Armonia 2015 Winners Memorial.

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest
Moot Court Competition

TEAM CODE
Before
The Honourable High Court of Odisha, Cuttack
Cri. Appeal No. *** / 2015
IN THE MATTER OF
[ An appeal preferred U/S 374 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, against the
conviction and sentence U/S 302 & 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the
Learned Trial Court ]
IN THE MATTER OF
Varun.......... Appellant
v.
State of Odisha
...............
Respondent
MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Abbreviations.......................................................................................... 4
Index of Authorities .............................................................................................. 6
Cases.....................................................................................................................6
Statutes.................................................................................................................6
Lexicons...............................................................................................................9
Commentaries / Digests ..9
Journals & Reports.....10
Legal Database...10
Statement of Jurisdiction..................................................................................... 11
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................... 12
Statement of Issues.............................................................................................. 14
Summary of Arguments................................................................................................15
Arguments Advanced.......................................................................................... 16
2.1.
That the Prosecution Has Failed To Prove the Case beyond All Reasonable Doubt.17
2.1.1. Facts so Established should be Consistent Only With the Hypothesis of Guilt of the
Accused.18
2.1.2. The nexus between the proximate cause of death and the Act of accused do not
coincide.21
2.2.
Chain of Circumstances is not properly knitted....22
-2-

2.3.
Accused
Not
Liable
for
the
Death
of
the
Deceased.......23
2.4.
Absence of Necessary Mens Rea..23
3.1.
Deficiency Of Will Due To Weak Intellect Of The Accused.......25
3.1.1. Plea Of Unsoundness Of Mind As A Statutory Defense..................25

3.1.1.1.
The Accused Is Suffering From Dissociative Identity Disorder....26
3.1.1.2.
Appellants Case Backed By The Statement Of Pw6. ..................28
3.1.1.3.
Statement Of Dw1 In Line With The Appellants Version...28
3.1.2. Facts Precedent, Attendant And Antecedent Must Be Taken Into Consideration...29
3.2.
Presumption Under The Evidence Act Is Rebuttable. ....29
3.3.
BENEFIT OF DOUBT Vis--Vis BURDEN OF PROOF..30
3.4.
Dissociative Identity Disorder As A Defence In Lieu Of Legal Insanity....32
Prayer for Relief..................................................................................................34
-3-

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
Section
Sections
Paragraph
Paragraphs
A.C.
Appellate Cases
AIR
All India Reporters
All ER
All England Law Report
Anr.
Another
Att. Gen.
Attorney General
All.
Allahabad
Bom.
Bombay
B.L.J.R
Bihar Law Journal Report
CJI
Chief Justice of India
CrPC
Criminal Procedure Code
Cr. L.J.
Criminal Law Journal
CLT
Cuttack Law Times
C.W.N.
Calcutta Weekly Notes
DW
Defence Witness
Edn.
Edition
GLR
Gujarat Law Report
I.C
Indian Cases
-4-

ILR
Indian Law Report
IPC
Indian Penal Code
IndLaw
Indian Law
J.
Justice
Ker.
Kerala
KB
Kings Bench
M.P.
Madhya Pradesh
Ori
Orissa
p.
Page
P. / para
Paragraph
PW
Prosecution Witness
P.L.W
Patna Law Weekly
Raj
Rajasthan
SC
Supreme Court
v.
versus
Vol.
Volume
-5-

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Indian Penal Code, 1860
India Evidence Act, 1872
TABLE OF CASES
1. Abdul Jabar v. State, P.L.W. 1954 SC 81 at p. 87..........................................................18
2. Anandi v. Emperor, 32 I.C. (All.) 838................................................17
3. Ashok v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 Indlaw SC 174....18
4. AshokKumar Chatterjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 1890....................19
5. Basangauda Yamanappu v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 139 at pp. 141, 142: ILR (1941)
Bom. 315: 42 Cr.L.J. 697: 43 Bom. L.R. 144................................................................18
6. Bhikari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1...26
7. Caetano PiedadeFernandes v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, 1977 Cr.L.J.
167 at pp. 172, 173 (S.C.)...... .................. .................. .................. ..............................22
8. Chandigarh Administration v. Dharam Singh, 1985 C.A.R. 240 at p. 241
(S.C.)................. .................. .................. .................. .................. ................................22
9. Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1563...................................26
10. Daniel Mcnaughtens case, (1843) 8 E.R. 718 : (1843) 10 Cl. Fin. 200.25
11. Debyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1955 SC 1563....................29
12. Devikadevi wife of Premji Bhai Ruparel v. State of Gujarat and others, 1983 (1) GLR
215; 1983 GLH (NOC) 19.............................................18
13. Digendra v. State, 74 C.W.N. 231 at p. 241....................... ...........................................26
14. Fowler v. Padget (1789) 7 TR 509..................... .................. .........................................24
-6-

15. Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC 18 2002 Indlaw SC

1925...............................................................................................18
16. Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 343.....................................19
17. Hari Shankar v. State of U.P., 1998 All Cr.R. 1438 at p. 1441......................................22
18. Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1977 SC 1063 19
19. Kamla Singh v. State AIR 1955 Pat. 209........................................................................29
20. Kanna Kunnummal Ammed Kova v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 92 at p.95........29
21. Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430.20
22. Mahadev Sonu Pardhi v. State of Maharastra, 1996 (2) Crimes 87...... ........................19
23. Mousam Singha Roy and Ors v. State of West Bengal, [2003] 12 SCC 377....17
24. N. Rajendra Prasad Bhat v. The State of Karnataka, 1996 Cri LJ 257..........................19
25. Naresh Kumar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1980 SC 1168 at p. 1169....22
26. Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR 1990 SC 7920
27. Prakash v. State of Rajasthan 2013 Cr.LJ 2040 (SC): AIR 2013 SC 1474......................20
28. Rajnikant Kesha Bhandari v. State, AIR 1967 Goa 21 at p. 56.......17
29. Roshan Lal v. State of M.P. AIR 1971 SC 778..............................................................30
30. S.W. Mohammed v. State of Maharastra AIR 1972 SC 2443.........................................30
31. Sarju Merandy v. State of Bihar, (1978) 26 B.L.J.R. 267 at pp. 272-73..........................29
32. Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 1984 Indlaw SC
432.........................................................................................................................20
33. Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra 1973 AIR 2622..20
34. Shiva Sahai v. State of U.P., 1990 Cri LJ (NOC) 15 (All) (DB)...................................19
-7-

