS ESTATE; BOTH
PROCEEDINGS IN REM, OTHER EQUIVALENT GENERAL LIQUIDATION OF SIMILAR NATURE. Insolvency
proceedings end settlement of a decedents estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding the whole world. All
persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound. Consequently,
a liquidation of similar import or other equivalent general liquidation must also necessarily be a proceeding in rem so that
all interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound by such proceeding.

3. ID.; ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF UNPAID CONTRACTORS FEE; NOT AN ACTION IN REM. The proceedings
in the court below do not partake of the insure of insolvency proceedings or settlement of a decedents estate. The action
filed by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex apartment. It is far from being a
general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
6. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION; ANNOTATION OF CLAIMS AND CREDITS AS STATUTORY LIENS;
RELEVANCE TO THE STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. In the case at bar, although the lower court found that
"there were no known creditors other than the plaintiff and the defendant herein," this cannot be conclusive. It will not bar
other creditors in the event they show up and present their claims State petitioner bank, claiming that they also have
preferred liens against the property involved. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued in favor of the
bank which is supposed to be indefeasible would remain constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been
the intention of Article 2243 of the Civil Code although it considers claims and credits under Article 2242 as statutory liens.
Neither does the De Barreto case sanction such instability. In fact, an annotation, as suggested above, would insure to the
benefit of the public, particularly those who may subsequently wish to buy the property in question or who have a
business transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate the enforcement of a legal statutory right which cannot be
barred by laches (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).
7. ID.; SALE; BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OF REALTY; TAKES IT FEE FROM LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES OTHER
THAN STATUTORY LIENS AND THOSE ANNOTATED IN THE TITLE; CASE AT BAR. Since the action filed by the
private respondent is not one which can be considered as "equivalent general liquidation" having the same import as an
insolvency or settlement of the decedents estate proceeding, the well established principle must be applied that a
purchaser in good faith and for value takes register land free from liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens and
those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It Is an limited fact that at the time the deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of
the petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Tabligan was free from any recorded lien
and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title were deeds in favor of the petitioner.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided over by
respondent Judge Gregorio T. Lantin, in Civil Case No. 79914 entitled Candido Ramos v. Philippine Savings Bank and of
the order denying a motion for its reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P15,000.00 as his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment house which was built
by the plaintiff for the spouses likewise Filomeno Tabligan and Socorro Espiritu, which is now registered in the name of the
defendant under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, on August
6, 1970, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; to pay the sum of P500.00 as
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
"The counterclaim interposed by the defendant is hereby dismissed."cralaw virtua1aw library
Involved in this case is a duplex-apartment house on a lot covered by TCT No. 86195 situated at San Diego Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, and owned by the spouses Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan.
The duplex-apartment house was built for the spouses by private respondent Candido Ramos, a duly licensed architect
and building contractor, at a total cost of P32,927.00. The spouses paid private respondent the sum of P7,139.00 only.
Hence, the latter used his own money, P25,788.50 in all, to finish the construction of the duplexapartment.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Meanwhile, on December 16, 1966, February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, the spouses Tabligan obtained from
petitioner Philippine Savings Bank three (3) loans in the total amount of P35,000.00, the purpose of which was to
complete the construction of the duplex-apartment. To secure payment of the l2oans, the spouses executed in favor of the
petitioner three (3) promissory notes and three (3) deeds of real estate mortgages over the property subject matter of this
litigation.
On December 19, 1966, the petitioner registered the December 16, 1966 deed of real estate mortgage with the Register

