Criminal Law

G.R. No.
102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal

penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is
plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from
his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did
not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability
is based.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished

only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled
upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of
the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo
cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia
firme.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme."
What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer:

It says:
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This
same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in
part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
xxx xxx xxx
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la

fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las
partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de
los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts
it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior
thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en
tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And,
as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings
to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9,
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability
is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal
liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source
thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce
it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in
the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines
v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v.Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view
of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established,
and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accusedappellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo
and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should
be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the
former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical
injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein
that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act
No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal
Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction
of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises
from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment.
The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability
springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil
contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who
was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently,
while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine,
his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to
be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its
judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be
included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of
the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this longestablished principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted
by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that
such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The
legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of
the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him
of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered
him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and
Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals,
L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina,
24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the
Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan
arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case
had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action
for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule
that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon
dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code
and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the accused's civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil
liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This
is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the
death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly
instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had
been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from
one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate
one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12One
would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably
signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all
things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the
criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the
criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to
the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will
take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of
July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as thesource of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's
civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of
his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in

both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom
that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to
exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the
component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.
There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal
procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from
the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. .
..
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions
of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable
for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex
delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86
provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part
of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil
action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the
deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor
or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages
for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and
not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those
for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers
only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate
civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced.
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004
and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00
from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson
(Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency
of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of
the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson
claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had
lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent
various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on
the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of
the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already
elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order
of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from
petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that
Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the
DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file
three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines
and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which
governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case
of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in
Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's
office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August
2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached
to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate
court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition
for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not
provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with
Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to
petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of
cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being
neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by
attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently
complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground
that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003
resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," 39 and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August
2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of
Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was
approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing
rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the
Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also
notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues
that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave
injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under
B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the
position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or
examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against
the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A.
No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent
change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution
has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings"
should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the
guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive
period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal
of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from
the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9)
years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks
because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement
of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since
there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there
is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141931
December 4, 2000
ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. No. 21347 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Aniceto Recebido," dated September
9, 1999 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public
Document; and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are the following, to wit:

On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin,
petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her property, an
agricultural land with an area of 3,520 square meters located at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon,
which Caridad Dorol mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad
Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a
copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 (Exhibit "A") executed in her favor by her father,
Juan Dorol.
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property on his
claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted that
the transaction between them involving her property was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there exists on its file a
Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit "J"), allegedly executed by Caridad Dorol in favor
of petitioner and that the property was registered in the latter's name. After comparison of the
specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other documents (Exhibits "K" to "K-10") with that of the
signature of Caridad Dorol on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio
Magbojas, found that the latter signature was falsified (Exhibits "L-1" to "L-2").
Thereafter, Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto Recebido with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legaspi City and its Questioned Documents Division
conducted an examination in the original copy of the Deed of Sale in question allegedly signed
by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed thereon.
Mr. Magboja's report was approved by the Chief of the Questioned Documents Division, Arcadio
Ramos, and the Deputy Director of Technical Services, Manuel Roura, both of the NBI.1
Thus, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information indicting petitioner
for Falsification of Public Document with the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Branch
51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, reading as follows:
"That on or about the 13th day of August, 1979, in the Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being a private individual, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, falsify and/or imitate the signature of
one Caridad Dorol and/or cause it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed her
name on a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in favor of the herein accused and
Notarized as Doc. No. 680; page No. 54; Boon No. XIV and Series of 1979 of the
Registry of Notary Public Dominador S. Reyes, when in truth and in fact accused well
knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said document, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.
Contrary to law."2
Upon arraignment petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contends that the land in question was
mortgage to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad, on February 25, 1977 and was
subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983 although it was made to appear that the deed of
sale was executed on August 13, 1979. It was also on the said date that Recebido gave Caridad
the amount of P1,000.00 in addition to the P2,600.00 mortgage price given to Juan Dorol which
culminated into the execution of the Deed of Sale signed by Caridad.3
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision on December 2, 1996, convicting
petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing him as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, accused ANECITO RECEBIDO is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment.
Accused is ordered to pay P5,000.00 damages and to vacate the land in question
owned by the offended party.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the award for damages is DELETED, is
assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in all of her respects.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioner raises his case before this Court seeking the reversal of the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals. Based on his petition, the following issues are before this
Court:
1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed?
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of discretion in
sustaining the conviction of the petitioner?
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grievous error in affirming the
decision of the trial court for the petitioner to vacate the land in question owned by the
offended party?
We rule in the negative on the three issues.
On the first issue: While the defense of prescription of the crime was raised only during the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, there was no waiver of the
defense. Under the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert the ground of extinction
of the offense, inter alia, in a motion to quash shall not be deemed a waiver of such ground. 6 The
reason is that by prescription, the State or the People loses the right to prosecute the crime or to
demand the service of the penalty imposed.7 Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in
the trial, may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal.8 Hence, the failure to raise this defense in
the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to
raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The petitioner is correct in
stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was
filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is "prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00
pesos."9 Under the Revised Penal Code,10 said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way
that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional,
the offense shall prescribe in ten years.11 The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is
the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the tenyear prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is
inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall
"commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents," In People v. Reyes,12 this Court has declared that registration in
public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as
well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains.
The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not sell the subject land to
the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime in 1983 the private complainant mortgaged
the agricultural land to petitioner Recebido. It was only on September 9, 1990, when she went to
petitioner to redeem the land that she came to know of the falsification committed by the
petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the land in question was mortgaged to him
by Juan Dorol, the father of private complainant, and was subsequently sold to him on August
13, 1983. This Court notes that the private offended party had no actual knowledge of the
falsification prior to September 9, 1990. Meanwhile, assuming arguendo that the version of the
petitioner is believable, the alleged sale could not have been registered before 1983, the year
the alleged deed of sale was executed by the private complainant. Considering the foregoing, it
is logical and in consonance with human experience to infer that the crime committed was not
discovered, nor could have been discovered, by the offended party before 1983. Neither could
constructive notice by registration of the forged deed of sale, which is favorable to the petitioner
since the running of the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned earlier, have
been done before 1983 as it is impossible for the petitioner to have registered the deed of sale
prior thereto. Even granting arguendo that the deed of sale was executed by the private
complainant, delivered to the petitioner-accused in August 13, 1983 and registered on the same
day, the ten-year prescriptive period of the crime had not yet elapsed at the time the information
was filed in 1991. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had not prescribed at the
time of the filing of the information.
On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court. The petitioner admits that the
deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and appellate
court.13 Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that
there is no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under
his direction. This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any
direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor
General, "the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was
requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was
petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial
Assessor's Office of Sorsogon."14 In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged
deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. Given
this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale,
despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner
is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. 15 As it stands,
therefore, we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
On the third issue: Petitioner submits that the trial court is without jurisdiction to order petitioner
to vacate the land in question considering that the crime for which he is charged is
falsification.16 The petitioner insists that the civil aspect involved in the criminal case at bar refer
to the civil damages recoverable ex delito or arising from the causative act or omission.17 In
addition, petitioner argues that he is entitled to possession as mortgagee since the private
complainant has not properly redeemed the property in question.
These are specious arguments. The petitioner based his claim of possession alternatively by
virtue of two alternative titles: one, based on the forged deed of sale and, two, as mortgagee of
the land. As already discussed, the deed of sale was forged and, hence, could not be a valid
basis of possession. Neither could his status as mortgagee be the basis of possession since it is
the mortgagor in a contract of mortgage who is entitled to the possession of the property. We
have taken note of the practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession
usually goes with it.18 Besides, even assuming that petitioner had a right to possess the subject
land, his possession became unlawful when the private complainant offered to redeem the
property and petitioner unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his crime. The
trial court, therefore, did not commit any error in ordering petitioner to vacate the subject
property.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its Decision dated September 9, 1999 and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000.
ACCORDINGLY, is instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Case No. 16612:
G.R. Nos. 120744-46
June 25, 2012
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 122677
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another,
and while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and
conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons
by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby
causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V.
Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by
said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having
commenced the commission of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce
the murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.
PERALTA, J.:
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is
never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later"
disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a
function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 122776
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
June 30, 1995 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614
cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The
cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the
Integrated National Police (INP)2 stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of
Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra
(Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan.
They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three
Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:
intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which
would have produced the crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent
of the defendants will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C.
Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, 6 the
accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,7 and Yapyuco who was then
allegedly indisposed8 entered individual pleas of not guilty.9 A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.10 In the
meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a
Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.11 Said motion was heard on the premise, as
previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that these cases would be
jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would automatically constitute
evidence at the trial on the merits.12 On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in
Criminal Case No. 16612.13Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was
also granted on May 21, 1991.14 Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,15 and accordingly, the
charges against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial
inquest. 16 Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of
evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta
celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m.,
shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang
reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and
open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire
and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.17
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see any
one on the road flag them down.18 In open court, Flores executed a sketch19 depicting the
relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they
had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where
the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron
where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not
tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup
and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them
Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously
introduced himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead,
Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when
Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup
were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the
scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being
loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.20 This was corroborated by Villanueva
who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St.
Francis Hospital.21
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded
each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would
say.22 He professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao
jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding long
firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had
been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together
with his two armed companions.23 He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought
Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7, 1988.24 He claimed that
all the accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for
Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any
rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill
motives. 25 He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and
that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.26
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence of his
companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated Villanuevas and
Flores narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after
seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his house and reminding them to
proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard
a volley of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores frantic call for help. He
immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just
outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six
people whom he could not recognize. 27 At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being
loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then
retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his
mothers house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel
of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which
he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he
spent the night at his mothers house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him with
whom, however, he was not able to talk.28
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in front
of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses
was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group
of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty
that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his
injured companions to the hospital.29
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp
Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by
petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not,
however, determine exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she tell how many
firearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted
having declined to administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the
opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined
the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had punctured the
door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained,
rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney
was either at a standstill or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the
curve on the road.30 Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the INPPampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and ammunitions to
members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the
memorandum receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes,
Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco.31
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the injuries
of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital
region of Villanuevas head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing
serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also
located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this
wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant
and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level
of the assailants waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal
so that with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He
hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of
the seated victim and exit at a lower level.32
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient, he
noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head one consistent with being hit
by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of
which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a through-andthrough wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another,
through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in
the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He
hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have
been exposed and the assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher
than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered
from the left side and crossed over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman
must have been positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted
ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his
position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have
been caused by a bullet fired at the victims back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle
without hitting any hard surface prior.33
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been caused by a bullet
fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the
improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed
position following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant
who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule
out the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very
rapidly. He could not tell which of Licups three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the
bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to
lean forward and stoop down with his head lying low and steady.34
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively
charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident
and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which
culminated in their dismissal from service.35 Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM,
testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on the
shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This,
according to her, together with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law
enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the
NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration.36 The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the
commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior
officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included
Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he
and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon
for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a
reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their
main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be
dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and
bring their M-16 rifles with them.37
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told
him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective
strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby
Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu
members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the
approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the
road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable
turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so
he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He
claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly
inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno,38 to fire warning shots but the
jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house directly at
the subject jeepney.39
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and
his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital.
From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the
people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise
gone.40
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in
bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been
ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,41 and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on
account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein. 42 That night, he said, his group
which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the
Sindalan Police Substation, 43 the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the
team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were
armed.44He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the
occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. 45 He said that the shots which
directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police
officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said
shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were
assembled.46
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused
after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his coaccused had already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando, but the
inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.47 He admitted an administrative case
against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been ordered dismissed from
service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise
alluded to an investigation independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt.
Rolando Cinco. 48
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga
acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where members of
the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself
has actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been
trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has
accordingly conducted "clearing operations" in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He
intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos team had already been alerted of the
presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos declaration, he confessed
having investigated the shooting incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was
supposedly attached Pamintuans statement referring to Flores as being "married to a resident
of Barangay Quebiawan" and found after surveillance to be "frequently visited by NPA
members." He affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief
investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. 49
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well
as the latters documentary evidence.50 Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and
Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum as told.51
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular
and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay
officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the
justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had
deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.52 With the evidence in hand, it
found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals
in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by
Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted
the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case
No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the
June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate
a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective
action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official duty; 55 that the
theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no
showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that
the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude
ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;56 that there was
insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were
members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have
been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of
either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a
hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.57
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of P77,000.00 as actual damages
and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate shares
of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in
the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y
Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Baez, Ruben
Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of
Multiple Attempted Murder charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised
Penal Code, and crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual
and compensatory damages, plusP120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to
pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.53
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which
brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the
guise of maintaining peace and order;54 that the acts performed by them preparatory to the
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution
witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the
subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed
stopped if it had truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since as it turned
out after the search of the vehicle they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had
nothing to be scared of.58 It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide
residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain
no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which were not far from the
scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney
in Salangsangs house that evening could not have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it
noted that Pamintuans Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his
suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and
whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. 59 It surmised how the defense, especially
Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men which
allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays were assembled at the house
of Naron that night, and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the
target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle
would be coming from the direction of Salangsangs house such knowledge is supposedly
evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to
afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the house of Naron,
the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses were
deliberately not lit that night.60
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the position of the
Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet holes
on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of
the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence
and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight
to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been
tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed
been discharged.61
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence
pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney
and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such
damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the
front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of
the street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in
the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of
petitioners. 62
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners
admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion
that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective
to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who
among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally
wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were
shown to have discharged their firearms that night petitioners herein.63 Interestingly, it was
speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or
subsequent to or contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or
that some, if not all of them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel
Corporation;64 and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there
could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP
authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.65 It likewise found very consequential
the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly
because it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in
view of the weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of
lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits to the
effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Narons residence from
which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.66
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how
the aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring
Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a
deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere
suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding
holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons
for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the
scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements
of that circumstance.67
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for 60
days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits; 68 that he was
earning P8,350.00 monthly;69 and that he had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw
jeepney.70 Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent P18,000.00 for the funeral of
his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot andP20,000.00 in
attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases.71 He also submitted a certification from San
Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.72 On these bases, the
Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00
as actual and compensatory damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the
proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount
of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the
proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy and
labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly established
that he had by positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the
other accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal object has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva,
who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were
taken to the hospital on his jeepney.73 He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayans
declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a well-planned police operation,
but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the
barangay officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He
theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or
frustrated homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. 74 He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were
caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the
scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the
scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful
performance thereof a fact which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it
dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.75 He
also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why
he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects
were armed rebel elements.76
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision
was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously
attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police
officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs
comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of
evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu,
Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to present
evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and
CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and,
hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an
established fact.77 Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based
on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those
presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and
suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
prosecution.78 Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and
that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of
the incident or that they were among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they
identified as among the perpetrators of the crime.79
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim
that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the
incident was the result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by the
accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned,
shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that
alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely followed
orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the latter,
David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed
to have had community of criminal design with the rest of the accused.80 They affirm Yapyucos
statement that they fired warning shots at the subject jeepney,81 but only after it had passed the
place where they were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then
became apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the
chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill
motives that would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since
none of the victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they
were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly
aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their fire
when Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that
if killing was their intent, then they could have easily fired at the victims directly.82
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of
conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled
themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be
coming from Salangsangs residence. It posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired
upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged.83 It
believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the
road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target as shown by the trajectories of the
bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.84 This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley
of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening
consequence.85 It refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was
no factual basis to support the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the
NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the
suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely responded to the call of
duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the
performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by
innocent individuals instead.86
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence adduced
before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on them,
the OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu,
had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the
case for decision as to them with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial
of due process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence
on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the
presentation of their own evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an
accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially
where the latter has failed to register his objection thereto.87
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to rest on
loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence
nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the
incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony which was
adopted by Cunanan and Puno as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their
affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution,88 explained that their presence
at the scene was in response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed
rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly
spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal
to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake
of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the
shooting transpired when it became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet
contention arises as to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of
Licup and injured Villanueva.
implication in his affidavit that it was "the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing vehicle" 98 that
the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the
CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.99
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only Manguerra
from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning shots, 100 and that
it was the "policemen [who] directly fired upon" the jeepney.101 Manguerra himself shared this
statement.102 Yet these accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet
holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony,
described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This
evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the
jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already moved past them such that the line of fire
to the passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim
that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot
where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of
the yard of Narons house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would be
direct and perpendicular to it.103
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who among
the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the
examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted
within the yard of Narons house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot
be applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may
not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a
joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused,
Yapyuco.104
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said
accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats
in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other
accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible
against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.105 It is thus
perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as
the latters testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to
present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or
non-participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been
denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the
prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory
admissions of their co-accused.
II.
89
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal. To this
end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit90 of Andres
Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit91 of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit92 of
Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit93 of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit94 of
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief,
Cunanan and Puno stated therein that "[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" when it
accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyucos signal for it to
stop;95 in their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were "constrained
x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle."96 Yapyucos open court declaration, which
was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning
to the subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires
thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape.97 He suggested substantiating the
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in
the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.106 The justification is based on the complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony
connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.107 Where invoked,
this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the
injury or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized
because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of
his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the
accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden
necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not
obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them who
were either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of
peace and order were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel
infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their
suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received;
they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had
just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be
argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence
suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects
under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims
having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or
having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly
those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material
evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger
in the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed
and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or
not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not
stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the
accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably
be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of
policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that
he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his
call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or
a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects,
since the completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.108
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. 109 United States v.
Campo110 has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is
not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of
resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected
and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the
same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer
had used necessary force.111 He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be effected otherwise.112 People v. Ulep113 teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The
law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be
true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation
where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that
the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a
clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound
discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they
are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal
elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with
human rights.114
Thus, in People v. Tabag,115 where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four members of a
family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the accused
sought exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said,
thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no evidence that Welbino
Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they
were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they
were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day.
Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the
Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution. 116
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that it
failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead tried
to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing
the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it
the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been
to,117 still, we find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact
there was at least one other vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco
which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived
to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of
force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that
petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does not
necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been
confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims.
No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their
suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to
take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they
actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to
Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and
limb all of which could not have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their
duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure.
In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true,
would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution.118 Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime.119 It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent.120 The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and it does not look
at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.122 A proper invocation of this defense
requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;123 (b) that it be a matter of fact;124 and
(c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.126
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah
Chong,127 but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the
physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression
which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the
sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after
having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the
intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and,
perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned
out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest
mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court
explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all
cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves
the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as
laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence
of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on
which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is
legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without
fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure. x x x 128
the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its
responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.133 By reasonable doubt is meant that
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. 134 The overriding consideration
is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.135
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.136 Corpus delicti consists of two things:
first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.137 In
homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the
party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than
the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced
the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct
or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill.
Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at
the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.138 In such case, even if there is no
intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the
penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. 139 Evidence of intent to kill is crucial
only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of
these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of
the other elements of said offenses.140
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the justification of an act, which
is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on
the part of the accused.131Thus, Ah Chong further explained that
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting
that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the
jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense
evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are
replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the
suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on conceded to be a
mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan
had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with
NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was
being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a
number of ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the
neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of
these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.141
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the
facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.132
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and materiality.
Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains
significance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence purely circumstantial or
otherwise inconclusive.142 The question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as
to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no
doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so
important to know the reason for the deed.143
IV.
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to kill
anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by
which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion
than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt
that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to
sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been
established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is
bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of
circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill.
Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always
proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances
so far as they develop in the evidence.144
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber
carbine.145 While the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they
are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney,
it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It
must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at
that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine
the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at
the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers
or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself
of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we
find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the
jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in
instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon
the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we
found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on
the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the
consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other
inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack
of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State146 tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences
of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by
the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes
that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found
to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it
was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was
designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of
killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744
that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice.147 People v.
Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,150 we
held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as
reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated
homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once
found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken
up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.151
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence.1a\^/phi1 From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.152 The instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners
that they were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to
conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that
matter, had converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by
Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to
let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred to them that
the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to
stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with the
convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepneys supposed
escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their common
purpose. And by their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from
the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the suspects,
conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve their object as shown
by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and
perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused
had discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since
only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that
night and had fired the same, they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences
of the subject law enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.153
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal
injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other
accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.154 The
allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the
evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of
petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and
evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable
proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal
whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower
by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in
these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there
being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six
(6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision
correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed attempted
homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2)
degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision
correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in moral
damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages andP20,000.00 as
moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case
No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in
moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual
and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out
upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
G.R. No. L-5272
March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of
the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a
house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40
meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers'
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of
the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In
the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from
the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise
at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook;
and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his
pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left
the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and
Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess
hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped
at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party
separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found
Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran
back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and
sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who
he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the
exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx
xxx
xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the
intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as
the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of
the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his
whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the
time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of
a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no
real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under
his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the
facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's
Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7
Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the
crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or
offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to
the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or
other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is
true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions
of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some
form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of
express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from
acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime
or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.
And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is
little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether
it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the
affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so
little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of
them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a
crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less
according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or,
as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended
to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used
in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly
asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime;
and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly
set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied
and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in
itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which
case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may
consider proper.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is
no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under
our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the
sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in
its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which
is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may
be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law;
nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a
necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the
trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element
of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence
or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
degrees.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."
And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a
bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes
"malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word
"malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of
a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in
one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning
from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports
his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to
the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing
was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal
mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in
philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any
age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a
principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine
confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct
on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my
will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the
happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we
hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold
him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In
times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around
the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that
where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no
one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind,
destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment
which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him,
it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost
confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these
facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the
doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which
the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain
acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will
not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose
need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg.
Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves
the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as
laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C.
C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the
mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be
expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with
the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts,
and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it
is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding
some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness,
he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise,
and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is
the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds
up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is
killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled
at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent,
and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in
cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be
either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used
and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case,
Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life
as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a
club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say
that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol?
Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he
strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a doctrine which
would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered
that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
(Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at
bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the
man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a
person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a
contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown
person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on
the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the
unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he
learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral
congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always
sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free
from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
theAudiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the
force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned
him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon
appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven,
that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who
was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation
and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence,
and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was
unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with
which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use
means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with
which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might
bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did
not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means
employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred,
etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the
voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his
pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before
simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his
assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak,
for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place.
Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide,
as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4,
article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find,
but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that
the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the
identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness
and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable.
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night,
by a large stone thrown against his window at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money,
otherwise his house would be burned" because of which, and observing in an alley
adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in
just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites
of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the
accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by
threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was
in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge;
that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant
at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and
the property under his charge.
G.R. No. 209464
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
July 1, 2015
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries,
and perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the
Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
36, Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A.
Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8049, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information4 against the petitioners before the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That
on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity
and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose
identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as
condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information5 which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-name accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of
Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA,
a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to
physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause,6 but it was
denied by the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and
jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies
are summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal
Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat.
Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did
not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and
legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer
running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he
saw large contusions on both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to
the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him
that they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baos, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned
them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of
the men just said that they were headed somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report. 8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with
hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also
because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that
he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his
findings in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found various external injuries
in the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various
severity and nature. He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to
head injury contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his
previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazingrelated. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking
of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol,
Calamba City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January
13, 2006, at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw
a jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as
the person seated beside the driver of the jeepney.11 She estimated the ages of these persons in
the group to be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men
wore white long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands
and embraced each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the
resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like
they were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was
shown photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went
to her store.12 It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the
policemen visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the
comer of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the
resort needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who
needed a ride. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked
very weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being
carried and sensed it was cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside
the emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go
home. Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards
on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men,
who signed on the logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the
lifeless body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the
security guards did not allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police
station .so that an investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital.
During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons who brought
Villanueva to the hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock
in the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless
body of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s
corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen
companions then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what
happened, but they invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy.
Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked
on the door and the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baos (UP Los Baos)
students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added
that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting
the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baos during the
academic year of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in
the UPLB Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away
from her. She identified the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.14They were wearing black
shirts with the logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and,
with their heads bowed, approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was
carrying a 5-gallon water container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did
not report to him when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but
the latter just kept quiet with his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates
at the UP Los Baos Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali
Subdivision, Los Baos, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva
introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also
to undergo final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baos, testified that Dungo and
Sibal were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for
initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baos, testified that Villanueva was a
B.S. Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baos,15 as evidenced by his official transcript
of record.16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the
UP Los Baos, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006
against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa
Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses
for the complainant.17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified
that he met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to
convince her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her
safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked
and vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son,
her family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the
aggregate amount ofP140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.18 Her husband also
incurred travel expenses in the amount ofP7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his
son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane ticket.19 She further attested that she
experienced mental anguish, sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family
relationship as a result of her son's death.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006,
around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baos Graduate
School. Dungo asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in
the negative because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
Cornelio again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine
along Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baos, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked
Dungo if he would attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he
and his girlfriend had something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around
1 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo
Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baos Graduate
School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there
from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo
Restaurant for dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her
boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed
and slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006,
they were roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo then left the boarding house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at
the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baos Graduate School and inquired about the requirements
for a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked
about their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo
and Rivera then reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near
Crossing Junction, Los Baos. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half
hours. Then they walked back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met
Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he
would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the negative. Dungo
and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep
because Sibal was palling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to
Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led
him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and
Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the
hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He
identified himself before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real
name.
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the
tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baos because their neophytes would be initiated that
night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada,
Los Baos. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a
bruise on the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa
Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to
the second floor of the resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around
11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to
stay at the resort and accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes,
Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los Baos.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baos from 2002 to 2006, taking up
B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in
charge of fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood
donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's
tambayan for the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the initiation
rites, Sibal, together with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baos, where he saw
fellow fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face.
Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a
rest. A few minutes later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's
face. He was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and
the other neophytes came out and told him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that
they were returning to UP Los Baos. Sibal wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay
with Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on
the second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the
early morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who
looked unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about
Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After
Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital.
There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4
of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial
court stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los
Banos Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of
Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day
by the testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo,
the prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP
Los Bafios student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal
were members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal,
together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported
Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba
City, for the final initiation rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort,
performed under the cover of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by
Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and
that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal
Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to
bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for
their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final
initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend
Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by
the defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of
denial of Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were
suspect because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of
Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of money:
1. P141,324.00 for and as actual damages;
2. P200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. P100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. P50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the
prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049.
They also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere
presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding
them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently
weak, could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime. The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their
presence in the venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches
Resort for the final initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the
assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE
THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT FROM
THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY
INCLUDE THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049
because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"24 during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing
by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation.
Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information.
By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.
In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that
Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and
convicted for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty
members and officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite
would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the
victim to be present thereat and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others.26 In
their Reply27filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance
between the, offense charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the
offense "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat."28 The prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or
circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among the
petitioners and the other twenty accused.
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise
only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon
the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule
45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail
the existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an
examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the
novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for
review.37 Substantive Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due
to hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare
undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony,
cries and ordeal of their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter
how modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of
fraternities, sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of
the academe.
The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher
court authority.29The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due
process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court
when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 31 According to the
said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of
Appeals."
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of
Villareal v. People.38It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of
hazing were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.39 Thus, a
study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the
current predicament of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and
Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states.40 In the case of
People v. Lenti,41the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining
hazing on the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would
have been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new
forms of hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or
emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.42
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.33
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence,
acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing
may include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual
hazing have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does
not only result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and
traumatic stress.45
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall
raise only questions of law.34Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons.35 In other
words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused
may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter
of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception
of Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing
laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to
six years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result
in death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony.49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident,
was enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or
she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily
injury or death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is
categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal
Law of New York.51
Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and
Texas, the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing. 52 In fact, in Alabama, no
person is allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the
offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission. 53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a
hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have
removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts
to effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases.56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned. 57 Hazing, which
threatens to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are
possible.58
In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for
complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on
their heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and head.
The Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v.
Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of
aspirating his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation
ritual. The defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to
the victim. The court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively
contributed to the death of the victim as part of their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District, 61 a tenthgrade wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing,
including; a ritual where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with
his buttocks exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the
incident despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the
parties in the amount ofUS$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old
freshman, who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi
Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a
chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity
because, even if the student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its
activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain
redress before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the
distinct dilemma of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to
the rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa.63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin
Reglos of the San', Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the
Philippines - Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for
an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and
acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious
to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however,
there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.67
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act
or .omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral
in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is
mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of
the statute.68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would
show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows:
SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong
kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan
na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas
ang penalty sa inyo."
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition
of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,
fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted
in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But
I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that
resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we
create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements
of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate,
the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the
Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking
the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of
certain acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered
crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing,
but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these
very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group
of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes,
Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of
lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one
will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of
inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or
the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did
not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SENATOR LINA. x x x
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether
it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he
wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will
not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose
that suggestion, Mr. President.69
[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto.
Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.70 In
Vedana v. Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had
spoken, through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral,
but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the
existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar
tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the
definition of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities.74 In fact,
the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army
Training. Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation
engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049
qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices
to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular
members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the
National Police Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Director General of the PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that
initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the
following requisites are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school
authorities or head of organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct
of such initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3)
days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during
such initiation rites. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the
head of the school or organization or their representatives that they must
assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to be present
during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative ,is to see to it
that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte
or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or
organizations that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and
organization administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the
law, which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and
accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected
to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof,
the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in
the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any
person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein.76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the
victim.77 The penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less
serious physical injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the penalties for
hazing increased one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would
aggravate the imposable penalty.79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical
or psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical
harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the victim.
Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him,
there is still a prescribed penalty.80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing.81 Although these
planners were not present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be
liable as principals. The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the
organization, such as their former officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be
present thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct
participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by
inducing the victim to attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when
the acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but
also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity,
group, or organization.84 The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members.
The parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to
take any action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including
faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed
to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as
accomplices.85 Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an
accomplice to the crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge
of the hazing conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the same. Recognizing
the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with the
said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim
shall not be a defense in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as
a punishable act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the
consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering
is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries
merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. n '.'provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military
or citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on
the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their
conviction.89 Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal
actions against the offenders.90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and
contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the
penalties imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage
would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law
can be effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1
contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of
Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA,
a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to
physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a
person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly.92
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information
included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One
of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present.
Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually
brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the
death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of
the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. 93 To require the
prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception
of the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous
task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad
impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity
which has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently
informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned
initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven
conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to

constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable
presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4,
paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie
evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable
acts. This provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence
of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps
to prevent the commission of the hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the
CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain
facts have still to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce."100
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a
common design to commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and,
from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.96 Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President.98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not
prove conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders
are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia
gives rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check
for insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit;102 and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.103
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the
crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts
that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a
requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing;
and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing
because of their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo
and Sibal during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of
Ignacio. She testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this
group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.
xxxx
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?
xxxx
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial,
can you please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said
visited your store is here?
xxxx
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on
the first row.
xxxx
ATIY. PAMAOS:
For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness
has been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring
to Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the
night of the hazing, to wit:
COURT
Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how
would you know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?
WITNESS
A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka
iyong nagyakapan po ... "
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that
you could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng
driver bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod
nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila
iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver
came out and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney,
is that your testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor.105
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight
because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established
the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence
of their actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut
and overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that
they performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they
induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based
on the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of
hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.106Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the
petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing,
the petitioners? guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not
merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law, proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.108
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when
direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt
of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution
may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct
evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit
heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.109 Needless
to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the
Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any
information regarding initiation rites.110 The silence is only broken after someone has been
injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is
revealed and the activities become public.111 Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is
only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial
evidence to prove it.
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of
all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.112 To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to
form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate
Joey Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at
their tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters
way from her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she
did not know the third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of
the Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology
wing arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the
victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to
the two fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo."
He later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant
Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him
why he did not report to him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then
continuously punched the victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just
kept quiet with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards
the Entomology wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the
evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the
initiation right [sic]. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio
saw more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a
jeepney.1wphi1 She estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30
years old. Three (3) persons riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who
looked like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons
went to her store to buy some items. She did not know their names but could identity
[sic] their faces. After she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man
later identified as Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the man later
identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified
that around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for
passengers at the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and
told him that someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort
and asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the
body of the man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak
like a vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P.
Rizal Hospital and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the
early morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo
Natividad and hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at
the emergency room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an
arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the passengers thereof as
appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the passengers unload
a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied
that they did not bring with them any I.D. or wallet.1wphi1 Instead of giving their true
names, the appellants listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon
Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to
leave, not telling them that they secretly called the police to report the incident which
was their standard operating procedure when a dead body was brought to the
hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency
room, observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the
latter did not respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan
noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several
injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already
cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on
both legs which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial
portion or the back of the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined
that he was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having
undergone hazing when he was a student and also because of his experience treating
victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region
IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of
death was blunt head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct postmortem examination of the two (2) persons whose deaths were attributed to hazing.
These two (2) persons sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of
their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both
persons died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries found
on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva,
sustained similar injuries to those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple
injuries and contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were hazingrelated.114
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are
the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.115 As properly held
by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense
witnesses also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was
suspect because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she
would stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity
brothers, likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome
of the case. Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested
witnesses to substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the
guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by
the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They
took part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted
physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical
injuries eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life
lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven,
the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No.
8049 was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were
raised. The Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous
in penalizing the crime of hazing.
G.R. No. 192330
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of
R.A. No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the
court, it is not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused
to be overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and
substantiate the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties
must also consider hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the
discussion earlier, this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should
be a penalty or liability for noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and
with Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should
also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs
on R.A. No. 8049, the movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a
democratic response to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should,
be another way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of violence and
suffering. The senseless deaths of these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the
spark that lights the candles of their graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as
guidance for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of
the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section
2 and 3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED.
November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those
suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of
victims of calamities.
The Facts and the Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte,
Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials
to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the
labor needed for construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan,
was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find
food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement.
Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the
municipalitys Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom.
And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be
given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to
seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed
the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to
CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting
department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of
the Municipal Accountants Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an
emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those
goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the
municipal auditor as per auditing rules.
The Courts Rulings
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the
present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head,
testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leytes
malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation
Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro
committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted
Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was
based on the executive budget7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for
the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which covers the CSAP housing
projects.9 The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunians intention to appropriate
separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for
the poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the
Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipalitys poor CSAP
beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA
Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found
nothing irregular in its transactions.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be
used for SFPs needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of
its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the
moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2)
the families of six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule
provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people who
are in urgent need of the governments limited resources.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
technical malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public
service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that
Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been
appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoros motion
for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this
Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayans finding that he committed technical
malversation. He particularly raises the following questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose
different from their originally intended purpose;
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings
that could be used to augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him;
and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies
public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use
for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for
the offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he
gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If
Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for
the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that,
therefore, the same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v.
People12 which states that funds classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or
ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoros
argument.
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran
throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already
finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had
already distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of
2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded
savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or
can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the
year was quite premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly
apply funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose.
Thus:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. Funds shall be available exclusively for
the specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item to another. However, the local chief
executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized
to augment any item in the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in
other items within the same expense class of their respective appropriations.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law
gives the Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize
the augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of
the subject goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro
failed to present the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would
have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the
presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor
testified, his testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditors view
regarding the transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the
mayors liability if it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into
speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and
testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for
the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he
consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries.
Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.1wphi1
G.R. No. 186412
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to
another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act
as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoros act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted,
constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that
his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010. SO ORDERED.
September 7, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02550, which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant
Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of
murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ,
thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.4
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr.
Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store located at C-4
Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendejas
store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store,
Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of
Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs
body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to
catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the
broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.5 Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical
Center.6
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz
sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on
February 14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that
he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical
chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.7 Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruzs death in the following manner:
The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of opening the
mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic
encephalopathy neuro transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus,
Stage III.8
The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz
at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias
testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres testimony on
Cruz dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta
recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two oclock in the morning of
January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm
around Villacortas shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went
home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruzs death
upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.9
On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.10
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal to
assail his conviction by the RTC.11 The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacortas
brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief12 on May 30, 2007; while the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief 13 on October 2, 2007.
On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC
judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was adopting the
Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.14 The OSG, likewise, manifested that it
was no longer filing a supplemental brief. 15
In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE COULD
ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.16
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident. It was
Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early morning of
January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendejas account of the stabbing incident is replete
with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1)
instead of shouting or calling for help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja
attempted to run after and catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendejas own account, there were
other people who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only
Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described, then it
would have been physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator,
who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran
in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder
weapon, was left at her store, although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left
embedded in Cruzs body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are
neither trivial nor inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from
its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude
under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.17
opportunity to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.18
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate
such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have ruled
time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and
accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive
can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, then her version of the story
deserves much weight.19
The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters
that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed
Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendejas store.
In the face of Mendejas positive identification of Villacorta as Cruzs stabber, Villacorta could
only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is
inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.20
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the testimony
of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected Villacortas attempts to impugn
Mendejas testimony, thus:
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Appellants reason for concluding that witness Mendejas testimony is incredible because she
did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court
because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found
to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.
"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons could have run after
the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness Mendeja, the other person
whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was wounded. Further, the
stabbing occurred at 2:00 oclock in the morning, a time when persons are expected to be
asleep in their house, not roaming the streets.
His [Villacortas] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible
or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper in view of his admission
that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the morning
and that he assaulted the victim by boxing him.
Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support appellants
argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and
regular customers. There was light in front of the store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and
meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly those buying articles
from the store. The victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further,
immediately after the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."21
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23,
2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe
tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did
not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical
Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up
medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between January 23 to February 14,
2002.
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the Court was confronted with a case of very similar
factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked
Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on Javiers hand. Javier was treated by Dr.
Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and
convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that Javiers serious condition was
caused by tetanus infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information
was filed against Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano appealed before this Court, arguing that
Javiers own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr.
Meneses examined Javiers wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could
have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after
sustaining his injury. The Court granted Urbanos appeal.
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in
the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives
way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is
the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In
the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred to
as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a
poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible
central nervous system damage and death.
"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of
more than 6 days.Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms
are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time.
The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound
could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.23
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking incident
and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court that
Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano
that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)24
We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of
Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing
and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe
tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano,
severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit
symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality.
Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its
subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The
infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.1wphi1 Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and
form part of those constituting the offense of murder.25
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals
expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to
wit:
Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the left
side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as lethal as those made
of metallic material. The part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can
ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt
as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the
appellant. x x x.26
The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to
the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accusedappellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When
such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical
injuries only.27
Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical treatment
immediately after the stabbing incident.1avvphi1 Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz
was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no other evidence
to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more
than nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.28
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in the
Information and proved during trial.
The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets
out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the
employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and
the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real
opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor.29 Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person,
treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. 30
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case, and
we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two oclock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out
buying bread at Mendejas store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally
unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with
a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body,
then swiftly ran away. Villacortas treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all
to defend himself or retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall
be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.31 The Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its coverage cases where the
penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year.32 With the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the
maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon
Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has
been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence,
we order his immediate release.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a
proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to
previous jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is
appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.33
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has
been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas immediate release, unless Villacorta is being
lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision, of the compliance with such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. The
police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for
Wilsons death.
SO ORDERED.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI
performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings:
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner
Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching
fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead
when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and
dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,

vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents.
Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy particles with bloody
path.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old,
were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go
fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.1 Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was
dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of
the drainage system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered
the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter
wide, with water about a foot deep.3 After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish,
came out of the drainage system and left4without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came
out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead.
Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area.5Shocked at the sudden
turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto
rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.7
Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody froth.
Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide by dolo against the
two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the
respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating,
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to
drown and die.
the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co.,
91 Phil. 672)15
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified on direct
examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head and the abrasion on the latters
left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object.
The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some
muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik").
Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure
or by force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was
caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt
instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his
head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons head could
have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the boy could
have died by drowning.
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and speculations
when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the
drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake
which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert;
or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner
also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive
on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent Andres even
informed her of Wilsons death.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the 4x3centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the
trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted the
pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,13 the prosecution
rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold
the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove
their liability for Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of the
case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21, 2001. It
ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that
the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the
above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY,

LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr.
Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the victim which caused his
death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents
after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left
the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent Andres
returned inside the drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting
for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that either or
both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable
therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution failed to
adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the death
of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil liability of such person
established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.18 When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.19 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating
the civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21 The sole purpose of the civil action is
the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury
he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.22 While the prosecution
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is
required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for
damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does
not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while
"logical" means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the
resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender,
the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause and effect"
relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the
pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition
of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended
party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions
supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury,
and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and
death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed
to the death of the victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take
away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. 30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the
present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and
in this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the
evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by
the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased
was the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is
evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People v.
Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for
homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of
two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the act.
Wharton says that corpus delictiincludes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause
or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder,
there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter
alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private complainant is
burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence. Although the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, he is not
entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the
defendants.35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence
is determined:
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that the victim
was still alive when he was placed under water.37
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.36
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victims face could have been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by the face
rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents
rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of Garcia, who
was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the victim was
strangled?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda,
the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased
sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the
deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the
deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have
slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
COURT:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the victim fell
down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object and might have been
inflicted as a result of falling down?
The Court would ask questions.
A - If the fall if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.39
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is the hematoma, caused on the back of the head might
be due to the victims falling on his back and his head hitting a pavement?
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong enough and
would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the pavement,
the injury might be caused by that slipping?
The trial court took into account the following facts:

Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were stones
inside the culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have caused the victim to slip and
hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with
water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head
and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and drown.40
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible that he
might have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion based on the
said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of facts of the
trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusion
anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court,
unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which,
if considered, would change the outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any
justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that
the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join
respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.41 Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only
respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the abrasion on the left
forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face and left
forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the
respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt
object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the
deceased.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the culvert, I ran
immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres also came or
arrived?
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action for
damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no
reason at all.42However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and
admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the
deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing.
Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with
her son before the latters death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from her mother
who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)43
G.R. No. 162540
July 13, 2009
When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who
brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her sons death. Even after
informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her
way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,

vs.
PERALTA, J.:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?

A He went with me, Sir.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated
December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the
matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for
her purchases from Mega Foam.4Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from
company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside
the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro
Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in
his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown
woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted.
He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the
identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check
bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman who rediscounted
the check.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals
the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount
of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l.,
Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in
the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who
was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject
BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the
bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through
Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through
Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca
to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to
take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills
were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's
plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was
then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan
did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was
only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the
premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the
cash she actually brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously
given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep,
gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified
theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife
of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997,
but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time
before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal
check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former
and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had
no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of
Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the
NBI agents arrested them.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner
Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the
information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June
30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on
the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia)
could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she
agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where
Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby
Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait
for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave
her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y
Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime ofQUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of
the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as
collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and,
instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another the check belonged
to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with
intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact
that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment
from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be
a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence petitioner is
admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto
mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the
law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59,
both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime.
Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for theinherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means
employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense
has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not
produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to
produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held
in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, "there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of
personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing
of] personal property of another without the latters consent."
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the
position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by
one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony
that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for
the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check
was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving
the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with
cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTYof an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as
defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and
to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental
and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the
shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that
before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially
Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and
his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due
to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own
spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her
house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced,
that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality,
and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically
possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the
courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired
by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act
which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in
order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2)
there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of
the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is
the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police
officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused
failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It
held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party
imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no
less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country
that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and
these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is
committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him
liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only
became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did
not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is
inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by
outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts
not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of
his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the
public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the
unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again:
Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort
to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention
will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes
cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking
that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house.
The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make
this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely
upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine
and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators
and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If
the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to
smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if
done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send
a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However,
unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The
lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a
charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the
Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal
by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility
until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court
will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted
of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It
appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to
commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment,
the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt not for an impossible
crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible
crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger
and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months ofarresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the
reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution2 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David
(CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with
attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering
the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying
effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of
rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable
to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage
and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private
complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa,
Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some
detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", ) along A.H.
Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou
Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right
in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
G.R. No. 138033
February 22, 2006
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece
of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her
mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this
the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then
squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx.
Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out
during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes and weight. His upper garment was of
cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He was
wearing a t-shirt and shorts Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo
Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue
(TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her
room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one
without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by
the time CHITOs knocking on the door woke him up, . He was able to fix the time of CHITOs
arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was
awakened by the knock at the door .
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when
he let the latter in. . It was at around 3 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he
woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista
(Bernard), .
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOUs room and thereat was shown by Bernard the
open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to
CHITO . He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not
being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate , was friendly
until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita,
mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. . (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was
in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to
see if the others were there. xxx.
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at
1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with a marking on
the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the quoted letters the word
1946 UST Medicine and Surgery (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand
name Adidas (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room 306.
This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission
to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.
People from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning . They likewise invited
CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned .
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G
Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] . S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the
security guards logbook :
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter
from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be
our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), .
An occupant of Room 310 Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon
of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and
Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for
anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the
authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit.
Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45)
from inside their unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the
investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO
(Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p.
45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white tshirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief ,
three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the
handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITOs because CHITO had lent the very same one to him
. The t-shirt with CHITOs fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the
handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what
consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadans testimony.
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results:
Exhs. C and D POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
xxx xxx xxx.

Exhs. A, B, E and F are insufficient for further analysis.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared
to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time
Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 oclock that
afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom
where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 oclock in Camp
Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M.
Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted
laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted. Her Chemistry Report No. C487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked UNIMART with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh C One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked JONAS with the following:
Exh. D One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. E One (1) white T-shirt marked TMZI.
Exh. F One (1) black short (sic) marked ADIDAS.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above
stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. C and D contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied
committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou.
Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as
culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of (UST). With Robert Chan and Alberto
Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity . MALOU, , was
known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building , CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong
tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at Dos
Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was
included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas
gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street,
North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool . Soon after, the four
(4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into
the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he
was dunked. Perla Duran, , offered each dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the
white t-shirt with the Fraternitys symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Albertos car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol
TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15),
CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13,
1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had
left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush
(Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day .
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and , S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch,
approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time was
1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry . xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 . xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10)
minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie
window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes,
approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid.,
pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO
then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, , at last answered the
door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and
went inside the bedroom. CHITO , changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on
the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up . He was already in his
school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked
the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had
happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not able
to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building . When two
(2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself.
Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306.
xxx xxx xxx
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray bag
which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to the
fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag
when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 oclock in the early morning of December 13,
1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 oclock in the morning to
go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December
13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid).
He only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among
the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioners fraternity brothers, Alberto
Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991
party held in Dr. Durans place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming from
the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were
one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and
leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of
the said building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of
December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and
white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with
stripes after the dunking party held in her fathers house.8 Presented as defense expert witness
was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court
showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor
staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and
the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted
rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
When they arrived at Camp Crame , Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and
talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina
Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus
reasonable Attorneys fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx

Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to
undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital .. At the hospital, CHITO and
Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip .
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him
by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7
oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9
P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS
agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag
were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask
CHITO if the items thereat were his.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999,
affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a quo,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed
resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred 1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted
rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove
the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial
evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based
thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are
unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award
was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and
that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground
that the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA
erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable jurisprudence,
the Court is disposed to rule for petitioners acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no
direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned
Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act
of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last
seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence.13 In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be
hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the
intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CAs finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity of
the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room of
MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and
egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin,
but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts
and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of
December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of
her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satinsmooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the
handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short
pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time,
Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the
incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both contained chloroform, a
volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of
her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that
the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malous face the piece of cloth
soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced
the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that
petitioners actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can
not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after
he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said,
adds that if petitioners intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.15
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His
sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the
intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist
would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her
guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to
the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M.
Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the
cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code.18
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the
rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for
proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted
rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that
petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in
the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an
overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce
her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to
rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner
wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys
guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainants feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged
locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude
that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises,
of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation
that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during
the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of
acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article
287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an
accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,24 it cannot
be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded
against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to
make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to
allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust
vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term
is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical
or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.25 The paramount question
is whether the offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the
mind of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while
relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a
case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts
of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING
petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is
adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor
and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Witnesses for the defense narrated a different version. They pointed to Angel Soliva instead as
the person to blame for Noli Madriaga's death while justifying Noel Madriaga's wound as a result
of self-defense.
G.R. Nos. 138943-44
September 17, 2001

vs.
HENRY ALMAZAN, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision1 of the trial court declaring accused-appellant Henry
Almazan guilty of murder and frustrated murder. It traces its origin to two
(2) Informations charging Henry Almazan with shooting Noli S. Madriaga with a handgun,
aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation, which caused the latter's death; and with
shooting Noel Madriaga with the same handgun which would have produced the latter's death if
not for timely medical attendance, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. C-51276 and C-51277
respectively. These cases were tried jointly pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 119, of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
On 28 September 1996, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Madriaga and a certain
Allan played chess in front of the former's house at Pag-asa, Camarin, Caloocan City.
Spectators were Vicente's son Noli, who was carrying his 2-year old daughter, Vicente's
grandson Noel, and a neighbor named Angel Soliva. While the game was underway, Henry
Almazan unexpectedly arrived and brandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group.
Almazan's fighting cocks had just been stolen and he suspected Angel, one of the spectators, to
be the culprit. Thus he said, "manos-manos na lang tayo,"2 aimed his gun at Angel and pulled
the trigger. It did not fire. He tried again, but again it failed.
At this juncture, Vicente Madriaga stood up and tried to calm down Henry, but the latter refused
to be pacified("ayaw paawat"). Angel ran away and Henry aimed his gun instead at Noli. Noli
cried for mercy, for his life and that of his daughter, but to no avail.3 Henry shot Noli at the left
side of his stomach sending him immediately to the ground. His daughter, unscathed, held on to
Noli, crying. Henry then turned on Noel and shot him on the left thigh. Noel managed to walk
lamely ("paika-ika") but only to eventually fall to the ground. Thereafter, Vicente Madriaga called
on his neighbors who brought Noli and Noel to the hospital. Noli however died before reaching
the hospital, while Noel survived his injuries.
Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service conducted an autopsy on the body
of Noli which revealed that the cause of the victim's death was a gunshot at the trunk from a .38
caliber revolver. Dr. Misael Jonathan Ticman, attending physician of Noel, in turn declared that
the gunshot wound on the left thigh of Noel was a minor injury that would heal in a week.4 Noel
was never admitted in the hospital as his doctor sent him home the same day.5 On crossexamination, Dr. Ticman testified that if not medically treated the wound might get infected or
lead to the victim's death.6
Henry Almazan testified that at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 28 September 1996 he
went home accompanied by his friend Johnald Molina. Henry's wife informed him upon his
return that his fighting cocks, twelve (12) in number, had been stolen. He went out of the house
to inquire from neighbors as to who could have taken his cocks. He was followed by Johnald. On
their way they saw Vicente Madriaga and Allan playing chess surrounded by Noli, Noel, Angel
and other persons. They were drinking liquor. As he (Almazan) and Johnald were passing by,
Angel called Henry and asked if he was looking for his fighting cocks. The group then burst into
laughter and pointed to their pulutan. Someone in the group advised Henry not to look anymore
for his fighting cocks as he would only be courting trouble ("naghahanap ka lang ng sakit ng
katawan"). To this advice Henry replied, "Bakit naman ganoon?" Suddenly, Angel pulled out his
gun and shot Henry twice but the gun did not fire. Seizing the opportunity Henry grappled with
Angel for the possession of his gun. During the scuffle Angel pulled the trigger which hit Noli.
Henry finally succeeded in wresting the gun from Angel and aimed it at him. Suddenly, he
received a blow from behind and he fell. As he raised his head from the ground, he saw Noel
poised to attack him with a broken bottle, so that he had to train his gun at the lower part of
Noel's body and fired. The bullet hit Noel on the thigh which sent him reeling down his
knees ("napaluhod"). Shocked and afraid that he hit Noel, Henry ran home.
Johnald Molina corroborated Henry Almazan's statement in all material points. Johnald testified
that the group mocked Henry when they told him not to look for his cocks anymore as they had
already been cooked for pulutan, and to insist in his search would only cause him physical
trouble. Henry could only reply, "Tila nga may nagnakaw ng mga manok ko . . . . Bakit naman
ganoon?" As he made his remarks, someone from the group suddenly pulled out a gun and
aimed at Henry. Henry grappled with the gun-wielder who pressed the trigger twice but the gun
misfired each time. When the gun-wielder pulled the trigger for the third time it fired, hitting a
person who was carrying a small child and standing within the vicinity. He was obviously
referring to Noli. Johnald immediately ran towards Henry's house to report the incident to his
wife and asked for help. Then he heard another shot, but in his haste to reach Henry's house he
ignored it. Upon reaching Henry's house, Henry also arrived. To avoid being involved and out of
fear, Johnald did not report the incident to the police. Later however, bothered by his conscience
and being the friend of Henry, Johnald volunteered to testify on what he knew of the incident.
The court a quo found Henry Almazan's defense devoid of merit. Apart from being positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as the person responsible for the violence and the
injuries inflicted, the trial court declared that the theft of Henry's fighting cocks constituted
sufficient motive for the killing and that as a cockfightafficionado he must have found it
imperative to exact vengeance on his suspected culprits.7 The trial court held that the testimony
of Johnald failed to create reasonable doubt on the guilt of Henry since as a friend he was
expected to extend succor to a friend, especially one in need.8 Thus, the trial court held Henry
Almazan guilty of murder and frustrated murder as charged.
In imposing the penalty for each offense, the lower court appreciated the qualifying circumstance
of treachery against accused-appellant on the ground that the victims were completely
defenseless when attacked and did not commit the slightest provocation, but found no
justification for evident premeditation as there was no proof as to the manner and time during
which the plan to kill was hatched. On the contrary, the trial court found in favor of accused-
appellant the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. Thus, in Crim. Case No. C51276, accused-appellant was sentenced to the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua instead
of death, with all the accessory penalties according to law, and ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity,P8,000.00 as funeral expenses, and to pay the costs;
while in Crim. Case No. C-51277, he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to payP20,000.00
as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.9
Accused-appellant now prays to be absolved of murder in Crim. Case No. C-51276 on the
ground that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the
testimony of Shirley Abordo, common-law wife of Nilo Madriaga, for being hearsay, as well as
the testimony of Vicente Madriaga for its alleged inconsistencies in various vital points.
Significantly, accused-appellant impugns the veracity of the prosecution's evidence for its failure
to present Angel Soliva who was primarily involved in the incident and whom the defense points
to as the real transgressor. Thus, accused-appellant contends that evidence sufficient to
establish the absolute and moral certainty of his guilt being absent he should be acquitted.
As for Crim. Case No. C-51277, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding
him guilty of frustrated murder as the wound sustained by Noel Madriaga was not fatal that could
have caused his death if not for timely medical assistance. Moreover, accused-appellant claims
that he shot Noel only to forestall any attack on him and not to kill Noel intentionally.
Appellate courts are doctrinally bound by the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence.
The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination - factors which are significant in the
evaluation of the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth.10 We see no reason to depart
from this doctrine.
The witnesses for the prosecution were consistent in their narration of the manner by which the
events transpired, and they remained steadfast in their identification of accused-appellant as the
author of the violence. Despite attempts to confound them, Vicente Madriaga and Noel Madriaga
were relentless in their declaration that it was accused-appellant, armed with a .38 caliber
revolver, who pounced upon them without warning thereby killing Noli Madriaga and wounding
Noel Madriaga in the process. They were one in their assertion that accused-appellant was
inflamed by his suspicion that Angel Soliva and Noel Madriaga had stolen his fighting cocks and
was intent on getting even with them, thus he fired at them. Efforts to pass the blame on the
group by claiming that in their inebriated state they mocked accused-appellant and thus initiated
the violence were actually set to naught as Vicente and Noel Madriaga unfailingly denied the
same.
True, Shirley Abordo's testimony was spattered with inconsistencies bordering at times on
incoherence. As she herself admitted, her narration was merely derived from the accounts of the
other prosecution witnesses and not from her own perception of the events. This constitutes
hearsay, which we then reject. Be that as it may, these alleged inconsistencies are immaterial
and irrelevant as they do not alter the determination of the Court that murder was committed and
accused-appellant was the assailant. For a discrepancy to serve as basis for acquittal, it must
refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused. An inconsistency, which
has nothing to do with the elements of the crime, cannot be a ground to reverse a conviction.11
In the same vein, the testimony of Angel Soliva or of Allan, with whom Vicente Madriaga was
playing chess, is unnecessary as the facts on record are clear enough for judicial assessment
and verdict.
The defense suggests that it could be Angel Soliva instead who shot Noli Madriaga. This is
unacceptable in the face of the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses. The allegation that the shooting was the accidental consequence of the struggle
between accused-appellant and Angel Soliva does not inspire belief as no substantial evidence
was presented to prove it. It is highly improbable that a struggle even occurred as accusedappellant and Angel Soliva were surrounded by the latter's friends who would have easily
ganged up on accused-appellant. Testimonial evidence to be credible should not only come from
the mouth of a credible witness but should also be credible, reasonable and in accord with
human experience,12 failing in which, it should be rejected.
Indeed, Johnald Molina corroborated the statement of accused-appellant pointing at Angel
Soliva as the real culprit; however, we are inclined to agree with the observation of the court a
quo that it was natural for an individual to exert effort in liberating his friend from confinement or
execution, even to the extent of distorting the truth.
It is significant to note that accused-appellant went into hiding after the shooting incident and
was only collared by the agents from the Western Police District eight (8) months later. Flight
indeed is an indication of guilt, especially when accused-appellant failed to sufficiently explain
why he left his residence and resurrected only several months after.
The trial court properly appreciated the presence of treachery as the attack was made upon the
unarmed victims who had not committed the slightest provocation and who were totally unaware
of the murderous designs of accused-appellant. Contrary to the finding of the court a quo,
treachery in this case qualifies the offense to murder, hence, may not be considered a generic
aggravating circumstance to increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. In other
words, while the imposable penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death, in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be appreciated in favor
of accused-appellant as this was never proved during the trial.
As for Crim. Case No. C-51277, accused-appellant admits responsibility for the injuries inflicted
on Noel but reasons out that he did so only to defend himself. Accused-appellant therefore
pleads self-defense, a justifying circumstance that could acquit him of the charge but which we
are not disposed to grant as the elements necessary to qualify his actions13 were not present. In
alleging that the killing arose from an impulse to defend oneself, the onus probandi rests upon
accused-appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements thereof: (a) that there
was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that there was reasonable necessity for the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the defendant.14 This, it has failed to discharge.
Nevertheless, we find that the accused-appellant should be held liable for attempted murder, not
frustrated murder. For the charge of frustrated murder to flourish, the victim should sustain a
fatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance. This is
not the case before us. The court a quoanchored its ruling on the statement of Dr. Ticman on
cross-examination that the wound of Noel could catch infection or lead to his death if not timely
and properly treated. However, in his direct testimony, Dr. Ticman declared that the wound was
a mere minor injury for which Noel, after undergoing treatment, was immediately advised to go
home.15 He even referred to the wound as a slight physical injury that would heal within a
week16and for which the victim was in no danger of dying.17 Clear as the statement is, coupled
with the fact that Noel was indeed immediately advised to go home as he was not in any danger
of death, we have no reason to doubt the meaning and implications of Dr. Ticman's statement.
His statement that Noel could catch infection was based on pure speculation rather than on the
actual nature of the wound which was a mere minor injury, hence, not fatal. According to
jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury that was not fatal, and could not cause
his death, the crime would only be attempted.18 The observation that the conviction should be for
slight physical injuries only is likewise improper as the accused-appellant was motivated by the
same impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, if necessary, when he shot Noel
Madriaga. The fact that the wound was merely a minor injury which could heal in a week
becomes inconsequential.
In the final analysis, there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance and the more
appropriate offense being attempted murder, accused-appellant should be meted a penalty two
(2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is prision mayor the
range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in the case for attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor, which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or prision correccional, in any of
its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court of 15 June 1999 finding accused-appellant
HENRY ALMAZAN guilty of Murder in G.R. No. 138943 (Crim. Case No. C-51276) and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, and to pay the heirs of Noli
Madriaga P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P8,000.00 as funeral expenses, and to pay the costs,
is AFFIRMED. However, his conviction for Frustrated Murder in G.R. No. 138944 (Crim. Case
No. C-51277) is MODIFIED by lowering the crime to Attempted Murder and he is sentenced
accordingly to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional medium as minimum, to eight (8) years two (2) months and twenty (20)
days of prision mayormedium as maximum, and to pay the offended party Noel Madriaga the
amount of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
That on or about the 11th day of August 1991 in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, all armed
with bladed weapons and GI lead pipes, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation
with abuse of superior strength did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Jeonito Araque y Daniel at the back of his body, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 91-5843, the Amended Information2 for Frustrated Homicide charges:
That on or about the 14th day of May 1991 in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together, mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and hit with a lead pipe and bladed
weapon one Marlon Araque y Daniel on the vital portions of his body, thereby inflicting serious
and mortal wounds which would have cause[d] the death of the said victim thus performing all
the acts of execution which should have produce[d] the crime of Homicide as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is by timely
and able medical attendance rendered to said Marlon Araque y Daniel which prevented his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado and Samson dela Torre y Esquela pleaded
not guilty to the crimes charged. Their other co-accused have remained at large.
Trial thereafter ensued after which the court a quo rendered judgment only against accused
Agapito Listerio because his co-accused Samson dela Torre escaped during the presentation of
the prosecutions evidence and he was not tried in absentia. The dispositive portion of the
decision3 reads:
G.R. No. 122099
July 5, 2000

