#1

GOSIACO vs. CHING

G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009
Facts:

On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco

(petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings, Inc.
(ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a
period of 48 days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent
to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its Business
Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS
checks no. 0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00
and P112,000.00 respectively. The checks, both signed by
Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office
branch. ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000,
acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned
amounts.[5]
Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to
the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to deposit the two (2)
checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were
dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop
payment order and for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner
informed respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April
2000,[6] about the dishonor of the checks and demanded
replacement checks or the return of the money placement
but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
San Juan against the private respondents.
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained
at large. Ching denied liability and claimed that she was a
mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have
knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks.
Such responsibility, she claimed belonged to another
department.
On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved [7] that ASB
and its president, Luke Roxas, be impleaded as party
defendants. Petitioner, then, paid the corresponding docket
fees. However, the MTC denied the motion as the case had
already been submitted for final decision. [8]

On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of

criminal liability but it did not absolve her from civil liability.
The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was
civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks. [9]
Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the
RTC. Petitioner appealed to the RTC on the ground that the
MTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or severally
liable with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a
reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Thereafter,
she filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she should
not be held civilly liable for the bouncing checks because
they were contractual obligations of ASB.
On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision
sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC affirmed the MTCs ruling
which denied the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for lack
of jurisdiction over their persons. The RTC also exonerated
Ching from civil liability and ruled that the subject obligation
fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held civilly
liable.[10]
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals on the grounds that the RTC erred in absolving
Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal of the MTC
to implead ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the
corporate veil of ASB and hold Roxas liable.
On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC and stated that the amount petitioner
sought to recover was a loan made to ASB and not to Ching.
Roxas testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks
issued by Ching were for and in behalf of ASB. The Court of
Appeals ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22
case since it is not a natural person and in the case of
Roxas, he was not the subject of a preliminary investigation.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no need to
pierce the corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites
were present.[11]
Issues:

(1) Whether or not a corporate officer who signed a

bouncing check civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22;
(2) Whether or not a corporation be impleaded in a
B.P. Blg. 22 case.
Ruling:
B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing
Checks Law Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons,
who actually signed the check in behalf of
such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in
the corporate name he may be held personally liable for
violating a penal statute.[17] The statute imposes criminal
penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of
money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank
with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank
to meet the check on presentment. [18] Moreover, the
personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the
principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his
own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not
his personal act.[19]
The general rule is that a corporate officer who
issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly
liable when he is convicted. The Court ruled decisively that
the civil liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg. 22 case is
extinguished with the criminal liability.
We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is
entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg. 22 case, or any other
corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the
joint trial of both the criminal and civil liability. A basic
maxim in statutory construction is that the interpretation of
penal laws is strictly construed against the State and
liberally construed against the accused. Nowhere in B.P. Blg.

22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as

an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of
that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.
Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes
a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is
distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the
amount represented from the check. The civil liability
attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful
act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of
funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching
to the corporation is itself the very obligation
covered by the check or the consideration for its
execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to
be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the
singularity of the amount of each.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to
the right of petitioner Jaime U. Gosiaco to pursue an
independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the
amount of the subject checks, in accordance with the terms
of this decision. No pronouncements as to costs.

#2 Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC

G. R. NO. 167011, APRIL 30, 2008
Facts:

Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that petitioners

made false and untruthful representations in violation of
Section 10[11] of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating
therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street,
Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still
are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City.
The petitioners contended, inter alia that Section
45(j) of the Voters Registration Act was void for being vague
as it did not refer to a definite provision of the law, the
violation of which would constitute an election offense ;

hence, it ran contrary to Section 14(1) and section 14 (2) ,

Article III of the 1987 Constitution ( due process clause)
Nevertheless,
the
Commission
on
Election
(COMELEC) Charged the petitioners with violations of
Section 10 (g) and (j) , in relation to Section 45 (J) of the
Voters Registration Act.

application. However, this Court has imposed certain

limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged
law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that
facial invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.

1. Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act

No. 8189, provides that a qualified voter shall be
registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality wherein he
resides to be able to vote in any election. To register
as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an
application form for registration as prescribed by the
Commission in three (3) copies before the Election
Officer on any date during office hours after having
acquired the qualifications of a voter. The application
shall, inter alia, contain the following data: Periods of
residence in the Philippines and in the place of
registration and a statement that the application is
not a registered voter of any precinct.
2. Section 45(j) of the same Act provides, inter alia,
that the following shall be considered election
offenses under this Act: Violation of any of the
provisions of this Act.

Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes

would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may
not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual
case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a
sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.The
rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its

discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction
when it premised its resolution on a misapprehension of
facts and failed to consider certain relevant facts that would
justify a different conclusion.
Ruling:
The Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The void-for-vagueness doctrineholds that a law
is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal

hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding
of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Tinga:
A vague criminal statute at its core violates due
process, as it deprives fair notice and standards to all the

citizens, the law enforcement officers, prosecutors and

judges. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. The due process clause
makes legally operative our democratic rights, as it
establishes freedom and free will as the normative human
conditions which the State is bound to respect. Any
legislated restrictions imposed by the State on life, liberty or
property must be in accordance with due process of law. The
scope of due process encompasses values ascribed to
justice such as equity, prudence, humaneness and fairness.
Section 45(j) is vague. It does
notice to the citizentry, as well as
enforcement and adjudication. Thus, the
due process clause and thus deserves to

not provides fair

the standards for
section violates the
be struck down.