of Deeds of Manila. The subsequent mortgages of February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, were registered with the
Register of Deeds of Manila on February 2, 1967 and March 1, 1967, respectively. At the time of the registration of these
mortgages, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195 was free from all liens and encumbrances.
The spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. As a result thereof, the petitioner bank foreclosed the mortgages,
and at the public auction held on July 23, 1969, was the highest bidder.
On August 5, 1969, the petitioner bank registered the certificate of sale issued in its favor. On August 9, 1970, the bank
consolidated its ownership over the property in question, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Manila in the name of the petitioner bank.
Upon the other hand, the private respondent filed an action against the spouses to collect the unpaid cost of the
construction of the duplex-apartment before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, which case was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 69228. During its pendency, the private respondent succeeded in obtaining the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment, and pursuant thereto, had the property in question attached. Consequently, a notice of
adverse claim was annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195.
On August 26, 1968, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 69228 in favor of the private respondent and against the
spouses. A writ of execution was accordingly issued but was returned unsatisfied.
As the spouses did not have any properties to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. 69228, the private respondent
addressed a letter to the petitioner for the delivery to him (private respondent) of his pro-rata share in the value of the
duplex-apartment in accordance with Article 2242 of the Civil Code. The petitioner refused to pay the pro-rata value
prompting the private respondent to file the instant action. As earlier stated, a decision was rendered in favor of the private
Respondent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The parties are agreed that the only issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to claim a pro-rata share in
the value of the property in question. The applicable provision, Article 2242 of the Civil Code, reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the following claims, mortgages
and liens shall be preferred, and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Taxes due upon the land or building;
"(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold;
"(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of architects, engineers and contractors,
engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or
other works;
"(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction reconstruction, or repair of buildings, canals or other works
upon said buildings, canals or other works;
"(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property, upon the real estate mortgaged;
"(6) Expenses for the preservation or improvement of real property when the law authorizes reimbursement, upon the
immovable preserved or improved;
"(7) Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by attachments or executions, upon the
property affected, and only as to later credits;
"(8) Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the partition of an immovable among them, upon the real property thus divided;
"(9) Claims of donors of real property for pecuniary charges or other conditions imposed upon the donee, upon the
immovable donated;
"(10) Credits of insurers upon the property insured, for the insurance premium for two years."cralaw virtua1aw library
Both the petitioner bank and private respondent Ramos rely on the case of De Barreto v. Villanueva (6 SCRA 928).
The petitioner bank would impress upon this Court that the proceedings had before the court below is not one of the

proceedings contemplated in the De Barreto case that will sustain the authority of the respondent court to adjudicate the
claims of all preferred creditors under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that for Article 2242 of the Civil
Code to apply, there must have been an insolvency proceeding or other liquidation proceedings of similar import. And
under the facts then obtaining, there could have been no insolvency proceeding as there were only two known creditors.
** Consequently, it is argued that private respondents unpaid contractors claim did not acquire the character of a
statutory lien equal to the petitioners registered mortgage.
Upon the other hand, private respondent Ramos maintains that the proceedings had before the court below can qualify as
a general liquidation of the estate of the spouses Tabligan because the only existing property of said spouses is the
property subject matter of this litigation.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of his property is subjected to the
claims of several creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no questions of consequence where the value of the
property or the value of all assets of the debtor is sufficient to pay in full all the creditors. However, it becomes material
when said assets are insufficient for then some creditors of necessity will not be paid or some creditors will not obtain the
full satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the question of preference will then arise, that is to say who of the creditors
will be paid ahead of the others. (Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970 ed., Vol. VI, p. 472.)
Under the system established by Article 2249 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and assessments upon
immovable property enjoy absolute preference. All the remaining specified classes of preferred creditors under Article
2242 enjoy no priority among themselves. Their credits shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the amount of the
respective credits.
Under the De Barreto decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must first be some
proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the
settlement of a decedents estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar import.
The pertinent ruling reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Thus, it becomes evident that one preferred creditors third-party claim to the proceeds of a foreclosure sale (as in the
case now before us) is not the proceeding contemplated by law for the enforcement of preferences under Article 2242,
unless the claimant were enforcing a credit for taxes that enjoy absolute priority. If none of the claims is for taxes, a
dispute between two creditors will not enable the Court to ascertain the pro rata dividend corresponding to each because
the rights of the other creditors likewise enjoying preference under Article 2242 can not be ascertained. Wherefore, the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila now appealed from, decreeing that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale be
apportioned only between appellant and appellee, is incorrect and must be reversed.
"In the absence of insolvency proceedings (or other equivalent general liquidation of the debtors estate), the conflict
between the parties now before us must be decided pursuant to the well established principle concerning registered
lands; that a purchaser in good faith and for value (as the appellant concededly is) takes registered property free from
liens and encumbrances other then statutory liens and those recorded in the certificate of title. There being no insolvency
or liquidation, the claim of the appellee, as unpaid vendor, did not acquire the character and rank of a statutory lien coequal to the mortgagees recorded encumbrance, and must remain subordinate to the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
The resolution of this petition, therefore, hinges on the determination of whether an insolvency proceeding or other
liquidation proceeding of similar import may be considered to have been conducted in the court below.
The respondent court ruled in the affirmative holding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There were no known creditors, other than the plaintiff and defendant herein, and the proceedings in the present case
may ascertain and bindingly adjudicate the respective claims of the plaintiff and the defendant, serving as a substantial
compliance with what the Supreme Court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . it is thus apparent that the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there must be first some
proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the
settlement of a decedents estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar import.
(de Barretto v. Villanueva, Et Al., G.R. No. L-14938, December 29, 1962)."
A careful considering of this petition leads us to agree with the petitioner. The conclusions of the lower court are not
supported by the law and the facts.
The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the nature of the insolvency proceedings or settlement of a

