PROGRAMEVALUATIONANDRESOURCEMANAGEMENT

IMPROVEMENTINTHECOMMONWEALTHPUBLICSERVICE

ByKEITHLINARD,BE(Civil),BTRP,BComm,DipTRP,MIEAust.
Keithlinard#@#yahoo.co.uk(Removehashestoemail)

ABSTRACT

Thepaperoutlinesthecurrentmechanismsforinternalandexternalreviewof(Commonwealth)
publicsectorprogramsandactivities.

ItthenbrieflyoutlinestheFederalGovernment'sbudgetaryreformswhichaimatimproving
resourceallocationdecisionmaking,anddiscussestheimportanceofprogramevaluationin
reapingthefullbenefitofthebudgetreforms.Itarguesthatthecomprehensiveandsystematic
managementreformapproachembodiedintheFinancialManagementImprovementProgramis
morelikelytobesuccessfulinimprovingprogramevaluationpractices,thanwereprevious
"reform"attemptsoverthepasttwodecades.

Thepapersummarizestheresultsofasurveyofcurrentprogramevaluationpracticesinthe
Commonwealthsector,outlinesdeficiencieshighlightedinthesurveyandsuggestsprioritiesfor
reform.

Finallythepaperdiscussestherespectiverolesofexecutivemanagement,evaluationpractitioners
andlinemanagersintheprogramevaluationprocess.

INTRODUCTION

Economy,efficiencyandeffectivenessintheallocationofpublicsectorresourceshavelongbeen
aconcernofbothGovernmentandpublicsectormanagement,whileperformancemonitoring
andevaluationofprogramresultshavebeenwidelyacceptedasessentialaspectsofsound
management.Inaddition,thevariousreviewsofCommonwealthpublicsectoradministration
overthedecadeshaveinvariablydevotedsegmentstosystematisingevaluationproceduresand
toproposingstrategiestoimprovetheefficacyofexternalreviewmechanisms.

Thisconcerntogetthebestvalueforpublicfundshasgenerallybeenbipartisan.Neither
conservativenorsocialdemocraticGovernmentswishtoseefundsbeingappliedinaninefficient
andineffectivemanner.

ThusforexampletheRoyalCommissiononAustralianGovernmentAdministration(RCAGA),
establishedbytheWhitlam(Labor)GovernmentinJune1974discussedatlengththeneedto
upgradebothinternalandexternalreviewprocesses,examiningtherespectiverolesofthe
Ministeranddepartmenthead,theAuditorGeneral,Treasury,PublicServiceBoardand
DepartmentofthePrimeMinisterandCabinet.Similarlysuchissueswereaddressedbythe1976
reviewbySirHenryBland,the1980ReviewofCommonwealthFunctions,andthe1983Reviewof
CommonwealthAdministration,allofwhichwereestablishedbytheFraser(LiberalNational
Party)Government.CurrentlythejointpartyHouse
ofRepresentativesStandingCommitteeonExpenditureisinquiringintoPublicServiceefficiency
reviewmechanisms.

ExternalReviewMechanisms

Overtheyearsavarietyofformalandadhocexternalreviewprocedureshavedeveloped:
externalreview,inthiscontext,meaningboththosemechanismswhichreporttoanauthority
otherthanthatresponsiblefortheactivityunderreview,andmechanismswherethereviewis
headedorconductedbyagroupindependentoftheresponsibleauthority.Suchexternalreview
mechanismsinclude:

. RoyalCommission
. CommitteeofInquiry
. MinisterialConsultant
. StatutoryInquiryBody
. ProgramManagementPerformanceReview
. AuditorGeneral'sOffice
. ParliamentaryCommitteeofInquiry
. InterdepartmentalTaskForce

Toputthesemechanismsinperspective,thetotaldirectoutlaysonthe27externalinquiries
identifiedinBudgetPaperNo1forthepastthreebudgetsamountsto$45.8million.TheJune
1987DepartmentofPrimeMinisterandCabinetregisterofcurrentandrecentreviewsidentified
over150studiessince1980whichwouldfallintothebroadcategoryofexternalreview.Sincethe
registrationproceduresonlycommencedin1985thisnumberisundoubtedlyconservative.

Whilstthescientificrigourofthesereviewsmayvarysignificantly,andwhilstsomewould
undoubtedlybelookedataskancebyprofessionalevaluators,thenumberofexternalreviewsand
expenditureonthemdemonstratesthatthereissignificantexternalevaluationactivityinthe
Commonwealthpublicsector.

