6th Dr. PARAS DIWAN MEMORIAL INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW' MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

PROVISIONAL REGISTRATION NO: "PR17"
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE

THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
THE CASE CONCERNING

THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACEFUL
USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
_____________________________________________________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF ALBROSA & OTHERS,

APPLICANTS
v.
THE PEOPLES DEMOCRACY OF BRISSELANTA,
RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANTS

6th Dr. PARAS DIWAN MEMORIAL INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW MOOT
COURT COMPETITION, 2016
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............. i
B.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS... ii
C.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iii
D.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION... ix
E.
STATEMENT OF FACTS... x
F.
ISSUES RAISED... xii
G.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............. xii
H.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED... 1
1.
The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the present case.................... 1
2.
The Respondent, being a supplier of nuclear equipment and material is liable to compensate
the Applicants for the nuclear disaster............................................
2.1. Albrosa
has
right
to
recourse
against
Brisselanta
under
Section
23(c)
of
the
CLNDA... 5
2.2. There
was
latent
defect
in
the
materials
and
equipments
supplied
by
Brisselanta............................................................................................................
2.3. The SC of Albrosa held BPPEC liable for the nuclear incident.. 8
3.
The Respondent is liable to Compensate the Applicants for the pollution of their Marine
Environment that gravely dented their economic interests
10
3.1. Respondent disregarded their duty under VCLT............. 10

3.2. The
Respondent
failed
to
comply
with
the
provisions
of
the
Aarhus
Convention... 12
3.3. The
Respondent
failed
to
fulfil
the
obligations
under
UNCLOS......................................................... 13

i
3.4. The Respondent disregarded their duty under CBD................................................ 14

3.5 Brisselanta violated its obligations under customary international law.. 15
3.6 Respondent is liable to compensate for degradation of the environment which harmed the
economic interests of the Applicants... 16
4.
Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta is not violative of the
123 Agreement........ 17
4.1. Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta does not violate Article
XV of the 123 Agreement....... 17
4.2. Albrosas indefinite moratorium falls under the General Exceptions provided in Article XXX of
the 123 Agreement... 19
4.3. The indefinite moratorium is authorised under the Essential Security Clause of the 123
Agreement....................................... 23
I.
SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT.............. 26
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Pragraph
123
Agreement Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the

Republic of Albrosa and the Government of Peoples Democracy of
Brisselanta on the Development of Peaceful Energy, 2010
Albrosa
The Republic of Albrosa
Art.
Article
BPPEC
Brisselanta Power for Power Electrical Company
Brisselanta
The Peoples Democracy of Brisselanta
CBD
Convention on Biological Diversity
CLNDA
Civil Liability for Nuclear Disaster Act, 2010
CSC
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,1997
Doc.
Document

ii
Eg.
Example
EIA
Environmental Impact Assessment
FNPP
Floating Nuclear Power Plant
GATT
General Agreement on tariff and trade
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ
International Court of Justice
ICSID
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IMF
International Monetary Fund
no.
Number
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCIJ
Permanent Court of International Justice
SC
Supreme Court
SDR
Special Drawing Right
SIA
Social Impact Assessment
UN
United Nations
UNC
Charter of the United Nations
UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
v.
Versus
VCLT
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases, Advisory Opinion and Administrative Rulings
-
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE-
1. Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary. v. Slovakia.), 1997 I.C.J. 7

2. Military and Paramilitary Activities case (Nicaragua v US) [1986] I.C.J. Rep 14
-ICSID RULINGS1. Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction, 17 October 2006; Saipem
S.P.A. v. The Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. Arb/05/07
2. Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005; Helnan International Hotel A/S v. The
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19,

iii
3. Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi

A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29,
4. Jan de Nul N.V. Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/04/13,
5. S.p.A. v. Republique Algerienne Democratique at Populaire, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, 12 July 2006;
6. Salini v.Morraco 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004)
-OTHER JUDGEMENTS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS 3. Amco v. Indonesia, Award, 20 November 1984.
1. Case C-183/91Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-1513
2. Grady v United Kingdom (App. No) (2000)29EHRR 493;
3. Ireland v United Kingdom (App. No. 5310/71) (1980) 2 EHRR 25.
4. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143
5. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
6.
MOX Plant Case, Ireland v United Kingdom, (2003) 126 ILR 310, (ICGJ 366 (PCA
2003).
7. Rodriguez v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1974).
8. The Schooner Betsey, 44 Ct. Cl. 506, 514 (1909)
9. Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria (1977) Q.B 529
10. Ultramares Corporation v Touche 174 NE 441 (1931).
11. United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (2d. Circ. 1947).
-GATT/WTO PANEL BODY REPORT1. WTO, Dominican Republic Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale
of Cigarettes, Panel Report, (19 May 2005)DS302
2. WTO, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos And AsbestosContaining Products, Report of the Panel, (12 March 2001), WT/DS135/AB/R
3. WTO, United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services ,Panel Report, (10 November 2004) WT/DS285/R

iv
4. WTO, United States Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products,
Report of the Panel, (15 June 2001), WT/DS58/RW
5. WTO, Thailand Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines,
(28 January 2013 ) DS371
-
GATT/WTO APPELLATE BODY REPORT-
1. WTO, Turkey: Restriction on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products-Report of

the Appellate Body (22 October 1999) WT/DS34/AB/R.
2. WTO, US Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, (20 May 1996) WT/DS2/9
3. WTO, Korea Beef, Appellate Body Report, (10 January 2001) DS161, 169
4. WTO, Brazil Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Report. (17 December 2007)
DS332
Treaties, Agreements & Conventions
1. Aarhus Convention, 1998, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517.
2. Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, 1971
3. Convention for Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/567 (Sept. 12, 1997).
4. Convention on Biological diversity, 1992, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.13
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
6. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960
7. Protocols to the Paris and Brussels Convention, 2004
8. Statute of the International Court of Justice, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
9. The Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 1962 and the
Joint Protocol,
10. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
2004
11. United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, 1984, 1833 UNTS 3 / [1994] ATS 31 /
21 ILM 1261 (1982)
12. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107
13. Vienna convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265, 2 I.L.M. 727

v
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Books, Reports and Articles
-BOOKS1. A.R.Biswas, International Law, Kamal Law House, 1999.
2. Alina Kaczorowska, Textbook On Public International Law, Old Bailey Press, 2002
3. Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, Cambridge University Press.
4. Baris Soyer & Andrew Tettenborn, Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, Informa Law
from Raouledge (2013)
5. Bernard M. Hoekman And Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy Of The
World Trading System, The Wto And Beyond, 3rd ed., The Oxford University Press,
2009
6. D.W. Greig, International Law, 2nd ed., London Bitterworths, 1976
7. Francesco Francioni, Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, Hart
Publishing
8. James
Crawford,
The
International
Law
Commission's
Articles
on
State
Responsibility, Cambridge University Press

