FIRST DIVISION

The complainant refuted respondents defense. He insisted the records of the case were transmitted to the
RTC only on July 10, 2003 as evidenced by the stamp mark made and initialed by the RTC's receiving clerk.

JULIANITO M. SALVADOR, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1695

Complainant, (formerly OCA IPI 03-1380-MTJ)
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and

In a report,[7] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) gave credence to the complainants version and
recommended that:
1.

the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter;

2.

respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., 4 th MCTC, Valladolid-San EnriquePulupandan, Negros Occidental be administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision and be FINED in the amount of P1,000 with a warning that a
repetition of similar infraction be dealt with more severely; and[,]

3.

respondent Clerk of Court John O. Negroprado, be ADMONISHED to be more

circumspect in the discharge of his functions.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO,
JR. and JOHN O. NEGROPRADO,
Clerk of Court, both of the 4th
MCTC, Valladolid-San EnriquePulupandan, Negros Occidental,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 16, 2008

We adopt the OCAs recommendations, with modification.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This treats of the administrative complaint for obstruction of justice, undue delay in rendering a decision and
gross inefficiency filed by the complainant Julianito M. Salvador against respondent Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr.
In his affidavit-complaint,[1] the complainant averred that, on October 21, 2001, he filed an ejectment case [2] in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
Respondent judge presided over that court.
After the defendants filed their answer, the case was heard on February 13, 2002. As the parties failed to
amicably settle the case, respondent judge required them to submit their respective position papers. The
complainant submitted his position paper on March 15, 2002 while the defendants failed to do so.
After two months, the complainant moved for the early resolution of the case but the defendants opposed it
claiming respondent judge was yet to issue a pre-trial order defining the issues to be discussed in the position
papers.
Respondent judge did not act on the motion. Instead, he again required the complainant to submit a copy of
his position paper. According to the complainant, respondent judge lost the original copy of his position paper.
On November 4, 2002, he complied with respondent judges directive. He filed two more motions for the early
resolution of the case. Respondent judge did not resolve both motions.
On May 21, 2003, respondent judge finally rendered a decision dismissing the ejectment case for lack of
cause of action.[3]
The complainant filed a notice of appeal which the MCTC granted. On follow-up, however, he was informed
that the records had not yet been transmitted to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He also discovered that the
MCTC's clerk of court, respondent John O. Negroprado, failed to attach his position paper to the cases
records and to issue a certificate on the completeness of said records.
The complaint was amended to include Negroprado for undue delay in transmitting the complete records of
the case to the RTC and for not issuing the certificate.

Under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the court shall render its judgment within 30 days after its receipt of the
parties position papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same, [8] whichever comes first.
The record shows that during the February 13, 2002 hearing, the parties were given 30 days (or until March
15, 2002) within which to submit their respective position papers. Only the complainant complied with the
order.
Despite the expiration of the period granted by the court, however, respondent judge failed to decide the case.
It was only after more than one year from the lapse of the prescribed period that he rendered his decision.
A judges foremost consideration is the administration of justice. [9] Thus, he should follow the time
limit set for deciding cases.[10]
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or
resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision. [11] Judges are enjoined to dispose of
the courts business promptly and expeditiously and decide cases within the period fixed by law. [12] Failure to
comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases.[13] It also undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers
its standards and brings it to disrepute. [14] Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a
member of the bench.[15]
Under Rule 140, Section 9 (1), as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC, respondent judges
undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious offense. It carries the penalty of suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of
more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[16]
Regarding respondent Negroprado, the complainant failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that he had
maliciously retained the original copy of the position paper or that he had custody of the same. The
complainant submitted the original copy of his position paper on March 15, 2002 while Negroprado assumed
his position only on May 5, 2003. Considering, however, that he failed to immediately transmit the records of
the case to the RTC and to certify their completeness upon transmittal, he is sternly warned to be more
circumspect in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in
rendering a decision. Accordingly, he is FINED P20,000 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, respondent Clerk of Court John O.
Negroprado is hereby sternly WARNED to be more circumspect in the discharge of his functions.

In his comment,[4] respondent judge contended that the complainant's accusations were baseless. According
to him, he had already decided the case on May 21, 2003. It was not also true that he lost the original copy of
complainants position paper. He insisted he neither received nor saw the document.

SO ORDERED.

Regarding the complainants notice of appeal, respondent judge stated that he had in fact ordered the
transmittal of the records to the RTC. On the other hand, respondent Negroprado maintained that he
transmitted the complete records on June 16, 2003.[5] He, however, admitted that he failed to issue the
certificate relating to the completeness of the documents. [6]

G.R. No. L-5270

January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended
by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under
proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of
the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then
and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a
foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of
said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle
and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull,
master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and
suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there
cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow
and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being
tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure
of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of
some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals
during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port
of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water
at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of
their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the
following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and
proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which
they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load
or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains
attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to
comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of
not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each
offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost
court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port
where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and
licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost
court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing
inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the

Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in
accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S.vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was
committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a
Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly
conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was
a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under
the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States.
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or
within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial
waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before
she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the
vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was
a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial
waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the
jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal
right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now
conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all
friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not
established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 AttorneyGeneral Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship
of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen.,
46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government
as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144),
Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may
reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory
she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which
announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of
nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual
deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la
Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but
little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting
under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial
sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that
experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are
essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the
extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to
extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters
happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the
crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit
Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such
jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded

it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who
consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is
doubtless the leading English authority, says that
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so
soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on
all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or
through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178;
2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting
the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit,
so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.
S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce
and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the
consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such
differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose
interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of
the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force,
1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and
particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168
Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to a
riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon
the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the
cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in
the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district
attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed,
and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar
proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876;
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of
the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in
the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port
of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels
to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the
Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the
views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827
between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause
of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the contract
of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from personal
violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges
or abitratorsin such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where
such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the
captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a
public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it

must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in
the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local
order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of
the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the
offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a
merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold that any
violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is
charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the
master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the
nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general
principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged
in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court
sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the
complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction
is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element
in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly andwillfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so
as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed
willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R.
Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden
by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to,
designed, and directed the act." So in Wongvs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is
that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act
complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel that the words 'willfully'
and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design done
for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same
effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the
assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold
is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was
done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state
the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language,
without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment
according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep.,
556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable
means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as
to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid
neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded,
bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with
failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios
adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context
and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the

objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to
rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute
penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of
the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the
legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of
the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional
principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question thus
presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature
and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After
much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has the
power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the
United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government
being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the
power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and other property
belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United
States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor
devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and
delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has
been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which were within the
Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in
an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The
organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been formally
incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by
its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To
the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in
its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the
action of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during
the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power
can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370,
385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although the
liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an impression
upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In
legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the
Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other
respects it is plenary. (De Limavs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244;
Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and legislation
founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section
1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which
are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in
every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil
government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply
to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the war
with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the
principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the
military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which
should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the
American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the occupied territory.
Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of
military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the
President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically

effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and
that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the
United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the
interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed
under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the
President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely military
government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by
Secretary Root in his report for 1901
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers the exercise of the
legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determination of
right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit.
After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission
to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise,
subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the Philippine
Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to the Commission,
to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such
time as complete civil government should be established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative
power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having
the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and
expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient
civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of municipal
and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now
competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the
Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain
specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the
government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for
the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should
be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent
with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific
restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment
for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the
Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to
govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and
persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the
establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been
exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by
virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer
the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress

assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7,
1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President had
erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President in
organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power
by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative
act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which
were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated
powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and
through the Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of
peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincolnvs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands
were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all
statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the
course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or
non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress
under its power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization
somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the
United States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine
Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving
power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the
Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of
Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of
the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from the
viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with
executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such
departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State
governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the
Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls
legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over
legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a
member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress
framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted
for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined
which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of
the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and
state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in
all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as
well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same
independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory
could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a
free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts
must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers
only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the States
exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former operates under
grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the
Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State
legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act
of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by

Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific
limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon
certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress
was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in
other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the
Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was
unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the
necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the
new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to
annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government
of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to
annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the
Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence,
make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until
annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been
expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands.
The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the
territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this
directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate.
Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the
Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of
commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign
commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the
Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its
approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect
the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before
Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government instituted by the
President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between
foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Crossvs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin,
21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action
by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the
Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of
commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended
by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the
judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the evidence.
On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain
cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the
provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the
following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was
engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and into
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid,
brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was
anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of
Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then
and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also

that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon
the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of
said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle
were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the
city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the
hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into
Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and crosscleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching
and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the
animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf
of the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss
whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that
according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not
maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for
them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or
unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if
transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-45685

November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu
Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and
of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the
aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs.
Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from
taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment
of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.",
criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent
herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal
case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October
15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private
prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of
time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the
Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended
party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified
the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven
years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were
denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The
defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
but the latter denied the petition forcertiorari in
November, 1936. This court, on
November 24,
1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the
judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng on
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he
is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18,
1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging,
among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the
questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las
pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos
probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in
G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social
que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la
misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse
indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de
una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la
superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda
el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution
denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional
motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31,
1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys
had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid
motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that
the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu
Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely
as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)."

On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an
order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiaeaforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion
should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of
the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera
issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the
court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of
his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but,
upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both
motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but
proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to
court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on
extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of
First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and
ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this
court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation
for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to
the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered
cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence
of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of Manila for the
purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law
of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be
applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section
11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City of
Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct
from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of
the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in
continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison
after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for
probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or
denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28,
1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change
the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation
in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office
as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative
when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent
to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation
for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative
of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law
operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper
delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law
(section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly;
and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art.
VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of
different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal
of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the
first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the
oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve
and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant
pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended
that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9,
1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the
People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other
contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented.
Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act
No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful
delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped
from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings
and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional
question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums,
challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ
of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the
very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution before
the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment
before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under
the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless
cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the
same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court
of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated
because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in the
probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to
and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of
the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically
provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First Instance
denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision
of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that the
said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the
requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the
restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net

(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial
court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion
for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable,
it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
ofcertiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the accused
was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused
is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an opportunity to
correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its
jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice; that
this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise
either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the
form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege,
said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not
be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the accused
commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is
constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation
of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach
upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for
the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and
contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less
question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from
questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court;
that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest
of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out
of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on
November 5, 1937. This
memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the
petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the
court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in
denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing
upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No.
41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of
this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the
printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs.
Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First
Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to
litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious
realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system
of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents,
this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented,
namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;
and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a
discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a
well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu
[1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the
ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs.

Patstone([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be
raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional
in an action of quo warrantobrought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held
that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey
on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for
injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil.,
234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional
question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70
Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6
Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case ofYu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided
by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The
constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by
the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was
raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in
prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held
that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70
Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice,
said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court
is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or
persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of
the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be
carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del
Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and
extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court
exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the
interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex
parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14
Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A.
1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction
was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and
both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that
court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is
not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict
in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of
the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having
jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review,
and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to
the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J.,
670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912],
109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54;
46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221
which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their
conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the
authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a
number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is
inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909],
156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs.

State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61
Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the
United States expressed the opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to
temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief
Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and
upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess
ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their
authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since
it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of
powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also
is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right
in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of
consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to
relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided
belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First
Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to
suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All
are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to
grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue
that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in
such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition
where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill
vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746).
In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only
before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent,
Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the
ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise
said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec.
177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as
authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute
by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent
judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley
that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the
human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to
duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded
on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the
constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised
by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private
prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of
constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are
parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held
that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its
being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J.,
sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by
the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and
prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also,Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs.
Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in
the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a
statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there

is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of
the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held
that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs.
Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908],
214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it
has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it
involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power
of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these
proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on
the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution,
is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we
are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No.
4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs.
Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney
General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining
corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional
because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the
constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of
the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of
the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we
were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not
follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a
general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by
the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil.,
192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be
presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp
conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any state of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it
is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears
that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville &
B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685;
113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held
that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court
to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn
again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to
raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the
People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public

funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence,
the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
[1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an
action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73
Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted
quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the
statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of
contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was
itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last
proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in
form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than if it
had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the
legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only
parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in
speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The
people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the
Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question
whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not
disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of
fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac.,
118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or
county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the
matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan.,
803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs.
Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W.,
1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91;
State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211
N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176
La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty
of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth
Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of
New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47
La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to
plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to
enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not,
merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to
file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge
should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is
tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party
litigant. Stateex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer
on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the
ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is
immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state

treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it
were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the
enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may
impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In
fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no
application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the
Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the
City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act
in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17
and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him
as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its
validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases
for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as
valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the
resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision
is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the
case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2
Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a
constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing
Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E.,
849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan
vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W.,
605), as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p.
782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188
Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation
solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act
is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that
may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of
them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future;
and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first
conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47
Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207
N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W.,
209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng
vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal
rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972
is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of
public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide
the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our
ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in
support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly
raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This
court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the

Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay.
It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give
effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is
presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined
by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board
of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes
before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief
Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to
this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution.
The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three
grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy
which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and
an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that
the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation
Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel,
however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact
that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the
immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417
of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but
that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out
from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to
observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional
prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons
are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether
or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within
his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this
court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by
him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from
taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to
make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are
independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government independent in
the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity,
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the
time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of
the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This
power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the
Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has
been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any
time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United
States, Art. II, sec. 2;In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus
empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully
brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state
constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the
new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule
generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in
England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says
Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the
king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed.,
421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St.,
457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is

not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its
sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment,
depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold
office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the
power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as
he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the
concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental
changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the
Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise
of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any
legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The
coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly
belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in
cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning
power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any
pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S.,
27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White,
after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law
the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely
and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right
of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and
so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by
probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as
may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite
variations which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative
power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States
[1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the
enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521,
43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and
expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles
and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme
Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by
a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4,
1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this
case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court
traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form
of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation
officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129;
L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the
right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the
necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In
1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the
judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never
reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its
treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of

the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law
applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and
Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs.
United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have
been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive
review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the
authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762),
likewise construing the Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language,
pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as
actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally
enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This
conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285;
151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate and define all
classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott
([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The
legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general
assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to
the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional."
(Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined
all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to
vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law
prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts,
they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced,
should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is
clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases
where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law
provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result
of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil.,
506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the
limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil
produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits
established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly
the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code
provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of
age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by
law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete
self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper,
in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the
commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the
degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from
200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the
entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not
imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the
case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of
the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art.
83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or
while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the
personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more
clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate
Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a
system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law.
Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof.
The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently
amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become
article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently
reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the
intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases
of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the
discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the
offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed
that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of
probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict
with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong,
while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by
legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can
have nothing to do." (Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the
court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it attempted to
delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the
power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any
penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be
questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the
legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise,
as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27
L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran
[1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19
L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23;
63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.],
1144; 150 S. W., 162;Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509;
42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630;
181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S.
W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926;
D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171
Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re
Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac.,
874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac.,
1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327;
133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534;
35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle
[1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs.
District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47

L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne
[1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parteBates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac.,
698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15
Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs.
Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re
Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep.,
275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33
L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs.
State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker
vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165
S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall
[1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan
[1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac.,
29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be
legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation
however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R.,
393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension
of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be
placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the
court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the
constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini
[1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from
each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288,
294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood
when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was
always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The
suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely,
but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative
when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in
the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new
man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parteGarland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law.
ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149;
24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles
governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the
executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were
used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in
the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was
understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it
was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any
degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has
so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the
judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of
criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, a power inherent in
such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an
ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative
power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the
executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with
approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson,
J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the
probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act

provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from
supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have
submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of
probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the
control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the
conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally
imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It
is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of
the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as
purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense.
The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and directs
the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power,
and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10
F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs.
State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly
by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves,
having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the
legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of
sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held
that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to
persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and
reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant
reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between
a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the
sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1
Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words &
Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the
Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of
Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now
found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon
the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the
time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086.
A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission
of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs.
Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71).
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the
one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the
sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution
(Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs.
State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes
which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is
granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A.,
1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if
the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it

beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for
that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of
the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular
will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law
(sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the
Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to
have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there
developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions
forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free
government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of
the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither
must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people
have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oftquoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency
alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing
other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust."
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908],
11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs.
Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs.
Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that
local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the
municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation
is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed
local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in
cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to
delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory
stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs.
Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United
States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may
not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101
N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be
republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial
but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32
Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain
progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn.
(Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910],
57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs.
Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by
law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified

limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same
article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed,
to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this
decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President
could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may
have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In
the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an
act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue
a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime.
(See and cf. Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.)
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be
filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards.
(6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed
with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or
delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to
administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here
adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that
the ratio decidendiis at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the
presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the
delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others
that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete
and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United
States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs.
Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title
"Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise
of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may
use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves
the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or
not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to
do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of
the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See
also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court
in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) andCruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this
court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and

municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian
inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and
approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the
Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign
cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased among
foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of
execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into
effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs.
Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53
Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi
vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the
legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the
executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed.,
253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W.,
738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing
essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of
a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins.
Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs.
Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law.
ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this
modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments",
foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly
Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on
Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United
States in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies:
"The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this
authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no
action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of
what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done
according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228;
27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course,
come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be
left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357;
Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to
some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the
case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or
non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any
specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the
legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any
purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any
funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at
some future time we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The
time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and
not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or
conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.

The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of
the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be
suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas
provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and
section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be
suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer
absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may
suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals
only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for
individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177,
178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is
declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be
exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular
cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of
rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the
reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of
James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the
kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and
suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article
in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by
legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is
further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part
thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a
dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the
parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English
Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is
intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be
equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to standing
laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the
people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our
constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious and
oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any
one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which
all others under like circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner
of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a
provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the
current year their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a
part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more
confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days
of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis.,
504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59
Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the
county court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they
might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon
the act should become inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order
the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this
act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to the county
court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county court
as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the
county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then,
require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by

its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . .
empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is
before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the
power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be
delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not
presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in
force in that county, did by order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed
which is the subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities
and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have
sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But
option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment
in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of
intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different
localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not
embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within
the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley
on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government
and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which
treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in
a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state
that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but,
considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of
probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take
effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature
to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not
tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs.
Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of
what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power,
legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said
that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable
that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it
should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these timehonored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the
Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our
government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional
power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously
observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S.,
510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed.,
679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S.,
28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed.,
666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however,
to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each

member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37
L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake
Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry.
Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs.
Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given
by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the
necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In
such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means
that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation
in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which
case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every
person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act.
Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any
amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if we accept the
contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province
and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer.
These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law
and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But
whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring
actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law
vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of
Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no
difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By
analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U.
S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881],
103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law.
ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In
other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co.
vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911],
84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the
law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed.,
835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs.
Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act,
not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one
province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have probation during
that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years.
While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show
that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how
easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. &
S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234
U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of
this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of
the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law.
ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed,
however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by
General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal
protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the

City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first
instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in
any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an
information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the
decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney although not in the form had in the
provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions
of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where
the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any
circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of
appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself
and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also
repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry
is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the
courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute
otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional
features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69
N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929],
278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda
vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning partial
invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this,
the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that
the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A.
S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou.,
963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be
eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to
the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper
vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N.
S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part
of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must
express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to
legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S.,
vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S.,
601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on
constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be
inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with
the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of
the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of
the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of
the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower
than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation
officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the
actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act
No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a
probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every
probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer.