Abriefoutlineoftheparticularfeaturesofthemorecommonexternalreviewmechanismsis
includedforcompleteness.

RoyalCommission:ARoyalCommissionistheonlynonParliamentaryformofreviewwith
statutorypowersenablingevidencetobecompelledandprovidingprotectionfortheinquiryand
witnesses.TheexistenceofthesepowersmeansaRoyalCommissionisbestsuitedfor
investigatorytaskswheretheaimistoestablishthefactsofamatterand(possibly)allocate
responsibilityforcertainactions.Thisapproachislikelytobeadoptedwherethefactsarehardto
determine,makingsubstantialresearchworknecessaryaswellascompulsivepowersonthepart
oftheinquiry.RoyalCommissionsaremostoftenusedtoinquireintocontroversialmattersof
nationalimportancewhentheGovernmentneedstobeseentobeappointingabodywithfull
powers,guaranteedindependenceandawidemandate.ExamplesaretheRoyalCommissionon
theUseandEffectsofChemicalAgentsonAustralianPersonnelinVietnamandtheRoyal
CommissionintoBritishNuclearTests.RoyalCommissionshavealsobeenusedforverybroadly
basedpolicyinquiries,suchastheRoyalCommissiononAustralianGovernmentAdministration
andtheRoyalCommissiononHumanRelationships.

CommitteeofInquiry:Inrecentyearsnonstatutorycommitteesofinquiryhavefrequentlybeen
establishedbyMinisters(withtheapprovalofCabinet)tocarryoutreviewsofGovernment
programs.RecentexamplesaretheNationalRoadFreightIndustryInquiryandtheIndependent
InquiryintoAviationCostRecovery.Thismechanismismostoftenusedwherethereisaneedfor
widerangingconsiderationoftheprogramandrelatedpolicyandwherethereisaclose
involvementintheissuebyawiderangeofinterestgroups.Suchcommitteesgenerallyoperate
withanumberofmembersappointedbothbecauseoftheirexpertiseandbecausetheyare
broadlyacceptabletobothGovernmentandrelevantkeyinterestgroups.Theygenerallyseek
submissionsfromthepublic,mayundertakepublichearings,andtheirreportsaregenerally
publishedandtabledintheParliament.

MinisterialConsultant:Arisingfromthe1983GovernmentWhitePaper,Reformingthe
AustralianPublicService,wastheMembersofParliament(Staff)Act,whichenablesthe
appointmentofMinisterialConsultantswhomayworktotheMinisteronspecificprojects,
includingreviewsofprograms.ExamplesofsuchappointmentsincludeMrPaulDibbbythe
MinisterforDefencetoreviewtheAustralianDefenceprogramandMrT.MaybytheMinisterfor
AviationtoreviewAustraliandomesticaviationpolicy.Suchreviewswouldgenerallyoperatein
closerconsultationwiththeMinisterthanwouldbethecaseofacommitteeofinquiry.Thismay
havetheadvantageofproducinganoutcomemoreattunedtotheGovernmentpolicyobjectives
andthusmorereadilyabletobeimplemented;ontheotherhandthepublicandinterestgroups
maynotseetheirviewsasbeingsufficientlytakenintoaccount.

StatutoryInquiryBody:Thereareanumberofstatutorybodieswhichhavethefunctionand
powerstoinquireintoandreportonparticularareasofpolicy.Insomecasesitisalsoopentothe
Governmenttoasktherelevantbodytoconductareviewofaparticularprogramorpolicy.This
hastheadvantageofusingabodywithinquiryexperience,andwithanestablishedpositionwith
thepublicandinterestgroups.ExamplesincludetheIndustriesAssistanceCommission,theTrade
PracticesCommission,theInterstateCommissionandtheAustralianBroadcastingTribunal.

ProgramManagementPerformanceReview:ForanumberofyearsthePublicServiceBoard
(PSB)undertookanannualprogramofJointManagementReview(JMRs)whichfocusedprimarily
onadministrativeefficiencyinthedeliveryoftheprogramsunderinvestigation.Suchreviews
werecarriedoutbyteamscomposedofofficersfromtheDepartmentinvolved,thePSB,and
generally,managementconsultants.In1986thePSBhasextendedthescopeofitsreviews
beyondtheirtraditionalconcernwithadministrativeefficiencytoconsiderwhetherthepolicy
objectivesofprogramsweresufficientlywelldefinedandtheextenttowhichprogramactivitywas
directedefficientlytothoseobjectives.ThetermProgramManagementPerformanceReview
(PMPR)waschosentoreflectthenewscopeandfocus.WiththeabolitionofthePSBtheris,as
yet,noreplacementmechanism.