9. John H. Steele, Steve A. Thorpe, Karl K. Turekian, Marine Policy & Economics: A
Derivative of the Encyclopedia of Ocean Sciences (2nded.) Elsevier Ltd., 2009
10. Linda A. Malone, Environmental Law (2nd ed.) Aspen Publishers
11. Louis B. Sohn, John E. Noyes, Cases and Materials on the Law of the Sea,
Transnational Publishers, 2004
12. Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers
13. Philippe J. Sands, Chernobyl: Law and Communication: Transboundary Nuclear Air
Pollution- The Legal Materials
14. Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, (2nd ed.) Cambridge
University Press
15. Ram Prakash Anand, Compulsory Jurisdication of the International Court of Justice,
Asia Publishing House (1961)
16. Robin Rolf Churchill, Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea, (2nd ed.)
Manchester University Press
17. S A Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
How Compulsory is it?(OUP, Oxford 2006)

vi
18. S Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy(1998) 38 Va. J.Intl L. 689
19. Xue Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law (2003).
-REPORTS1. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application,
2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgement on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 3 February 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006.
2. Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge
University Press
3. International Law Commission, First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of
Loss in Case of tansboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, , U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/531 (Mar. 21, 2003).
4. Report of the Executive Directors on The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals Of Other States adopted on March 18, 1965.
5. Reports Of International Arbitral Awards , Trail smelter case (United States, Canada)
16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941 , Volume III , pp. 1905-1982
6. Riccardo P. Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm, in International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (Francesco Francioni
& Tullio Scovazzi eds, 2001).
7. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 659
8. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007.
-ARTICLES1. B Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals
125 (Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1953)
2. Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, (2nd ed.)
Cambridge University Press
3. Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The
implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 Berkeley J.Intl Law.
200(2001)

vii
4. H Steinberger, Sovereignty, in Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law

and International Law, Encyclopedia for Public International Law, vol 10 (North
Holland, 1987) 414
5. Lew, J., Mistelis, L., and Kroll, S., Comparative International Commercial
Arbitration (The HagueLondon-New York : Kluwer Law International), 2003
6. Philippe Sands, Principles Of International Environmental Law 236 (2d ed. 2003).
7. Stoiber, C., A. Baer, N. Pelzer and W. Tonhauser, Handbook on Nuclear Law,
(2003) IAEA Doc. STI/PUB/1160, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.
- Dictionaries8. BA Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary (7th edn West Group St. Paul, Minn., 1999)
9. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th edn OUP, oxford 2003)
-Miscellaneous1. Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practices (Vol 1 World Trade
Organization, Geneva 1995)
2. Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp 653 at 937
(1925).
3. Law of Treaties, Third report by J.L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur, DOCUMENT
A/CN.4/54
4. Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 93/VOL. 2014/1, NEA No. 7181, OECD 2014

viii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Albrosa, Island States of Bong-Bong and Kolra and the Peoples Democracy
of Brisselanta have accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
Further, The Republic of Albrosa and the Peoples Democracy of Brisselanta have entered
into a Special agreement to submit the disputes to the International Court of Justice.
This Courts jurisdiction is invoked under Article 36(1) and Article 36(2) read with Article
40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1950.

ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Republic of Albrosa (Albrosa), a developing archipelagic island nation is located in a
high-risk seismic zone with a history of cataclysmic natural disasters. The Peoples
Democracy of Brisselanta (Brisselanta) is a developed and technologically advanced nation
which announced plans to build FNPP comprising of small nuclear reactors which are
mounted on barges and are floated in the territorial waters of the installing State. Albrosa also
showed interest in starting the FNPP project. Both the countries appointed experts and carried
out all requisite compliances as per IAEA Nuclear safeguards.
In furtherance of the installation of the FNPPs, both the countries entered into 123 Agreement
on 1st February, 2010 wherein it was agreed that BPPEC would supply the equipment for
establishing 12 FNPPs in Albrosa in phases and provide 8,000 tons of uranium over the
period of next 10 years. Art. V of 123 Agreement which is the liability cause, provided no
fault and exclusive liability of the operator. The parliament of Albrosa objected to this clause
and under article V (3) of the Agreement enacted the CLNDA, 2010 which provided the
operator for a right to recourse against the supplier under sec. 23 of the Act. The BPPEC
refused to supply any nuclear material or equipment to Albrosa as they may be vulnerable to
inflated liability claims, In order to overcome the impasse and to make the 123 Agreement
operational, Brisselanta and Albrosa amended Art. V of the 123 Agreement, taking away the
operators right of recourse against the supplier and made it mandatory for the parties to
ratify the three international conventions.
The new Socialist Government which was sworn in denied the validity of the amendment via
an official notification. Nevertheless, both the parties went ahead with the project and the first
FNPP was installed at Morsin-kkkuyu site after receiving provisional approval from IAEA,
approval from clean alive foundation and the licence from Electricity Market License
Regulation of Albrosa.

x
The neighbouring island of Albrosa, the island state of Bong Bong, raised concerns regarding
the Morsin-kkkuyu site as it apprehended that the site posed an imminent danger to them.
Bong Bong asserted that under the Aarhus Convention, public opinion and consultation
before operationalizing a nuclear power which is required, was not complied with. The
concerns were not considered by BPPEC as it was understood that the Bong Bong island has
no authority to intervene in a matter of solemn bilateral Agreement.
On 21st June, 2014, the Bong-Bong Island was hit by an underwater earthquake which lead
to the collision of an aircraft super-carrier with the FNPP at the Morsin-kkkuyu site, which in
turn led to the release of radioactive material into the territorial waters of Bong-Bong, Kolra
and Albrosa, causing deaths, cancer cases and also affecting the marine environment.
Albrosa retorted that the nuclear reactor coolants and generators were not seismically robust.
The BPPEC contended that Albrosa was negligent in not maintaining them which led to
equipment failure. A petition was filed before the SC of Albrosa under section 23 (c )of the
CLNDA and an ex parte judgement was passed against the BPPEC which was asserted to be
void on the grounds of natural justice.
A compensation package arising out of the nuclear insurance pool was apportioned between
the three states on a pro-rata basis and an outstanding compensation under the Right of
Recourse (Section 23 (c) CLNDA) was asked by the states from Brisselanta.
The Government of Albrosa placed an indefinite moratorium on the import of uranium from
Brisselanta under Article XXX of the 123 Agreement which was condemned by Brisselanta
for violating Article XV of the 123 Agreement.
Albrosa, along with the island States of Bong Bong and Kolra, brings a claim before the
International Court of Justice, claiming the outstanding compensation from the Brisselanta
for the nuclear disaster and the pollution of their marine environment.