vs.
AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO and SAMSON DELA TORRE y ESQUELA, accused,
AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For the deadly assault on the brothers Jeonito Araque and Marlon Araque, Agapito Listerio y
Prado, Samson dela Torre y Esquela, Marlon dela Torre, George dela Torre, Bonifacio Bancaya
and several others who are still at large were charged in two (2) separate Amended Informations
with Murder and Frustrated Murder.
In Criminal Case No. 91-5842 the Amended Information1 for Murder alleges
WHEREFORE, finding Accused AGAPITO LISTERIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt, he is

sentenced:
1. For the death of Jeonito Araque y Daniel in Criminal Case NO. 915842, RECLUSION PERPETUA;
2. For the attempt to kill Marlon Araque y Daniel, in Criminal Case No. 91-5843, he is
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day as minimum, to four (4) years as
maximum;
3. As civil indemnity, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jeonito Araque y Daniel
the sum[s] of :
P54,200.66 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages;

P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. And for the damages sustained by Marlon Araque y Daniel, he is required to pay
Marlon Araque y Daniel, the sum[s] of :
P5,000.00 as actual damages;
Marlon Araque was examined by Dr. Salvador Manimtim, head of the Medico Legal Division of
the UP-PGH, 19who thereafter issued a Medical Certificate20 indicating that Marlon Araque
sustained two (2) lacerated wounds, one measuring 5 centimeters in length located in the center
(mid-parietal area) of the ear.21 The second lacerated wound measuring 2 centimeters in length
is located at the mid-frontal area commonly known as the forehead.22 A third lacerated wound
measuring 1.5 centimeters long is located at the forearm23 and a fourth which is a stab wound
measuring 3 centimeters is located at the right shoulder at the collar.24 Elaborating on the nature
of Marlon Araques injuries, Dr. Manimtim explained in detail during cross-examination that the
two (2) wounds on the forearm and the shoulder were caused by a sharp object like a knife while
the rest were caused by a blunt instrument such as a lead pipe.25
P5,000.00 as moral damages; and

P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied, accused Agapito Listerio interposed this appeal alleging that
I
THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF CONSPIRACY AND
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
The version of the prosecution of what transpired on that fateful day of August 14, 1991 culled
from the eyewitness account of Marlon Araque discloses that at around 5:00 p.m. of August 14,
1991, he and his brother Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum of
money from a certain Tino.5 Having failed to collect anything from Tino, Marlon and Jeonito then
turned back.6 On their way back while they were passing Tramo near Tinos place,7 a group
composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and
Bonifacio Bancaya8 blocked their path9 and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed
weapons.10
Agapito Listerio, Marlon dela Torre and George dela Torre, who were armed with bladed
weapons, stabbed Jeonito Araque from behind.11 Jeonito sustained three (3) stab wounds on the
upper right portion of his back, another on the lower right portion and the third on the middle
portion of the left side of his back12 causing him to fall down.13 Marlon Araque was hit on the
head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily lost
consciousness.14 When he regained his senses three (3) minutes later, he saw that Jeonito was
already dead.15 Their assailants then fled after the incident.16 Marlon Araque who sustained
injuries in the arm and back,17 was thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment.18
Dr. Bievenido Munoz, NBI Medico Legal Officer conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Jeonito
Araque26 and prepared an Autopsy Report27 of his findings. The report which contains a detailed
description of the injuries inflicted on the victim shows that the deceased sustained three (3)
stab wounds all of them inflicted from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-bladed instrument
like a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.28 The first stab wound, measuring 1.7
centimeters with an approximate depth of 11.0 centimeters, perforated the lower lobe of the left
lung and the thoracic aorta.29 Considering the involvement of a vital organ and a major blood
vessel, the wound was considered fatal.30 The second wound, measuring 2.4 centimeters,
affected the skin and underlying soft tissues and did not penetrate the body cavity.31 The third
wound measuring 2.7 centimeters was like the second and involved only the soft
tissues.32 Unlike the first, the second and third wounds were non-fatal.33 Dr. Munoz averred that
of the three, the first and second wounds were inflicted by knife thrusts delivered starting below
going upward by assailants who were standing behind the victim.34
On the other hand, accused-appellants version of the incident is summed thus in his brief:
1. Accused-appellant is 39 years old, married, side walk vendor and a resident of
Purok 4, Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He earns a living by selling vegetables.35
2. At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, Accused-Appellant was
in the store of Nimfa Agustin having a little fun with Edgar Demolador and Andres
Gininao drinking beer. At around 2:00 oclock Accused-appellant went to his house
and slept.36
3. While asleep, at about 5 oclock, Edgar Remolador and Andres Gininao woke him
up and told him there was a quarrel near the railroad track.37
4. At around 6:00 oclock two (2) policemen passed by going to the house of Samson
de la Torre while Accused-appellant was chatting with Edgar Remolador and Andres
Gininao. These two (2) policemen together with co-accused Samson de la Torre came
back and invited Accused-appellant for questioning at the Muntinlupa Police
Headquarters together with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao. Subsequently,
Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao were sent home.38
5. At the Police Station, Accused-Appellant was handed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
executed by Marlon Araque, implicating him for the death of Jeonito Araque and the
frustrated murder of Marlon Araque. Accused-Appellant confronted Marlon Araque as
to why he was being included in the case. Marlon Araque answered "because you
eject[ed] us from your house."39
Q Do you know of your own knowledge how he died?

A Yes, sir.
Professing his innocence, accused-appellant claims that Marlon Araques uncorroborated

testimony failed to clearly and positively identify him as the malefactor responsible for his
brothers death. In fine, he insists that Marlons testimony is insufficient to convict him of the
crimes charged.
We disagree.
It is well settled that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, such that the testimony of a
single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused.40 More
explicitly, the well entrenched rule is that "the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive
and credible by the trial court is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony
bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in
a straightforward manner. It has been held that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered;
hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness."41
The trial court found Marlon Araques version of what transpired candid and straightforward. We
defer to the lower courts findings on this point consistent with the oft-repeated pronouncement
that: "the trial judge is the best and the most competent person who can weigh and evaluate the
testimony of witnesses. His firsthand look at the declarants demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the trial places him in a peculiar position to discriminate between the true and the false.
Consequently appellate courts will not disturb the trial courts findings save only in cases where
arbitrariness has set in and disregard for the facts important to the case have been
overlooked."42
The account of Marlon Araque as to how they were assaulted by the group of accused-appellant
was given in a categorical, convincing and straightforward manner:
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court what is your own knowledge?
A He was stabbed, sir.
Q Do you know the person or persons who stabbed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court who are these person or persons, if you know?
A Its (sic) Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and
Bonifacio.
Q Now if these persons [are] inside the courtroom, could you identify them?
A They (sic) are only two persons but the three persons is (sic) not around.
Q Could you please point to this Honorable Court who are these two persons in side the
courtroom?
A Yes, sir (Witness pointing to a persons [sic] and when asked [identified themselves as] Agapito
Listerio and Samson dela Torre.)
Q Now, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, do you recall where were
you?
Q Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jeonito Araque y Daniel?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court where were you at that time?
Q And why do you know him?
A Im in Alabang at Purok 4 and Im collecting.
A He is my brother.
Q Do you have any companion at that time?
Q Where is Jeonito Araque now?
A Yes, sir.
A He is already dead.
Q What are you doing at that time in [that] particular date?
Q When did he die?
A Im collecting from a certain Tino.
A Last August 14.
Q Were you able to collect?
Q Do you know the reason why your brother fall (sic) down?
A No, sir.
A I cannot recall, sir. Because I already painted (sic).
Q If you said that there were no collections, what did you do?
Q Do you know the reason why your brother fall (sic) before you painted (sic)?
A We went back.
A Yes, sir.
Q When you went back, did you have any companion?
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court why your brother fall (sic) down?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Who was your companion?
A Yes, sir, because he was stabbed.
A My brother.
Q What particular place of his body was [he] stabbed if you know?
Q While you were going back, was there any untoward incidents that happened?
A At the back of his body.
A Yes sir "Hinarang po kami."
Q Do you know the person or persons who was (sic) stabbed him?
Q Now, what particular place [where] you were waylaid, if you recall?
A Yes, sir.
A In Tramo, near Tinos place.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court who was that persons was stabbed him?
Q And who were the persons that were waylaid (sic)?
A Agapito, Marlon and George.
A Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre and Bonifacio.
COURT
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court how will (sic) you waylaid by these persons?
How many stabbed [him], if you know?
A We were walking then suddenly they stabbed us with knife (sic) and ran afterwards.
A Three (3), sir.
Q Who were the persons that waylaid you?
COURT
A Agapito Listerio, George and Marlon.
In what particular part of his body was stabbed wound (sic)?
Q How about your brother, what happened to him?
A Witness pointing to his back upper right portion of the back, another on the lower right portion
and another on the middle portion of the left side at the back.
A He fall (sic) down.

COURT
Q And after he fall (sic) down, do you know what happened?
Proceed.
A I was hit by a lead pipe thats why I painted (sic).
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court why you are (sic) lost consciousness?
A I was hit by [a] lead pipe by Samson and Bonifacio.
Q Bonifacio?
Q And when did you regain consciousness?
A With your borther (sic)?
A After three minutes.
Q So you want to tell this Honorable Court that there was no point in time on August 14, 1991 at
4:00 p.m. that you did not take a sip of wine?
Q And when you gain[ed] consciousness, what happened to your brother?

