Def Stan 59-113

Ministry of Defence
Interim Defence Standard 59-113

Issue 1
Publication Date 3 March 2006
Lightning Strike Protection

Requirements for Service Aircraft
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Unclassified
DPA
Defence
Procurement
Agency
MR C. SIM
STANDARDS PROGRAMME MANAGER 2
D/DStan/59/113
UK Defence Standardization
Rm 1138
Kentigern House
65 Brown Street
Glasgow G2 8EX
Direct line:
0141 224 2585
Switchboard:
0141 224 2531
Facsimile:
0141 224 2503
e-mail:
pdgsts1@dpa.mod.uk
3rd March 2006

INTERIM DEFENCE STANDARD - INVITATION TO COMMENT
Defence Standard Number: 59-113 Issue 1 INTERIM
Title: Lightning Strike Protection Requirements for Service Aircraft
The above Defence Standard has been published as an INTERIM Standard and is provisional
because it has not been agreed by all authorities concerned with its use. It shall be applied to
obtain information and experience on its application which will then permit the submission of
observations and comments from users.
The purpose of this form therefore is to solicit any beneficial and constructive comment that will assist
the author and/or working group to review the INTERIM Standard prior to it being converted to a
normal Standard.
Comments are to be entered below and any additional pertinent data which may also be of use in
improving the Standard should be attached to this form and returned to writer at the above address.
No acknowledgement to comments received will normally be issued.
NAME: Calum Sim
SIGNATURE:
Calum Sim
BRANCH: TES DSTAN SPM 2
1. Does any part of the Standard create problems or require interpretation:

YES
NO
If yes state under section 3:

a. the clause number(s) and wording;
b. the recommendation for correcting the deficiencies.
2. Is the Defence Standard restrictive:

YES
NO
If yes state in what way under section 3.
3. Comments, general or any requirement considered too rigid:
AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Page
Clause
Comments
Proposed Solution
4. I/We agree that this Draft Standard, subject to my/our comments being taken into
consideration, when published in final form will cover my/our requirements in full. Should you
find my/our comments at variance with the majority, I/we shall be glad of the opportunity to
enlarge upon them before final publication.
Signature.................................................................Representing.................................................
Submitted by (print or type name and address)
Telephone number:
Date:
Our Ref:
DSTAN Form 4
INTERIM DEF STAN 59-113 Issue 1
Unclassified
Contents
Foreword ...........................................................................................................................................................x
1
Scope ....................................................................................................................................................1
Warning.................................................................................................................................................1
Normative References .........................................................................................................................1
Applicability and Reference Information...........................................................................................1
4.1
Applicability ......................................................................................................................................1
4.2
Requirements....................................................................................................................................2
4.3
Abbreviations....................................................................................................................................2
4.4
Acronyms ..........................................................................................................................................3
4.5
Definitions .........................................................................................................................................4
4.6
Informative References ..................................................................................................................10
4.7
Relationship to Other Documents ................................................................................................10
Requirements .....................................................................................................................................10
5.1
Protection Aim Requirements .......................................................................................................10
5.2
Design Requirements.....................................................................................................................10
5.3
Evaluation Requirements...............................................................................................................11
5.4
Background and Guidance ............................................................................................................11
Annex A External Derived Lightning Environment (Lighting Threat Levels) to be used as Design
Criteria.................................................................................................................................................12
A.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................12
A.2
General Considerations .................................................................................................................12
A.3
Air Side External Environment......................................................................................................12
Annex B Lightning Zoning Requirements for Rotary Wing Aircraft .........................................................16

B.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................16
B.2
Zoning Concepts for Rotary Wing Aircraft ..................................................................................16
B.2.1
General Considerations and Assumptions...............................................................................16
B.2.2
Main Rotor ....................................................................................................................................17
B.2.3
Tail Rotor (non-enclosed type)...................................................................................................18
B.2.4
Main Body of Aircraft ..................................................................................................................19
B.3
Zoning Diagram ..............................................................................................................................20
Annex C Some General and Particular Design Requirements...................................................................21

C.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................21
C.2
General Design Requirement ........................................................................................................21
C.2.1
CFC Construction and Surface Protection ...............................................................................21
C.2.2
Dielectric Surfaces ......................................................................................................................22
C.2.3
Surface Damage to Metal Skins .................................................................................................22

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C.2.4
Bonding and Installation of Conductors Carrying Lightning Current ...................................22
C.2.5
Installation of Cables and Wiring...............................................................................................22
C.2.6
Requirements for the Design and Installation of Avionic Equipment to Withstand

Lightning Induced Voltage and Current Transients.................................................................23
C.2.7
Environmental Conditions..........................................................................................................23
C.2.8
Life Cycle Aspects.......................................................................................................................23
C.3
Particular Design Requirements ...................................................................................................24
C.3.1
Fuel Systems................................................................................................................................24
C.3.2
Flight Control Systems ...............................................................................................................27
C.3.3
Pylons, Missile Launch Rails and Stores..................................................................................27
C.3.4
Radome Protection......................................................................................................................28
C.3.5
Antenna Systems.........................................................................................................................28
C.3.6
De-Icing Systems.........................................................................................................................29
C.3.7
Canopy and Personnel Protection.............................................................................................29
C.3.8
External Probes and Equipment, including Drogues and other Trailed Equipment ............29
Annex D Requirements for the Assessment and Certification of the Capability of Aircraft to
Withstand Lightning Effects .............................................................................................................30
D.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................30
D.2
Lightning Environment and Design Parameter ...........................................................................30
D.3
Aim of Lightning Protection Plan..................................................................................................30
D.4
Scope of Lightning Protection Plan..............................................................................................30
D.5
Scope of Lightning Hazard Design Analysis ...............................................................................31
D.6
Lightning Test Waveforms ............................................................................................................32
D.7
Test Plan and Schedule .................................................................................................................32
D.8
Presentation of Documentation, Risk Evaluation and Recommendations for Approval........32
Annex E Evaluation of the Hazards Caused by Transients Induced on Aircraft Wiring .........................33
E.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................33
E.2
Evaluation Requirements when Modelling is Essential .............................................................33
E.2.2
Analysis ........................................................................................................................................34
E.2.3
Selection of Equipment...............................................................................................................34
E.2.8
Testing of Equipment ..................................................................................................................35
E.3
Evaluation Requirements when Modelling is not Essential.......................................................35
E.3.2
Selection of Equipment...............................................................................................................36
E.3.7
Equipment Testing ......................................................................................................................36
E.4
Margins to be Applied ....................................................................................................................37
E.5
Additional Evaluation Requirements For EED's & Fuzing Devices...........................................37
Annex F Evaluation of Fuel and Explosive Vapour Hazards .....................................................................38

F.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................38
F.2
Evaluation Requirements ..............................................................................................................38
F.3
Mandatory Tests .............................................................................................................................39
Annex G Waveforms for Test and Analysis Derived from the External Threat........................................40
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G.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................40
G.2
Test Waveforms for Direct Effects Testing ..................................................................................40
G.3
Test Waveforms for Indirect Effects Testing ...............................................................................42
G.3.1
Waveforms for Induced Voltage and Insulation Breakdown Tests ........................................42
G.3.2
Waveforms for Lightning Transient Assessment and Pulse Tests ........................................43
G.3.3
Waveforms for Equipment Testing ............................................................................................44
G.4
Waveform for Leader Phase Effects Testing ...............................................................................44
Annex H Internal Environments and Waveforms ........................................................................................46

H.1
Introduction.....................................................................................................................................46
H.2
Standard Induced Transient Waveforms for Assessment of Equipment Susceptibility.........46
H.2.1
The Origin and Shape of Transients..........................................................................................46
H.2.2
Standard Waveforms...................................................................................................................46
H.3
Equipment Test Levels for IP, SP and LP Waveforms................................................................48
H.3.1
General Considerations ..............................................................................................................48
H.3.2
Equipment Installation Categories for IP, SP and LP Waveforms..........................................48
H.3.3
Test Levels ...................................................................................................................................48
H.4
Levels and Frequencies for DS Waveform...................................................................................49
H.4.1
Selection of Transient Test Frequencies ..................................................................................49
H.4.2
Test Limits....................................................................................................................................49
H.5
Multiple Burst Test Waveform and Levels ...................................................................................49
H.6
Guidance Concerning Equipment Test Waveforms....................................................................49
Annex I Informative References....................................................................................................................53

I.1
Section 4 ..........................................................................................................................................53
I.2
Section 5 ..........................................................................................................................................53
I.3
Leaflet 0/2 ........................................................................................................................................53
I.4
Leaflet 1 ...........................................................................................................................................53
I.5
Leaflet 1/3 ........................................................................................................................................53
I.6
Leaflet 1/4 ........................................................................................................................................53
I.7
Leaflet 2/1 ........................................................................................................................................54
I.8
Leaflet 2/2 ........................................................................................................................................54
I.9
Leaflet 2/4 ........................................................................................................................................54
I.10
Leaflet 2/5 ........................................................................................................................................55
I.11
Leaflet 2/6 ........................................................................................................................................55
I.12
Leaflet 2/7 ........................................................................................................................................55
I.13
Leaflet 2/8 ........................................................................................................................................56
I.14
Leaflet 2/9 ........................................................................................................................................56
I.15
Leaflet 2/11 ......................................................................................................................................56
Annex J Leaflets .............................................................................................................................................57

J.1
Leaflet 0/2 - Relationship of Def Stan 59-113 to other Documents............................................57
J.1.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................57
J.1.2
Comparisons................................................................................................................................58
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J.1.3
Detailed Comparisons of Definitions.........................................................................................60
J.1.4
Discussion Concerning Indirect Effect Assessments .............................................................66
J.1.5
Discussion Concerning Derived External Environment..........................................................67
J.1.6
Discussion Concerning Explosive Vapour Assessments.......................................................68
J.1.7
Differences between 59-113 and Draft STANAG's 4236 and 4327..........................................69
J.2
Leaflet 1 - Recommended Test Methods......................................................................................70
J.2.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................70
J.2.2
Test Methods................................................................................................................................70
J.2.3
General Test Requirements........................................................................................................70
J.3
Leaflet 1/1 - Recommendations for Indirect Effects Tests on Whole Aircraft ..........................72
J.3.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................72
J.3.2
Selection and Preparation of Test Item .....................................................................................72
J.3.3
Test Configuration.......................................................................................................................72
J.3.4
Pulse Tests...................................................................................................................................73
J.4
Leaflet 1/2 - Recommendations for indirect effects tests on Parts of Aircraft.........................75
J.4.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................76
J.4.2
General Requirements for Indirect Effects Test.......................................................................76
J.4.3
Combination with Direct Effects Tests......................................................................................76
J.4.4
Waveform .....................................................................................................................................76
J.4.5
Current Path .................................................................................................................................76
J.4.6
Test Levels ...................................................................................................................................75
J.4.7
Load Impedances ........................................................................................................................75
J.4.8
Data to be Recorded....................................................................................................................75
J.4.9
Induced Voltage Measurements.................................................................................................76
J.4.10
Insulation Breakdown and Voltage Flashover Assessment ...................................................76
J.5
Leaflet 1/3 - Recommendations for Equipment Tests.................................................................77
J.5.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................77
J.5.2
General Requirements for Damped Sinewave and Ground Voltage Tests............................77
J.5.3
Damped Sinewave Injection Test...............................................................................................78
J.5.4
Ground Voltage Injection Tests .................................................................................................81
J.5.5
Multiple Burst Tests ....................................................................................................................83
J.6
Leaflet 1/4 - Recommendations for Fuel Hazard Tests...............................................................88
J.6.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................88
J.6.2
Arc Root Tests .............................................................................................................................88
J.6.3
Sparking Test ...............................................................................................................................88
J.6.4
Flammable Gas Test....................................................................................................................89
J.6.5
Test Waveforms ...........................................................................................................................90
J.6.6
Conditioning of Test Sample by Repeated Testing .................................................................90
J.7
Leaflet 1/5 - Recommended Tests for Direct Effects ..................................................................91
J.7.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................91
J.7.2
Tests .............................................................................................................................................91
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J.8
Unclassified
Leaflet 1/6 - Recommended Tests for Leader Phase Effects .....................................................95
J.8.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................95
J.8.2
Test L1/6-1 Dielectric Puncture ..................................................................................................95
J.9
Leaflet 1/7 - Recommended Methods of Detecting Sparking.....................................................96
J.9.1
Applicability .................................................................................................................................96
J.9.2
Method A (Photographic)............................................................................................................96
J.9.3
Method B (Photomultiplier).........................................................................................................96
J.10
Leaflet 2 - Background, Rationale and Guidance........................................................................98
J.10.1
Status of Advisory Material ........................................................................................................98
J.10.2
Sub Leaflets of Leaflet 2 .............................................................................................................98
J.11
Leaflet 2/1 - The Natural Lightning Discharge .............................................................................99
J.11.1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................99
J.11.2
Cloud To Ground Discharges.....................................................................................................99
J.11.3
Inter And Intra Cloud Discharges ............................................................................................100
J.11.4
Natural Lightning Parameters ..................................................................................................101
J.12
Leaflet 2/2 - Lightning Interactions with Aircraft.......................................................................105
J.12.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................105
J.12.2
Lightning Strikes to Aircraft .....................................................................................................105
J.12.3
Classification of Lightning Effects to Aircraft ........................................................................111
J.12.4
Direct Effects..............................................................................................................................112
J.12.5
Indirect Effects...........................................................................................................................115
J.12.6
Far-Field Effects.........................................................................................................................116
J.12.7
Relationship between Indirect Effects Tests and Equipment Tests ....................................116
J.12.8
Leader Phase and Arc Driven Voltage Effects .......................................................................119
J.12.9
Design Aim Parameters and Lightning Test Waveforms ......................................................120
J.12.10
Composite Test Waveform for Direct Effects and some Indirect Effects ............................121
J.12.11
Lightning Flight Restrictions....................................................................................................121
J.13
Leaflet 2/3 - General Assessment, Guidance.............................................................................124
J.13.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................124
J.13.2
Purpose of Lightning Protection Plan and Lightning Hazard Design Analysis ..................124
J.13.3
Criticality Lists and Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) Prepared by the Aircraft
Manufacturer ..............................................................................................................................124
J.13.4
Need for Risk Evaluation ..........................................................................................................124
J.13.5
Factors Affecting the Need for Testing ...................................................................................125
J.13.6
Test Plan, Test Schedule and Test Report..............................................................................126
J.13.7
Test Combinations ....................................................................................................................126
J.13.8
Hazards Arising from Testing ..................................................................................................126
J.14
Leaflet 2/4 - Assessment, Guidance for Indirect Effect Hazards .............................................127
J.14.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................127
J.14.2
Summary of Indirect Effects Mechanisms ..............................................................................127
J.14.3
Aircraft Clearance......................................................................................................................128
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J.14.4
Indirect Effect Tests on Whole Aircraft ...................................................................................133
J.14.5
Indirect Effects Test on Parts of Aircraft ................................................................................135
J.14.6
Assessment of Voltages Liable to Stress Insulation or Cause Voltage Flashover ............136
J.15
Leaflet 2/5 - Fuel Hazard Assessment and Design Guidance ..................................................139
J.15.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................139
J.15.2
Fuel Characteristics and Criteria for Explosion or Combustion ..........................................139
J.15.3
Hazard Mechanisms ..................................................................................................................145
J.15.4
Fuel Hazard Assessments and Tests ......................................................................................146
J.15.5
Risk Assessments, Overall Probabilities and Safety Margins..............................................148
J.16
Leaflet 2/6 - Techniques and Guidance for Direct Effects Tests .............................................155
J.16.1
Simulation of the Environment ................................................................................................155
J.16.2
Test Current Generation ...........................................................................................................158
J.16.3
Reference to Earth Potential ....................................................................................................159
J.16.4
Diagnostics ................................................................................................................................159
J.16.5
Factors Affecting the Need for Testing ...................................................................................160
J.17
Leaflet 2/7 - Techniques and Guidance for Equipment Tests..................................................162
J.17.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................162
J.17.2
Determination of Transients to be Applied to Equipment.....................................................162
J.17.3
Bulk Cable Injection ..................................................................................................................162
J.17.4
Characteristics of the Pulse Generator ...................................................................................164
J.17.5
Provision of Equipment for Test ..............................................................................................164
J.17.6
The Damped Sinewave Injection Test .....................................................................................165
J.17.7
The Ground Voltage Injection Test ..........................................................................................167
J.18
Leaflet 2/8 - Techniques for Leader Phase Tests ......................................................................168
J.18.1
Dielectric Puncture Tests .........................................................................................................168
J.18.2
Selection of Test Waveform .....................................................................................................168
J.18.3
Test Guidance ............................................................................................................................169
J.19
Leaflet 2/9 - Guidance Concerning Some Design Requirements ............................................170
J.19.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................170
J.19.2
CFC Construction ......................................................................................................................170
J.19.3
Dielectric Surfaces ....................................................................................................................172
J.19.4
Surface Damage to Metal Skins ...............................................................................................173
J.19.5
Bonding and Installation of Conductors Carrying Lightning Current .................................173
J.19.6
Installation of Cables and Wiring.............................................................................................174
J.19.7
Lightning Surge Suppressors and Diverters..........................................................................174
J.19.8
Flight Control Systems .............................................................................................................175
J.19.9
Propulsion Systems and Installations.....................................................................................175
J.19.10
Fuel Systems..............................................................................................................................176
J.19.11
Radome Protection....................................................................................................................178
J.19.12
Antenna System Protection......................................................................................................178
J.19.13
De-Icing Systems.......................................................................................................................179
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J.19.14
J.20
Unclassified
Canopy and Personnel Protection...........................................................................................179

Leaflet 2/10 - Preferred Format for Lightning Protection Plan Status Report ........................180
J.20.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................180
J.20.2
Headings To Include In Report.................................................................................................180
J.20.3
Report Format ............................................................................................................................181
J.21
Leaflet 2/11 - Flight Restrictions to Minimise Risk of Lightning Strikes.................................188
J.21.1
Introduction................................................................................................................................188
J.21.2
Discussion..................................................................................................................................188
J.21.2.1
Triggered and Intercepted Strikes .........................................................................................188
J.21.2.2
Triggered Strike Avoidance....................................................................................................188
J.21.2.3
Intercepted Strike Avoidance .................................................................................................188
J.21.2.4
Avoidance Distance ................................................................................................................189
J.21.2.5
A Practical Avoidance Criteria ...............................................................................................189
J.21.2.6
Proscribed Cloud Conditions.................................................................................................189
J.21.2.7
Eurofighter Restriction and some other Restrictions .........................................................189
J.21.2.8
Nimrod MRA4 Restriction .......................................................................................................190
J.21.2.9
Lightning Risk States..............................................................................................................190
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Foreword
AMENDMENT RECORD
Amd No
Date
Text Affected
Signature and Date
REVISION NOTE
This standard is raised to first issue.
HISTORICAL RECORD
This standard supersedes the following:
No Historical Record
a)
This standard provides requirements for design, evaluation and testing requirements with risk
assessment procedures to ensure the safety & suitability for service of UK Military Aircraft when
exposed to a lightning threat.
b)
This standard has been produced on behalf of the Defence Material Standardization Committee (DMSC)
by the Joint Airworthiness committee (JAC).
c)
This standard has been agreed by the authorities concerned with its use and is intended to be used
whenever relevant in all future designs, contracts, orders etc. and whenever practicable by amendment
to those already in existence. If any difficulty arises which prevents application of the Defence Standard,
UK Defence Standardization (DStan) shall be informed so that a remedy may be sought.
d)
Any enquiries regarding this standard in relation to an invitation to tender or a contract in which it is
incorporated are to be addressed to the responsible technical or supervising authority named in the
invitation to tender or contract.
e)
Compliance with this Defence Standard shall not in itself relieve any person from any legal obligations
imposed upon them.
f)
This standard has been devised solely for the use of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and its contractors
in the execution of contracts for the MOD. To the extent permitted by law, the MOD hereby excludes all
liability whatsoever and howsoever arising (including, but without limitation, liability resulting from
negligence) for any loss or damage however caused when the standard is used for any other purpose.
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Standards for Defence - Lightning Strike Protection

Requirements for Service Aircraft
Scope
The aim of this standard is to define the design, evaluation and testing requirements, with risk assessment
procedures, to be used for ensuring the safety and suitability for service of UK Military Aircraft when exposed
to a lightning threat.
Warning
The Ministry of Defence (MOD), like its contractors, is subject to both United Kingdom and European laws
regarding Health and Safety at Work. All Defence Standards either directly or indirectly invoke the use of
processes and procedures that could be injurious to health if adequate precautions are not taken. Defence
Standards or their use in no way absolves users from complying with statutory and legal requirements
relating to Health and Safety at Work.
3
3.1
Normative References
The publications shown below are referred to in the text of this standard.
STANAG 4236 Edition 2, Lightning Environment Ratification, Draft 1

STANAG 4327 Edition 2, Lightning, Munitions Assessment and Test Procedures, Draft 6
AOP 25 Edition 2, Lightning Discharges Assessments and Tests, Rationale and Guidance, Draft 7
Def Stan 59-41, Electro Magnetic Compatibility
Reference in this Standard to any normative references means in any Invitation to Tender or contract
the edition and all amendments current at the date of such tender or contract unless a specific edition is
indicated.
3.2
In consideration of clause 3.2 above, users shall be fully aware of the issue and amendment status of
all normative references, particularly when forming part of an Invitation to Tender or contract. Responsibility
for the correct application of standards rests with users.
3.3
Defence Standard (DStan) can advise regarding where normative references documents are obtained
from. Requests for such information can be made to the DStan Helpdesk. How to contact the helpdesk is
shown on the outside rear cover of DStans.
3.4
4
4.1
Applicability and Reference Information

Applicability
4.1.1 This standard states the minimum requirements for the design of aircraft in order to protect them and
the crew from the effects of lightning strikes. It shall apply to all fixed and rotary wing aircraft which are
procured against Def Stan 00-970. It does not apply to air launched weapons and weapon systems; the
requirements for which are given in STANAG 4327 but it does apply to the aircraft pylons and launchers.
Unclassified
Unclassified
4.1.2 The standard covers the cases of both a direct strike, where the lightning channel attaches to the
aeroplane, and a nearby flash, where, although there is no contact, the aeroplane is near enough for it or the
crew to possibly be affected by the electromagnetic fields or the aerodynamic shock wave.
4.1.3 Far field effects, are the effects of exposure to the radiated electromagnetic field of a distant lightning
flash. The effects are not addressed in this Def Stan as protection is automatically provided by indirect
effects hardening.
4.1.4 Direct effects arise directly from the passage of lightning current and are therefore present only in
direct strikes. Possible hazards include puncture of the aeroplane skin, including that of fuel tanks, and fire or
explosion due to sparking or hot spots. Indirect effects are due to coupling with the electromagnetic fields of
the lightning current flowing in the aeroplane or in the lightning flash itself. These effects may therefore arise
as a result of either a direct strike or a nearby flash. Possible hazards include malfunction of electronic
equipment, or permanent damage to it, due to induced transient voltages or currents. Leader phase effects,
such as corona or dielectric puncture, are the effects due to the high electrical stress that occurs as a
lightning leader attaches to the aircraft.
4.2
Requirements
4.2.1 Section 5 states the minimum requirements that UK MOD Aircraft Project Directors will accept for
the certification of aircraft against lightning strike hazards. The Aircraft Manufacturer may offer alternative
means of compliance (and design where appropriate) to the mandatory requirements given in Section 5 but
must justify their use to the Aircraft Project Director.
4.2.2 The test methods recommended in Leaflet 1 (see J.2) are not mandatory but are designed to
ensure uniformity of results between different test houses. The design requirements of Annex C are
mandatory, although alternative practices could be used if absolutely necessary and if the outcome of such
use is recognised in the Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA) and Risk Evaluation.
4.3
Abbreviations
Amperes
AC
Alternating Current
Coulomb
CW
Continuous Wave
dB
Decibel
DC
Direct Current
Hz
Hertz
Joules
kA
Kiloamperes
kHz
Kilohertz
kV
Kilovolts
Meter
mA
Milliamperes
MHz
Megahertz
Megaohms
Resistance
Seconds
Volt
Impedance
Ohms
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Unclassified
H
Micro Henries
Micro Joules
4.4
Acronyms
AC
Advisory Circular
ARP
Aerospace Recommended Practices
CFRP
Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plastic
CO
Cost of Ownership
EED
Electro Explosive Device
EMC
Electromagnetic Compatibility
EUROCAE
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
EUT
Equipment under Test
FS
Flight Safety
HV
High Voltage
LHDA
Lightning Hazard Design Analysis
LISN
Line Impedance Stabilisation Network
LPP
Lightning Protection Plan
LRU
Line Replaceable Unit
MA
Mission Accomplishment
RF
Radio Frequency
RTCA
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
SAE
Society of Automotive Engineers
TP
Test Plan
WhAT
Whole Aircraft Test
Unclassified

4.5
Unclassified
Definitions
4.5.1
Properties of Lightning
ACTION INTEGRAL Action integral
(i2 dt measured in A2s or joules/ohm) defines the energy in any

portion of the current path per ohm resistance.
CHARGE TRANSFER
the time integral of current transferred in a particular phase of the

flash (e.g. the continuing current) or in the whole flash.
CLOUD TO GROUND FLASH
cloud to ground flash is a lightning discharge from a cloud to

ground.
CONTINUING CURRENT
continuing current is that current which may occur between strokes

of a negative flash and more often after the last stroke. This current
has the lowest current amplitude (between 200 and 800 A) but the
longest duration. It is in this phase that the largest charge transfer
usually occurs.
FIRST RETURN STROKE
the first return stroke is that current flow along the previously ionised
path, occurring when that path is complete between two charge
centres, e.g. from cloud to ground.
FLASH
the total lightning discharge. It may occur within a cloud, between

clouds or between a cloud and ground. It can consist of one or
more return strokes, plus intermediate or continuing currents. A
discharge to ground from a region of negative charge is called a
negative flash.
INTERCLOUD FLASH
an inter cloud flash is a lightning discharge between clouds.
INTERMEDIATE CURRENT
the intermediate current is that current of a few kilo-amperes which

may occur after some strokes in a negative flash and which may
persist for several milliseconds after the initial decay of a return
stroke.
INTRACLOUD FLASH
an intra cloud flash is a lightning discharge within a cloud.
LEADER
a leader is a preliminary breakdown that forms a weakly luminous

low-current ionised path.
STROKE
a stroke is a component discharge of a lightning flash, which follows

a leader.
SUBSEQUENT STROKES
subsequent strokes are the component strokes of a negative or

positive flash which occur after the first return stroke.
4.5.2
Interactions with Aircraft
ATTACHMENT POINT
a point on an aircraft surface at which lightning current enters or

leaves. There must be at least two such points and due to the swept
stroke effect with a moving aircraft, there may be many more.
CAPTURE DISTANCE
capture distance is that distance from an aerospace vehicle at

which a discharge would have passed, had it not been captured by
the vehicle.
CAPTURE RADIUS
capture radius is the radius of a sphere, centred on an aerospace

vehicle, beyond which the vehicle is unable to capture and divert a
lightning discharge to it.
Unclassified
Unclassified
DIRECT STRIKE
direct strike is a lightning discharge which attaches directly to the

aircraft, causing actual lightning current to flow in parts or the whole
of that aircraft.
DISTANT OR "FAR FIELD" FLASH
a far field flash is a lightning discharge which occurs at such a

distance that the only coupling to the aircraft is by electromagnetic
radiation.
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
the environment caused by natural lightning discharges which

interact with the aircraft. Parameters taken to be the worst case
result in the Derived External Environment.
INTERCEPTED LIGHTNING STRIKE
an intercepted lightning strike is a naturally occurring discharge

which attaches to an aerospace vehicle, by virtue of the discharge
passing sufficiently close to the vehicle to be captured and diverted
to it, so that the vehicle becomes part of the discharge channel.
INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
the internal magnetic and electric fields generated by the external

environment which interact on the wiring within the aircraft to cause
transient voltages and currents in the wiring and at the inputs to
electrical and electronic equipment. The internal environment can
also cause currents to flow in, and potential differences to develop
between, metallic parts not intended to carry current.
LIGHTNING ATTACHMENT ZONES
because of the sweeping action of the lightning channel, the

proportion of the flash experienced by any particular point depends
on its location on the vehicle surface and this has led to the concept
of dividing the surface into 3 Zones depending on the probability of
initial attachment, sweeping and hang-on, as follows:-
a)
Zone 1
surfaces for which there is a high probability of initial lightning flash

attachment (leader or return stroke current, entry and exit).
b)
Zone 2
surfaces of the vehicle for which there is a low probability of initial

attachment but a high probability of a lightning flash (return current)
being swept by airflow from a Zone 1 point of initial flash
attachment.
c)
Zone 3
all other surfaces not in Zones 1 and 2. Such areas have a low
probability of flash attachment but may carry substantial lightning
current between attachment points situated in Zones 1 or 2. In some
Zone 3 areas that current may be due to the whole of the lightning
discharge.
Depending on the likely duration of flash hang-on, Zones 1 and 2 may be further divided into Zone A and B
regions as follows:a)
Zone 1A
initial attachment point with low probability of flash hang on for a

time in excess of 50 ms, such as a leading edge.
b)
Zone 1B
initial attachment point with high probability of flash hang on for a

time exceeding 50 ms, such as a trailing edge.
c)
Zone 1C
limited area of an aerospace vehicle surface behind Zone 1A into

which a leader attachment may be swept and which may therefore
experience a first return stroke attachment.
d)
Zone 2A
swept stroke zone with low probability of flash hang on for a time in
excess of 50 ms, such as a forward or mid position of a Zone 2.
Unclassified
Unclassified

e)
Zone 2B
swept stroke zone with high probability of flash hang on for a time
exceeding 50 ms, such as a trailing edge in Zone 2.
MULTIPLE BURST ENVIRONMENT
a derived external environment resulting from the shock excited

bursts of current oscillations that appear on the surface of air borne
aircraft at the time of leader attachment to the Aircraft.
NEARBY FLASH
nearby flash is a lightning discharge which does not attach to the

aircraft, but due to its proximity, may induce significant current in the
aircraft either by electric field coupling, magnetic field coupling or by
a combination of both.
RE-ATTACHMENT
re-attachment is a subsequent attachment, brought about by the

swept stroke effect. It will follow an earlier attachment either from a
first or a subsequent return stroke.
RESTRIKES
subsequent return strokes occurring after the first return stroke in a

multi-stroke flash are sometimes called restrikes. A restrike will
generally cause a reattachment.
STRIKE
a strike is a lightning discharge which interacts with the aircraft.
SWEPT STROKE
as the lightning channel remains substantially stationary in space

and the aircraft moves forward, the lightning channel sweeps back
along its surface, usually causing re attachment. This is called a
swept stroke but should more accurately be called a swept flash
since the whole of the flash, including all its phases, takes part in
the process.
TRIGGERED LIGHTNING STRIKE
a triggered lightning strike is a discharge initiated by the presence of

an aerospace vehicle.
ZONING
the process (or the end result of the process) of determining the
location on the aircraft of the Lightning Attachment Zones.
4.5.3
Classification of Lightning Effects on Aircraft
DIRECT EFFECTS
the effects directly due to the attachment or passage of the lightning

channel currents such as metal burn through, hot spots and ohmic
heating.
FAR-FIELD EFFECTS
these are the effects of exposure to the radiated electromagnetic

field of a comparatively distant lightning flash.
INDIRECT EFFECTS
the effects due to coupling with the magnetic or electric field of the
lightning current, either in the channel or flowing in the aircraft,
taking place in parts of the aircraft in which the lightning channel
current cannot flow. Such effects can arise as a result of either a
direct strike or a nearby flash. An example is a transient voltage
induced in aircraft wiring. See also, 'Aperture Flux' and 'Diffusion
Flux'.
LEADER PHASE EFFECTS
4.5.4
the effects resulting from the attachment of a lightning leader to

the aircraft. Examples are corona or dielectric puncture.
Transient Levels and Evaluations
COMPUTED TRANSIENT LEVEL (CTL)
the transient amplitude given by unsubstantiated modelling at

full threat.
Unclassified
Unclassified
MEASURED TRANSIENT LEVEL (MTL)
the amplitude of the actual response measured during a pulse

test.
SHOCK EXCITATION
the excitation that occurs when lightning attaches to the aircraft

giving high frequency damped sinusoidal oscillations, usually in
the range 2 to 50 MHz, corresponding to natural resonances of
the aircraft and its electrical systems. The frequencies and
damping of the oscillations (although not their amplitudes) are
independent of the shape of the lightning pulse.
TEST TRANSIENT LEVEL (TTL)
the measured response from a pulse test (MTL), extrapolated

to full threat.
EQUIPMENT TRANSIENT DESIGN LEVEL (ETDL) is the transient amplitude up to which the equipment
must operate without malfunction or signs of failure.
EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION LEVEL (EQL)
is the actual transient level to which the equipment
has been tested and qualified. The EQL must never be less
than the TCL plus the agreed margin.
TRANSFER FUNCTION
at a given frequency the transfer function between two points in

an electrical system is defined as the ratio of the amplitude of
the signals at those points, together with the phase difference
between them. The complete transfer function, over the range
of frequencies considered, consists of plots against frequency
of the amplitude ratio and phase angle between the two points
of interest.
TRANSIENT CONTROL LEVEL (TCL)
the worse case actual amplitude that a Transient Assessment

establishes should exist at an equipment when it is installed in
the aircraft and subjected to the maximum lightning threat. It is
the transient amplitude arrived at by:
a)
taking the worst case of all configurations and attachment points from either modelling or pulse tests,
when the difference between all of the relevant CTLs and TTLs is <6 dB, or
b)
when modelling is not done it is the TTL, corrected if necessary for any non linearity.
WHOLE AIRCRAFT TESTS
4.5.5
transient Assessment Tests made on a complete aircraft

enclosed in a return conductor system.
Regarding Fuel
AUTO IGNITION AND AUTO-IGNITION DELAY

the temperature at which a fuel/air mixture
spontaneously ignites. There will be a delay between addition
of fuel to the hot air and ignition taking place. This delay may
be tens of minutes long with a very high statistical scatter at the
minimum auto-ignition temperature and is known as the Auto
Ignition Delay.
ENERGY REQUIRED FOR IGNITION (ERI) AND MINIMUM IGNITION ENERGY (MIE)
the Energy Required for Ignition (ERI) or Ignition Energy,
depends on several factors but principally upon fuel vapour/air
ratio, temperature, pressure and degree of oxygen enrichment
of the air. For given values of temperature, pressure and
oxygen content, it is least at a certain stoichiometric ratio. That
least energy is known as the Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE).
FLAMMABILITY LIMITS (EXPLOSION LIMITS) the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) of a fuel occurs when the
percentage volume of fuel vapour to air is just sufficient for
ignition to occur - about 1.3% for AVTUR at ground level
7
Unclassified
Unclassified
pressure. The upper explosive limit (UEL) occurs when the
fuel vapour air ratio is just sufficient to give an over rich
situation, and prevent combustion - about 7.9% for AVTUR at
ground level pressure.
FLASHPOINT
the temperature of a fuel sample at which the vapour over the

liquid surface ignites when challenged with a small flame.
STOICHIOMETRY, STOICHIOMETRIC RATIO the stoichiometric ratio = 1.0 occurs when the
proportions of fuel and air taking part in combustion result in
all of the oxygen in the air reacting completely with all of the
fuel. If there is twice as much fuel as there is available oxygen
= 2.0, if twice as much oxygen as fuel = 0.5.
THERMAL SPARKING
thermal sparks are burning particles emitted from areas of a

conducting surface where the current density is sufficient to
cause vaporisation of the surface material. Thermal sparking
occurs when a very high current is forced to cross a joint
between two conducting materials, which have imperfect
mating between their surfaces, see Leaflet 2/5 section J15.4.2
(J.15). It can also occur at places on the surface of a conductor
where there is an acute change of geometry.
VOLTAGE SPARKING
voltage sparking occurs when the voltage difference between

two conductors rises to a value high enough to break down the
intervening medium, whether this is air or other dielectric,
Leaflet 2/5 section J15.4.2 (see J.15).
4.5.6
Other Definitions
ADHESIVELY BONDED
a structure or a joint which is adhesively bonded is held

together (glued) with adhesive which is generally nonconducting and therefore does not provide an electrical bond.
APERTURE FLUX (FAST FLUX)
aperture flux is the magnetic flux of lightning origin inside an

aircraft that has penetrated through electromagnetic apertures
such as a dielectric cover or joints and gaps in the skin. Its
waveform is that of the external magnetic flux.
ARC
an electric discharge characterised by high luminosity,

temperature and current.
BONDING
bonding is the process of making a low resistance electrical

connection between parts or between a part and the structure.
BOUNDARY LAYER
for laminar flow, a layer of air at the surface of an aircraft in

flight which has zero velocity relative to the aircraft at the
surface, increasing to the free stream velocity at some distance
from the surface.
CFC
an abbreviation for carbon fibre composite, also known as

carbon fibre reinforced plastic (CFRP). It is a material
constructed of carbon fibres laid in a resin matrix, employed in
weapons mainly for its good strength/weight ratio. It has a
resistivity about 1000 times that of aluminium alloy.
COMMON-MODE VOLTAGE
in a two-wire circuit a common-mode voltage is the difference

between the mean voltage of the wires and the structure.
Unclassified
Unclassified
CORONA
the ionisation of a volume of air around a conducting body

under high electric field conditions. It occurs particularly at
sharp points, edges and protuberances, where the intensity of
the electric field is enhanced by the local geometry.
DIFFERENTIAL VOLTAGE
in a two-wire circuit a differential voltage is the voltage

difference between the wires.
DIFFUSION FLUX
diffusion flux is the magnetic flux that has penetrated by

diffusion through a conducting portion of the skin; the diffusion
process distorts and attenuates the external flux. The amplitude
depends on the resistivity of the material through which it has
diffused, being low for good conductors such as metal and
higher for high resistivity materials such as CFC.
FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT
an assessment made by the Aircraft Manufacturer listing all the

aircraft systems and equipments and the type of hazard (e.g.
Mission Critical, Flight Safety Critical) should those systems or
equipments fail for any reason.
OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE OF A HIGH VOLTAGE IMPULSE GENERATOR

the open circuit voltage of the generator is that voltage
which occurs across the test electrode gap when breakdown
does not occur in that gap.
PART TESTS
Direct or Indirect Effect tests made on parts of aircraft.
PEAK (MAXIMUM) RATE-OF-RISE
the peak (maximum) rate of rise of a waveform is the largest

instantaneous rate-of-change of the waveform as it rises to its
peak value. In a current waveform it would be expressed
mathematically as di/dtmax.
QUASI CO-AXIAL
a return conductor arrangement, whereby the return current

interaction with the test arc and the current flowing in the test
object is minimised.
ROLLING SPHERE
a method of determining lightning attachment points by rolling

an imaginary sphere of a prescribed diameter around an object,
whereby attachments can occur at all points where the sphere
touches the object.
STREAMERS
ionised paths or filaments that emanate from corona regions on

a conducting body, when the field considerably exceeds the
corona threshold. Steamers can occur across the surface of a
dielectric, or from the aircraft to the surrounding atmosphere.
TIME TO REACH PEAK
the time from the start to the maximum amplitude of the

waveform.
TOTAL DURATION
the time from the start of the waveform to the point at which
the waveform has decreased to an amplitude of 5% of its peak
value.
V90 VOLTAGE
the peak open circuit voltage of a high voltage impulse

generator required to cause breakdown of the gap between a
test electrode and a test object in 9 out of every 10 discharges
of the generator.
Unclassified

4.6
Unclassified
Informative References
Informative references are contained in Annex I.
4.7
Relationship to Other Documents
The relationship of Def Stan 59-113 to other documents is given in Leaflet 0/2 (see J.1).
Requirements
5.1
Protection Aim Requirements
5.1.1 The Design Aim shall be to provide protection of the aircraft from lightning against the objectives
given below. Unless otherwise stated in the Aircraft Specification, these objectives shall be addressed in the
following order of priority:a)
a strike shall not jeopardise flight safety;
b)
a strike shall not prevent the aircraft from carrying out the operational mission specified in the Aircraft
Specification;
c)
a strike shall require the practicable minimum of repair work.
5.1.2 The responsibility for making trade-offs in design to meet the above objectives, to the priorities
stated above or in the Aircraft Specification, shall lie with the Aircraft Design Authority, who shall if necessary
justify the outcome in the Risk Evaluation required by Annex D which shall also identify risks from multiple
strikes.
5.2
5.2.1
Design Requirements
The External Lightning Environment and Design Aim Parameters
Aircraft shall be designed to withstand the lightning environment and design aim parameters specified in
Annex A. Aircraft Specifications when evoking Def Stan 59-113 shall identify any requirements not precisely
given in this section.
5.2.2
Lightning Strike Attachment and Zoning
The likely lightning strike initial attachment points and zoning for the aircraft shall be decided according to the
methods outlined in EUROCAE Document ED91 (Ref 2.1), except that zoning for rotary wing aircraft shall be
in accordance with Annex B and High Voltage Model Tests shall not be used to determine attachment
points.
5.2.3
Aircraft Internal Environments
Internal environments and waveforms shall be in accordance with Annex H.