InquirybyAuditorGeneral:In1979,partlyinresponsetotheRCAGArecommendations,the
AuditActwasamendedtoincludespecificprovisionforefficiencyauditing,anddesignated
efficiencyauditsweresubsequentlyconducted.MorerecentlytheAuditorGeneralhas
conductedcomprehensiveauditingunderwhichhetakesabroaderviewofagencies'activities,
comprehendingcomplianceandefficiencyaspectsbutstoppingshortofcommentingon
underlyingGovernmentpolicies.

AMinistermayalsorequesttheAuditorGeneral,unders.63poftheAuditAct,tocarryoutan
inspectionandauditoftheaccountsandrecordsofagovernmentagency.Suchaninquiryhasthe
advantagebothoftheperceivedindependenceoftheAuditorGeneral,andofstaffwhoare
familiarwiththeprocess.

ParliamentaryCommittee:ItisopentotheGovernmenttoseekreviewofaGovernment
programbyanappropriateexist ingParliamentaryCommitteeoreventoproposethe
establishmentofaSelectCommitteetoinquireintotheprogram.StandingCommitteeswhich
mayundertakesuchinquiriesincludethevariousSenatelegislationandgeneralpurposes
committees,theJointCommitteeonPublicAccounts,theParliamentaryStandingCommitteeon
PublicWorksandtheHouseofRepresentativesExpenditureCommittee.Parliamentary
CommitteesarevestedwiththepowersoftheParliamentandthusareabletoundertake
inquiriesthatmayrequiretheuseofcompulsivepowersandthegivingofprotectiontowitnesses.
Theyalsoprovidetheopportunityforthepublicandforinterestgroupstomakesubmissionsand
putforwardviewsontheprogram.ForaParliamentaryCommitteetofunctioneffectivelyin
reviewingaGovernmentprogramitisgenerallynecessarythattherebeabipartisanperception
oftheproblemswhichmaybearisingintheprogramandadegreeofdetachmentofthe
Governmentfromtheprogram.

InterdepartmentalTaskForce(ProgramEffectivenessReview):ThenotionofaProgram
EffectivenessReviewisthatataskforceissetupconsistingofofficersfromtheDepartment
administeringaprogramandfromotherDepartments,usuallyincludingFinance,andpossibly
PrimeMinister&Cabinet.Theofficersonthetaskforceareintendedtoworkinapersonal
capacityratherthanasrepresentativeoftheirDepartment.AregularprogramofPERswas
undertakenforseveralyearsinthelate1970'sbutsincethentheuseofthismechanismhasbeen
adhoc.AnexamplewasthePERestablishedtoreviewthestaffhousingprogramsoftheDefence
ForceandtheAustralianPublicService.

EfficiencyScrutinyReviews:On25September1986thePrimeMinisterestablishedtheEfficiency
ScrutinyUnit,headedbyaseniorprivatesectormanager,MrBlock,whoreporteddirectlytothe
PrimeMinister,andthroughhimtotheExpenditureReviewCommitteeofCabinet.Theunit
operatedcooperativelywithagencies,andtherelevantMinistersweredirectlyinvolvedatall
stages.Aninnovativefeatureofthisnewreviewprocesswasthatagencieswerepermittedto
retain25ofanysavingsidentifiedinareview,forapplicationtostaffdevelopment,acquisitionof
newtechnologyorotherefficiencyimprovements.

InternalReviewMechanisms

Whiletheseexternalreviewmechanismswillcontinuetoplayanimportantroleinachieving
governmentpolicygoals,theprimaryresponsibilityfortheefficientandeffectiveuseofresources
byanagencylieswiththeheadofthatagency.Thethrustofthegovernmentpublic
administrationandbudgetaryreforms,particularlythedevolutionofsignificantauthorityfrom
thecentralagenciestolinedepartments,furtheremphasisesthis.

Unfortunatelythereislittlecomprehensivedataontheextentofformalinternalreviewactivity,
andsuchdatathatdoesexistpaintsalessthanexcitingpicture.Inessence,whilethereis
significantreviewactivity,muchofitisadhoc,basedonlimiteddataandcarriedoutwithvarying
degreesofscientificrigour.