It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the
probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section
3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning
his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside
within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated
in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under
section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation officer and
appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that
probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section
5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without
bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the
probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6
prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all
persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation,
and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and
encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the
conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and
condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two
months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are
necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such
other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct.
The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution
for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall
act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without
additional compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under
section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a
Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the GovernorGeneral with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred
pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the
Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative
personnel of the probation officer under civil service regulations from among those who possess
the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix
the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall
have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not
those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo
singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the
various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of
Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer"
shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and
visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3,
par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable
inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court
shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the
probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been

intention of the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer
in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of
Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his
probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces
or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be
and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is
not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding
progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read
into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from
the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the
salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to
have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act",
is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These
probation officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions
shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the
Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said
salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to
cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be
left of the amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the
provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think
it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in
each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a
correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing
under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the
provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the
punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his
particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is
believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted.
It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the
convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309;
312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end
and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is
commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our
inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel
for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases
brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study
and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles
involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned
authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil.,
136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought
to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more
authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified
because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United
States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in
the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the
Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect to the
Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United States;
Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the
integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p.
1317);

(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York
[1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of
times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co.
[1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142),
fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and
environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted.
Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-2044

August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of
Manila,respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-2756
August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,
vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3054
August 26, 1949
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3055
August 26, 1949
LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3056
August 26, 1949
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.,
Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.

Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici
curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A.
Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
TUASON, J.:
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other
dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will
be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of
interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether
prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the
procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of
the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions
challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No.
671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses
and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ
of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims
to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel
the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of
shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the
exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to
Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case
No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection
with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner,
Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not
press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that
the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the
basic question we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently address ourselves and
devote greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken
for granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be
understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING
THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create
new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to
abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would

lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of
those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or
abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to
authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or
municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the
suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibities and to maintain and
enforce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under
the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has
to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the
Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid
to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period."
"Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds;
restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary,
3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean
restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary
or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et
al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite
theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is
deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is
needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were
necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would
be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may
become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even
if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to
override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers
by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at
the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that
legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be
maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of
the delegate; . . . .
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the
face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former.
It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the
National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the termination
of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and
regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President
could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the
legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the
unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the
same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the

emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be
revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could
treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic
apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of
the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals
after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an
executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3
provides:
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress
of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers
herein granted.
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President
was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have
said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report in section 3 was to be
the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in
appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to
continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, of as
unimportant, as the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is
enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the
law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of
the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted
with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain
period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the
law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to
keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a
different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography
furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it
became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis
ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President
was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor
than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the
National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations
of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete
disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the
constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite,
limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and
limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison
d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending
with the conventing of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded
it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President)
may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to
legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to which
department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still
exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter
of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assemblycall that will, an exercise of the police
power or the war power and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in
proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it

is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on
the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal
principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or
inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we take it that the respondents, in
sustaining the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former
Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is
purely statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from the Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of
Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were
self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts
Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to
the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended
or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the mind
of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and
regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was
predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the
case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature
amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return
them into force and to issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning
heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies
to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in fact,
continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the
elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the
continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding
the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result
of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the
enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the
National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the
National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities
could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the
fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting
parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this
system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is
preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history
of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we
regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even
when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve
the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more
than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to
act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to
answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary powers
as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible disruption and
interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these cases from
the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this
decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of
the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be charged.
Ozaeta, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-6266

February 2, 1953

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Taada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma.
Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion, on August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court
had already passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December 16, 1941,
"declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing the President
to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five members held that the Act ceased to be
operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress convened in special session) according to Chief
Justice Moran. Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres in effect concluded that the powers
delegated to the President had been withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on
which the latter had demonstrated its readiness or ability to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21,
1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and
226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949
to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore
declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had
enacted legislation on the same subjects.1
More or less the same considerations that influenced our pronouncement of August 26, 1949 are and should
be controlling in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545
and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential
public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited
by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence
of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines
makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National
Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly
repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the
result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter
ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the
President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the
Congress and the President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the
delegation of legislative powers, in palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant
thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the
arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular statute,
it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of
the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would
lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the
law."2
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be
forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted only during the emergency
resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on
December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war could

prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following statement of President
Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942,
the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the
Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the
President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in
time of war."3 When President Quezon said "in time of war", he an doubtedly meant such factual war as that
then raging.
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that "since liberation conditions have gradually
returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not
received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the
last war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them
the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." 4 It is important to remember that
Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration was made bore the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter
in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces
today are incidental passing rains artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common among
democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this
year," an admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of the last war as
envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the legislative department on the alleged
existence of emergency, reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred to, repealing all
Emergency Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the
delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency. The emergency
expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other
national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes such as widespread
earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952
not only did not result from the last world war but were and could not have been contemplated by the
legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people
down without somehow being answerable thereover.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727, did
not invoke any emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called attention to an impending
emergency that may be brought about by present complicated and troubled world conditions, and to the fact
that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of democracy and freedom and for the
preservation of our Republic. The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the war mentioned
in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied Powers on the other; and
indications are that in the next world war, if any, the communist countries will be aligned against the
democracies. No departure can be made from the national policy declared in section 1 of Act No. 671. New
powers may be granted as often as emergencies contemplated in the Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still technically at war with Japan pending the
ratification of the peace treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the second place, the
last world war was between the United States and Japan, the Philippines being involved only because it was
then under American sovereignty. In the third place, the United States had already signed the peace treaty
with Japan, and the Philippines has become an independent country since July 4, 1946.
It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that the emergency
powers are non-existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill had to be approved
merely to remove all doubts, especially because this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary
majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen and Senators and on House Resolution No.
99, urging the President to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public works and for relief in
the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state, in reply, that the said petition and resolution cannot prevail
over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by two chambers of the Congress. If faith can
be accorded to the resolution of one house, there is more reason for accepting the solemn declarations of two
houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or
ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro
tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can
take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the

result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. If the President had ceased to have
powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise
he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly
limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President
can by executive orders make new appropriations. The specific power "to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to
exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven
years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still
has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency
powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we
have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In
line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of
separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of
the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements
between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in
some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be
preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the
Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the
President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the
good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure;
but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy
the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and the respondents are
ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside therein. So
ordered, without costs.
Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion
(relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to
introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest
interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they
have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now
to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the
facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the
"non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It
is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the
non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken
for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward
educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make
a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake
Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that
said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by
the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2
which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a
site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes
in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of
the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all
the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take
up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31,
1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for
the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff
of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and
2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required
by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which
read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who
shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to
section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding
sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of
this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of
1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically
relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its
proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with
reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the
attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on
the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI,
Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at
Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on
November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and
in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they
may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To
carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at
various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious
memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved
that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from
one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal
benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that
convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted
and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation
the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such
forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not
presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in
settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not
required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx
xxx
xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of
waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league
long, wherein the indioscan have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the
Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY
THEM.