5.2.4
General and Particular Design Requirements
Annex C gives some general and particular design requirements that must be met.
Unclassified
10
Unclassified
5.3
5.3.1
Evaluation Requirements
Lightning Protection Plan (LPP) and Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA)
5.3.1.1 The ability of the aircraft to withstand the effects, described in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12), caused by
the lightning environment specified in shall be assessed by Annex A, a Lightning Hazard Design Analysis
(LHDA) according to Annex D. The LHDA shall be part of a Lightning Protection Plan (LPP), as defined in
Annex D, which may be part of an Electromagnetic Hazards (EMH) control plan.
5.3.1.2 Because there is a close connection between the design requirements for protection against
lightning indirect effects and those covering EMC and Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP)
considerations, the lightning protection plan shall take account of EMC Requirements, and also of NEMP
requirements if applicable. Lightning requirements shall be co-ordinated with these other requirements and
any conflict of requirements in particular instances shall be noted in the risk assessment and proposals
included for resolving the conflict.
5.3.1.3 An output of the LPP shall be a risk evaluation and probability analysis, see Leaflet 2/3 section
J13.4 (see J.13).
5.3.2
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)
When assessing critical functions of systems and major components that could be affected by lightning, the
assessments shall take note of the FHA prepared for the aircraft by the aircraft manufacturer. When
insufficient detail is given in that FHA, it shall be expanded in conjunction with the Aircraft Design Authority.
5.3.3
Waveforms for Test and Analysis Derived from the External Threat
Waveforms for test and analysis shall be in accordance with Annex G.

5.3.4
Test Requirements
When the LHDA of Annex D requires that tests shall be made, they shall preferably be selected from those
recommended in Leaflet 1 (see J.2). Alternatively the Aircraft Project Director may authorise the use of
similar or improved tests that fulfil the same function.
5.4
Background and Guidance
Leaflet 1/2 (see J.4) and Leaflet 2 (see J.10) provide information concerning lightning effects, and guidance
concerning design, assessment and recommended test techniques.
11
Unclassified
Unclassified
Annex A
External Derived Lightning Environment (Lighting Threat Levels) to be
used as Design Criteria
A.1
Introduction
A.1.1
This annex defines lightning threats, which are used for both design and test purposes. The threats
are generally derived from the natural lightning parameters given in Leaflet 2/1 (see J.11). Internal
environments resulting from these external threats are addressed in Annex H.
A.2
General Considerations
The Rationale for the environments given below is given in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12).
A.3
Air Side External Environment
A.3.1 Environments derived from natural lightning parameters as described in Leaflet 2/1 (see J.11) are
given below in Sections A.3.2 and A.3.3.
A.3.2
Aircraft shall be designed to survive the parameters relevant to lightning attachment zones (Leaflet
2/2 section J12.2.5 (see J.12) as given in Table 1. It should be clearly understood that the parameters
listed are the worst case parameters that are expected to apply to the attachment zones noted. The
parameters do not represent a real lightning waveform, neither can they be described (for a particular
attachment zone) by a double exponential waveform.
Zone
i Pk
di/dt max
-1
kA
As
Action
Integral
Charge
Transfer
A2s
Due to Leader
Attachment
Due to Return
Stoke Attachment
200
2 x 1011
0.4 x 1011
1B
200
11
2 x 10
1.4 x 10
11
1C (see Note 1)
150
2 x 1011
1.4 x 1011
0.8 x 106
30 in 50 ms
2A
100
11
2 x 10
1.4 x 10
11
0.25 x 10
30 in 50 ms
2B
100
2 x 10
11
1.4 x 10
11
0.25 x 10
300
1.4 x 10
11
3.75 x 10
300
1A
3 (see Note 2)
NOTE 1
200
11
2 x 10
3.5 x 106
3.75 x 10
30 in 50 ms
300
Leaflet 2.2 section J12.2.6 (see J.12) discusses the extent of and the duration of Zone 1C parameters.
NOTE 2
The parameters in the table are relevant to the arc attachment point. When considering a particular position
on a structure, especially for Zone 3, it may be necessary to reduce the parameter levels according to local geometry
(see Leaflet 2.2 section J12.9.5 (see J.12)).
Table 1 Design Parameters Relevant to Lightning Attachment Zones
Unclassified
12
Unclassified
A.3.3
a)
In addition to the parameters given in Table 1, aircraft shall also be designed to survive:-
The Multiple Burst environment of EUROCAE ED84 given in Reference 2.2, as follows:A repetitive Component H waveform of 3 sets of 20 pulses each, as shown in Figure A1.2. The minimum
time between successive individual Component H pulses within a burst shall be 50 s, the maximum
shall be 1000 s. The 3 bursts shall be distributed according to the following constraints:The minimum period between the start of successive bursts shall be 30 ms
The maximum period between the start of successive bursts shall be 300 ms
b)
A rate of change of E field (dE/dt) of 1013 Vm-1s-1.
Reference 2.2 defines Component H as a double exponential waveform with a peak current of 10 kA and a peak rate of
11
-1
rise of 2 x 10 A s at to, according to the following relationship:-
i = Io(e-t-e- t)
where:
Io = 10572 A
= 19105100 s-1
= 187191 s-1
t = time in s
NOTE 1
as explained in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12), Section J12.2.11 & J12.7.2 a Multiple Stroke Environment is not
considered necessary.
NOTE 2
To take account of the occurrence of positive striking with action integrals much greater than the values in
Table 1, the Aircraft Project Director may require the action integral parameters to be increased by a factor of 2 when
evaluating direct effects on safety critical structures.
13
Unclassified
Current
Unclassified
Single Pulses, mostly < 50kA
50
Rise Time
100ns - 10 s
Fall Time
1s - 50 s
40
30
Multiple Recoil
Streamers
Low
Level
Random Pulses
20
Detachment
Phase
10
Time
v/i
Figure 1 Typical Intra-Cloud Lightning Flash to an Aircraft
30 ms < t < 300ms
10 kA
20 Pulses
Figure 2 Multiple Burst Waveform - Three Bursts of 20 Pulses
Unclassified
14
Unclassified
50 uS < t < 1000 uS
10 kA
T1
Figure 3 Multiple Burst Waveform - A Burst of 20 Pulses
15
Unclassified
20
Unclassified
Annex B
Lightning Zoning Requirements for Rotary Wing Aircraft
B.1
Introduction
The interaction of lightning with rotorcraft is similar to the interaction with fixed wing aircraft. The purpose of
this annex is to outline zoning concepts particular to rotary wing aircraft and especially those associated with
main and tail rotors.
B.2
Zoning Concepts for Rotary Wing Aircraft
B.2.1
General Considerations and Assumptions
B.2.1.1 The zoning of helicopters is complex due to the relatively large rotating structures and the
capability of hover and flight in directions other than forward.
B.2.1.2 The problem arises from the difficulty in predicting for all flight modes (hover, forward, sideways
and backward flight) exactly where attachments will occur, taking into account the swept leader effect and
also the duration of the lightning event. To develop a set of simplistic rules is therefore very difficult and to
take full advantage of zoning concepts, a detailed analysis of each aircraft type must certainly be made.
However, a realistic worst case can be made, which should cover most helicopter types, by making certain
assumptions. These assumptions are that:a)
The main rotor disc effectively screens the majority of the airframe, especially upper regions, from a
downward coming leader and that initial attachments can always occur to main rotor blade tips,
whatever the flight mode. However, in cases of a helicopter with only two main rotor blades, the
possibility of an attachment penetrating between the rotor blades should be considered.
b)
Protrusions along the underside of the aircraft are vulnerable to initial attachments as well as swept
strokes.
c)
Because of the possibility of hover 1A zones will not occur on the non-rotating parts of the structure.
Initial attachments will be in 1B zones or in 1C zones if a swept leader is involved.
d)
On the rotor discs 1B zones will not occur, the arc being swept by virtue of the rotational motion, even in
hover, therefore initial attachments are in zone 1A (or 1C). (An exception here is the region near the
centre of a rotor where a protrusion may only be moving small distances and sweeping is unlikely.
Consideration shall be given to allocating such protrusions 1B zones.). The hang on times will depend
on a number of aircraft variables and must be calculated for each helicopter type.
e)
The rotational speed (N) of a main rotor is typically between 2 and 6 RPS.
f)
The lightning event (after the initial attachment) is equivalent to a Component C of 300 Coulombs
normally represented by a pulse of 500 ms duration with a corresponding current level of 600 amps (see
Annex A and Annex G).
B.2.1.3 Note that 'n' is the number of blades in the main rotor and the blade tip velocity is vt metres per
second, whilst the maximum forward velocity of the aircraft is v metres per second.
B.2.1.4 Full Zone 1A parameters should be used in Zone 1C areas unless otherwise decided by the
Aircraft Design Authority.
B.2.1.5 It will be noted below that no reference is made to Component B of the composite test waveform.
That is because that component is of somewhat academic interest, as it is seldom necessary to use it in
design.
Unclassified
16
Unclassified
B.2.2
B.2.2.1
Main Rotor
Hover
Leader attachments will occur only to the tips of the blades, and to the hub at a lower probability (mast
mounted sights could significantly increase that probability). As there is no forward movement of the aircraft,
the hub automatically becomes a Zone 1B in conventional zoning terms. Also in conventional terms, an area
of 0.5 m inboard of the tip extremity and behind any leading edge curvature at the tip will be a Zone 1A. That
Zone 1A area will be extended backwards by a distance equal to 5.7 vt x 10-3 m to give a Zone 1C which will
encompass the trailing edge of the blade (see I.8, Section 2.6). Following blades in the hover can
experience a continuing current of duration 1/Nn seconds, the majority of which will occur to the trailing edge
of the tip1. Also subsequent return stroke attachments2 could occur to any part of the chord tip area although
such an attachment is more likely to occur to the leading or trailing edge or the extreme tip.
B.2.2.2
Forward Flight
B.2.2.2.1 As in the hover a leader attachment can occur to a blade tip. On a blade pointing forwards, due
to the forward velocity of the aircraft, there will be a Zone 1C extension from the Zone 1A area along the
span of the blade towards the hub.
The maximum length of that extension will be approximately 5.7 v x 10-3 m. It has been noted above that in
the hover there will be a Zone 1C extension towards the back of the blade. Obviously that extension will also
occur in forward flight and at the tip may predominate over the spanwise extension just mentioned. In any
case, the movement of the leader attachment relative to the blade will be the vector sum resulting from the
forward and rotational velocity, thus giving a maximum spanwise extension somewhat less than 5.7 v x 10-3
m.
Although it may be possible to take advantage of this, generally a worst case should be considered by
assuming a spanwise extension equal to 5.7 v x 10-3 m. An initial return stroke attachment can still occur to
the tip of a blade and re-attachments can occur anywhere along the span of following blades. The pattern of
those re-attachments will depend on whether the blade considered is advancing or retreating relative to the
forward motion of the aircraft and whether or not it is in front or behind the hub centre at the time of the
attachment. WHL have pointed out that when the blade initially struck is to the rear of the hub, attachments
to advancing blades will tend to sweep from tip to tip, with the likelihood of an early re-attachment to the tail
structure.
B.2.2.2.2 When the first blade to be struck is forward of the hub, the attachment patterns will tend to spiral
inwards towards the hub and then out again towards the tips. This is taken to the limit when a blade pointing
directly forward is struck, so that attachments to the following blades are at points successively inboard
along the blade span until the arc passes across the hub and then re-attaches successively outboard until it
reaches a blade tip. Then, if the duration is sufficiently long, the arc re-attaches to the tail structure.
Equivalent Component C durations under these conditions will not exceed 1/Nn.
B.2.2.2.3 Attachments to retreating blades forward of the hub tend to be swept along the blade towards
the hub, giving hang-on times greater than 1/Nn. At the maximum aircraft speed this value can rise to as
high as 1.4/Nn at the rotor tips (zone 1A), and up to as high as 2.0/Nn towards the inboard end of the blades
where the tangential velocity of the blade at that point approximately equals the forward speed of the aircraft,
so that the movement of the blade relative to the (stationary) arc channel is very slow.
B.2.2.2.4 From the above, the worst case parameters for forward flight may be obtained by considering a
Zone 1A at the tips extended chord-wise by a Zone 1C to embrace the trailing edge and along the span by a
distance equal to 5.7 v x 10-3 m. Also a Component D will be applicable anywhere on the blade (and
especially to the leading and trailing edges) together with a Component C anywhere on the trailing edge, of
1 Depending on the speed of rotation of the rotor and the duration of the lightning event, the same blade can encounter
the arc several times. The total time for charge to be deposited in a particular blade is T/n, where T is the total duration
of the lightning event. Whilst the successive attachments will not necessarily occur to the same point on the blade, the
cumulative charge transfer will have to pass off the blade by the same route.
2 Such an attachment is simulated by 'Component D'.
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duration given by 1.4/Nn towards the tip and 2.0/Nn towards the root end. The hub can experience
parameters equivalent to Component D and a proportion of Component C, say 1/Nn, together with
Component A should it be an initial attachment point. As is noted above, unless otherwise decided by the
Rotorcraft Design Authority, the parameters applicable to the 1C areas shall be the full Component A values.
B.2.2.3
Sideways and Rearwards Flight
The aircraft velocity will always be low in these conditions and cases worse than those given above will not
occur. Therefore these flight modes can be ignored from the point of view of zoning.
B.2.2.4
Worst Case for Hover and Forward Flight for Main Rotor
Figure 4 Typical Main Rotor Blade Zoning

Figure 4 shows a typical zoning picture for a modern main rotor blade. This zoning picture is appropriate for
the upper surface of the rotor and the outboard regions of the lower surface. The inboard regions of the
lower surface (about 30-50% of the length) are not likely to receive an attachment and can be considered to
be Zone 3. The worst case parameters for the main rotor are those given at the end of B.2.2, except that
protrusions in the hub area (0.5 m radius from the centre) must be capable of withstanding the full
Component C in addition to Components A and D; i.e. they are deemed to be 1B zones which may extend
as far as the inboard ends of the blades (hub & fixing).
B.2.3
Tail Rotor (non-enclosed type)
B.2.3.1 The tail rotor of a helicopter will be revolving much faster than the main rotor and therefore when it
is struck, there will be more interactions with the lightning channel to each blade than occur to the main rotor.
Initial attachments will obviously occur to the tips of the blades giving a Zone 1A area extending 0.5 m from
the tip but due to the relatively small dimensions of tail rotors, their higher speeds and the geometry of
aircraft in that area, swept leader effects are likely to occur less frequently and be less significant than on the
main rotor. When the effect occurs however, as with a main rotor, there will be a spanwise Zone 1C
extension from the 1A area given by the vector sum of the rotational motion and the forward motion of the
aircraft. Zone 1C areas should be treated as 1A zones and tested to the full 1A parameters unless otherwise
decided by the Aircraft Design Authority. Inboard of this will be a 2A zone although on helicopters with a
small tail rotor this area may be very small and as it may be the same construction as some of the 1A/1C
zones may be covered by comparison with these areas.
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B.2.3.2
The maximum possible dwell time of the lightning arc on each blade per revolution will be (1/Ntnt)s
where nt is the number of blades on the rotor and Nt is the rotor speed [RPS]). This means that any blade of
a four bladed rotor revolving at 16 RPS can experience an initial attachment followed by approximately 15.5
ms duration of continuing current. Movement of the aircraft is very likely to sweep any of those attachments
down to the hub or the tail structure. However, as the full lightning event could hang on to the tail rotor as a
whole any one blade could experience approximately of the full C component current (i.e. 125ms of the
continuing current).
Figure 5 Typical Tail Rotor Blade Zoning

B.2.3.3 Figure 5 shows a typical tail rotor zoning diagram. The outcome of the above is that a tail rotor
must be designed to withstand Component A parameters to the tip of a blade with 125 ms of Component C,
Component D to anywhere along the trailing edge of a blade with 15.5 ms of continuing current, a
Component D to any protruding parts on the rotor disc including the hub and say 150 ms worth of
Component C to the hub. Unless the hub protrudes significantly, it is unlikely to be an initial attachment point.
When that is so, however, Zone 1B parameters shall be ascribed to protruding components within the 0.5
metre radius central hub region (e.g. blade attachment pins). Also the possibility, discussed above, of a Zone
1C extension from the 1A area at the blade tips shall be taken into account when the construction of the
blade in the 1C area is different from that in the 1A area.
B.2.4
Main Body of Aircraft
B.2.4.1 All parts of the aircraft apart from the main and tail rotor discs may be zoned for all flight modes,
by considering the usual zoning definitions (see Figure 6). Essentially, that means that hover and forward
flight must be considered. Due to the hover mode, all initial attachment points on the underside of the aircraft
must be considered as Zone 1B areas which may have Zone 1C and 2A areas behind them due to forward
flight. Zone 1A areas are unlikely to occur anywhere on the aircraft. The rear of the tail structure would be
classified as a Zone 1B area both from hover and forward flight considerations.
B.2.4.2 Therefore, in effect, the majority of the attachment points on the aircraft, other than to the rotor
discs, will be classified as Zone 1B. It should be noted however, that it is possible that there could be a flash
over from the main rotor blade cuff area (rotor fixing to Hub) to a protruding structure adjacent to the hub and
Zone 1A parameters should be ascribed to such regions. If this is deemed to be the case then those areas of
the rotor blades passing over the protrusions should also be tested at Zone 1A levels.
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B.3
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Zoning Diagram
B.3.1 A zoning diagram should always be prepared as part of the Lightning Hazard Design Analysis.
Areas on the main airframe may be appropriately designated using the conventional zoning definitions
discussed in the last section. The main and tail rotor discs should be described separately. The appropriate
components of the composite test waveform (see Leaflet 2/2 section J12.10 (see J.12)) shall be noted.
B.3.2 When the lightning arc has more than one interaction with a rotor blade, the Component C duration
designated shall be applied during test as a continuous discharge.
Figure 6 Typical Helicopter Zoning
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Annex C
Some General and Particular Design Requirements
C.1
Introduction
The design of aircraft to withstand the lightning environment specified in Annex A shall include measures to
satisfy the requirements of this annex. These design requirements are the outcome of many years of work by
Culham (funded by UK MOD when CLSU) and assessments of aircraft designs. The requirements should be
adhered to unless there is an overwhelming need to do otherwise, when it should be shown that any penalty
for so doing can be justified.
C.2
General Design Requirement
C.2.1
CFC Construction and Surface Protection
C.2.1.1 The design of the CFC structure shall ensure that the safe level of action integral shall not be
exceeded in any part of the structure.
NOTE
dry CFC.
The safe level of action integral is defined as that value which gives a temperature rise of less than 100C for
C.2.1.2 Each joint and interface, whether CFC/CFC or CFC/Metal that may be required to carry lightning
currents shall be so designed that it will safely carry without significant damage the peak current and action
integral density that is likely to be appropriate to that joint or interface. As the adhesive used in adhesively
bonded joints is usually non-conductive such joints should be avoided unless special provisions are made to
conduct the current across the interface.
C.2.1.3 All CFC surfaces in Zones 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B shall be protected against surface damage by a
method approved by the Aircraft Design Authority, unless it can be shown that either,
a)
there is a low probability of an arc root attachment to the unprotected surface, or
b)
the aircraft will not be endangered by severe surface damage in the arc root area on the unprotected
surface and the damaged section can be repaired or replaced with the practical minimum of work.
C.2.1.4 CFC skins of less than 2 mm thick, whether or not with surface protection, shall not be used in
Zones 1A and 1B unless it can be shown that:a)
the skin will not suffer impact fracture from the acoustic shock wave associated with the first return
stroke, or
b)
that any such damage will not be extended by aerodynamic forces subsequent to the lightning strike to
an extent that would endanger the aircraft, and that the damaged section can be repaired or replaced
with the practical minimum of work.
C.2.1.5 When it is considered necessary to provide electromagnetic shielding measures on a CFC skin to
prevent indirect effects problems such measures shall be combined, wherever possible, with any surface
protection against direct effects.
C.2.1.6 Aluminium honeycomb structures should not be used below CFC dielectric skins if there is any risk
of lightning current flow in such a structure.
NOTE
21
Advice and guidance concerning the design and testing of CFC structures is given in Leaflet 2/9 (see J.19).
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C.2.2
C.2.2.1
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Dielectric Surfaces
All dielectric surfaces in Zones 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B shall be protected against puncture unless:
a)
it can be shown that flashover to surrounding metallic structure will occur before puncture, or
b)
damage to the surface or equipment below it would not compromise flight safety and repair to the
surface or equipment is an acceptable economic penalty for lack of protection.
C.2.2.2 Conductive coatings and diverter strips used for protection shall be electrically connected to
metalwork that is well bonded to airframe. The bonding resistance between solid conductors and such
metalwork shall be less than 5 milliohms.
NOTE 1
The implication of the last requirement is that when correct operation of an equipment necessitates that an
unprotected dielectric surface must be used and when lightning damage to the dielectric or equipment below it could
seriously compromise flight safety, the location of the equipment and dielectric surface should be in an attachment Zone
3. Alternatively, if location in a Zone 1 or 2 is essential, the dielectric surface, if at all possible, must be so designed as to
prevent puncture, or the risk to flight safety accepted and defined in the risk evaluation
NOTE 2
C.2.3
Guidance concerning the protection of dielectric surfaces is given in Leaflet 2/9 section J19.3 (see J.19).
Surface Damage to Metal Skins
Arc root damage to metal skins shall not,

a)
cause melt through or unacceptable hot spots, where such skins are in contact with fuel, fuel vapour,
hydraulic fluid, oil or any other inflammable liquid or gas, or any explosive solid;
b)
endanger the aircraft for any other reason.
NOTE
C.2.4
Guidance concerning these requirements is given in Leaflet 2/9 section J19.4 (see J.19).
Bonding and Installation of Conductors Carrying Lightning Current
C.2.4.1 The total metallic cross section of stranded copper bonding straps through which all of the current
in the lightning discharge may flow shall not be less than 18 mm2 the corresponding figure for stranded
aluminium conductors shall be not less than 27 mm2. Where two or more conductors share the total current,
the cross-sectional area of individual bonding straps shall be not less than 9 mm2 for copper and not less
than 14 mm2 for aluminium.
C.2.4.2 Solid copper conductors which may take all of the lightning current shall have a minimum cross
section area of 9 mm2; the; the corresponding figure for solid aluminium conductors is 14 mm2.
C.2.4.3 Bonding straps shall be as short and as straight as possible to minimise inductance and magnetic
forces. Soldered connections shall not be used.
C.2.4.4 Acute changes of geometry in solid conductors shall be avoided wherever possible to minimise the
risk of current concentration and high magnetic forces producing thermal sparks, especially in areas where
explosive vapour may be present.
NOTE
Guidance concerning the installation of bonding straps and conductors will be found in Leaflet 2/9 section
J19.5 (see J.19).
C.2.5
Installation of Cables and Wiring
C.2.5.1 Aircraft wiring and especially wiring associated with flight critical systems shall be installed in a
manner most likely to minimise lightning induced transients, taking note of the guidance given in Annex
C.2.6. Consideration of special means of protection against lightning transients shall be made in conjunction
with EMC requirements and also NEMP protection requirements if applicable. Any conflict between those
requirements and the lightning protection requirements shall be noted and resolved between the Aircraft
Design Authority and the Aircraft Project Director.
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C.2.5.2 Wiring shall be positioned to make maximum use of the shielding properties of the aircraft metallic
structure. In aircraft of mainly CFC construction, maximum possible use shall be made of whatever metallic
structure exists. Configuration of signal circuits shall be such as to minimise susceptibility to transients. The
return connection of each circuit shall be by means of a separate wire and the airframe shall not be
employed for that purpose.
C.2.5.3 The level of lightning injected transients allowed to reach equipment (the Transient Control Level
(TCL) shall be lower than the Equipment Qualification Level (EQL), by the appropriate margin defined at
Annex E.4.
C.2.6 Requirements for the Design and Installation of Avionic Equipment to Withstand
Lightning Induced Voltage and Current Transients.
All flight and mission critical avionic and electrical equipment shall be designed to tolerate without
unacceptable upset or damage the test frequencies and waveforms set out in Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5), as
required by Section J5.3 of that Leaflet.
NOTE
For guidance concerning the use of computer modelling in the analysis referred to above, see Leaflet 2/4
(see J.14).
C.2.7
Environmental Conditions
All measures taken for protection against lightning shall operate satisfactorily over the full range of
environmental conditions (temperature, pressure, climatic, vibration and acceleration etc.) given in the
Aircraft Specification. When there is any doubt that this may be so, appropriate verification tests should be
made.
C.2.8
Life Cycle Aspects
C.2.8.1 All lightning protection measures shall be chosen with a view to their durability and shall be so
designed such that they need minimum maintenance and avoid expensive repair schemes. Protection
methods which require a high level of inspection shall be avoided.
C.2.8.2 Care shall be taken to ensure that modifications to equipment and installations, and especially
those that are flight and mission critical, shall meet all the relevant requirements of this annex, and that such
modifications do not compromise the lightning protection of other equipment and installations.
NOTE 1
Particular care should be taken to avoid surface protection schemes which could be significantly impaired by
accidental mechanical damage. The Aircraft manufacturer should prepare a continued airworthiness life cycle plan
document that identifies the Lightning Protection Measures and the periodicity of inspections.
NOTE 2
Aircraft maintenance schedules should ensure that all lightning protection measures are regularly inspected
and the efficacy of such items as surge suppressers and filter components checked. The bonding and grounding of
conduits and screens should not be overlooked. The aircraft manufacturer should prepare a continued airworthiness life
cycle plan document that identifies the lightning protection measures and the periodicity of inspections.
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C.3
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Particular Design Requirements
C.3.1
C.3.1.1
Fuel Systems
Suppression of Sparking and Use of Inerting or Explosion Suppression Techniques
C.3.1.1.1 Unless inerting or explosion suppression techniques are used, the aircraft structure which forms
part of a fuel system and all fuel system components shall be designed such that sparking cannot occur in
areas where fuel or flammable vapour is normally present, or could be present due to leakage or seepage
during normal operation of the aircraft.
NOTE
It must be demonstrated that all sparking has been eliminated down to a level equivalent to 0.2 mJ.
C.3.1.1.2 When inerting or explosion techniques are used, the design aim shall be to eliminate as much
sparking as is possible in those parts of the fuel system so treated. Those parts of the system not so treated
shall comply with the requirements of C.3.1.1 above.
C.3.1.2
Hot Spots
The aircraft structure inside which there is fuel or fuel/air vapour shall be so designed that hot spot
temperatures on an inner surface due to a lightning attachment on the outer surface are limited to a value
which cannot cause ignition. Similarly, the size of conductors which could carry lightning current shall be
such that the temperature rise of any conductor in contact with fuel or fuel/air vapour (not withstanding C.2.4
above) shall be limited to a safe value.
NOTE
As is noted in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12) melt through will occur in an aluminium structure before a transient hot
spot temperature sufficient to cause ignition is reached and consequently a hot spot temperature for aluminium is not
quoted. The temperature of CFC structures, however, shall be limited to 230C. A safe hot spot temperature for titanium
structures must be decided by the Aircraft Design Authority, although generally a Flammable Gas Test will be required
to demonstrate absence of hazard. Data available at CELL Culham gives guidelines concerning hot spots in terms of
temperature, duration and size.
C.3.1.3
Lightning Current Flow inside Fuel Systems
All reasonable measures shall be taken to prevent the passage of lightning current inside a fuel system
structure, or through fuel system components.
C.3.1.4
Position of Tanks
Unless specifically protected, integral fuel tanks shall not be installed in lightning attachment Zones 1A, 1B
and 2A or 2B.
C.3.1.5
Solid Skin Thicknesses over Fuel Tanks
Skin thicknesses over integral fuel tanks shall comply with the following requirements:a)
Aluminium construction - The thickness of solid structural skins below which fuel or fuel air vapour may
be present shall not be less than 2 mm, in a Zone 1A, 2A and 1C region, unless the Aircraft Design
Authority specifically decides that suitably protected thinner skins may be used (see C.3.1.6 below). In a
Zone 1B or 2B area, 2 mm aluminium skins will not always be thick enough to prevent puncture and an
acceptable skin thickness shall be decided by the Aircraft Design Authority.
b)
Titanium construction - When titanium construction is used, the acceptable skin thickness shall be
decided by the Aircraft Design Authority.
c)
CFC Construction - Not withstanding the requirement of Sections C.2.1.3 and C.2.1.4 above, when CFC
construction is used solid skins shall not be less than 5 mm thick unless specifically decided otherwise
by the Aircraft Design Authority.
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24
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NOTE
The above requirements shall apply to the structure enclosing bag tanks where there is any risk of flammable
vapour accumulating in the space between the tank and the structure.
C.3.1.6
Thin Solid Skins and Sandwich Panel Skins
When either thin skins or sandwich panel skins are used as a fuel tank structure, a recognised protection
method shall be selected by the Aircraft Design Authority.
C.3.1.7
Joints and Fasteners
C.3.1.7.1 Unless inerting or explosion suppression techniques are used, skin panel joints, access doors
and fasteners must be so designed that sparking, due to lightning attachments to fasteners or Zone 3 current
flow through joints, cannot occur in the presence of fuel or fuel/air vapour.
NOTE
With respect to CFC construction, it is unlikely that this requirement can be met without the use of surface
protection over joints and fasteners and sealant below fasteners.
C.3.1.7.2 Co-cured bonded joints shall not be used in CFC wet wing construction when there is any
likelihood whatsoever of lightning current crossing the joint, unless inerting or explosion suppression
techniques are used.
C.3.1.8
Fuel and Air Pipes
C.3.1.8.1 Fuel and air pipes used in the fuel system shall be so installed that lightning current is unable to
flow in them. Alternatively in an aluminium wet wing, pipes shall be bonded to structure and across all pipe
couplings.
C.3.1.8.2 In a CFC structure, all metallic pipework shall be divided into short sections separately bonded
to structure and connected one to the other with pipes constructed from material with a conductivity in the
range 10-5 to 109 Siemens m-1. The insulating sections shall be of sufficient length to prevent the maximum
voltage likely to be generated between the conducting sections causing flashover between them.
C.3.1.9
Fuel System Wiring
C.3.1.9.1 Fuel system wiring shall be so installed that the wiring within a fuel tank (whether in a wet wing
or a demountable tank) takes a route to the relevant fuel system component most likely to give minimum
voltage coupling. The wiring shall also be installed so that aperture flux and diffusion flux voltages resulting
from lightning current flow are below a level where flashover across insulation or breakdown between air
gaps (at any ambient pressure) at a fuel system component can occur. All wiring shall be screened by
conduit or heavy duty braid bonded at both ends to the aircraft structure except that such screening shall not
penetrate a fuel tank especially where the construction is CFC. Whenever possible, twisted pair wiring shall
be used.
C.3.1.9.2 Cable screens, bonding and cable connectors used in association with carbon fibre structures
shall be capable of carrying the worst case lightning current that might be generated in such a hybrid
structure.
C.3.1.10
Fuel System Electrical Components
Fuel system electrical components such as probes, level sensors and pumps should be designed to
withstand the maximum voltage to ground likely to be generated in the fuel system wiring without flashover
or sparking. The electrical components of fuel system equipment when used in CFC structures shall be
insulated from the structure.
C.3.1.11
Dump Masts and Vents
C.3.1.11.1 Unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project Director, fuel dump masts and vents shall
only be installed in areas where lightning strike attachments and corona effects are unlikely to occur.
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C.3.1.11.2 Consideration shall be given to the need to fit flame suppression devices. Such devices shall
always be fitted when masts and vents are installed other than as noted above.
C.3.1.12
Fuel Filler Caps
Fuel filler caps should, whenever possible, should be installed outside lightning strike attachment areas.
They shall be so designed that sparking within the ullage space cannot occur as a result of a lightning
attachment to the outer surface of the cap.
C.3.1.13
Flight Refuelling Probes
Flight refuelling probes shall be designed and installed so that a lightning attachment to the probe cannot
cause lightning current to flow in a part of the probe which is in contact with fuel when the probe is in use, or
in fuel pipes from the probe to the fuel system.
C.3.1.14
External Fuel Tanks
The requirements of Sections C.3.1.1 to C.3.1.3 and C.3.1.5 to C.3.1.10 shall generally apply to external
fuel tanks. Guidance concerning the application of those requirements is given in Leaflet 2/9 (see J.19).
Additional requirements shall apply as noted below:a)
Non-metallic or CFC tanks shall be provided with metallic nose and tail caps for a distance of 150 mm
from each end. The fuel space shall not extend into the nose and tail cap areas, which should also
exclude fuel vapour. Tail fins (should they be made of metal) shall be engineered in such a way that
lightning attachments to them do not cause sparking in the fuel area.
b)
Pylon mounted tanks:-
c)
1)
Shall comply with the requirements of C.3.3 below with regard to lightning current paths between
the tank and the pylon, the position of wiring between the tank and the pylon relative to those
current paths, and the level of induced voltage generated in that wiring and inside the tank.
2)
Lightning current shall be prevented from crossing the fuel/air interface.
Tanks constructed with GFRP or other non-conducting material or with CFC:1)
Shall be provided with external protection over their entire surface (notwithstanding C.2.1.3
above with regard to CFC tanks).
2)
All internal metalwork shall be electrically bonded together and present only one current path to
airframe or pylon to avoid current loops.
3)
CFC tanks shall comply with the requirements of C.3.1.8, which shall take precedence over any
conflicting requirements in 2) above.
4)
CFC tanks shall also comply with the requirements of C.2.1 above.
5)
All bolts penetrating the skins should have their nuts capped with 'PRC' or equivalent.
C.3.1.15
Design and assessment guidance particular to fuel hazards is given in Leaflet 2/5 (see J.15).
NOTE
As required by Def Stan 00-970, copper or copper alloys shall not be used for bonding in fuel tanks unless
suitably protected (tinned or plated) so that contact with usable fuel is not possible. The plating medium shall not be
soluble in fuel nor have any effect on fuel properties.
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C.3.2
Flight Control Systems
C.3.2.1
System Wiring
The design shall incorporate the maximum practical degree of dissimilar redundancy, such as different wiring
routes and methods of coupling for the various channels. In order to reduce the propagation of commonmode transients, maximum practical use shall be made of optical and/or transformer coupling.
C.3.2.2
Sensors and Pick-offs
Sensors and pick-offs shall be situated so that they are protected from direct exposure to lightning currents.
Sensors and pick-offs shall be designed to withstand the common-mode voltage that stresses their insulation
to airframe in Leaflet 2/4, Section J14.6 (see J.14).
C.3.2.3
Control Surfaces
Control surfaces shall have a bonding strap across each hinge, except for installations having a single hinge,
in which case at least two straps shall be fitted. The straps shall conform to the requirements of C.2.4 above.
A piano type hinge may be considered to be self-bonding provided that the resistance across it is less than
0.01 ohms. When a novel type of hinge whose lightning performance is uncertain is to be employed, it shall
be subjected to direct effects lightning tests appropriate to the zone in which it is located, to confirm that
binding or welding or excessive pitting does not occur.
C.3.3
Pylons, Missile Launch Rails and Stores
C.3.3.1
Scope of Lightning Protection Requirements Regarding Stores
With the exception of external fuel tanks, the lightning protection and evaluation requirements for stores shall
be in accordance with the specifications governing a particular store and are not addressed in this annex,
except as given in C.3.3.3 and C.3.3.4 below.
C.3.3.2
Zoning and Lightning Attachment
A zoning diagram of the aircraft with pylons fitted, with and without stores attached, shall be prepared and all
likely lightning attachment points evaluated with respect to possible direct effects damage to the pylon.
C.3.3.3
C.3.3.3.1
Pylon Wiring and Electrical Equipment

Pylon wiring shall be installed in accordance with Section C.2.5 of this annex.
C.3.3.3.2 Pylon Decoder Units (PDUs), Explosive Release Units (ERUs) and other avionic or electrical
equipment installed in the pylon shall be in accordance with C.2.6.
C.3.3.4
Design of Stores
C.3.3.4.1 Stores shall be so designed that in the event of a lightning strike to the store, or to the aircraft,
the store does not hazard the aircraft or adversely affect its operation.
C.3.3.4.2 Unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project Director, induced voltage levels generated by a
store shall be limited to 125 V (see C.3.3.6 Note 2).
C.3.3.4.3 Unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project Director, stores must tolerate the induced
voltage level generated at the aircraft/pylon interface which shall not exceed 425 V see Leaflet 2/4 (see
J.14).
C.3.3.4.4 The above requirements shall be reflected in the specification for a particular store, except that
all external fuel tanks shall also be in accordance with C.3.1.14.
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C.3.3.5
Unclassified
Aircraft to Pylon and Pylon to Store Interfaces
C.3.3.5.1 Lightning current must be excluded from interface wiring and any fuel/airlines. Current paths
between a store and a pylon, and a pylon and the aircraft, shall be at well defined places. The normal
attachment and suspension points may be used for those current paths provided good non intermittent
contact is provided. All intermittent contacts (such as at sway braces) shall be avoided, if necessary with
insulating pads.
C.3.3.5.2 All wiring in the store/pylon and pylon/aircraft interfaces shall be well screened with the screen
360 bonded to the back shell at plug breaks or connectors. All wiring shall cross an interface as close to a
main current path as is practically possible. Wiring should not run parallel to the surface of the store and
pylon but should cross at right angles to it.
C.3.3.5.3
Induced voltage levels generated by wiring crossing an interface shall not be greater than:
a)
125 V at a pylon/aircraft interface.
b)
300 V at a store/pylon interface.