35. Shivu and Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka &Anr., (2007) 4 SCC
713 2007 Indlaw SC 103....................................................................19
36. Soni v. State of Gujarat, 1991 (2) Crimes 4 at o, 12(SC) .................. .......... 18
37. State v. Emerciano Lemos, AIR 1970 Goa 1 at p. 6......... .................. .........................32
38. State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Ohio App. 1982)........................................32
39. State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Balbir Singh and another, 2013 Indlaw HP
888.........................................................................................................................19
40. State v. Shaqila and Ors, 2000 (55) DRJ 713..........................................22
41. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 998..25
42. State of M.P. v. Satish, 2005 Cri LJ 1428 : AIR 2005 SC 1000 (SC).. 19
43. State of Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage (1979) 4 SCC 715 1979 Indlaw SC
490.................................................................................................23
44. State v. Milligan No 77-CR-11-2908 (Franklin County, Ohio, December 4, 1978)......33
45. State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava 1992 AIR 840..............................................18
46. State of UP v. Satish, AIR 2005 SC 1000: 2005 (1) Crimes 146 (SC): (2005) 3 SCC
114.................................................................................................18
47. Sudhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582.......................................25
48. Tarseem Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1978 J. & K. 53 at p. 58.................... ..........................29
49. The State v. DurgacharanBarik Alias Duria, AIR 1963 Ori 33.................25
50. Tomaso Bruno and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2015 Indlaw SC 37; 2015 ALL
MR (Cri) 837; 2015(1) SCALE 498.......................................................22
51. Vendatasubba v. Emperor, ILR 54 Mad. 931........................18
52. Vikas Ramdas Khairnar Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Indlaw MUM
23.......................................................................................................20
53. Vinita Singh v. State Of ChhattisgarhSLP(CRL) NO. 9858/2013....20
54. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1935 A.C 462...................................31
-8-

55. Younghusband v. Luffing [1949] 2 KB 354..........24
COMMENTARIES, DIGESTS & BOOKS

1. Dr. Hari Singh Gours, Commentaries on Hurt & Homicide, 2nd Edn.
(2012)
2. Dr. Hari Singh Gours, Penal Law of India, 11th Edn. (2011); Vol. I
3. Dr. Hari Singh Gours, Penal Law of India, 11th Edn. (2011); Vol. III
4. Fields, Commentary on The Law of Evidence, 13th Edn. (2013)
5. Sarkars, Commentary on The Law of Evidence, 2nd Edn. (2009); Vol. I
6. KD Gaurs, Criminal Law Cases & materials, 7th Edn. (2013)
7. Glanville Williams, Text Book of Criminal Law, 2nd Edn. (2009)
8. S. N. Mishras, The Code of Procedure, 1973, 18th Edn. (2012)
9. R. V. Kelkars, Criminal Procedure, 5th Edn. (2011)
10. Tandons, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18th Edn. (2011)
11. S. N. Mishras, Indian Penal Code, 17th Edn. (2009)
12. Tandons, The Indian Penal Code, 25th Edn. (2011)
13. Dr. V. Krishnamacharis, Law of Evidence, 7th Edn. (2014)
14. Dr. Avtar Singhs, Principles of the Law of Evidence, 20th Edn. (2013)
LEXICONS
1. Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary Ninth Edition
2. Blacks Law Dictionary Ninth Edition, 2009
3. J. L. P. Singh & P. K. Majumdars Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edition 2009
JOURNALS & REPORTS

1. History of Criminal Law of England, Vol II, 1883
2. Annual Survey of the Indian Law, 1963, Indian Law Institute
3. Harvard Law Review, no 52, 1938-39
6. American Psychiatric Press, 4th ed., 1994
-9-

7. Criminal Law Journal

8. CRIMES
9. All India Reporter
10. Supreme Court Cases
11. Cuttack Law Times
LEGAL DATABASE
1. Manupatra
2. SCC Online
3. West Law
- 10 -

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE APPELLANTS HAVE THE HONOUR TO SUBMIT BEFORE THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF
ORISSA, THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANTS IN THE CRI. APPEAL PETITION NO.
***/2015 FILED BY VARUN, UNDER SECTION 374 (2) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
1973.
THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS IN
THE PRESENT CASE.
- 11 -