decedents estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex
apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedents estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the
whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally
bound. Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or "other equivalent general liquidation must also necessarily be a
proceeding in rem so that all interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound by such proceeding.
In the case at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors other than the plaintiff and the
defendant herein", this can not be conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present their
claims against the petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred liens against the property involved.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible
would remain constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been the intention of Article 2243 of the Civil
Code although it considers claims and credits under Article 2242 as statutory liens. Neither does the De Barretto case
sanction such instability. It emphasized the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are understandably loath (absent a clear precept of law so commanding) to adopt a rule that would undermine the
faith and credit to be accorded to registered Torrens titles and nullify the beneficient objectives sought to be obtained by
the Land Registration Act. No argument is needed to stress that if a person dealing with registered land were to be held to
take it in every instance subject to all the fourteen preferred claims enumerated in Article 2242 of the new Civil Code, even
if the existence and import thereof can not be ascertained from the records, all confidence in Torrens titles would be
destroyed, and credit transactions on the faith of such titles would be hampered, if not prevented, with incalculable results.
Loans on real estate security would become aleatory and risky transactions, for no prospective lender could accurately
estimate the hidden liens on the property offered as security, unless he indulged in complicated, tedious investigations.
The logical result might well be a contraction of credit to unforeseable proportions that could lead to economic disaster.
"Upon the other hand, it does not appear excessively burdensome to require the privileged creditors to cause their claims
to be recorded in the books of the Register of Deeds should they desire to protect their rights even outside of insolvency
or liquidation proceedings.
In fact, an annotation, as suggested above, would inure to the benefit of the public, particularly those who may
subsequently wish to buy the property in question or who have a business transaction in connection therewith. It would
facilitate the enforcement of a legal statutory right which cannot be barred by laches. (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).chanrobles law library
Respondent Ramos admitted in the partial stipulation of facts submitted by both parties that at the time of the loans to the
spouses, the petitioners bank had no actual or constructive knowledge of any lien against the property in question. The
duplex apartment house was built for P32,927.00. The spouses Tabligan borrowed P35,000.00 for the construction of the
apartment house. The bank could not have known of any contractors lien because, as far as it was concerned, it financed
the entire construction even if the stated purpose of the loans was only to "complete" the construction.
Since the action filed by the private respondent is not one which can be considered as "equivalent general liquidation"
having the same import as an insolvency or settlement of the decedents estate proceeding, the well established principle
must be applied that a purchaser in good faith and for value takes registered land free from liens and encumbrances other
than statutory liens and those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It is an admitted fact that at the time the deeds of real
estate mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Tabligan was
free from any recorded lien and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens in the title were deeds in favor of the
petitioner.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the private respondents claim must remain subordinate to the petitioner banks title over
the property evidenced by TCT No. 101864.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII is, hereby,
reversed and set aside. The complaint and the counterclaim are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted
heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL.,Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO,
ET AL., Respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition by certiorari for review for the decision of CA affirming the decision of CFI petition by certiorari had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership
of the properties mentioned therein.
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died. His will was admitted to probate.
Hermogena Reyes herself died. she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
The executor filed a project partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the
estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was allotted
to her collateral relatives aforementioned.
relatives filed an opposition to the executors project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to
the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
"The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of
the original conjugal character of the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil
Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of
his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any
specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa. prohibits donations between
spouses during the marriage. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor
to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the
properties mentioned in the deed of donation.
executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving
title to the properties mentioned
The motion for new trial was denied
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review
by certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to pass upon the title to the property in question.
HELD
While as a general questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, except where
one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate
court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action (Garcia v.
Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144), however, when the parties are all heirs of the deceased, it is
optional on them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate
court may definitely pass judgment thereon.
The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of the deceased regarding the ownership of properties alleged to
belong to his estate is vested in probate courts. This is so, because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees, and by liquidation is meant the
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses
The question of whether certain properties involved in a testate proceeding belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively, is a matter within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs.
Decision affirmed.

