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Instructions
You will prepare a presentation based on the answers to the questions provided.
Make sure to apply leadership concepts discussed in class to the topic of the
case.
Time length of the presentation is approximately 15 minutes.
The assignment is due at the beginning of the class. Do not forget to bring a
printout of the presentation for me.
Assignment Questions
How would you characterize the broader context surrounding the January 1986
teleconference? What were the organizations in which they worked like? What was the
group against? What impact might that have on the groups decision-making process?
Put yourself in Roger Boisjolys shoes. The teleconference is scheduled for tonight.
What approach will you take with the group to get support for your perspective? What
will you actually say during this meeting?
What issues face Bob Lund (VP Engineering)? What might he be concerned about in the
teleconference meeting? What will you actually say during this meeting?
What issues face Larry Mulloy (Manager, SRB project)? What might he be concerned
about in the teleconference meeting? What will actually say during this meeeting?
Conclusion
Integrate in your answer:
What acctually happened? Why did it happen? What made it difficult for them to discuss
the issues more thoughtfully and analytically? What are the learnings for business
leaders from this analysis?
9-603-068
REV: OCTOBER 21, 2002
AMY C. EDMONDSON
1 For Space Shuttle flights one through nine, NASA used the designation STS (Space Transport System). After STS-9 NASA
changed the method on numbering missions: each flight was since designated by two numbers and a letter, e.g. 41-B. The first
digit indicated the fiscal year of the scheduled launch (4 for 1984), the second digit identified the launch site (1Kennedy
Space Center, Florida, 2Vandenberg Air Force Base, California), and the letter corresponded to the alphabetic sequence for
the fiscal year (Bthe second mission scheduled).
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Amy C. Edmondson and Research Associate Laura R. Feldman prepared this case. This case was developed from published sources.
HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or
illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Copyright 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwisewithout the permission of Harvard Business School.
be-developed space station. Continued financial constraints prompted NASA to accept a proposal
from the Air Force to build the Shuttle to Air Force specifications (i.e. meet criteria for military use) in
exchange for additional funding from Congress and the White House. However, the Air Force was
unwilling to pay for some of the specifications that they required. A 1971 analysis by Mathematica,
Inc. (a Princeton, New Jersey-based think tank), found that even with the Air Force-induced increase
in development costs, the Shuttle Program could pay for itselfif it were launched very frequently
(over 30 times per year). Program survival was dependent on routine flights, recovering costs, and
making money on commercial payload.2
Funding for the STS program was scaled down to $5.1 billion; modifications to the Shuttle design
reflected the lower-cost operation. A new design replaced the costly all-liquid fuel system with a
mixed solid (Solid Rocket Booster, or SRB) and liquid (External Tank) system. The three components
of the Shuttle included a reusable Orbiter, an expendable External Fuel Tank, and two reusable SRBs,
shown in Exhibit 3.
NASA divided responsibility for the Shuttle among three of its field centers: the Johnson Space
Center in Houston dealt with the Orbiter; the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville,
Alabama was assigned the main engines, External Tank, and SRBs; and the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) in Merrit Island, Florida (the launch site), had to assemble the components.
Morton Thiokol
On November 20, 1973, NASA granted the contract to build the SRBs to the engineering firm
Morton Thiokol. Two factors contributed to Thiokol winning this contract: 1) their bid was $100
million lower than those of the other competitors (Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co., Lockheed Propulsion
Co., and United Technologies) and 2) they proposed an innovative modular design that would allow
them to build the SRB components in Utah and ship them to Florida for assembly. The modular
design relied upon O-Rings to seal its largeyet narrow enough to transport through highway
tunnelscomponent parts. When assembled, each SRB was 149 feet in length (by comparison, the
Statue of Liberty was 151 feet tall), 12.7 feet in diameter, and weighed 2 million pounds.
Thiokols segmented design was modeled after United Technologies 1950s Titan III solid fuel
rocket motor.3 Unlike Uniteds design, which relied on a single rubber O-ring, Thiokol used two Orings to seal the joint between each segment and prevent blow-by, or leakage of hot gases during
take-off (see Exhibit 4 for a drawing of the SRB and joint). Thiokol management assumed
redundancy in designthe similarity to Uniteds successful Titan III motor and the double layer of
O-ringswould translate to safety in use.
O-rings
Problems with Thiokols SRB design were uncovered as early as 1977. Analysis of a pre-flight
hydroburst test found joint rotation between the clevis and tang did not apply the required amount
of pressure to the O-rings for them to seal the joint properly. NASA and Thiokol officials continued
2 Payload is the load (including passengers or instruments) carried by a vehicle exclusive of what is necessary for its operation.
The participation of civilian Christa McAuliffe, Payload Specialist for the Teacher in Space Project, was widely publicized,
heightening media coverage of flight 51-L.
3 Thiokols and Uniteds SRBs differed in one significant way: Uniteds SRB was designed for a single use while Thiokols was
2
This document is authorized for use only by Marife Mendez in 2016.