(see C.3.3.6 Note 3)
C.3.3.6
Missile Launch Rails
The appropriate requirements of C.2.1 to C.2.7 shall be applied to missile launch rails and their interfaces
with an aircraft and store.
NOTE 1
Generally speaking, lightning attachments can occur to most pylons and stores. However, it should be
remembered that even if there is not a lightning attachment to a store, an attachment to another part of an aircraft will
cause current to flow from the aircraft onto the pylon and from the pylon onto the store.
NOTE 2
The significance of the voltage levels quoted is discussed in Leaflet 2/4 (see J.14).
NOTE 3
In an interface, the wiring layout is extremely important from the point of view of limiting induced voltages.
The closer the wiring is to a lightning current path, the lower will be the voltage that can be induced on that wiring. This is
especially important when there are limitations to the degree of screening that can be provided to the wiring. If the normal
attachment hangers are not adequate or are not appropriate current paths, to comply with the requirements of C.3.3.5.1
and C.3.3.5.2 it may be necessary to provide spring loaded plungers between the pylon to give the necessary contact.
The correct places for such plungers are as close to the front and the rear of the pylon as is possible.
C.3.4
Radome Protection
C.3.4.1 When lightning protection conductors are fitted to a radome in accordance with C.2.2 above, the
protection strips shall be fastened to the exterior surface of the radome and the fastening method must not
provide an easy path for lightning current to penetrate the radome wall. All diverter strips shall be capable of
carrying a test impulse, having a peak current and action integral appropriate to the lightning strike zone,
without causing major damage to the radome wall by virtue of melting or fuzing or from magnetic forces.
C.3.4.2 Any sensors, such as pitot probes, mounted on the radome shall have their metallic parts
adequately bonded back to airframe. All electrical cables or signal wires connected to such probes which
pass through the radome wall shall be contained in metal conduits which are electrically well bonded (dc
resistance 0.1 milliohm) to the probe at one end and the airframe at the other. The conduits and bonding
shall be capable of carrying a test impulse having the peak current and action integral appropriate to the
particular lightning strike attachment zone.
C.3.5
C.3.5.1
a)
Antenna Systems
Protection shall be designed according to the following order of priorities:-
Prevention of damage to other systems, for example by the propagation of transients through the aircraft
electrical system.
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b)
Prevention of damage to the antenna system electronics, cables and connectors.
c)
Prevention of damage to the antenna itself.
C.3.5.2 Consideration shall be given to the protection of dielectric covers by the use of conducting strips to
divert lightning currents to the airframe, insofar as such provision is compatible with the operational
requirements of the antenna.
C.3.6
De-Icing Systems
C.3.6.1 All electrically operated de-icers in Zones 1 and 2 shall be protected against lightning strike. In the
case of heaters under a metal erosion strip, the strip shall be so designed as to afford effective protection
against the possibility of puncture of the heater insulation with resultant flow of lightning current in the
heaters. The erosion strip shall also provide sufficient shielding to prevent induction into the heaters, of
unacceptable voltages by direct or diffuse flux coupling.
C.3.6.2 Where heaters are placed under non-conducting erosion strips, or highly resistive skins, where no
protection to indirect effects is afforded by shielding, the heater wires shall be otherwise protected by the use
of a metal conduit system, or some other protection method.
C.3.7
Canopy and Personnel Protection
C.3.7.1 Explosive devices in canopy break-up or jettison systems and ejector seats shall be protected
against inadvertent operation as a result of a lightning strike.
C.3.7.2 Precautions shall be taken against transient voltages being induced into aircraft wiring due to
lightning and/or electrostatic discharge interaction with canopy and window electrically heated films.
Canopies and screens shall be so designed that puncture to an electrically heated film cannot occur
C.3.8
External Probes and Equipment, including Drogues and other Trailed Equipment
C.3.8.1 All externally mounted probes and equipment shall be protected from direct effects damage and
from causing unacceptable currents to be injected into any wiring connected to the probe (which might cause
exploding arcs if the wires fuse), or causing unacceptable induced voltages in aircraft wiring unless it can be
shown that a lightning attachment to the probe is so unlikely that it may be ignored, or that the damage
consequent upon such arc attachment is acceptable in terms of flight safety and operational functioning of
the aircraft.
C.3.8.2 All metal parts of any external probe or equipment that is located in Zones 1 or 2, shall be
adequately bonded to the airframe, except where such bonding would be detrimental to the functional
operation of the probe or equipment, e.g. in the case of an externally mounted antenna. The bonding shall
be capable of carrying lightning currents having parameters appropriate to the lightning zone in which the
probe or equipment is located.
C.3.8.3 All drogues and trailed equipment and their method of deployment and attachment to the aircraft
shall be so designed that they do not cause direct effects damage to the aircraft, or unacceptable currents or
induced voltages in aircraft wiring, unless it can be shown that those effects are acceptable in terms of flight
safety and operational functioning of the aircraft.
NOTE
It should be remembered that the deployment of trailed equipment will significantly alter the zoning diagram
for the aircraft and that such equipment will almost certainly form a lightning attachment point should a lightning strike
occur. Moreover, trailing equipment may significantly increase the risk of triggering a lightning strike.
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Annex D
Requirements for the Assessment and Certification of the Capability of
Aircraft to Withstand Lightning Effects
D.1
Introduction
This appendix gives the requirements for the assessment of the capability of aircraft and associated systems
to withstand lightning effects. The assessment shall be made by means of a Lightning Hazard Design
Analysis (LHDA) which shall be part of a Lightning Protection Plan (LPP) as described below.
D.2
Lightning Environment and Design Parameter
UK military aircraft must be designed to tolerate a certain lightning threat. Those threats for both design and
test purposes, are defined in Annex A.
D.3
Aim of Lightning Protection Plan
The purpose of the LPP is to ensure that the lightning hardness of aircraft and associated systems to a direct
or nearby strike are adequately addressed and demonstrated.
D.4
Scope of Lightning Protection Plan
At the start of a project a LPP shall be prepared and presented to the Aircraft Project Director. It shall be
reviewed and amended as necessary during the life of the project. The LPP shall provide:a)
A criticality list of systems and equipment prepared from the Aircraft Manufacturers FHA, including
probes, antennae and external sensors that might be affected by lightning under headings of Flight
Safety and Mission Accomplished.
b)
A Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA) (see Para D5).
c)
A statement defining the general environmental conditions (climatic, mechanical and electrical) in which
any lightning protection devices must be capable of operation.
d)
The relevant Test Plans (TPs), if testing is required.
e)
The relevant Test Schedules, if test plans are prepared
f)
Reports of all tests made, with analysis, conclusions and recommendations.
g)
A Risk Evaluation, which shall include a Probability Analysis, stating the level of protection afforded to all
items/systems noted in the Criticality List of (a) above reference in Leaflet 2/3 Sections J13.3 & J13.4
and Leaflet 2/10 (see J.13 and J.20).
h)
A Continued Airworthiness Life Cycle Plan (CALCP) for all protection measures utilised
i)
Installation methods that affect lightning protection.
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D.5
Scope of Lightning Hazard Design Analysis
A Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA) shall be made and agreed with the Aircraft Project Director early
in the development of a project. It shall be a continuing process with revisions agreed by the Aircraft Project
Director as they become necessary. The LHDA shall:
a)
Provide a statement defining the applicability of lightning zoning (see Note 1 below), together with a
zoning diagram for all aircraft configurations.
NOTE 1 As required by Section 5.2.2, Zoning shall be in accordance with ED 91 for fixed wing aircraft and
Annex B for rotary wing aircraft.
NOTE 2 Guidance regarding the interpretation of zoning rules will be found in Leaflet 2/2 J12.2.5 (see J.12).
b)
For a direct strike provide a statement defining the lightning test parameters appropriate to the different
parts of the aircraft according to the lightning zones ascribed to it, taking due note of the design aim
parameters defined in A.3.
c)
Outline the general construction of the aircraft, drawing attention to the use of insulating and partially
conductive composite materials.
d)
Survey the structure and note areas where specific lightning protection is required, such as those areas
made of insulating or partially conductive material and especially insulating material in association with
buried metallic materials.
e)
Define the possible lightning attachments to, and current paths through, the aircraft for all configurations
of the aircraft according to the zoning of (b) above.
f)
Identify wiring that connects the critical systems and equipment and state the measures taken to protect
it against indirect effects.
g)
Identify wiring where large common mode voltages could be developed to structure and identify
insulation which could be at special risk to voltage flashover, detailing measures taken to protect such
wiring and prevent such flashover.
h)
Include a lightning transient assessment which shall:-
i)
1)
Provide the evaluation detailed in Annex E.
2)
Determine the additional indirect effects testing not covered by Annex E, on the complete
aircraft or parts of the aircraft, to verify that induced voltage levels do not cause insulation
breakdown or flash-over. (See Leaflet 1/1, (see J.3)).
Include a hazard vapour assessment which shall, as appropriate and as detailed in Annex F:1)
Provide an evaluation of fuel systems.
2)
Provide a similar evaluation for dry bays into which fuel or other hazardous liquid may leak.
j)
Detail the actions taken to prevent exploding arcs occurring inside dielectric enclosures.
k)
Draw attention to any specific lightning risks not covered by the above and the actions taken to
overcome them, especially noting measures taken to prevent insidious lightning risks that could affect
safety.
l)
Determine what tests may be necessary in addition to those that may be required to satisfy the
assessments of h) and i) above.
NOTE
The additional Indirect effects testing referred to in h) 2) above can be combined with the testing required by
Leaflet 1/1 (see J.3) and direct effects tests. Guidance concerning this is given in Leaflet 2/4, Section J14.5.5 (see
J.14).
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D.6
Unclassified
Lightning Test Waveforms
When lightning tests are determined to be necessary according to D.5 above, the waveforms to be
used for those tests shall be as prescribed in Annex G.
D.6.1
D.6.2 Waveforms for the Lightning Transient Assessment and Pulse Tests according to Annex E of this
standard shall be according to G.3.2.
D.7
Test Plan and Schedule
When tests are proposed by the LHDA a test plan shall be prepared in association with the Test House. The
TP shall:a)
Detail the tests that are required.
b)
Define the objectives for each test.
c)
Outline the test methods, which shall include the lightning attachment points, the return conductor
system and the lightning test waveforms to be used.
d)
Define the number of samples to be tested and the number of simulated lightning discharges to be
applied to each sample (see Leaflet 2/3, Section 7 (J.13)).
e)
Detail the equipment to be used and the measurements to be made to:1)
Provide evidence that the lightning test waveform is in accordance with the relevant waveform of
Annex G.
2)
Record the effects of the lightning simulation on the aircraft/equipment under test.
3)
Observe the functioning and safety of the aircraft/equipment during test.
f)
Provide a Test Schedule which shall decide the order in which the tests shall be done and which (if any)
shall be combined. The Schedule may be amended as the tests proceed.
D.8
Presentation of Documentation, Risk Evaluation and Recommendations for

Approval
D.8.1
A Risk Evaluation and Probability Analysis is required at D.4 g). A detailed assessment and
analysis shall be made as far as is relevant to Lightning Hazards after all Lightning Protection work has been
completed. It shall be the final item in the LPP and shall form the basis of the recommendations for approval.
A final submission of the full LPP shall be presented to the Aircraft Project Director when final approval of the
lightning protection is required.
Lightning Protection Plan Status Reports shall be prepared according to the guidance given in
Leaflet 2/10 (see J.20).
D.8.2
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Annex E
Evaluation of the Hazards Caused by Transients Induced on Aircraft
Wiring
E.1
Introduction
An evaluation of lightning transient protection shall be made as noted in Sections 2 and 3 below. Rationale
and guidance concerning these evaluations is given in Leaflet 2/4 (see J.14), which illustrates the route to
compliance when modelling is essential (Figure 25) together with histograms showing the various levels see
Figures 26 and 27.
This annex gives a transient hazard evaluation which makes use of the transient level definitions developed
for the ratification draft of STANAG 4327. Those definitions are given in 4.5 and for convenience, repeated
below. They are compared with the Civilian Definitions in Section J14.3.2 of Leaflet 2/4 (see J.14),
COMPUTED TRANSIENT LEVEL (CTL)
The transient amplitude given by unsubstantiated modelling at full threat.
MEASURED TRANSIENT LEVEL (MTL)
The amplitude of the actual response measured during a pulse test.
TEST TRANSIENT LEVEL (TTL)
The measured response from a pulse test (MTL), extrapolated to full threat.
TRANSIENT CONTROL LEVEL (TCL)
The worse case actual amplitude that a Transient Assessment establishes should exist at an equipment
when it is installed in the aircraft and subjected to the maximum lightning threat. It is the transient amplitude
arrived at by:a) taking the worst case of all configurations and attachment points from either modelling or pulse tests,
when the difference between all of the relevant CTLs and TTLs is <6 dB, or
b)
when modelling is not done it is the TTL, corrected if necessary for any non linearity.
THE EQUIPMENT TRANSIENT DESIGN LEVEL (ETDL)

Is the transient amplitude up to which the equipment must operate without malfunction or signs of failure?
THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION LEVEL (EQL)
Is the actual transient level to which the equipment has been tested and qualified? The EQL must never be
less than the TCL plus the agreed margin.
EUT (EQUIPMENT UNDER TEST)
The equipment, usually comprising several units, which is being tested.
UUT (UNIT UNDER TEST)
The particular unit of an equipment where measurements are made during equipment tests.
E.2
Evaluation Requirements when Modelling is Essential
E.2.1
The requirements of this section shall apply where the aircraft installation to be evaluated is too
complex to allow all necessary Transient Control Levels (TCLs) to be determined by measurement (see
Leaflet 2/4, Sections J14.3.4.1 (see J.14)).
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E.2.2
Unclassified
Analysis
E.2.2.1 A continuing analysis shall be made as the project develops, using methods acceptable to the
Aircraft Project Director. A computer model of the aircraft in its operating environment shall be made (which
shall be updated as the project develops) for all attachment points and configuration scenarios given by
Annex D.5e) to predict likely responses (bulk current, both damped sinewave and ground voltage) to the full
threat defined in Annex G.3, at all the equipments and cable bundles defined by Annex D 5f). Computed
Transient Levels (CTLs) for those responses (damped sinewave and waveforms equivalent to IP, SP and LP
waveforms) shall be decided accordingly.
NOTE
Only those attachments and configurations that will give worst case coupling to the cables of interest need
be considered.
E.2.2.2 Analysis and/or tests shall also be made to verify that equipment can operate, without risk to
safety or mission accomplishment, when the aircraft is subjected to the Multiple Burst environment given in
A.3.3.
E.2.3
E.2.3.1
Selection of Equipment
During the equipment procurement process, equipments are either:-
a)
chosen from previously tested equipment, if such equipment is available and suitable, or
b)
chosen from existing untested or newly developed equipment.
E.2.3.2 When selecting from previously tested equipment the appropriate ETDLs shall be decided by
adding the agreed margin defined in Section E4 below to the CTLs determined in Section E2.2.1 above. If it
is too early in the project to derive test levels from modelling, the maximum levels of those given in Annex 0
according to the likely installation categories given by the analysis of 2.2.1 shall be used for air side
equipment. Only equipment tested to the requirements of Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) shall be considered for
selection. The level to which the equipment has been tested (or was previously tested) shall be declared as
the Equipment Qualification Level (EQL).
E.2.3.3 When it is necessary to test equipment the tests made shall be in accordance with Leaflet 1/3
(see J.5). ETDLs for such tests shall be the CTLs determined in section E2.2 above plus the margin defined
in Section 4 below. Any susceptibility shown by previous EMC testing shall be taken into account. The
equipment shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance, damage or deviation from
specification when subjected to pulses up to and including the test limits determined above.
E.2.4
A return conductor system shall be designed, using computational methods to give the aircraft
surface current distribution modelled in E2.2.1 (Leaflet 2/4 J.14).
E.2.5
Systems and cable runs on which to make pulse tests shall be selected and defined in the Test
Plan:a) where the modelling of E2.2 has high confidence, and
b)
where the modelling may be in question,
and Whole Aircraft Pulse Tests shall be made in accordance with Section J3.5 of Leaflet 1/1 (see J.3) to
provide Measured Transient Levels (MTLs) which shall be extrapolated (see Leaflet 2/4 J.14) to full threat
Test Transient Level (TTL) responses for each cable and measurement point defined in the Test Plan, for
comparison with the responses predicted in Section 2.2.1 above. Full threat parameters shall be as
prescribed in A.3 i.e.:dE/dt
di/dt
Ipk
1013 Vm-1s-1
1.4 x 1011 As-1
200 kA
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E.2.6 Using the results obtained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.5, an assessment shall be made to confirm that
there is linearity in the pulse measurements (see Leaflet 2/4 Section J14.4.6 (see J.14)) and to substantiate
the cable resonances used for equipment tests. Taking due account of any non linearity, the analysis of 2.2.1
shall be validated by comparing the TTLs derived in 2.5 and the corresponding CTLs of 2.2.1. If the
difference between them is generally <6 dB, Transient Control Levels (TCLs) shall be decided by taking the
appropriate worst case responses of all configurations and attachment points.
E.2.7 The margins defined in Section 4 below shall be applied to the TCLs of 2.6 above and
substantiated Equipment Transient Design Levels (ETDLs) decided.
E.2.8
Testing of Equipment
E.2.8.1 When equipments tests have not previously been made, the equipment shall be tested in
accordance with Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) using ETDLs derived at E2.7. Any susceptibility shown by previous
EMC testing shall be taken into account. The equipment shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of
performance, damage or deviation from specification when subjected to pulses up to and including the test
limits determined below. The level to which the equipment has been tested (or was previously tested) shall
be declared as the EQL.
E.2.8.2 When equipments have been selected or tested in accordance with Section E2.3 above, a
comparison shall be made between the TCLs in E2.7 and the relevant EQLs of the equipment under
consideration. The difference between those levels shall be recorded.
Where margins of E2.8.2 are less than the margins defined in Section E4 and unacceptable to the
Aircraft Project Director, either the equipment shall be redesigned to provide additional tolerance, or the
installation shall be redesigned to lower the relevant TCLs. Any such redesign shall be verified by tests to be
agreed with the Aircraft Project Director.
E.2.9
E.2.10
When of necessity the whole aircraft tests of Section E2.5 above are made (by agreement with the
Aircraft Project Director) on a non-production aircraft, consideration should be made of the differences
between the measurements and those that could be obtained on the production aircraft and a strategy
agreed with the Aircraft Project Director.
NOTE
Except when all necessary TCLs can be determined by measurement (see Section E3 below), the
philosophy of assessment is based on measurement and analysis complimenting each other. It is often not possible,
however, for practical or economic reasons to make measurements on every cable bundle at every measuring point of
interest. When that is so, reliance must be placed on analysis supported by measurements made on carefully selected
cables and measuring points that will demonstrate the general validity of the modelling and analysis used, see Section
J14.3.1 Leaflet 2/4 (J.14).
E.3
Evaluation Requirements when Modelling is not Essential
E.3.1 The requirements of the section apply when the aircraft installation to be evaluated is such that all
necessary TCLs can be determined by measurement.
E.3.1.1 A continuing analysis shall be made as the project develops, using methods acceptable to the
Aircraft Project Director, (which shall be updated as the project develops) for all attachment points and
configuration scenarios given by Annex D 5e) to enable likely installation categories (see Annex H) to be
decided for all the equipments and cable bundles defined in Annex D.5 f).
E.3.1.2 Analysis and/or tests shall also be made to verify that equipment can operate without risk to safety
or mission accomplishment when the aircraft is subjected to the Multiple Burst environment given in A.3.3.
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E.3.2
E.3.2.1
Unclassified
Selection of Equipment
During the equipment procurement process, equipments shall either be:-
a)
chosen from previously tested equipment, if such equipment is available and suitable, or
b)
chosen from existing untested equipment or be newly developed.
E.3.2.2 When selecting from previously tested equipment or testing new equipment the necessary ETDLs
shall be the maximum levels of those given in Annex 0, according to the installation categories given by the
analysis of 3.1.1. Only equipment tested to Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) shall be considered for selection. Suitable
equipment not so tested shall be retested accordingly. When it is necessary to test equipment the tests
made shall be in accordance with Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5). Any susceptibility shown by previous EMC testing
shall be taken into account. The equipment shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of performance,
damage or deviation from specification when subjected to pulses up to and including the test limits
determined above. The level to which the equipment has been tested shall be declared as the EQL.
E.3.3
A return conductor system shall be designed, using computational methods or other methods
acceptable to the Aircraft Project Director to give the aircraft surface current distribution that would occur in
the operating environment.
E.3.4
Systems and cable runs on which to make pulse tests shall be selected and defined in the Test
Plan, and Whole Aircraft Pulse Tests shall be made in accordance with Section 5 of Leaflet 1/1 (see J.3)
to provide Measured Transient Levels (MTLs) which shall be extrapolated (see Leaflet 2/4, Section 4.6 (see
J.14)) to full threat Test Transient Level (TTL) responses for each cable and measurement point defined in
the Test Plan. Full threat parameters for dE/dt, di/dt and Ipk shall be as prescribed in Annex A.3, i.e. 1013 Vm1 -1
s , 1.4 x 1011 As-1 and 200 kA.
E.3.5 An assessment shall be made of the results above to confirm that there is linearity in the pulse
measurements (Leaflet 2/4, Section J14.4.6 (see J.14)) and to substantiate the cable resonances (see
Leaflet 1/3, Sections J5.3.4 and J5.3.5 (see J.5)) used for equipment tests. Taking due account of any non
linearity, the necessary TCLs shall be decided from the relevant TTLs of E3.4 above.
E.3.6
The margins defined in Section E4 below shall be applied to the TCLs of E3.5 above and
substantiated Equipment Transient Design Levels (ETDLs) decided.
E.3.7
Equipment Testing
E.3.7.1 When equipments tests have not previously been performed, the equipment shall be tested in
accordance with Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) using the ETDLs derived at E3.6. Any susceptibility shown by previous
EMC testing shall be taken into account. The equipment shall not exhibit any malfunction, degradation of
performance, damage or deviation from specification when subjected to pulses up to and including the test
limits determined below. The level to which the equipment has been tested should be declared as the EQL.
E.3.7.2 When equipments have been selected or tested in accordance with Section E3.2 above, a
comparison shall be made between the TCLs in E3.5 and the relevant EQLs of the equipment under
consideration. The difference between those levels shall be recorded.
E.3.7.3 Where the margins of E3.7.2 are less than the margins defined in Section E4 and are
unacceptable to the Aircraft Project Director, either the equipment shall be redesigned to provide additional
tolerance, or the installation shall be redesigned to lower the relevant TCLs. Any such redesign shall be
verified by tests to be agreed with the Aircraft Project Director.
E.3.7.4 When of necessity the whole aircraft tests of Section E3.4 above are made (by agreement with the
Aircraft Project Director) on a non-production aircraft, some pulse tests, as agreed with the Aircraft Project
Director, shall be repeated on selected circuits of a production aircraft.
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E.4
Margins to be Applied
The Aircraft Design Authority shall agree with the Aircraft Project Director a margin to be applied in Sections
E2 and E3 above. That margin shall take account of the confidence which can be attributed to the verification
methods and the criticality of the system concerned, so that the margin is decreased when the verification
confidence is high and increased for highly critical systems. Where such margins cannot be agreed, they
shall be 12 dB for Safety and 6 dB for Suitability of Service.
E.5
Additional Evaluation Requirements For EED's & Fuzing Devices
E.5.1
Ensure that in the analysis of Sections E2 and E3 above, an assessment is made of the induced
voltage hazard to EED's and fuzing devices.
E.5.2
Identify the measures taken, in the analysis of Sections E2 and E3 above, to ensure (and if
necessary, demonstrate) that fuzing and firing circuits cannot inadvertently operate as a result of a full threat
lightning attachment to any part of the aircraft.
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Annex F
Evaluation of Fuel and Explosive Vapour Hazards
F.1
Introduction
An evaluation of fuel and explosive hazards shall be made as noted in Section F2 below.
F.2
Evaluation Requirements
F.2.1
A survey shall be made of fuel systems and the following identified:-
a)
The construction of fuel tanks (integral and external). This shall include the type and thickness of skins
and any thermal insulation between the skin and explosives and in a partially conducting structure the
type and location of bolted joints and the location, relative to possible current flow, of any adhesively
bonded joints.
b)
The position of tanks relative to lightning strike zones.
c)
The type, location and method of installation of fuel and pressurisation pipes, within and external to
propellant and fuel tanks.
d)
The location and method of installation of wiring and wiring conduits, within and external to tanks; and
the size of any conductors which could carry lightning current and which are of necessity in contact with
fuel.
e)
The type and location of access doors and covers.
f)
The location of all possible sites of thermal and voltage sparking.
Identify any hot spots and the measures taken to prevent unacceptable temperatures, (see Annex
C.3.1.2 and Leaflet 2/2, Section J12.4.3 (see J.12)).
F.2.2
F.2.3
With respect to structure skin below which fuel, fuel vapour or other hazardous vapour can be
present:a)
Identify the location of any solid aluminium skin in Zones 1A and 2A less than 2 mm thick and identify
the measures used to protect those skins.
b)
Determine the minimum thickness allowable for solid aluminium skins in Zones 2A and 2B.
c)
Determine the minimum thickness allowable for steel and titanium skins (see Annex C.3.1.5).
d)
Identify any CFC skins which are thinner than 5 mm and the measures taken to protect them (see
Annex C.3.1.5).
e)
Identify the protection given to other construction which would otherwise be at risk, such as:1)
2)
Sandwich panels made either from conducting, non-conducting or partially conducting materials,
or a mixture of such materials.
Solid dielectric skins.
F.2.4
Identify the measures taken to prevent the passage of lightning current inside a structure containing
fuel, or through a component of a fuel system. Where such current flow cannot reasonably be eliminated,
identify the measures taken to prevent a hazard.
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38
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F.2.5
Identify joints and fasteners and the measures taken to prevent sparking.
F.2.6
Identify any adhesively bonded joints and the measures taken to prevent current flow through them.
F.2.7
Identify the measures taken to prevent current flow in pressurisation and fuel pipes, or alternatively
in aluminium structures identify the bonding used to limit current flow through couplings. In a CFC structure
detail the isolation and bonding needed to meet the recommendations of Annex C.3.1.3.
F.2.8
Establish that the wiring in fuel is installed according to the recommendations of Annex C.3.1.9 and
determine, by analysis and/or test, the value of possible flash-over or insulation breakdown voltages.
F.2.9
Establish that fuel electrical components meet the recommendations of Annex C.3.1.10 and can
withstand the voltages determined in F2.8 above. Also establish that sparking and flash-over cannot occur in
any part of the fuel system wiring in contact with fuel or vapour from fuel.
F.2.10
Determine the testing that is necessary to verify compliance with the above and to meet the
requirements of F3 below:a)
on panels, components, and sections of assemblies and structure (additionally to that required in
Section F2.9 above) and
b)
on complete major assemblies, such as fuel tanks and wet wings.
NOTE 1
When tests are required they shall be selected from those given in Table 6 of Leaflet 1 (see J.2).
NOTE 2
From the point of view of sparking, clearance for fuel systems is based on the elimination of all sparking,
both voltage and thermal. Detection methods for voltage sparking should be sensitive down to 0.2 mJ, see Leaflet 2/5
(see J.15).
F.3
Mandatory Tests
F.3.1
Tests shall always be made as follows:-
a)
When it cannot be otherwise demonstrated, by comparison with previously accepted systems or by

analysis, that sparking, arcing, arc penetration and hot spots have been eliminated.
b)
When it is thought that sparking tests (see Leaflet 1/4 Section J6.3 (see J.6)) on panels or sections
may not be representative of full scale conditions regarding current density and distribution, and induced
voltage levels (and hence the number and position of sites of possible sparking), tests on major
assemblies shall be made. When there is doubt that such tests will not reveal the presence of all the
sparking, or that there may be small hot spots not evaluated by Test L1/5.2 of Leaflet L1/5 (see J.7),
Flammable Gas Tests shall be made (see Leaflets 1/4 (see J.6) and 1/7 (see J.9)).
c)
When it is impossible to establish by measurement of induced voltage levels and analysis, or

comparison with previously accepted systems, that sparking and flash-over in fuel system wiring will not
occur, a test shall be designed to establish that such a hazard is not present.
F.3.2
Unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project Director the test shall be made on a major
assembly and may be either a sparking test (Leaflet 1/4, Section J6.3 (see J.6)) or a flammable gas test
(Leaflet 1/4, Section J6.4 (see J.6)). When such tests are made the full threat induced voltage values shall
be simulated.
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Annex G
Waveforms for Test and Analysis Derived from the External Threat
G.1
G.1.1
Introduction
This annex defines Waveforms for Test and Analysis.
G.1.2
It is necessary for the design and testing of lightning protective measures to define the threat level
in the form of a standard simplified current waveform having the relevant parameters set at the chosen
degree of severity. The derived environments given in Annex A are therefore also related to the so called
'Lightning Test Waveform' given in this annex which has been agreed essentially for direct effects and
certain indirect effects tests. This waveform, often called a 'composite test waveform', has been developed
for application to aircraft according to their zoning. The four components represent the important parameters
of the four principle phases of the high current part of a lightning flash, i.e. an initial stroke, intermediate
current, continuing current, and a restrike but does not attempt to simulate those parts of the lightning
discharge. The composite test waveform is adequate for direct effects, but for some indirect effects, which
depend largely on the rate of change of current, Component D is specified to have a peak rate of rise of (1.4
x 1011 As-1 , in addition to the other parameters listed. When employed by itself purely for indirect tests, it
may be designated Waveform D2 and the rate of rise defined more exactly as noted below in Section G3.
G.1.3
It is not necessary to employ the whole composite waveform in a single test; combinations of the
components may be selected according to the zone in which the test object is situated and the particular
damage mechanism being investigated. It is however, important for the components employed to be placed
in their correct order in time (not necessarily in the order given in the composite waveform) immediately
following one and another, say within 1 ms of the cessation of the preceding component.
G.1.4
G.2
G.2.1
Waveforms particular to indirect and Leader Phase effects are also given below.
Test Waveforms for Direct Effects Testing

The four test waveform components are given in
Table 2. The parameters given in

Table 2 are shown diagrammatically in Figure 7 below. It should be noted that when Component C is
combined with Component D, the continuing current must fall to near zero before the restrike component
commences.
Unclassified
40
Unclassified
Component
Parameter
Value
Tolerance
%
Component A
(High Current)
Component AH
(Swept Leader)
Peak Current
200 kA
+10
Action Integral
6 2
3.5 x 10 A s
+20
Time to peak current
<10 s (see NOTE)
Peak Current
150kA
Action Integral
Component B
(Intermediate Current)
See Note on Figure 7
Component C
(Continuing Current)
Component D
Restrike
(Direct Effect)
+10
6
0.8 x 10 A s
Average Amplitude
+20
2 kA
+10
Charge Transfer
10 C
+20
Amplitude
Duration
Charge Transfer
Peak Amplitude
600 A
500 s
300 C
100 kA
+10
+10
+20
+10
Action Integral
6 2
0.25 x 10 A s
+20
<3.5 s (see Note 2)
NOTE
A longer time to peak may be used when non rise time dependent damage mechanisms are being
investigated.
Table 2 Test Current Component Parameters
CURRENT (NOT TO SCALE)
COMPONENT A (Intermediate Current)

Peak Amplitude = 200kA + 10%
6 2
Action Integral = 2 x 10 A s + 20%
COMPONENT D (Restrike)
Peak Amplitude = 100kA +10 %
6 2
Action Integral 0.25 x10 A s +20 %
COMPONENT B (Intermediate Current)

Maximum Charge Transfer = 10 Coulombs +10 %
Average Amplitude 2kA +10 %
Note; This can be neglected
COMPONENT C (Continuing Current)
Charge Transfer = 300C + 20%
Amplitude typically 600A +10 %
A
< 500 s
C
-3
< 5 x 10 s
0.5 s < T _< 1 s
D
< 200 s
Time - not to scale
Figure 7 Schematic Representation of the Most Important Parameters and Values Considered
for Lightning Tests
41
Unclassified
Unclassified
G.2.2
The current test waveforms applicable to the part of the aircraft under investigation according to the
Lightning Zone ascribed to it, are shown in Table 3 below.
Attachment Zone
Current Component
A
1A
1B(See Note 4)
1C
2A
2B(See Note 4)
3
NOTE 1
AH
X
X
B
X
X
X (See Note 3)
X
X
X
C
X(See Note 2)
X
X(See Note 2)
X(See Note 2)
X
X
D
X
X
X
X
Component C should be a unipolar discharge of 600 A with a duration of 50 ms (see Note 3).
NOTE 2
Reduced Component A with Ipk = 150 kA, Action Integral = 0.8 x 106 A2s (see Leaflet 2/2 Section 2.6
(see J.12)).
NOTE 3
Experiments have been conducted in order to establish some basic rules concerning the action of
swept strokes in Zone 2A. So far no method has given any confidence in the ability to predict the probable hangon time under any particular set of circumstances. It is generally agreed however that a restrike will generate a
new attachment point, and that the mean interval between strikes is of the order of 50 ms. The figure of 50 ms has
therefore been accepted as an International test level for dwell time duration (see Leaflet 2/2, Sec J12.4.3 (see
J.12))
Table 3 Current Components Applicable to the Test Zones
NOTE 1 In natural lightning the restrike may have a di/dt of 1.4 x 1011 in addition to the parameters
listed against Component D in
Table 2. In general this is not required for direct effects testing. This rate of rise is, however, significant for indirect effects
tests and also when tests are made for both direct and indirect effects at the same time (see Section 3 below).
NOTE 2
A quasi double exponential waveform should be used for Component A when testing CFC or similar
materials, although a sinusoidal waveform may be used for metallic components (see Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12)).
G.3
G.3.1
Test Waveforms for Indirect Effects Testing

Waveforms for Induced Voltage and Insulation Breakdown Tests
G.3.1.1 It is often desirable to evaluate the voltages likely to be induced by lightning in individual subsystems or components, such as aerials and external sensors for example, when these are thought to be
particularly vulnerable to insulation breakdown or voltage flashover. Such tests will generally be done
separately to the pulse tests of Section 3.2 below but may be combined with them.
G.3.1.2 In tests for aperture flux (sometimes called fast flux) coupling (see definitions 4.5), the important
waveform parameter is di/dt, therefore such tests should be conducted using Waveform D2a (see Figure 8)
which is defined as follows:I
where
Io
Io (e-t - e- t)
=
=
=
109490 A
22200 s-1
1918110 s-1
G.3.1.3 The above waveform are based on Component D with additional parameters such that di/dtmax is
2 x 1011 As-1 and di/dt is greater than 0.25 x 1011 As-1 for at least 0.5 s.
Unclassified
42
Unclassified
G.3.1.4 As the important parameter for fast flux coupling is di/dtmax any waveform giving the maximum
value of di/dt in D2a may be used for such tests, provided di/dt is greater than 0.25 x 1011 As-1 for more than
0.5 s from the start of the waveform. When combined direct and indirect tests are made, the action integral
of 0.25 x 106 As-1 must also be present and Waveform D2a must be used for such tests, or an appropriate
clamped (quasi double exponential) waveform with the same parameters.
G.3.1.5 In the case of diffusion flux (see definitions 4.5) or resistive coupling, the important parameter is
peak current and the tests should be conducted using Waveform D2a with appropriate scaling for peak
current, or with current Component A (see Note 1). When in a composite structure, current redistribution is
important (see Section G3.2 below), the duration of Component A shall be 480 s (see Note 1).
G.3.1.6 When tests for both diffusion coupling and fast flux coupling are made together, Waveform D2
shall be used with appropriate scaling for peak current (see Note 2). For diffusion flux coupling or diffusion
coupling and fast flux coupling together, use Waveform D2a with peak current scaled to 200 kA. Alternatively,
for diffusion flux coupling alone, use Component A.
NOTE 1
When only indirect tests are made action integral is not important, unless redistribution is important. When
11
that is so, use Component A with a decay time of 480 s and scale di/dt to 2 x 10 for fast flux coupling if linearity is
assured.
G.3.2
Waveforms for Lightning Transient Assessment and Pulse Tests
G.3.2.1 When an assessment is made of the lightning induced transients in a whole aircraft by means of
analysis or test, or a combination of both, it is necessary to define the threat in the form of a current pulse
having appropriate values of those parameters which are relevant to indirect effects in extensive systems. In
addition to peak current and maximum rate of current rise the relevant parameters include action integral
because this is the injected energy per ohm of current path and with the other parameters; it defines the
duration of the waveform. These parameters are important, for example, for the production of persistent
circulating currents between low resistivity and high resistivity parts of the materiel, particularly when
composite materials are extensively employed. In some cases such circulating currents persist well after the
original disturbance (the lightning current pulse) has died away. The waveforms for this application shall
therefore be as follows:The threat shall be defined as a unidirectional waveform having the following parameters:Peak current
200 kA
Maximum rate of rise 1.4 x 1011 As-1
Action integral
3.5 x 106 A2s
G.3.2.2 For analysis these parameter values shall be incorporated in a double exponential waveform,
which consequently has the form:I
where
Io
Io (e-t - e- t)
=
=
=
210859 A
6179 s-1
671141 s-1
G.3.2.3 This waveform, designated Waveform A2a (see Figure 9), has a time to peak of 7.1 s and a
duration of 494 s, with a decay time to 50% of peak of 121 s as shown in Figure 9.
G.3.2.4 For test purposes the 'quarter amplitude' waveform shall be either a double exponential or a
clamped waveform with the following parameters:Peak current
50 kA
Maximum rate of rise 0.35 x 1011 As-1
Action integral
0.22 x 106 A2s
NOTE
43
it is not considered necessary to use a Waveform H type excitation for Pulse Tests.
Unclassified

G.3.3
Unclassified
Waveforms for Equipment Testing
Internal environment waveforms are given in Annex H.
G.4
Waveform for Leader Phase Effects Testing
G.4.1
The waveform for dielectric puncture tests (see Leaflet 1/6 (see J.8)) shall be a 50 to 200 s to
flashover waveform.
G.4.2
The voltage of the high voltage generator (see Note) shall rise to flashover from t0 in 50 to 200 s
(+10%). The decay time for a 'withstand' is typically 2000 s (+10%) but as the flashover should occur near
peak its precise value is not important.
NOTE
This Def Stan recognises a 'dielectric puncture' test as predominantly an engineering test, see Leaflet 2/2
Section J12.8.3 (see J.12).
Unclassified
44
Unclassified
100
90
80
70
Ampltude kA
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
time s
Figure 8 Waveform D2a - Indirect Tests, Induced Voltage and Insulation Breakdown
200
180
160
140
Ampltude kA
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
time s
Figure 9 Waveform A2a - Pulse Tests and Analysis
45
Unclassified
160
180
200
Unclassified
Annex H
Internal Environments and Waveforms
H.1
Introduction
The external environment described in Annex A gives rise to internal environments which induce transients
on the wiring linking equipments in the materiel, giving rise to characteristic transient waveforms as is noted
below and described in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12).
H.2
Standard Induced Transient Waveforms for Assessment of Equipment

Susceptibility
H.2.1
The Origin and Shape of Transients
The origin and shape of transients is discussed in Leaflet 2/2 Section J12.5.1 (see J.12).
H.2.2
H.2.2.1
Standard Waveforms
This Def Stan recognises four standard waveforms for equipment testing. They are the:-
a)
Intermediate pulse, 6.4/70 s
(the IP waveform, equivalent to waveform 1/4 of ED-84)
b)
Short pulse, 100 ns rise 6.4 s

to zero crossover
(the SP waveform, equivalent to waveform 2 of ED-84)
c)
Long pulse, 50/500 and 40/180 s
(the LP waveform, similar to waveform 5 of ED-84)
d)
Damped sinusoidal
(the DS waveform, equivalent to waveform 3 of ED-84)
H.2.2.2 The four waveforms are shown in Figure 10 to Figure 13. The waveforms may be either of current
or voltage as appropriate to the particular test. Descriptions such as 6.4/70 s refer respectively to the time
to reach the peak and the time to decay to 50% of the peak. Two versions of the long pulse are given
dependent on the degree of protection afforded to diffusion flux by the structure. The 50/500 s waveform is
applicable to poorly protected composite structures and the 40/180 waveform to well protected structures
(see Leaflet 2/2 Section J12.7 (see J.12) and Leaflet 2/7 (see J.17). Equipment Installation Categories and
test levels for the IP, SP and LP waveforms are given in Section H3 below.
H.2.2.3
If mathematical expressions are needed for analytical purposes, they are as follows:-
IP WAVEFORM - may be idealised as a double exponential represented by the following expression:i

where
1.09405 Ip (e-t - e- t)
Ip is the peak value

t is time s
= 11354 s-1
= 647265 s-1
Unclassified
46
Unclassified
SP WAVEFORM - the derivative of the above expression for the IP waveform is:1.09405 Ip (-e-t + e- t)
but this would give an instantaneous rise at time zero, and for practical purposes a rise time of
100 ns is assumed instead.
LP WAVEFORM - may be idealised as a double exponential represented by the following expression:i
K Ip (e-t -e- t)
where
Ip is the peak value
t is time s
for 50/500 waveform
= 1585 s-1,
= 80022 s-1,
K = 1.104
for 40/180 waveform
= 5558 s-1
= 68262 s-1
K = 1.36
DS WAVEFORM Io e-ft/Q sin(2ft)
where
Io is the initial (t=0) amplitude of the envelope of the oscillations

f is the frequency
t is time
Q is the Q factor = /r where r is the logarithmic decrement, which must be between 0.462 and
0.0959
NOTE
47
The ratio of successive peaks of the same sign is e-/Q
Unclassified
H.3
Unclassified
Equipment Test Levels for IP, SP and LP Waveforms
H.3.1
Equipment test levels for IP, SP and LP waveforms are obtained either from pulse tests made on aircraft to
obtain the Computed Transient Level (CTL) (Annex E), or if those tests have not been made and modelling
has not been done from previous experience of similar installations. Levels for airborne equipment, when
CTLs are not known, are given below.
H.3.2
Equipment Installation Categories for IP, SP and LP Waveforms
H.3.2.1 When Computed Transient Levels (CTLs) are not known, maximum amplitudes for the test
waveforms are chosen according to equipment categories A-D (electromagnetic environments of the
equipment) and E (criticality of equipment) :CAT A
Equipment and cabling installed in a protected EM environment such as a completely

enclosed compartment in metallic materiel.
CAT B
Equipment and cabling installed in a partially exposed EM environment such as below a

dielectric cover in a largely metallic structure.
CAT C
Equipment and cabling bonded to the same part of the materiel structure and installed in
an exposed EM environment where large portions of the structure are constructed from
poorly conducting or CFC materials.
CAT D
Equipment and cabling bonded to different parts of the materiel structure and installed in
an exposed EM environment where large portions of the structure are constructed from
poorly conducting materials or CFC.
CAT E
Equipments where lightning ground transients are judged not to have any impact or where
upset or damage would not compromise materiel safety or mission success.
H.3.2.2 Where equipment and cables can be defined in more than one of the above categories, the test
levels associated with the more severe environment shall be applied.
H.3.3
Test Levels
Test levels appropriate to the test categories with a tolerance of +10% are defined in Table 4 below.
Category
Waveform (voltage/current V/A+10%)

SP (Short) V/I
IP (Intermediate)
as current V/I
IP (Intermediate)
as voltage V/I
LP (Long) V/I
125/250
125/250
N/A
N/A
300/600
300/600
2000/1000
2000/1000
750/1500
750/1500
2000/3000
2000/3000
1600/3200
1600/3200
2000/10000
2000/10000
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Table 4 Test Levels for Equipment Installation Categories
Unclassified
48
Unclassified
H.4
Levels and Frequencies for DS Waveform
H.4.1
Selection of Transient Test Frequencies
During injection tests, transients shall be injected at frequencies according to the following:a)
The most susceptible frequencies in the range 2 to 50 MHz found from any previous CW bulk current
injection EMC testing.
b)
The frequencies at which maxima and minima cable impedances occur.
c)
Over the frequency range 2 to 50 MHz inclusive not less than 50 frequencies such that any resonances
in the EUT internal circuitry are excited, so subjecting any active or passive devices to maximum voltage
or current threat. These frequencies shall be spaced evenly with a logarithmic increment. The
approximate frequency of each injection is obtained by the use of the following equation:Test frequency (MHz) =
Where
H.4.2
10(0.3 + 0.028k)
= 0, 1, 2, 3 to 50 for 50 frequencies
Test Limits
When Computed Transient Levels (CTLs) are not known, the limits given in Figure 14 shall be used,
i.e. a current limit of 30A from 2 to 30 MHz decreasing to 15A at 50 MHz.
a voltage limit of 3 kV between 2 and 30 MHz decreasing to 1.5 kV at 50 MHz.
a kVA limit of 30 kVA between 2 and 30 MHz decreasing to 7.5 kVA at 50 MHz.
H.5
Multiple Burst Test Waveform and Levels
The Multiple Burst Test Waveform shall be the damped sinewave defined in H.4.1 above both for frequency
and limits. That waveform shall be applied in 3 bursts. Each burst shall consist of 20 pulses at the relevant
frequency, with the time between pulses as defined for the Component H pulses shown in Figure 3. The
time between successive bursts shall also be as defined in Figure 3.
H.6
Guidance Concerning Equipment Test Waveforms
Background and guidance concerning equipment testing and equipment test waveforms is given in Leaflets
2/7 (see J.17) and 2/2 (see J.12).
49
Unclassified
Unclassified
Peak
T1 = 6.4s 20%.
T2 = 70s 20%
50%
T2
Figure 10
time
IP Waveform (Intermediate Pulse) Simulating Resistive Coupling
v/i
peak
T1 = 100ns Max
T2 = 6.4s 20%
T1
time
T2
Overshoot shall be less than 20% of peak.
Figure 11
SP Waveform (Short Pulse) Simulating Aperture Flux Coupling
Unclassified
50
Unclassified
v/i
peak
Well Protected Composite Structures, LPA
T1 = 40s 20%
T2 = 180s 20%
Poorly Protected Composite Structures, LPB
T1 = 50s 20%
T2 = 500s 20%
50%
T1
Figure 12
time
T2
LP Waveform (Long Pulse) Simulating Diffusion/Redistribution Coupling
Amplitude of eighth half cycle shall

be at least 25% but not more than
75% of the second half cycle when
injecting into a 100 ohm loop.
Amplitude
time
8th half cycle

2nd half cycle
Frequency of resonance to be tuneable
over the range 2MHz to 50MHz.
Figure 13
51
DS Waveform (Damped Sinewave Test Waveform)
Unclassified
Unclassified
Induced
current
(amps)
30
20
10
2MHz
30MHz
40MHz
50MHz
Frequency
Figure 14
Voltage limit: 3kV 2-30MHz derating to 1.5kV at 50MHz.
kVA limit: 30kVA 2-30MHz derating to 7.5kVA at 50MHz.
Current, Voltage and kVA Test Limits
Unclassified
52
Unclassified
Annex I
Informative References
I.1
Section 4
5.1
I.2
Sixth Draft STANAG 4327 Edition 2 Lightning, Munitions Assessment and Test Procedures
Section 5
5.1
ED91, Aircraft Zoning Standard, EUROCAE, July 1998.
5.2
Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms Standard, EUROCAE ED84,
September 1999.
5.3
G A M Odam, A W Hanson & R H Evans, Lightning Protection Requirements for Aircraft - A

Proposed Specification, RAE Tech Memo FS(F) 632, October 1990.
C.1
G W Read, Damage to Metal and Composite Structures from Lightning Strikes (Direct Effects),
Lecture 3, Culham Laboratory Short Course Notes, September 1993.
I.3
Leaflet 0/2
L0/2.1
ARP 5415, Users Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect
Effects of Lightning, issued August 2001.
L0/2.2
ED113/ARP 5577, Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects Certification, Sept 2002.
L0/2.3
G A M Odam, Status of Draft STANAG's 4236 and 4327 Ed 2, Paper No 108, Toulouse, ICOLSE
1999.
L0/2.4
J C Pinchen & G A M Odam, The MOD Approach to Lightning Requirements for Military Aircraft
RAeS Symposium, Rotor Craft in Lightning Environment, April 1999.
L0/2.5
CCR Jones & C Ward, G A M Odam, Clearing Aircraft against Induced Lightning Transients,
Paper No 99, Toulouse, ICOLSE 1999.
L0/2.6
R H Evans, Lightning Induced Transient Susceptibility of Equipment, A Comparison of Civil

Standard D0-160C and NATO STANAG 4327, GAOC Report 12/1-3, February 2000.
I.4
Leaflet 1
L1.1
I.5
ED105/ARP 5416 Aircraft Lightning Test Methods, 2004.
Leaflet 1/3
L1/3.1
I.6
Leaflet 1/4
L1/4.1
53
DEF-STAN 59-41 Electromagnetic Compatibility.
Aircraft Lightning Test Methods, EUROCAE ED105, Section 7.7.2a.

