CASE DIGESTS

ANDRES VS MANTRUST G.R. NO. 82670 SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

FACTS:
Andres, using the business name Irenes Wearing Apparel was engaged in
the manufacture of ladies garments, childrens wear, mens apparel and
linens for local and foreign buyers. Among its foreign buyers was Facts of the
United States.

Sometime in August 1980, Facts instructed the First National State Bank
(FNSB) of New Jersey to transfer $10,000 to Irenes Wearing Apparel via
Philippine National Bank (PNB) Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. FNSB instructed
Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the
transfer by charging the amount to the account of FNSB with private
respondent.

After Mantrust effected the transfer, the payment was not effected
immediately because the payee designated in the telex was only Wearing
Apparel. Private respondent sent PNB another telex stating that the
payment was to be made to Irenes Wearing Apparel.

On August 28, 1980, petitioner received the remittance of $10,000.

After learning about the delay, Facets informed FNSB about the situation.
Facts, unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance, informed

private respondent and amended its instruction y asking it to effect the

payment to Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) instead of PNB.

Private respondent, also unaware that petitioner had already received the
remittance, instructed PCIB to pay $10,000 to petitioner. Hence, petitioner
received another $10,000 which was charged again to the account of Facets
with FNSB.

FNSB discovered that private respondent had made a duplication of

remittance. Private respondent asked petitioner to return the second
remittance of $10,000 but the latter refused to do so contending that the
doctrine of solution indebiti does not apply because there was negligence on
the part of the respondents and that they were not unjustly enriched since
Facets still has a balance of $49,324.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent has the right to recover the
second $10,000 remittance it had delivered to petitioner

HELD: Yes. Art 2154 of the New Civil Code is applicable. For this article to
apply, the following requisites must concur: 1) that he who paid was not
under obligation to do so; and 2) that payment was made by reason of an
essential mistake of fact.

There was a mistake, not negligence, in the second remittance. It was

evident by the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice
number.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et
Al. (1979)

G.R.

No.

L-33171 May

31,

1979

Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article
2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence

under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant
primary

and

direct

responsibility

of

employers

and

their

presumed

negligence are principles calculated to protect society

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from
the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation"
for the harm done
NPC v. CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns near
the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their

properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent

opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the
residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations
and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the
opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the
selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the
residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship
between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the
residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened
was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the
typhoon is a fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque
injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous
event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation
or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there
was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents,
they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done." Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but

it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in

the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned
solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from
creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found
to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active
intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the
case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners
can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage.
2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike
one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause
people to take precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not
delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the municipalities
concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were
delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said
notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the
residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not
receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants
allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot
claim, as they do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of
said notice has absolved them from liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the
damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum
absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was physical damage,
there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no
question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate,
maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence
cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end
does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done

otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent.

Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.
Puyat and Sons Co. v. Arco Amusement Company
Facts:
Respondent is engaged in operating cinematographs, while petitioner is
acting as an agent for Starr Piano Company of Richmond. Respondent
negotiated with petitioner and agreed that petitioner would order sound
reproducing equipment on its behalf, and respondent would pay 10%
commission and out-of-pocket expenses in addition to the selling price.
Transactions for 2 orders transpired. After 3 years, respondent discovered
that that price quoted to them by petitioner was not the net price but the list
price. They sought to obtain reimbursement from the petitioner, and failing
on this, filed the instant case.
Issue:
Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent is that of agency
where agent is bound to indemnify the principal for damages, or a mere
contract of sales
Held:
The letters, by which the respondent accepted the prices for the sound
reproducing equipment subject of its contract with the petitioner, are clear in
their terms and admit no other interpretation that the respondent in question
at the prices indicated which are fixed and determinate. The respondent
admitted in its complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila that
the petitioner agreed to sell to it the first sound reproducing equipment and
machinery.
We agree with the trial judge that "whatever unforseen events might have
taken place unfavorable to the defendant (petitioner), such as change in
prices, mistake in their quotation, loss of the goods not covered by insurance

or failure of the Starr Piano Company to properly fill the orders as per
specifications, the plaintiff (respondent) might still legally hold the defendant
(petitioner) to the prices fixed of $1,700 and $1,600." This is incompatible
with the pretended relation of agency between the petitioner and the
respondent, because in agency, the agent is exempted from all liability in the
discharge of his commission provided he acts in accordance with the
instructions received from his principal (section 254, Code of Commerce),
and the principal must indemnify the agent for all damages which the latter
may incur in carrying out the agency without fault or imprudence on his part
(article 1729, Civil Code).
While the letters state that the petitioner was to receive ten per cent (10%)
commission, this does not necessarily make the petitioner an agent of the
respondent, as this provision is only an additional price which the respondent
bound itself to pay, and which stipulation is not incompatible with the
contract of purchase and sale.
In the second place, to hold the petitioner an agent of the respondent in the
purchase of equipment and machinery from the Starr Piano Company of
Richmond, Indiana, is incompatible with the admitted fact that the petitioner
is the exclusive agent of the same company in the Philippines. It is out of the
ordinary for one to be the agent of both the vendor and the purchaser. The
facts and circumstances indicated do not point to anything but plain ordinary
transaction where the respondent enters into a contract of purchase and sale
with the petitioner, the latter as exclusive agent of the Starr Piano Company
in the United States.
It follows that the petitioner as vendor is not bound to reimburse the
respondent as vendee for any difference between the cost price and the
sales price which represents the profit realized by the vendor out of the
transaction. This is the very essence of commerce without which merchants
or middleman would not exist.