xi
ISSUES RAISED
I.
Whether the ICJ has the jurisdiction to hear the present case?
II.
Whether the Respondent is liable to compensate the Applicants for the pollution
of their marine environment that gravely dented their economic interests?
III.
Whether the Respondent, being a supplier of nuclear equipment and material, can
be held liable to compensate the Applicants for the nuclear disaster?
IV.
Is Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta violative

of the 123 Agreement?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
Whether the ICJ has the jurisdiction to hear the present case?
The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the present case pursuant to the consent given by Albrosa and
Brisselanta in the 123 Agreement to submit the dispute to ICJ. Also, all the parties to the dispute
have accepted compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of the ICJ. The current dispute cannot be
submitted to the ICSID as it fails to comply with the conditions stipulated in the ICSID
convention namely, ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione voluntatis. Therefore, as
provided for in the 123 Agreement, ICJ has the jurisdiction to hear the present case.
II.
Whether the Respondent is liable to compensate the Applicants for the pollution of
their marine environment that gravely dented their economic interests?
Albrosa has a right to recourse against Brisselanta under Section 23(c) of the CLNDA which
provides for legal recourse if in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Albrosa, the nuclear
incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of the supplier including latent defect in the

xii
material supplied. Since, nuclear reactor coolant and generators supplied by the respondent had
latent defect, there was snag in coolant supply that consequently caused the nuclear accident.
Hence, the Respondent being the supplier of nuclear equipment, is liable to compensate the
Applicants for the nuclear disaster.
III.
Whether the Respondent, being a supplier of nuclear equipment and material, can
be held liable to compensate the Applicants for the nuclear disaster?
The respondent failed to grant Bong Bong their right of public opinion and consultation and also
did not notify them inspite of imminent harm to them. The Respondent caused pollution of the
marine environment and violated the general obligation of protecting the Marine environment as
laid down under UNCLOS. The defective nuclear reactor coolants and generators supplied by
the Respondent led to a disaster. For environmental damage, the main form of reparation is
restitution and in calculating the environmental damage, the loss to the environment is often
measured by cost of measure of restoration. Thus, the Respondent is liable to compensate for
damage to the environment which dented economic interests.
IV.
Is Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta violative

of the 123 Agreement?
The indefinite moratorium does not violate Article XV as it does not fall within the purview of
prohibition or restriction as provided for in the Article but is a mere indeterminate delay in
the import. Further, the indefinite moratorium is undertaken with the objective of safeguarding
human, animal and plant life in Albrosa, and is thus, covered by the exceptions as provided for
in Article XXX. Further, Albrosa considers the measure necessary for protection of its own
interests and therefore, justified under the Essential Security Clause.

xiii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the present case.
The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the present case under Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute 1. The
basis for jurisdiction is the consent of the States parties to a dispute and one of the ways of
expressing consent is through the inclusion of a jurisdictional clause in a treaty.2 Therefore, it
can be said that the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the present case pursuant to the Dispute
Settlement Clause in the 123 Agreement between Albrosa and Brisselanta.3 Further, the
jurisdiction of the ICJ also exists by virtue of the declarations made by Albrosa, Bong Bong,
Kolra and Brisselanta, that they recognize compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in all legal
disputes concerning the matters specified in Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.4
The 123 Agreement provides that the parties must satisfy the requirements of Chapter II of
the ICSID Convention5 in order to submit the claim to arbitrate before the ICSID. 6 The
ICSID Tribunal has jurisdiction over the present dispute if the following conditions are met:
A. A condition ratione personae;
B. A condition ratione materiae;
C. A condition ratione voluntatis.7
Statute of the International Court of Justice, T.S. No. 993 (1945), Article 36(1).
Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
See, Dispute Settlement, 123 Agreement, Ch. 7.
Clarifications to the Compromis, 5
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter cited as the ICSID
Convention).
6
Supra note 3, Dispute Settlement (3).
Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press.

1
The condition ratione personae requires the Claimants to be investors of one Contracting
Party and another Contracting Party. In this case, all parties to the dispute i.e. Albrosa, Bong
Bong, Kolra and Brisselanta are Contracting Parties as provided under the definition of the
ICSID Convention. But Bong Bong and Kolra, who are the relevant parties to the dispute, are
not covered by the definition of investor as provided under the 123 Agreement and also they
are not parties to the 123 Agreement. The condition ratione personae is not complied with.
The condition ratione materiae requires that the dispute must be a legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment made by the Claimants in the territory of the other Contracting
Party.8 Therefore, ICSID subject-matter jurisdiction has three components: Firstly, the
requirement of a legal dispute; Secondly, the requirement that the legal dispute arise directly
out of the underlying transaction; and Lastly, that such underlying transaction qualify as an
investment.
There is no objection to the fact that there exists a legal dispute between the parties and the
dispute has arisen out of 123 Agreement entered into by Albrosa and Brisselanta. But a
general obligation of law which is not specially contracted for in the investment agreement
does not arise directly out of the investment.9 Brisselanta was under a general obligation of
law to provide seismically robust power plants10 and also under an obligation to pay
compensation for the damage caused to Albrosa, Bong Bong and Kolra due to its negligence.
Therefore, disputes regarding these obligations cannot be regarded as arising out of the
investment.
Additionally, for the dispute that has arisen out of the underlying transaction to be within the
jurisdiction of the ICSID it has to fall within the definition of investment as per the ICSID
8
Supra note 6.
Amco v. Indonesia, Award, 20 November 1984.
10
Compromis, 6.

2
Convention. Even though the parties have certain discretion in describing their transaction as
an investment, this discretion is not unlimited as the investment must fall within the outer
limits set by the ICSID Convention.11
The typical features of an investment under the Conventions are12:
i.
The project should have a certain duration;
ii.
There should be a certain regularity of profit and return;
iii.
There is typically an element of risk for both sides;
iv.
The commitment involved would have to be substantial;
v.
The operation should be significant for the host states development.
The current investment in question does qualify as an investment as per the usual hallmarks
of investment, it fails to comply with the additional condition derived from the ICSID
Conventions preamble i.e. the contribution to the economic development of the host state.13
Under the Salini test, one of the objective criteria to be satisfied is that the economic
activity must contribute positively and significantly to the economic development of the host
State.14 Therefore, the Salini test logically requires that if the investors activities or
interests create an overall negative effect on economic development, such as the Claimants
11
International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts And Tracking Innovations ISBN 978-92-64-04202-
5, OECD 2008 at pg. 9 <http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471468.pdf>

12
Helnan International Hotel A/S v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction, 17 October 2006; Saipem S.P.A. v. The Peoples Republic of Bangladesh,
ICSID Case No. Arb/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction & Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 21-03-2007
13
ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Preamble.
14
Salini v.Morraco, 6 ICSID Rep.400(2004).