On 29
December
2000, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for
Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be
affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of
the North Luzon Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil
Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos,
Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development
Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting
that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment
of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the
total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an
authorized government depository.

On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion

to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly
authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the
amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRBs advance deposit
#3 Republic of the Philippines v. Holy Trinity Development
Corporation
of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the
interest which accrued thereon. Acting on said motion, the
G.R. No. 172410, April 12, 2008
RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003, directing the
manager of LBP-South Harbor to release in favor of HTRDC
the amount of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already
proved its absolute ownership over the subject properties
and
paid
the
taxes
due
thereon
to
the
Facts:
government.
According
to
the
RTC,
(t)he
issue
however
on
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
the
interest
earned
by
the
amount
deposited
in
the
bank,
if
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
[6]
[1]
there
is
any,
should
still
be
threshed
out.
Decision dated 21 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 90981 which, in turn, set aside two
Orders[2] dated 7 February 2005[3] and 16 May 2005[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case
No. 869-M-2000.

The controversy, though, arises not from the amount

of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the interest that
had since accrued on the deposited amount.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in

holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in

the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue

of accession, hinges on the determination of who actually
owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the
Civil Code, the right of accession is conferred by ownership
of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which
is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or
artificially.
Ruling:
HTRDC is determined to be the owner of only a part
of the amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the
sum of P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is entitled by right of
accession to the interest that had accrued to the said
amount only.
Notwithstanding that the amount was deposited
under the DPWH account, ownership over the deposit
transferred by operation of law to the [HTRDC] and
whatever interest, considered as civil fruits, accruing to the
amount of Php22,968,000.00 should properly pertain to
[HTRDC] as the lawful owner of the principal amount
deposited following the principle of accession. Bank interest
partake the nature of civil fruits under Art. 442 of the New
Civil Code. And since these are considered fruits, ownership
thereof should be due to the owner of the principal.
Undoubtedly, being an attribute of ownership, the [HTRDCs]
right over the fruits (jus fruendi), that is the bank interests,
must be respected.[20]

#4 United Paracle Mining Co. v. Dela Rosa

G.R. Nos. 63786-87
Facts:
In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale
Mining Company, Inc. and Coco Grove, Inc., petitioners seek
to set aside the Order of dismissal of the case they filed with

the trial court for the ejectment of their respective

defendants from the mining claims which were allegedly
privately owned by them having been located and perfected
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 624.
Petitioners contend that having filed mining lease
applications on the mining claims they have previously
located and registered under then existing laws, pursuant to
the requirements of this Presidential Decree, and despite the
waiver of their rights to the issuance of mining patents
therefor (emphasis theirs), they cannot be placed in equal
footing with those who forfeit all rights by virtue of non-filing
of an application within the prescribed period such that they
(petitioners) have no causes of action against private
respondents.
Issue:

Whether or not P.D 1214 is unconstitutional

Ruling:
The court ruled that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is
not unconstitutional. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign
power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public
domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part,
and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral
deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this
connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims
located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims
over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And
even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable
twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No.
463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the

affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the
located land or area from the public domain by barring other
would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating
for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise
would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and
maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot
approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of
the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and
consistently comply with the requirements for annual work
and improvements in the located mining claim.

#5 People v. Jalosjos
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a fullfledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.

RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.,
this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges
of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

#6 Quimsing v. Lachica
G.R. No. L-14633, May 30,1961
Facts:

Owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit,

Joachin Quimsing, where the said cockpit was raided on a
Thursday. By members of a City police force led by Capt.
Alfredo Lachica upon the ground that it was being illegally
operated by ordinances of the City of Iloilo filed a petition.
Issue:
Whether or not repeals by implication are favored.

Ruling:
Repeals and even amendments by implication are
not favored, whereas an affirmative
answer would entail a vital amendment, amounting, for all
practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Doubts in the
interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of
the
national
government
against
the
political
subdivisions concerned.

#7 CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA

G.R. NO. 138496 February 23, 2004
FACTS:
HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister,
ARLENE TAN CO, was born May 19, 1975. In their respective
certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON
PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS.
CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as
a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on
Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His
application was granted and he was conferred Philippine
citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of
naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine
citizen on February 15, 1977. On August 27, 1998, they filed
with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for
correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was
denied on the ff. grounds: a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270
are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not
provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor
children of the applicant; **Sec. 15: effects of naturalization
on the wife and the children b) LOI 270: refers to qualified
individuals only; c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be
deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;d)
Application of pari material rule of construction is
misplaced.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens

on account of the naturalization
of their Father Co Boon Peng.
HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in
evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, to
entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise
mandated to prove the ff. material allegations in their
petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

#8 Commisioner of Internal Revenue v Fortune

Tobacco Corp.
(GR Nos. 167274-75 July 21 2008)
Facts:
Respondent FTC is a domestic corporation that
manufactures cigarettes packed by machine under several
brands. Prior to January 1, 1997, Section 142 of the 1977 Tax
Code subjected said cigarette brands to ad valorem tax.
Annex D of R.A. No. 4280 prescribed the cigarette brands
tax classification rates based on their net retail price. On
January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect. Sec. 145 thereof
now subjects the cigarette brands to specific tax and also
provides that: (1) the excise tax from any brand of
cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the effectivity
of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax, which is
due from each brand on October 1, 1996; (2) the rates of
excise tax on cigarettes enumerated therein shall be
increased by 12% on January 1, 2000; and (3) the

classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its

average retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in
Annex D shall remain in force until revised by Congress.