With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided
they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by
them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to
retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx
xxx
xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR
COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of
the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos,
priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en.
And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we
hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered
fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more
than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in
the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At
Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on
October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS,"
AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some
Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of
dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs
done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and
mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad
customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the
goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby
order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which
should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take
great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the
ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds
(zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate
them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an
integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it
is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which
enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns
under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow
any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the
seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial
of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed
to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the
punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded
against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this
serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as
well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and
Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner
and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby
promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by
the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the
differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races
which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided
into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without
forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet
entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall
be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the
provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn
these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April,
and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the
towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the
appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools,
and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the
administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first
day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the
first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously
indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in
case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the
place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these
cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined
in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and
duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands
and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition
against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other
transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.

7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and
assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in
towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the
manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes
upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not
opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be
Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall
teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a
kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the
ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered,
shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall,
schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the
Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the
latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting
of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious
attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the
Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros),
shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their
dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a
punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where
such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of
the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to
my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military
authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently
be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a
council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the
application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of
provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines
was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and
ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions
have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest
should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and

contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such
tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue
or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices
and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this
end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction
over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that
part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority
theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the
Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province,
Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the
passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.
16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed
senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the
territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission
and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the
Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the
Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro
Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act;
Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408,
the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548,
549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the
powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers
by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment
of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions
shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire
the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his
supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order
and individual freedom shall be maintained.

SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions
of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a
township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by
the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The
last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in
questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be
found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act
No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of
the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos.
127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature.
These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the
Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No.
2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a
religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and nonChristians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there
could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga,
"Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr.
N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898,
vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of
many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in
the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers
similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in
the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other
acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this
article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized
provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes,
and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the
powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines
which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians
and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative
Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate.
The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a

particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack
of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term.
"The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had
these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the
"backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the
Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act
to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine
Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of
the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and
sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of
non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with
special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization
and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection
with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In
discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of socalled non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without
compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact
that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence,
uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating
circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the
legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former
Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of
provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by
the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally
non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been
recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or nonChristians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number
of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an
Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory,
but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any
particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their
own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the
doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction
of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should
be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the
provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to
say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the

Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of
religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law
invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement,
agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of
Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11,
1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that
all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal
relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others,
including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they
live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a
matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject
to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated
with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not
come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living
with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax,
inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from
all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of
the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned.
Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition
similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes
are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that
civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations
are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes
of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby
published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that
they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes
may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same
law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so
attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from
other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule
should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case
may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for
former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a
man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or
lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and
"Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the

application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same
as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915,
by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a
transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the
opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the
Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of
a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person
selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General
Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in
question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the
person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No.
1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court
shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of
the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its
natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino
or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the nonChristian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the
mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos
which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the
religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes
of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the
religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then
"Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and
non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present
Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now
being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of
the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title
non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently
shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas
de Filipinas, says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may
be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has
been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this
name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino
languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name
was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number
approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the
preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings
with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by
the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be
derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship
shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians."
After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian
nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting
them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118
U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress
"power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more
extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and
since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and
of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United
States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed
and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land
itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples
without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any
part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the
only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons,
or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves
these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having
a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation
not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union
or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance
to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power.

This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever
the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to
the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all
the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood.
The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds
that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation
Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of
the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official
supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the
Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United
States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection
over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to
overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in
nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197
U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra;
U.S.vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168
U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553;
Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest.
Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A.
[N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has
full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians
thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
ofhabeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon
return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing
Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance
that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the
Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their
tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to
maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that
whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they
were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the
return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian
Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest
and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused
the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The
second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian
escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing
with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the
Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon
certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations
without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the
commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully
exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge,
in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or
where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the
Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation
of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as
the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that
Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the
meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In
re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that
Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain
on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form
the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the
segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to
provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority
and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his
instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1
Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1)
may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of
the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the
approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of
the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands
ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States
Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all
Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a
good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the
nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions
naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is

needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule.
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As
officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients,
says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and
unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The
inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between
individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be understood
to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by
the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as
hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression,
especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid,
the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not
discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or
of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as
much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of
like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to
keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what
one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same
right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others
. . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own
will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any free
government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it

is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of
great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the
safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197
U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude.
The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator,
subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of
authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of
the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and
the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by
free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2
Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578;
State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty"
as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of
the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever
and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights
which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the
citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise
within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left
to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due
Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and
justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process
of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that
it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909],
212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in
nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not
exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party

shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any
place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the
Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the
United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude,
together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude.
It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next
must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its
purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and
add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in
is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake
View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary
rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go
beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right
of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is
limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya
[1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether
any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should
endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such
legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will
be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating
the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5)
the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the
site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the
work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after
the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed
to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained
during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its
continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to
be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following
statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a
nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its
policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their children with the
object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring
life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they

will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people,
has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our
population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the
adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with
the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the nonChristian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in
order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to
nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to
organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the
control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude
and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with
their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the
more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called nonChristians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of
non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following
unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and
liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means
and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and
political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the
mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements
populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and
arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and
apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we
have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the
Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather
together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin
the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea
adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the
same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few
reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is
not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not
the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights
which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens
of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have
their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say
that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of
the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of
Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and
order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and
making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and
damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish
to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy
burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from
one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that
they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx
xxx
xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do
not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as
to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any
measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean
that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in
the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter
measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times
point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has
already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people,
shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal
interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of
the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat,
treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition,
now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them
to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left
in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities.
They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially
established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement
in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does

not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place
to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is
the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place
to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them
in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make
them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will
come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could
be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The
early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not
possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding
Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without
question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined
as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed
Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the
law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that
they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did illtreat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and
the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally
challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the
Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of
the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has
assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical
subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In
resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives
a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class
attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in
interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to
determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the
other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled
policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University
(200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that
comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior
case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a
thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must
be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been
in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from
early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the
highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile
regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a
view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must
be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference
on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the
aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to
take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions
which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a
view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in
no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and
effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of
the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-10202