G.R. No. L-3342

April 18, 1951

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
ANG CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and LEE BUN TING,
respondents-appellants.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Zalazar for appellants.
Hector Bisnar and Rafael Dinglasan for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal by Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee, and Lee Bun Ting from an order of the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
issued in the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Lee Liong, holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for
an extrajudicial partition and the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of Civil Case No. V-331 of the
same court, entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al., vs. Lee Bun Ting, Claro Lee and Ang Chia, in her personal capacity and as
administratrix of the estate of Lee Liong.
Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on February 16, 1948, against Ang Chia, her
son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz, Capiz,
and damages in the amount of P1,000 a month. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the appointment of a
receiver to which counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only at the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs
discovered that there was pending in the same court a case concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. In view thereof,
the motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking the
inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the estate, who is the same widow Ang Chia, who was already a
party-defendant in her personal capacity. In order to protect their interests, the plaintiffs also filed in the intestate
proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and
the bond of the administratrix in the amount of P500 be increased to P20,000. By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs
made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case No. V-331 and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not
closed until said civil case shall have been terminated.
On June 21, 1948, the administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motion for the
increase of her bond and for the appointment of a co-administrator. On August 4, 1948, the court issued an order denying
the petition for a co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000, and as regards the petition not to close the intestate
proceedings until after civil case No. V-331 shall have been decided, the court stated that it would act thereon if a motion
to close the proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. The court however took cognizance of
the pendency of said civil case No. V-331. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and

instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had
already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the petitioners objected, whereupon the court
issued on July 15, 1949, an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until
after the decision in said civil case has been rendered. From this order the administratrix and the heirs appealed and now
assign the following errors:
I
The lower court erred in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed "claim" of petitioners-appellees.
II
The lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of
the separate civil action filed by the petitioners-appellees.
III
The lower court erred in ordering the administratrix to file an increased bond of P5,000.
Under the first assignment of error, the appellants question the validity of the order of the lower court of August 4, 1948,
whereby the court took cognizance of the civil case filed by the appellees against the administratrix to recover possession
of lot No. 398 and damages, and required the administratrix to file a new bond of P5,000, contending that by taking such
action the court assumed jurisdiction over the case which it cannot do because its jurisdiction as probate court is limited
and especial (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil. 61). They claim further that probate proceedings are purely statutory
and their functions are limited to the control of the property upon the death of its owner and cannot extend to the
adjudication of collateral questions. (I Woermer, The American Law of Administration, 514, 662-663.) Appellees on the
other hand claim that said order of August 4, 1948, is not the subject of this appeal, as no appeal has been taken by the
appellants from said order and the same has long become final; so that the present appeal is only from the order of the
lower court dated July 15, 1949, which denies the motion of the appellees to terminate the intestate proceedings on the
ground that they have already agreed on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and to relieve the administratrix of the
obligation of filing an increased bond.
There is merit in the claim of the appellees. It really appears from the record that the order increasing the bond of the
administratrix to P5,000 was issued on August 4, 1948, and from said order no appeal has been taken by the appellants
which has become final long ago and that the present appeal is only from the order of the lower court dated July 15, 1949.
It is true that the lower court in its later order of July 15, 1949, reiterated its order to the administratrix to file a new bond in
the amount of P5,000 within 30 days after receipt thereof, but this cannot have the effect of receiving the former order of
August 4, 1948, nor does it give the appellants the right to question in this instance the validity of said order, which has
long become final. Moreover, an order requiring the filing of a new bond by the administratrix is interlocutory in nature and
is solely addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said
case nor does it violate the ruling of this court which says that "when questions arise as to the ownership of property,
alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions
cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probate court,
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a Court of First Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ." (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil.,
61, 62-63.)
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their
interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the
estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far
reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331

the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the
close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property
from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator". What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the
intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling
which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another
person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, supra). These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs. Another rule of court provides that
"after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the
court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17,
Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case
wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory.

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS., petitioners-appellees, vs. ANG CHIA, as
Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and LEE BUN TING,respondents-appellants./
April 18, 1951/ Justice Bautista Angelo
FACTS:
- Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a civil case (no. V-331) in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on February 16, 1948, against
Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located in
Capiz. They also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. - The counsel for defendants objected on the basis that
there was a pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. - The plaintiffs withdrew the
motion and they filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratix of the estate,
who is the widow Ang Chia. The plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a
motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix be increased. The
plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the civil case and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said
civil case shall have been terminated. - Thereafter, the administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and
objected to the abovementioned motions made by the plaintiffs. - On August 4, 1948, the trial court : (a) issued an order
denying the petition for a co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000, (b) stated that it would act thereon if a
motion to close the intestate proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners, and (c) took
cognizance of the pendency of said civil case No. V-331. - The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new
bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the
heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The petitioners objected. - On July 15, 1949, CFI of
Capiz issued in the intestate estate proceedings an order holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extrajudicial partition the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of Civil Case No. V-331 of the same court.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
WON the lower court erred:
1. in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed "claim" of petitioners-appellees and in ordering
the administratrix to file an increased bond of P5,000.