The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 17-99 to implement

the provision for the 12% excise tax increase. RR No. 17-99
added the qualification that the new specific tax rate xxx
shall not be lower than the excise tax that is actually being
paid prior to January 1, 2000. In effect, it provided that the
12% tax increase must be based on the excise tax actually
being paid prior to January 1, 2000 and not on their actual
net retail price.

FTC filed 2 separate claims for refund or tax credit of its

purportedly overpaid excise taxes for the month of January
2000 and for the period January 1-December 31, 2002. It
assailed the validity of RR No. 17-99 in that it enlarges
Section 145 by providing the aforesaid qualification. In this
petition, petitioner CIR alleges that the literal interpretation
given by the CTA and the CA of Section 145 would lead to a
lower tax imposable on 1 January 2000 than that imposable
during the transition period, which is contrary to the
legislative intent to raise revenue.

Issue:
Should the 12% tax increase be based on the net
retail price of the cigarettes in the market as outlined in
Section 145 of the 1997 Tax Code?

Held:
YES. Section 145 is clear and unequivocal. It states
that during the transition period, i.e., within the next 3 years
from the effectivity of the 1997 Tax Code, the excise tax
from any brand of cigarettes shall not be lower than the tax
due from each brand on 1 October 1996. This qualification,
however, is conspicuously absent as regards the 12%
increase which is to be applied on cigars and cigarettes
packed by machine, among others, effective on 1 January
2000.

Clearly, Section 145 mandates a new rate of excise tax for

cigarettes packed by machine due to the 12% increase
effective on 1 January 2000 without regard to whether the
revenue collection starting from this period may turn out to
be lower than that collected prior to this date.

The qualification added by RR No. 17-99 imposes a tax

which is the higher amount between the ad valorem tax
being paid at the end of the 3-year transition period and the
specific tax under Section 145, as increased by 12%a
situation not supported by the plain wording of Section 145
of the 1997 Tax Code. Administrative issuances must not
override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out.

Revenue generation is not the sole purpose of the passage

of the 1997 Tax Code. The shift from the ad valorem system
to the specific tax system in the Code is likewise meant to

promote fair competition among the players in the

industries concerned and to ensure an equitable distribution
of the tax burden.

#9 Davao Oriental Electric Cooperative v

Province of Davao Oriental (GR No 170901, 20
Jan 2009)
FACTS:
Petitioner Davao Oriental Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(DOEC) was organized under PresidentialDecree (PD) No.
269 which granted a number of tax and duty exemption
privileges to electriccooperatives. In 1984, PD No. 1955 was
enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Itwithdrew
all exemptions from or any preferential treatment in the
payment of duties, taxes, fees,imposts, and other charges
granted to private business enterprises and/or persons
engaged in anyeconomic activity.Due to the failure of
petitioner to declare the value of its properties, the Office of
the ProvincialAssessor assessed its properties. On October
8, 1985, the Provincial Assessor sent the Notice
of Assessment to petitioner which duly received it.During
the same year of 1985, the Fiscal Incentive Review Board
(FIRB) issued FIRBResolution No. 13-85, the Ministry of
Finance issued Local Tax Regulation No. 3-85, and theOffice
of the Local Government Finance, Region XI, Davao City
issued Regional OfficeMemorandum Circular No. 42-85, all of
which
reiterated
the
withdrawal
of
tax
exemptions previously granted to business entities including
electric cooperatives.In May 1990, respondent filed a
complaint for collection of delinquent real property
taxesagainst petitioner for the years 1984 until 1989,

amounting to P1,825,928.12.Petitioner contends that it was

exempt from the payment of real estate taxes from 1984 to
1989 because the restoration of tax exemptions under FIRB
Resolution No. 24-87 retroacts to the dateof withdrawal of
said exemptions. Further, petitioner questions the
classification made byrespondent of some of its properties
as real properties when it believes them to be
personal properties, hence, not subject to realty tax. It
claims that the tax declarations covering its properties were
issued without prior consultation, and without its knowledge
and consent. Inaddition, it argues that respondent classified
its poles, towers and fixtures, overhead conductorsand
devices, station equipment, line transformers, etc. as real
properties when by their nature,use, purpose, and
destination and by substantive law and jurisprudence, they
are personal properties.On March 15, 2000, the RTC
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent
appealed tothe CA which set aside the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1.

2.

Whether or not the restoration of the tax exemption

under FIRB Resolution 24-87 was notretroactive to
the date of effectivity of PD 1955; - YES. Not
retroactive
Whether or not petitioner could be made to pay
taxes based on a wide-sweeping and erroneous
assessment of its real properties. Yes.