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Himtal, is a small underdeveloped town in the north-west Odisha with very thin population,
and is one of the coldest town in the State of Odisha. It is built on highlands, but the outskirts
are mostly marshy and covered with dense forest. Apart from other places, it has a town square,
a few recreational places and one local library.
Pallavi Mishra, (hereinafter, deceased) a woman aged 26 years, was the librarian of the local
library. She was an intelligent and attractive woman, married to one Shrikant Mishra, since,
February 29th, 2008. Her husband, a dealer in pesticides and insecticides, used to go to the
neighbouring town which was 5-6 hours away, very often, for business supplies.
She was a very friendly lady and shared a cordial relationship with people visiting the library
and of the many regular visitors to the library, she had developed friendship with a person
named Varun, (hereinafter, accused / appellant) who was a writer and professional district level
cricketer. The appellant was very strong and well-built man with very jovial, mellow, humorous
and quick witted personality. They bonded over their love for literature and with passage of
time their relationship became more intimate. Although she was married, yet she responded to
his advances.
Everything went well for a few months but eventually their relationship got strained, owing to
the temporary occasional erratic and violent behaviour of the appellant, which was in sharp
contrast to his usual nature but, when things got more complicated, the deceased decided to
back out of the relationship and stopped talking to him without giving any reason. Appellant
tried talking to her and she eventually agreed to meet and settle the matter.
Deceased's husband went out of the town for few days to get supplies and on the morning of
28th December 2012, whereby, she called the appellant to meet on that very evening. At around
5 P.M., after closing the library, the appellant picked her up from the end of the town square.
En route to forest on his bike, they were seen by two local people (P.W. 2 and 3).
At around 8:30 P.M., P.W. 4, who happens to be an acquaintance of the appellant, saw him
walking towards his bike from the forest, parked beside the main road, in a hurried manner.
P.W. 4 called out the appellant, who didn't respond and rode away.
- 12 -

Shrikant, tried calling the deceased, throughout the next day and when she didn't pick up the
call, he called their neighbours to enquire about her. On not finding her whereabouts, he
returned to the town on the night of 30th December, 2012. On 31st December, 2012 he filed
an F.I.R in the local police station.
On 4th January, 2013, the dead body of the deceased was found in a damp and marshy place in
the heart of the forest. On post mortem which was conducted the next day, various injuries
were found on her body and the cause of death was determined to be intake of monocrotophos.
The date and time of death could not be conclusively determined, yet from the state of
decomposition of the body it was opined by the doctors that the death could have occurred 3-4
days ago.
During investigation, P.W. 1 came forward and stated that on the night of 28th December, 2012,
he met the appellant and being his flatmate, tried to indulge him in a friendly conversation. But
the appellant seemed very distant, cold and unresponsive. He behaved very strangely and tried
to leave the place. On being enquired further by P.W. 1, he turned uncharacteristically angry
and shouted at him, revealing in the process that he had just beaten the deceased very brutally
and left her at a certain spot, which happened to coincide with the place where the dead body
was discovered.
The appellant was arrested and during interrogation he stated that he does not remember
anything about that evening apart from picking up the deceased and having altercation with her
on the road. During his physical examination, the doctor (P.W. 5) found some scratches on the
back of the neck of the appellant. In course of trial, the court ordered for a psychiatric
evaluation of the appellant. On examination, it was found that he is suffering from Dissociative
Identity Disorder. The Psychiatrist (P.W. 6) also examined the father of the appellant (D.W. 1)
and he gave statement regarding the accused's previous occasional unpredictable behaviour.
The trial court held that the fact that the accused is suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder
does not exempt him from criminal liability and relying on the facts, circumstances and the
evidence adduced convicted the appellant under section 302 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
- 13 -

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following questions are presented before the Honble Court in the instant matter:
Issue I
Whether the appeal filed by the accused in the instant matter is maintainable?
Issue II
Whether the order of conviction passed by the learned trial court is tenable in the eyes of
law?
Issue II
Whether the Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) can be considered as a defense that may
excuse the criminal liability of the Accused?
- 14 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
THE INSTANT APPEAL PREFERRED U/S 374 (2) OF THE CRPC, 1973 IS
MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted that the instant appeal filed by the Appellant, u/s 374(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, against the order of conviction and sentence u/s 302 & 325 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, is tenable in the eye of law, as the aforesaid provision inscribes appellate
jurisdiction to the Honble Court in the instant matter and the appeal involves substantive
question of law to be determined.
II.
THE ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED COURT

BELOW IS NOT TENABLE IN THE EYE OF LAW.
It is furthermore submitted that the Learned Trial Court has erringly passed the order of
conviction and sentenced the appellant with life imprisonment for the charges of Section 302
& 325, I.P.C. as the case is solely based on the circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has
ipso facto failed to discharge its initial burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond all
reasonable doubt.
III.
THE PLEA OF UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND TO NEUTRALIZE THE

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY TAKEN BY THE APPELLANT IS TOTALLY
JUSTIFIED, AS THE APPELLANT IS SUFFERING FROM DID.
It is humbly submitted that the appellant is suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder and at
the time of commission of his act he was labouring under the unsoundness of mind because of
DID due to which he was rendered incapable of knowing the nature of his act and hence his
plea under Section 84 must not be disputed.
- 15 -

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. Whether The Appeal Filed By The Accused In The Instant

Matter Is Maintainable?
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble High court that the instant appeal preferred
under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is maintainable.
It is further submitted before the Honble court that the clause 2 of Sec 374 Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 provides as herein after cited
Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional
Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of
imprisonment for more than seven years [has been passed against him or
against any other person convicted at the same trial] may appeal to the High
Court.
It is submitted that, in the instant matter, the accused has been convicted U/S 302 and 325
of The Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the learned trial court thereby sentencing him to life
imprisonment.
Evidently, Section 374(2) provides the appellate remedy to the accused in case of conviction
with a sentence of imprisonment for 7 years or more. In the instant matter since the accused
has been convicted with life imprisonment, hence the instant appeal referred under the
aforesaid provision of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is maintainable.
- 16 -

2. Whether The Order Of Conviction Passed By The
Learned Trial Court Is Tenable In The Eyes Of Law?
It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that, the more serious the offence, the
stricter the degree of proof, since a higher degree of assurance, is required to convict the
accused.1
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble court that the order of conviction U/S 302 and
325 of the IPC passed against the appellant by the learned trial court, in the instant matter is not
tenable in the eye of law, as not only the order of conviction is devoid of any merit, but so also
the learned court below has failed to appreciate the facts and evidences laid in the instant matter.
2.1.
That the Prosecution Has Failed To Prove the Case beyond