[It did not err in view of the fact that the appellants did not appeal from the courts order of August 4. Moreover, an order
requiring the filing of a new bond by the administratrix is interlocutory in nature and is solely addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. ]
2. in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed
by the petitioners-appellees. [It did not err because a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of
ordinary case because to hold otherwise would render some rules in the ROC nugatory.]
Ratio: 1. It really appears from the record that the order increasing the bond of the administratrix to P5,000 was issued on
August 4, 1948, and from said order no appeal has been taken by the appellants which has become final long ago and
that the present appeal is only from the order of the lower court dated July 15, 1949. The act of the lower court in taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling
of this court in Guzaman vs Anog and Anog which says that "when questions arise as to the ownership of property,
alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions
cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probate court,
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a Court of First Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ." The court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general urisdiction over the case but merely makes of
record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted
in excess of its jurisdiction.
2. Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property
from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator". This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which
declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person
should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to
be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) Order AFFIRMED. Doctrine: A probate courts jurisdiction is limited and special. But by
taking cognizance of civil case, the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record
its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases.

G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978

ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION SANTOS,
MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA,
HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA GUERRA,
respondents.
Ernesto C. Hidalgo for petitioners.
Romulo S. Brion & Florentino M. Poonin for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
Appeal by way of certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49915-R, entitled "Adelaida Nista
Petitioner-appellee, versus Buenaventura Guerra, et al., Oppositors -Appellants, " denying and disallowing the probate of
the second last will and codicil of the late Eugenia Danila previously probated by the Court of First Instance of Laguna
Branch III at San Pablo City.
The facts are rotated in the appealed decision. the pertinent portions of which state:
It appears that on June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a
petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 (Exhibit H) and codicil dated
April 18, 1963 (Exhibit L) of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966. The petitioner prayed that
after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and codicil be probates and allowed and that she or
any other person be appointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate. She also prayed that in case no
opposition thereto be interposed and the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00, said estate be
summarily settled in accordance with the Rules.
Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on July 18, 1966 and an
amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to the petition alleging among others that they are the legally
adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila (Exhibit 1); that the
purported will and codicil subject of the petition (Exhibits H and L) were procured through fraud and undue
influence; that the formalities requited by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been
complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and
deed of the purported testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951
her last will and testament (Exhibit 3) which was duly probated (Exhibit 4) and not revoked or annulled
during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and qualified to act as
administration of the estate.
On November 4, 1968, the petitioner and the oppositors, assisted by their respective counsels, entered
into a Compromise Agreement with the following terms and conditions, thus:
1. That oppositors Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina (Martina) Guerra are the legally adopted son and
daughter, respectively, of the deceased spouses, Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Manila;
2. That Florentino Guerra pre-deceased Eugenia Danila that Eugenia Danila died on May 21, 1966, at
San Pablo City, but during her lifetime, she had already sold, donated or disposed of all her properties,
some of which to Marcelina Martina Guerra, as indicated and confirmed in paragraph 13 of the Complaint
in Civil Case No. SP620, entitled Marcelina Guerra versus Adelaida Nista, et al., and Which We hereby
'likewise admit and confirm;
3. That, however, with respect to the parcel of riceland covered by TCT No. T-5559 of the Register of
Deeds of San Pablo City, which oppositors believe to be the estate left and undisposed of at the time of
the death of the owner thereof, Eugenia Danila it now appears that there is a Deed of Donation covering
the same together with another parcel of coconut land situated at Barrio San Ignacio, San Pablo City, with
an area of 19,905 sq.m., and covered by Tax Declaration No. 31286, executed by the late Eugenia Danila
in favor of Adelaida Nista, as per Doc. No. 406, Page No. 83, Series of 1966 under Notarial Register III of
Notary Public Pio Aquino of San Pablo city;
4. That inasmuch as the above-mentioned parcel of coconut and has been earlier donated inter vivos and
validly conveyed on November 15, 1965 by the late Eugenia Danila to Marcelina (Martina) Guerra as
shown by Doc. No. 237, Page No. 49, Series of 1965, under Notarial Register XV of Notary Public Atty.
Romulo S. Brion of San Pablo City, the inclusion of said parcel in the subsequent donation to Adelaida
Nista is admittedly considered a mistake and of no force and effect and will in no way prejudice the
ownership and right of Marcelina Martina Guerra over the said parcel; that as a matter of fact Whatever