HELD: Retroactivity of FIRB Resolution No. 24-87.

#10 In RE
petitioner

Tampoy:

Diosdada

Alberastine,

GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)

Facts:
This concerns the probate of a document which
purports to be the last will and testament of Petronila
Tampoy, on 19 November 1939. Where on 22 February
1957, Petronila died and two weeks after, the heir found in
the testament, Carman Aberastine also died, leaving her
mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine.

The trial court denied the petition on the ground that

the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix, even though the second bears her thumbmark and
both pages were signed by the three testimonial witnesses.
Petitioner emphasize that no one has filed any to the
opposition to the probate of the will and that the three
testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court
that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of
the deceased.

Held:
Yes. Statutes prescribing the formalities to be
observed in the execution of wills are very strictly
construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the
present case, the contention that the petition for probate is
unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses
testified and manifested to the court that the document
expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased,
cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express
provision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as
it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first
page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental
witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and
therefore cannot be admitted to probate.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order,

without pronouncement as to costs.

#11 PLDT vs City of Davao

GR L-23080, 30 Oct 1965

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of the testators
thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void.

Facts:

The Philippine Legislature granted PLDT a special

franchise to establish and operate a telephone system
throughout the country; and wisely provided that the rights
granted shall not be exclusive.

interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more power to

local governments in promoting the economic condition,
social welfare and material progress of the people in the
community (Sec. 12, RA 2264, Local Autonomy Act).

Answering the clamor of the inhabitants of Davao

City, the Davao City Council provided for a city-owned and
operated telephone system. Thereafter, Congress expressly
authorized such; and the executive, approved the same.

Police power has not received a full and complete

definition it is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions it is not confined within the
narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions it must follow the legal progress of a democratic
way of life.

PLDT contended the scope of police power, and

therefore of the general welfare clause, has been fixed by
traditional delineations. And Davao City's telephone system
being proprietary in nature, cannot be undertaken under the
general welfare clause.

Issue:
Whether or not the scope of police power has been
fixed, therefore general welfare clause should be limited to
governmental functions only.

The fact that in thereby promoting the general

welfare of its inhabitants, the means adopted by the city
would likewise serve the public in a proprietary manner is no
argument that the city is powerless to adopt said measure.
It frequently happens that from the same act both
governmental
and
corporate
functions
arise.
An
interpretation that would totally limit the general welfare
clause to such governmental functions only as are without
proprietary aspects would thereby often cripple local
governments in the face of the very evils that said clause
intended them to remedy.

Held:

WHEREFORE,
denied. So ordered.

the

motion

for

No. A restrictive view of the general welfare clause is

not favored. The general welfare clause shall be liberally

(Additional Info: you may include it ^^)

reconsideration

is

CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM states: ... The police

power of a municipal corporation must be responsive, in the
interest of common welfare, to the changing conditions and
developing needs of growing communities, and is not
confined within the narrow circumscription of precedents
resting on past conditions. That which may at one time be
regarded as not within such power may, at another time, by
reason of changed conditions, be recognized as a legitimate
exercise for the exercise of the power. Also, that which may
be regarded as within the police power of one municipal
corporation may not be so regarded as to another.
The general welfare clause, delegates in statutory
form the police power to a municipality. As above stated,
this clause has been given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the particular
circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the
courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of
Philippine jurisprudence (U.S. vs. Salaveria).

#12 Mayor Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp.,

Inc. & PAGCOR
G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan
de Oro City and leased a portion of a building owned by
Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project.

Petitioners opposed the casinos opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and cancelling existing business permit to the
establishment for the operation of the casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the
casino and providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances

on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree
No. 1869 which authorize PAGCOR to centralize and regulate
all games of chance. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to
the Local Government Code, they have the police power
authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general
welfare. LGC of 1991, empowers all government units to
enact ordinances to prevent and suppress gambling and
other games of chance.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 337593 are valid.

Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However,
ordinances should not contravene a statute because local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred to them by Congress. The Ordinance Nos. 3353
and 3375-93 violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and
force of a statute as well as the public policy expressed in
the decree.

Moreover, P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the

Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of
gambling prohibited by law.

Petition is denied.

J. Padilla dissenting opinion:

It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is
legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always
justify the means.

In the present case, it is my considered view that the

national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine
and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino
on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City for it is abundantly
clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it,
and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will
the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino
outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of
values?