All Reasonable Doubt.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble court that in all cases of homicide, the
prosecution is required to give satisfactory proof of the corpus delicti, i.e., it must prove that
the deceased was murdered. The prosecution has then to prove that the appellant is the person
who murdered the deceased and no one else.2
With reference to the instant matter, it is humbly submitted that the post mortem report of the
deceased clearly dictates that the cause of the death is the intake of a highly toxic and life
threatening insecticide named Monocrotophos. Furthermore, the circumstances as stated in the
facts in record have also failed to establish any reasonable link between the cause of the death
and the act of the accused.
It is furthermore submitted that, in cases of murder, the court has to be satisfied not merely on
the probability, but of a reasonable certainty of the guilt of the accused.3 Suspicion, however
Mousam Singha Roy and Ors v. State of West Bengal, [2003] 12 SCC 377
RajnikantKesha Bhandari v. State, AIR 1967 Goa 21 at p. 56
3
Anandi v. Emperor, 32 I.C. (All.) 838
2
- 17 -

strong, is not sufficient.4 The view is based on the theory that the court must always get a true
picture of the fracas.5
If after distinguishing the chaff from the grain, the essential thread of the prosecution case is
proved, conviction would follow. However, if on the other hand, despite of utmost care and
scrutiny, it is difficult to find out the truth and the defense version cannot be discarded as
reasonably true, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.6
In a criminal trial it is for the prosecution to establish by true and trustworthy evidence that the
appellant has committed the murder of the deceased. It is not for an accused person to say, much
less to establish that someone else has committed the murder.7
Howsoever, in the instant matter, the chain of circumstances, is inconsistent with the rule of
criminal jurisprudence which states that the circumstantial evidence must be consistent, and
consistent only with the guilt of the accused, and that if the evidence is consistent with any
other rational explanation, then there is an element of doubt of which the accused must be given
the benefit.8
2.1.1. Facts so Established should be Consistent Only With the
Hypothesis of Guilt of the Accused.
It is humbly submitted that it is undisputed that where the prosecution relies on circumstantial
evidence alone to prove the guilt, the facts and circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any reasonable doubt 9, and the
facts and circumstances should not be only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but they
must be such in their effect as to be entirely incompatible with the innocence of the accused10
Vendatasubba v. Emperor, ILR 54 Mad. 931: Abdul Jabar v. State, P.L.W. 1954 SC 81 at p. 87: Soni v. State of
Gujarat, 1991 (2) Crimes 4 at o, 12(SC)
5
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava [AIR 1992 SC 840]
6
Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC 18 2002 Indlaw SC 1925
7
Ashok v State of Maharashtra, 2015 Indlaw SC 174
8
Basangauda Yamanappu v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 139 at pp. 141, 142: ILR (1941) Bom. 315: 42 Cr.L.J.
697: 43 Bom. L.R. 144
9
State of UP v. Satish, AIR 2005 SC 1000: 2005 (1) Crimes 146 (SC): (2005) 3 SCC 114
10
Devikadevi wife of Premji Bhai Ruparel v. State of Gujarat and others, 1983 (1) GLR 215; 1983 GLH (NOC)
19
- 18 -

and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis, consistent with his innocence.11 Such evidence
also must show that in all human probabilities act must have been done by the accused.12
In a case, based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances alleged against the accused must
be conclusively established and the chain of circumstances must be so closely knit so as to
exclude all the reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused.13 The evidence must
point only to the guilt of the accused and if the evidence leads to two interpretations, the
interpretation in favour of the accused must be given effect to.14
From the evidence considered and scrutinized by the Learned Court below, it can be well made
out that the claim of the evidence is incomplete and is of not such a nature that it would
definitely and unerringly points to the guilt of the accused15. At the time of occurrence there
was none else than the deceased and the appellant at the scene, and the manner of occurrence
do not concur with the cause of the death, as stipulated in the post mortem report.
It has been consistently laid down in cases of Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan16 and Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh 17 that, where a case rests squarely on the
circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or guilt
of any other person.18
The dictum in, Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh19 is the one, which is widely
accepted and uniformly followed with regards to the said subject. The relevant part of the
aforesaid judgment, laid down by Mahajan, J. has been quoted herein below:
"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the
11
Mahadev Sonu Pardhi v. State of Maharastra, 1996 (2) Crimes 87

Shiva Sahai v. State of U.P., 1990 Cri LJ (NOC) 15 (All) (DB)
13
State of M.P. v. Satish, 2005 Cri LJ 1428 : AIR 2005 SC 1000 (SC)
14
N. Rajendra Prasad Bhat v. The State of Karnataka, 1996 Cri LJ 257
15
State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Balbir Singh and another, 2013 Indlaw HP 888
16
AIR 1977 SC 1063
17
AIR 1989 SC 1890
18
Shivu and Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 713 2007 Indlaw SC 103
19
AIR 1952 SC 343
12
- 19 -

circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be

such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused
and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused."
It is furthermore submitted that there is not only a grammatical, but a legal distinction, between
'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved', as was held by the Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra20 where the following observations were made:
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and
'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."
In Prakash v. State of Rajasthan,21 Justice P. Sathasivam (former CJI) has laid down the
following five golden principles of standard of proof required in a case sought to be established
on the basis of circumstantial evidence otherwise said to constitute the panchsheel of the proof
of a cased based on circumstantial evidence:
a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established.22
b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.23
c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.24
d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved25,
and
20
1973 AIR 2622