3
interests, this would not meet the definition of investment as protected by the ICSID
Convention.15
Albrosa would be the host State here as the investment activities were undertaken in Albrosa.
The nuclear incident which took place at the Morsin-kkkuyu site had a negative impact on the
economic development of Albrosa as the fishing industry came to a standstill and loss of ecotourism etc.16 Hence, the investment activities of Albrosa and Brisselanta fail to comply with
the ratione materiae requirement of the ICSID Convention.
Lastly, the condition ratione voluntatis requires the parties to the dispute have consented that
the dispute be settled through ICSID arbitration. The consent given by Albrosa and
Brisselanta in the 123 Agreement for settling the dispute through ICSID arbitration is a
conditional consent as it is subject to the fulfilment of the requirements of Chapter II of the
ICSID Convention.17 As it has been shown above, not all conditions laid down in the Chapter
II have been complied with. Therefore, as the conditions to the consent are not complied
with, it can be said that Albrosa has not consented to submit the disputes to the ICSID
Tribunal for arbitration.
Further, as Bong Bong and Kolra, who are parties to the dispute, are not Contracting Parties
to the 123 Agreement and therefore, have not consented to submit the disputes to the ICSID
Tribunal for arbitration. Hence, it can be seen that the last condition of ratione voluntatis is
also not complied by with the parties. In conclusion, it can be said that, as demonstrated
15
Grabowski, Alex (2014) The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defence of Salini,
Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 15: No. 1, Article 13.

<http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol15/iss1/13>
16
17
Compromis, 15.
Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson, Nigel Blackaby, Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson, Nigel Blackaby, Kluwer Law
International (2006).

4
above all the requirements of Chapter II of the ICSID Convention have not been fulfilled and
therefore, as provided in the Dispute Settlement Clause of the 123 Agreement, the ICJ has
jurisdiction to hear the present case.
2. The Respondent, being a supplier of nuclear equipment and material is liable to
compensate the Applicants for the nuclear disaster
2.1 Albrosa has right to recourse against Brisselanta under Section 23(c) of the CLNDA.
The domestic legislation of Albrosa, CLNDA, 2010 under section 23 (c) expressly provides
for right to recourse against the supplier if in the opinion of the SC of the country, the nuclear
incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of the supplier which includes supply of
equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services. The Supreme
Court of Albrosa, on 28th September, 2014 held BPPEC liable for the latent defect in the
equipment supplied18. Consequently, Albrosa gets an undisputed right of recourse against the
supplier.
It is humbly submitted that Albrosa cannot be governed by the amended 123 Agreement,
since it was invalid on the ground that it was in disregard to their domestic law, CLNDA. The
amendment to the 123 Agreement was entered into by the preceding government in bad faith.
Public Officials are presumed to act in good faith unless proved otherwise, and this
presumption extends to public officials conduct in the execution and performance of treaty19.
The preamble of VCLT also recognizes the principles of free consent and of good faith
universally. Amendment to the treaty made in bad faith by the preceding government cannot
be said to be binding upon Albrosa.
18
Compromis, 17.
19
The Schooner Betsey, 44 Ct. Cl. 506, 514 (1909).

5
It is further submitted that one of the principles enshrined in the preamble of VCLT and also
in UN Charter is non-interference in the domestic affairs of State. The Amendment to 123
Agreement was made invalid by the Socialist Government of Albrosa vide a notification
dated 2nd February, 201120. This notification issued by the new government to make the
amendment by the preceding government of Albrosa null and void, which is exclusively a
domestic affair of Albrosa and thus, the Respondent cannot interfere or claim any rights
under the amended Agreement.
2.2. There was latent defect in the materials and equipments supplied by Brisselanta.
Suppliers are by all means obligated to provide for safety and quality guarantees for the
reactor or equipment for a particular period (product liability/guarantee period), ideally
concurrent with the contractual timeline or license period, which Brisselanta failed to do.
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,21 the court held that "If the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life or limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger"' and the supplier should be held liable without the need for privity of contract.
In the present case, nuclear reactor coolant and generators that are supplied by Brisselanta are
the thigs of danger which caused catastrophe due to the latent defect in the nuclear reactor
coolant and generators supplied by BPPEC. Brisselanta, accordingly, should be held liable
for placing the life of the people of Albrosa and neighbouring islands in peril.
It is further submitted that the suppliers owed a duty of care to the operators. This can be
proved by satisfying the test of proximate cause introduced in the case of Ultramares
20
Compromis, 12.
21
217 N.Y. 382 (1916).

6
Corporation v Touche,22 wherein, it laid out factors to be considered in determining if the

Respondents breach of duty was a major cause of the Applicants injury. The first factor that
injury is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Respondents breach of duty is evident
in the present case as the damage to the life and property from the nuclear accident (the
injury) primarily happened due to the covert defect in the coolants and generators supplied
by Brisselanta. (breach of duty of care by the suppliers)
Secondly, Albrosa was a reasonably foreseeable victim of the Respondents breach of duty
as the Respondents conduct directly affected the Albrosa and the neighbouring islands. Thus,
the causation can be made out through the proximate cause test.
It is humbly submitted that Brisselanta owed duty of care to the Applicants which was
breached. The standard of care is that which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent
person acting under similar circumstances23. Defendant owes a duty of care to all persons
who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the
conduct unreasonably dangerous24. In these circumstances, BPPEC, a professional and
qualified company since it is dealing in the nuclear coolants and generators and the standard
of care that should be exercised, is very high in the instant case. Applicants are foreseeably
endangered by the suppliers conduct and the duty of care to the operators, under no
circumstances, can be waived off by Brisselanta.
Under the ordinary rules of civil liability, should an incident occur due to defect in services,
material or equipment supplied, the supplier is held liable for the compensation. Such liability
may arise from the concept called product liability. Products liability law allow for suppliers
22
174 NE 441 (1931).
23
United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (2d. Circ. 1947).
24
Rodriguez v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1974).

7
to be liable for product liability, faulty design, faulty manufacture, negligence, etc 25. In
such circumstance of gross negligence on the part of the suppliers, propriety would demand
that suppliers be held liable to compensate the applicants for the nuclear disaster.
2.3. The Supreme court of Albrosa held BPPEC liable for the nuclear incident.
Article 13 (a) of Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960
expressly provides that jurisdiction over nuclear damage claims lies only with the courts of
the state in which the accident has occurred, and in the instant case, accident happened at the
Albrosa coast.
SC of Albrosa was competent to try the claims relating to pecuniary compensation for death
or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property in Albrosa and neighbouring
islands, caused by the negligence attributable to Brisselanta and since the accident occurred
on the territory of Albrosa, Brisselanta cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before SC
of Albrosa26 refraining from the liability of personal injuries and damage to the property.
The judgement of SC is binding on Brisselanta, by the application of principle of comity
which provides for the recognition of the validity and effect of the executive, legislative, and
judicial acts of the other countries27.
Article XIII.5 and XIII.6. of the CSC provides that foreign judgements are recognised and
enforceable in any other member country as if it were a judgment of a court of such country.
This puts an embargo on the state of Brisselanta from claiming any jurisdictional immunity.
25
International Product Law Manual, Arundel McDougall, Kluwer Law International BV, 2010.
26
Article 12 of United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004.
27
The Transformation Of International Comity, Joel R. Paul, [Vol. 71:19 ].