#13 City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan

Telecommunications, Inc.
[G.R. No.162015. March 6, 2006]
FACTS
Respondent
Bayan
Telecommunications,
Inc.
(Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3259 (1961) to establish and operate radio
stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone,
broadcasting and telecasting. Section 14 (a) of R.A. No.
3259 states: The grantee shall be liable to pay the same
taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of the franchise, xxx. In 1992, R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC) took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local
government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to
levy tax on real properties. Barely few months after the LGC
took effect, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7633, amending
Bayantels original franchise. The Section 11 of the
amendatory contained the following tax provision: The
grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal
property, exclusive of this franchise, xxx. In 1993, the
government of Quezon City enacted an ordinance otherwise
known as the Quezon City Revenue Code withdrawing tax
exemption privileges.
ISSUE

Whether or not Bayantels real properties in Quezon

City are exempt from real property taxes under its franchise.
RULING
YES. A clash between the inherent taxing power of
the legislature, which necessarily includes the power to
exempt, and the local governments delegated power to tax
under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution must be ruled in
favor of the former. The grant of taxing powers to LGUs
under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the
power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons,
pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the
constitutional grant to local governments simply means that
in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing
powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations.
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase exclusive of
this
franchise cannot
be
construed other than
distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they
real or personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those
actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or
telecommunications business, and (b) those properties
which are not so used. It is worthy to note that the
properties subject of the present controversy are only those
which are admittedly falling under the first category.
Since R. A. No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC,
perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn
Bayantels former exemption from realty taxes, the
Congress using, Section 11 thereof with exactly the same
defining phrase exclusive of this franchise is the basis for
Bayantels exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In
plain language, the Court views this subsequent piece of
legislation as an express and real intention on the part of
Congress to once again remove from the LGCs delegated
taxing power, all of the franchisees (Bayantels) properties
that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit
of its franchise.

#14 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, INC.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 167146 October 31, 2006
Facts

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the en banc
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA EB No. 37
dated 22 February 2005,1 ordering the petitioner to
withdraw and cancel Assessment Notice No. 000688-807333 issued against respondent Philippine Global
Communication, Inc. for its 1990 income tax deficiency. The
CTA, in its assailed en banc Decision, affirmed the Decision
of the First Division of the CTA dated 9 June 20042 and its
Resolution dated 22 September 2004 in C.T.A. Case No.
6568.
Respondent, a corporation engaged in telecommunications,
filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1990 on
15 April 1991. On 13 April 1992, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) issued Letter of Authority No.
0002307, authorizing the appropriate Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) officials to examine the books of account and
other accounting records of respondent, in connection with
the investigation of respondents 1990 income tax liability.
On 22 April 1992, the BIR sent a letter to respondent
requesting the latter to present for examination certain
records and documents, but respondent failed to present
any document. On 21 April 1994, respondent received a
Preliminary Assessment Notice dated 13 April 1994 for
deficiency income tax in the amount of P118,271,672.00,
inclusive of surcharge, interest, and compromise penalty,
arising from deductions that were disallowed for failure to
pay the withholding tax and interest expenses that were
likewise disallowed. On the following day, 22 April 1994,
respondent received a Formal Assessment Notice with
Assessment Notice No. 000688-80-7333, dated 14 April

1994, for deficiency income tax in the total amount of

P118,271,672.00.3
ISSUE:
Whether or not CIRs right to collect respondents
alleged deficiency income tax is barred by prescription
under Section 269(c) of the Tax Code of 1977
RULING
This Court finds no merit in this Petition.
The law prescribed a period of three years from the
date the return was actually filed or from the last date
prescribed by law for the filing of such return, whichever
came later, within which the BIR may assess a national
internal revenue tax.13 However, the law increased the
prescriptive period to assess or to begin a court proceeding
for the collection without an assessment to ten years when
a false or fraudulent return was filed with the intent of
evading the tax or when no return was filed at all.14 In such
cases, the ten-year period began to run only from the date
of discovery by the BIR of the falsity, fraud or omission.
Thus, the three-year statute of limitations on the collection
of an assessed tax provided under Section 269(c) of the Tax
Code of 1977, a law enacted to protect the interests of the
taxpayer, must be given effect. In providing for exceptions
to such rule in Section 271, the law strictly limits the
suspension of the running of the prescription period to,
among other instances, protests wherein the taxpayer
requests for a reinvestigation. In this case, where the
taxpayer merely filed two protest letters requesting for a
reconsideration, and where the BIR could not have
conducted a reinvestigation because no new or additional
evidence was submitted, the running of statute of
limitations cannot be interrupted. The tax which is the
subject of the Decision issued by the CIR on 8 October 2002
affirming the Formal Assessment issued on 14 April 1994

can no longer be the subject of any proceeding for its

collection. Consequently, the right of the government to
collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The assailed en banc Decision of the CTA in CTA EB No. 37
dated 22 February 2005, cancelling Assessment Notice No.
000688-80-7333
issued
against
Philippine
Global
Communication, Inc. for its 1990 income tax deficiency for
the reason that it is barred by prescription, is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

#15 Tolentino v. COMELEC

GR No 187958 April 7, 2010
Facts:

Tolentino contends that the Division should first

resolve the issue of the inclusion or exclusion of the
protested ballot boxes, considering that the verification,
investigation and examination of their condition had already
been terminated by the Election Officer of Tagaytay City. He
insists that the COMELEC should provide a reasonable
procedure in view of a vital threshold issue of whether the
ballots found in the ballot boxes during the revision
proceedings were the same ballots that were cast and
counted in the elections; and that the assailed issuances
totally overhauled, amended, and altered the final and
executory ruling of January 12, 2009 that deferred any
revision proceedings until all the protested ballot boxes were
all in the custody of the COMELEC.
De Castro submits that the obstinate refusal of the Division
to issue an order setting forth the ground rules for the per
case revision of ballots was an omission exemplifying a
grave abuse of discretion and a denial of his substantive and
procedural right to due process; that the caption of the
orders dated May 25, 2009 and June 2, 2009 show that the
three protest cases were consolidated, but the Division still

chose to conduct the revision piecemeal starting with the

position of Mayor, then of Vice Mayor, and finally of City
Councilors, separately as provided in the June 2, 2009 order.
The private respondents counter through their Consolidated
Joint Comment filed on September 8, 2009 that Rosal does
not mention any requirement for the suspension of revision
of ballots or for the stoppage of the opening of a ballot box
in a revision proceeding; that the set-aside ballot boxes
should be opened; that a full determination of the integrity
of the ballot boxes and their contents could be made only if
the status and condition of the contents were also
considered; that the disallowance of the opening of the setaside ballot boxes pre-empted the parties rights to examine,
present and argue upon the condition of the ballot boxes
and their contents; that the COMELEC could not be bound to
maintain a strict adherence to its January 12, 2009 order
because the SET had already allowed the revision to be
conducted within its premises; and that the COMELEC had
issued sufficient and adequate rules of procedure for the
revision of the questioned ballots, for, as mandated in the
June 2, 2009 order, the normal procedure of revision would
be followed, implying that the procedure in previous revision
of ballots be maintained.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed issuances ordering the revision of the 44
ballot boxes with the SET without first resolving if the 16
ballot boxes segregated should be included in the revision.

At the outset, the Court holds that the order of

revision and the revision of ballots synchronized with that of
the SET were proper. The reasons for this holding follow.
First: In regular election contests, the general
averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes
justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of
votes. The only means to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy of the election returns is to examine and
determine first whether the ballot boxes have been
substantially preserved in the manner mandated by law.
Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision (can be
omitted).
Second: The synchronized revision of ballots by the
SET and the Division is allowed under Section 3 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2812. It is clear that by its suspension order
the Division only adopted an auxiliary means necessary to
carry its jurisdiction into effect. In that light, we should find
that there was no irregularity in the Divisions lifting of the
suspension, for, after all, nothing prohibited the COMELEC
from undertaking the appreciation of ballots in tandem with
the SETs own revision of ballots for the senatorial electoral
protest.
Third: Under Section 11, Rule 20 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure,1[33] one of the most indispensable
informations that should appear in the revision report
relates to the conditions of the ballot boxes. The importance
of this information cannot be understated. According to
Rosal v. Commission on Elections,2[34] the integrity of the
ballots and therefore their probative value, as evidence of
the voters will, are contingent on the integrity of the ballot
boxes in which they were stored. This was precisely what
Tolentino was asking the Division to do before the order of
revision issued. The Court rejects Tolentinos urging for
obvious reasons. Any defects in the security locks or seals of

Ruling:

the set-aside ballot boxes, as predetermined by the

examining Election Officer, could not yet satisfy the
requirement of the rule. For one, the COMELEC was not
bound by the report simply because the defects still needed
to be confirmed during the process of actual revision.
Moreover, the presumption that the ballots reflected the
intent of the voters, as expressly recognized in Section 6(c)
(2), Rule 13 of A.M. No. 07-4-15- SC,3[35] should not be done
away with solely on the basis of the report of the City
Election Officer, by which said officer complied with a
requirement set primarily for the transmittal of the ballot
boxes involved.
Fourth: The supplemental arguments of Tolentino
allege a violation of his right to due process by the nonobservance of the cardinal rules of due process in
administrative adjudications and by the piece-meal
resolution of the pending incidents.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos
gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due
process. The Division had required him to provide the names
of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of
objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of
the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged
being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated any
situation in which his revisors were denied access to the
revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the
COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments;
besides, he could still raise them in his memorandum should
he chose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all
objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his
memorandum before the case would be submitted for
resolution. Such manner of presenting his side would fully
meet the demands of due process, for, as the Court has
explained the nature of due process- The essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the

action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing

is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack
of notice and hearing. xxx
A review of the records proves that the parties, including
Tolentino, were afforded ample opportunity to ventilate their
respective claims, to raise their objections, to claim votes,
and to contest the votes of their opponents through their
duly designated revisors

# 16 Romualdez v. Marcelo
GR No. 165510-33 July 28, 2006
Facts:
On February 22, 1989, 24 informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were filed against
petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for his alleged failure
to file the SAL from 1962 to 1985. A warrant of arrest was
issued on February 28, 1989, but this was not served
because of petitioners exile from the country.
Due to his non-compliance with these terms, the
Sandiganbayan denied on January 24, 1992 petitioners
motion to recall the warrant of arrest. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan denied on April
24, 1992. It also declared that until petitioner submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, the issue regarding
his compliance with the conditions imposed in the resolution
of November 4, 1991, will not be entertained.
Hence, on May 27, 1992, he filed a petition with this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 105248, assailing the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated January 24, 1992,
April 24, 1992 and November 4, 1991.
In a Decision dated May 16, 1995, this Court declared
invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG
for lack of jurisdiction. However, it held that the invalidity or