2013 Cr.LJ 2040 (SC): AIR 2013 SC 1474
22
Vikas Ramdas Khairnar Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Indlaw MUM 23
23
Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 1984 Indlaw SC 432
24
Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P.
AIR 1990 SC 79
25
Vinita Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh SLP(CRL) NO. 9858/2013
21
- 20 -

e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
2.1.2. The nexus between the proximate cause of death and the Act
of accused do not coincide.
It is humbly submitted that the legal position with respect to the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence for sustaining criminal conviction is well-settled. The circumstances established on
the record according to law must be consistent only with the guilt of the accused and wholly
inconsistent with his innocence.
Furthermore, the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances must be complete and
leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with his innocence.
The prosecution has not been able to cross the hurdles of achieving the standard of proof which
is beyond reasonable doubt, against the accused. With reference to the facts of the instant matter
it is submitted that the remoteness in between the causa proxima of the death and the act of the
accused, enable us to conceive a reasonable doubt as to the innocence of the accused, the benefit
of which must in all cases be attributed to him.
It is furthermore submitted that, though the post mortem report of the deceased, corroborates
the fact of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by the accused, but this act of the accused has not
resulted in the death of the deceased. The cause of the death, in no doubts, is intake of a highly
toxic and lethal insecticide, named Monocrotophos, and the prosecution has prima facie failed
in its duty to knit out the link in between the cause of the death and the involvement of the
accused in her death.
In such a circumstances it is submitted that the possibility of suicidal death or if still homicidal,
homicide caused by some other person is not ruled out, which give rise to a solid conclusion
that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the circumstances
relied is not, on whole, inconsistent with the innocence of the accused.
It is most humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that, in the case of State of U.P. v.
Ashok Kumar Srivastava,26 it was laid down that, the golden thread which runs through the web
of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
26
1992 AIR 840
- 21 -

adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to his innocence, the view
which is favorable to the accused should be adopted.27 The paramount consideration of the court
is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented.
2.2.
Chain of Circumstances is not properly knitted.
It is furthermore submitted that in order for a conviction to be based solely upon the
circumstantial evidence, there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused 28 and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.29
It is also submitted that accused cannot be convicted on mere speculation. In case of
circumstantial evidence no such presumption can be drawn unless the circumstances proved are
completely incompatible with the incidence of the accused.30 The circumstances of the case, no
doubt, raise suspicion against the accused, but suspicion, howsoever strong it may be, cannot
take the place of proof.31
Pursuant to the facts of the instant matter it is submitted that, even the chain which linked the
accused with the proximate cause of the death is missing and so also the chain of evidence as
linked by the prosecution is not so complete, so as not to leave any reasonable doubt regarding
the innocence of the accused.
Initially, the prosecution has relied upon the theory of last seen together which has been
corroborated by the depositions of PW 2 & PW3 and even though if strict reliance be made
upon such depositions, it does not amount to any conclusive proof that the deceased has been
killed by the accused, eventually when the prosecution has ipso facto failed to knit a link the
cause of the death with the accused.
So also, the deposition of PW 4 & PW 1 in a manner corroborates the plea of insanity taken by
the accused in the instant matter, as the accused by failing to recognize the former justified the
deposition of DW 1, while with regards to the later the accused has shown a behavior which
27
State v. Shaqila And Ors, 2000 (55) DRJ 713

Tomaso Bruno and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2015 Indlaw SC 37; 2015 ALL MR (Cri) 837; 2015(1)
SCALE 498
29
supra note 15
30
Naresh Kumar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1980 SC 1168 at p. 1169; Hari Shankar v. State of U.P., 1998 All
Cr.R. 1438 at p. 1441
31
Caetano Piedade Fernandes v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, 1977 Cr.L.J. 167 at pp. 172, 173 (S.C.);
Chandigarh Administration v. Dharam Singh, 1985 C.A.R. 240 at p. 241 (S.C.)
28
- 22 -

signifies that at the time of the occurrence the alter personality of the accused which as per PW
6 is very violent and volatile, would have been in control.
Moreover, the deposition of DW 1 also corroborates the fact that since the accused failed to
recognize PW 4, near the place of occurrence, hence during the time of occurrence the accuse
might be under the influence of insanity or unsoundness of mind.
It is submitted that all the above mentioned circumstances gives birth to a single conclusion that
the prosecution has failed in its duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned
Trial Court has committed an error in convicting the accused, as the hypothesis of innocence of
the accused cannot be totally ruled out in the instant matter and hence the accused must be given
the benefit that has arisen due to incomplete link in the evidence, placing reliance upon which
the accused has been convicted by the Court below.32
2.3.
Accused Not Liable for the Death of the Deceased.
With reference to the facts in record it is humbly submitted that the post mortem report and the
chain of circumstances if analysed together give rise to a reasonable conclusion that the accused
may have voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the deceased, but there is absolutely no
connection, even in the remotest way, of his act of causing grievous hurt and the death of the
deceased.
The post mortem report has ipso facto declared the cause of the death to be intake of a highly
toxic pesticide, Monocrotophos and the prosecution has prima facie failed to knit any
connection of the accused with the cause of the death.
Eventually, the depositions of various prosecution witnesses and the chain of circumstances as
stipulated by the prosecution has also failed to establish mens rea of the accused or that the act
of the accused has caused the death of the deceased.
In such circumstances, it is therefore, submitted that, it cannot be anyway ruled out that there
is no connection between the accused and the cause of death and hence it shall be presumed
that the accused had not caused the death of the deceased.
2.4.
32
Absence of Necessary Mens Rea.
State of Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage (1979) 4 SCC 715 1979 Indlaw SC 490.
- 23 -