TheFinancialManagementImprovementProgramDiagnosticStudy,publishedinFebruary1984,
foundlittlesystematicevaluationinevidenceindepartments,otherthanthetraditionalinternal
audit.

"...Ofthetwentyormoreagenciesvisited,onlyoneactuallyhadaunitwhichwasdedicatedto
monitoringandevaluationpurposes;inthatcase,however,ithadbeenintroducedonlyrecently
soitwasnotpossibletoassessitseffectiveness."(para2.3.5)

"...Programevaluationinlineagenciesappearstobelargelytheresponsibilityof"policy"areasof
agencies.However,theTeamdidnotidentifyanysystematicactivityinthisareaofresponsibility
...itoftenseemedtobeabyproductofthegeneralpolicydevelopmentfunction."(para2.3.9)

SignificantevaluationofprogramsisundertakenintheDepartmentofFinance,mainlyinthe
Budgetcontext,embracingbothfinancialandnonfinancialissuesbut,astheDiagnosticStudy
noted,suchevaluationsaregenerally:"...ontherunandnotsubjecttostrictandrigorous
objectiveperformancecriteria...theyaremoreinthenatureofpassingcritiques..."

Neverthelessmostseniormanagerswhorespondedtothestudyconsideredthatprogram
evaluationandperformancemeasurementwerekeyaspectsoftheirmanagerialfunctionand
mostclaimedtocarryoutthesefunctionstosomedegree.TheDiagnosticStudyreported,
however,that:"...mostassignedthetasktomanagementcommitteeswhichusedintuitiveand
subjectivestandardsforevaluationandmonitoring."

Morerecently,inthecontextofpreparingitsreporttotheMinisterontheprogressofthe
FinancialManagementImprovementProgram,alldepartmentsandfourmajorbudgetdependent
statutoryauthoritiesweresurveyed,interalia,inrespectofmatterspertinenttoprogram
evaluation.Theresultsofthesurveyarediscussedmorefullylaterinthepaper.Sufficeittosay
thatonlyfourofthe32agenciessatisfiedtheevaluationcriteriawhichtheDepartmentofFinance
FMIPUnitregardedasabareminimum,namelythatanagencyhad

aformalpolicyforevaluatingperformanceofallprograms,and

hadidentifieddescriptionsorobjectivesforallprograms,and

haddeterminedefficiencyoreffectivenessperformanceindicatorsforatleastsome
programsorsubprograms.

THEREFORMENVIRONMENTTHEFINANCIALMANAGEMENTIMPROVEMENTPROGRAM

InApril1984theFederalGovernmentissueditsWhitePaper,BudgetReform,whichdetaileda
packageofbudgetaryandfinancialmanagementreforms.Theaimsofthereformswerespecified
tobe:

todevelopbettermeansofidentifyingandsettingbudgetarypriorities,inordertoensure
thatthebestoverallresultisachievedintermsofmeetingtheGovernment'sobjectives
withtheresourceswhichcanbemadeavailable;

tofocusattentionmoreclearlyonthegoalsandobjectivesofparticularprograms,in
relationtotheresourcestheyuse;

todevelopandapplytothemanagementofCommonwealthprogramsspecifictechniques
aimedatimprovedperformanceandmoreefficientresourceuse;and

tosetupmachinerytoensurethattheeffectivenessandefficiencyofprogramsare
reviewedregularly,andthattheresultsofsuchreviewsaretakenintoaccountinthe
ongoingevaluationofbudgetarypriorities.

TheGovernment'sconcernwithreformsintheseareasderived,inlargemeasure,from
recognitionthattherearelimitstotheeconomicresourceswhich(couldbemobilisedto
implementitssocialgoals.Suchlimitsalwaysexist,ofcourse,butwereparticularlyevidentinthe
budgetarycircumstancesexistingwhenthepresentGovernmenttookofficeand,ifanything,the
limitshavebecomeeventightersincethen.

TheFinancialManagementImprovementProgram(FMIP)istheumbrellamechanismfor
implementingarangeofinitiativesinvolvedinthispackage,including

aportfolioapproachtobudgeting

programbudgeting

devolutionoffinancialandstaffingcontrols

resultsorientedmanagementindepartmentsandauthorities.