Unclassified
I.7
Unclassified
Leaflet 2/1
L2/1.1
J Phillpott, Recommended Practice for Lightning Simulation and Testing Techniques for Aircraft,
UKAEA Report CLM-R163, 1977.
L2/1.2
F Heidler, Hopf.Ch., Current and Field Measuring Activities in Munich, Germany, 13th International
EMC-Symposium, Zurich, 1993.
L2/1.3
Ch. Hopf., Transiente Elektrische Felder Naher Blitzentladungen, Phil. Thesis, University of The
Federal Armed Forces, Munich, 1995.
L2/1.4
Frank Drumm, University of Federal Armed Forces, Germany, Private Communication to Wkg Grp
31 Members.
L2/1.5
Specialists Meeting on Lightning Multiple Burst Criteria, Cocoa Beach, Florida, April 1991,SAEAE4L Summary Notes of Meeting.
L2/1.6
K Berger, R Anderson and H Kroninger, Parameters of Lightning Flashes, CIGRE Journal Electra
No 41, July 1975.
L2/1.7
N Cianos and E T Pierce, A Ground Lightning Environment for Engineering Usage, Tech Report 1,
SRI Project 1834, Stanford Research Institute, August 1972.
L.2/1.8
ET Pierce, Natural Lightning Parameters and their simulation in Laboratory Tests, LSE Conference,
Oxford, 1975.
L2/1.9
RH Evans and GAM Odam, The Selection of Parameter Values of Negative and Positive Lightning
for Combination in the Composite Test Waveform Proceedings of Aerospace and Ground
Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity, Williamsburg Virginia, September 1995.
I.8
Leaflet 2/2
L2/2.1
Pitts, Lee, Perala and Rudolph, New Methods and Results for Quantification of Lightning-Aircraft
Electrodynamics, NASA Technical Paper 2737, June 1987.
L2/2.2
Pitts, Lee, Perala and Rudolph, New Methods and Results for Quantification of Lightning-Aircraft
Electrodynamics, NASA Technical Paper 2737, June 1987
L2/2.3
P F Little, Transmission Line Representation of Lightning Return Stroke, Journal of Applied

Physics, D11, 1978.
L2/2.4
Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms Standard, EUROCAE ED84,
September 1999.
L2/2.5
Specialists Meeting on Lightning, Multiple Burst Criteria, Cocoa Beach, Florida, April 1991, SAEAE4L Summary Notes of Meeting.
L2/2.6
LTT Culham, 1983 Short Course Notes, Lecture 4.
L2/2.7
S J Haigh, Summary of the Lightning Club/UK MOD Research Work on Fuel Ignition Hazards,
September 1994 (private communication to GAOC).
I.9
Leaflet 2/4
L2/4.1
Private Communication to G A M Odam from C C R Jones.
Unclassified
54
Unclassified
L2/4.2
R H Evans, Some Considerations concerning the Natural Oscillations excited by Lightning in

Aircraft Electrical Systems, International Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity, a GAOC
paper given at ICOLSE, Toulouse, France, June 1999.
L2/4.3
B J C Burrows - Designers' Guide to the Installation of Electrical Wiring and Equipment in Aircraft to
minimise lightning effects. Culham Laboratory Report CLM-R212, January 1981.
L2/4.4
UK Defence Standard 59-41, Electro Magnetic Compatibility.
L2/4.5
Lecture 10.1, Culham Laboratory Short Course Notes, September 1989.
I.10
Leaflet 2/5
L2/5
GAM Odam The Certification of Aircraft Fuel Systems with Respect to Lightning and Electrostatic
Hazards, Proceedings of International Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity, Blackpool
2003.
L2/5.2
G A Odam, JR Tilston, CCR Jones, JC Pinchen Factors Affecting Fuel System Certification
Against Lightning Hazards Proceedings of International Conference on Lightning and Static
Electricity, Seattle 2001.
L2/5.3
Fuels, Lubricants and Associated Products, UK Ministry of Defence Standard HMSO.
L2/5.4
J R Tilston, Aircraft Fuels Chemistry of Ignition and Combustion, Workshop Session, ICOLSE
2003, Blackpool, September 2003.
L2/5.5
Private communication to G A M Odam from H W G Wyeth, RAE, May 1984.
L2/5.6
Lewis and Von Elbe, Combustion Flames and Explosions, Academic Press, 1961.
L2/5.7
CAA, Relationship between Probability and Severity of Effects, JAR-25 Section 2, Figure 1.
L2/5.8
AOP 24 Draft 1, February 1990, Assessment and Testing of Munitions and Associated Systems to
the Requirements of STANAG 4329.
I.11
L2/6.1
I.12
Leaflet 2/6
Lecture 4, Culham Laboratory Short Course Notes, September 1980. A5.2 Lecture 8, Culham
Laboratory Short Course Notes, September 1989.
Leaflet 2/7
L2/7.1
J Bishop, EMP Test Methods and Test Specifications for Avionic Equipment, Fourth NEMP
Symposium, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, July 1984.
L2/7.2
SAE Test Waveforms and Techniques for Assessing the Effects of Lightning-induced Transients,
SAE AE4L Committee Report AE4L-81-2, December 1981.
L2/7.3
SAE Recommended Draft Advisory Circular. Protection of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems

against the Indirect Effects of Lightning, SAE AE4L Committee Report AE4L-87-3, February 1987.
L2/7.4
R A Hobbs, The Design and Construction of Pulse Generators to Comply with the Requirements of
RAE Tech Memos FS(F) 457 and 510, RAE Tech Memo FS(F) 550.
L2/7.5
R A Hobbs, Equipment Test Methods for Externally Produced Electromagnetic Transients, RAE
Tech Memo FS(F) 457, Issue 2 July 1987.
55
Unclassified

L2/7.6
I.13
Unclassified
N J Carter, Recommended Test Specification for Electromagnetic Compatibility, RAE Tech Memo
FS(F) 510, November 1985.
Leaflet 2/8
L2/8.1
R Baldwin et al, A Review of Progress on the Joint Programme on Improving the Lightning and
Static Protection of Radomes, Paper 3-1, International Conference on Lightning and Static
Electricity, Williamsburg, Virginia, USA, September 1995.
L2/8.2
British Standard Institute, High Voltage Testing Techniques, BS 923/IEC 60.
I.14
Leaflet 2/9
L2/9.1
C C R Jones, A Designers' Guide to the Correct Use of Carbon Fibre Composite Materials and
Structures used in Aircraft Construction, to Protect against Lightning Strike Hazards, Part A Direct
Effects, AEA Technology Report CLM/RR/M10/30, January 1990.
L2/9.2
B J C Burrows, 'A Designers' Guide to the Correct Use of Carbon Fibre Composite Materials and
Structures used in Aircraft Construction to Protect against Lightning Strike Hazards, Part B Indirect
Effects, AEA Technology Report CLM/RR/M10/30, January 1990.
L2/9.3
B J C Burrows, 'A Designers' Guide to the Installation of Electrical Wiring and Equipment in Aircraft
to Minimise Lightning Effects, AEA Technology Report CLM-R212, January 1981.
L2/9.4
Lecture 4, Culham Laboratory Short Course Notes, September 1980
L2/9.5
B J C Burrows, Lightning Hazards to Aircraft Aerial Systems, AEA Technology Report

CLM/RR/M5/3, 4 and 5.
I.15
Leaflet 2/11
L2/11.1 G A M Odam, EFA Lightning Avoidance Criteria, GAOC Report No 14/1, Issue 2, June 93.
Unclassified
56
Unclassified
Annex J
Leaflets
J.1
J.1.1
Leaflet 0/2 - Relationship of Def Stan 59-113 to other Documents

Introduction
This leaflet outlines differences between Def Stan 59-113 and Draft STANAGs 4236 Ed 2, 4327 Ed 2, AOP
25 Ed 2, together with EUROCAE Working Group 31 documents. Minor differences and different ways of
saying more or less the same thing are ignored, especially when considering definitions. The comparison is
tabulated in Section 2 below and where related clauses are too involved for a tabular comparison, the
details are given in Sections 3 to 7.
57
Unclassified
Unclassified
J.1.2
Comparisons
Table 5
Section and Short Title of 59-113

at variance with another
document
Other Document Related Clause

Document
Section and Title
Reason for Variance
Difference
Leaflet 0/1 Definitions
ED14, ED81, ED84,

ED91, ED105
Definitions
See Section 3 below
Chp 2, Sec 2-1 Protection Aim

Requirements, Sec 2-2 Design
Aim Requirements, Annex B1
Requirements for Assessment &
Certification,
Annex
B1-1
Transient Hazard Evaluation and
Annex
B1-2
Fuel
Hazard
Evaluation.
Various
ARP 5415
Various
Civilian
adequate
not
The Civilian documents do not give clearly defined Protection

and Design Requirements as in Chapter 2 of D-Stan 59-113
and detailed in Annex B1 which calls for a Lightning Protection
Plan (LPP) and Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA).
LHDAs are talked about in some of the Civilian documents but
the requirements for such analyses are nowhere as detailed as
in Annex B1, B1-1 (Transient Hazards Evaluation) and Annex
B1-2 (Fuel Hazards Evaluation). ARP5415 (Users Manual for
Indirect Effects), Ref L0/2.1, seems to be the best on offer but
this is for Indirect Effects and there does not seem to be
anything similar for Fuel Hazards and certainly not an overall
document such as Annex B1 of 59-113. ED-113/ARP 5577
(Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects Certification), Ref L0/2.2
however has reasonably useful clauses in Section 4. No
document seems to give general and particular design
requirements (and practises best avoided) as in Annex A3 of
D-Stan 59-113. It also seems that there is no requirement for
controlled acceptance documentation as required by Section
2-3.1.3 and Leaflet 2/3 Section 4 and Leaflet 2/10 of 59-113.
Annex B1 Sec 5 (viii) and
ED81/ARP 5413
Various
Civilian
methods
not
acceptable
for
Military
applications and not consistent
with STANAG 4327.
Various papers have been written (Refs L0/2.3, L0/2.4 and

L0/2.5) giving the UK Military position for Indirect Effect
Assessments which has been adopted for Draft STANAG 4327
Ed 2 and this Def Stan. Those requirements, which necessitate
new transient level definitions, are discussed at J.1.4 below.
ED84
Various
No good logic in combination

of positive and negative
parameters to give a derived
environment.
Parameter levels decided in a more scientific way than those

for the Civilian documents see Reference L2/2.6. These levels
are compared with the ED84 levels in J.1.5 below.
Evaluation
Annex
B1-1
Transient Hazards
Documents
ED-113/ARP 5577
of
Chp 2, Sec 2-2.1 External

Environment and Annex A1
External Derived Environment
58
including
See J.1.3 below
Unclassified
Unclassified
Chp 2, Sec 2-2.2 Zoning and

Annex A2 Rotary Wing Zoning
ED91
Various
Zoning for Rotary Wing Aircraft

considered to be too simplistic.
The main difference from ED84 is that Annex A2 takes note of

the rotational speed of the rotor to develop zoning rules.
Chp 2, Sec 2-2.3 and Annex B3

Internal
Environments
and
Waveforms
ED14/DO160,
Section 22
Various
Environments and Waveforms

consistent with Draft STANAG
4327 & Def Stan 59-41
These environments are discussed in J.1.4 below.
Chp 2, Sec 2-2.4 and Annex A3
Design Requirements not stated in Civilian documents except size of bonding leads in AC25.899-1
Design Requirements
Annex B1 Requirements for
Assessment & Certification and
Annex
B1-2
Fuel
Hazard
Evaluation
AC2053, AC981 and

others
Various
Corrects
misconception
Annex B2 Test Waveforms
ED84
Various
See Section 5
See Section 5
Test
ED105
Section 5
59-113 more precise
Not possible to summarise but in 59-113. Requirements

separated from guidance which is generally not so in ED105.
Leaflets 1/1 and 1/2 Indirect Effect

Test Methods
ED105
Section 6
UK
MOD
method
developed & published in
conference papers (Refs
L0/2.3, L0/2.4 and L0/2.5)
and adopted for Draft
STANAG 4327.
Aircraft clearance is based on analytical techniques supported

and validated by tests unless the aircraft under consideration is
a very simplistic system.
WhAT's made at 3 levels up to 50 kA. CW tests not
recognised.
See discussion in Section 4 below.
Leaflet 1/5
Methods
59
Direct
Effect
Unclassified
some
Def Stan 59-113 Explosive Vapour Hazard Assessments are

discussed in Section 6 below

J.1.3
Unclassified
Detailed Comparisons of Definitions
J.1.3.1 The Civilian documents (EUROCAE WG31/SAE AE2) omit many definitions used in Def Stan 59-113. The most important of these are:Cloud to Ground Flash
Inter Cloud Flash
Intra Cloud Flash
Stroke
Subsequent Strokes
Intermediate Current
Continuing Current
Direct Strike
Nearby Flash
Distant or "Far Field" Flash
Intercepted Lightning Strike
Triggered Lightning Strike
Capture Radius
Capture Distance
Far-Field Effects
Leader Phase Effects
Shock Excitation
Whole Aircraft Tests
Transfer Function
Functional Hazard Assessment

Bonding
Aperture Flux (Fast Flux)
Diffusion Flux
Differential Voltage
Common-Mode Voltage
Open Circuit Voltage of a High Voltage Impulse Generator
Arc
Quasi Co-Axial
Rolling Sphere
Flammability Limits (Explosion Limits)
Stoichiometry, Stoichiometric Ratio
Flashpoint
Energy Required for Ignition (ERI) and Minimum Ignition Energy(MIE)
Auto Ignition and Auto-Ignition Delay
Voltage Sparking
There are 5 Civilian definitions which are essentially the same as those in Def Stan 59-113.
The definitions used in 59-113 were developed in consultation with Culham CLSU, under contract to MOD(PE), for Draft STANAGs 4326 and 4327 and JAC Paper 1213.
Unclassified
60
Unclassified
J.1.3.2
Transient Level Definitions
Different definitions are used in Def Stan 59-113 as follows in Table 6:Table 6
59-113
Test Transient Level (TTL)
extrapolated to full threat
ED81 etc (given in italics)
The measured response from a pulse test (MTL),
Instead of TTL the Civilian Standards would use ATL which is defined as
follows:
The actual transient level is the level of transient voltage and/or current which
appears at the equipment interfaces as a result of the external environment.
This level may be less than or equal to the transient control level but should not
be greater
It should be noted that there may be several ATLs for a single equipment
interface, depending on how the lightning attaches to the vehicle and the
configuration of the vehicle particular at the time. The Civilian definition says
nothing about enveloping these together and taking the worse case as the TCL
Transient Control Level (TCL) The worse case actual amplitude that a Transient
Assessment establishes should exist at an equipment interface when the
equipment is installed in the materiel and subjected to the maximum lightning
threat. It is the transient level arrived at by:-
d)
e)
Transient Control Level (TCL) The transient control level is the maximum
allowable level of transients appearing at the equipment interfaces as a result of
the defined external environment
taking the worst case of all configurations and attachment points from
both modelling and pulse tests, when the difference between all
corresponding CTLs and TTLs is <6 dB , or
when modelling is not done by taking the TTLs, corrected if necessary
for any non linearity, as the TCL
The Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) Is the transient amplitude to

which the equipment must be designed to operate without malfunction or signs of
failure
Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL)

to which the equipment is qualified.
The peak amplitude of transients
This is what 59-113 calls the EQL.
The Equipment Qualification Level (EQL) is the actual transient level to which the
equipment has been tested and qualified. The EQL must never be less than the
TCL plus the agreed margin
ETSL is not recognised by 59-113
61
Equipment Transient Susceptibility Level (ETSL) The transient peak amplitude

that will result in damage or upset to the system components
Unclassified
Unclassified
J.1.3.3 The Civilian documents have many definitions not used in 59-113 as the more obvious terms used there are not listed as definitions. The Civilian and 59-113
definitions are under review and a more complete list of definitions may be given in a later issue of Leaflet 0/1, when Leaflet 0/2 would also be updated. There are some
Civilian definitions, however, which are not acceptable to 59-113, either because they are technically incorrect (3) or convey the wrong meaning (14) and the 59-113
definitions of the same term are more correct. The more important of the unacceptable definitions, other than those noted in Section 3.2 above, are compared with the
equivalent in 59-113 and commented on below. The Def Stan 59-113 definitions are consistent with those of Draft STANAG 4236/4327.
Table 7
Term Defined
ED/ARP Document Text3
59-113 Text
2
Comment
ACTION INTEGRAL
Action integral (i dt measured in A s or

joules/ohm) defines the energy in any
portion of the current path per ohm
resistance.
The integral of the square of the time

varying current over its time of duration. It
is usually expressed in units of ampere
squared seconds (A2s).
The Civilian definition says nothing about energy.
ATTACHMENT POINT
A point on an aircraft surface at which

lightning current enters or leaves.
There must be at least two such points
and due to the swept stroke effect with
a moving aircraft, there may be many
more.
A point of contact of the lightning flash with

the aircraft.
When we are talking about attachment points we generally are thinking

about the return current phase. The Civilian definitions would allow leader
attachment. When that is so, we would specify leader attachment point.
CORONA
The ionisation of a volume of air around

a conducting body under high electric
field conditions. It occurs particularly at
sharp points, edges and protuberances,
where the intensity of the electric field
is enhanced by the local geometry.
A luminous discharge that occurs as a

result of an electrical potential difference
between the aircraft and the surrounding
atmosphere.
A streamer discharge and an arc are luminous discharges but not corona.
At the surface of the aircraft the surrounding atmosphere will be at the
same potential as the aircraft. The aircraft in fact takes up the potential of its
position in the ambient E field.
DIRECT EFFECTS
The effects directly due to the

attachment or passage of the lightning
channel currents such as metal burn
through, hotspots and ohmic heating.
Any physical effects to the aircraft and/or

equipment due to the direct attachment of
the lightning channel and/or conduction of
lightning current. This includes dielectric
puncture, blasting, bending, melting,
burning and vaporisation of aircraft or
equipment surfaces and structures. It also
includes directly injected voltages and
current in associated wiring, plumbing and
other conductive components. Direct
Direct Effects are listed and discussed in Leaflet 2/3 and do not include
dielectric puncture. AC310 Working Groups were careful to separate the
latter from Direct Effects, putting them in their Group IV, which are now
known as Leader Phase Effects. Also one cannot inject a voltage but a
voltage is generated across an impedance due to current flow, such as the
IR drop in an aircraft skin which is dependent on flux penetration (diffusion
flux) and therefore has always been understood by Farnborough and
Culham to be an Indirect Effect. Anyway, in a properly designed lightning
protection system, those events should not happen. Electric shock to aircrew
can only be called an Indirect Effect as the currents that flow producing the
3) ED105 text unless otherwise stated. ED105 is the latest published document.
Unclassified
62
Unclassified
effects also include shock and flash

blindness to personnel.
voltage which causes the shock have got to be due to flux penetration, for
example, the flux linking through the canopy to the pilots body. Some types
of flash blindness may also be caused by similar effects.
EXTERNAL
ENVIRONMENT
The environment caused by natural

lightning discharges which interact with
the aircraft. Parameters taken to be the
worst case result in the Derived
External Environment.
Characterisation of the natural lightning

environment for design and certification
purposes as defined in ARP 5412/ED-84.
The Civilian definition leads to the misunderstanding that, for example,

Component A is a first return stroke when it only represents the 2 percentile
parameters that occur in a combination of negative and positive first return
strokes. It certainly is not the natural lightning environment. The natural
lightning return stroke has a slow turn on with di/dt maximum at about the
peak of the waveform and is nothing like the double exponential postulated
for the waveform components used for design and certification.
INDIRECT EFFECTS
The effects due to coupling with the

magnetic or electric field of the lightning
current, either in the channel or flowing
in the aircraft, taking place in parts of
the aircraft in which the lightning
channel current cannot flow.
Electrical transients induced by lightning in

aircraft electric circuits.
The 59-113 definition is more complete. Indirect Effects are not limited to
aircraft wiring. Currents can also be induced in structural metallic
components and fuel and hydraulic lines, airdata pipes etc
Such effects can arise as a result of either a direct strike or a nearby flash. An
example is a transient voltage induced in Aircraft wiring. See also, 'Aperture Flux' and
'Diffusion.
The terms Direct and Indirect Effects are US terms adopted by EUROCAE
and not originally used by UK. Culham, in Reference L2/1.1, at Section 3.3
of that reference use the terms Group I and Group II Effects and listed them
in Table A2 of Appendix 2. RAE Farnborough endorsed those definitions and
Working Group AC310 adopted them and expanded them to include Group
III (Far Field) and Group IV (Leader Phase) and those terms were in use
until recently.
Culham Group I Effects were Metal Skin Puncture, Hotspot Formation,
Mechanical Damage, Magnetic Forces, Damage to Composite Structure,
Fuel Ignition, Damage to Lightning Arrestors, Sparking. Their Group II
Effects were Induced Voltages, Voltage Flashover, Sparking, and Fuel
Ignition.
INTERNAL
ENVIRONMENT
63
The internal magnetic and electric fields

generated by the external environment
which interact on the wiring within the
aircraft to cause transient voltages and
currents in the wiring and at the inputs
to electrical and electronic equipment.
The internal environment can also
cause currents to flow in, and potential
The fields and structural IR potentials

inside the aircraft produced by the external
environment.
Unclassified
The 59-113 is a more accurate definition.
Unclassified
differences to develop between,

metallic parts not intended to carry
current.
LEADER
A leader is a preliminary breakdown

that forms a weakly luminous lowcurrent ionised path.
The low luminosity, low current precursor

of a lightning return stroke, accompanied
by an intense electric field.
The intense electric field causes the leader to develop and is part of it.
RESTRIKES
Subsequent return strokes occurring

after the first return stroke in a multistroke flash are sometimes called
restrikes. A restrike will generally cause
a reattachment.
A subsequent high current surge during the

lightning flash, which has a lower peak
current, a lower action integral, but a
higher di/dt that the first return stroke. This
normally follows the same path as the first
return stroke, but may reattach to a new
location further aft on the aircraft.
The Civilian definition only implies that a restrike is a subsequent stroke.

Subsequent high current surges (i.e. subsequent strokes) only become
restrikes when they interact with an aircraft. Subsequent strokes always
follow the same path as the first stroke and generally do cause a
reattachment.
LIGHTNING
ATTACHMENT ZONES
See Section 3.4 below
STREAMERS
Ionised paths or filaments that emanate

from corona regions on a conducting
body, when the field considerably
exceeds
the
corona
threshold.
Steamers can occur across the surface
of a dielectric, or from the aircraft to the
surrounding atmosphere.
Branch-like ionised paths that occur in the

presence of a direct stroke or under
conditions when lightning strokes are
imminent.
Streamers can occur from an aircraft without it receiving a lightning strike.

Severe electrostatic charging will also cause streamering.
SWEPT STROKE
As the lightning channel remains

substantially stationary in space and
the aircraft moves forward, the lightning
channel sweeps back along its surface,
usually causing re attachment. This is
called a swept stroke but should more
accurately be called a swept flash since
the whole of the flash, including all its
phases, takes part in the process.
A series of successive attachments due to

sweeping of the flash across the surface of
the aircraft by the motion of the aircraft.
A swept stroke is not a series of attachments. The swept stroke effect

causes the successive attachments. In theory a stroke could sweep without
causing attachments.
THERMAL SPARKING
Thermal sparks are burning particles

emitted from arrears of a conducting
surface where the current density is
sufficient to cause vaporisation of the
surface material. Thermal sparking
occurs when a very high current is
Burning particles emitted by rapid melting

and vaporisation of conductive materials
carrying current through a point contact.
Def Stan 59-113 gives a better definition. Thermal sparking does not only
occur due to current through a point contact. The Civilian definition says
nothing about current density.
Unclassified
64
Unclassified
forced to cross a joint between two

conducting materials, which have
imperfect
mating
between
their
surfaces, see Sec 4.2 of Leaflet 2/5. It
can also occur at places on the surface
of a conductor where there is an acute
change of geometry.
J.1.3.4
The 59-113 Zoning definition is:-
Because of the sweeping action of the lightning channel, the proportion of the flash experienced by any particular point depends on its location on the vehicle surface and this
has led to the concept of dividing the surface into 3 Zones depending on the probability of initial attachment, sweeping and hang-on, as follows:Zone 1
Surfaces for which there is a high probability of initial lightning flash attachment (leader or return stroke current, entry and exit).
Zone 2
Surfaces of the vehicle for which there is a low probability of initial attachment but a high probability of a lightning flash (return current) being swept by
airflow from a Zone 1 point of initial flash attachment.
Zone 3
All other surfaces not in Zones 1 and 2. Such areas have a low probability of flash attachment but may carry substantial lightning current between
attachment points situated in Zones 1 or 2. In some Zone 3 areas that current may be due to the whole of the lightning discharge.
Depending on the likely duration of flash hang-on, Zones 1 and 2 may be further divided into Zone A and B regions as follows:Zone 1A
Initial attachment point with low probability of flash hang on for a time in excess of 50 ms, such as a leading edge.
Zone 1B
Initial attachment point with high probability of flash hang on for a time exceeding 50 ms, such as a trailing edge.
Zone 1C A limited area of an aerospace vehicle surface behind Zone 1A into which a leader attachment may be swept and which may therefore experience a first return
stroke attachment.
Zone 2A
A swept stroke zone with low probability of flash hang on for a time in excess of 50 ms, such as a forward or mid position of a Zone 2.
Zone 2B
A swept stroke zone with high probability of flash hang on for a time exceeding 50 ms, such as a trailing edge in Zone 2.
and the ED/ARP definition:Aircraft surface areas and structures classified according to the possibility of lightning attachment, dwell time and current conduction, see ED 91.
65
Unclassified
Unclassified
Comment: One cannot have a level of possibility, an attachment is either possible or not. For example, it is possible to have a return stroke attachment in a Zone 3 area, but
such an event has a very low probability of occurrence.
J.1.4
Discussion Concerning Indirect Effect Assessments
Contrary to the Civilian documents Leaflet 2/4 notes that the UK Military approach to Transient Hazard Assessment is based on measurement and analysis complimenting
each other. Due to the expense and complication of whole aircraft testing, aircraft clearance must be based on analytical techniques supported and validated by tests, unless
the aircraft under consideration is a very simplistic system. This means that for all the systems of interest full threat responses must be predicted for all cables and
equipments. That analysis must then be substantiated by Whole Aircraft pulse tests made on selected cables and equipments.
For clarity this Def Stan now separately defines evaluation requirements when modelling is essential and when it need not be used. Transient level definitions necessitated by
the new approach are given in Section 3.2 above.
J.1.4.2 As explained in Leaflet 2/4 (Sec 3.1) Def Stan 59-113 does not recognise the low level swept CW tests of ED105 as a valid assessment method.
J.1.4.3 Def-Stan 59-113 (Leaflet 1/1) calls for pulse tests to be made at three well spaced current levels up to a peak current value of 50 kA, so that it is possible to compare
the surface current density measurements with computer predictions to confirm the accuracy of the return conductor system design, check the linearity of the measurements
with increasing pulse current, and to provide by extrapolation the full threat current and voltage responses on the cables and at the equipments specified in the Test Plan.
Tests at a single test current level within the range of 1 to 20 kA as allowed by ED105 are not acceptable, neither is the option to try to obtain the correct test current
waveshape rather than a proscribed waveform as is required by 59-113. A Waveform H excitation is not used for 59-113 tests.
Def Stan 59-113 requires that computational methods be used for the design of return conductors.
Def Stan 59-113 does not recognise pin testing and relies on bulk current measurement at the equipment cabling interfaces.
Def Stan 59-113 recommends a closely defined test method rather than the Guidance on Testing given at Section 6.1.6 of ED105, Section 4.4. The common mode voltage
insulation breakdown test of ED105, Section 5.3, says nothing about the need to add the IR and di/dt components of the loop voltage to give the maximum value of the
voltage stressing the insulation.
Def Stan 59-113 transient assessments call for different margins than the Civilian documents inasmuch as the margin shall take account of the confidence which can be
attributed to the verification methods and the criticality of the system concerned, so that the margin is decreased when the verification confidence is high and increased for
highly critical systems. Where such margins cannot be agreed, they shall be 12 dB for Safety and 6 dB for Suitability of Service.
J.1.4.4 With regard to internal environments, Def Stan 59-113 as noted in Annex B3, recognises four standard waveforms for equipment testing:Intermediate pulse, 6.4/70 s
(the IP waveform, equivalent to waveform 1/4 of ED-84)
Short pulse, 100 ns rise 6.4 s to zero crossover
(the SP waveform, equivalent to waveform 2 of ED-84)

Unclassified
66
Unclassified
Long pulse, 50/500 and 40/180 s
the LP waveform, similar to waveform 5 of ED-84)
Damped sinusoidal
(the DS waveform, equivalent to waveform 3 of ED-84)
Annex B3 also gives equipment test levels and installation categories. With regard to the damped sinewave test, 59-113 calls for transients to be injected at the most
susceptible frequencies in the range 2 to 50 MHz found from previous EMC testing and at the frequencies at which maxima and minima cable impedances occur. A test over
the frequency range 2 to 50 MHz is also required. ED14 does not require such rigorous damped sinewave testing. The Def Stan 59-113 requirements are in line with those of
Def-Stan 59-41 and Draft STANAG 4327 and a comparison of the latest documents requirements with Civil standard D0160C, Section 22, was made in reference L0/2.6.
J.1.5
Discussion Concerning Derived External Environment
The Evans method described in Reference L2/2.6 gives a convenient way of combining the maximum parameters of both negative and position strokes. When the ratio of
negative to positive strokes is 9:1, the combined parameters are those given in Table A1.1 of Annex A1 to Chapter 2. The return stroke parameters for the total flash are
therefore as follows set alongside those extracted from ED 84.
Table 8
Parameter
59113 Value
1.4 x 1011 As-1
Max rate of change of current (di/dt)
ED 84 Value
1.4 x 1011 As-1
Peak current
(i pk)
200 kA
Action integral
( i2dt)
3.7 x 106 A2s
2.25x 106 A2s
Charged content
( i dt) (continuing current)
300 C
200 C
It is noted in Annex B2 that is necessary for the design and testing of lightning protective measures to define the threat level in the form of a standard simplified current
waveform, having the relevant parameters set at the chosen degree of severity. The parameters appertaining to the components of that waveform, given in 59-113, are
compared below with those in ED 84.
Table 9
Component
Parameter
59113 Value
ED84 Value
Component A
Peak Current
200 kA
200 kA
(High Current)
Action Integral
3.5 x 106 A2s
2 x 106 A2s
<10 s*
Peak Current
150kA
Component AH
67
Unclassified
150kA
Unclassified

(Swept Leader)
Action Integral
0.8 x 106 A2s
0.8 x 106 A2s
Component B
Average Amplitude
2 kA
2 kA
(Intermediate Current)
Charge Transfer
10 C
10 C
Component C
Amplitude
600 A
200-800A
(Continuing Current)
Duration
0.5 s
1 - 0.25 s
Charge Transfer
300 C
200 C
Component D
Peak Amplitude
100 kA
100 kA
Restrike
Action Integral
6 2
0.25 x 10 A s
6 2
0.25 x 10 A s
(Direct Effect)
<3.5 s*
25 s
It may be noted that ED 84 indicates that Component A is a first return stroke and doubtless many engineers who are not conversant with lightning, assume this to be so,
when in fact, it is a convenient way of combining the worst parameters that occur in an amalgam of negative and positive strikes. The double exponential waveform used to
describe it is in fact nothing like a lightning return stroke, inasmuch as a real lightning return stroke has a slow turn on and the peak di/dt occurs near the crest.
To make allowances for the occurrence of positive strikes with action integrals much greater than those given in Table A1.1, Def Stan 59-113 allows the Project Director to
require the action integral value to be increased by a factor of 2 when evaluating safety critical structure.
In Def Stan 59-113 the dwell time in a swept stroke region is taken to be 50 ms. ED 84, however, does not recognise that dwell time for a short Component C, called C*, the
duration of which is allowed to be anything between 1 and 50 ms according to the type of surface (see Leaflet 2/2, Sec 4.3)
J.1.6
Discussion Concerning Explosive Vapour Assessments
The requirements in 59-113 for Explosive Vapour Hazard Assessments are more detailed than given in any of the Civilian documents. A new term had been used, namely
Energy Required for Ignition (ERI) as distinct from Minimum Ignition Energy Level, as explained in Leaflet 2/5. Where MIE is referred to, it remains at 0.2 mJ, but is only
relevant to ground level temperature and pressure. Much of the content of Leaflet 2/5 is based on information from a QinetiQ Fuels Specialist and, for example, corrects the
error that different explosive gases have different probabilities of ignition, pointing out that the apparent probabilities are a result of experimental error and that an explosive
mixture, either ignites or does not ignite depending on whether or not the mixture reaches a critical temperature.
Unclassified
68
Unclassified
J.1.7
Differences between 59-113 and Draft STANAG's 4236 and 4327
Draft Def-Stan 59-113 is essentially the same as the equivalent sections of the Ratification Drafts of
STANAGs 4326, 4327 and AOP 25, except as noted below. Errors in those drafts have not been considered.
f)
Fuel Hazard Evaluation

In consultation with a fuel combustion expert at QinetiQ Pyestock an attempt
has been made to put some combustion technology into the Hazardous Vapour assessments to counter
the somewhat simplistic outlook of the Civilian approach. The background and rational given in Leaflet
2/5 has been updated in the light of References L2/5.1, L2/5.2 and L2/5.4 so that:1)
Fuel related terms are given, including a new term Energy Required for Ignition (ERI) so that
Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) is a particular case of ERI
2)
Some misconceptions are noted and explained, namely:i)
That MIE is a single value below which it is always impossible to ignite.
ii)
That lightning generated sparks are the same sort as are used to determine MIE and that
iii)
MIE is applicable to the lightning scenario.
iv)
That 0.2mJ MIE is necessarily applicable to aircraft fuel.
v)
That we are always dealing with clean fuel.
vi)
That some gases (in explosive gas tests) have a greater probability of ignition than others
3)
The concept of critical temperature is introduced whereby if there is sufficient energy input for the
mixture to reach that temperature there is ignition, otherwise no ignition no matter how many
attempts to ignite.
4)
Risk assessment and probability of hazard elimination is discussed
5)
A list of fuel related accidents is given
6)
Hydrogen as a test gas is allowed
g)
Unprotected dielectrics are now proscribed in Zone 2 (see Annex 3, Sec 2.2)
h)
Arc generated voltages are discussed (Leaflet 2/2 at Section 2.2 and 8) and HV tests for Zone 2
allowed (Leaflet 1)
i)
Dielectric puncture tests are now allowed in support of Certification (Leaflet 2/2 Sec 8)
j)
A component AH has been added to Tables B2.1 and 2 in Annex B 2
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J.2
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Leaflet 1 - Recommended Test Methods
J.2.1
Introduction
This Leaflet defines the test methods available for inclusion in the Test Plan (TP), when testing is determined
to be necessary by the Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA) required.
J.2.2
Test Methods
J.2.2.1 It is recommended that Test Methods should be selected from those given in Table 10 and Table
11 according to the interaction effects and damage mechanisms under investigation. The recommended
tests are given in Leaflets L1/1 to L1/7 as noted below and will be an acceptable means of demonstrating
compliance, if other tests methods are used it may be necessary to validate their use with the Aircraft Project
Director.
J.3 Leaflet 1/1
Recommendations for Indirect Effects Tests on Whole Aircraft
J.4 Leaflet 1/2
Recommendations for Indirect Effects Tests on Parts of Aircraft
J.5 Leaflet 1/3
Recommendations for Equipment Tests
J.6 Leaflet 1/4
Recommendations for Fuel Hazard Tests
J.7 Leaflet 1/5
Recommended Tests for Direct Effects
J.8 Leaflet 1/6
Recommended Tests for Leader Phase Effects
J.9 Leaflet 1/7
Recommended Methods of Detecting Sparking
J.2.2.2
J.2.3
Test Guidance and Rationale is given in Leaflets 2/4 to 2/8 see J.14 to J.18
General Test Requirements
The following requirements should apply:a)
All tests shall be made at a Test House approved by the Aircraft Project Director.
b)
Evidence shall be available to the Aircraft Project Director that all diagnostic and measuring devices
have been calibrated in accordance with recognised engineering practice, or by calculation from basic
principles, to a standard of accuracy commensurate with the precision required of the test.
c)
Unless otherwise noted the test waveforms specified in Leaflets 1/11/7 shall be as defined in Annex A
and Annex G.
d)
For the tests of Leaflet 1/5, the test item shall be arranged in a co-axial or quasi co-axial return
conductor system, as detailed in the relevant test.
NOTE Guidance concerning the design of return conductor systems is given in Leaflet 2/6.
e)
The test item shall normally be production or equivalent development hardware. Alternatively an
electrical representative simulation of the production configuration may be used if acceptable to the
Aircraft Project Director.
f)
Variations to the test methods shall only be made by agreement with the Aircraft Project Director.
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Test Method
Effects Classification
Title
Direct Effects
Test
Metal Melt Through
Leaflet L1/5 Test L1/5.1
Hot Spot Formation
L1/5.2
Arc Root Damage to CFC Skins
L1/5.3
Arc Root Damage to Metal Sandwich