March 27, 1917
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS EX REL. THE MUNICIPALITY OF
CARDONA, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, ET AL., defendants.
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff.
Moreno and Guevara for defendants.
MORELAND, J.:
The plaintiff amended his complaint in this action after a demurrer thereto had been sustained. No new or
additional facts have been alleged and the case stands precisely where it stood before the amended complaint
was filed. A demurrer having been offered to the amended complaint, that also must be sustained.
The plaintiff still insists with great vigor that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the
adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces and
subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public convenience and interest," is in
violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General,
whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature.
Section 1 of the Act referred to provides in substance that, whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General
the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order, enlarge, contract, or otherwise change the boundary
of any province, subprovince, municipality, or township or other political subdivision, or separate any such
subdivision into such portions as may be requires, merge any of such subdivisions with another, divide, any
province into one or more subdivisions as may be required, name any new subdivision so created, change the
seat of government within any subdivision existing or created thereunder, to such place therein as the public
interests require, and shall fix in such executive order the date when the change, merger, separation or other

action shall take effect. The section also provides that whenever the Governor-General creates a new political
subdivision he shall appoint such officers for the new subdivision with such powers and duties as may be
required by the existing provisions of law applicable to the case and fix their salaries; and that such appointees
shall hold office until their successors are appointed or elected and qualify. Successors to the elective offices
shall be elected at the next general election following such appointment.
The contention of the plaintiff is not well founded. The delegation of the power referred to on the GovernorGeneral does not involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the
particular subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of
certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of
them subject to more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper
regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to
permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act applicable so far as it
touches this case which is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
The demurrer is sustained and the complaint is finally dismissed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 47065

June 26, 1940
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the
Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by
means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos.
24948, 30973, 36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service
Commission an application for authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641),
on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as
a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of September 26, 1939, granting the
petitioner's application for increase of equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como
ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la presente se enmienda las
condiciones de los certificados de convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos.
24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran
incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos y
subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco (25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la
promulgacion de esta decision.
Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por
alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del precio d costo
de su equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al tiempo de
su adquisicion.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing certificates, the petitioner filed
on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service Commission on
November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present petition for a writ of certiorari was
instituted in this court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission
to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that this court, after hearing,
render a decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this
court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be
rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued
prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in the language of the petitioner, it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and
judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its

functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned, is
unconstitutional and void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of
legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act
applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8,
1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked
by the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads
as follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in
the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public
necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the
preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or
by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of
time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of
the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age
of the model, or other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into
consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually force
and to those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of
public services and to authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public service can
operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of convenience and public necessity to the
effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will "public interests in a proper
and suitable manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service
Commission may prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is that "the
service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumental thereof upon payment
of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a
restatement of the principle already embodied in the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides that
"the State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government. "Another condition which the
Commission may prescribed, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate "shall be valid only
for a definite period of time." As there is a relation between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15,
the two provisions must be read and interpreted together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the
Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of the service under said certificate during a
definite period fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under section
16 (a) of Commonwealth Act. No. 146 which is a complement of section 15, the Commission is empowered to
issue certificates of public convenience whenever it "finds that the operation of the public service proposed
and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner."
Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate
itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the issuance
of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining
"a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power
being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art.
XIII, sec. 8.) We have already ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs.Fernandez
and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G. R. Nos.
46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287
U.S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79 Law. ed.
1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and
when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.

454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it
"shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued
for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional
mandate. More than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service
Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is
the administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in
view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National
Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission
does not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to
forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain
efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of
governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find the rule
prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have
proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness,
however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of
confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and
that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to
Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2,
p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
(People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly,
with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and
the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation
of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish
Drainage Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs. Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973,
976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case
of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied
upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the "delegation of greater powers by
the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus,
56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938;
People vs. Rosenthal & Osmea, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and
Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.).
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 454, the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribed the conditions "that the service can be
acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost
price of its useful equipment, less reasonable," and "that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period
of time" is expressly made applicable "to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in force" and "to
authorizations to renew and increase equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative
proceedings on the subject and have found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing
certificates of public convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an
attempt to suppress, by way of amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only
for a definite period of time," but the attempt failed:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sr. CUENCO. Seor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido
que se supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite
period time.' Esta disposicion del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un
plazo de vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se puede
determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren la explotacion de un servicio publico
y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos
buses en cierta ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de los
servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del volumen como trafico y de
otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicos
el interes publico asi lo exige. El interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un
proceso mas o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso en el caucus de
anoche.
EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. Que dice el Comite?

Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de que esto certificados
de conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia: sepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados
por la compaia durante el tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la extension y se le
extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia
publica de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta anos, porque seria anticonstitucional.
xxx
xxx
xxx
By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea
Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted
before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. Section 74 of
the Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to any corporation
except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the
United States." The Jones Law, incorporating a similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or
right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of the
Philippines provided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual,
firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
the National Assembly when the public interest so requires." The National Assembly, by virtue of the
Constitution, logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal
any franchise or right granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has declared its will
and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.
Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state
of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's
operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the Commission.
Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power.
As soon as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities, become at once
subject to the police power thus called into operation. Procedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad Commission, 184
Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is applicable not only to those public utilities
coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
The 'Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in
pursuance of the police power. The only distinction recognized in the statute between those
established before and those established after the passage of the act is in the method of the
creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public convenience and necessity it required for
any new operation, but no such certificate is required of any transportation company for the
operation which was actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in the
creation of their operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to supervise and
regulate them. Obviously the power of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as
effective against companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against those
subsequently securing such right under a certificate of public convenience and necessity. (Motor
Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service
Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise"
in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a common carrier holds
such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation.
When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but so long as he maintains the use he
must submit to control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the
power of the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of
commissioners. (Fisher vs.Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113;
Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc. R.
Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556, 571; Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry
Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the

police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the
protection of the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional,
either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal
protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be devoted to
a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places
his property in public service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state.
(51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public convenience
constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property right, and is mere license or privilege.
(Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs.Commisioners of
Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E.
581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. [d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are, however,
of the opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and the case remanded
thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public Service Commission has power,
upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any certificate issued under the
provisions of this Act, whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was
issued have been misrepresented or materially changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.)
The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the conditions
of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its
certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be
heard or present evidence. The Commission appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment
petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty or
fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights
is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1,
58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile
if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without or consideration." While
the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates
from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission for
further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante
and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of

section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit,
"to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore,
is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act
No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said
Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen
should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is
withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means
the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court
this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that

animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from
a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of
the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of
such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places
above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable.
As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to
an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
necessity of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads
and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling
or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the
national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public
Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public

welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the
wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which
cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939,
and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26,
1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of
separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater
powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not
only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v.
Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one,
and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or
other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good."
And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing
desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly
were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all