A No, sir.
A He was already dead.
Q Neither your brother?
Q How about you, what did you do?
Atty. Agoot
A I go (sic) to the Hospital.
Objection, Your Honor, the question is vague.
Q How about the accused, the persons who way laid, what happened to them?
COURT
A From what I know, they ran away.43
Ask another question.
Persistent efforts by defense counsel to establish that the attack was provoked, by eliciting from
Marlon Araque an admission that he and the deceased had a drinking spree with their attackers
prior to the incident, proved futile as Marlon steadfastly maintained on cross examination that he
and his brother never drank liquor on that fateful day:
Q Mr. Witness, will you please tell the Honorable Court where this George dela Torre, Marlon
dela Torre and a certain Bonifacio were?
Atty. Agoot
Q After your work, was there an occasion when you drink something with your borther (sic)?
Witness is incompetent.
A No, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, you testified that it was your brother the deceased who invited you to Purok 4?
Q And you stand to your testimony that you never drink (sic) on August 14, 1991?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Lumakang
Q Were (sic) there no occasion on August 14, 1991 when you visited Sonny Sari-Sari Store at
4:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991?
A No, sir.
Q And did you not have a drinking spree with George dela Torre?
A No, sir.
Q Marlon dela Torre?
A No, sir.
That will be all for the witness, your Honor.44

That Marlon was able to recognize the assailants can hardly be doubted because relatives of the
victim have a natural knack for remembering the faces of the attackers and they, more than
anybody else, would be concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by the felons being
brought to the face of the law.45 Indeed, family members who have witnessed the killing of a
loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.46 Marlons credibility cannot be
doubted in this case because as a victim himself and an eyewitness to the incident, it can be
clearly gleaned from the foregoing excerpts of his testimony that he remembered with a high
degree of reliability the identity of the malefactors.47
Likewise, there is no showing that he was motivated by any ill-feeling or bad blood to falsely
testify against accused-appellant. Being a victim himself, he is expected to seek justice. It is
settled that if the accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order
of events to falsely impute charges of wrongdoing upon him.48 Accused-appellant likewise insists
on the absence of conspiracy and treachery in the attack on the victims.
We remain unconvinced.
It must be remembered that direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for criminals do not write
down their lawless plans and plots.49 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative
of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. 50 Indeed
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish the existence of a conspiracy, direct
proof is not essential since it may be shown by facts and circumstances from which may be
logically inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense
charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated.51
Nowhere is it more evident than in this case where accused-appellant and his cohorts blocked
the path of the victims and as a group attacked them with lead pipes and bladed weapons.
Accused-appellant and his companions acted in concert during the assault on the victims. Each
member of the group performed specific and coordinated acts as to indicate beyond doubt a
common criminal design or purpose.59 Thus, even assumingarguendo that the prosecution
eyewitness may have been unclear as to who delivered the fatal blow on the victim, accusedappellant as a conspirator is equally liable for the crime as it is unnecessary to determine who
inflicted the fatal wound because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.60
As to the qualifying circumstances here present, the treacherous manner in which accusedappellant and his group perpetrated the crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected
attack upon the unsuspecting and apparently unarmed victims but also by the deliberate manner
in which the assault was perpetrated. In this case, the accused-appellant and his companions,
all of them armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, blocked (hinarang) the path of the
victims effectively cutting off their escape.61 In the ensuing attack, the deceased was stabbed
three (3) times from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-bladed instrument like a kitchen
knife,balisong or similar instrument62 while Marlon Araque sustained lacerated wounds in the
head caused by blows inflicted by lead pipes as well as stab wounds on the shoulder and
forearm which were caused by a sharp object like a knife.63
More explicitly
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and
generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances, which
vary according to the purpose accomplished. Previous agreement to commit a crime is not
essential to establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient that the condition attending to its
commission and the acts executed may be indicative of a common design to accomplish a
criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of circumstances to that effect, conspiracy can
be established.52
Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as
clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.53 In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the
present case, it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.54 Hence, it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his conconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy
over the other co-conspirators.55
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.56 "Conspiracy to
exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.57 From
the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution."58 In this case, the presence of
accused-appellant and his colleagues, all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus
criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the victims.
It must be noted in this regard that the manner in which the stab wounds were inflicted on the
deceased were clearly meant to kill without posing any danger to the malefactors considering
their locations and the fact that they were caused by knife thrusts starting below going upward
by assailants who were standing behind the victim.64Treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.65 That circumstance qualifies the crime
into murder.
The commission of the crime was also attended by abuse of superior strength on account of the
fact that accused-appellant and his companions were not only numerically superior to the victims
but also because all of them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, purposely used force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked. However, this
aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in treachery.66 Furthermore, although alleged in
the information, evident premeditation was not proved by the prosecution. In the light of the
finding of conspiracy, evident premeditation need not be further appreciated, absent concrete
proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was
carried out.67
In stark contrast to the evidence pointing to him as one of the assailants of the victims, accusedappellant proffers the defense of alibi. At the risk of sounding trite, it must be remembered that
alibi is generally considered with suspicion and always received with caution because it can be
easily fabricated.68 For alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, the accused must establish that: a.]
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense; and b.] it would
thus be physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.69
Suffice it to state that accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden. The positive
identification of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime by the prosecution
eyewitness, absent any showing of ill-motive, must prevail over the weak and obviously
fabricated alibi of accused-appellant.70 Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by the trial court "[t]he
place where the accused was at the time of the killing is only 100 meters away. The distance of
his house to the place of the incident makes him physically possible to be a participant in the
killing [of Jeonito] and [the] wounding of Marlon."71
All told, an overall scrutiny of the records of this case leads us to no other conclusion than that
accused-appellant is guilty as charged for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-5842.
In Criminal Case No. 91-5843, wherein accused-appellant was indicted for Frustrated Homicide,
the trial court convicted accused-appellant of Attempted Homicide only on the basis of Dr.
Manimtims testimony that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon Araque were fatal.
The reasoning of the lower court on this point is flawed because it is not the gravity of the
wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated but whether or not
the subjective phase in the commission of an offense has been passed. By subjective phase is
meant "[t]hat portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward, the phase is objective. It may
also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control
that period between the point where he begins and the point where he voluntarily
desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of
his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If
he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated."72
It must be remembered that a felony is frustrated when: 1.] the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony; 2.] the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrators will.73 On the other hand, in an attempted felony: 1.] the
offender commits overt acts to commence the perpetration of the crime; 2.] he is not able to
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; and 3.] his failure to perform
all the acts of execution was due to some cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.74 The distinction between an attempted and frustrated felony was lucidly
differentiated thus in the leading case of U.S. v. Eduave:75
A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of
the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all
of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the
purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and
compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should
produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has
performed all the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime
and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt. The essential element
which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention
of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of crime
and the moment when all the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not
arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped
short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
To put it another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of
the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes
before the subjective phase is passed.
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing
through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond
his control.
In relation to the foregoing, it bears stressing that intent to kill determines whether the infliction of
injuries should be punished as attempted or frustrated murder, homicide, parricide or
consummated physical injuries.76Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts which at the time of
their execution are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate
means.77 Suffice it to state that the intent to kill of the malefactors herein who were armed with
bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly be doubted given the prevailing facts of the case. It
also can not be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering
that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost
consciousness and fell, Marlons attackers apparently thought he was already dead and fled.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review78 and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgement79 or even reverse the
trial courts decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors.80 With the foregoing in mind, we now address the question of the proper penalties to be
imposed.
With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. The courts, in view of the facts
of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or
homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than
that which should be imposed under the provisions of article 50.81
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one degree the penalty
which under article 51 should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of such crimes.
The penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal82 thus, the penalty one degree lower would
be prision mayor.83With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and no mitigating circumstances, the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum
period.84 Prision mayor in its maximum period ranges from ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Applying further the Indeterminate Sentence Law,85 the minimum of the
imposable penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e. prision
correccional in its maximum period which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years.
What now remains to be determined is the propriety of the awards made by the trial court with
regard to the civil aspect of the case for the death of Jeonito Araque and the injuries sustained
by Marlon Araque.
Anent actual or compensatory damages, it bears stressing that only substantiated and proven
expenses or those which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death,
wake or burial of the victim will be recognized by the courts.86 In this case, the expenses incurred
for the wake, funeral and burial of the deceased are substantiated by receipts.87 The trial courts
award for actual damages for the death of Jeonito Araque should therefore be affirmed.
2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case

No. 91-5843 of Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional, as minimum to Ten (10) Years and
One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
After finality of this Decision, the records shall be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, which is directed to render judgment based on the evidence against Samson dela Torre y
Esquela.
SO ORDERED.
In line with current jurisprudence,88 the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto must
also be sustained as it requires no proof other than the fact of death of the victim and the
assailants responsibility therefor.89 The award for moral damages for the pain and sorrow
suffered by the victims family in connection with his untimely death must likewise be affirmed.
The award is adequate, reasonable and with sufficient basis taking into consideration the
anguish and suffering of the deceaseds family particularly his mother who relied solely upon him
for support.90 The award of exemplary damages should likewise be affirmed considering that an
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. 91
The trial court, however, correctly ignored the claim for loss of income or earning capacity of the
deceased for lack of factual basis.1wphi1 The estimate given by the deceaseds sister on his
alleged income as a pre-cast businessman is not supported by competent evidence like income
tax returns or receipts. It bears emphasizing in this regard that compensation for lost income is
in the nature of damages92 and as such requires due proof thereof.93 In short, there must be
unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income.94 In this case, the victims sister merely gave
an oral, self-serving and hence unreliable statement of her deceased brothers income.
As for the awards given to Marlon Araque, the award for actual damages must be affirmed as
the same is supported by documentary evidence.95 With regard to moral and exemplary
damages, the same being distinct from each other require separate determination.96 The award
for moral damages must be struck down as the victim himself did not testify as to the moral
suffering he sustained as a result of the assault on his person. For lack of competent proof such
an award is improper.97 The award for exemplary damages must, however, be retained
considering that under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be imposed "when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."98
Finally, this Court has observed that the trial court did not render judgment against accused
Samson dela Torre, notwithstanding that he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Under the circumstances, he should be deemed to have been tried in absentia and,
considering the evidence presented by the prosecution against him, convicted of the crime
charged together with appellant Agapito Listerio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of moral damages in Criminal
Case No. 91-5843 is DELETED;
G.R. No. 129433
March 30, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away with frustrated rape 2 and allowed
only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case
lurks at the threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering
almost every attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the
contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that concept may send the wrong
signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with
climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered
consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then
be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were
already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts
necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was
not essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was
sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for
consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was
no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 3 The inference
that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for
rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to
its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia
or lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina,
to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the
female organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g.,
labia majora, labia minora, etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be
inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile
penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must
be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however
slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia
has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed
either in its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would
exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may
seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for the accused a reclusive life
that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life
on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but
consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus
limited only to consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no
longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by
the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review
under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. 6
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went
down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2)
children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic
bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a
helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she
heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs.
Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed
the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her
blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path.
Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle
who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. 8Seconds later, Primo was
apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back
of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials
instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative
results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on
Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence
and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will
against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a
playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both
of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them
and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad
but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for
help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente
punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards
the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to
explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead.
When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his
back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon
him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him
guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay
his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He
argues that her narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured
with implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and
experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that
Crysthel's younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs
preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the
fact that the episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could
easily be heard and responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the
crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be taking
place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have
possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He
asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's
private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that
she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas
and panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into
Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel
was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion
perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended
party being below seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal
knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is
the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. 10 But the
act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the
labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
In People v. De la Pea 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the
attacker's penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the
context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the
accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which
could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on
the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his
penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt
his organ on the lips of her vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of
her vagina. 13 Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
rape. 14 As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs
or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to
attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the
labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area,e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin
skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there
can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the
female organ,"17 but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male
organ into the labia of the pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." 19 But, to our
mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as
earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion.
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus
of proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we
grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we
seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo
and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged
into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her
relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the
contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the
former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is
pinning down the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is
spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling position rendered
an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and
the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly
reaching Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since
the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to
discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from
Corazon's view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen
the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not
enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim
be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot
conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold
otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her
timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where
he is and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have
already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal
behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to pull his
pants up to avoid being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively
short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to
conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the
question of the court
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir. 20
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of
whether rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis
penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration, 27 obviously induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been
aware of the finer distinctions between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper
and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult
interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry.
Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the accused
touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the
prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate
Crysthel. 22Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he
responded with an erection. 23 On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his
penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to
penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together; 24 consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what
Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases
where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape
nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal
finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping
with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was shown in this case.
Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender
age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true,
acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that
even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for
consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.1wphi1
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no
external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the
absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the
accused and the victim. 27
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted
or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the
accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that
rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from
consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape and only of
attempted rape are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only
for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for
the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees
lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which
is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN
Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is
MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days ofreclusion
temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.1wp
1. One (1) cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana;