8
It is humbly pleaded that Brisselanta cannot escape the liability imposed by the SC of
Albrosa by claiming sovereign immunity. With increased State participation in international
business transactions, absolute sovereign immunity has been gradually limited and doctrine
of restrictive immunity has been created. Restrictive immunity restricts immunity in cases
where the dispute is purely commercial in nature28. Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of
Nigeria29 held that sovereign immunity should not apply to commercial transactions as is now
generally accepted by international law.
Commercial Transaction means any commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods
or supply of services30; it should be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as to
include not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services, but also
other types of economic transactions.31 In this regard, 123 Agreement is commercial in nature
as it deals with the supply of equipment and uranium for over 10 year period and thus
sovereign immunity cannot be claimed.
Albrosa and Brisselanta were engaged in commercial transaction and differences relating to
the transaction under 123 agreement falls within the jurisdiction of Albrosa, chiefly because
the nuclear accident had happened in the country of Albrosa due to the defective equipment
supplied by Brisselanta, the latter cannot invoke immunity from that jurisdiction in a
proceeding arising out of that commercial transaction32. Further, the SC of Albrosa in
applying the national law of Albrosa to arrive at the decision is licit and justified. Article 14
of Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960, contemplates
28
Sornarajah, M, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff ,1986)
Pg.253.
29
(1977) Q.B 529.
30
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Article 2(1)(c)(i).
31
Principles Of International Commercial Contracts, Unidroit, Principles Art. 1.6(2).
32
Article 10 of United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004 .

9
that the courts having jurisdiction will apply the relevant convention and their own national
law over claims arising out of a nuclear accident and the national law of Albrosa, CLNDA,
provides for Right to recourse under section 23(c)33 and thus, the SC of Albrosa has full
authority to apply this national law.
The Applicants humbly plead that the Brisselanta is bound by the decision of SC of Albrosa
that justly and precisely held the nuclear incident was caused by a latent defect in the
equipment supplied by BPPEC and that the State of Albrosa had a right of recourse against
the BPPEC under Section 23(c) of the CLNDA.
3. The Respondent is liable to compensate the Applicants for the pollution of their
marine environment that gravely dented their economic interests.
3.1.Respondent disregarded their duty under VCLT
It is well settled that signing a convention does not have a binding effect on the prospective
Party concerned if the convention requires ratification. However, in accordance with the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties34, after a country signs a convention, it is obliged
to refrain from acts which could defeat the object and purpose of the convention.
3.1.1. The object of Aarhus Convention was breached
The Preamble helps to denote the objective and purpose of the treaty.35 Aarhus Conventions
preamble sets out the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life,
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being by referring to
principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration. It also brings in the aspect of public participation in
33
Compromis, 8.
34
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan.27,1980, art.18, 25,1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(V.C.L.T.).
35
Hans-Dietrich Treviranus, Preamble, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. III, R. Bernhardt
ed., (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1997), p.1097.

10
environmental issues by recalling principle 10 of Rio Declaration. Principle 10 of the Rio

Declaration summarizes the basic three rights granted by the Aarhus Convention. The
Preamble to the Aarhus Convention recognizes that public participation, as laid down in the
Aarhus Convention, is a critical tool in guaranteeing the right to a healthy environment.
Along with the Preamble, Article 1 of the Aarhus convention also brings out the object and
purpose of the treaty. In the present case, the Respondent failed to fulfil the obligations under
the Aarhus convention and also violated the object and purpose of the Aarhus Convention by
failing to consider public opinion of States who were in imminent danger.
3.1.2. The object of UNCLOS was breached
UNCLOS aims to establish a legal order for the seas and oceans to facilitate international
communication and peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient use of
resources, conservation of the living resources and protection and preservation of the marine
environment.36 It requires States to follow two vital environmental objectives: prevent,
reduce and control marine pollution; and to conserve and manage marine living resources.
Contrary to the initial assurances made by the Respondent, FNPP were not seismically
robust. Albrosa being an archipelagic island nation and history of catastrophic disaster was
prone to nuclear disaster. Even after a reminder of risk by a professor from Brisselanta, the
respondent acted negligently by supplying defective nuclear reactor coolant and generator. 37
UNCLOS also desires that interest and needs of mankind as a whole should be taken in to
consideration.38 Bong Bong Island was exposed to immediate threat and raised its concerns
about the same which were disregarded by the Respondent. Thus, it is humbly prayed that,
the Respondent breached the object and essence of the UNCLOS.
36
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Preamble , Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
37
Compromis, 1, 3, 4.
38
Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, (2nd ed.) Cambridge University Press.

11
3.2. The Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention
The Aarhus Convention39 grants the public three rights.4041 The Aarhus Convention
recognises that the public must have access to environmental information These rights are
not limited to citizens of the state party; they apply equally to non-citizens and non-residents.
If there is an imminent threat to human health or the environment, information held by a
public authority which would enable the public to take preventive or mitigation measures
against harm must be disseminated.42
The Aarhus Convention grants the public concerned43 the right to participate in
environmental decision making on a wide range of activities including the construction,
operation of nuclear power plants. Bong Bong and Kolra in the present matter can be
construed as public concerned as they are public affected or likely to be affected. Morsinkkkuyu posed an imminent danger to Bong Bong islands44. Where a proposed activity could
affect a neighbouring country, members of the public in that country may participate in the
decision making process. In the present case, the respondent failed to comply with the
obligations provided by the Aarhus Convention as they disregarded the concerns raised by
Bong Bong.45
39
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M.517.

40
Right to environmental information from public authorities; the right to participate in environmental decision-
making by public authorities; and the right to judicial redress when the two previous rights or national
environmental law has been violated, for present and future generations to live in a healthy environment.
41
The Aarhus Convention, supra note 39, Article 1.
42
The Aarhus Convention, supra note 39, Article 5.
43
Article 2(5) of Aarhus Convention defines The public concerned as the public affected or likely to be
affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, nongovernmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national
law shall be deemed to have an interest.
44
Compromis, 14.
45
supra note 44.

12
3.3.The respondent failed to fulfil the obligations under UNCLOS

The nuclear disaster at Morsin-kkkuyu caused release of radio-active material into territorial
waters of the Applicants and had a severe impact which caused damage to the Applicants and
also posed a threat to their future.46
There has been pollution of the marine environment47 because of the respondents
negligence, as the release of the radioactive material was a result of a latent defect in the
reactors supplied by the Respondent and contrary to their initial assurances; the FNPP was
not seismically robust.48
The Respondent has violated the general obligation of protecting the Marine environment as
laid down under UNCLOS, where States have the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment.49 The Respondent failed to perform its duty to protect the environment
and take steps necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of marine environment.
The duty of a State to consult includes the duty to notify other affected countries, the duty to
exchange information, the duty to listen to the concerns of affected countries, the duty to
respond to these concerns, and the duty to negotiate in good faith. When an activity may
have a significant transboundary effect on ocean and coastal waters, the UNCLOS requires
the exchange of information about the proposed activity and the preparation of an EIA to
46
Compromis, 15.
47
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art.1(1)(4), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397: "pollution
of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as
harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities.
48
Compromis, 6, 16.
49
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 36, art. 192.