Panels with Honeycomb Core
L1/5.4
Arc Root Damage to Thin Metal

Sandwich Panels with Ablative Layer
L1/5.5
Arc Root Damage to CFC Sandwich

Panels with Honeycomb Core
L1/5.6
Ohmic Heating
Tests L1/5.7
Magnetic Forces
L1/5.8
Acoustic Shock Wave
Tests L1/5.9
Indirect and Nearby Effects on Whole

Aircraft
Pulse Tests
Leaflet 1/1
Indirect and Nearby Effects on Parts

of Aircraft
Induced Voltage Tests
Leaflet 1/2, Section J4.9
Insulation Integrity Assessment Tests
Damped Sinewave injection tests
Ground voltage injection tests
Multi burst
Dielectric Puncture Tests
Leaflet 1/6
Indirect and
Equipment
Nearby
Effects
on
Leader Phase Effects
See Table 11
Direct and Indirect Effects that may

affect Fuel
NOTE
If it is thought necessary to check the puncture of dielectrics in Zones 2, the test of 5.1.2 of ED105,
Reference L1.1 may be used.
Table 10
Test Methods Approved For Use

Tests
Title
Arc Root & other Group I Tests
Leaflet L1/5 Test L1/5.1-9
Sparking Test
Leaflet L1/7 Sec J9.3
Flammable Gas Test
Leaflet L1/7 Sec J9.4
Induced Voltage
Leaflet 1/2, Sec J4.9
Insulation Breakdown
Leaflet 1/2, Sec J4.10
Table 11
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Reference
Test Applicability for Fuel Systems
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J.3
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Leaflet 1/1 - Recommendations for Indirect Effects Tests on Whole Aircraft
J.3.1
Introduction
This leaflet defines the requirements which must be met when performing indirect effects tests on the whole
aircraft. Further, guidance concerning indirect effects tests on the whole aircraft are given in Leaflet 2/4 see
J14.
J.3.2
Selection and Preparation of Test Item
J.3.2.1
Aircraft Standard and Configuration
Unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project Director, the aircraft used for test shall be fully
representative of a production aircraft with respect to construction, the type and location of access doors and
'electromagnetic apertures' in relation to the system wiring of interest and the type and installation of
equipment, cable runs and wiring relevant to the tests to be made.
J.3.2.2
Operation of Aircraft Equipment During the Tests
Arrangements shall be made so that the systems of interest can be operated during the tests.
J.3.2.3
Modification of Aircraft to Accommodate Diagnostics
The aircraft shall be suitably modified without compromising the above requirements to allow the fitting of the
sensors and diagnostic equipment necessary to make the measurements and if necessary the safety earth.
J.3.2.4
Preparation of Aircraft for Safety
In an aircraft in which fuel has been present, the system shall be made safe, either by filling the tanks and
fuel lines, or by making provision for continuous purging with an inert gas such as nitrogen.
When such purging is used, the oxygen content of the effluent gas shall be continuously monitored and tests
made only when the content is below the acceptable level.
J.3.3
Test Configuration
J.3.3.1
J.3.3.1.1
Return Conductor System

Simulation of the Environment
A return conductor system shall be constructed around the aircraft (see Leaflet 2/4, Section J.14.4) with
provision for simulated lightning excitation between pairs of attachment points as defined in the Test Plan. A
hard wire connection shall be made between the aircraft and the return conductors at the end of the system
remote from the pulse generator.
The return conductor system shall, consistent with an acceptable value of inductance (see Leaflet 2/4,
Section J.14.4), give as nearly as possible the operating environment electromagnetic field pattern around
the aircraft, so that the current density and direction on the aircraft surface, from a lightning test pulse
excitation, are within 20% of that which would actually occur in practice (see Leaflet 2/4, Note 3 J.14).
J.3.3.1.2
Inductance Value
The system shall also be designed, consistent with J3.1.1 above and in conjunction with the design of the
lightning pulse generator, to give an inductance value such that the peak value and maximum di/dt of the
excitation current specified below at Section J3.4.1 shall be achieved.
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J.3.3.1.3
Computer Calculations
Computer calculations shall be made of E field and the aircraft surface current density and direction at points
defined in the Test Plan for comparison with pulse test measurements.
J.3.3.1.4
Termination and Current Attachment Points
The return conductor system shall be designed so that they can be modified to allow selection of the current
attachment points as defined in the Test Plan (see Leaflet 2/4, Section J.14.4.5).
J.3.3.1.5
Isolation
The return conductor system shall be isolated from the aircraft (other than by the attachment points noted
above) and from earth by insulation sufficient to withstand the full voltage of the lightning pulse generator.
J.3.3.1.6
Validation of Return Conductor System
Before the return conductor system (of aircraft and conductors) is used for tests, it shall be validated by
discharging the pulse generator into the system and comparing E field and surface current density
measurements with those predicted at J3.3.1.3 above.
J.3.3.2
Safety Earth and Isolation of Ground Power Supply
Only one connection shall be taken from the Test Site earth system to the pulse generator/aircraft/return
conductor system to form a safety earth, which shall have a low DC resistance but a high impedance above
0.1 MHz. If operation of equipment during the tests entails the use of a test facility power supply, it shall be
isolated from earth with insulation sufficient to withstand the voltage that will appear between the aircraft and
earth when the pulse generator is operating.
J.3.3.3
Connection of Lightning Pulse Generator
A lightning pulse generator shall be hard wired connected to the return conductor system and shall be
isolated from earth, with insulation sufficient to withstand the maximum voltage of the generator.
J.3.4
J.3.4.1
Pulse Tests
Test Waveforms and Maximum Parameters
The pulse generator shall be capable of providing a double exponential pulse (or equivalent clamped
waveform) such that, together with the return conductor system, the following maximum parameters may be
obtained with a waveform which shall be as defined in G.3.2.
dE/dt > 0.25 x 1013 Vm-1s-1
di/dt 0.35 x 1011 As-1
ipk 50 kA
action integral 0.22 x 106 A2s
J.3.4.2
Measurements to be made
According to the requirements of the Test Plan, provision shall be made for the measurement of:a)
dE/dt at the start of the transmission line formed by the return conductors and aircraft arrangement, at a
position halfway along it, and in flux apertures
b)
The generator current waveform.
c)
The current density J at selected points on the exterior surface of the aircraft.
d)
Internal magnetic fields at selected points inside the aircraft, especially in equipment bays.
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e)
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Cable bundle currents on the cables of interest.
Measurement information shall be transmitted to the recording equipment preferably by Fibre Optic Links
(FOLs) or by the careful use of hard wire connections to avoid earth loops, as appropriate to a particular
measurement. The FOLs shall be capable of making measurements over a frequency band of at least 50 Hz
to 50 MHz.
J.3.4.3
Test Levels
Unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project Director pulse tests shall be made, with equipment
operating at (at least) three well spaced current levels up to a peak current value of 50 kA, so that it is
possible to:a)
Compare the surface current density measurements with the computer predictions of section J3.3.1.3
above and hence confirm the accuracy of the return conductor system design, as required at section
J3.3.1.6 above.
b)
Confirm the linearity (or otherwise) of the measurements with increasing pulse current.
c)
To provide by extrapolation the full threat current and voltage responses on the cables and at the
equipments specified in the Test Plan.
J.3.4.4
Common Mode Flash-over and Insulation Breakdown
As required by Annex D.5.h.2), measurements also shall be made of any common-mode voltage between
wires and ground which could result in insulation being stressed to a level at which breakdown or flash-over
might occur (see Leaflet 2/4, Sec J.14.5.1). Such measurements shall be made as follows:a)
The requirements of the sections above shall apply.
b)
High impedance measurement equipment shall be connected at one end of the circuit under test, which
shall otherwise be open circuit and a temporary connection to structure shall be made at the remote
end.
c)
Measurements shall be made at the same levels used in section J3.4.3 either simultaneously with the
measurements of J3.4.3 or separately. Linearity of the measurements shall be demonstrated.
d)
The measured transient waveform shall be separated into di/dt and IR components and the amplitude of
those components extrapolated to full threat.
NOTE 1
The maximum driving voltage capable of threatening insulation will be given by the sum of the extrapolated
components (see Leaflet 2/4, Section J14.4.6).
NOTE 2
If an airworthy aircraft is used, after Pulse Tests it will be necessary to check that all electronic systems are
functioning correctly.
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J.4
J.4.1
Leaflet 1/2 - Recommendations for indirect effects tests on Parts of Aircraft

Introduction
This leaflet defines the requirements which must be met when indirect effects tests are made on wiring or
electrical equipment in parts of aircraft, or sections of an aircraft, when the "whole aircraft tests" of Leaflet
1/1 (see J.3) are not appropriate.
J.4.2
General Requirements for Indirect Effects Tests
The general requirements of Section J3.3 of Leaflet 1 (see J3) shall apply to all the indirect effects tests
noted in this Leaflet.
J.4.3
Combination with Direct Effects Tests
Indirect effects tests may be made at the same time as direct effects tests provided that all the requirements
for both types of test are met and correctly noted in the Test Plan.
J.4.4
Waveform
The waveform shall be waveform D2a defined in G.3.1, unless direct effects tests are also being made. In the
latter case the waveform shall be that needed for the direct effects test with a maximum rate of change of
current commensurate with the test current component being used i.e. for Component A not less than 0.4 x
1011 As-1. For Component D di/dt shall be 1.4 x 1011 As-1.
NOTE
G.3.1 Note 2, gives the requirements for the duration of Component A when composite structures are being
investigated.
J.4.5
Current Path
The current shall be applied to the test object through a solid connection, not an arc. The choice of entry and
exit locations and the design of the return current conductors shall be such that the current in the test object
flows as nearly as possible in a manner corresponding to that anticipated in an actual lightning strike.
J.4.6
Test Levels
The tests shall be conducted at a number of current levels (maintaining the same waveform shape) leading
up to the full level of waveform D2a (or components A & D if direct effects tests are also being made).
The measured peak transients shall be plotted against the peak currents to verify that a linear relationship
exists.
J.4.7
Load Impedances
The wiring forming part of the test object shall be terminated with load impedances simulating, over the
relevant frequency range, those encountered in the actual installation.
J.4.8
Data to be Recorded
For each test 'shot', calibrated waveforms of the test current and the induced transients shall be recorded in
permanent form on a common calibrated time-base so that their relationship in time is known. Consideration
shall be given to the possible need to repeat some shots with different recorder time-bases so that records
may be obtained of both the whole transient and a suitably expanded initial portion. Repeated shots may
also be necessary if the number of recording channels is less than the number of transient monitoring points.
When shots are repeated care shall be taken to ensure that test conditions remain the same.
The signal noise level in each diagnostic shall be recorded to allow calculation of signal to noise ratio.
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J.4.9
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Induced Voltage Measurements
Common-mode and differential-mode measurements shall be made, according to the requirements of the
Test Plan, as noted below.
The requirements of sections J4.2 to J4.8 above shall apply.
Peak induced voltages shall be extrapolated to full threat level as follows:a)
Induced voltages dependent on resistive or diffusion-flux coupling shall be extrapolated linearly to a

current peak value of 200 kA.
b)
Induced voltages dependent on aperture-flux coupling shall be extrapolated linearly to a test current rate
of change of 1.4 x 1011 As-1.
If a fault such as voltage flash-over or sparking is observed, the threshold level of test current at which it
occurs shall be recorded, and the measurements repeated at a test current level just below this threshold.
The Aircraft Project Director shall be consulted before proceeding with further tests.
J.4.10
Insulation Breakdown and Voltage Flashover Assessment
When the Test Plan requires insulation breakdown and voltage flash-over assessment tests to be made to
satisfy the requirements of D.5 h) 2) remote earth induced voltage measurements shall be made as noted
in Leaflet 1/1, section J3.4.4 (a), (b) and (d) (see Leaflet 2/4, Sections J14.5.1 and J14.6).
NOTE 2 Guidance concerning indirect effects tests on parts of aircraft is given in Leaflet 2/4, (see J14.5).
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J.5
Leaflet 1/3 - Recommendations for Equipment Tests
J.5.1
Introduction
This leaflet defines the requirements that must be met when Equipment Tests are made in accordance with
Annex E. Background and guidance concerning these tests is given in Leaflet 2/7 (see J.17). The tests are
based on those given in Def Stan 59-41.
J.5.2
J.5.2.1
General Requirements for Damped Sinewave and Ground Voltage Tests

General
The general requirements of Leaflet 1 Section J.2.3 (a), (b), (e) and (f) shall apply to both damped sinewave
and ground voltage tests as well as those given in section J5.2.2 to J5.2.7 below, unless otherwise stated in
sections J5.3, 4 and J5.5 below.
J.5.2.2
Ground Plane
In order to provide a reference plane, the equipment under test (EUT) shall normally be mounted on a solidplate metallic ground plane having a minimum thickness of 0.25 mm for copper, 0.5 mm for aluminium (nonpreferred because of oxidation) and 0.63 mm for brass, with a minimum area of 2.25 m2 and minimum side
length of 0.7 m. The ground plane shall be bonded to the screened room walls (along the longer side nearest
the wall) at not more than 0.9 m intervals. The dc resistance between the ground plane and the walls shall
not exceed 2.5 milliohms.
J.5.2.3
Line Impedance Stabilising Networks (LISN)
In order to eliminate possible differences in power supply impedance at different EMC Test Houses, and to
provide a defined impedance, a LISN shall be included in all power supply leads to the EUT. A circuit
diagram of a suitable LISN is given in Figure 15. When selecting LISNs, care should be taken to ensure that
individual components withstand the voltages that will be encountered during the tests.
A 10 F feed-through capacitor shall be connected on the supply side of the LISN, unless already
incorporated within the LISN. When used on dc power supplies, an additional 30,000 F (min) Electrolytic
capacitor of appropriate rating shall be connected between positive and negative on the power supply side of
the LISN to improve its low frequency performance and simulate the dc supply.
J.5.2.4
Equipment Layout and Lead Lengths
J.5.2.4.1 The EUT power leads and interconnecting cable forms shall whenever possible be of a length,
type and layout representative of the aircraft, and an installation as similar as possible to that of the aircraft
should be used. To simulate the ground loop area of a typical installation where wiring runs cannot always
be clamped directly to the vehicle structure over the whole of the cable length, interconnecting cables shall
be supported above the ground plane on 50 mm insulated stand-offs (e.g. Styrofoam, plastic etc.).
J.5.2.4.2 When the aircraft cable form length is not known, control and signal cable lengths shall be 2m
0.1m. Primary power lines shall always be 1m 0.1m. When the length of an interconnecting cable form is
greater than 2m, the leads must be deployed in a defined manner. The cable form shall be arranged so that
any excess length is zig-zagged across the test bench on 50 mm supports (see Leaflet 2/7, Section
J17.6.2.2). The lengths of the cable forms used shall be recorded in the Test Report.
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J.5.2.5
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Bonding of Equipment under Test
J.5.2.5.1 The provisions included in the design of the EUT and specified in the installation instructions
shall be used:a)
to bond the EUT items together, such as equipment case and mount, and/or
b)
to bond the EUT to the ground plane.
J.5.2.5.2 When used, bonding jumpers and their routing shall conform as close as possible to those
specified for the installation, including the method of connection and type of bonding lead.
J.5.2.5.3 Equipments intended to be grounded through a third wire shall be grounded via that method,
unless a special installation requires otherwise. When that is so, the EUT shall be placed on an insulating
mat.
J.5.2.5.4 When EUTs are secured to mounting bases having shock or vibration isolators, bonding straps
when furnished with mounting bases, shall be connected to the ground plane. If bonding straps are not
specified, none shall be fitted.
J.5.2.5.5 Portable equipment shall not be bonded to the ground plane during testing unless the installation
specification so requires. Portable equipment that is grounded through the power cable shall not be bonded
to the ground plane but shall be mounted on insulating material 50 mm above the ground plane.
J.5.2.5.6 When an external terminal lug, stud or connector pin is available for a ground connection on the
EUT, it shall be used if normal installation so indicates. When the installation is unknown, the ground
terminal or pin shall not be used.
J.5.2.6
EUT Interface Loads
EUTs shall have their appropriate loads connected even when those loads are not part of the EUT (see
Leaflet 2/7, Sec J17.6.2.4).
J.5.2.7
Excitation of Equipment Under Test
The mode(s) of operation of the equipment to be used for the tests and the various criteria for performance
verification shall be defined in the Test Plan. The Test Plan shall also define the standard of the equipment
under test together with details of the inter-face to support equipment if appropriate (see Leaflet 2/7,
Section J17.6.2.4).
J.5.3
J.5.3.1
Damped Sinewave Injection Test

Test Arrangement and Description
J.5.3.1.1 The unit to be tested (unit under test - UUT) shall be arranged with the other associated
equipment (equipment under test - EUT) necessary for the test (see Leaflet 2/7 Sections J.17.2.1 and
J.17.4) as shown in Figure 16. It may be necessary to connect more than one unit of the EUT to the UUT
but only one is shown in Figure 16.
J.5.3.1.2 Damped sinewave transients of frequency waveshape and amplitude as defined below, supplied
by a transient generator, shall be injected on to the cable bundle of interest with an injection probe. The
injected current is monitored with the measurement probe and recorded with either a transient digitiser or a
storage oscilloscope, together with the voltage generated in a single turn monitoring loop around the
injection probe. The amplitude of the injected current is increased until one of the following occurs:a)
the current limit given in section J5.3.3 below is reached,
b)
the voltage limit given in section J5.3.3 (measured on the single turn monitor loop) is reached,
c)
the product of a and b reaches the prescribed limit given in section J5.3.3 (see Note),
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d)
equipment degradation or malfunction occurs.
NOTE
If the test is stopped at the current limit, the levels achieved in the test need to be carefully compared with
the aircraft TCL data as transient levels may have been defined as a voltage test level (converse may be true if TCLs
specified in terms of current). It is a common misconception that a successful test has been done if either the voltage or
current levels/limits are reached.
J.5.3.1.3 The calibration jig, illustrated in Figure 17 and Figure 18, is used to ensure that the damping
factor of the injected waveform is within the specified limits given in Figure 19. The jig is fitted at one end
with a 50 ohm load and at the other end with a 50 ohm attenuator (which feeds the transient digitiser or
storage oscilloscope) so that the effective load on the injection coil is 100 ohms (Figure 18).
J.5.3.2
J.5.3.2.1
Test Equipment Characteristics

Injection Probe
The injection probe shall be provided with a high voltage connector and have the following characteristics:Those of ERA probe Type 36A, salient details of which are as follows:a)
Frequency range:
2 - 200 MHz CW
b)
Self inductance:
0.7 H 20%
c)
Self resonant frequency:
40 MHz 25%
d)
Impedance of resonance:
328 ohms 25%
e)
Insertion loss:
at 2 MHz
at 5 MHz
at 10 MHz
at 20 MHz
at 50 MHz
at 100 MHz
at 200 MHz
17 dB 1.5 dB
10 dB 1.5 dB
6.0 dB 1.5 dB
4.5 dB 1.5 dB
4.5 dB 1.5 dB
4.5 dB 1.5 dB
5.0 dB 1.5 dB
J.5.3.2.2 Current Measurement (Monitor) Probe

The current measurement probe shall be capable of recording the transient without saturation due to either
the normal current in the cable or the injected transient current.
J.5.3.2.3 Voltage Monitoring Probe
The voltage monitoring probe when used with the digitiser or oscilloscope shall have a minimum bandwidth
of 200 MHz. The probe capacitance shall be < 5 pF and the input resistance shall be > 4000 ohms (see
Leaflet 2/7 J17, Section 5.2 i).
J.5.3.2.4
Digitiser or Storage Oscilloscope
The digitiser or storage oscilloscope shall have a minimum band width of 200 MHz and, in the case of the
digitiser, a sampling rate >0.1 GHz with a resolution better than 10 ns per point.
J.5.3.3
Test Waveform and Test Limits
The test waveform shall be the DS waveform of H.2.2 (see Figure 13). Frequencies shall be selected for the
injection test as noted in section 3.5 below. The amplitude limits for this waveform are as follows:a)
79
When Transient Control Levels (TCLs) are not known (see Leaflet 2/7 Section J.17.1.1), the limits
given in H.4.2 shall be used for the ETDL;
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b)
Figure 14
c)
Where TCLs are known (see Leaflet 2/7 Section J.17.1.2), the appropriate current or voltage limit shall
be the relevant TCL plus the margin determined according to E.4.
J.5.3.4
Test Waveform Calibration
The injection probe shall be fitted to the calibration rig described in section J.5.3.1.3 above and the transient
generator waveform shall be checked to see that it falls within the limits given in Figure 14 of Annex H as
follows:at 10% of the maximum kVA rating given in
a)
Figure 14
at the maximum kVA rating given in

b)
Figure 14
c)
both at the band centre and the band edges of each tuning range of the transient generator.
J.5.3.5
Selection of Transient Test Frequencies
During injection tests, transients shall be injected at the frequencies defined in Annex 0 as follows:a)
The most susceptible frequencies in the range 2 to 50 MHz found from any previous CW bulk current
injection EMC testing.
b)
The frequencies, at which maxima and minima cable impedances occur, see section.J.5.3.6 below, and
the frequencies of the HF responses given by the appropriate TCLs of Annex E where these are known.
c)
Over the frequency range 2 to 50 MHz inclusive not less than 50 frequencies such that any resonances
in the EUT internal circuitry are excited, so subjecting any active or passive devices to maximum voltage
or current threat. These frequencies shall be spaced evenly with a logarithmic increment. The
approximate frequency of each injection is obtained by the use of the following equation:Test frequency (MHz) = 10(0.3 + 0.028k)
where k = 0, 1, 2, 3 to 49 for 50 frequencies
J.5.3.6
Measurement of Cable Loom Impedance
J.5.3.6.1 Low level swept CW signals shall be injected into the interconnecting cable forms or power lines
under test over the frequency range 2 to 50 MHz, using the injection probe. The ratio of the injected cable
voltage (measured on the voltage monitor loop around the injection probe) to injected cable current is a
measure of the modulus of the cables bulk RF impedance. A plot of the measured impedance against
frequency shall be included in the test report.
J.5.3.6.2 Prior to the measurement of the loom impedance, the measurement system shall be calibrated
such that any aberrations in the system may be removed. The use of a network analyser or similar is
required. Approximately 1mW of power is applied to the injection probe sweeping the frequency range 2 to
50 MHz. A short turn of wire is placed around the probe such that the induced driving voltage around the
loop may be measured. The probe is placed on a short loop of wire that is terminated in a known value of
resistance, typically 100 ohms. The resulting induced current in this loop is monitored with the measurement
probe. The network analyser is set to display the voltage divided by current against frequency, hence
impedance is obtained. The display should at this stage have no major aberrations. Normalisation may be
used to obtain a flat amplitude response. The terminating resistor shall be changed to a value 20 dB higher
and then 20 dB lower, in order to demonstrate that the measurement system is functioning correctly.
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J.5.3.7
Injection Test
J.5.3.7.1 All the cable bundles specified in the Test Plan shall be tested individually with the injection and
measurement probes placed at the distances from the relevant connections on the UUT specified in Figure
16. For primary power lines the test shall be made at the UUT connector end of the cable. For other cables
the test shall be applied at each end of the cable where the cable under test is linking two or more EUT
boxes. The spacing of 50 mm (see Figure 16) shall be maintained between the EUT connector shell or any
extension of that shell and the face of the current measurement probe.
J.5.3.7.2 The equipment shall be operated according to the requirements of section J5.2.7 above and
monitored for degradation or malfunction.
J.5.3.7.3 When TCLs are not known, pulses shall be injected at the frequencies defined in section J5.3.5
above at progressively increasing levels, starting at 50% full threat and increasing in approximately 10%
steps, until either one of the test limits, defined in section J5.3.3 above, is reached (current, voltage or kVA)
or equipment degradation or malfunction occurs. If degradation or malfunction does not occur at least 5
transients shall be injected at the maximum amplitude at each frequency. The time interval between
transients shall be a minimum of 2 seconds in order to ensure that the generator gives the required output
for each pulse.
J.5.3.7.4 When TCLs are known, pulses shall be injected as required by section J.5.7.3 above except
that the current limit shall be the substantiated ETDLs of E.2.6 or E.3.5.
NOTE
With digital systems, if the lightning pulse coincides with clocking pulses or other data transfer actions, data
corruption could occur and it may be necessary to inject more pulses in order to achieve confidence of required error
rates. This latter situation shall be identified in the Test Plan.
J.5.3.7.5
If susceptibility occurs, the transient level shall be reduced to obtain the threshold of malfunction.
J.5.3.7.6 The test report shall contain details of the induced transient current and probe loop voltage in
addition to the frequencies selected for test. The loom current at each frequency is to be recorded
graphically together with an indication of where failure has occurred during the test.
J.5.4
J.5.4.1
Ground Voltage Injection Tests

Identification of Units to be Tested
J.5.4.1.1 If at any two units of an EUT are mounted less than 0.5 m apart and their ground bonding points
are taken to the same part of the aircraft structure, they shall be regarded as a single unit and tested as a
single UUT.
J.5.4.1.2 If any two units of an EUT are mounted less than 0.5 m apart and their ground bonding points
are connected to different parts of the aircraft structure, they shall be tested as two separate UUTs.
J.5.4.2
Test Arrangement and Description
J.5.4.2.1 The unit to be tested (UUT) shall be arranged with the other associated equipment (EUT)
necessary for the test (see Leaflet 2/7, Paras J.17.2.1 and 4) as shown Figure 19.
J.5.4.2.2 The UUT shall be spaced 50 mm from the ground plane and insulated from it with material
capable of withstanding the maximum test voltage.
J.5.4.2.3 Interconnecting cable looms shall be laid out in such a manner as to minimise any non
representative inductive coupling (see Leaflet 2/7 Para J.17.7 (a)).
J.5.4.2.4 All grounding straps, safety earths, signal earths etc. which are normally grounded to the same
part of the aircraft structure within 0.5 m of the UUT, shall be connected to the grounding terminal on the
UUT.
81
Unclassified
Unclassified
J.5.4.2.5 The transient generator, set to give one of the waveforms specified in Figure 10, Figure 11or
Figure 12 of Annex H (depending on which test is to be made), shall be connected between the UUT
grounding terminal and the ground plane with the generator test leads specified at section J5.4.2.6 below. A
storage oscilloscope shall be arranged to display and record both the output voltage and current of the
generator. The output voltage shall be measured with a high impedance high voltage probe and the current
by either a suitable current probe (as shown in Figure 19) or a current monitor output on the pulse
generator.
J.5.4.2.6 The generator test leads shall be solid copper links 2 mm thick, 25 mm wide and not more than
75 mm long.
J.5.4.2.7 After verifying the generator calibration (see section J4.4.5 below) and selecting the required
waveform, both positive and negative transients are injected between the UUT and the ground plane,
progressively increasing the test level until one of the following occurs:a)
the current limit given in section J5.4.4 below is reached,
b)
the voltage limit given in section J5.4.4 is reached,
c)
equipment degradation or malfunction occurs.
(See note in section J5.3.1)

J.5.4.3
Test Waveforms and Transient Generator
J.5.4.3.1 The transient test generators shall produce the four waveforms defined in H.2.2, as short pulse
(SP), intermediate pulse (IP) and long pulse (LP) as below:The generator should be capable of achieving the maximum test limit levels given in Table 4 of Annex H,
i.e.:Short pulse
3200 A
or
1600 V
Intermediate pulse
3200 A
or
1600 V
Long pulse
10000 A
or
2000 V
J.5.4.4
Test Categories and Levels
J.5.4.4.1 Where TCLs are not known and modelling has not been done five equipment categories (A - E)
are defined in H.3.2 and test levels appropriate to those categories with a tolerance of 10% are defined in
Table 4 of Annex H.
J.5.4.4.2 Where equipment and cables can be defined in more than one of the categories noted, the test
levels associated with the more severe environment shall be applied:J.5.4.4.3 Where TCLs are not known and modelling has been done, the waveform shall be selected
according to the equipment categories given in Annex H and the current limit shall be the relevant CTL plus
the margin determined according to E.4.
J.5.4.4.4 Where TCLs are known the waveform shall be selected according to the equipment categories
given in Annex H and the current limit shall be the relevant TCL plus the margin determined according to
E.4.
Unclassified
82
Unclassified
J.5.4.5
Calibration of Transient Generator
J.5.4.5.1 The test leads defined in section J5.4.2.6 above shall be connected to the generator and left
open circuit and a high impedance high voltage oscilloscope probe connected at the open circuit ends.
Selecting each waveform in turn (short, intermediate, long), the generator shall be operated in turn for both
positive and negative polarity waveform and the output level adjusted to give the maximum peak voltage
particular to the test category of interest. The waveform shall comply with the parameters given in Figure 10,
Figure 11 or Figure 12 as appropriate and shall be recorded for inclusion in the test report.
J.5.4.5.2 The test leads shall be short circuited and either the current monitor output of the generator (if
available) or a current probe shall be connected to the oscilloscope to measure the generator output current.
Selecting each waveform in turn (short, intermediate, long), the generator shall be operated in turn for both
positive and negative polarity waveform and the output level adjusted to give the maximum peak current
particular to the test category of interest. The waveform shall comply with the parameters given in Figure 10,
Figure 11 or Figure 12 as appropriate and shall be recorded for inclusion in the test report.
J.5.4.6
Injection Test
J.5.4.6.1
below:-
The equipment shall be tested with both positive and negative polarity pulses according to
a)
The equipment shall be operated according to the requirements of section J5.2.7 above and monitored
for degradation or malfunction.
b)
When TCLs are not known, with the waveform selected as appropriate to the equipment test category
given in Table 4 of Annex H (see section J5.4.4 above) and injecting three transients at each level,
pulses shall be injected at progressively increasing levels, starting at 50% full threat and increasing in
approximately 10% steps, until either one of the test limits, defined in Table 4 of Annex H is reached
(current or voltage) or equipment degradation or malfunction occurs.
c)
When TCLs are known, pulses shall be injected as required by b) above except that the limits shall be
the substantiated ETDLs of E.2.6 or E.3.5.
d)
When testing equipment using the Long Pulse if the voltage limit is reached before the current limit,
testing shall be stopped and recommenced using the Intermediate waveform at CAT D levels.
e)
At the test limit, if equipment degradation or malfunction has not occurred, 10 pulses separated by at
least 8 seconds over a period of not more than 2 minutes shall be injected.
A typical set of current and voltage waveforms shall be recorded and included in the Test Report.
J.5.4.6.2 If susceptibility occurs, the transient level shall be reduced to obtain the threshold of malfunction.
The current and voltage levels at the threshold of malfunction shall be recorded.
J.5.5
Multiple Burst Tests
Tests to ascertain that equipment is not at risk when subjected to the Multiple Burst Environment given in
A.3.3 shall be as follows:The Damped Sinewave Test defined in section J5.3 above shall be repeated but using the waveform
and amplitude limits defined in H.5.
83
Unclassified
Unclassified
For Details of Inductor See Below.

Tappings at 25% 50% and 75%
Terminal
To Supply
L1
To EUT
Details
of L1
100R
0.05F
10R
0.05F
33pF
To 50 Ohm Measuring
Set or 50 Ohm
Terminator
10F Feed Through

Bushing Capacitor
10R
100R
100R
All Resistors 2W Rating
0.25F
LISN Chassis
Current
Rating
A
Inductance
Inside Diameter
Length
mm
mm
Number of Turns
Conductor Cross
Section
mm
10
25.4
32
20
1.6 diameter
100
50
115
28
6 diameter
500
90
178
11
12.5 square
Figure 15
Details of Line Impedance Stabilisation Network (LISN)
Unclassified
84
Unclassified
Figure 16
85
Test Arrangement for Damped Sinewave Injection Test
Unclassified
Unclassified
Transient
Recorder
Monitor Turn around

Injection Probe together
with Oscilloscope Probe
50 ohm load
50 ohm attenuator
Transient
Generator
Calibration Jig
Figure 17
Calibration Jig Schematic
Injection Probe
Signal Source
Transient Generator
High impedance, high

voltage divider or
50 ohm attenuator
Calibration Jig
50 ohm
Load
50 ohm load
Figure 18
To
Oscilloscope
Calibration Jig Equivalent Circuit
Unclassified
86
Unclassified
Figure 19
87
Test Arrangement for Ground Voltage Injection Test
Unclassified
J.6
Unclassified
Leaflet 1/4 - Recommendations for Fuel Hazard Tests
J.6.1
Introduction
This leaflet defines the requirements which must be met when hazard assessment tests are made on fuel
systems. When such tests are specified as part of the LHDA they shall be selected from those listed in Table
L5 of Leaflet 1 (see J2) and noted in the Test Plan. It should be noted that that ethylene or hydrogen is used
for the flammable gas tests (see Section J15.4.4 of Leaflet 2/5).
J.6.2
Arc Root Tests
Arc Root Tests shall be in accordance with the relevant sections of Leaflet 1/5 (Tests J.7.1- J7.9)
J.6.3
Sparking Test
J.6.3.1
J.6.3.1.1
Test Requirements
The general requirements of Section J2.3 of Leaflet 1 shall apply.
J.6.3.1.2 The test sample may be a panel or fuel system component (such as a filler cap), a section of
structure (such as part of a fuel tank), or a section of an assembly, or a complete major assembly (such as a
fuel tank). When the former are used they shall be mounted in a light tight box so designed to ensure
compliance with section J6.3.1.3 below and able to accept the spark detection instrumentation noted in
J.6.3.1.7 below. Modifications to major assemblies for the installation of spark detecting equipment shall also
be made in such a way that the requirements of section J6.3.1.3 below are satisfied.
J.6.3.1.3 The test current attachment points and the design of the return current conductor configuration
shall be as noted in the Test Plan which shall define the lightning current paths through the test object so
that the current distribution corresponds as nearly as possible to that which is likely to result should an actual
lightning strike occur. It may be necessary for more than one current path to be tested corresponding to
different sets of lightning attachment points on the aircraft, should it be impossible to define one set of
attachments that give a worst case current distribution.
The test current connections shall be hard wired to the test object except that an open arc shall be used
when localised high current densities are required (e.g. to a fastener), or when this test is combined with an
arc root damage test.
J.6.3.1.4 When an open arc is used it shall not be less than 50 mm long and should be initiated by a fine
wire, not exceeding 0.1 mm diameter. The wire may be either metallic (e.g. copper) or carbon fibre. A Jet
Diverting Electrode is not needed unless arc root tests are being made.
J.6.3.1.5
The test arrangement shall be referred to earth potential at one point only.
J.6.3.1.6 A record shall be made of the arc voltage and the arc current on a common calibrated time base,
so that the relationship of voltage and current with respect to time can be determined.
J.6.3.1.7 Spark detection equipment shall be installed and any sparking that occurs during the tests
detected by either method A or B, or a combination of both methods, as defined in Leaflet 1/7 (see J.9 Note
5 of this Leaflet, and Leaflet 2/5 J.15). Equivalent methods may be used by agreement with the Aircraft
Project Director.
J.6.3.1.8 Tests for sparking may be included in tests for other failure mechanisms where test currents with
high action integrals are employed provided that all the requirements for all the tests are observed (see
section J6.5 note 3). Direct effects sparking tests may also be combined with the measurement of induced
voltages on wiring inside the test object and the detection of sparking due to those voltages, provided that
the special requirements of section J6.5 notes 3-5 of this leaflet are met.
Unclassified
88
Unclassified
J.6.3.2
Test Waveform
The Test Waveform shall be as noted in section J6.5 of this leaflet
J.6.4
Flammable Gas Test
J.6.4.1
J.6.4.1.1
Test Requirements
The general requirement of section J.2.3 of Leaflet 1 shall apply.
J.6.4.1.2 The test sample will generally be a complete major assembly such as a fuel tank or a complete
'wet wing', although panels, fuel system components or sections of an assembly may also be tested. When
the latter is so the 'fuel side' of the sample shall be enclosed in a gas-tight cell provided with 'blow off' panels.
Major assemblies shall also be modified to incorporate such panels. The gas cell or major assembly shall
have provision for a continuous flow of the prescribed gas/air mixture (see section J6.4.1.3 below) through
it. A test cell, fitted with a calibrated spark source (see section J6.4.1.7 below) to allow the ignitability of the
gas/air mixture to be proved, shall be arranged so that both the inflow and outflow test sample mixture can
alternatively flow through the cell. The blow off panels, spark source and gas/air supplies shall be installed in
such a way that the requirements of section J6.4.1.5 below are met.
J.6.4.1.3 The explosive mixture shall be either ethylene/air in a proportion 1.4 times richer than
stoichiometric or hydrogen, oxygen, argon, (5% hydrogen, 12% oxygen and 83% argon, Ref Leaflet1 J2.4.1).
There shall be 'continuous flow mixing' of the gas and air and the mixture shall flow through the test sample
until the out-flowing mixture continuously has the correct composition and is shown to be ignitable.
NOTE 1
The exhaust mixture from the test sample should be collected or safely vented. Areas external to the sample
where leakage could occur should be sealed to atmosphere and continuously purged with nitrogen.
NOTE 2
Ignition probability at the rich and lean limits where the energy excess over the critical temperature is
vanishingly small will be very sensitive to mixture properties. A failure to meet the critical temperature (see Section J15.2
of Leaflet 2/5) by as little as 5C will probably result in non-ignition or failed propagation. This requires the mixture
strength to be controlled to 0.5% or better. Probably of more significance is the ability to generate repeatable spark
conditions where spark energies may need to be controlled to better than 1%. A 1% increase in energy would give a
10C increase in flame kernel temperature which would double the reaction rate
J.6.4.1.4 The calibration spark source shall be a gap to give a spark discharging a suitable value capacitor
charged to a voltage such that the energy stored immediately before flash-over of the gap is 0.2 mJ 1%.
J.6.4.1.5 The test current attachment points and the design of the return current conductor configuration
shall be as noted in the Test Plan which shall define the lightning current paths through the test object so
that the current distribution corresponds as nearly as possible to that which is likely to result should an actual
lightning strike occur. It may be necessary for more than one current path to be tested corresponding to
different sets of lightning attachment points on the aircraft should it be impossible to define one set of
attachments that give a worst case current distribution. The test current connections shall be hard wired to
the test object except that an open arc shall be used when localised high current densities are required.
J.6.4.1.6 When an open arc is used it shall not be less than 50 mm long and should be initiated by a fine
wire, not exceeding 0.1 mm diameter. The wire may be either metallic (e.g. copper) or carbon fibre. A Jet
Diverting Electrode is not needed.
J.6.4.1.7 A record shall be made of the test current on a calibrated time base, so that the total action
integral of the test current may be determined. The voltage across the load may also be recorded on a
common calibrated time base (when hard wire connections are used) as an aid to the analysis of the test
results.
J.6.4.1.8 Simulated lightning discharges shall be made to the test object. Using the test cell and spark
source, both the inflow and outflow mixture shall be checked immediately before and after each shot. Tests
shall not be made if the mixture fails to ignite before an intended shot. If it fails to ignite after a shot, that test
shall be ignored and repeated.
89
Unclassified

J.6.4.2
Unclassified
Test Waveform
The Test Waveform shall be as noted in section J6.5.