rights and interests Adelaida Nista has or may still have thereon are already considered waived and
renounced in favor of Marcelina Martina Guerra;
5. That in view of the fact that the riceland mentioned in paragraph 3 of the foregoing appears to have
already been disposed of by Eugenia Danila in favor of petitioner Adelaida Nista which the parties hereto
do not now contest, there is therefore no more estate left by the said deceased Eugenia Danila to he
disposed of by the will sought to be probated in this proceedings; that consequently, and for the sake of
peace and harmony money among the relations and kins and adopted children of the deceased Eugenia
Danila and with the further aim of settling differences among themselves, the will and codicil of Eugenia
Danila submitted to this Honorable Court by the petitioner for probate, are considered abrogated and set
aside;
6. That as the late Eugenia Danila has incurred debts to private persons during her lifetime, which in
addition to the burial and incidental expenses amounts to SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS
(P6,800.00) her adopted daughter, Marcelina (Martina) Guerra is now determined to settle the same, but
herein petitioner Adelaida Nista hereby agrees to contribute to Marcelina (Martina) Guerra for the
settlement of the said indebtedness in the amount of THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,400.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be delivered by Adelaida Nista to Marcelina (Martina)
Guerra at the latter's residence at Rizal Avenue, San Pablo City, on or about February 28, 1969;
7. That should there be any other property of the deceased Eugenia Danila that may later on be
discovered to be undisposed of as yet by Eugenia Danila during her lifetime, the same should be
considered as exclusive property of her adopted children and heirs, Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina
(Martina) Guerra and any right of the petitioner and signatories hereto, with respect to said property or
properties, shall be deemed waived and renounced in favor of said Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina)
Guerra; and
8. That with the exception of the foregoing agreement, parties hereto waived and renounce further claim
against each other, and the above-entitled case. (Exh. 6)
This Agreement was approved by the lower court in a judgment readings as follows:
WHEREFORE, said compromise agreement, being not contrary to public policy, law and moral, the same
is hereby approved and judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions set
forth in the above- quoted compromise agreement, which is hereby made an integral part of the
dispositive portion of this decision, and the parties are strictly enjoined to comply with the same. (Exh. 7)
On November 16, 1968, Rosario de Ramos, Miguel Danila Felix Danila Miguel Gavino Amor Danila
Consolacion Santos and Miguel Danila son of the late Fortunato Danila filed a motion for leave to
intervene as co-petitioners alleging that being instituted heirs or devisees, they have rights and interests
to protect in the estate of the late Eugenia Danila They also filed a reply partly admitting and denying the
material allegations in the opposition to the petition and alleging among other things, that oppositors
repudiated their institution as heirs and executors when they failed to cause the recording in the Register
of Deeds of San Pablo City the will and testament dated November 5, 1951 (Exhibit 3) in accordance with
the Rules and committed acts of ingratitude when they abandoned the testatrix and denied her support
after they managed, through fraud and undue influence, to secure the schedule of partition dated January
15, 1962. The Intervenors prayed for the probate and/or allowance of the will and codicil (Exhibits H and
L), respectively and the appointment of any of them in as administrator of said estate.
On December 6, 1968, the intervenors also filed a motion for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or relief from
judgment and to set aside the judgment based on compromise dated November 5, 1968. The oppositors
interposed an opposition to the motion to which the intervenors filed their reply.
The lower court resolved the motions in an order the dispositive portion reading, thus:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING the Court hereby makes the following dispositions