TheFMIPdiffersfrompreviousapproachestomanagementreforminseveralrespects:

FMIPdoesnotconfineitselftotryingtoreformmanagementpractices,butisasystematic
andintegratedapproachcovering:

thebudgetaryandregulatoryenvironment

theagencymanagementenvironment

servicewidestandardsandprocedures

FMIPisacooperativeeffortbetweentheCentralAgenciesandothergovernment
agenciesratherthanasetofidealisticrulesimposedfromabove:

thereisatoplevelSteeringCommitteewithmembersfromFinance,Defence,
TransportandAboriginalAffairs

anInterdepartmentalAdvisoryandDevelopmentCommittee(IADC)actsas
soundingboardandinformationexchangeonFMIPissues

FMIPFinancialManagementGroupshavebeensetupinallStatestoprovidea
forumfordiscussionofanddisseminationofideasonfinancialmanagementimprovement,to
ensurethatthereformsareunderstoodandimplementedservicewide,notmerelyincentral
officesinCanberra,andtoensurethereisregionalofficeinputintotheprogram

FMIPPractitionersForumshavebeenestablishedintheWodenandBelconnento
disseminatepracticalideasamongcentralofficesofdepartmentsandauthoritiesonFMIP
implementation.

SignificantresourceshavebeenappliedbybothDOFtoimplementtheprogram

DOFhasestablishedsupportunits,eachwithabout13staff,whohavethe
responsibility,interalia,tosupporttheIADC,providedirectassistancetoseniormanagementin
departmentsandagencies,preparepromotionalandtrainingmaterialsandruntrainingsessions

THETHREEMAJOREMPHASESOFFMIP

Theenvironmentwithinwhichmanagersoperatehasapowerfulinfluenceonhowefficientlyand
effectivelytheymanage.Itembodiestheincentivestructure,whetherexplicitlyorimplicitly,
whethercarrotorstick,towhichmanagersrespond.Therehavebeenaspectsofthedecision
environmentwhichmilitateagainstefficientandeffectiveresourcemanagementandagainst
evaluationoftheconsequentresourceallocationdecisions.Forexample:

ifParliamentaryoversight,forexamplethroughtheSenateEstimatesCommitteeprocess,
focusesunduelyonresourceinputsandlargelyignoresoutputsandoutcomes,itis
understandablethatseniormanagementinagencies,andthemanagementinformation
systemswhichsupportthem,reflectthisfocus;

thustheFMIPdiagnosticstudyfoundthat94percentofseniormanagersregarded
resourcemanagementassimplyinvolvingspendingthetotalfundsallocated,orcontrolling
expenditureagainstappropriations.

ifdepartmentalmanagementbelievethattheresultsofanevaluationwillbeusedbythe
DOFtocuttheprogrambudget,ratherthanbeingusedtoimprovethewaytheprogram
operates,thentheintegrityofevaluationsmustsuffer.

ifthedevelopmentoftheGovernment'sbudgetproceedsinanincrementalfashion,
consideringfirstthecontinuedworthofexistingpolicy,thenproceedingtoconsidernew
initiatives,thereexistsastrongincentiveformanagersfirsttostrivetoprotectwhatexists,
andthentopressthemeritsofthenewproposals;thereisthuslittleincentivet1oreview
thecontinuedrelevanceorpriorityofexistingactivitiesinthelightofnewneeds.

iftherulesorproceduresformanagementaresetoutsidetheagency,andifallsavings
arisingfrommanagementimprovementarereturnedtoconsolidatedrevenue,thereexists
littleincentivetoseekimprovedapproaches.

ThefundamentalreasonforthesuccessofFMIPtodateinchangingattitudestowardsresources
managementandingeneratinganenthusiasmacrosstheServicehasbeenbecauseithas
focussedspecificallyonthedecisionenvironmentbyintroducingpositiveincentivestoimproved
resourcesmanagement,andbychangingfeaturesofthatenvironmentwhichdiscouragegood
resourcemanagementorpromotepoormanagement.

TheBudgetaryandRegulatoryEnvironment

ThefirstandpossiblymostimportantareaforactionunderFMIPhasbeenthebudgetaryand
regulatoryenvironment.Inthisareatherehavebeensomedramaticchangeswhichencourage
managerstoviewevaluationasavaluabletoolratherthanathreat.