absence of a preliminary investigation did not affect the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the validity of
the informations. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was ordered to
suspend the proceedings pending the holding of a proper
preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit as
directed. On April 27, 2000, he returned to the Philippines
and voluntarily surrendered. He filed a Motion to Quash on
June 2, 2000. The clarificatory hearing scheduled on the
same date was reset to June 9, 2000.
On June 8, 2000, one day before the scheduled
clarificatory hearing, the Sandiganbayan denied in open
court petitioners motion to quash and the reconsideration
thereof and also terminated the preliminary investigation.
His arraignment scheduled on June 26, 2000 was reset to
July 28, 2000.[
On July 27, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with this Court, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 143618-41. He assailed the orders of the
Sandiganbayan (1) denying his motion to quash and his oral
motion for reconsideration; (2) ordering the termination of
the preliminary investigation; and (3) setting his
arraignment on July 28, 2000. He claimed that the criminal
cases against him were based on void informations, hence,
the Sandiganbayan must be enjoined from arraigning him on
July 28, 2000.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss
the preliminary investigation
(2) Whether or not the offenses charged against
petitioner have prescribed.
Ruling:
It is noteworthy that petitioner did not raise the
defense of prescription in his motion to dismiss the
preliminary investigation. It is only in this petition that he

raised this issue. As this case has never progressed beyond

the filing of the informations against petitioner, it is only
prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the
merits to determine whether the offense charged has
already prescribed.
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,
and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against
whom it is taken in jeopardy.
Consequently, the Ombudsman did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss
the preliminary investigation. Not only did the Ombudsman
have the jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation
under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, but he also acted
within the legal bounds of the authority conferred upon him
when he denied the motion to dismiss under Administrative
Order No. 07.
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[45]
WHERFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

#17 THENAMARIS PHIL., INC. vs. CA

G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014
FACTS:
This Petition for Certiorari against CA for allegedly
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA, through

the said Resolution, entertained private respondent's

(Amanda C. Mendigorin) Petition for Certiorari, despite
having been filed 15 days late and had allowed her to
correct the technical infirmities therein. Also assailed is the
CA's February 10, 2010 Resolution denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss and giving
private respondent another chance to cure the remaining
deficiencies of the petition where in they had stated the
following contentions: 1. A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC effectively
rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari
non-extendible after it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining
to extension of time to file petition. Thus, petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. 2. private respondents motion for
extension is a prohibited pleading, as well as one filed
outside of the reglementary period, then private
respondents Petition for Certiorari is a mere scrap of paper
with no remedial value whatsoever.
ISSUES:
1. The public respondent CA committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it noted the petition for certiorari filed by the private
respondent instead of dismissing it outright for having been
filed beyond the mandatory and jurisdictional 60-day period
required by section 4, rule 65 of the rules of court, as
amended by a.m. no. 07-7-12-sc.
2. The public respondent CA committed grave abuse
of discretion when, in noting the very late petition filed by
the private respondent, it grossly ignored this honorable
courts very recent ruling in laguna metts corporation v.
Court of appeals, aries c. Caalam and geraldine esguerra,
which disallowed any motions for extension of time to file a
petition for certiorari under rule 65.
HELD:

The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it

extended underserved and unwarranted liberality to private

respondent. "There is grave abuse of discretion when there

is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of
law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. Such is
present here as shown by the CA's obstinate refusal to
dismiss the case despite the late filing of the motion for
extension and the flimsy excuse for the extension sought,
the late filing of the petition and the numerous infirmities
attending the same, and private respondent's continued
defiance of its directive. These circumstances serve to
highlight private respondent's propensity to disregard the
very rules that the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are
duty-bound to follow. CAS decision are reversed and set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We stated that the general rule, a petition for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. Under exceptional cases, however, the 60day period may be extended subject to the courts sound
discretion. Additionally, there should be an effort on the part
of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why
he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason
offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy
workload of private respondents counsel, which is hardly a
compelling or meritorious reason. We have held that the
excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.
Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from
the 60-day rule." Thus, private respondents motion for
extension should have been denied outright.
We recognized that although procedural rules ought
to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability
in the legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid
application of the rules of procedure in several cases to
afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their
cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice
would be better served if the parties were given the chance

to argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise

constantly reminded that the general objective of procedure
is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing
claims of the competing parties and always be guided by
the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather,
promote the administration of justice. Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of
even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation
and the parties right to due process. In numerous cases,
this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when
to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
equity.

#18 CITY OF DUMAGUETE VS PPA

G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated March 4, 2005
and Resolution dated June 6, 2005 of the Court Appeals,
which granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of
respondent Philippine Ports Authority and set aside the
Ordersof the RTC.
The antecedent facts are as follows: On October 14,
1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Remollo,
filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration
of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at
Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete, under the Property
Registration Decree. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent,
represented by the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for
registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent
averred that petitioner may not register the property in its
name since petitioner had never been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the