It is humbly submitted that, the criminal guilt would attach to a man for violation of criminal
law, however, the rule is not absolute and is subject to limitation indicated in the Latin maxim,
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.33
It is furthermore submitted that as per the undisputed principle of criminal jurisprudence, the
intent and the act must concur to constitute a crime.34
It is also submitted that to make a person criminally accountable, it must be proved that an act,
which is forbidden by law, has been caused by his conduct, and that the conduct was
accompanied by a legally blameworthy attitude of mind, which is clearly absent in the instant
case.
Pursuant to the facts in record, it is submitted that the accused does not have any guilty mind
or necessary mens rea that will make him accountable to the criminal liability in the instant
matter. Eventually, the accused and the deceased shared a very good and friendly relation and
when even when it got strained, the accuseds endeavour to settle the matter, negates the claim
of mens rea to some extent.
Furthermore, the appellant after the incident the neither tried to evade, nor did he resisted his
arrest, which prima facie demonstrates that he did not have mens rea. Furthermore, he did not
even denied his presence at the date of occurrence where the event took place. Had he even the
slightest guilty mind, he would not have accepted the fact of altercation with the deceased at
the date of occurrence, very well knowing the fact that such a statement have the effect of
incriminating him.
Even, the deposition of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 falls short in its goal to establish the mens
rea of the accused and the same points towards only one conclusion that there might be a
possibility that during the commission of the act, the accused might be labouring under the
influence of Dissociative Identity Disorder, which give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the
innocence of the accused.
Evidently, no act is per se criminal, the act becomes criminal when the actor does it with a
guilty mind. Mens Rea, is thus a technical term, generally taken to mean some blameworthy
33
34
Fowler v. Padget (1789) 7 TR 509

Younghusband v. Luffing [1949] 2 KB 354
- 24 -

mental condition, whether constituted by intention or knowledge or otherwise, the absent of

which on any particular occasion, negatives the contention of a crime.35
3. Whether The Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) Can Be

Considered As A Defense That May Excuse The Criminal
Liability Of The Accused?
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that the prime question that has to be
considered by this appellate court in the instant matter is that whether Dissociative Identity
Disorder can be taken as a plea of insanity or unsoundness of mind as defined U/S 84 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, to evade the criminal liability.
3.1.
Deficiency Of Will Due To Weak Intellect Of The Accused.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Court that every man is presumed to be sane
and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved36, and to establish a defense on ground of unsoundness of mind, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and the quality of the act
he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.37
3.1.1
Plea Of Unsoundness Of Mind As A Statutory Defense.
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 deals with the acts of a person of unsound mind and
mandates interalia
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by
reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or
that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.38
35
Stephen James, History of Criminal Law of England, Vol II, 1883, pp 94-95; Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law,
Fifth Edn, 1983, pp 47-48; Annual Survey of the Indian Law, 1963, Indian Law Institute, p 499; KM Perkins, A
Rationale of Mens Rea, Harvard Law Review, no 52, 1938-39, p 905; Mental Element, Harvard Law Review,
no 74, 1960-61, p 779, Harvard Law Review, no 75, 1960-61, pp 17-21
36
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 998; The State v. Durgacharan Barik Alias Duria, AIR
1963 Ori 33; Sudhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582
37
Daniel Mcnaughtens case, (1843) 8 E.R. 718 : (1843) 10 Cl. Fin. 200.
38
Bhikari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1.
- 25 -

It is humbly submitted that as to insanity, it has been observed in Halsburys Laws of England,39
that where it can be shown that a person at the time of his committing or omitting an act, the
commission or omission of which would otherwise be criminal, was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act or
omission or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong then such a person is not in law
responsible for his act.40
It is also submitted that accuseds duty under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 18060 is
twofold i.e., initially he must establish that at the time of committing the act, he was non
composo mentis not of sound mind.
In the second place, he must prove that the said unsoundness of mind was of a degree and nature
to fulfil one of the tests as laid down in the aforesaid provision, namely, that by reason of such
unsoundness of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing
what is either wrong or contrary to law.41
3.1.1.1.
The Accused Is Suffering From Dissociative Identity

Disorder.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Court that according to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, Multiple Personality Disorder otherwise termed as Dissociative
Personality Disorder is characterized by the presence of:
two or more distinct identities or personality states, at least two of which
recurrently take control of the persons behaviour;
an inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be
explained by ordinary forgetfulness;
and the lack of any direct connection between the disturbance and the physiological
effects of a substance (e.g., blackouts) or a general medical condition (e.g., complex
partial seizures).42
39
3rd Ed. (Simonds), Vol. 10 at p. 287

Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1563
41
Digendra v. State, 74 C.W.N. 231 at p. 241
42
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(American Psychiatric Press, 4th ed., 1994).
40
- 26 -

Precisely, it can be defined as a condition in which a person's identity dissociates, or fragments,

creating additional, distinct identities that exist independently of each other within the same
person.
Interestingly, persons suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) adopt one or more
distinct identities which co-exist within one individual. Each personality is distinct from the
other in specific ways. For instance, tone of voice and mannerisms will be distinct, as well as
posture, vocabulary, and everything else we normally think of as marking a personality.
It is furthermore submitted that presently Dissociative Identity Disorder is listed in DSM-IVTR as an axis I disorder.43 Evidently DSM-IV lists four criteria for diagnosing someone with
dissociative identity disorder, as hereinafter mentioned-1) The first being the presence of two or more distinct "identities or personality states."
2) At least two personalities must take control of the person's identity regularly.
3) The person must exhibit aspects of amnesiathat is, he or she forgets routine personal
information.
4) And, finally, the condition must not have been caused by "direct physiological effects,"
such as drug abuse or head trauma.
With reference to the facts of the instant matter, it is furthermore submitted that the accused
very well qualifies the test as laid down by the DSM-IV for diagnosing someone with
Dissociative Identity Disorder.
Evidently, the facts in record has disclosed the presence of two distinct identities or personality
states which takes control of the accused identity at regular interval and so also the accused at
the same time has exhibited the aspects of amnesia.
Furthermore, since the aforesaid conditions of the accused have not been caused by any direct
physiological effects, hence there exists no ambiguity in question pertaining to the accused
suffering from the Dissociative Associative Disorder.
43
Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. 4th ed, text rev. Washington DC: American Psychiatric
Association; 2000.
- 27 -