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to monitor two conditionserosion of the primary O-ring and blow-byboth of which reduced the
integrity of the joint seal. If the primary O-ring was eroded then the secondary O-ring, instead of
serving as a backup, could actually reduce the chances that the joint would seal.
Erosion of the primary O-ring on the November 1982 STS-5 flight prompted NASA to increase the
criticality rating of the primary O-ring.4 However, this change was not thoroughly communicated
within Thiokol. Boisjoly, an engineer of 27 years and an expert on booster seal joints, performed
post-flight analysis on SRBs recovered from the Atlantic Ocean.
Boisjoly learned of the
reclassification only in 1984. He became increasingly alarmed about seal failure following the April
29, 1985 launch of flight 51-B in which both O-rings in the nozzle joint eroded, the primary O-ring by
two-thirds of its diameter. Despite the higher criticality rating, NASA responded to the mounting
risk by waiving launch constraints on a case-by-case basis, rather than grounding the entire fleet of
Shuttles. One contributor to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
observed the decision-making involved was
A kind of Russian roulette.... (The Shuttle) flies (with O-ring erosion) and nothing happens.
Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can
lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time.... You got away with it,
but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that.5
In July 1985 Thiokol formed an unofficial seal task force to solve the O-ring problems. Along with
data from previous Shuttle launches, the task force focused attention on a test from March of that
year demonstrating O-ring rigidity and failure to seal at low temperatures. Dissatisfied by Thiokols
attitude towards the task force and the seal problem, Boisjoly wrote a memo to his boss, Bob Lund, in
which he warned of the catastrophic consequences of uncorrected O-rings (the memo is reproduced
in Exhibit 5). Following receipt of the memo, Boisjoly was accused of histrionics by Joe Kilminster,
VP for Space Booster Programs, in the Thiokol cafeteria.
In an October 4, 1985 SRM Seal Problem Task Team Status memo Boisjoly wrote:
The team generally has been experiencing trouble from the business-as-usual attitude from
supporting organizations. Part of this is due to lack of understanding of how important this
task team activity is and the rest is due to pure operating procedure inertia which prevents
timely results to a specific request6
4 Criticality ratings indicated the degree of uncertainty involved with the reliability of a component or system.
5 Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1986. Vol II, Appendix F. Available at http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51l/docs/rogers-commission/Chapter-6.txt (accessed October 10, 2002).
6 Source: Ibid, Appendix D. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1p254.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).
3
This document is authorized for use only by Marife Mendez in 2016.
Exhibit 1
Teleconference Attendees
Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Volume 1, Chapter 5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm (accessed October 15, 2002).
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Exhibit 2
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Challenger Flight 51-L was originally scheduled for July 1985, but by the time the crew was assigned
in January 1985, launch had been postponed to late November to accommodate changes in payloads.
The launch was subsequently delayed further and finally rescheduled for January 22, 1986.
January 1985 - Boisjoly discovers serious erosion of the O-rings from the Discovery (51-C).
March 1985 - Preliminary tests at Thiokol suggest that O-rings do not work as well in low
temperatures.
April 1985 - O-ring failure in nozzle joint occurs at launch temperature of 70 degrees. NASA
requests full review of rocket joints.
August 1985 - Thiokol management briefs NASA on all joint seal problems. NASA concludes it is
not an issue worth grounding the entire fleet and tells Thiokol to fix it as they go along.
January 12, 1986 - Columbia (61-C) lifts off after a record-setting seven delays over 25 days.
January 21, 1986 - NASA announces it is seeking bids for a second source (besides Thiokol) to
supply SRBs.
Late January, 1986 - Several delays to the Challenger mission because of weather.
January 27, 1986 - Dan Rather stated on the CBS evening news, Yet another costly, red-faces-allaround space-shuttle-launch-delay. This time a bad bolt on a hatch and a bad weather bolt from
the blue are being blamed. Launch rescheduled for 9:38 a.m., January 28, 1986.
Sources: Adapted by casewriter from Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture,
and Deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996; and from materials used by Action Design
Associates in conjunction with video to teach interpersonal skills for organizational learning.
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Exhibit 3
Artists drawing depicts the Shuttle stacked for launch in view from dorsal side of Orbiter (left) and
from the left side of stack.
Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Volume 1, Chapter 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch1.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).
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Exhibit 4
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Exhibit 4 continued
Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Volume 1, Chapter 4. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).
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Exhibit 5
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Exhibit 5 continued
Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix D. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1appd.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).
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Exhibit 6
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Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter
5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm (accessed
October 10, 2002).
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Exhibit 6, continued
Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 4, Hearings
of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 14, 1986. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1986. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v4part6.htm#6 (accessed October 10, 2002).
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Exhibit 6, continued
Plot of Flights with O-Ring Incidents versus Weather-Induced Joint Temperature
Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 6, p 146. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986.
Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch6.htm#6.3 (accessed October 11, 2002).