G.R. No. L-4043

May 26, 1952
CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.
REYES, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance
as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.
It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a
resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted
quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month. Submitted the Control
Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was on August 3, 1949,
disapproved by the said Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by
the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter
of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year,
and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such
allowance.
On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his claim
for allowance for January to June 15, 1949, amounting to P1,650. The claim was again referred by the Control
Committee to the auditor General for comment. The latter, in turn referred it to the NAFCO auditor, who
reaffirmed his previous recommendation and emphasized that the fact that the corporation's finances had not
improved. In view of this, the auditor General also reiterated his previous opinion against the granting of the
petitioner's claim and so informed both the Control Committee and the petitioner. But as the petitioner insisted
on his claim the Auditor General Informed him on June 19, 1950, of his refusal to modify his decision. Hence
this petition for review.
The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332, approved on June 18, 1939, with a capital stock
of P20,000,000, 51 per cent of which was to be able to be subscribed by the National Government and the
remainder to be offered to provincial, municipal, and the city governments and to the general public. The
management the corporation was vested in a board of directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the
president of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. But the corporation was
made subject to the provisions of the corporation law in so far as they were compatible with the provisions of
its charter and the purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy the general powers mentioned in the
corporation law in addition to those granted in its charter. The members of the board were to receive each
a per diem of not to exceed P30 for each day of meeting actually attended, except the chairman of the board,
who was to be at the same time the general manager of the corporation and to receive a salary not to exceed
P15,000 per annum.
On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among
other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the
purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the
President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises
Council to be composed of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the Secretary of Commerce and
Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and managing heads of all such corporations
as ex-officio members, and such additional members as the President might appoint from time to time with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The council was to advise the President in the excercise of his
power of supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and
measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. The Executive Order also
provided that the council was to have a Control Committee composed of the Secretary of Commerce and
Industry as chairman, a member to be designated by the President from among the members of the council as
vice-chairman and the secretary as ex-officio member, and with the power, among others

(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or
controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in their
operations;
(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the
respective Boards of Directors of the said corporations; and
(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government Enterprises Council with
the approval of the President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No. 93.)
With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors vested in the
President of the Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is Government controlled corporation
subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated in accordance
therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control Committee created in said executive
order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in the
operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget
of expenditures approved by the board of directors. It can hardly be questioned that under these powers the
Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of
the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance necessarily
constitute an item of expenditure in the corporation's budget. That the Control Committee had good grounds
for disapproving the resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the NAFCO auditor,
the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the
corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the corporation.
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only because it is based on a law that is
unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislature power to executive, but also because it was promulgated
beyond the period of one year limited in said law.
The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is
excluded and the last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946,
and the President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his executive order and that the
order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule the said executive
order was promulgated within the period given.
As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing
the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled
corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon
the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to
carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above
cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner
by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of
the chairman of said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per anum. But
regardless of whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the
board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given effect since it was
disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And
in any event, petitioner's contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on which
American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of officers and employees working for the
Government of the Philippines and its Instrumentalities, including, naturally, government-controlled
corporations. This is so because Executive Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional
compensation to those working for the Government and its Instrumentalities, including government-controlled
corporations, was in 1945 amended by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition
the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local government officials and employees entitled to this under
existing law." The amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in the
term "additional compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not have expressly excepted it from the
prohibition. This being so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just mentioned, quarters
allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore, prohibited.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. 1 Soon after the date last
mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against
the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper
parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders
because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions
intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were
allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the
name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however,
That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of
the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory
overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied
or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of
the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act
No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary,
or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other
political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name
any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
(Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary
of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance
herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative

officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such
officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the
new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an
equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in
such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not
the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See
Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in
consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two
municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving,
as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it
is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely
and exclusively the exercise oflegislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405,
409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.2aIndeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also
and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the
Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the
first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require"
qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the
government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was
originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General
the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said
section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest
requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers
therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section
referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed
that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is
true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld
"public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority
to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be
construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute

precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue
rules and regulations topromote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the
Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel
certificates or permits for the sale ofspeculative securities. Both cases involved grants
to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of municipalities,
is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The
question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely
a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313,
315-318), or apolitical question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any
case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state
laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be annexed to
a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine
the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same,
although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86
Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and
designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the
area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing
the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps
being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the
inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the
petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted
by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may
require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control
which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public
interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter
an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway
vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case
of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter
case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the
President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or
industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership
therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to
eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to
effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It
supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of
conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative
procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe
them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the
general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope
of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion
of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of
trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered."
and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which
has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers
made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public
interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the
Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution,
which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.

It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the
creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that
the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits
him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an
ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty
imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within
the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective
official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of
the corresponding provincial board. 5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials,
by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his
office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if
he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in
effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no
morethan the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by
its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control
which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of
giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon
him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus
or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as
part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper
parties" referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities "have been impleaded in this case,"
and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the
officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the
Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law
"to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation,
proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in
connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary,
function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their
interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented. 8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive
order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of
common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued
executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in actual
operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have been
sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to
believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in
this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-19850

January 30, 1964
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
Federico S. Arlos and P. H. del Pilar for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission. Upon the
filing of the petition and the submission and approval of the corresponding bond, we issued a writ of injunction
restraining said respondent from enforcing the order complained of Republic Act No. 316, approved on June
19, 1948, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate
an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power,
for sale within the limits of several municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur. Accordingly, petitioner secured
from respondent on May 31, 1950, a certificate of public convenience to render electric light, heat and/or
power services in said municipalities and to charge its customers and/or consumers the following rates:
FLAT RATE

1 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................

P2.30

1 25 watt bulb per month ............................................................

3.00

1 40 watt bulb per month ............................................................

4.50

1 50 watt bulb per month ............................................................

5.50

1 60 watt bulb per month ............................................................

6.50

1 75 watt bulb per month ............................................................

7.50

1 80 watt bulb per month ............................................................

8.00

1 100 watt bulb per month ............................................................

9.00

1 150 watt bulb per month ............................................................

13.00

1 200 watt bulb per month ............................................................

17.00

METER RATE

For the first 15

For the first 15 Kw. hrs. ............................................................

P0.40

For the next 35 Kw. hrs. ............................................................

.30

For the next 50 Kw. hrs. ............................................................

.25

For all over 100 Kw. hrs. ............................................................

.20

Minimum Charge: P6.00 per month for connection of 200 watts

or less; plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess
of 200 watts.

TEMPORARY RATE
P0.01 per watt per night.