J.6.4.3
Regarding Ignition Probability
It is noted in Leaflet 2/5, Section J15.2.5, that if there is sufficient energy to start the combustion process
when the first spark is applied, and if all parameters are maintained strictly constant including a fresh sample
for each attempt at ignition, all subsequent sparks will ignite. Conversely, if the above caveats are held and
there is insufficient energy in the first spark to ignite the mixture, subsequent sparks of exactly the same
energy will not ignite, no matter how many are applied. For this reason, given a flammable mixture, it is valid
to take the ignition probability as unity, when trying to state a probability of a catastrophic event occurring
due to unsuppressed sparking due to lightning
J.6.5
Test Waveforms
The test current waveforms shall be selected from those defined in Table 3 in Annex G according to the
lightning attachment Zone of the test object, as follows:a)
Zone 1A. Component A, with initial rate of rise not less than 0.4 x 1011 As-1.
b)
Zone 1B and 3. Component A, but with an action integral increased to 3.75 x 106 A2s and an initial rate
of rise not less than 0.4 x 1011 As-1.
c)
Zone 2B. Component D, with 1.4 x 1011 As-1 initial rate of rise of current and di/dt exceeding 0.25 x 1011
As-1 for more than 0.5 s as defined for waveform D2a of Annex G.
NOTE 1
When voltage sparking is also being evaluated the initial rate of rise shall be as defined in Waveform D,
11
-1
alternatively a second test shall be made using Component D with a maximum di/dt of 1.4 x 10 As ).
NOTE 2
When it can be shown that only voltage sparking will occur, Waveform D shall be used. When it can be
shown that voltage sparking will not occur, Components A or D without a specified initial rate of rise may be used.
NOTE 3
When it can be shown that the test object as a whole will never be subjected to the full current of a lightning
strike, the test current amplitudes may be scaled down proportionately.
NOTE 4
When tests for other failure mechanisms are being conducted in the same series of tests, then either the
appropriate waveforms for the different mechanisms shall be applied in separate tests or else waveforms shall be
chosen, in agreement with the Aircraft Project Director, which adequately test for all the mechanisms simultaneously.
NOTE 5
When sparking and flash-over in fuel system wiring is being evaluated, the lightning current test waveform
11
-1
11
-1
shall be Component D, with 1.4 x 10 As (Air) or 10 As (Ground) initial rate of rise of current and di/dt exceeding
11
-1
0.25 x 10 As for more than 0.5 s.
J.6.6
Conditioning of Test Sample by Repeated Testing
It should be noted that the repeated passage of high current through a joint reduces the tendency for that
joint to spark. The number of simulated lightning discharges (shots) applied to each test sample shall
therefore be limited to take this into consideration and unless otherwise agreed with the Aircraft Project
Director shall be limited to 4 shots. For tests which involve both conduction and arc attachment shots, the
conduction shots shall be made first. When, however, deciding the number of samples for a certification test
factors to consider include whether or not the sample is representative of the aircraft installation at new build,
and whether or not it would still represent the build after the aircraft had been in service for some time. There
is also the problem of manufacturing variants. Not withstanding what has been said above regarding ignition
probability, little confidence can be given to one sample surviving the test threat. For example as noted in
Leaflet 2/5 (see J15) when dealing with munitions.
NOTE
A single item on test is 50% reliably insensitive to the test threat with a 50% confidence level, rising to 85%
reliability that the item is insensitive with an 80% confidence if 10 items are tested.
Unclassified
90
Unclassified
J.7
Leaflet 1/5 - Recommended Tests for Direct Effects
J.7.1
Introduction
This leaflet defines the requirements which should be met when tests for direct effects are required by the
LHDA. Guidance concerning direct effect tests is given in Leaflet 2/6 (see J16). Test Waveforms will be
found in Annex G.
J.7.2
Tests
NOTE 1
The test waveforms prescribed below are noted according to the attachment zones relevant to that part of
the aircraft of interest and are based on the requirements of Table 3 in Annex G, the particular waveform used being
selected accordingly to the damage mechanism under investigation.
NOTE 2
It is not necessary to employ the whole composite waveform in a test; combinations of the components may
be selected from those appropriate to the Zone in which the test object is situated and the particular damage mechanism
being investigated. Consequently not all of the waveform components are necessarily used in the tests given in this
Leaflet. It is however, important for the components employed to be placed in their correct order in time (and not
necessarily in the order given in the composite waveform) and immediately following one and another (i.e. the following
waveform component should start within 1 ms of the cessation of the preceding component). Details of the waveform
components to be used in a particular test are given below in Table 12.
NOTE 3
The Aircraft Project Director may require the
Table 2 action integral parameters of Annex G to be increased by a factor of 2 when testing safety critical structures
(see Annex A, Note 3 to A.3.3).
J.7.2.1
J.7.2.1.1
Test L1/5.1 Metal Melt Through

Test Requirements:
a)
The general requirements of Leaflet 1 Section J2.3 shall apply.
b)
The test object shall be connected to the lightning current generator by an open arc to the point of test
and the test current shall return to the generator via a return conductor configuration which shall be
designed to assist in stabilising the arc channel and to produce the correct current distribution for a
distance of not less than 400 mm from the centre of the arc root.
c)
The test electrode shall be of the 'jet diverting type' (see Leaflet 2/6 J16). The arc shall be not less than
50 mm long and may be initiated by a fine wire, not exceeding 0.1 mm diameter. The wire may be either
metallic (e.g. copper) or carbon fibre.
d)
The test arrangement shall be referred to earth potential at one point only.
e)
The moment of penetration shall be detected and recorded on the time base used for voltage and
current measurements, if this is a necessary part of the test.
J.7.2.1.2
Test Waveform: See Table 12.
NOTE
Notwithstanding that Table 3 in Annex G does not denote a Component D for attachment zone 1A, that
component has been specified for Zone 1A in Test L1/ 5.1 (this leaflet J7). This is to allow for the remote chance of a
restrike affecting a 1A region, which must be allowed as the time interval between negative strikes can be <8 ms (Table
8 of Leaflet 2/1 see J11, 95% percentile). At 100 knots the distance moved in 8 ms is 0.4m.
J.7.2.2
Test L1/5.2 Hot Spot Formation
J.7.2.2.1 Test Requirements:

a)
91
As for those for Test L1/5.1 (Metal Melt Through a - d).

Unclassified

b)
Unclassified
The temperature of the inner surface under the arc root shall be measured by the use of temperature
sensitive paints, thermo-couples, thermal imaging cameras, or other forms of temperature measuring
systems which can be used without the risk of disturbance by the high electro-magnetic fields created by
the test current.
J.7.2.2.2
J.7.2.3
J.7.2.3.1

Test L1/5.3 Arc Root Damage Tests for CFC Skins
Test Requirements:
a)
As those for Test L1/5.1 (Metal Melt Through a - d).
b)
The extent of the damage shall be assessed by methods decided by the Aircraft Project Director.
J.7.2.3.2
J.7.2.4 Test L1/5.4 Arc Root Damage on Metal Sandwich Panels with Non Conducting Honeycomb
Core
J.7.2.4.1
Test Requirements:
a)
b)
J.7.2.4.2
J.7.2.5
J.7.2.5.1

Test L1/5.5 Arc Root Damage on Thin Metal Sandwich Panels with Ablative Layer
Test Requirements:
a)
b)
J.7.2.5.2
J.7.2.6 Test L1/5.6 Arc Root Damage on CFC Sandwich Panels with Non Conducting Honeycomb
Core with and without Ablative Layer
J.7.2.6.1
Test Requirements:
a)
b)
J.7.2.6.2
J.7.2.7
J.7.2.7.1
a)
Test L1/5.7 Ohmic Heating Tests

Test Requirements:
As for those for Test L1/5.1 (Metal Melt Through a and d).
Unclassified
92
Unclassified
b)
Hard-wired connections to the test item shall be used unless tests for arc root problems are also to be
investigated, when the test object shall be connected to lightning current generator in accordance with
the requirement of L1/5.1 (b).
c)
When open arc testing is done, the return conductor configuration shall also be designed to achieve the
correct current distribution in the rest of the test item away from the arc root. The test electrode shall be
of the 'jet diverting type'. The arc shall be not less than 50 mm long and may be initiated by a fine wire,
as defined in L1/5.1 (c).
d)
When hard-wired connections are used, the return conductor configuration shall be designed to produce
the correct current distribution in the test object.
e)
A record shall be made of the test currents on a calibrated time base, so that the total action integral of
the test current may be determined. The temperature of the test object shall be measured by
temperature sensitive paints, thermocouples, thermal imaging cameras, or other methods. The voltage
across the load may also be recorded on a common time base with the test current, as an aid to the
analysis of the test.
J.7.2.7.2
J.7.2.8
J.7.2.8.1

Test L1/5.8 Magnetic Forces
Test Requirements:
a)
As for those of Test L1/5.1 (Metal Melt Through a and d).
b)
The test object shall be connected to the lightning current generator by a hard-wire connection to the
point of test and the test current shall return to the generator via a return conductor configuration which
shall be designed to produce the correct current distribution in the test object. For tests involving
magnetic reaction with the arc channel, the arc channel itself shall be represented by a rigid metal
conductor.
c)
A record shall be made of the test current on a calibrated time base, so that both peak current and
action integral of the test current can be determined. The voltage across the load may also be recorded
on a common time base with the test current, as an aid to the analysis of the test results.
d)
The effects of the magnetic forces on the test object shall be determined by visual inspection or other
non-destructive test methods as may be decided by the Aircraft Project Director.
J.7.2.8.2
J.7.2.9
J.7.2.9.1

Test L1/5.9 Acoustic Shock Wave Tests
Test Requirements:
a)
As for those of Test L1/5.1 (Metal Melt Through a - d) except that a plain electrode may be used.
b)
A record shall be made of the test current on a calibrated time base, so that the peak current i and
action integral can be determined.
c)
The extent of the damage shall be determined by visual inspection or other non-destructive test
methods as may be decided by the Aircraft Project Director.
J.7.2.9.2
93
Unclassified
Unclassified
Waveform Component
in order given in brackets see Note 2
Test No
L1/5.1
Zone
Component A
lA, 2A
Reduced
Component C
Full Component
C
600 A for 50 ms
600 A for 0.5 s
X (see note)
(1)
(2)
1B, 2B
L1/5.2
1A
1B
(1)
(2)
AI increased to
3.75 x 106 A2s
1A
1B
AI increased to
3.75 x 106 A2s
2A
(1)
(2)
X
(2)
2A, 2B
L1/5.3
(1)
(2)
X
(2)
X
(1)
(2)
2B
(1)
(2)
L1/5.4
All Zones
As for Test L1/5.1
L1/5.5
All Zones
As for Test L1/5.3
L1/5.6
1A
1B
(2)
(1)
2A
(1)
(2)
2B
L1/5.7
1A
1B
AI increased to
3.75 x 106 A2s
(1)
(2)
2A, 2B
L1/5.8
All Zones
L1/5.9
1A
1B
AI increased to
3.75 x 106 A2s
As for Test L1/5.7
2A, 2B
NOTE
Component D
See Note to L1/5.1
Table 12
Waveform Components for Tests
Unclassified
94
Unclassified
J.8
Leaflet 1/6 - Recommended Tests for Leader Phase Effects
J.8.1
Introduction
This leaflet defines the requirements which should be met when tests for Leader Phase effects are required
by the LHDA. Guidance concerning Leader Phase Tests is given in Leaflet 2/8 see J18. Test Waveforms
will be found in Annex G. These tests should only be used as engineering tests unless otherwise agreed
with the Aircraft Project Director, see Leaflet 2/2, Section J12.3.4.
J.8.2
Test L1/6-1 Dielectric Puncture
Test Requirements:a)
A high voltage pulse generator shall be used, capable of giving pulses of both polarities with a 50 to
200/2000 s wave shape. The peak voltage shall be at least 1.5 MV.
b)
The generator shall be set to the voltage which will produce a breakdown on the leading edge of the
impulse after at least 50 s.
c)
The test object can be mounted in a variety of ways, the most representative would be to suspend the
radome and use a large ground. If this is not possible the radome may need to be mounted on insulating
stands to minimize the effect of the ground distorting the field. Some part of the airframe is usually
represented and forms the stand.
d)
The test object and stand shall be electrically bonded together.
e)
The high voltage output terminal of the generator shall be connected to either the radome and stand or
the distressed HV electrode. The electrode shall be capable of being placed in different positions around
the test object, or alternatively the test object must be capable of being rotated under a fixed electrode
so that different sections of the dielectric surface are presented in turn to the test electrode.
f)
A maximum of 5 discharges of both polarities shall be made in each position of the electrode. (Repeated
discharges will age the dielectric).
g)
A complete record of all discharges shall be made which shall include:
95
1)
Waveform of the discharge voltage.
2)
Still photographs of each discharge taken simultaneously from not less than two positions.
Unclassified
J.9
Unclassified
Leaflet 1/7 - Recommended Methods of Detecting Sparking
J.9.1
Applicability
The spark detection methods given below have been developed to detect sparks down to an energy level of
0.2 mJ. They will also detect thermal sparks which are capable of igniting an explosive fuel/air mixture.
J.9.2
Method A (Photographic)
J.9.2.1 This relies upon the use of photographic methods with film speeds and exposure times sufficiently
sensitive to record voltage sparks down to 0.2 mJ and thermal sparks capable of igniting a fuel/air mixture.
J.9.2.2 Suitable cameras shall be positioned in the light-tight enclosure in which the sample is mounted, or
in the major assembly (if necessary in apertures cut into it), so that all possible sparking sources are viewed.
To facilitate that and to limit the number of cameras, a fish eye lens or a system of mirrors may be used,
provided due allowance is made for the reduction in sensitivity that will so occur. Alternatively the test may
be repeated with the sensors in different positions but this is not recommended.
J.9.2.3
Film speeds shall not be less than ASA 3000 and lens apertures shall not be less than F 4.7.
J.9.2.4 The field of view shall not be wider than one metre and the maximum distance, depending on the
focal length of the lens, shall be according to the following guidance:
8 mm (fish eye)
---
300mm
16 mm " "
---
500mm
28 mm " "
---
1m
50 mm " "
---
2m
J.9.2.5 The field of vision of each camera shall be completely shielded from all ambient light and a test
exposure shall be made with each camera to prove that is so.
J.9.2.6 All possible sparking sources shall be temporarily illuminated and each camera carefully focused
and a record made of each field of view, to enable any sparking recorded during the test to be referred to its
origin (see Note).
NOTE
If two fibre optic 'spots' are used, the positions of sparks are more readily determined.
J.9.2.7 A small light source (which can conveniently be provided by a fibre optic cable), which illuminates
briefly immediately before or during the application of the test current, shall be provided in the field of view of
each camera, to demonstrate that they are capable of recording sparks if they occur. A photographic record
shall be made of the position of each of the light sources immediately following the record made in Section
J.9.2.6.
NOTE
Care must be taken that a light source cannot be confused with a spark and that it does not interfere with
(e.g. shield from view) the recording of any sparks. Care must also be taken that the cameras do not themselves create a
source of sparking.
J.9.2.8 When tests are made, a procedure shall be followed that locates any sparks as exactly as
possible. For example, if sparking is so intense as to completely over-expose the film, not withstanding
J.9.2.3 above the test shall be repeated with the camera aperture adjusted to a lower sensitivity.
J.9.3
Method B (Photomultiplier)
J.9.3.1 This method relies upon a combination of photomultiplier sensors and supporting cameras - the
former to detect and provide a time history of the sparks and the latter to give an indication of the location of
the sparks.
Unclassified
96
Unclassified
J.9.3.2 A photomultiplier tube shall be arranged in a remote screened enclosure and linked to all possible
sparking sites with fibre optic cables. Each fibre optic cable and photomultiplier combination shall be
calibrated to demonstrate sensitivity to a 0.2 mJ voltage spark.
J.9.3.3 Cameras sufficient to give general views of the test object shall be installed in general accordance
with Sections J9.2.2 to J9.2.7. They may be omitted, by agreement with the Aircraft Project Director, in
areas where they would be unduly difficult to install.
97
Unclassified
J.10
J.10.1
Unclassified
Leaflet 2 - Background, Rationale and Guidance

Status of Advisory Material
The material contained in Leaflet 2 and sub leaflets is intended to provide background to the understanding
of lightning discharges and their effects to aircraft, together with guidance concerning the fulfilment and
interpretation of the requirements stated in Def Stan 59-113.
J.10.2
Sub Leaflets of Leaflet 2
J11
Leaflet 2/1
Natural Lightning Parameters
J12
Leaflet 2/2
Lightning Interactions with Aircraft
J13
Leaflet 2/3
General Assessment, Guidance
J14
Leaflet 2/4
Assessment, Guidance for Indirect Effect Hazards
J15
Leaflet 2/5
Fuel Hazard Assessment and Design Guidance
J16
Leaflet 2/6
Techniques and Guidance for Direct Effects Tests
J17
Leaflet 2/7
Techniques and Guidance for Equipment Tests
J18
Leaflet 2/8
Techniques and Guidance for Leader Phase Tests
J19
Leaflet 2/9
Guidance concerning some Design Requirements
J20
Leaflet 2/10 Preferred Format for Lightning Protection Plan Status Report
J21
Leaflet 2/11 Flight Restrictions to Minimise Risk of Lightning Strikes
Unclassified
98
Unclassified
J.11
J.11.1
Leaflet 2/1 - The Natural Lightning Discharge

Introduction
Lightning flashes usually originate from charge centres in a cloud of vertical development to temperatures
less than -10C, particularly the cumulonimbus (Cb) thunder cloud, although they can occur in snow and
sand storms. The charges in clouds are produced by complex processes of freezing and melting and by
movements of raindrops and ice crystals involving collisions and splintering. Typically in a Cb, most positive
charges accumulate at the top of the cloud, leaving the lower regions negative, although there may be a
small positive region near the base. The result is the typical structure of Figure 20 depicted by Malan, who
extensively studied thunderstorms in South Africa. When during their process of development thunder clouds
extend vertically over more than about 3 km, the strong electric fields can initiate lightning discharges, which
may be of three types, namely:a)
Discharges between centres of opposite polarity within a cloud (intra-cloud discharges).
b)
Discharges between centres of opposite polarity in different clouds (intercloud discharges).
c)
Discharges to earth from regions of either polarity (cloud to ground discharges).
J.11.2
J.11.2.1
Cloud To Ground Discharges

The Discharge Process
J.11.2.1.1 Conventionally, a discharge to earth from a positive region is called a positive flash and a
discharge from a negative region is a negative flash.
J.11.2.1.2 It is common for a negative flash to discharge several charge centres in succession, with the
result that the flash contains several distinct pulses of current, and these are usually referred to as strokes.
J.11.2.1.3 The process that culminates in a lightning discharge begins with the formation of an ionised
column called a leader which travels out from a region where the electric field is so high that it initiates
progressive ionisation; this critical field is thought to be about 900 kVm-1 at water droplets or 500 kVm-1 at ice
crystals. For a negative discharge to earth the column advances in zig-zag steps each about 50 m long and
separated by pauses of 40-100 s, hence the name stepped leader.
J.11.2.1.4 The luminous diameter of the leader is between l m and 10 m although the current, which is low
(about 100 A), is probably concentrated in a small diameter core. The average velocity of propagation is 1.5
x 105 ms-1. The leader may form branches on its downward path, most of them fading out before reaching
the ground. When a branch is near to the ground it causes high fields to form at projections such as trees
and buildings and these then send up streamers, one of which will make contact with the tip of the leader.
J.11.2.1.5 This is similar to the effect of closing a switch and the position in the channel where it occurs is
known as the switching point. When that conjunction occurs, a 'return stroke' is initiated which retraces and
discharges the leader channel at a velocity of about 5x107 ms-1.
J.11.2.1.6 This initial return stroke is characterised by a current pulse of high amplitude accompanied by
high luminosity. After the first return stroke, further strokes may occur as other negative regions are
discharged; the leaders for these usually traverse the same path as the first but in one continuous movement
at a velocity of 2x106 ms-1.
J.11.2.1.7 The above description is typical of a negative flash to open ground but over mountains and tall
buildings the leader may be of the upward moving type, originating from a high point such as a mountain
peak. When such a leader reaches the charge pocket in the cloud, a return stroke is initiated and
subsequent events follow the same pattern as for initiation by a downward moving leader. Thus the
'switching' point is near the ground for downward leaders but near the charge pocket in the cloud for upward
leaders. This will make a significant difference to the waveform and amplitude of the current experienced by
an airborne vehicle that forms part of a lightning path.
99
Unclassified

J.11.2.2
Unclassified
The Negative Discharge to Ground
J.11.2.2.1 An example of the return stroke current in a severe negative flash is sketched in Figure 21. The
number of strokes in a negative flash is usually between 1 and 11, the median value being 3; the total
duration is between about 20 ms and 1 s, with a median value of 0.2 s. The time interval between strokes is
typically about 60 ms. There is some correlation among these parameters, the flashes with the most strokes
tending also to be the longest in duration. The median rise time of all strokes is about 2 s, with a decay time
(to half the peak amplitude) of 45 s. There is a difference between the characteristics of first and
subsequent strokes, the latter having shorter rise times (about one half) than the former and higher
maximum rates of rise, although lower peak amplitudes.
J.11.2.2.2 Near the end of some of the strokes in a negative flash, there is often a lower level current of a
few kA persisting for several milliseconds, known as an 'intermediate current', as shown in Figure 21.
Although each stroke has a high amplitude, its duration is short and only a few coulombs of charge are
transferred. However, after some strokes a 'continuing current' of 100-400A flows with a duration of 100-800
ms (Table 9 J11), so that there is substantial charge transfer in this phase; this is particularly so after the last
stroke.
J.11.2.2.3 It is generally thought that before a restrike can occur the continuing current must cease, as
illustrated after stroke 5 in Figure 21.
J.11.2.3
The Positive Discharge to Ground
J.11.2.3.1 Positive flashes to ground are much rarer than negative flashes, the proportion being
dependent on geographical location. The average at the moment being taken as 10%. Positive flashes are
usually initiated by upward moving leaders and more commonly occur over mountains than over flat terrain.
Until recently it was thought that positive flashes consisted of one stroke only, having slower rise times than
negative flashes, with high peak current and charge transfer with a duration longer than a single stroke of a
negative flash but usually shorter than a complete negative flash.
J.11.2.3.2 However, recent research has shown that positive flashes can also have multiple strokes.
Commenting on this work, Table10 states that from 1989 to 1991 the electric field characteristics of more
than 200 lightning flashes were recorded, which could be identified as cloud-to-ground flashes and divided
into positive and negative flashes. From these measurements, the multiple characteristic of positive and
negative flashes were considered separately. A total of 160 negative flashes were recorded, with a mean
number of strokes per flash of 3.59. The maximum number of strokes was 12 at a maximum recording time
of 800 ms after the 1st return stroke. A total of 45 positive flashes were recorded with a mean number of
strokes per flash of 1.36. The maximum number of strokes recorded in a positive flash was 4. When that
work has been properly assessed the combined environment of Annex A will be reviewed and updated.
J.11.2.3.3 An example of a single positive flash (i.e. without multiple strokes) is shown in Figure 22; it is a
moderately severe example although not the 'super flash' which occurs occasionally. Typically the rise time
of a positive flash is 20 s and the total duration 0.1 s. Although positive flashes are far less globally frequent
than negative, they have to be taken into consideration in the selection of design and test parameters
because their contribution in relation to thermal effects and magnetic forces is severe, the governing factors
for these effects being peak current, charge transfer and action integral as discussed at section J11.4 below
and Sections J12.10 and J12.11 of Leaflet L2/2.
J.11.3
Inter And Intra Cloud Discharges
J.11.3.1 The above discussion relates to flashes of either polarity to ground and most of our knowledge
relates to flashes of that type. However, since about 1980, US and French programmes have been in
progress with specially instrumented aircraft to measure the parameters of lightning strikes to aircraft in flight.
Sufficient data has now been acquired to influence the derived environment defined in Annex A, although it
is still insufficient to allow a statistical description to be made comparable with that employed for the
parameters of ground flashes.
Unclassified
100
Unclassified
J.11.3.2 Generally cloud flashes are less severe than ground flashes in respect of peak current, charge
transfer and action integral but measurements indicate that the rate of rise of current is sometimes higher
than the usually accepted figure for the corresponding ground parameter; in particular the pulses of
moderate amplitude but steep leading edge (called K pulses) that often occur between the strokes of
negative ground flashes, are more prominent in the in-flight measurements of strikes to aircraft (Ref L2/1.5
see I 7). Both the pulse height and width can vary widely. The pulses usually occur both singly and in groups
or 'bursts'. The detailed physics is not well understood at present and because aircraft measurements are
involved, it is not possible to say which features are properties of the interaction process itself and which
may be properties of a natural flash in isolation. For this reason a more detailed description of the interaction
between lightning and an aircraft is given below.
J.11.4
J.11.4.1
Natural Lightning Parameters

Cloud to Ground Parameters
J.11.4.1.1 Parameters at different probabilities of occurrence for naturally occurring negative and positive
discharges to ground, measured at or near the ground, are given in Table 13 and Table 14 below. The
numerical values of the parameters have been determined in measurement programmes extending over
many years in several countries, consisting mainly of recording the waveforms of the currents flowing in
lightning strikes to towers together with both still and moving photography of the flash. These have been
supplemented in more recent years by measurements in aircraft. The numerical values of the parameters
vary widely from flash to flash and are therefore best stated in statistical terms. For any given parameter this
may take the form of a curve which indicates the percentage of flashes in which that parameter exceeds any
chosen level.
J.11.4.1.2 Table 13 and Table 14 give data derived from various sources, notably Berger, Cianos and
Pierce etc. (for example Ref L2/1.6, L2/1.7 and L2/1.8 see I 7.), stating parameter values measured at or
near ground level for certain probabilities of occurrence of cloud to ground discharges.
J.11.4.1.3 The numerical values of the parameters have been determined in measurement programmes
extending over many years in several countries, consisting mainly of recording the waveforms of the currents
flowing in lightning strikes to towers together with both 'still' and 'moving' photography of the flash.
J.11.4.1.4 The numerical values of the parameters vary widely from flash to flash and are therefore best
stated in statistical terms. For any given parameter this may take the form of a curve which indicates the
percentage of flashes in which that parameter exceeds any chosen level. For example, in the case of peak
current in negative flashes the curve would indicate that 50% of such flashes have a current greater than 20
kA, 2% have a current greater than 140 kA, and so on for any other percentage level of interest (Ref L2/1.9
see I 7.).
J.11.4.1.5 In Table 13 and Table 14, therefore, the 50%, 2% and 10% levels are those probabilities for
negative and positive strikes as stated. The values are estimations taken from the published data, the graphs
of which represent the best fit to the measured data.
J.11.4.1.6 The parameters at the levels and probabilities stated do not however all occur together in one
flash, for example, there is no such thing as a 2 percentile flash. Considerable work has been done,
however, to establish a threat that can be used as a design criterion, derived from the values given in both
tables. This 'derived threat' is given in Annex A1 of Def Stan 59-113, and takes into account the relative
frequency of occurrence of both positive and negative strokes to ground.
J.11.4.1.7 The purpose that the tables serve referred to above is to illustrate the diverse nature of natural
lightning and to provide an appreciation of the probabilities and severity of the derived threat.
101
Unclassified

J.11.4.2
Unclassified
Rate of Change of E Field
Section J11.2 and section J11.3, Table 13 and Table 14 do not mention dE/dt however; dE/dt is a
parameter which may be of concern when making certain indirect effects measurements. Unfortunately, data
concerning this parameter is somewhat scanty but the value usually considered, as far as it affects aircraft in
flight, is 1013 V/ms-1.
Parameters
Unit
Lightning Parameters
95%
50% (Typical)
2%
1-2
11
ms
60
320
kA
14
Number of strokes
Time intervals between strokes
st
Peak current (1 stroke)

st
Peak rate of rise (1 stroke)
-1
As
5.5 x 10
Time to peak (all strokes)
Pulse width at half peak current (all strokes in

flash)
30
Peak current (subsequent strokes)
kA
4.6
Peak rate of rise (subsequent strokes)
-1
As
20
1.2 x 10
140
1.2 x 10
10
1.8
1.2
45
170
10
10
4 x 1010
100
2.2 x 10
10
1 x 1011
Amplitude of continuing current
33
140
500
Duration of continuing current
0.058
0.16
0.4
Charge in continuing current
26
110
As
2 x 10
0.8 x 106
Charge per stroke
20
Total charge in flash
1.3
15
200
Flash duration
0.03 0.04
0.2
Action integral
Table 13
Parameters for Negative Lightning Flash Measured at Ground Level
Unclassified
102
Unclassified
Parameters
Unit
Lightning Parameters
50% typical
10%
Peak current
kA
25
170
Peak rate of rise
As-1
2.5 x 109
1.2 x 1010
Estimated time to peak
20
120
Pulse width at half peak current
15
60
Total charge in flash
70
310
Action integral
A2 s
5 x 105
8 x 106
Flash duration
0.1
0.4
Table 14
Parameters for Positive Lightning Flash Measured at Ground Level
NOTE
The individual parameters given in the tables are approximate and represent a consensus of experimental
measurements. They do not necessarily occur together in any one flash.
Figure 20
103
Probable Distribution of the Thundercloud Charges, P N and P for a South African

Thundercloud According to Malan
Unclassified
Figure 21
Unclassified
Severe Negative Lightning Flash Current Waveform
Current kA
185 Coulombs after 2ms
60
65 Coulombs up to 2ms
I2 dt = 2.5 x 106 A2s
40
Curve 1
20
Curve 2
Curve 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Time (ms)
1.0
1.0
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Time (ms)
2.0
6.0
10.0
14.0
18.0
22.0
Curve 2
Figure 22
Severe Positive Lightning Flash Current Waveform
Unclassified
104
Unclassified
J.12
J.12.1
Leaflet 2/2 - Lightning Interactions with Aircraft

Introduction
This Leaflet reviews the processes whereby naturally occurring lightning discharges and those triggered by
the presence of the aircraft interact with the aircraft. The effects of those interactions are discussed and
some restrictions to minimise the probability of an aircraft receiving a strike are given.
J.12.2
J.12.2.1
Lightning Strikes to Aircraft

Triggered and Intercepted Lightning Strikes
J.12.2.1.1 An aircraft in flight is struck by lightning for one of two reasons, either it triggers from a charge
centre a discharge which would not have occurred had the aircraft not been present, or it diverts and
intercepts a naturally occurring discharge. The triggered variety of strike may occur during natural lightning
activity but very often does not. In fact the majority of strikes reported to QinetiQ Farnborough (formally, RAE
Farnborough) seem to be of the triggered variety, occurring in cloud but in meteorological conditions where
lightning would otherwise be absent.
J.12.2.1.2 Many of the penetrations of storm clouds by the NASA F106 aircraft during the in flight
measurement programme (Ref 2/2.1 see I 8) also gave lightning strikes in that category. It is thought
therefore that triggered lightning strikes are far more frequent than any other form of aircraft interaction.
J.12.2.1.3 If an aircraft cannot distort the field near a naturally occurring discharge to give it an easier
path, the discharge will not be diverted towards the aircraft and the aircraft cannot intercept it. As the field
local to an aircraft will be undisturbed by its presence five aircraft diameters away the avoidance distance
from a naturally occurring discharge to preclude its diversion to an aircraft may be taken as 150 m. In fact it
is likely to be less than that, as it is thought that a stepped leader is only influenced by what occurs about 50
m away from the advancing tip of the leader.
J.12.2.1.4 Intercepted strikes can occur for all types of discharges inter, intra and cloud to ground,
although, depending on the altitude of the aircraft and whether or not it is in cloud, it is likely that the majority
of intercepted events are intra cloud discharges. As has been mentioned before the parameters of such
discharges are probably less severe with respect to charge and action integral than those of discharges to
ground. Even if we consider only flashes to ground however, it is likely that for negative discharge to ground
the charge and action integral parameters at the altitude of an aircraft in flight will be less severe than those
at ground level, because the lightning channel acts as a transmission line and the return current pulse as it
ascends from the ground towards the aircraft experiences changes in both shape and amplitude. Moreover
there will be fewer and fewer fulfilled leader channels being neutralised by the return stroke at altitude
leading to a significant lowering of current.
J.12.2.1.5 However as aircraft can be struck when flying near the ground, design parameters, for both
intercepted and triggered strikes, at the moment are based on ground flashes measured at ground level, as
likely to represent the most severe threat. An empirical justification is that the actual damage experienced by
aircraft roughly corresponds to the damage produced by simulated lightning with ground level parameters.
105
Unclassified

J.12.2.2
Unclassified
Form of Interaction
A lightning flash can react with an aircraft in three possible ways, as follows:a)
By a Direct Strike, where the lightning channel attaches to the aircraft so that an aerospace vehicle in
flight would form part of the channel and be subjected to the whole lightning current.
b)
By a Nearby Flash, where actual lightning current does not flow in the aircraft, but where the discharge
passes sufficiently close to it to induce current on conducting surfaces, or in internal components of the
aircraft with non conducting surfaces, either by electric field coupling, magnetic field coupling, ground
currents, or by a combination of all three. A proportion of the currents induced on the surface of the
aircraft may penetrate to the interior depending on the electro-magnetic shielding properties of the outer
surface. In general a nearby flash is not likely to be a threat to an aircraft adequately hardened against
direct strikes and therefore does not usually merit separate consideration.
c)
By a Distant or 'Far Field' Flash, where the aircraft experiences only the 'far field' electromagnetic
radiation from the flash, characterised by a constant ratio between the electric and magnetic
components of the field and having intensity approximately inversely proportional to the distance from
the flash. The radiation may cover a wide frequency spectrum, but is not likely to be a threat to aircraft
adequately hardened to direct strikes or nearby flashes.
J.12.2.3
Attachment Processes
J.12.2.3.1 As noted in Section J12.3-3 above, the process that initiates a lightning flash begins with the
formation of an ionised column called a leader which travels out from a highly charged region of a cloud. A
conducting object near the advancing leader experiences an increasing electric field which is concentrated at
its extremities and protuberances; these become electric 'stress raisers' and send out streamers, one of
which may reach and link with the leader. The point of origin of this streamer then defines the initial
attachment point. Thus some parts of the surface (extremities, sharp edges, protuberances) are more likely
to be the site of initial attachments than others. This is taken into account by the zoning concept, described
more fully below, which is applicable to fast moving vehicles such as aircraft and missiles in flight. If the
cloud to ground discharge is considered, streamers from objects on the ground will be attracted towards the
advancing leader and the strongest and closest streamer to the leader will link with it. Thus the streamers
are, in a sense, in competition to 'capture' the leader. Broadly speaking, tall objects will have a certain
capture radius beyond which lightning strokes will not attach to them. This capture radius will depend on the
objects height and its ability to produce strong streamers.
J.12.2.3.2 The concept of capturing a lightning discharge and diverting it also applies to an object in the
air, such as an aircraft or missile. All aircraft lightning strikes which are not triggered by the presence of the
aircraft are in that category. There is a critical 'aircraft to leader distance' (similar to the ground capture radius
just mentioned) which, if exceeded, will preclude capture of the leader. It is likely that this capture distance
will depend on the magnitude of some of the discharge parameters.
J.12.2.3.3 The most likely scenario for an aircraft in flight, however, is that it triggers a discharge that
otherwise would not have occurred (see section J12.2.1 above). The mechanism could be similar to the
formation of upward moving leaders from the ground. For example, the aircraft might be between two charge
centres of opposite polarity either in a cloud or between two clouds; the presence of a conducting body such
as an aircraft concentrates the electric field. Streamers of opposite polarity may move out from stress raisers
on opposite sides of the aircraft towards the charge centres of appropriate polarity, eventually making
contact and initiating a discharge.
J.12.2.3.4 The mechanism of initiating a ground discharge would probably be more complicated than that
of initiating an aircraft discharge but it is not impossible to do, as lightning discharges have been deliberately
triggered by firing rockets, both earthed with a trailing wire and electrically isolated, into charged clouds.
Unclassified
106
Unclassified
J.12.2.4
The Swept Stroke Effect
J.12.2.4.1 If an aircraft experiences a direct strike, then throughout the flash the point of entry is likely to
be swept backwards along the aircraft, since the lightning channel tends to remain stationary relative to the
surrounding air. Except possibly on smooth unpainted surfaces, this movement of the attachment point is not
continuous but progresses in a series of discrete irregular steps. The dwell time at any particular step is
chiefly dependent on the nature of the surface, the velocity of the aircraft and the voltage developed along
the arc.
J.12.2.4.2 Reattachment occurs when the latter (the product of iR and Ldi/dt components) is sufficient to
breakdown the air gap due to the boundary layer and the insulation of the paint layer or any other dielectric.
Experiments have shown that the dwell time is not likely to exceed 50 ms (see section J12.4.3 and section
J12.4.10 below). The movement of the attachment point is known as the 'swept stroke' phenomenon
although more accurately it should be called a swept flash, since the whole of the flash, including the fast
strokes, the intermediate current phase and the continuing current phase (defined in 4.5) participate in the
movement.
J.12.2.4.3 For a velocity of 600 knots an aircraft moves through its own length of say 15 m in 50 ms, which
is well within the average duration of a lightning flash. When the lightning arc has swept back to a trailing
edge, it can progress no further and may remain there, or 'hang on', for the remainder of the flash.
Alternatively the 'upper' and 'lower' parts of the arc may join together and the aircraft cease to be part of the
channel.
J.12.2.5
Zoning Concepts
J.12.2.5.1 The sweeping action of the arc channel can have several consequences. For example, inboard
areas of an aircraft wing that are unlikely to be the site of initial attachment and which might be thought to be
not at risk will be subject to attachments if they are in the swept path. On the other hand, the arc erosion
effects of the flash are spread out over a considerable number of points so that except for an exit point at a
trailing edge at the rear of an aircraft, no single point receives the full energy of the flash. The proportion of
the flash experienced by any particular point depends on its location on the aircraft surface and this has lead
to the concept of dividing the surface into zones depending on the probability of initial attachment, sweeping
and hang-on.
Ignoring the sweeping leader effect, the aircraft surface can be divided into three zones as follows:Zone 1
Surfaces for which there is a high probability of initial lightning flash attachment (current entry
or exit).
Zone 2
Surfaces across which there is a high probability of a flash being swept from an initial
attachment in Zone 1.
Zone 3
All other surfaces. Although such surfaces do not experience attachments, they may carry
substantial lightning current by conduction between the attachment points situated in Zones 1
or 2.
J.12.2.5.2 Zones 1 and 2 may be further divided into A and B regions depending on the probability that the
flash will hang on for a protracted period of time (say more than 50 ms), this probability being low for the A
region and high for the B region.
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J.12.2.5.3
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Some examples of zones for an aircraft are as follows:
Zone 1A Likely to have an initial attachment point with low probability of long hang-on, for times in
excess of 50 ms, such as a nose mounted pitot or an engine nacelle.
Zone 1B Likely to have an initial attachment point with high probability of long hang-on, such as a tail-fin
trailing edge.
Zone 2A A swept stroke zone with low probability of long hang-on, for times in excess of 50 ms, such
as a fuselage or wing mid-chord behind an engine nacelle.
Zone 2B A swept stroke zone with high probability of long hang-on, such as a wing inboard trailing
edge.
J.12.2.5.4 The usually accepted location and extent of Zone 1 areas, as given in Reference 2.1, should be
adopted for fixed wing aircraft. For rotary wing aircraft, Annex A2 of Def Stan 59-113 is applicable.
J.12.2.6
The Sweeping Leader Effect and Transition Zone (Zone 1C)
J.12.2.6.1 When an aircraft is struck by a natural flash initiated by a downward moving leader, the
situation is complicated by the fact that the aircraft has usually moved a significant distance in the interval
(see I.7)between the initial leader contact and the arrival of the return stroke from the ground, and indeed it
continues to move throughout the duration of the flash. This is course would not apply to a helicopter or a
VTOL aircraft that was hovering at the time.
J.12.2.6.2 Apart from the swept stroke effect discussed above, therefore, the consequences of forward
movement are also that the initial attachment points (points of return current entry or exit) do not necessarily
correspond to the points of leader contact at the extremities. This is known as the sweeping leader effect.
This effect, which leads to a 'transition zone' (Zone 1C) behind Zones 1A, is explained in Reference 2.1 (see
I.7). That reference defines Zone 1C as a limited area of the aircraft surface behind Zone 1A into which a
leader attachment may be swept and which may therefore experience a first return stroke attachment. The
parameters associated with that attachment will be less than the parameters appertaining to Zone 1A but
greater than parameters appertaining to Zone 2A.
J.12.2.6.3 This is because it has been shown theoretically (Refs L2/2.2 and L2/2.3 see I.8) that lightning
channel parameters change with altitude. For example, for a downward going leader if an aircraft is struck at
a significantly high altitude, the peak current could be reduced by a factor of 4 and the peak di/dt is likely to
be ten to a hundred times less than if it was struck near the ground (Ref L2/2.4). Still considering a
downward going leader, it is obvious that the higher an aircraft is flying, the further back will be the initial
return stroke attachment due to the sweeping leader effect. However, due to the reduction in parameters
with altitude just mentioned, it would be unreasonable to apply the parameters normally associated with
Zone 1A to such a swept initial attachment. It is therefore not worth considering the return stroke
attachments due to swept leaders which are further back from the initial leader attachment (the conventional
Zone 1A area) than where the parameters are equal to the Zone 2A parameters.
J.12.2.6.4 WG31 in ED91 have decided that the action integral and peak current parameters that should
be used in Zone 1C are 150 kA and 0.8 x 106 A2s. They have compared various models that predict the falloff in parameters with altitude. Taking the peak current parameters, and a model which gives a somewhat
slower fall-off than the average of the models, they have found that the 150 kA level occurs at 5000 ft and
the 100 kA level at 10000 ft. For a given aircraft speed there will therefore be a distance D1 back from the
rearmost extremity of the area in which initial leader attachments can occur (point x in Figure 23) behind
which the peak current will never exceed 150 kA (point y in Figure 23) and a corresponding distance D2
(from point x) behind which the peak current will never exceed 100 kA. Distances D1, D2 and distance A
(from the nose to point x in Figure 23) therefore define the boundaries of Zone 1C. Zone 1A parameters are
said to apply from the nose to point y. Zone 2A parameters apply behind the rearmost extremity of distance
D2 (point z in Figure 23).
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J.12.2.6.5 This Def Stan adopts the above position, although it could be argued that incorrect assumptions
have been made, in as much as the 2 percentile level of peak current in a negative stroke to ground (at
ground level) is 140 kA and it needs to be confirmed that the models used to decide the heights to calculate
distances D1 and D2 are applicable to positive strikes. Distance A should be taken as 0.5 m in the absence of
leader attachment data.
J.12.2.6.6 Assuming a leader velocity of 105 ms-1
distance is:-
4)
an approximate expression for leader sweep
6.66 hV x 10-6 metres

where
h = height of aircraft, in feet

V = speed of aircraft in knots
Distance D1 and D2 may therefore be calculated from the expression:D1 = 6.66 x 5000 V x 10-6 metres
D2 = 6.66 x 10000 V x 10-6 metres
J.12.2.6.7 Similar arguments to the above apply when upward going leaders cause the switching point to
be near the cloud. However, if the maximum operating speed of the aircraft at any altitude up to say 4,500 m
is used in the calculations outlined above, a realistic worst case will be obtained. On this basis the threat
would be higher at altitude for positive strokes. However it seems even for upward leaders that there is a
significant dart leader and a switching point near the ground.
J.12.2.7
Inter and Intra Cloud Parameters
J.12.2.7.1 Inter and Intra Cloud Parameters only have relevance to the air side threat and especially to the
so called Multiple Burst Environment (see section J12.2.11 below). As noted in Leaflet 2/1, data
concerning intra and inter cloud parameters is somewhat scarce, especially from the viewpoint of probability
of occurrence, thus it is not possible to tabulate them as has been done for cloud to ground flashes. At a
Lightning Specialists Meeting (Ref 2/2.5 see I.8) the consensus of opinion was that the parameters of the
single pulses and bursts of pulses, due to the intra (and sometimes inter) cloud discharges which can
interact with an aircraft, will have values as follows:amplitudes ranging from
10 kA to 60 kA,
rise times ranging from 100 ns to 10 s and

fall times ranging from
1 s to 50 s,
as illustrated in Figure A1.1 of Annex A1 of Def Stan 59113.