PortfolioBudgetGuidance:Incontrasttothetraditionalincrementalagencybyagency,
activitybyactivityapproachtobuildingtheBudget,theGovernmentnow,having
collectivelyrevieweditsfiscalandsocialpriorities,provid46esbothgeneralandspecific
guidanceforeachofthe28portfolios;Ministersareencouragedtocomeupwitha
packageproposalwithintheseguidelines.ByencouragingMinisterstoofferuplower
priorityactivitiesasoffsetstoinitiativesinnewareasofneed,theGovernmenthas
providedamajorincentivetoMinistersandtheiradviserstoestablishsystematicreviews
 ofportfolioactivities.Thisprioritisingwasaidedinthe198687andsubsequentbudget
processesbyrequiringMinisterstoidentifytheimplicationsof2%,4%and6%cutsintotal
portfoliobudget.

ProgramBudgeting:Withtheintroductionofprogrambudgeting,consolidated
informationwillbeprovidedtoMinisters,theParliamentandthepublicontheobjectives,
performanceandfullcostofprograms.ThiscanbeexpectedtoleadParliamentary
Committeesinparticulartofocustheirscrutinymoreonprogramobjectivesandresults
thanoninputs.

InformationSessionsforParliamentaryOfficersetc:AnintegralpartofFMIPhasbeenthe
holdingofinformationsessionsforbothmembersandresearchstaffofParliamentary
Committeessothattheyarebetterplacedtomakeuseoftheresultsorientedprogram
information.

ConsolidationofSalariesandAdministrativeVotes:Uptotheearly1980'snotonlywere
thereoveralllimitsonspendingonsalariesandadministration,butthereweredetailed
spendinglimitsatlowerlevels(egovertime,transportcosts,postage,officesupplies,office
equipmentetc),andDepartmentshadnoauthoritytoswitchfundsfromoneareato
anotherinresponsetochangesinpriorities.Forthe1985/86BudgetDepartmentssimply
hadtwovotes,SalariesandAdministrativesExpenses,andcouldreallocatefundswithin
them.From1987/88hasbeenasinglelineitemforthesevotes.Thisincreasedflexibility
meansmanagersarenowforcedtoestablishtheirownpriorities,whichinturncreatesan
environmentmorefavourableforevaluation.

CarryOverofEndofYearSurplus:IntheCommonwealthpublicservice(andinState
Governmentagenciesalso)therehasbeenevidenceofmajorspendingtowardstheendof
thefinancialyear,asagenciesendeavourtospendtheirappropriationsbeforetheylapse
andthefundsreverttoconsolidatedrevenue.Fromtheperspectiveoftheindividual
agencythereisastrongincentivetobelessthan100effectiveinsuchspendingifthe
alternativemeansthattheygetnobenefitatall.From1987/88theGovernmenthas
allowedarolloverofupto4%oftheadministrativevoteattheendofthefinancialyear
toallowformoreflexibleplanningontheuseoffundsandhencefurtherencourage
evaluationtoachieveoptimalallocation.

Inrecognitionoftheincreasedflexibilityfromthesemeasures,theGovernmentappliesan
"efficiencydividend"tothesalariesandadministrativevotesofalldepartmentsfrom
1987/88.Thisistoensurethetaxpayergetsadirectbenefitfromtheseproductivity
improvementmeasures.

ServiceWideStandardsandPractices

AnotherimportantfocusofFMIPhasbeen(andwillcontinuetobe)theimprovementinservice
widestandardsandpracticeswhichimpingeonresourcemanagement,andparticularlyonthe
overallresourcemanagementincentivestructure.Areaswhichareattractingattentionunder
FMIPinclude:

 GuidelinesonExpenditureProposals:In1984theInterdepartmentalAdvisoryand
DevelopmentCommitteeonFMIPendorsedguidelines,subsequentlyissuedasBudget
EstimatesDirectionsbyDepartmentofFinance,whichrequiredallnewpolicyproposalsto
includeaclearstatementofobjectives,detailsofperformanceindicatorswhichwouldbe
usedtoassessresults,andtheproposedperformancemonitoringandevaluationprocess.

ManagementInformationSystems(MIS):FollowinganFMIPsurveyin1985ofMISand
relatedmattersin57Commonwealthagencies,guidelineswereissuedonupgradingMIS;
acompendiumofinformationsystemsoperatedbydepartmentsandlargerauthorities
wasissuedtofacilitateinteragencycommunication;theservicesprovidedto
departmentsandagenciesbythecentralFinanceLedgerSystemweresignificantly
upgraded(includingmovestogiveagenciesdirectonlineaccesstoledgerandstaffing
data);andFMIPsupportunitstaffhavebeensecondedtoagenciestoassisttheirMIS
upgrading.