13
disclose the nature of the activity and the attendant risks.50

UNCLOS, while imposing responsibility and liability on the Parties, states that, States shall
cooperate in the implementation of existing international law for prompt and adequate
compensation for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment.51
3.4. The Respondent disregarded their duty under CBD
A general obligation in international law to inform other states exists with respect to
imminent and serious harm52. Imminent harm has been defined as acute emergency
situations, such as sudden, grave natural events, which would cause great harm towards other
states. 53 As per the definition and the facts, it can be understood that there existed imminent
harm to Bong Bong54 and therefore, the Respondent were under an obligation.55
The provisions of CBD apply in relation to each Contracting party, not only in case of
components of biological diversity within its national jurisdiction as well as beyond the limits
of its national jurisdiction, regardless of where the effects occur.56 The convention also
imposes an obligation on each Contracting Party to notify the potentially affected States of
any danger or damage as well as initiate action to prevent or minimize such danger or
damage, in the case of imminent or grave danger, originating under the jurisdiction or control
of Contracting Party, to biological diversity within the area under jurisdiction of other States
or in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction57
50
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 36, art. 204-06.
51
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 36, art. 235(1).
52
Corfu Channel (merits), 22; Rio, principle 18; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 36, art.198; Convention
on Biological diversity, 1992, Art.14(1)(d), 31 I.L.M. 818.13.

53
Corfu Channel (merits), 22; UNEP 1978, principle 9. See also Art. XXIX Helsinki.
54
Compromis, 14.
55
Compromis, 1, 4 and 14.
56
Convention on Biological diversity, supra note 52, Article 4.
57
Convention on Biological diversity, supra note 52, Article 14.

14
It is humbly submitted that, the respondent refused to consider any of the concerns raised by
Bong Bong about the threat of setting up the FNPP being an imminent danger to them. It was
understood that Bong Bong Island can have no authority to intervene in that matter.58 This
obligation mentioned in the Convention was disregarded by the Respondent.
3.5. Brisselanta violated its obligations under customary international law
The precautionary principle, confirmed in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, constitutes
an obligation of diligent prevention and control.59 Some of the vital elements of the
precautionary principle are that Developments and initiatives affecting the environment
should be thoroughly assessed before action is taken, the burden is on the developer or
initiator to establish that the new program is safe, whenever serious or irreversible damage is
anticipated, the action should be postponed or cancelled etc.
A State interested in undertaking or continuing a particular activity has to prove that such
activities will not result in any harm, rather than the other side having to prove that it will
result in harm.60
Cooperation in matters is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate
adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres; also
sovereignty and interests of all States has to be taken into account.61 In the MOX Plant Case,
the Tribunal ruled that the duty to cooperate required the two countries to exchange
information concerning the risks created by the plant, to monitor the effects of the plant on
58
Supra note 44.
59
Patricia W. Birnie And Alan E. Boyle, International Law & The Environment, 111 (2d ed. 2002).
60
MOX Plant Case, Ireland v United Kingdom, Order No 3, (2003) 126 ILR 310, (2003) 42 ILM 1187, ICGJ
366 (PCA 2003), 24th June 2003, Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA] (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001)
(opinion of Judge Wolfrum).
61
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at Principle 24.

15
the marine environment, and to work together to reduce those risks.62

3.6.Respondent is liable to Compensate for degradation of the environment which
harmed the economic interests of the Applicants
For environmental damage, the main form of reparation is restitution, that it, to restore the
area to the condition it would have been had the disaster not occurred.63 In case of damage
with respect to marine areas, damage can be measured in economic units as suffered by other
States, for example loss of tourism or damage to the fishing industry, or in terms of the costs
of removal and restoration. Environmental values are considered in each particular context
using a criterion based on the nature and extent of human use as well as on the availability of
the natural resource to human society with the currently available and feasible technology. In
calculating the environmental damage, the loss to the environment is often measured by cost
of measure of restoration. The costs incurred to restore the environment from the injuries
suffered are compensable under the 1997 Supplementary Compensation Convention if they
are reasonable, have been approved by the competent authorities of the State, and are
designed to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components of the environment, or to
introduce, where reasonable, the equivalent of these components in the environment.64 In
the present case, fishing industry of the Applicants had come to a halt, the eco-tourism of
Bong Bong and Kolra islands had largely suffered. 65
The ICJ recognizing the polluter pays principle stated that, it is an established rule of
international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the State which
62
MOX Plant Case, supra note 60.
63
Xue Hanqin, Transboundary Damage In International Law, 163 (2003).
64
International Law Commission, First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of
tansboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, 88, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/531
(Mar. 21, 2003) (prepared by Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Special Rapporteur).
65
Compromis, 15.

16
has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it.66 This rule was
reaffirmed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in The M/V Saiga Case.67
This principle is also codified as Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. Thus, it is humbly
submitted that the Respondent is liable to compensate the Applicants for pollution of the
marine environment which harmed the economic interests of the Applicants.
4. Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta is not violative
of the 123 Agreement.
Article 31 of VCLT provides that any relevant rules of international law applicable in
relations between the parties shall also be taken into account68. In the instant case, the
relevant rule of international law applicable in relations between the parties is GATT since
the Applicants and Respondent, both are members of the WTO69 and therefore, 123
Agreement should be interpreted in the light of provisions of GATT. Further, Article XV and
Article XXX of the 123 Agreement are in pari materia with Article XI and Article XX of the
GATT respectively and therefore reliance can be placed on the aforementioned articles of
GATT for the interpretation of the 123 Agreement.
4.1. Albrosas indefinite moratorium does not violate Article XV of the 123 Agreement.
4.1.1 In order to invoke Article XV of the 123 Agreement, the criteria of either an institution
or maintenance of a prohibition or restriction made effective through quotas, import or
export licences or other measures must be satisfied70.
66
Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 53 (Sept. 25).
67
M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143, 170 (Intl Trib. L. of the Sea
1999).
68
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan.27,1980, art.31.3(c), 25,1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
69
Clarifications to the Compromis, 3.
70
Article XV of 123 Agreement.

17
Firstly, it is humbly submitted that the indefinite moratorium does not qualify as a
prohibition or restriction within the meaning of Art. XV of the Agreement. It is submitted
that no moratorium has been instituted but, arguendo an indefinite moratorium by its nature is
at best a temporary suspension. Therefore, an indefinite moratorium does not qualify as a
prohibition or restriction. It is the principle of International law that a treaty should be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose71.
Going by the ordinary meaning of the term indefinite72, it refers to an action having no
clearly determined being or character, i.e. indeterminate, vague, or undefined.
Moratorium73 is defined as an authorized postponement usually a lengthy one. Therefore,
an indefinite moratorium implies an indeterminate delay.
Furthermore, prohibition74 means the action or an act of forbidding a thing by command
or the legal ban on trade or importation of specified commodity. Restriction75 is a thing
which restricts someone or something, a limitation on action; and as per the interpretation of
the international tribunals it amounts to imposing absolute limitations76.
Thus, in the instant case, the import of uranium has been indeterminately or indefinitely
delayed, but there is no legal ban, limitation or an imposition of a particular condition to be
fulfilled on the imports. Therefore, it does not qualify as a prohibition or restriction and
is not contrary to Art. XV (1). Secondly, It is an undeniable fact that there were no quotas,
71
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan.27,1980, art.31.1, 25,1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
72
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th edn OUP, Oxford 2003)1353.
73
Blacks Law Dictionary (n 7) 1026.
74
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (n 11) 2362.
75
Id. at 2554.
76
WTO, Turkey: Restriction on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products-Report of the Appellate Body (22
October 1999) WT/DS34/AB/R.