J.12.2.7.2 It should be realised that some of these bursts of pulses, for example at initial attachment, only
occur because an aircraft is an isolated body in space and are not present in a discharge which does not
interact with an aircraft. It is also true to say that the majority of the discharges are not naturally occurring,
being triggered by the presence of the aircraft. In the past it has been usual to assume that inter and intra
cloud parameters, including those of aircraft triggered discharges, are probably less severe than those of
cloud to ground discharges measured at the ground, although it is thought that quite high peak currents can
occur and that the maximum rate of rise of a pulse can exceed 1011 As-1, (Ref L2/2.5 see I 8).
4) As a return stroke is about three orders of magnitude faster than a stepped leader, only the leader need be
considered and the return stroke may be assumed to be instantaneous.
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J.12.2.8
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The Important Parameters and Environments for all Aircraft
J.12.2.8.1 The important parameters in a lightning discharge from the point of view of interaction with
aircraft are:Maximum rate of change of current (di/dt max)
Peak current
(i pk)
Action integral
(i2dt)
Charge content
(i dt)
Duration of the flash
(t)
J.12.2.8.2 In addition to the five main parameters noted above, the rate of change of E field (dE/dt) and
the Multiple Burst environment are also important.
J.12.2.8.3 The charge transferred is idt coulomb and governs the energy dissipated in the arc at the
lightning attachment point since the volt drop at the attachment point is substantially constant.
J.12.2.8.4 The action integral is i2 dt A2s or Johm-1. This gives the energy dissipated in each ohm of
resistance in the lightning path.
J.12.2.9
Basis of Air Side Environment
As noted in section J12.2.1 above, discharges that affect aerospace vehicles can be either cloud to ground,
inter cloud, or intra cloud events. When they are triggered by the presence of the vehicle, they are more
likely to be intra cloud discharges. There is little information concerning inter and intra cloud parameters,
except as has been gathered by in flight measurements leading to the Multiple Burst and Multiple Stroke
environments. Despite the lack of information concerning inter and intra cloud parameters, it has always
been assumed that they are probably less severe (apart from possibly the value of di/dt) than the cloud to
ground discharges measured at the ground and the values of those parameters have been used quite
successfully to define the lightning threat for aircraft for direct effects and some indirect effects. Taking those
values does in fact give a worst case, not only from the point of view that most lightning strikes to aircraft are
intra cloud strikes, but also because the severity of the parameters in a cloud to ground discharge (certainly
for downward going leaders) decreases with altitude.
J.12.2.10
Derived Parameters for Direct Effects and some Indirect Effects
J.12.2.10.1 With regard to the five parameters mentioned above, the problem is to combine the negative
and positive parameters of cloud to ground strikes to give a realistic worst case. The 2% level of all strikes
has generally been the approximate aim for aircraft air worthiness requirements and that probability of
occurrence is used in this Defence Standard for direct effects and some indirect effects threats.
J.12.2.10.2 R H Evans at Reference L2/1.9 (see I.7) reviews the way that the negative and positive
parameters have been combined in the past and recommends a method which gives somewhat higher
values of charge and action integral than hitherto used on the Air Side. The Evans' method and the previous
method (Phillpott, see Reference 4 of Ref L2/1.9 see I 7) assumed that a reasonable average for the ratio of
negative to positive flashes to ground was 9:1. The proportion of positive flashes, however, varies between
1% and 20% depending on geographic location. The Evans' method gives a convenient way of recalculating
for any other ratio when that is found necessary. This Def Stan, however, adopts the 9:1 ratio for all
environments and the combined values using the Evans' method are as follows:Maximum rate of change of current (di/dt) 1011 As-1
Peak current
(i pk) 180 kA
Action integral
(i2dt) 3.7 x 106 A2s
Charge content
(i dt) 300 C
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J.12.2.10.3 The above values, with some adjustment are adopted by this standard as given in Table 1,
except that di/dt max is taken as 1.4 x 1011 As-1 as that value of di/dt has sometimes been observed during in
flight measurements, so that the parameters for the total flash are:-
J.12.2.11
Maximum rate of change of current
(di/dt)
1.4 x 1011 As-1
Peak current
(i pk)
200 kA
Action integral
(i dt)
3.75 x 106 A2s
Charge content (continuing current)
(i dt)
300 C
Multiple Burst and Multiple Stroke Environments
J.12.2.11.1 In-flight measurements have also shown that at leader attachment a burst of pulses flows
through the aircraft. The time interval between the pulses is between 100 and 300 s initially, shortening to
50 s corresponding to time intervals between individual steps of negative leaders. The amplitude tends to
increase from the beginning of the burst, up to pulses of about 20 kA. In addition to the initial burst on
attachment, there are sometimes 2 to 3 other bursts.
J.12.2.11.2 Most strikes observed to instrumented aircraft in cloud seem to show that the initial attachment
burst consists of about 20 current pulses within 1 millisecond, sometimes followed by isolated pulses,
possibly associated with 'K changes' or perhaps subsequent return strokes, of up to 24 events in 2 seconds.
These phenomena form the basis for the multiple burst waveform specified in the EUROCAE ED84 (Ref
L2/2.4 see I.8) and which is given in A.3.3. Each pulse in the burst is defined by a 'waveform H' having a 10
kA peak current and 100 ns rise time. The maximum di/dt of 'waveform H' is 2x1011 As-1 which can result in
induced transients in wiring, so that a sequence of such pulses may cause disruption of computer systems.
J.12.2.11.3 The multiple burst environment is only present because of the attachment and excitation
mechanisms peculiar to a body in space. The multiple stroke environment is associated with the number of
restrikes in a cloud to ground discharge.
J.12.2.11.4 As there will generally only be one or two attachments (to an aircraft) in the course of the
lightning event (an initial attachment and one restrike), 24 bursts of pulses seemed unreasonable and
EUROCAE and SAE-AE2, now state that three bursts are required as given in Annex A.
J.12.2.11.5 ED84 defines a Multiple Stroke for an aircraft, arguing that 24 or more restrikes have been
observed in a cloud-to-ground strike (see section J12.7.2 below). That an aircraft would experience that
number of restrikes is extremely unlikely but, as noted above, in flight measurements of intra cloud events
suggest a similar number of pulses at a similar peak amplitude can occur. Notwithstanding that, This
Defence Standard does not specify a Multiple Stroke environment for the reasons given in section J12.7.2.
J.12.3
Classification of Lightning Effects to Aircraft
J.12.3.1 Lightning produces a variety of effects on the materiel with which it interacts. For convenience in
formulating protection and test methods, it is usual to divide these into four groups, as follows.
a)
Direct Effects - These are the effects arising directly from the passage of lightning current and are
therefore present only in direct strikes. Examples are ohmic heating, burning effects at an attachment
point which could puncture the skin or create a hot spot on the inside surface, acoustic shock wave,
magnetic forces and sparking.
b)
Indirect Effects - These occur in parts of the materiel not carrying the lightning current and are due to
coupling with the magnetic field (inductive coupling) or the electric field (capacitive coupling) associated
with either a direct strike or a nearby flash. For example, voltages and currents may be induced in
materiel wiring which could cause the inadvertent operation of firing circuits of an aircraft or a missile.
The induced voltages and currents may contain components related to the shape of the lightning current
waveform and also damped high frequency oscillations related to the natural electric resonances of the
materiel which are shock-excited by the sudden arrival of the lightning pulse. The induced transients
may also produce sparking, so sparking may be either a direct effect or an indirect effect.
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c)
Far Field Effects These are the effects of exposure to the radiated electromagnetic field of a
comparatively distant lightning flash. The most common effect is to induce oscillatory voltages and
currents at the electrical resonant frequencies of the system, but the amplitude is likely to be
considerably less than for nearby flashes since the intensity of the far field is inversely proportional to
the distance.
d)
Leader Phase Effects Whereas direct effects are due to the passage of the lightning current. Leader
Phase effects cover direct damage due to high electric fields and rapid changes of that field; they are
therefore nearly always associated with a direct strike. The most common form of damage is the
puncture or even shattering of dielectric surfaces, such as radomes and dielectric covers.
J.12.3.2 A more detailed account of the various effects of lightning and the mechanisms through which
damage may occur are described below. During the design process all these possible effects are reviewed in
relation to the particular materiel, this procedure being formally embodied in the Lightning Protection Plan
and the Lightning Hazards Design Analysis detailed in Annex D and described in Leaflet 2/3 see J13.
Where the initial design shows weaknesses, additional protective measures are incorporated. Finally it will
be decided what tests, if any, are needed to confirm the design. Sometimes tests will also be required during
development.
J.12.3.3 The vulnerability of aircraft to lightning is increased by the modern trend towards the use of nonmetallic materials such as glass fibre and carbon fibre composite (CFC) in their construction. These reduce
the electromagnetic shielding afforded by the skin, thus tending to increase internal induced voltages.
Moreover, because CFC has a much higher resistivity than aluminium alloy, much higher voltage gradients
and heat generation for a given lightning current are produced. The relevant properties of composite
materials are discussed in more detail under the various Groups below.
J.12.4
J.12.4.1
Direct Effects
Ohmic Heating: Thermal Damage
J.12.4.1.1 When a lightning current pulse whose instantaneous value is i flows through a conductor of
resistance R, the heat generated by the whole pulse is R i2dt joules. The quantity i2dt is called the action
integral of the pulse and is measured in A2s or joules per ohm.
J.12.4.1.2 Practically, the whole of this heat is devoted to raising the temperature, since no significant
proportion of the heat can flow to the surroundings during the very short duration pulse. Thus the maximum
temperature rise is proportional to the resistance of the conductor multiplied by the action integral of the
pulse. Parts of materiel which may carry lightning current therefore need to be designed with a crosssectional area large enough to keep the temperature rise well below a critical value such as the melting point
of the material. The design also needs to take into account the fact that due to the rapidly changing current
of the lightning pulse, there is a skin effect, that is, the current tends to concentrate at the surface of a
conductor and the maximum skin temperature reached is therefore greater than it would be if the current was
uniformly distributed over the whole cross-section.
J.12.4.1.3 When the conductor carrying lightning current is made of a high resistivity material such as
CFC, then ohmic heating can be particularly important. The resistivity of CFC may be up to 1000 times that
of aluminium alloy, depending on the type of fibre, the way the fibres are laid and manufacturing process;
moreover, the allowable temperature rise is lower than for metal, because of the comparatively low softening
temperature of the resin matrix. The result is that for a given current a CFC component requires a much
larger cross-section than a metal component if delamination or loss of residual strength is to be avoided.
Joints in CFC are particularly liable to be of high resistance and are therefore possible sites of damage due
to over-heating.
J.12.4.2
Ohmic Heating: Disruptive Mechanical Forces
When a conductor of small cross-section is constrained to carry a substantial part of the lightning current it is
likely to fuse explosively, especially if situated in a confined space, possibly causing major structural
damage. Examples are electric wiring connected to external equipment such as aerials and probes and
metal honeycomb constructions. Moisture trapped in a dielectric honeycomb or in a dielectric skin, can cause
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a similar problem due to its sudden vaporisation. Arcing and sparking in the voids of glue lines or due to
dielectric breakdown can also have a similar effect (see also Sections J12.4.4 & J12.4.7 below).
J.12.4.3
Arc Root (attachment point) Damage
J.12.4.3.1 At an arc root (attachment point) on the skin of an aircraft, all the lightning current is
concentrated in a small area, producing a high temperature which in turn may produce a transient hot spot
on the underside of the skin. If the skin is of metal there will be melting at the arc root, which may cause
complete melt through of the skin, depending on its thickness and on the magnitude and duration of the
current. The arc burning voltage V is almost constant so that for a metal skin the heat generated is very
nearly Vidt joules, that is, it is proportional to the charge idt coulombs in the lightning pulse. The resulting
melt through of the skin is not entirely dependent on charge, however, because of random movements of the
active spots within the arc area, causing it to expand with time, and also the molten pool of metal under the
arc advances through the skin thickness by normal heat conduction and must take a finite time to reach the
inside surface. The result is that if various levels of constant current are applied through an arc to a metal
skin of given thickness, then the melt-through time may be plotted against current in the form of a curve
which reduces with increasing current but there are limiting values at either end; there is a current below
which melt through will never occur and at the other end of the curve there is a time below which melt
through will not occur however severe the current.
J.12.4.3.2 There has recently been some controversy encountering dwell time and melt through. The UK
have always understood that a 50 ms dwell time at 800 A will only just melt through 2 mm thick aluminium
alloy, hence the previously noted 45 ms dwell time figure. This understanding follows from Culham
Laboratory work (Ref L2/2.6 see I 8) which is summarised in Figure 24. It is now US opinion, however, that
this is not so and that dwell times are more likely to be between 5 and 20 ms. That position is reflected in
ED84 (L2/2.4 see I 8). The UK contends that dwell times can easily exceed 50 ms under normal
circumstances and consequently a 50 ms dwell time has been adopted by the Defence Standard. The
current level is however now set at 600 A rather than the arbitrary 400-800 A level hitherto used.
J.12.4.3.3 If the skin is of high resistivity composite such as CFC there are several important differences in
conditions at the arc root. Because the resistivity is up to 1000 times greater than that of metal, the ohmic
heat Ri2dt becomes important; the arc heat Vidt is also higher because the burning voltage is higher due to
carbon contamination. Conditions are also different because CFC has properties (for example, electrical and
thermal conductivity and coefficient of thermal expansion) which are different for the along-fibre and acrossfibre directions. Arc root damage to CFC is usually manifest in 'tufting' of the fibres due to vaporisation of the
resin matrix and delamination due to inter-lamina stress resulting from differential expansion.
J.12.4.3.4 For dielectric materials there is no arc attachment but puncture may occur by high voltage
breakdown, as described in section J12.8 below.
J.12.4.3.5 If the arc root parameters are insufficient to cause melting of metallic skins or burn through
damage to CFC panels, a hot spot will still be formed on the under surface. Such an occurrence could be
thought to be an ignition hazard if the surface encloses fuel and some specifications in the past have
stipulated that hot spot temperatures should be limited to 230C, which is the auto ignition temperature of
aircraft fuel.
J.12.4.3.6 Recent work at Culham has shown however, (Reference L2/2.7 see I.8) that the size and
duration of the hot spots that occur under lightning attachments to aluminium alloy panels are likely to give
temperatures of about 900C before ignition takes place. As aluminium melts at about 660C, the problem
with aluminium alloy panels is not that of a hot spot, but of melt-through and direct ignition by the lightning
arc.
J.12.4.3.7 Reference L2/2.7 (see I.8) has also shown that the aircraft fuel ignition temperature required for
CFC hot spots is about 800C; consequently burn through would occur before that temperature was
reached. Hot spot temperatures behind titanium panels, however, would be important as titanium melts at
1800C. Hot spot temperatures for aluminium and CFC may also be important with exotic aircraft fuels and
for both solid and liquid explosives.
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J.12.4.4
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Acoustic Shock Wave
At the beginning of the first high current stroke, there is a rapid pinching of the arc channel due to the
increase in the magnetic field, and this produces a radial acoustic shock wave, which together with magnetic
forces between the arc and the current flow in the aircraft skin can cause indentations on metal skins. At an
attachment point there are more local (axial) acoustic forces and these combined with the magnetic forces
also present may enhance the thermal damage. The severity of the acoustic shock depends on both current
magnitude and rate of rise of current. CFC will not plastically deform under such conditions, hence a shock
of sufficient magnitude may cause fracture of thin CFC skins.
J.12.4.5
Magnetic Pressure and Forces
J.12.4.5.1 An isolated conductor carrying a current suffers a radially inward pinching effect. Where the
current is of sufficient magnitude to produce a very high surface magnetic intensity (of the order of several
MAm-1) severe mechanical distortion may occur. For example, a conductor of 5 mm diameter carrying a peak
current of 200 kA would experience a peak surface pressure of 1000 atmospheres (108 Nm-2). The pressure
is proportional to the square of the current and inversely proportional to the square of the diameter. The
effect can be important in conductors whose purpose is to protect the vehicle by carrying the lightning
current, for example, radome protection strips and metal braid bonding strips.
J.12.4.5.2 The magnetic pressure produces a temperature rise but this is usually insignificant compared
with ohmic heating due to current flow. The pressure may be sufficient to stress the material beyond its yield
point, which will be lowered due to the increased temperature caused by the current flow.
Because the current density is very high at the arc root, the magnetic pressure there will also be very high,
approximately 6000 atmospheres for a current that rises rapidly to 200 kA peak. This pressure accelerates
the burn through process by its tendency to expel the thermally weakened skin.
J.12.4.5.3 In addition to the magnetic pressure on an isolated conductor, there are interactive forces
between two adjacent conductors carrying current. The force is proportional to the product of the currents
and inversely proportional to the distance between them. The second 'conductor' may be the arc channel
itself, so that current in the vehicle may produce a reactive force with the current in the nearby lightning
channel. When the same current is flowing in both conductors, the instantaneous force is proportional to i2
but the ultimate effect in terms of stress or movement is a complicated function of the current waveform
shape and duration and the mechanical response characteristics of the conductors and their mountings.
J.12.4.6
Direct Effects Sparking
Voltage and thermal sparking may occur, either separately or together. Voltage sparking is the result of
dielectric breakdown including tracking or flashover across dielectric surfaces. It could arise inductively in a
loop or bend, or from the resistive drop in a high resistance material such as CFC, especially at joints.
Thermal sparking consists of burning fragments of melted material thrown out from hot spots such as high
resistance contacts having a high current concentration, or at acute changes of geometry. The temperatures
of both types of spark are high and are potentially sources of fire or explosion. The incendivity of a spark
depends to a large extent on its total energy content but other factors, such as the time over which the
energy is deposited, are also significant. It is virtually impossible to quantify an energy level for thermal
sparking but a Minimum Ignition Energy Level can be defined for voltage sparks in a liquid fuel/air mixture,
see Leaflet 2/5 J15. It is difficult to measure the incendivity of sparks and it is therefore usual to assume
during a simulated lightning test that any spark (detected for example by sensitive photography - see Leaflet
1/7 J9) which occurs in a vulnerable region is a hazard. Further information concerning spark ignition
hazards is given in Leaflet 2/5 J15.
J.12.4.7
Exploding Arcs and Hydraulic Shock
J.12.4.7.1 A high current arc formed in an enclosed space will generate a shock wave due to the rapid
heating of the air. Such arcs, and especially long arcs, can be very disruptive and have been known to
fracture plastic fuel tanks and to cause radomes to become detached from the aircraft, even though the
radome space was vented to atmosphere.
J.12.4.7.2 When an exploding arc occurs in a fluid (even a small amount of fluid such as the residual fuel
in an otherwise empty external tank), the fluid tends to concentrate and focus the shock to an extent that can
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cause fracture of quite large metallic members such as the joint rings between the sections of an external
plastic fuel tank.
J.12.5
J.12.5.1
J.12.5.1.1
Indirect Effects
Induced Transients in Aircraft Systems
Transients due to Lightning Current
Essentially a lightning current pulse flowing through the aircraft, or in a nearby flash, injects a voltage into the
wiring (the magnitude depending on the shielding properties of the skin) and the consequent current that
flows depends on the impedance of the circuit. The induced voltage waveforms are often very complex but
usually consist of one or more of the following four components:a)
A voltage proportional to the lightning current, due to resistive coupling (for example, the voltage
gradient on the inner surface of the aircraft skin) or to inductive coupling where the magnetic flux has
diffused through a high resistivity skin (such as CFC) and in doing so has effectively undergone an
integrating process. The peak voltage will then be proportional to the peak lightning current.
b)
A voltage proportional to the rate of change of lightning current (di/dt), due to direct coupling with the
magnetic field that has penetrated through apertures (sometimes referred to as aperture flux or fast
flux). The peak voltage will then be proportional to the maximum value of di/dt, that is, the greatest slope
of the rising front of the lightning current pulse.
c)
High frequency damped sinusoidal oscillations. These are usually in the range 2 to 50 MHz for air based
systems. Ground and sea systems are likely to be similar. These are shock-excited oscillations
corresponding to natural resonances of the aircraft, and its electrical systems; the frequencies of the
oscillations (although not their amplitudes and effective damping) are independent of the shape of the
lightning pulse.
d)
In structures of mixed materials of different resistivities, there may be an extra long current pulse of
considerably longer duration than that of the lightning current itself.
More details of the waveforms are given in Section 7.1.2 below.

J.12.5.1.2
Transients due to Electric Field
J.12.5.1.2.1 In addition to the high quasi static electric field which may be present under thundery
conditions when a lightning channel attaches to a body (irrespective of whether that body is attached to or
isolated from ground), or passes nearby, it causes the body to experience an electric field having high
intensity and rapid rate of change. The rate of change of field may be as high as 1014 Vm-1s-1, although a
dE/dt value of 1013 Vm-1s-1 is assumed in this Def Stan, see Section J11.4.2 of Leaflet 2/1.
J.12.5.1.2.2 When a changing electric field terminates on a conductor the displacement (capacitive)
current of the field enters the conductor, giving a current density on the surface of the conductor of dE/dt
Am-2 where is the permittivity of air. A rate of field change of 1013Vm-1s-1 corresponds to a current density of
about 88 Am-2. Thus conductors such as the braided shields on cables, or unshielded wires, will have
significant transient currents flowing in them in regions exposed to electric fields. As well as currents
proportional to dE/dt there are the damped sinusoidal oscillations which are shock excited by the sudden
application of the disturbance mentioned in section J12.5.1.1 c).
J.12.5.1.2.3 High levels of field (not necessarily changing) also may give rise to corona discharges at
sharp edges or protrusions of the structure. Those discharges produce RF emissions which constitute an
additional possible hazard. Although not a lightning phenomenon, it may be noted that a dielectric surface
can accumulate electrostatic charge, which may reach such an intensity that a local discharge occurs; this
may puncture a thin dielectric or, if (as is more likely) the discharge is to an adjacent conducting part of the
surface, be the source of RF emissions.
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J.12.5.2
Unclassified
Effects of Transients
a)
Faults in Operation of Equipment - An electric transient may produce faults in the operation of
equipment. The exact nature of the fault will depend upon the transients waveform, amplitude, duration
and time of occurrence as well as other factors such as whether the equipment is analogue or digital.
The fault may simply be a transient error with return to normal operation after a short recovery period, or
it may be a deviation from correct functioning, known as an upset or malfunction. The latter does not
correct itself, but the system may be returned to normal operation by resetting or reloading the software,
with no permanent damage having been done to the equipment.
b)
Permanent Damage to Hardware Examples of which are breakdown of semi-conductors or other

components, and flashover at connector pins or in wiring, causing permanent tracking or consequential
damage to other components.
c)
Sparking A transient could be of sufficient magnitude to cause a breakdown of air (Indirect Effects
sparking) which could constitute a hazard to explosives and fuel similar to that due to Direct Effects
sparking.
d)
Inadvertent Firing of EEDs.
J.12.6
Far-Field Effects
These are the effects that occur when an aircraft acts as a receiving antenna, being in the far field of the
lightning channel which is acting as a transmitter. The transients will be predominantly damped sinusoidal
oscillations with frequencies related to the electrical resonances of the aircraft, and its electrical systems. All
the effects of induced transients mentioned under Indirect Effects are still possible but less likely because of
the lower intensity. In general if the system has been designed to be invulnerable to direct strikes and nearby
flashes, then the more distant 'far field' flashes will not present a hazard and are not addressed in the
Defence Standard. Antennas on aircraft can of course pick up the radiations but such signals are an EMC
problem, along with other unwanted radio frequency emissions.
J.12.7
J.12.7.1
J.12.7.1.1
Relationship between Indirect Effects Tests and Equipment Tests

Standard Waveforms for Assessment of Equipment Susceptibility
Background
It should be noted that indirect effects tests are employed largely for the purpose of measuring the
magnitude of transients likely to be produced by lightning on the complete system. They are not employed
for testing electric systems or equipment before installation in the aircraft. For the purpose of designing and
testing electrical equipment, it is necessary to define a second set of standard waveforms based on the
probable waveforms and parameters of induced voltages and currents in aircraft wiring. It is necessary to do
this because equipment has to be developed simultaneously with the aircraft itself and it is usually
impossible to wait until the aircraft has been constructed and its induced voltages measured before
designing the equipment. The procedure is to design the equipment to withstand a specified level of
transient, the Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) based on previous experience and to design the
aircraft (including shielding of the wiring) so that transients above the allowable level, with an adequate
safety margin below the ETDL do not reach the equipment. Finally at a later stage in design, pulse tests are
made to confirm that the predicted level of transients at equipment inputs does not exceed the level allowed.
If it does, then either further shielding needs to be incorporated in the aircraft or the equipment itself needs to
be further hardened to withstand the higher level.
J.12.7.1.2
Waveforms
J.12.7.1.2.1 Equipment test methods are given in Leaflet 1/3 see J5 and are based on the Damped
Sinewave (DCS08) and Ground Voltage (DCS09) Tests of UK Def Stan 59-41 (Part 3). Two main types of
waveform are employed, as follows:-
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a)
Unidirectional pulses, having decay times considerably longer than their rise times, and whose shape is
related to that of the lightning current waveform. These are sometimes known as forced transients
because they are 'driven' by the lightning waveform.
b)
Bursts of damped sinusoidal oscillations. These are shock-excited oscillations corresponding to the
natural electrical resonances of the aircraft and its electrical systems. They are free or natural
oscillations, whose frequency and degree of damping are independent of the lightning current waveform,
although their amplitude will depend on the shape and amplitude of the shock (the lightning waveform)
that triggers them off.
J.12.7.1.2.2 For test purposes, four waveform shapes have been selected as representative of the range
that occurs in practice. Different cable bundles will experience different amplitudes of transients depending
on their location and construction (for example, with or without shielding) so a range of test amplitudes
(levels) will also be required together with Equipment Installation Categories (see H.3.2).
J.12.7.1.2.3 The four waveforms are shown in Figure 10 to Figure 13 of Annex H and are described
below. The waveforms may be either of current or voltage as appropriate to the particular test. Descriptions
such as 6.4/70 s refer respectively to the time to reach the peak and the time to decay to 50% of the peak.
a)
Intermediate pulse, 6.4/70 s (IP Waveform)

This waveform (Figure 10) is (see Note 2 below) the same shape as the standard lightning current
waveform described in G.3.2 for pulse testing of aircraft. It may appear in several manifestations as
follows:1)
An induced voltage that has the SP waveform due to inductive coupling with flux that has
penetrated through a skin aperture will drive an IP waveform current in the shield of a conductor
(small R/L ratio). In this case there will also be a voltage of the same shape on the inner (core wire)
due to the product of shield current and transfer impedance.
2)
The voltage gradient on the inner surface of a vehicle skin when lightning current is flowing in
the skin will have an IP shape, and in this case, could also appear as a current in the conductors
connected to structure that have a large R/L ratio. It can also appear as the induced voltage on a
conductor as a result of inductive coupling with magnetic flux that had diffused through a high
resistivity skin such as carbon fibre composite (CFC) and in doing so, has effectively undergone an
integrating process.
b) Short pulse, 100 ns rise time, 6.4 s to zero crossover (SP Waveform)
This waveform (Figure 11) is effectively the derivative (slope) of the intermediate waveform so that its
zero occurs at the same time as the peak of the intermediate waveform. It may arise as an induced
voltage in wiring when magnetic flux penetrates through an aperture of air or non-conducting material,
because the internal flux then has the same shape as the lightning current and the induced voltage is
proportional to the rate of change of flux.
c) Long pulses, 40/180 and 50/500 s (LP-A and LP-B Waveforms)
This waveform (Figure 12) represents a transient of duration considerably longer than that of the
lightning current itself, that is, it has both a longer rise time and longer duration than the intermediate
waveform. The longer variant (LP-B) may occur for example as a long transient current in the metal
parts of vehicles where much of the construction is of high resistivity material such as CFC; for early
times (substantially during the rising front of the lightning current waveform) the current division between
the metal and the CFC depends on their relative inductances, but at later times the division depends on
their relative resistances. This leads to a redistribution of current, taking the form of a circulating current
which reverses the current flow in the CFC and may persist long after the lightning current itself has
decayed to negligible amplitude. For example, the time for decay of the circulating current might be 7
times that of the lightning current (compare the 50% decay times of the intermediate and LP-B
waveforms). When an equipment, and its associated cables, is situated in a well protected composite
structure, the shorter variant (LP-A) waveform may be used.
d) Damped sinusoidal oscillation (DS Waveform)
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This waveform (Figure 13) represents the oscillations that result from the 'shock' (steep-fronted
disturbance) of the lightning strike, which correspond to the natural electrical resonances of the aircraft
and its electrical systems. It may be employed in tests at a wide range of frequencies and amplitudes.
The allowable range of the degree of damping defined in Fig B3.5 corresponds to a Q factor (the usual
inverse measure of damping employed in connection with resonant circuits) of between 6.8 to 32.8.
NOTE D0160C Section 22 Waveforms (with the exception of WF3) are specified either as a voltage or a current
waveform. They correspond to the Equipment Test Waveforms in Annex H as follows:IP
SP
LP-B
LP-A
DS
J.12.7.1.3
WF1
WF2
WF5B
WF5A
WF3
(Current) or WF4 (Voltage)

(Voltage)
(Current)
(Current)
(Voltage or Current)
Levels for all aircraft
In D0160 Section 22, Test Levels are designated 1-5 for the different waveforms according to the severity of
the electromagnetic environment in which the equipment and cabling to it is installed. Similarly) defines
Equipment Categories and Levels for the IP, SP and LP waveforms for Air Side use (see NOTE 1 below re
the DS Waveform).
NOTE 1
A further consideration is that cable exposure will not necessarily be the same for each waveform. For
example, a cable which is in quite an exposed region as far as CFC and hybrid structures are concerned and therefore
extremely exposed to the long waveform could be completely hidden to the short and intermediate waveforms. That
could mean that the environment (according to the Category definitions of Annex C and the requirements of Table A3.1,
for a particular cable would be in Category B for a short pulse, but in Category D for an intermediate or long pulse. It
could also mean that other categories need defining. Annex C attempts to overcome this by noting that when a cable
can be defined in more than one category, the levels associated with the more severe environment should be used but it
may be punitive to test at Cat D for the SP Waveform when Cat B or Cat A is applicable.
NOTE 2
The test categories of Annex C compare to the waveform levels of DO160 approximately as follows:Cat A
Cat B
Cat C)
Cat D)
- Level 1
- Level 2
- Levels 3 to 5
NOTE 3
STANAG 4327, and Annex H, the IP, SP and LP waveforms are used in Ground Voltage tests that
terminology originates in Def Stan 59-41. The use of the words Ground Voltage could imply that current flow through
different grounding points is the coupling mechanism during the lightning strike. That is not necessarily so, especially
concerning the SP Waveform, and it should be remembered that Ground Voltage injection is merely a convenient way of
injecting the 3 waveforms into the equipment wiring. In fact, D0160 only uses that method for Waveform 5 and
occasionally for Waveform 4. The term Ground Voltage Injection is explained in Leaflet 1/3 J5.
NOTE 4
Test levels for the DS waveform are defined in H.3.3, from which it will be noted that above 30 MHz the
levels decrease with frequency, but do not change according to equipment category. The D0160C Section 22 levels for
Waveform 3 are constant with frequency but change according to the severity of the environment.
J.12.7.2
J.12.7.2.1
Multiple Stroke/Multiple Burst Testing

Multiple Stroke Testing
J.12.7.2.1.1 ED84 (Ref L2/24 see I.8) defined a Multiple stroke for an aircraft as an initial stroke
(Component A) followed by 23 subsequent strokes of lower amplitude (D/2) spaced at intervals of at least 10
ms. The interval between strokes, however, in the specified Multi Stroke waveform is long enough for the
transients induced by each stroke to have died away before the arrival of the next stroke, and therefore the
repetitive nature of the waveform is not significant with regard to upset and only cumulative thermal damage
needs to be considered. However, there is a school of thought which says the Multiple Stroke Environment
can cause upset but UK Military Lightning Specialists contend that that aspect is adequately covered by the
Multiple Burst Waveform.
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J.12.7.2.1.2 Consequently it is maintained that there is no need to specify a multiple stroke test
environment, provided that the equipment test internal environment incorporates all the relevant parameters
and levels due to a multi-stroke flash. In particular, in order to test for accumulated thermal damage it should
allow for, in the external environment, an action integral of at least 0.8 x 106 A2s. That value is the 2%
probability level for the total action integral for negative strokes to ground, including the initial stroke and all
subsequent strokes. This Defence Standard includes equipment test waveforms that meet these
requirements and it therefore does not recognise a Multi-Stroke Environment and associated equipment
tests.
J.12.7.2.2
Multiple Burst Testing
J.12.7.2.2.1 Component H represents a high rate of rise pulse whose amplitude and time duration are
much less than those of a return stroke. Such pulses have been found to occur randomly throughout a
lightning flash, interspersed with the other current components. While not likely to cause physical damage to
the aircraft or electronic components, the random and repetitive nature of these pulses may cause
interference or upset of certain systems. It should be noted that the Component H waveform has a maximum
rate of rise faster by a factor of approximately 2 than that of the Design Aim Parameter rate of rise given in
Annex A Table 1.
J.12.7.2.2.2 Each pulse (Waveform H) of the Multiple Burst Environment is likely to give rise to a damped
sinewave transients at the same frequencies that are excited by initial attachment of the return stroke. An
appropriate equipment test waveform for that environment is therefore bursts of the DS waveform given in
Section 5 of Annex A3. For a particular frequency, the equipment test consists of 3 bursts, each burst
consisting of 20 successive damped sinewaves at that frequency. For the complete equipment test this is
repeated for each prescribed frequency.
J.12.8
J.12.8.1
Leader Phase and Arc Driven Voltage Effects

Attachment
J.12.8.1.1 As previously mentioned, the process of lightning attachment to a body involved the formation
of high electric field concentration at the extremities, sharp edges and protuberances, with the consequent
formation of streamers which tend to link up with the advancing lightning leader. For airborne vehicles it is
also possible that the additional electrical field concentration caused by the presence of a conducting body in
an already high field may trigger a lightning flash that would otherwise not have occurred.
J.12.8.1.2 It is seen that the probability of a strike to any particular region of the surface is largely a matter
of the local geometry. This has lead to the classification of the surface into zones, Zone 1 having a high
probability of initial attachment, as described in section J.12.2.5 above. High voltage tests have been
performed on scale models in an attempt to establish the relative probabilities experimentally. However the
practical difficulties of accurately and economically reproducing the voltage and field conditions around a
lightning leader are so formidable, even if the correct rise time for the voltage waveform was known, that at
present such tests cannot be relied on for design or certification purposes. There are however other
acceptable methods as described in Reference 2.1. (see I.7)
J.12.8.1.3 One item of interest is that there is good evidence that conducting composites such as CFC,
although of high resistivity compared with metal, nevertheless behave as metal in relation to the probability
of initial attachment. In other words, it is usual to assume that a CFC structure has the same probability of an
attachment as a metal structure would have in the same location on the vehicle.
J.12.8.2
Dielectric Puncture
J.12.8.2.1 The process described above by which conductors become the site of lightning attachment
applies also to conductors behind dielectric surfaces such as radomes and antenna covers. The only
difference is that the dielectric intervenes between the conductor and the exterior. This does not prevent the
attachment but the dielectric is punctured or even shattered in the process. It is sometimes possible to
protect against puncture by fitting external conducting strips over the dielectric, carefully spaced to
preferentially 'attract' the strike; there is obviously a limit to this solution since excessive metal will prevent
the radar, antenna etc efficiently performing its function. Again, CFC behaves as a metal rather than a
dielectric in relation to high voltage puncture effects.
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J.12.8.2.2 These leader phase phenomena of attachment and dielectric puncture are classified as Leader
Phase effects. The phenomena of shock excitation due to rapidly changing E field do not come under that
heading as they are, strictly speaking, indirect effects.
J.12.8.3
Leader Phase Tests
High voltage model tests are not recognised by this Defence Standard as a means of determining the
position of leader attachment points. The tests given in Leaflet 1/6 see J8 and described in Leaflet 2/8 see
J9 are predominantly engineering tests to be used for the comparison of different protection schemes but
may be used in support of certification.
J.12.8.4
Arc Driven Voltage Effects
The voltage developed along the arc, due to the resistance and inductance of the arc channel, will cause
reattachment as the arc sweeps back over the aircraft (see section J12.2.4 above). Until recently it had
been thought that the voltage developed was not sufficient to puncture dielectrics other than those over
blade antennae etc but recently it has been realised that the voltage developed can cause breakdown of
quite thick dielectrics. Hence there is a need to proscribe unprotected dielectrics in Zone 2 arrears and for
suitable high voltage test as given in Reference L1.1
J.12.9
J.12.9.1
Design Aim Parameters and Lightning Test Waveforms