2. Two (2) cigarette foil wrapper (sic) containing marijuana which are prohibited drugs.
Contrary to law.1
The accused, who were assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on
May 26, 1987. On August 18, 1987, trial on the merits started, with the prosecution thereafter
presenting as its witnesses P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy, P/Capt. Luena Layador, T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas,
Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, and S/Sgt. Armando Isidro. On its part, the defense presented both
accused, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat as its witnesses.
The court a quo, in a comparative evaluation of evidence, painstakingly summarized the
clashing factual versions of the prosecution and defense, as follows:
. . . On its part, the prosecution alleged that after receiving a confidential report from
Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics
Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader,
S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as
poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around
2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 4, 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy
acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00
from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was
Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated (with) on the purchase and when Arcoy
told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed
Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his
pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected
marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates
by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the
vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and
effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill (Exhibit C-1)
used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with two
aluminum foils and containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3").
G.R. No. 83260
April 18, 1990

vs.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, accusedappellants.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and his co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban
were charged in Criminal Case No. 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila with violation
of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, in
an information which reads:
That on or about May 4, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell,
deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly sell, deliver or give away to and other the following:
Traversing this version is that of the defense which, in brief, consists of a denial to
(sic) the prosecution's theory and the claim that accused Juan de la Cruz, who was
then suffering from loose bowel movement, was all the time in bed at their place at
3034 Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila; that he never left their place throughout that day of
May 4, 1987; that he never had a visitor on that day and that he was never engaged in
the sale of marijuana. The NARCOM agents raided his place without search warrant
or without first securing his previous permission. One searched thoroughly his place,
the second acted as a guard posted at the door of De la Cruz' place and the third
agent was a mere observer. His place was ransacked and he was even bodily
searched. As regards accused Reynaldo Beltran, he was arrested by the same group
(prior to the arrest of Juan de la Cruz) while he was playing "pool" at Aling Ely's place
along Maliclic St. that afternoon and that without much ado, he was taken because he
was fingered by one Arnel to be engaged in selling marijuana. Both accused were
brought to a parked vehicle of the raiding team, From there, they were taken to
NARCOM headquarters for investigation where for the first time they came to know
that they were being charged of selling marijuana. 2
Finding the version of the prosecution more worthy of credit, the court a quo rendered its
decision3 on March 15, 1988, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the accused,
JUAN DE LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section
21, Article IV, both of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as further amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675 and as charged in
the Information, and, accordingly, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua,with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs.
The three (3) aluminum foils containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" to "B-4") placed in
an empty Marlboro pack (Exhibit "B-1") are hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government and once this Decision shall become final and executory, the
same shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board through the Director,
National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, for proper disposition while the P10.00 bill
(Exhibit "C-1") bearing Serial No. F-215962 shall be returned to T/Sgt. Jaime
Raposas.
Furnish copy of this Decision to the Honorable Supreme Court through the Honorable
Court Administrator. 4
From this decision, accused Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y
Aniban interposed the instant appeal.
In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated March 3, 1989, 5 the Court was informed of the
death of accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales on February 21, 1989. Counsel de
oficio having thereafter submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate of the accused 6 as
directed by the Court, the criminal case against said accused-appellant was dismissed in our
resolution of September 25, 1989. 7
The present appellate proceeding is, therefore, limited only to appellant Reynaldo Beltran y
Aniban who now faults the trial court with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Buy-Bust Operation being done to enforce Republic Act 6425 is
unconstitutional and any evidence acquired under such method should not be
admissible in court.
2. The Buy-Bust Operation should be declared illegal for it breeds corruption of police
and military officers through planting of evidence for purposes of extortion.
3. The Court erred in giving probative value to the confiscated marijuana sticks despite
the fact that no civilian or other neutral person signed as a witness to its taking. If it
were true, there must be at least one civic-minded citizen who could easily be
convinced by the police to witness it.
4. The Court erred in considering the evidence, Exhibits "B-2," "B-3" and "B-4", as the
very ones confiscated.
If they were the very ones taken from the accused, the original receipt prepared at the
scene of the crime would not have been thrown away by the very agent who acted as
the buyer. Exhibit "E" should have been given no probative value for having been
executed by someone who did not actually confiscate the marijuana.
5. The Court erred in giving probative value to the Buy-Bust Operation when even the
alleged marked money utilized in the operation could not be identified by the leader,
T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas.
6. The Court erred in not giving value to the testimony of the two disinterested
witnesses for the defense, namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, whose
testimony corroborated substantially that of the accused.
7. The Court erred in concluding that there was no motive for the military to
manufacture evidence.1wphi1 It is common knowledge that apprehensions of this
kind are made to fill up a quota of arrest in cases handled to comply with standard
operating procedure and efficiency reports. 8
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Appellant assails, unconstitutional, the manner in which the so-called buy-bust operation is
conducted in order to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act. He stigmatizes it as no different from
seizure of evidence from one's person or abode without a search warrant. He argues that this
procedure is pregnant with opportunities, and gives rise to situations, for corrupting our law
enforcers.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the common modus operandi of narcotic agents in utilizing
poseur-buyers does not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Act as it is susceptible of mistakes as well as harassment, extortion and
abuse. 9 By the very nature of this anti-narcotics operation, the possibility of abuse is great. 10
We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of narcotics agents whose task, as it is, is
already formidable and attended with great risk, lest their dedicated efforts for the apprehension
and successful prosecution of prohibited drug violators be unduly hampered. The proliferation of
drug addiction and trafficking has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network
of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous operations. Our experience has proven entrapment to be
an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers as exemplified by this case.
The Solicitor General explains that a buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace
officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment
since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a
crime. 11 Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense.12
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person
without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being
incident to a lawful arrest. 13 A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit an offense. 14 It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught redhanded. 15 There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
Appellant castigates the prosecution for not having presented any civilian or other neutral person
who could attest that the foils of marijuana were indeed confiscated from him. The absence of
any civilian witness should not undermine the case for the prosecution. The natural reaction of a
civilian to inhibit himself from being a witness to a crime is understandable. A criminal
proceeding entails a lot of unavoidable inconveniences, aside from the time involved in
attendance as a witness in investigations and hearings. Adding to this the inherent fear of
reprisal, we have the natural reticence and abhorrence of most people to get involved in a
criminal case.
At any rate, the testimony of other witnesses in this case would only be cumulative or
corroborative as they would only be repeating the facts already amply testified to by the
government witnesses. Credence should be accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as
it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. 16
Appellant maintains that the court below should have rejected Exhibit E, which evidences the
receipt of marijuana from appellant and which was prepared by Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, in the
absence of the original receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy who was the
poseur-buyer.
We agree with the Solicitor General, since this is borne out by the records, that Exhibit E is
actually based on, as it is merely a clearer copy of, the receipt prepared at the scene of the
crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy. Since the draft receipt had to be prepared hurriedly at the scene in order
that the accused could be brought to the Narcotics Command, such draft receipt was not clearly
written, so Sgt. Vicente Jimenez mechanically transferred the written entries of P/Pfc. Arcoy into
a more legible copy. 17 Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Sgt. Jimenez, a member of the
team, had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in both receipts, being an eyewitness to the
events that had transpired.
The testimony of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, the team leader who gave P/Pfc. Arcoy the money to
pay for the marijuana, is challenged in that he failed to identify the marked money utilized in the
operation. Appellant insists that the marked money must be recorded, if not photographed in
order to be admissible as evidence. This is clutching at evidentiary and argumental straws.
As found by the trial court, the money was in the possession of P/Pfc. Arcoy who had been
assigned as the poseur-buyer.1wphi1 In the ensuing transaction, the foil of marijuana was
handed to Arcoy by appellant and then Arcoy gave the money to accused Juan dela Cruz. 18
Suffice it to say that even if the money given to De la Cruz was not presented in court, the same
would not militate against the People's case. 19 In fact, there was even no need to prove that the
marked money was handed to the appellants in payment of the goods. The crime could have
been consummated by the mere delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not
only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited to, the act of delivering. In the latter case, the
act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any
means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. 20
On the trial court's rejection of the testimony of the alleged two disinterested witnesses for the
defense, namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
We reiterate the time-honored principle that on the issue of which version to accept, the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight and the highest degree of
respect by the appellate court. Subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present case,
the trial court is in a better position to decide this question, having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 21
Appellant imputes insidious motives on the part of the military to manufacture evidence,
theorizing that a buy-bust operation is for the purpose either of extorting money or, in line with
alleged internal policies, complying with a quota of arrests. 22 These are bare unsupported
allegations. From the evidence of record, we find no reason why the prosecution witness should
fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime. The defense has not
established any cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge the accused with peddling
marijuana. As found by the trial court, there is not even a breath, much less an accusation by the
defense, that the military and police personnel involved were indeed engaged in such nefarious
activities. 23
Finally, appellant reproaches the prosecution for not presenting the civilian informer as a
witness. 24 It is settled that the non-presentation of a certain witness by the prosecution is not a
sufficiently plausible defense. If the accused believes that the testimony of said witness is
important to his cause, he should avail thereof, even by compulsory judicial process if
necessary. Furthermore, the non-presentation of some prosecution witnesses does not detract
from the prosecution's case, since the number of such witnesses who should be called to testify
is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers. 25
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 8754417, insofar as accused-appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban is concerned, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with
and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her will
and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After
the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the
prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory
evidence and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA
@ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt,
with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR,
maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29,
1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
102, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant
found guilty of the crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
G.R. No. 88724
April 3, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29,
1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3,
subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information
filed in the said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath
by the offended party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape
committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house
at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by
the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St.
Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house.
Her classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984).
Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house
(p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She
then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9,ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since
the door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced
complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left
arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the
second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still
poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Breast Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear

abrasions below (L) breast.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall.
With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off
her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the

vulva, errythematous (sic)areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice,
tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger
can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
Back Multiple pinpoint marks.

Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the
knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a
portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this
position, only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this
stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping
(p. 20, ibid).
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses; and
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and
climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room.
Appellant again chased her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a
window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in
front of the boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer,
she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who
were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the
stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and
wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two
other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second
floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend
appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial
Hospital where she was physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a
Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states:
Physical Examination Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing
with no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the
accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show
remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore
casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far
from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be
justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations
also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make
mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility
(People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as
adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact,
complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of
spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one
of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim
that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her.
According to the accused, this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's
advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act."
(p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended
there. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the
aggression. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently
deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the
truth (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's
finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be
desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her
answer to every question profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and
straightforward. To the Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for
the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated into the mind of
the Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her
sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987,
153 SCRA 487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People
v. Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not
only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The
victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time
she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as
indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the
unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees, linear
abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior
neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof
of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court
even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the
incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry
the weight of both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in
the manner as narrated. The partitions of every room were of strong materials,
securedly nailed, and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same.
who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity
(Tugbang v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R.
No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim, the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another
physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused
did not bother to contradict this statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall
flat on its face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We
are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that
really calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper.
The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the
same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of
rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et
al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p.
55, Rollo):
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the
ground which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps
occasion no injury to a frightened individual being pursued. Common experience will
tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings,
many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being
injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom
honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of
her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is
enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally
deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We
ruled that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered
entirely naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the
latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to
her. All these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred
unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to
corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer
who actually examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies
as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated
stages apply to the crime of rape.1wphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated
stage applies to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil.
209, 212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is
readily understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside
cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words,
to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign
force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when
he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which
should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which
distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no
intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed
which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause
apart from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished.Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he
has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In
a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v.
Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996,
August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of
rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ
is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there
is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al.,
53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.
Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be
committed.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim, the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that
the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact,
he tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was
penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as
interpreted by Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of
uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not
oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony of
the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras
People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot
be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance
with the medical certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind
of the court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive
testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other,
for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance
in the medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not
exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous
(which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in
inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamoradid not rule out penetration of the
genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there
was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration,
even if only partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when
you said comply?
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eria 50 Phil.
998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this
is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.
Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which
provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted
orfrustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eria
case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in
the amendments introduced by said laws.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis
of the victim's testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167
SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v.
Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's
testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this
case (People v. Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the
accused because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the
proper imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989,
that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but
merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not
imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead
reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February
14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3,
is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112
SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People
v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

102007 September 2, 1994

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer:

xxx xxx xxx

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in

G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

Now, on the substantive aspects.

G.R. No. 141931

ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner,

The antecedent facts are the following, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 16612:

G.R. Nos. 120744-46

June 25, 2012

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,

GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,

Criminal Case No. 16614:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

2. P200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

The Court's Ruling

3. That the written notice shall indicate:

conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to

November 14, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

The Courts Rulings

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY,

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court would ask questions.

The trial court took into account the following facts:

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,

Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 138033

February 22, 2006

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

September 17, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

WHEREFORE, finding Accused AGAPITO LISTERIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt, he is

P50,000.00 as moral damages;

P5,000.00 as moral damages; and

Q Do you know of your own knowledge how he died?

Professing his innocence, accused-appellant claims that Marlon Araques uncorroborated

Q Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jeonito Araque y Daniel?

Q Were you able to collect?