(1) Movants Rosario de Ramos, Miguel C. Danila Miguela Gavino Amor Danila Consolacion Santos,
Miguel A. Danila and Raymundo Danila are allowed and admitted to intervene to this proceeding as Party
Petitioners; and likewise admitted in their reply to the amended opposition of November 11, 1968;
(2) The compromise agreement dated October 15, 1968 by and between Petitioner Adelaida Nista and
oppositors Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra Martina is disapproved, except as regards their
respective lawful rights in the subject estate; and, accordingly, the judgment on compromise rendered by
this Court on November 5, 1968 is reconsidered and set aside; and
(3) The original Petition and amended opposition to probate of the alleged will and codicil stand.
xxx xxx xxx
The lower court also denied the motion for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the
intervenors.
xxx xxx xxx
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order was filed by the intervenors co-petitioners but the
motion was denied.
xxx xxx xxx
On February 9, 1971, a motion for the substitution of Irene, Crispina, Cristina Casiano, Edilberto Felisa,
Guerra in place of their father, the oppositor Buenaventura Guerra who died on January 23, 1971, was
filed and granted by the lower court.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dated July 6, 1971 allowing the probate of the wilt In that
decision, although two of the attesting witness Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, testified that they did not see the
testatrix Eugenia Danila sign the will but that the same was already signed by her when they affixed their own signatures
thereon, the trial court gave more weight and ment to the .'straight-forward and candid" testimony of Atty. Ricardo
Barcenas, the Notary Public who assisted in the execution of the wilt that the testatrix and the three (3) instrumental
witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other, and that with respect to the codicil the same manner was likewise
observed as corroborated to by the testimony of another lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero who was also present during the
execution of the codicil.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the late Eugenia Danila had testamentary capacity when she executed
the will, Exh. H., and the codicil Exh. L, and that said will and codicil were duly signed by her and the
three attesting witnesses and acknowledged before a Notary Public in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law, the said will and codicil are hereby declared probated. No evidence having been
adduced regarding the qualification and fitness of any of the intervenors- co-petitioners to act as
executors, the appointment of executors of the will and codicil is held pending until after due hearing on
the matter.
SO ORDERED.
Oppositors Marcelina Guam and the heirs of Buenaventura Guam appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of
Appeals The latter court, in its derision dated May 12, 1975 ruled that the lower court acted correctly in setting aside its
judgment approving the Compromise Agreement and in allowing the intervenor petitioners to participate in the instant
probate proceedings; however, it disallowed the probate of the will on the that the evidence failed to establish that the
testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witness in accordance with Article 805 of the
Civil Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses.

In this present appeal petitioners vigorously insists on constitutional grounds the nullity of the decision of respondent court
but We deem it needless to consider the same as it is not necessary in resolving this appeal on the following assigned
errors:
(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT HAVING GIVEN WEIGHT TO THE
MANIFESTATION CLAUSES IN THE TESTAMENT AND CODICIL ANNEX B (PETITION) AND INSTEAD
IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OR BIASED WITNESSES OVER THEIR OWN
ATTESTATION CLAUSES AND THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND NOTARIAL
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC; AND
(B) THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING DENIED THE PROBATE OF THE WILL AND
CODICIL DESPITE CONVINCING EVIDENCE FOR THEIR ALLOWANCE.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the trial court allowing probate of the will and
codicil in question.
The main point in controversy here is whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in
accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses
testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.
Petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the win and codicil which were signed by the instrumental witnesses are
admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the said witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying
against due execution. Petitioners further maintain that it is error for respondent court to give credence to the testimony of
the biased witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the testimonial account of the
Notary Public who was also present during the execution and before whom right after, the deeds were acknowledged.
Private respondents, on the other hand reiterate in their contention the declaration of the two surviving witnesses, Odon
Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the win was not signed by the testatrix before their presence, which is strengthened by
two photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the act of signing, there being no picture of the same
occasion showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the view that where there was an opportunity to
take pictures it is not understandable why pictures were taken of the witnesses and not of the testatrix. It concludes that
the absence of the latter's picture to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the testatrix and the
witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in the presence of each other.
The oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the will and codicil
were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that the
documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was evidently supervised by his
associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the
execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object
is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity. 2 If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a wig, other than an
interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty
purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty.
Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of ty in the execution of the questioned documents.
There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition
alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question that each
and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting
witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither
is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix.
Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.
The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not easily
by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the testatrix
sign the will. A negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and faced with the convincing
appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra care. For in this regard