18
import or export licences in any way, form or manner through which any prohibition or
restriction has been imposed by the Applicants.
Albrosa has not taken any step that constitutes a measure putting a restriction or prohibition
on the import of Uranium from Brisselanta. The Panel in Dominican Republic Import and
Sale of Cigarettes77 found that not every measure affecting the opportunities for entering the
market would be covered by Article XI of GATT, but only those measures that constitute a
prohibition or restriction on the importation of products. The official notification which has
not been acted upon or in respect of which no step has been taken or law has been made to
that effect, cannot be construed as a measure imposing restriction or prohibition.
4.2. Albrosas indefinite moratorium falls under the General Exceptions as provided
under Article XXX of the 123 Agreement.
In order to be justified under Article XXX, the inconsistent measure must go through a twotier test: Firstly, the measure at issue must fall under one of the exceptions sub-paragraphs
(a) to (j) listed under Article XXX; and, Secondly, the measure must be applied in a manner
that satisfies the requirements of the Chapeau of Article XX.78
The assessment of an Article XXX claim always starts with the analysis with the particular
exceptions invoked by a party and only after the measure at issue has been found to be falling
within the scope of the claimed exceptions, should it be considered whether the application of
the measure satisfies the conditions of the Chapeau.79
The measure of indefinite moratorium taken by Albrosa is to facilitate the protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health therefore, falls under Article XXX(b). The measure
77
Panel Report, Dominican Republic Import and Sale of Cigarettes, 7.261.
78
US Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p. 22.
79
EC Asbestos, Panel Report, 6.20; US Shrimp, Panel Report, 5.27-5.28.

19
must meet two elements to fall under the scope of the Article XXX(b) exception: Firstly, the
policy in respect of the measure for which the provision is invoked must fall within the range
of policies designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; and Secondly, the
inconsistent measure for which the exception is invoked must be necessary to fulfil the policy
objective.
In order to determine whether a measure pursues a policy objective of protecting human and
animal life and health, it should first be considered whether a risk to human and animal life
and health exists. Albrosa is an archipelagic island nation, in a high-risk seismic zone,
further, Albrosa, due to the nuclear disaster, has already witnessed the damage caused to the
human, animal and plant life by exposure to radio-active material.80 Hence, it can be seen,
that uranium, which is a radio-active material, does pose a threat to human, animal and plant
life in Albrosa. The purpose for which the uranium was being imported into Albrosa was to
construct FNPPs in Albrosa and the FNPPs81, as can be concluded from the nuclear disaster,
pose a threat to the human, animal and plant life in Albrosa.
If a risk is found to exist, it should further be determined as to whether the policy objective
underlying the measure is to reduce that risk. Since, the FNPPs pose an environmental threat
to Albrosa, the further construction of FNPPs, itself is an issue. Therefore, till the time the
issue is not resolved by both the countries, the import of a dangerous material like uranium in
Albrosa should be halted. Hence, the measure of indefinite moratorium on the import of
uranium is in pursuance of fulfilment of the policy objective, of protection of the
environment of Albrosa.
80
Compromis, 1.
81
Compromis, 6.

20
In order to determine, whether a measure is necessary within the meaning of Article XXX,
it should be understood as being inevitable, indispensable or of absolute necessity. 82 In
Brazil Tyres83, the panel noted the objective of protecting human health and life against
life-threatening diseases.is both vital and important in the highest degree. It can therefore
be seen that, it is absolutely necessary for Albrosa to impose an indefinite moratorium on the
import of uranium, as protection of the environment is of utmost importance.
A GATT Panel acknowledged that: smoking constitutes a serious risk to human health and
that consequently measures designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fall within the
scope of Article XX (B).84 In US Gasoline85, the Panel and the parties agreed that: the
policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline was a policy within
the range of those concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health
mentioned in Article XX(b) In EC Asbestos86, the Panel found and subsequently the
Appellate Body confirmed that: chrysotile-cement products pose a risk to human life or
health and thus the EU policy of prohibiting chrysotile asbestos falls within the range of
policies designed to protect human life or health In Brazil Retreaded Tyre87, the Panel
found and subsequently the Appellate Body confirmed that: the Brazilian policy of reducing
exposure of the risks to human, animal, and plant life and health arising from the
accumulation of waste tyres falls within the range of policies covered by Article XX(b)
The necessity test involves a process of weighing and balancing a series of relevant
factors, in particular: The contribution made by the measure to the achievement of its
82
Korea Beef, Appellate Body Report, 161.
83
Panel Report, Brazil Retreaded Tyres.
84
Thailand Cigarettes, GATT Panel Report, para. 73.
85
US Gasoline, Appellate Body Report.
86
Panel Report in European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products
(WT/DS135/R, 18 September 2000).

87
Supra note 85.

21
objection; the importance of the interests or values at stake; the trade-restrictiveness of the
measure.88
The achievement of the objective of the measure and the importance of the interests or values
at stake has already been established. In order to determine the trade-restrictiveness of the
measure, it has to be compared with possible available alternatives, which may be less trade
restrictive while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective
pursued.89 In order to qualify as an alternative, a measure must be not only less trade
restrictive than the measure at issue, but should also preserve for the responding Member its
right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued. 90 In this
case, imposing a moratorium on the import of uranium is the only way to protect Albrosa
from radio-active exposure and any other restrictive measure will not serve the same purpose.
In order to justify a measure under Article XXX, it must also be shown that the measure
meets the requirements of Article XXX chapeau. It must be demonstrated that the measure is
not a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail; or a disguised restriction on international trade. This, being a bilateral
treaty there is no other country where the same conditions prevail, therefore, the first point is
not relevant in this case. In order to establish that it is not a disguised restriction on
international trade it should be determined that the measure applied would not constitute a
misuse or an abuse of the exceptions of Article XXX.91 Therefore, the measure undertaken
must be exercised in good faith.92 In this case, if the FNPP would not have led to the nuclear
88
Korea Beef, Appellate Body Report.
89
Brazil Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Report.
90
United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (the Panel
Report) WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004.

91
US Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, 157.
92
US Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, para. 158; Brazil Retreaded Tyres, 224.