ProgramEvaluation:guidelinesandothertrainingmaterialhavebeenorarebeing
developedtoassisttheintroductionofsystematicprogramevaluation.

ChargingPolicy:Somesignificantservices,forexampleofficeaccommodation,are
providedbycentralagencies"free"tootherdepartmentsandauthorities;themanagers
usingsuchserviceshavenoincentivetousesuchresourcesefficiently.Onthebasisofan
FMIPinitiativetheGovernmentisimplementinga"userpays"principleforsuchcommon
servicefunctions.

ManagementSystemsinDepartmentsandAuthorities

ThethirdmajorfocusoftheFMIPisinassistingdepartmentsandauthoritiestodeveloparesults
orientedsystemofmanagement.Basedontheexperienceofworkingwithagencies,andlistening
totheirmanagers,theFMIPisencouragingafiveprongedmanagementimprovementstrategy:

implementationofacorporateapproachtomanagement

developmentofagoalorientedprogramstructure

revampingoforganisationalstructuretomeshwiththeprogramstructure

upgradingofmanagementinformationsystems

developmentofprogramperformanceindicatorsandasystematicevaluationframework.

TheactivitiesundertakenunderFMIPinrespectofeachofthesefivekeyelementshaveincluded:

trainingcoursesforseniormanagers

conferences,workshopsandawarenessseminarscentrallyandinstateofficesofagencies

preparationoftrainingmaterialsforagencyuse

secondmentofspecialiststafffromtheFMIPsupportunitstoassistintheseareas

contributiontowardsthecostofengagingmanagementconsultants.

The"ManagingforResults"focusofFMIPisextremelyimportantforupgradedevaluation
strategiesinagencies.Thus:

introductionofacorporatemanagementapproach,whereobjectivesandprioritiesare
establishedfortheagencyasawhole,andstaffandresourcesareallocatedaccordingly,
bothfacilitatesandrequiressystematicperformancemonitoringandevaluationtoassist
prioritisingandresourcedecisionmaking;

theprogrammanagementapproachprovidesthelogicalgoalorientedframeworkfor
systematicevaluation;

thedevolutioninherentintheorganizationdesignreformsgivesmanagersatalllevelsthe
incentivestoevaluatetheirareasofresponsibilityandtodemandthisofsubordinates,and
torespondtosuchdemandsfromabove;

theupgradingofmanagementinformationsystemsisessentialtoprovidethedatafor
ongoingperformancemonitoringandperiodicindepthevaluation;and

thedevelopmentofaformalevaluationframeworkinagencies,builtonthepreceding
steps,meansthatevaluationwillbecomeanintegralandpermanentpartofresource
managementratherthana"sevendaywonder"whichquietlyfadesawaywhenallthefuss
diesdown.

Ofcourse,theotherbroad"environmental"changesnotedabovehavebeenveryimportantin
creatingaclimatewheremanagersarepreparedtostepoutofthe"ratrace"foramomentto
considertheoftenfundamentalandlongertermchangesnecessarytoimplementthisresults
orientedmanagementstrategy.

ASNAPSHOTONEVALUATIONINTHESERVICE

IfthereistobeasystematicapproachtoevaluationinaGovernmentagency,thefollowingare
consideredtobeessentialprerequisites:

(i) Thereneedstobeacorporateplanoratleastaformalstatementofagencyobjectives
whicharesufficientlyexplicit.

(ii) Corporatemanagementshouldhaveaformalpolicyonevaluationcoveringitsrolein
resourceallocationdecisionmakinganddefiningthekeyactorsintheprocessandtheir
responsibilities.

(iii) Corporatemanagementshouldapprovea3to5yearplanorscheduleofevaluations
whichencompassesallagencyprograms.

(iv) Forallprogramelementsthereshouldbeastatementofobjectivesexpressedin
measurableterms;(note:theappropriatesizeoftheprogramelementforanevaluationdepends
ontheparticularcharacteristicsoftheelementandmayrangefromanentireprogramtoasingle
activityatthebottomoftheprogramstructure).

(v) ManagementInformationSystemsintheagencyshouldbegearedtomonitoringrelevant
performanceindicators.

(vi) Resourcesmustbeallocatedsufficienttoachievetheevaluationplan.

(vii) Thereisaformalprocessforreviewingevaluationrecommendationsandformonitoring
implementationofthosethatareacceptedbycorporatemanagement.

(viii) Corporateprocessingshouldbeinplacetoensurethatevaluationresultsfeedintothe
budgetplanningandresourceallocationdecisionmaking.