It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a
valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in
determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerating what they
really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court
or favor one party to the prejudice of the others. This cannot be said of the condition and Physical
appearance of the questioned document. Both, albeit silent, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing,
forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. 3
Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause Which, significantly is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding that the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it
that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. This Court had previously hold that the
attestation clause basically contracts the pretense of undue ex execution which later on may be made by the attesting
witnesses. 4 In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the
proper execution of the will, and their signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact at not only to the
genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attention clause. 5 By
signing the wilt the witnesses impliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of
execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like. 6
In this jurisdiction, all the attesting witness to a will if available, must be called to prove the wilt Under this circumstance,
they become "forced witnesses" " and their declaration derogatory to the probate of the will need not bind the proponent
hence, the latter may present other proof of due exemption even if contrary to the testimony of or all of the at, testing
witness. 7 As a rule, if any or all of the submitting witness testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember
having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from
the testimony of other witness and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner
by law. 8 Accordingly, although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witness in connection with its due
execution, to deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise it may be overcome by
any competent evidence, direct or circubstantial. 9
In the case at bar, the s bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz on one
hand, and the Notary Public, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was contradicted
by his own admission. Though his admission to the effect that "when Eugenia Danila signed the testament (he) and the
two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and Calixto Azusada were present" (t.s.n., Feb. 12, 1970, p. 115) was made
extrajudicially, it was not squarely refuted when inquired upon during the trial.
With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the declaration of Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas. The
records show that this attesting witness was fetched by Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as witness to a
wilt Rosendo Paz did not know what the document he signed was all about. Although he performed his function as an
attesting witness, his participation was rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that his testimony, "half-hearted" as
that of Odon Sarmiento, be as candid and complete as one proceeding from a keen mind fully attentive to the details of
the execution of the deeds. Quite differently, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, more than a direct witness himself, was Purposely
there to oversee the accomplishment of the will and codicil. His testimony is an account of what he actually heard and saw
during the conduct of his profession. There is no evidence to show that this lawyer was motivated by any material interest
to take sides or that his statement is truth perverted.
It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of a will. 10 In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped
his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution
of a will deserves grave consideration. 11 An appraise of a lawyer's participation has been succinctly stated by the Court in
Fernandez v. Tantoco, supra, this wise:
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, his statements of a competent attorney, who
has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to
greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to anticipate in the act, supposing of course
that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of
the attorney being conversant of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more
likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.

One final point, the absence of a photograph of the testator Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will. The fact that the
only pictures available are those which show the Witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the will before the presence of the witnesses. We must
stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and not of what they did not speak of including the
events they failed to capture. The probate of a will is a proceeding not embued with adverse character, wherein courts
should relax the rules on evidence "to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible"
should be presented to the court before a reported will may be probated or denied probate. 12
We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the win does not serve any
persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been acted
on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special reason, the presentation of other competent evidence intended to
confirm a fact otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court having satisfied itself
that the win and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, and there being no indication of
abuse of discretion on its part, We find no error committed or any exceptional circumstance warranting the subsequent
reversal of its decision allowing the probate of the deeds in question.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed in so far its it disallowed the probate of the
will and codicil. With costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978
ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION SANTOS,
MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA,
HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA GUERRA,
respondents.
DOCTRINE: The law requires at least three attesting witnesses to a notarial will. The witnesses shall be called upon,
during probate, to recount the incidents which occurred thereat. To a large extent, admission to or denial of probate
depends on the testimony of these instrumental witnesses. However, if contrary to expectation, these witnesses, or
some of them, should testify against the formal validity of the will, the proponent of the will may use other evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to establish compliance with the formalities prescribed by law. A will is not necessarily void
because the witnesses declared against its validity.
FACTS:

Eugenia Danila allegedly executed a will and testament dated March 9, 1963 and a codicil dated April 18, 1963.
Adelaida Nista, one of the instituted heirs filed a petition for the probate of the two documents.
Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition to the petition alleging among others
that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila.
RESPONDENTSS CONTENTION: The adopted children alleged that the will and codicil were procured through fraud
and undue influence. They further contend that the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil
have not been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will
and deed of the testatrix. They also claim that Eugenia had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and
testament which was duly probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The will and codicil are valid since it complied with the formalities required by law for
the execution of a will and codicil.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering
two of the attesting witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the
contrary YES

RULING:

The last will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. There is no question that each
and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting
witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither
is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix.
Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.
There is no showing that the lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court failed to consider
the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention
of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was
presented to prove their occurrence.
With regard to the testimonies of the witnesses against the due execution of a will, it does not necessarily disallow its
probate. Although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witnesses in connection with its due
execution, to deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise, it may be overcome by
any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial.
As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having
attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by the law.

It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of a will. In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped his
judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution of a will
deserves grave consideration.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed insofar as it disallowed the probate of the
will and codicil. with costs against respondent.