On May 22, 1957, petitioner, acting with respondent's approval, entered into a contract for the purchase of
electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, for resale, in the course of the business of
said petitioner, to its customers, to whom, in fact, petitioner resold said electric power and energy, in
accordance with the above schedule of rates. About five (5) years later, or on January 16, 1962, respondent
advised petitioner of a conference to be held on February 12, 1962 for the purpose of revising its authorized
rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letterpetition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan Ilocos Sur", charging the
following:
We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by
the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal. Said electric meters
were imported from Japan by the Vigan Electric Light Company in behalf of the consumers of
electric current from said electric company. The Vigan Electric Light Company has commercialized
these privilege which property belong to the people.
We also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad
faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption.1wph1.t
and directing the petitioner to comment on these charges. In reply to said communications, petitioner's
counsel wrote to respondent, on February 1, 1962, a letter asking that the conference scheduled for February
12 be postponed to March 12, and another letter stating inter alia:
In connection therewith, please be informed that my client, the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., has
not had any dealing with the Avegon Co., Inc., relative to the 2,000 electric meter mentioned in the
petition. Attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an integral part thereof is a certification to that
effect by Avegon Co., Inc.
Furthermore, as counsel for Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., I wish to inform this Honorable
Commission that the charge that said company installed the electric meters in bad faith and that
said meters registered excessive rates could have no valid basis because all of these meters have
been inspected checked, tested and sealed by your office.
On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a communication form the General Auditing Office notifying him that
one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had "been instructed to make an audit and examination of the books and other
records of account" of said petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 325 and in accordance
with the request of the Public Service Commission contained in its letter dated March 12, 1962", and directing
petitioner to cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the successful accomplishment of his work". Subsequently,
respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to produce before the former, during a
conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain books of account and financial statements specified in said
process. On the date last mentioned petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was
not acted upon in said conference of April 10, 1962. However, it was then decided that the next conference be
held on April 30, 1962, which was later postponed to May 21, 1962. When petitioner's representatives
appeared before respondent, on the date last mentioned, they were advised by the latter that the scheduled
conference had been cancelled, that the petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum had been granted, and
that, on May 17, 1962, respondent had issued an order, from which we quote:
We now have the audit report of the General Auditing Office dated May 4, 1962, covering the
operation of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. in Vigan, Bantay and Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, for the
period from January 1 to December 31, 1961. We find from the report that the total invested capital
of the utility as of December 31, 1961, entitled to return amounted to P118,132.55, and its net
operating income for rate purposes of P53,692.34 represents 45.45% of its invested capital; that in
order to earn 12% per annum, the utility should have a computed revenue by rates of
P182,012.78; and that since it realized an actual revenue by rates of P221,529.17, it had an
excess revenue by rates of P39,516.39, which is 17.84% of the actual revenue by rates and
33.45% of the invested capital. In other words, the present rates of the Vigan Electric Light Co.,
Inc. may be reduced by 17.84%, or in round figure, by 18%.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, and finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a
net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that
it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction
of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates
for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962, to wit:
METER RATE 24-HOUR SERVICE
For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh
For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh
For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh
For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh
Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200 was or less plus P0.01 per
watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY LIGHTING
P0.01 per watt per night.
Minimum Charge: P1.00
Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple of five centavos. The above rates may be revised,
modified or altered at anytime for any just cause and/or in the public service.

Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order
of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, since its Corporate inception in 1948, petitioner it "never was able to
give and never made a single dividend declaration in favor of its stockholders" because its operation from
1949 to 1961 had resulted in an aggregate loss of P113,351.523; that in the conference above mentioned
petitioner had called the attention of respondent to the fact that the latter had not furnished the former a "copy
of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others"; that respondent then expressed the view
that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding
informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates; that petitioner
objected to said reduction without a hearing, alleging that its rates could be reduced only if proven by evidence
validly adduced to be excessive; that petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the reasonableness of
its aforementioned rates, and even the fairness of its increase; that petitioner was then assured that it would
be furnished a copy of the aforementioned letter-petition and that a hearing would be held, if a reduction of its
rates could not be agreed upon; that petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon
which the order complained of is based; that such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that,
accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.
In its answer respondent admitted some allegations of the complaint and denied other allegations thereof,
particularly the conclusions drawn by petitioner. Likewise, respondent alleged that it granted petitioner's
motion to quash the aforementioned subpoena duces tecum because the documents therein referred to had
already been audited and examined by the General Auditing Office, the report on which was on file with said
respondent; that the latter had directed that petitioner be served a copy of said report; and that, although this
has not, as yet, been actually done, petitioner could have seen and examined said report had it really wanted
to do so. By way of special defenses, respondent, moreover, alleged that the disputed order had been issued
under its delegated legislative authority, the exercise of which does not require previous notice and hearing;
and that petitioner had not sought a reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies.
In support of its first special defense respondent maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that
legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that
the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission is not in point
because, unlike the order complained of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang
Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions.
At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which
underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and
only to matters purely of local concern (Rubi vs. Provincia Board, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S.
370). However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the
details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is complete in itself (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs.
Rosenthal, 68 Phil., 328; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs. Collector
of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil., 1; Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495 Mulford vs.
Smith, 307 U.S., 38; Bowles vs. Willingham, 321 U.S., 503). Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays
down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another
legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce
said Policy (People vs. Lim Ho, L-12091, January 28, 1960; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957;
Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952; Philippine Association of Colleges vs. Secretary of
Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805; Antamok Gold Fields vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 340; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S., 414; Ammann vs.
Mallonce, 332 U.S., 245; U.S. vs. Rock Royal Corp. 307 U.S., 533; Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial
Commission, 276 U.S., 230). Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said
body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would
eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the
Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of
separation of powers. Hence, Congress his not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the
Public Service Commission.
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner
herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by
petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence
to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a
functionpartaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and
hearing.
Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice Indeed hearing. The
pertinent parts thereof provide:

SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance
with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the limitations and exception mentioned and
saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules thereof,
as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed,
observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may in its
discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any
hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and
notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public
service equipment of an operator is use principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private
business the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public
service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. Subject to established limitations and
exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the
owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission
previously had
(a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any individual or joint rates,
commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary. The
Commission shall approve only those that are just and reasonable and not any that are unjustly
discriminatory or unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public services and other
parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard, ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current rates were fixed
by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be made, over
petitioner's objection, without such notice and hearing, particularly considering that the factual basis of the

action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The rule applicable is set forth in the American
Jurisprudence the following language:
Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are
necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such
proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon
the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand,
legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or
quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a
public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716;
Emphasis supplied.)
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes of the
nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without previous notice and hearing said order
is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void, so that a motion for reconsideration
thereof is not an absolute prerequisite to the institution of the present action for certiorari (Ayson vs. Republic.
50 Off. Gaz., 5810). For this reason considering that said order was being made effective on June 1, 1962, or
almost immediately after its issuance (on May 17, 1962), we find that petitioner was justified in commencing
this proceedings without first filing said motion (Guerrero vs. Carbonell, L-7180, March 15, 1955).
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby made
permanent. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.