22
disaster in Albrosa, then FNPPs would actually have facilitated development of Albrosa.
Therefore, had not been for the safety of human, animal and plant life in Albrosa, they had no
reason to impose a moratorium on the import of uranium. Hence, it can be concluded that the
measure undertaken by Albrosa is in good faith and therefore, complies with the requirements
of the chapeau of Article XXX.
4.3.
THE
INDEFINITE
MORATORIUM
IS
AUTHORISED
UNDER
THE
ESSENTIAL SECURITY CLAUSE

4.3.1. The self-judging nature of the essential security clause
It is humbly submitted that the terminology of the essential security clause of the 123
Agreement93 suggests that every country is the sole judge on questions relating to its own
security94. It is further submitted that since the contracting parties are the members of WTO,
Article XXI of GATT can be relied upon for the further interpretation of essential security
clause of 123 Agreement.
Since the essential security clause refers to action which the contracting party considers
necessary for the protection of its own essential security interests; therefore, the necessity of
invoking such a provision is not left to objective but rather the subjective determination of the
State in question9596. The GATT Council discussions97 and the 1949, Czechoslovakia-USA
case98 noted that every country must be the judge in the last resort on questions relating to
93
See, Essential Security 123 Agreement, Ch. 7.
94
JH. Jackson, World Trade and Law of GATT (Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969) 748.
95
Dapo Akande & S Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the
WTO? (2003) 43 Va. J. Intl L. 365.

96
Military and Paramilitary Activities case (Nicaragua v US) [1986] I.C.J.Rep 14, 22 (June 27).
97
Analytical Index:Guide to GATT Law and Practice (Vol 1 World Trade Organisation Geneva, 1995) at 600.
98
Id. (citing GATT Doc. CP.3/33 (May 30,1949)).

23
its own security. In Commission v Greece99, it was held that the interpretation of the
essential security clause being a hard fact rather than perception 100 is subjective on account
of different geo-political considerations of States. Each member state is better placed than the
community institutions or the other member states, to mitigate the threat posed by a third
state. The issue of national security is subject to the appraisal of the authorities of the State
concerned101. It is also submitted that that the self-judging aspect of the essential security
clause is simply a reflection of a general principle of international law.
Hence, it is contended that, if a test is introduced to determine the reasonableness or necessity
of a measure under the essential security clause, it would fail to respect the deliberate
wording of that provision and the distinction made by the drafters with other provisions.
It is humbly submitted that under the tenets of law, the essential security clause can be
instituted via the subjective satisfaction of Albrosa alone. According to article XXI of GATT,
Albrosa may take any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests102 yet, in the light of justice and equity, the rationale behind the
aforementioned countermeasure, shall be explained in greater detail.
There was latent defect in the nuclear reactor coolant and generators supplied by BPPEC. The
cooling of the three FNPPs was disabled during the shock caused by the earthquake and the
succeeding collision. This was contrary to the initial reassurances of BPPEC of being
seismically robust103. Even, the report prepared by the IAEA inspectors pointed out that one
99
Case C-183/91Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-1513 54-55.
100
101
Peter Lindsay, The ambiguity of GATT article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant(1998) 52 Duke L.J. 1227.
Grady v United Kingdom (App. No) (2000)29EHRR 493; Ireland v United Kingdom (App. No.
5310/71)(1980) 2 EHRR 25.

102
Article XXI of GATT.
103
Compromis, 16.

24
of the ten turbines supplied by BPPEC was not fully compliant with the IAEA standards and
needed to be replaced104. Brisselantas negligence was a substantial factor in causing the
Applicants harm and damages. The Respondent has violated the duty of care it owed to the
Applicants. Because of such negligence and the defects in the material supplied, the nuclear
catastrophe similar to Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986 has occurred on the coast of the
Albrosa which caused the death of 18,500 people due to overexposure to radiation. A report
by the WHO predicted additional fatalities and cancer cases as a result of accumulated
radiation exposure. Further, the fishing industry of Kolra, Albrosa and Bong Bong had come
to a standstill. Eco-tourism of Bong Bong and Kolra had also been affected by the nuclear
disaster105.
It is submitted that the failure of the Respondent to take reasonable care to provide for
efficient and non-defective materials has created an apprehension in the mind of the
Applicants with respect of the safety and effectiveness of the remaining 11 FNPPs. The
Applicants cannot take the menace of continuing the import of Uranium from the Respondent
and jeopardize the life of people and animals of its own country and the neighbour islands.
It is further submitted that the state of Albrosa is a developing nation and the industrial
growth of the country has not been much significant. With no such good socio-economic
history106, the Applicants have put an indefinite moratorium in the interest of its own
essential security and for no other reason or whatsoever and for that reason the moratorium is
totally justified and authorized.
104
Compromis, 13.
105
Compromis, 15.
106
Compromis, 1, 2.

25
SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
For the foregoing reasons, the Republic of Albrosa & Others, respectfully request the Court
to adjudge and declare that:
1. This Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to hear the present case;
2. The Respondent is liable to compensate the Applicants for the nuclear disaster;
3. The Respondent is liable to compensate the Applicants for the pollution of their
marine environment that gravely dented their economic interests; and
4. Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta is not violative
of the 123 Agreement.
All of which is respectfully submitted

Agents for the Applicants
__________________________
__________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF ALBROSA
ISLAND STATE OF BONG-BONG
ISLAND STATE OF KOLRA

26

6th Dr. PARAS DIWAN MEMORIAL INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW' MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

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PROVISIONAL REGISTRATION NO: "PR17"

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE

THE CASE CONCERNING

THE REPUBLIC OF ALBROSA & OTHERS,

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANTS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iii

ISSUES RAISED... xii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............. xii

The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the present case.................... 1

3.1. Respondent disregarded their duty under VCLT............. 10

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

3.4. The Respondent disregarded their duty under CBD................................................ 14

SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT.............. 26

Agreement Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the

The Republic of Albrosa

Brisselanta Power for Power Electrical Company

The Peoples Democracy of Brisselanta

Convention on Biological Diversity

Civil Liability for Nuclear Disaster Act, 2010

Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,1997

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

Environmental Impact Assessment

Floating Nuclear Power Plant

General Agreement on tariff and trade

International Atomic Energy Agency

International Court of Justice

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

International Monetary Fund

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Permanent Court of International Justice

Special Drawing Right

Social Impact Assessment

Charter of the United Nations

United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE-

1. Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary. v. Slovakia.), 1997 I.C.J. 7

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

3. Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

GATT/WTO APPELLATE BODY REPORT-

1. WTO, Turkey: Restriction on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products-Report of

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

Responsibility, Cambridge University Press

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

4. H Steinberger, Sovereignty, in Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

Is Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta violative

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

Is Albrosas indefinite moratorium on uranium imports from Brisselanta violative

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

See, Dispute Settlement, 123 Agreement, Ch. 7.

Clarifications to the Compromis, 5

Supra note 3, Dispute Settlement (3).

Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

Amco v. Indonesia, Award, 20 November 1984.