3.1.1.2.
Appellants Case Backed By The Statement Of Pw6.
It is most humbly submitted that PW6 i.e., the Psychiatrist who examined the accused, has in
his statement, deposited in favour of the appellants case.
The relevant portion of the deposition as aforesaid, has been herein below quoted
.when I examined the accused. I found that he is suffering from Dissociative
Identity Disorder. The accuseds mind has created two different personalities. The
mind switches between the two personalities and when it does, the dominating
personality dictates the behaviour and thought process of the accused.
PW6 in his examination of the accused has also observed that the host personality of the accused
is very calm and normal, whereas the alter in control is violent and volatile.
3.1.1.3.
Statement Of Dw1 In Line With The Appellants Version.
It is furthermore submitted that the statement of the DW1, the accuseds father backed the fact
that the accused is suffering from Dissociative Personality Disorder since his childhood.
Relevant portion of his statement has been quoted herein below
..usually he is easy going happy soul but since his childhood, at times he gets
very violent and talks unreasonably as if he isnt himself. But such behaviour is
momentary and he doesnt recall anything that happens during that period, when
later enquired. When he grew up, his condition deteriorated
It is humbly submitted that both the DW1 deposition and the psychiatric examination of the
accused conducted by the PW6 speaks one utter truth, that the accused is suffering from a
serious mental ailment, the Dissociative Personality Disorder, which has adversely affected the
mental faculty of the accused so much so that at times when the alter is in control the he fails
to know the nature and quality of the act or omission or to know that what he was doing was
wrong then such a person is not in law responsible for his act.
- 28 -

3.1.2. Facts Precedent, Attendant And Antecedent Must Be Taken

Into Consideration.
With reference to the dictum of Honble Supreme Court in Debyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar
v. State of Gujarat,44 it is most humbly submitted that when a plea of legal insanity is set up,
the Court has to consider whether at the time of commission of the offence, the accused, by
reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was
doing that was either wrong or contrary to law. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the
state of mind of accused is the time when the offense was committed. Whether the accused was
in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed
the crime.45
Therefore, behaviour antecedent, attendant and subsequent of the event may be relevant in
finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the event.46
It is furthermore submitted that the proof of the insanity of the accused at the nick of time is
highly improbable and the same has to be judged from his conduct at the time of occurrence,
previous to the occurrence, and after the occurrence along with other attendant circumstances.47
3.2.
Presumption Under The Evidence Act Is Rebuttable.
With specific reference to Kamla Singh v. State,48 it is humbly submitted that the presumption
under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is rebuttable if any fact sufficient to rebut
the presumption has been proved by the defence, and the moment that presumption is rebutted
by the defence and the court is brought to a point where it becomes doubtful of the fact or when
it cannot positively be held that the prisoner was not then of unsound mind and was capable of
knowing the nature of the act alleged against him, the onus under Section 105 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 has to be taken as discharged, for, by reason of the neutralization of the
force of presumption, the prosecution is thrown back to its original position where it has to
discharge its onus beyond reasonable doubt.
44
AIR 1955 SC 1563

Sarju Merandy v. State of Bihar, (1978) 26 B.L.J.R. 267 at pp. 272-73
46
Kanna Kunnummal Ammed Kova v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 92 at p.95
47
Tarseem Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1978 J. & K. 53 at p. 58
48
AIR 1955 Pat. 209
45
- 29 -

It is furthermore submitted that the defence, therefore, has not to prove affirmatively beyond
all reasonable doubt that the person was of unsound mind and that by reason of unsoundness of
mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act.
In other words, the defence has only to demolish the aforesaid presumption laid down against
the accused under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and not to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, the opposite of that presumption.
3.3.
BENEFIT OF DOUBT vis--vis BURDEN OF PROOF.
It is humbly submitted that the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of insanity may be
stated as follows49:
(1) The prosecution must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused had committed
the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rest on
the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial;
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed
the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the India Penal Code, 1860. The
accused may rebut it by placing before the Court all the relevant evidenceoral,
documentary or circumstantial but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that
rests upon a party to civil proceedings;
(3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time
he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the
prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Courts as regards one or
more of the ingredient of the offence, including mensrea of the accused and in that case
the Court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden
of resting on the prosecution was not discharged.50
It is humbly submitted that in the instant matter, there is every indication that the appellant
when he committed the alleged crime by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of
knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.
49
State v. EmercianoLemos, AIR 1970 Goa 1 at p. 6

Bhikari v. State of U.P. AIR 1966 SC 11; RoshanLal v. State of M.P. AIR 1971 SC 778; S.W. Mohammed v.
State of Maharastra AIR 1972 SC 2443
50
- 30 -