TABLE1,derivedfromthe1986FMIPReport,summarisesthestateofthePublicServiceatthat
time.Giventhedisruptionsincethanduetodepartmentalreorganisation,notmuch
improvementhasoccurred.

IMPLEMENTINGPROGRAMEVALUATIONINANAGENCY

Thecommitmentbytheagencyexecutive,andparticularlybytheagencyhead,iLNscriticaltothe
ongoingsuccessofprogramevaluationinanagency.Corporatemanagement'srolein
establishingtheoverallevaluationframeworkinanagencyandallocatingresourcesforparticular
evaluationprojectsisclearlyimportant.Ofequalsignificanceiscorporatemanagement'srolein
creatinga"supportiveenvironment"withoutwhichitisoftendifficulttosecurethefullco
operationofotherlevelsofmanagement.TABLE2summarisessomekeyissuesforcorporate
managerstoconsiderinestablishinganevaluationframeworkintheiragencies.

Indevelopingitsapproachtoevaluation,thefollowingaresomeoftheorganisationalissues
whichcorporatemanagementwillhavetoaddress:

Shouldthevariousstrandsofevaluationintheagency(eginternalaudit,performance
monitoring,programandpolicyreview)besubjecttosomeformofhighlevelco
ordination?

Shouldaformalprogramevaluationunitbeestablished,possiblyincorporatingsomeorall
existingevaluationfunctions?

Whatistheroleofprogram/regional/linemanagersvisavisspecializedevaluationunits?

Whatrole,ifany,shouldcentralagencies(egFinance)play?

 Towhomshouldtheevaluationunitreport?

Whoshouldhaveresponsibilityfordevelopingprioritiesforanevaluationworkschedule?

Whoshouldapprovetheworkschedulefortheevaluationunit(s)?

Howshouldspecificevaluationsbestaffed:

(a) byfulltimeevaluators?

(b) bycooptedpersonnelfromcentralofficeprogramareasand/orfromregional
offices?

(c) byconsultantsorbyspecialistssecondedfromotheragencies?

(d) bysomecombinationoftheabove?

Whatskillsarerequiredtomanageorundertakeevaluationsinthisparticularportfolioand
whatstepscanbetakentoensuretheseskillsareavailabletotheagency?

Whatformalprocessesshouldtherebeforinputfromprogrammanagers,regional
directorsetc?

Whatstepsshouldbetakentoensurequalitycontrolofevaluations?

Whatwillbetheformalprocessesforconsideringtheevaluationconclusionsand
recommendations?

Whatdistributionwillnormallybegiventoevaluationreports?

TABLE1:STATEOFTHESERVICEONEVALUATION

AGENCIESWHERE NUMBEROUTOF32

1. Thereisacorporateplanor 9
formalstatementofobjectives

2. Thereisaformalpolicyforevaluating 6
performanceagainstobjectivesforall
activities

3. Thereisaspecificcyclethatensures 12
allprogramsareregularlyreviewed

4. Performanceindicatorshavebeen
identifiedforatleastmost
programswithrespectto:
(a)efficiency 10
(b)effectiveness 8

5. MISaregearedtomonitor
(a)resourceinputs 15
(b)programoutputs 12
(c)programoutcomes 10

6. Thereisaunit,otherthan 17
internalaudit,withevaluation
responsibilityfocussingon:
(a)focusonoperationalefficiency 12
(b)programeffectiveness 12

7. Therearesetproceduresfordeciding
onevaluationrecommendations 13

8. Therearemechanismsforlinking
evaluationtothebudgetprocess. 9

TABLE2:ROLEOFTOPMANAGEMENTINPROGRAMEVALUATION

1. Setevaluationpolicyframeworkintheagency.

2. Participateactivelyintheselectionofoperationalandpolicyissuesforanalysis.

3. Assignresponsibilityfortheanalysistoaunitoftheorganizationwhichcanconductthe
studyobjectively.

4. Ensurethatparticipationandcooperationareobtainedbothwithintheorganisationand
fromrelevantexternalagencies.

5. Provideadequatestafftomeetatimelyreportingschedule.

6. Insistonadequatequalitycontrolovertheevaluationproducts.

7. Haveaworkschedulepreparedandperiodicallymonitored.

8. Reviewresultsand,iffindingsareaccepted,seethattheyarefedintotheappropriate
decisionprocesses.

9. Monitoractiononrecommendationswhichhavebeenacceptedbycorporate
management.