application. The property is not alienable and disposable,

since it is a foreshore land making property administered
and managed by the State, through respondent, for the
benefit of the people that it remains to be a portion of the
public domain which belongs to the Republic. RTC was in
favor of respondents on the basis of the application for
original registration of the lot is the Property Registration
Decree. According
to
respondent,
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration of petitioner violated Rule 15 and 13 of the
Rules of court where the defects of the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner rendered the same as a mere
scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period to appeal the RTC Order. Court of
Appeals found merit in the Petition of respondent and set
aside the RTC Orders
ISSUE:
W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it noted the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner instead of
dismissing it outright for having been filed beyond the
mandatory and jurisdictional 60-day period and allowing any
motions for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ
of certiorari in favor of respondent. The RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion. Procedural rules were conceived
to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of
the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of
substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. We
allow a liberal application of technical rules of procedure,
pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing,
upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, as illustrated in well-settled cases, to wit:
The liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is
exemplified: Where a rigid application of that rule will result
in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule
may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that
the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory

judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals

contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in
order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim
a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. But that the rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of
procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial. The right to appeal should not be lightly
disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure
especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and
the interests of substantial justice would be served by
permitting the appeal.
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner,
which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7,
2000 dismissing the case; cite meritorious grounds that
justify a liberal application of procedural rules. The dismissal
of RTC for lack of jurisdiction is erroneous.
The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 has not yet
become final and executory as petitioner was able to duly
file a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration of the same, which the RTC eventually
granted in its Order dated December 7, 2000. Admittedly,
said motions filed by petitioner did not comply with certain
rules of procedure. Ordinarily, such non-compliance would
have rendered said motions as mere scraps of paper,
considered as not having been filed at all, and unable to toll
the reglementary period for an appeal. However, we find
that the exceptional circumstances extant in the present
case warrant the liberal application of the rules.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review of
petitioner City of Dumaguete is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court Appeals are SET ASIDE, and Regional
Trial Court of the City of Dumaguete are REINSTATED.

#19 Cristobal v. ECC

G.R. No. L-49280. February 26, 1981
Facts:

On April 30, 1980, The Supreme Court favored the

petitioner Luz G. Cristobal, widow of the deceased Fortunato
Cristobal. The petitioner has shown clear and convincing
evidence that her husband contracted rectal cancer or at
least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by
the conditions under which he was working and accordingly
ordered respondent GSIS: (1) to pay the petitioner the sum
of P12,000.00 as death benefits; (2) to reimburse petitioner
medical, surgical and hospital expenses duly supported by
proper receipts; (3) To pay petitioner the sum of P700.00 as
funeral expenses; and (4) to pay the petitioner attorneys
fees equivalent to 10% of the death benefits.
On June 14, 1980, respondent ECC likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration based essentially on the same
grounds, to wit: (1) the illness of rectal malignancy which
caused the death of Fortunato S. Cristobal is not
compensable under the theory of increased risk as provided
in PD 626, as amended. (2) The amounts awarded as death
benefits, funeral expenses and attorneys fees are not in
accordance with law. (3) The cause of death not being a
compensable illness, the order for reimbursement of
medical, surgical and hospital expenses has no basis.
Issue:
Whether or not strict rules of evidence are applicable in
claims for compensation of the illness of the deceased
worker?
Ruling:
No, the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation.
Respondents insist on evidence which would
establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal
cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict
requirement which even medical experts in the field cannot

support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the

disease would negate the principle of liberality in the matter
of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to
the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied
in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that "all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."
As the agents charged by the law to implement the
social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal
attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially
when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a workconnection. This should not be confused with the
presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation
under the Workmens Compensation Act. While these
doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor
Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be
challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in
general, still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds
were considered in relation to each other constituting
substantial evidence clearly convincing us to resolve that
rectal cancer is compensable.
Hence, strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation of the illness of the deceased
worker.

#20 Bermudez v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado
Quiaoit are the contending parties for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac. Bermudez, the First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of

then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position

of Provincial Prosecutor. On the other hand, Quiaoit was
supported by then Representative Jose Yap of the Second
Legislative District of Tarlac. On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit
emerged the victor when he was appointed by President
Ramos to the coveted office.
On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and
immediately informed the President, as well as the
Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of
that assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of
Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the
Secretary of Justice. Quiaoit, nonetheless, performed the
functions and duties of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez together with his copetitioners Arturo Llobrera and Claudio Dayaon, the Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the Fourth Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac, respectively, filed with the
RTC of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and
mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein
respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit
primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. This petition
was dismiss by the trial court. Hence, they went to file the
petition in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of a provincial
prosecutor mandatorily requires a prior recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice endorsing the intended
appointment?
Ruling:
No, prior recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
endorsing the intended appointment such as of a provincial
prosecutor is a mere directory.
The legislative intent is, of course, primordial. There is
no hard-and-fast rule in ascertaining whether the language

in a statute should be considered mandatory or directory,

and the application of a ruling in one particular instance
may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be
determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and the
peculiar circumstances attendant to it. More often than not,
the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and
addressed on a case-to-case basis. The nature, structure
and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at the
legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no
consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and no injury
can result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the
legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that
prescribed when substantially the same results can be
obtained, then the statute should be regarded merely as
directory, rather than as mandatory, in character.
In this case, given the above disquisition, that the
phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in

Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised

Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally
so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or
endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character
and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is
made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than
advisory in nature.
Thus, prior recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
endorsing the intended appointment such as of a provincial
prosecutor is a mere directory. The petition is denied.