Prima facie, the burden of establishing plea of insanity is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 is on the accused. But as pointed out by Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in
Dahyabhai Chhajanbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat51, the evidence of that falls short of
providing insanity may still raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of the requisite
intention.
If the accused claim the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 he has to establish
that he was non compus mentis i.e., was not in a position to understand the nature of his act.
But, to establish this, the degree of proof required is not the same as that required to establish
the guilt of the accused i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The quantum of proof required
is only that which is required in a civil case, a preponderance of probability on favour of the
accused, the normal presumption that every presumed to be sane is rebutted and the onus shifts
to the prosecution, in other words, the onus of the prosecution to establish the mens rea is not
discharged in such a case.
It is also submitted that the modern rule is not so strict since the case of Woolmington v.
Director of Public Prosecutions52 in 1935, and it is now established that the prisoner need no
more than to adduce evidence which raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to his
insanity.
The facts in record of the instant matter clearly shows that after the incident the appellant neither
tried to run away, nor did he resisted his arrest, which prima facie demonstrates that he did not
have mens rea. Furthermore, he did not even denied his presence at the date of occurrence
where the event took place. Had he even the slightest guilty mind, he would not have accepted
the fact of altercation with the deceased at the date of occurrence, very well knowing the fact
that such a statement have the effect of incriminating him.
The accused, therefore, is entitled to acquittal of charge levelled against him.
51
52
supra note 9
(1935) A.C. 462
- 31 -

3.4.
Dissociative Identity Disorder As A Defence In Lieu Of Legal

Insanity.
It is humbly submitted that as stated earlier the Dissociative Identity Disorder can be defined
as a condition in which a person's identity dissociates, or fragments, creating additional, distinct
identities that exist independently of each other within the same person.
It is furthermore submitted that the aforesaid disorder is a severe mental ailment that affects the
mental faculty of a human being, so much so that the person is debarred of his capability to
understand the nature of the act.
It is therefore submitted that since the accused in the instant matter, is suffering from the
aforementioned mental disorder hence his plea of insanity may be regarded as a plea of legal
insanity, for the said disorder at times when the alter is in control disturbs his mental faculty to
such an extent that he becomes incapable of understanding the nature of his act or that he was
doing what is contrary to law.
Furthermore, according to the Grimsley court53, in cases of Dissociative identity Disorder, an
individuals criminal responsibility rests on the mental state of the alter in control at the time of
the crime i.e., to say the mental condition of the personality committing the act must be taken
into consideration while affixing the criminal liability for the act done by him.
It is submitted that, Elyn Saks, an expert in mental health law has proposed a theory of general
non-responsibility of individuals with MPD.54 According to Saks, alter personalities differ from
one another characterologically, have distinct senses of self, view their fellow alter personalities
to be separate people, see the world from a first-person perspective, have their own unique lifehistories and memories, and show distinct and separate physiological responses.
In the light of the aforesaid submission it is further submitted that the alter personality of the
accused in the instant matter is very violent and volatile. The facts in records also revealed that
when the mind switches between the two personalities of the accused, the dominating
personality dictates the behaviour and thought process of the accused.
53
State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Ohio App. 1982)

ELYN R. SAKS, WITH STEPHEN H. BEHNKE, JEKYLL ON TRIAL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY
DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW (1997).
54
- 32 -

It is submitted that a plain reading of the facts in record makes it crystal clear that at the time
of occurrence, the alter personality of the accused was dominating his behavior, the very nature
of which would have debarred the accused from understanding the nature of the act he was
committing.
It is also submitted that DID was recognized as a mental disorder that could excuse criminal
responsibility for the first time in State v Milligan (1978)55, wherein the court declared serial
rapist Billy Milligan insane due to lack of one integrated personality and therefore not culpable
of the crimes he committed.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case the plea of legal insanity for
discharge of criminal liability u/s 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on account of accused
being suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder must be considered and the accused must
be acquitted of charges levelled against him.
55
State v. Milligan, No 77-CR-11-2908 (Franklin County, Ohio, December 4, 1978).
- 33 -

PRAYER
Wherefore, in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Honble Company Law Board, that it may
graciously be pleased:
1. To allow the appeal, and

2. To overrule the order of conviction and sentence u/s 302 & 325, passed by the Learned
Court below and pass an order of acquittal in favour of the appellant, and
3. Pass any other order it deems fit in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Place: Cuttack
Date: __ / 03 / 2015
s/d Moot Counsels For Appellants
- 34 -

Armonia 2015 Winners Memorial.

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Armonia 2015 Winners Memorial.

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

Moot Court Competition

The Honourable High Court of Odisha, Cuttack

Cri. Appeal No. *** / 2015

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

Chain of Circumstances is not properly knitted....22

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

Absence of Necessary Mens Rea..23

Deficiency Of Will Due To Weak Intellect Of The Accused.......25

3.1.1. Plea Of Unsoundness Of Mind As A Statutory Defense..................25

The Accused Is Suffering From Dissociative Identity Disorder....26

Appellants Case Backed By The Statement Of Pw6. ..................28

Statement Of Dw1 In Line With The Appellants Version...28

Presumption Under The Evidence Act Is Rebuttable. ....29

BENEFIT OF DOUBT Vis--Vis BURDEN OF PROOF..30

Dissociative Identity Disorder As A Defence In Lieu Of Legal Insanity....32

Prayer for Relief..................................................................................................34

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

All India Reporters

All England Law Report

Bihar Law Journal Report

Chief Justice of India

Criminal Procedure Code

Criminal Law Journal

Cuttack Law Times

Calcutta Weekly Notes

Gujarat Law Report

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

Indian Law Report

Indian Penal Code

Patna Law Weekly

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

15. Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC 18 2002 Indlaw SC

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

55. Younghusband v. Luffing [1949] 2 KB 354..........24

COMMENTARIES, DIGESTS & BOOKS

JOURNALS & REPORTS

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

7. Criminal Law Journal

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant

Armonia 2015 the 3rd National Law Fest

THE ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED BY THE LEARNED COURT

THE PLEA OF UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND TO NEUTRALIZE THE

MEMORANDUM on behalf of Appellant