Minimum design aim parameters for aircraft are given in Annex A.
J.12.9.2 J.12.2.10 gives the derivation of those parameters which for Action Integral and charge are more
severe than those given in ED84 (Ref L2/2.4 see I.8). They are the same however as those in STANAG
4236 Ed 2. This is justifiable as strike incidents to aircraft are occurring where the action integral has been
shown to be much greater than the 2.25 x 106 A2s value used by the Air Side to date. That conclusion has
been reached by reproducing in the laboratory the degree of damage that occurred in flight. There is strong
evidence, therefore, that the action integral value used in ED84 is not severe enough (and possible the
charge content value as well).
J.12.9.3 There could in fact be a case for increasing parameters still further as recent research (see Ref
L2/2 see I.8) has shown that in some geographical areas positive strikes can be as high as 80% of the total.
It is necessary, however, to investigate what that means in terms of total flash count before deciding a value
greater than 10% positive on which to base an increased parameter combined global environment. Until that
has been done, this Defence Standard adopts the position that the Aircraft Project Director may require the
action integral parameters to be twice those given in Table 1 of Annex A when evaluating safety critical
structures. If that were done, Component A (J.12.10 below) would have an action integral of 7 x 106 A2s,
which is the value that EUROCAE WG31 have said may be needed for certain scenarios.
J.12.9.4 Table 1 of Annex A lists parameters for the Air Side. Figure 1 and Table 1 of Annex G relates
those parameters to attachment zones and the components of the composite test waveforms. It will be noted
that Component C is now defined as 600 A for 0.5 seconds. This follows from the Evans analysis, which
defined the combined positive and negative parameters, noted in 4236 Annex D, Section 2.3. It then follows
that the short Component C for Zones 2A, 2B (C* of ED84) should also be defined at the 600 A level. It is
realised that this is at variance with other Lightning Standards but the position is logical and can be
defended.
J.12.9.5 It should be remembered that the Design Aim Parameters quoted in Table 1 of Annex A and the
Test Waveform Components of Table 2 (Components A, B, C and D) relate to the arc attachment point for
Zones 1 and 2 and the total current in the total section of a Zone 3. It is sometimes necessary to know the
parameters relevant to a particular part of a structure, e.g. in each of the booms of a twin-boomed aircraft
such as the old Gloucester Vampire. In that case the current in the boom would be half of the total current
flowing between a nose and tail attachment and the parameters for Zone 3 would be scaled down in that
ratio (see Note 5 to Annex A).
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J.12.9.6 Waveforms particular to Indirect and Leader Phase Effects testing and for equipment testing (see
3-5.5) are given in Annex G.
J.12.10
Composite Test Waveform for Direct Effects and some Indirect Effects
J.12.10.1 It is impossible to accurately simulate a natural lightning waveform due to its complexity, the
variation of parameters and the unpredictability of combination of parameters. Also the maximum di/dt tends
to occur at the same time as peak current, thus making it very difficult if not impossible to build a lightning
generator that would simulate such a waveform. It is, however, necessary for the design and testing of
lightning protective measures to define the threat level in the form of a standard simplified current waveform
having the relevant parameters set at the chosen degree of severity.
J.12.10.2 The derived environments given in Annex A are therefore also related to the so called 'Lightning
Test Waveform' which has been agreed essentially for direct effect and certain indirect effects tests. This
waveform, often called a 'composite test waveform', has been developed for application to aircraft according
to their zoning and has been more or less internationally agreed for direct effects and certain indirect effects
tests.
J.12.10.3 The waveform is given in Annex G at Figure 7. It should be remembered that the waveform is
not an attempt to simulate the lightning discharge. In fact it is not really a waveform at all but a diagrammatic
representation of the arrangement of the important severe parameters contained in the component parts of
the lightning flash and for that reason it is divided into Components A, B, C and D (see G.2).
J.12.10.4 To accommodate the reduced parameters in Zone 1C due to the sweeping leader effect
EUROCAE in ED84 have also added a component AH, which is also the position adopted by this Def Stan,
Also, the peak current and action integral of 'Component A' could be provided by either a unidirectional or an
oscillatory waveform when considering damage to metallic components, although it is important to use a
unidirectional waveform of the correct amplitude and duration when testing CFC and similar material as it is
then necessary to get the correct volumetric distribution of current. The latter depends on eddy currents and
hence frequency.
J.12.10.5 It is not necessary to employ the whole composite waveform in a single test; combinations of the
components may be selected according to the zone in which the test object is situated and the particular
damage mechanism being investigated. It is however, important for the components employed to be placed
in their correct order in time (not necessarily in the order given in the composite waveform) immediately
following one and another, say within 1 ms of the cessation of the preceding component.
J.12.10.6 This four-component waveform is based mainly on a negative flash to ground having
parameters at the 2% severity level, but with enhanced action integral in order to allow for the occurrence of
positive flashes to ground. The four components represent the important parameters of an initial stroke,
intermediate current, continuing current, and a restrike but are not an exact simulation of those parts of the
lightning discharge but are designed to produce effects equivalent to those produced by severe natural
lightning Such a waveform is adequate for direct effects, but for some indirect effects, which depend largely
on the rate of change of current, Component D is specified to have a peak rate of rise of (1.4 x 1011 As-1, in
addition to the other parameters listed. When employed by itself purely for indirect effects tests, it may be
designated Waveform D2 and the rate of rise defined more exactly.
J.12.11
Lightning Flight Restrictions
It is sometimes necessary, especially during development flying, to minimise the chance of an aircraft
receiving a lightning strike to invoke a flight safety restriction. Such an event cannot be completely precluded
but it can be reduced to an acceptable level, albeit usually with some penalty to a development programme
such that the aircraft may only fly when there is no risk or minimal risk of lightning activity. Some previous
flight restrictions which have been used are discussed in Leaflet 2/11 J21 (see J.21)
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d1 = h1 TAS
VQ
d2 = h2 TAS
VQ
where:
Vl = 1.5 x 105 m/s
h1 = 1524 m (5,000 ft.)

h2 = 3048 m (10,000 ft.)
TAS = 134 m/s (250 KTS)
1A
2A
1C
d1
d2
Figure 23
Examples of Limits of Zone 1C
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122
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Figure 24
123
Aluminium Puncture Threshold as a Function of Current and Dwell Time
Unclassified
J.13
J.13.1
Unclassified
Leaflet 2/3 - General Assessment, Guidance

Introduction
J.13.1.1 To neglect lightning protection especially in the early stages of development of new aircraft has
proved in several instances to have been a very uneconomic option, as crashes have occurred (some with
fatalities) which could have been avoided by timely implementation of lightning protection.
J.13.1.2 This leaflet gives some general background and guidance concerning the lightning hazard
assessment required by 5.3.1 and Annex D. More detailed guidance concerning indirect effects and Fuel
Hazard Assessment is given in Leaflets L2/4 (see I.9) and L2/5 (see I.10) respectively. Further guidance
regarding completion of the LHDA Report and Risk Evaluation is given in Leaflet 2/10 (see I.10).
J.13.2
Purpose of Lightning Protection Plan and Lightning Hazard Design Analysis
The purpose of Assessment and Lightning Testing is to determine whether aircraft and their associated
systems have been so designed that they are either inherently protected against the effects of lightning
described in Leaflet 2/2 (see I.8), or that adequate protection measures have been provided. The
assessment should include a risk analysis (see section J13.4 below), especially where protection has not
been achieved. To ensure compliance with the above, Def Stan 59-113 Annex A, calls for a Lightning
Protection Plan (LPP) to be prepared, which in turn requires that a comprehensive review of all aspects of
the design of the aircraft shall be made in the form of a Lightning Hazard Design Analysis (LHDA). The
LHDA is intended to be a continuing process starting early in the development of a project and which seeks
to cover every aspect of the design where lightning might affect safety and suitability for service.
J.13.3 Criticality Lists and Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) Prepared by the Aircraft
Manufacturer
When preparing the LHDA required by 5.3, due note should be taken of criticality lists compiled from the
aircraft manufacturers Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). Those lists should be prepared in consultation
with the Aircraft Manufacturer and may need to be agreed with the Aircraft Project Director. They should note
all items and systems which could be affected by lightning under headings of Flight Safety Critical, Mission
Accomplishment Critical and Non Critical. It is not the function of the Lightning Protection Design Engineer to
decide those criticalities but he may need to discuss the implications of a lightning event with the Aircraft
Manufacturer. For example, a radome may not be listed by the Aircraft Manufacturer as Flight Safety Critical
but it could become so if severely damaged by lightning so that it detached from the aircraft.
J.13.4
J.13.4.1
Need for Risk Evaluation

Risk Definition
The risk to an aircraft may be defined as the likely probability of an event occurring together with the
consequences of that event.
J.13.4.2
Scope of Risk Evaluation
J.13.4.2.1 The Lightning Protection Plan should include a Risk Evaluation which should state the level of
protection provided for all the items/systems noted in the Criticality Lists mentioned above. When compiling
the criticality lists, the question has to be asked, can it be affected by lightning and if so, does it matter from
the viewpoint of:a)
Flight Safety Criticality
b)
Mission Accomplishment Criticality
c)
Non Critical but has Impact on Repairs and Cost of Ownership?
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J.13.4.2.2 The Risk Assessment should therefore have statements defining the degree of protection
afforded under the above headings against all entries on the Criticality Lists.
J.13.4.2.3 The method of arriving at a particular solution should also be stated; e.g. by analysis, by test
and analysis by comparability with previous accepted etc.
J.13.4.3
Evaluation of Potential Consequences of a Lightning Event
It should be borne in mind that a 'Risk Evaluation' must explore all possible damage scenarios, including
hidden insidious damage (that is damage which is not serious until another event takes place). This will note
any items in the 'Criticality Lists' which are considered an unacceptable risk and the 'Lightning Protection
Plan' should state the measures taken by which the risk can be reduced to an acceptable level and the
trade-offs available for so doing or not doing.
J.13.4.4
J.13.4.4.1
Probability Analysis
The Risk Evaluation should include a Probability Analysis.
J.13.4.4.2 When evaluating the probability of an unacceptable occurrence, the probability of the aircraft
receiving a strike at the specified threat level must be estimated from the probability of a strike occurring in
the first place multiplied by the probability of lightning parameters at the specified severity level.
J.13.5
Factors Affecting the Need for Testing
J.13.5.1 The essence of the LPP/LHDA is that the assessment shall be made by an analysis of the
design. That analysis will normally be achieved by means of calculation and modelling, comparison with
known acceptable design and methods of protection and by comparison with previous approved systems;
supplemented, where and when necessary, by testing in accordance with the methods of Def Stan 59-113
Leaflet 1 (see J.3). The LHDA must therefore identify the need for testing, and when testing is necessary a
Test Plan (TP) must be prepared in accordance with Annex D of this Def Stan.
J.13.5.1.1 Testing without a formal Test Plan, may also be required on component parts and materials to
obtain performance informative as a design and development aid and to assist in the selection of suitable
components and materials. When such development testing is done it may, under certain circumstances, be
offered to the Aircraft Project Director as part of the testing required by the formal LHDA.
J.13.5.1.2 When deciding the need for testing during an assessment, the factors noted in Leaflet 2/6,
Section 5 (see J.16), should be borne in mind.
J.13.5.1.3 When deciding the number of samples to be tested and the number of shots per sample, it
should be remembered that the repeated passage of high current across joints reduces the tendency for that
joint to spark. If several shots are made to one sample this should be borne in mind. For tests which involve
both conduction and attachment shots the conduction shot should be carried out first. The number of test
samples is usually limited and generally more than one test will need to be made on each sample. Care must
therefore be taken to arrange the order of tests so that if damage should result from an early test, the sample
is still suitable for the tests that follow.
J.13.5.1.4 As the results of the tests must be examined statistically, little confidence can be given to the
fact that one test sample survives a test threat. AOP 24 (Reference 13) notes that such a sample size
corresponds to the single item on test being 50% reliably insensitive to the test threat with a 50% confidence
level, rising to an 85% reliability that the item is insensitive with an 80% confidence if ten items are tested. To
obtain an overall confidence of an unacceptable event not occurring however, these figures must be
weighted with the probability of a strike occurring in the first place multiplied by the probability of lightning
parameters occurring to the test severity.
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J.13.6
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Test Plan, Test Schedule and Test Report
J.13.6.1 The Test Plan is intended to be a comprehensive document which clearly defines why the tests
are being made, how they are to be made and what measurements are to be taken. It is, in effect, a test
proposal, made in collaboration with the Test House, from which a Test Schedule (TS) would be prepared
which is then included in the plan. The Test Schedule would detail in which order the tests are to be run and
which (if any) tests are to be combined, and would allow, by agreement with the Aircraft Project Director,
deviations from the order of test as dictated by information obtained as the tests progress.
J.13.6.2 The Test Report would include the final TP and TS, together with results of the tests, including
raw data, with all analysis leading to conclusions and any recommendations for further testing or redesign.
J.13.7
Test Combinations
When more than one damage mechanism is being investigated, it is sometimes possible to combine the
requirements of several tests in a single test, provided that the individual test requirements are met. For
example, it is permissible to conduct magnetic force tests whilst other tests are being made that involve test
currents having a high action integral, provided that the relative waveform requirements are satisfied.
Similarly, it is also permissible to run Group I and indirect effects tests together.
J.13.8
Hazards Arising from Testing
It is important to remember that the pulse generators used for the tests given in this Defence Standard
produce lethal voltages. The normal safety precautions of a high voltage laboratory must always be
observed. In addition, special precautions must be taken when making Whole Aircraft Tests, Sparking Tests,
Flammable Gas Tests, to eliminate an explosion, or contain it if it occurs. This also applies to Equipment
Testing, and especially when using the Long waveform, as component parts of equipment have been known
to explode during such tests, projecting particles over a distance of several metres.
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J.14
J.14.1
Leaflet 2/4 - Assessment, Guidance for Indirect Effect Hazards

Introduction
This Appendix gives Assessment and Test Guidance concerning the evaluation of measures to protect
Aircraft against hazards arising from lightning indirect effects. It should be read in conjunction with Annex D
and Annex E and Leaflets 1/1 (see J.3 and J.4) Section 2 mainly describes coupling mechanisms, section 3
the philosophy of clearance, whilst section J14.4 and section J14.5 discuss indirect effect tests as applied
to whole and part aircraft respectively. Section J14.6 gives guidance concerning indirect effect tests to
evaluate possible flashover voltages.
J.14.2
J.14.2.1
Summary of Indirect Effects Mechanisms

Summary
J.14.2.1.1 A summary of indirect effects has been given in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12). For convenience that
summary is repeated and expanded below. Indirect effects are those due to coupling with the magnetic or
electric field of the lightning current flowing on the aircraft or in the lightning channel itself. They can arise
therefore as a result of a direct strike, a nearby flash or a distant flash. The principal effect is that currents
are induced on the aircraft surface resulting in currents and voltages in the interior wiring. The amplitude of
the latter will depend on the electro-magnetic shielding afforded by the surface. Thus electronic equipment is
likely to be subjected to transients, which may cause malfunction or possibly permanent damage. Leaflet 2/2
(see J.12) notes that there is:
a)
A voltage proportional to the lightning current, due to restive coupling
b)
A voltage proportional to the rate of change of lightning current (di/dt) due to direct coupling with the
magnetic field that has penetrated through apertures (non-conducting materials or its gaps).
c)
High frequency damped sinusoidal oscillations usually in the range 2 to 50 MHz. Which are shockexcited oscillations corresponding to natural resonances (possibly including harmonics) of the aircraft
and its electrical. In the case of distant lightning, and also NEMP, this is the only form of transient that
appears.
NOTE As noted in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12), for a cloud to ground strike there is a shock excited set of oscillation at
the instant of leader attachment. The value of dE/dt at leader attachment to a body in the air is usually taken as 1013
-1 -1
Vm s .
d)
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Extra Long Current Pulse in Mixed Structures - Measurements with simulated lightning pulses have
shown that in a structure composed of materials of different resistivities closely bonded together, for
example metal and CFC, current division between them early in a lightning pulse is largely governed by
the inductances, and hence the geometry, with the resistance differences having little effect. The current
densities in the different materials at this stage tend to be of the same order, with the CFC having a high
resistive voltage gradient. However, later in the pulse (roughly after the peak has been passed) when
current changes are slower, relative resistances exert their effect and of course become the governing
factor for very slowly changing currents. The result is that the current in the CFC may reverse its
direction of flow while that in the metal continues in the original direction at an amplitude that reduces
more slowly than the total lightning current is reducing, giving rise to a long current transient. (Also the
current can redistribute from resistive external skins to internal metallic conduits) Indeed, this current
circulating between the metal and the CFC may continue for a considerable time after the lightning
current itself has become negligible. This is particularly marked if the structure is mainly of CFC with
only a small amount of metal, and applies particularly to cable sheaths and metallic pipes beneath CFC
skins.
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J.14.2.1.2 To cater for the effects noted in section J14.2.1 a) to d) above, the following waveforms are
used as equipment test waveforms, see section J14.3.6 below:
a)
an intermediate waveform is used, (the IP waveform of Annex H Figure 10)
b)
a short waveform is used, (the SP waveform of Annex H Figure 11)
c)
a damped oscillatory waveform is used(the DS waveform of Annex H Figure 12)
d)
a long waveform is used, (the LP waveform of Annex H Figure 13)
J.14.2.2
A Note about Component H and di/dt values in Table 1
J.14.2.2.1 In Table 1 it is noted that the di/dt value due to attachments is 2 x 1011 As-1. This comes from
the multiple burst postulated by NASA (Felix Pitts) and AE4L. The value generally used is 1.4 x 1011 As-1,
e.g. G.3.2. There is obviously an anomaly here and a note of explanation is as follows:In Table 1, di/dtmax for Indirect Effect Assessments is 2 x 1011As-1. This is in line with ED84 (Ref 2.2)
page 41, where a Component H waveform is said to be relevant to all zones. It is explained below at
section J.14.3.4 that it is not thought necessary to have a Component H waveform for pulse tests,
nevertheless it is necessary to use the maximum di/dt of the H waveform (due to leader phase
attachments) when making Indirect Effect Assessments other than pulse tests and, especially, when
evaluating flashover and voltages stressing insulation. For that reason, Waveform D2a in G.3.1, gives a
maximum di/dt of 2 x 1011 As-1.
J.14.2.2.2 Perhaps too much credence should not be given to the 2 x 1011 As-1 figure and the NASA F106
work, as the spiky pulses seen by them may not have been anything to do with the aircraft interaction. They
have said, when demonstrating their Air Lab on the ground that their instrumentation seemed to be
generating those spikes (Ref L2/1).
J.14.3
J.14.3.1
Aircraft Clearance
J.14.3.1.1 The philosophy of indirect effects clearance has been reconsidered and discussed amongst UK
experts in an endeavour to define the indirect effect clearance requirements for UK Military Projects, taking
note of the latest thinking and experience, for example from EFA. This has resulted in the New Transient
Level definitions given below. For clarity this Def Stan now separately defines evaluation requirements when
modelling is essential and when it need not be used. The route to certification arising from those
requirements is summarised in Sections J14.3.4.1 and J14.3.4.2 below.
J.14.3.1.2 Due to the expense and complication of whole aircraft testing, aircraft clearance must be based
on analytical techniques supported and validated by tests, unless the aircraft under consideration are very
simplistic systems (see section J14.3.3 below). This means that for all the systems of interest full threat
responses must be predicted for all cables and equipments. That analysis must then be substantiated by
Whole Aircraft pulse tests made on selected cables and equipments.
J.14.3.1.3 In the past it has been stipulated (e.g. in STANAG 4327 Ed 1) that low level swept CW tests
should be made with the aircraft in the return conductor system. The idea was that frequency domain
responses measured at all the equipments of interest should be converted to time domain responses and
compared with responses from modelling and the full threat extrapolated responses from pulse tests. Apart
from the problem of converting frequency domain responses to time domain, experience has shown that
there are often non-linearity effects which make these comparisons difficult, if not impossible. This is
because modelling assumes a homogenous aircraft structure at full threat. Therefore the model will predict
the full threat surface current distribution which could be very different to the current distribution at the levels
(of less an 1 Amp) used for low level swept excitation. This Def Stan does not therefore recognise low level
swept CW tests as a valid assessment method.
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J.14.3.1.4 There is an opinion which says that there should always be a full threat upset test, either on a
system rig with multi-point injection, or preferably during a whole aircraft pulse test. With regard to the latter
preference it is argued that only by testing on the aircraft at full threat will the correct environment due to
lightning occur, with appropriate amplitude and phase of voltages and currents on cables and
electromagnetic fields in equipment bays.
J.14.3.1.5 The opposing view is that even that type of test cannot reproduce the actual excitation that
occurs in practise (for reasons that are too complicated to explain here) and that all the variables and
imponderables can be swept up in an adequate margin between levels obtained from successfully validated
analysis and the bench test levels to which equipment is cleared. This Def Stan adopts the latter position and
requires a margin to be agreed with the Aircraft Project Director which is lower for high confidence
verification methods and correspondingly higher for lower confidence methods and if the criticality of the
system is high. If such agreement cannot be reached, the margins must be 12 dB for Safety and 6 dB for
Suitability for Service where safety is not an issue.
J.14.3.2
Definition of Levels
The terms used in this Defence Standard to describe Aircraft and Equipment Transient Levels are given in
4.5. The definitions for TTL, TCL ETDL are reproduced below and where appropriate compared with Civilian
definitions which are given in italics.
Test Transient Level (TTL) The measured response from a pulse test (MTL), extrapolated to full threat, (there
is no direct Civilian equivalent but see section J14.3.2.2 below).
Transient Control Level (TCL) The worse case actual amplitude that a Transient Assessment establishes
should exist at an equipment interface when the equipment is installed in the aircraft and subjected to the
maximum lightning threat. It is the transient level arrived at by:a)
taking the worst case of all configurations and attachment points from both modelling and pulse tests,
when the difference between all corresponding CTLs and TTLs is <6 dB , or
b)
when modelling is not done by taking the TTLs, corrected if necessary for any non linearity, as the TCL.
Transient Control Level (TCL) The transient control level is the maximum allowable level of transients
appearing at the equipment interfaces as a result of the defined external environment.
The Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) Is the transient amplitude to which the equipment must be
designed to operate without malfunction or signs of failure.
Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) The peak amplitude of transients to which the equipment is
qualified and what this Standard now calls the EQL.
The Equipment Qualification Level (EQL) is the actual transient level to which the equipment has been
tested and qualified. The EQL must never be less than the TCL plus the agreed margin.
J.14.3.3
Instead of TTL the Civilian Standards would use ATL which is defined as follows:-
"The actual transient level is the level of transient voltage and/or current which appears at the equipment
interfaces as a result of the external environment. This level may be less than or equal to the transient
control level but should not be greater."
NOTE
There may be several ATLs for a single equipment interface, depending on how the lightning attaches to the
vehicle and the configuration of the vehicle particular at the time. The Civilian definition says nothing about enveloping
these together and taking the worse case as the TCL. Hence the Civilian definitions seem too simplistic, therefore the
Draft STANAG 4327 Ed 2 definitions for TTL and TCL have been developed and adopted by this standard.
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J.14.3.4
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Assessment Applicability
J.14.3.4.1 Annex E assumes that only new installations will require assessment. If an existing installation
must be assessed the requirements of Annex E must be modified accordingly. It is assumed that the
assessment of a new project starts at the design stage and that the new aircraft will eventually have off the
shelf or new design equipments fitted to it, which may be qualified before pulse tests are made.
J.14.3.4.2 As noted in section J14.3.1 above, aircraft installations will generally be too complex to assess
by measurement alone and modelling substantiated by testing must be done. There will be simplistic aircraft
however where modelling is not required. Annex E gives assessment requirements for both cases.
NOTE
The HF content of predictions from modelling cannot be expected to have high accuracy. Although the
frequencies will be correct, the amplitudes will be different from those that occur in practice. This is because the lightning
waveform for analysis purposes is taken to be a double exponential, which departs from reality in two main particulars.
First, there are many spikes and rapid changes in real lightning, especially during the leader phase, and because these
are not contained in the double exponential waveform, they will tend to make the true HF content more severe than in
predictions. Secondly, the double exponential waveform departs from the shape of a typical return stroke because an
immediate turn-on is assumed, thus emphasising the HF energy at the start of the waveform because di/dt attains its
maximum value at time zero. In contrast, the real lightning return stroke waveform typically has a slow turn-on; the rate of
rise is initially zero and gradually increases to a maximum just before the peak current. For this reason the assumption of
a double exponential makes the prediction of HF more severe than the reality. Because of these two factors operating in
opposite directions, estimates of HF (damped sinewave) responses have to be made with great care when deciding
TCLs.
J.14.3.5
J.14.3.5.1
Assessment Requirements
When Modelling is Essential
When modelling is essential, the assessment should be made as follows:a)
Survey the likely installation and revise as the project develops to decide systems of interest, and hence
cable runs of interest.
b) Decide attachment points likely to cause maximum coupling to system cables of interest.
c) Model the aircraft and systems etc of interest at full threat for all worse case attachment points as
defined in b) and for the configuration scenarios given by a) above and review as the Project develops.
Predict likely bulk cable current responses at equipments of interest for DS and the waveforms
equivalent to IP, SP and LP and decide Computed Transient Levels (CTLs) accordingly.
d) Decide ETDLs for selection/initial testing of equipment by:1)
Adding the agreed margin (see section J14.3.1 above and E.4) to the CTLs, or
2)
When it is too early in a project for the modelling of c) to have been done, the ETDLs shall be
chosen from Table 4, see Note below.
e) Select or test equipment as appropriate by:1)
Choosing from previously tested equipment qualified to a level at least as high as the ETDL of
or if modelling not yet done from equipment qualified at the level of d) 1),
2)
Testing new equipment to the levels given by a) 1) or 2) as appropriate.
The level to which the equipment has been tested shall be declared as the Equipment Qualification
Level (EQL).
f)
Design a return conductor system, using computational or other methods acceptable to the Aircraft
Project Director, to give the aircraft surface current distribution that would occur in the operating
environment.
g) Select system and cable runs on which to make pulse tests,

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1)
where modelling has high confidence,
2)
where modelling may be in question.
h) As soon as an aircraft is available make pulse tests and obtain MTLs, for DS responses and responses
with DS removed, for circuits selected in g).
i)
Extrapolate MTLs to full threat to give TTLs.
j)
Compare TTLs of i) with corresponding CTLs of c) and if the difference between them is generally <6 dB
decide TCLs by taking appropriate worst case responses of all configurations and attachment points
considered in c) and i) above.
k) Add agreed margin as defined above and decide substantiated ETDLs necessary for all equipment.
l)
Test any equipment not qualified at e) to the substantiated ETDLs derived in k).
m) Compare TCLs of j) with the Equipment Qualification Levels (EQLs) of e) and note margins.
n) for any equipment where the margins given by m) are less than the agreed margin:1)
redesign and retest equipment to provide the necessary margin, or
2)
harden the installation to give a lower TCL and prove that the modified TCL gives the necessary
margin.
A summary of the above steps to compliance is given as a flow chart in Figure 26 and Figure 27 are
histograms illustrating the relationship of the various levels.
NOTE
When it is too early in a project for the modelling of c) to have been done default levels should be chosen. If
a rough idea of the likely location and disposition of equipment and wiring is known an appropriate ETDL may be
selected using the categories and levels given in H.3.
J.14.3.5.2
a)
When Modelling is not Essential
Survey the likely installation and revise as the project develops to decide systems of interest, and hence
cable runs of interest.
b) Decide attachment points likely to cause maximum coupling to system cables of interest.
c) Decide likely installation categories for each equipment according to Annex H.
d) To enable previously tested equipment to be selected or newly developed equipment to be tested decide
initial ETDLs from the levels given in Table 4.
e) Select or test equipment as appropriate by:1)
Choosing from previously tested equipment qualified to a level at least as high as the ETDL of d)
or
2)
Testing new equipment to the appropriate level given by d).
NOTE The level to which the equipment has been tested shall be declared as the Equipment Qualification Level
(EQL).
f)
Design a return conductor system, using computational or other methods acceptable to the Aircraft
Project Director, to give the aircraft surface current distribution that would occur in the operating
environment.
g) Select system and cable runs on which to make pulse tests.
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h) As soon as an aircraft is available make pulse tests and obtain MTLs, for DS responses and responses
with DS removed, for circuits selected in g).
i)
Extrapolate MTLs to full threat to give TTLs.
j)
Assess the results of i) above to substantiate cable resonances, taking into account any non linearity,
correct TTLs to give. TCLs.
k) Add agreed margin and decide substantiated ETDLs necessary for all equipment.
l)
Compare TCLs of j) with the Equipment Qualification Levels (EQLs) of e) and note margins.
m) for any equipment where the margins given by (xii) are less than the agreed margin.
1)
2)
redesign and retest equipment to provide the necessary margin , or

harden the installation to give a lower TCL and prove that the modified TCL gives the necessary
margin.
J.14.3.5.3 It will be noted that there can be two sets of ETDLs for the same equipment interface, those
used to select or initially test equipment before pulse tests are done and those which are derived from the
TCLs which follow after the pulse tests are made. These two sets of ETDLs may not have the same value.
J.14.3.5.4 From Reference J14.4.2 above it will be seen that the amplitude spectrum for Waveform H only
exceeds that for Waveform A above about 3 MHz but then only by about 3 dB. Apart from that real lightning
is not a double exponential waveform but has a slow turn on. Hence the high frequency content of
Component A is much greater than that of an actual lightning excitation. Consequently a Component H
excitation is not used for Pulse Tests.
J.14.3.6
Effects of Transients on Equipments
J.14.3.6.1 Although the effect of transients has already been outlined the particular effect on equipments is
reiterated here. Any of the following types of fault may be produced in an equipment by an electric transient,
depending upon its waveform, amplitude, duration, and time of occurrence as well as other factors such as
whether the equipment is analogue or digital:a)
A transient error, with return to normal operation after a short recovery period.
b)
A deviation from correct functioning, known as an upset or malfunction, which does not correct itself, but
where no permanent damage has been done to the equipment. Examples are corruption of the values of
control parameters stored in the memory of a flight control system, and causing the execution of a
programme to 'jump' to another branch from which it cannot return of its own accord. The system is
returned to normal by resetting, or reloading the software.
c)
Permanent damage to hardware. Examples are breakdown of semi-conductors, capacitors or other

components and flashover at connector pins causing permanent tracking or consequential damage to
other components.
J.14.3.6.2 The aim is to design systems so that type a) faults are of an acceptable magnitude and
duration, and type b) and c) faults are avoided altogether. Usually in safety critical systems, fault-tolerant
logic and redundancy of channels (multiplexing etc.) is employed, but since a lightning transient might affect
all channels it is important to incorporate as much 'dissimilar redundancy' as possible. Recommendations for
Equipment Tests
J.14.3.7.1 All equipment must be tested according to Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5). Ideally this should be done in a
system rig with multi-point injection but test methods and equipment to do that, although generally feasible in
principle, have yet to be developed (hence part of the reason for the 12 dB margin referred to above).
Instead of system tests, equipment bench tests are made according to the methods set out in Leaflet 1/3
see J.5 Sections 3 and 4), which are based on tests DCS08 and 09 of UK Specification Def Stan 59-41
(see J.14). To obtain the TCL, and hence the ETDL for the equipment tests, bulk current measurements are
made during whole aircraft tests on the cable bundles of interest. During equipment tests, bulk current
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injection is used (for the Damped Sinewave Test) to excite the equipment cable bundles and the ETDL
current level is measured by a bulk current probe. It should be realised that the relationship of individual wire
currents to the total cable bundle current that occurs during an equipment test is not necessarily the same as
the relationship that occurs at the same measuring point on the same cable bundle during a Whole Aircraft
Test. The adoption of the 12 dB margin which is added to the TCL to achieve the ETDL is taken to include
factors of uncertainty relating to inadequacies of measurement and lack of a complete system test.
J.14.3.7.2 A possible way in which the magnitude of the margin could be reduced would be to qualify the
equipments using a special system rig as representative as possible of the aircraft structure, and on which
the various equipments are mounted with the correct cable looms arranged in a manner to give, as closely
as possible, the excitation that would occur in the real aircraft when a representative lightning threat current
is passed through the rig structure.
J.14.3.7.3 During pulse tests, responses are obtained in terms of cable bundle currents at the points of
interest, consequently equipment test limits for both the damped sinewave and the short, intermediate and
long pulse tests are only obtained in terms of current. This is a further reason for the 12 dB margin and a
reason for making the common mode flashover and insulation breakdown tests of Section 5.4 of Leaflet 1/1
(see J.1) of this standard.
J.14.3.7.4 Equipment Tests, or rather equipment clearance to agreed levels, are both the starting and
finishing point of the Clearance Exercise, as levels have to be specified at equipment procurement, often
before the location of the equipment in the aircraft is known. These levels then have to be justified or revised
at the completion of the evaluation of Lightning Transient Protection, with subsequent re-testing (or
installation redesign) if the TCL and Margin so dictate.
J.14.4
J.14.4.1
Indirect Effect Tests on Whole Aircraft

Simulation of the Environment and Launcher Complex
J.14.4.1.1 As has already been said in section J14.3.1 clearance must be based on analysis substantiated
by whole aircraft testing. Unfortunately such testing cannot always completely simulate the lightning
environment and reproduce the conditions that will actually occur in practise. There are several reasons for
this, one of which, in the case of an aircraft, is the fact that the lightning channel is a very high impedance
compared with that of an aircraft and the aircraft is therefore effectively terminated with an open circuit when
it rings due to the sudden change of E field at a lightning attachment. Therefore there are current nodes at
the nose and tail and at each wing tip, implying wave resonances. It is very difficult to simulate those
resonances in whole aircraft testing as the only way to do it is to use open arc terminations at each end of
the aircraft return conductor aircraft system; such arcs require a very high generator voltage and complicate
measurements due to the large amount of electrical noise produced. To avoid these complications and to
achieve efficient use of stored energy, the pulse tests employ a direct connection of the aircraft to the return
conductors at the end remote from the generator. This means that there is a current antinode at the short
circuited termination remote from the generator and a node at the generator, giving wave resonances.
Hence the simulation of flight conditions is incorrect in this respect.
J.14.4.1.2 It has been suggested that the measured response could be treated mathematically to remove
the wave resonances and replace them by wave resonances. However, it is considered that applying
this process would not be worth while, both because of the complexity of the process itself and because of a
lack of knowledge of the precise electrical conditions in free flight which the process would be attempting to
simulate. This source of inaccuracy in testing is therefore considered to be one of those allowed for in the
overall margin discussed in J14.3.6, especially as modelling assumes wave resonances. Despite the
inevitable uncertainties, efforts should be made to make the configuration under test as realistic as possible.
J.14.4.2
Aircraft Standard
J.14.4.2.1 It is important that an aircraft used for a whole aircraft test is representative of a production
model in all the aspects noted in Leaflet 1/1 (see J.3), Section 3. In practise this may be difficult to achieve
as such tests often have to be made on a prototype or pre-production aircraft where equipment installation
and especially wiring layout may be appreciably different from the production model. Changes to the position
of equipments in an equipment bay could make significant differences in the coupling to the wiring to those
equipments as could also the type of cover or access door to the bay; for example if the latter was changed
from an all metal construction to a partially conducting or insulating composite.
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J.14.4.2.2 Where changes such as those that have been outlined above are inevitable following an
equipment test, the implications on the clearance given to the aircraft shall be assessed and agreed with the
Aircraft Project Director, who may require re-testing in certain areas.
J.14.4.3
Operation of Equipment and Safety Earth
J.14.4.3.1 The preferred method of operating the aircraft equipment is to use the Aircraft Power supplies.
However if that is not possible then a separate power supply is necessary. However, a unit which draws its
power via a transformer from the mains should not be used, as such a supply will essentially be 'earthy' and
that will complicate the safety earthing arrangements necessary. Instead, an engine driven generator should
be used which can then be isolated from earth. The insulation level used to obtain that isolation will be
decided by the position of the safety earth on the system and may need to be sufficient to withstand the full
voltage of the pulse generator.
J.14.4.3.2 When pulse tests are made a safety earth (the 'experimental earth reference point' of Leaflet
2/6 see J.16) must be connected to the system to meet 'Health and Safety' requirements. Such an earth
should be used with care to prevent capacitive circulating currents at the higher frequencies and for that
reason the earth connection should be a high impedance above say 0.1 MHz.
J.14.4.3.3 Care must be taken that the earth lead does not resonate with rig capacitance to ground, such
resonances can be minimised by careful positioning of the earthing point (Ref L2/4.5 see I.9).
J.14.4.4
Return Conductors for Whole Aircraft Tests
J.14.4.4.1 Computational methods should be used to design a return conductor system to the correct field
distribution around the aircraft and hence the correct current density over the surface of the aircraft. Two
dimensional computer programmes will normally be sufficient to do this, by taking sections through the
aircraft to establish the position and spacing of the return conductors relative to the aircraft, so that the field
pattern around the aircraft is as close as possible to its operating environment without giving unmanageably
high inductance. It is important that surface current density (Js) should be computed, especially near access
bay doors and 'flux apertures' and compared with the operating environment values for 'Js' to confirm that
the design is acceptable. Further confirmation is then obtained during pulse tests by measuring 'Js' at
selected places and comparing the measured values with the computed values.
J.14.4.4.2 The lumped series inductance of the return conductor aircraft system needs to be taken into
consideration as the total series inductance together with the pulse generator capacitor will determine the
wavefront and amplitude. With the system excited with a test pulse, E field and surface current density
measurements at selected positions are also made, and compared with calculated values.
NOTE
It is particularly important to get the current density and direction (to a tolerance of 20%) on the aircraft
surface that occurs in practice and especially at equipment bays or apertures below which cables associated with the
systems of interest are routed. When evaluating the efficacy of a return conductor system and measured transients, it is
also important to investigate damped sinewave responses to ensure they are not due to spurious resonances, e.g. the
resonances between the return conductors and a building.
J.14.4.5
Selection of Attachment Points
There can be more than one lightning path through a aircraft and a pair of attachment points, corresponding
to one of those paths must be selected to give a worst case excitation. Sometimes it is not possible to define
a worst case and more than one pair of attachment points must be tested to ensure that all possible modes
of excitation have been taken into account. When that is so, the return conductors shall be designed and
constructed to allow easy selection in terms of the pair of attachment points required.
J.14.4.6
Non Linearity and Extrapolation to Full Threat
J.14.4.6.1 When performing pulse tests non linearity can occur, due to voltage or current dependent skin
resistance and due to sparking and arcing causing local changes in the current distribution over the surface
of the aircraft. It is therefore important that measurements are made at increasing threat levels and that the
results are plotted against those levels. If the results do not lie on a straight line, then non linearity has
occurred. If a reasonable straight line can be drawn through the results, it can then be projected to give the
extrapolated full threat value of the transient. Extrapolation should be no more than a factor of 4. When non
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linearity is present, a judgement must be made concerning the cause of that effect and whether or not it is
valid to project that part of the results curve that may be linear, or if the most severe transient threat actually
occurs at less than full threat excitation. When doing this, it should be remembered that modelling assumes
a homogeneous structure at full threat (i.e. all flashovers that can occur have occurred) and hence the skin
current distribution could be very different at full threat to that for low level pulse tests.
J.14.4.6.2 It should be realised that non linearity could occur between the maximum test excitation and full
threat excitation, and judgements also have to be made in that respect.
J.14.4.7
Use of Clamped and Double Exponential Waveforms
J.14.4.7.1 Although a damped sinusoidal waveform can be used for a pulse test when the structure being
tested is mainly metallic, such a waveform will not necessarily produce the correct response at the
measurement points when the structure contains partially conducting composite such as CFC. This is
especially so in hybrid structures containing a lot of CFC together with metallic components. The test
waveform of G.3.2, with the decay time stated, gives a similar response to that which is likely to occur due to
a real lightning excitation and approximates in shape to a double exponential waveform. The latter is a
convenient waveform to use for analysis. Another reason for using that waveform rather than a damped
sinusoidal waveform is that it is necessary to use a realistic waveform when comparing analysis, and the
measured responses given by the pulse tests.
J.14.4.7.2 It should be understood that the double exponential waveform given in G.3.2 is not meant to
simulate a lightning waveform that actually occurs but is a waveform that combines the necessary di/dt,
action integral, and decay parameters necessary for correct testing and analysis. The subscript figure two
indicates that it is a waveform concerning indirect effects. It will be noticed that Waveform A2a is in fact the
EUROCAE/SAE waveform designated Component A - First Return Stroke. However, it is felt that such a
title is a misnomer as the waveform is not that of a first return stroke. The Waveform A2 of Annex G is not
intended to be Component A waveform. As is noted elsewhere in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12) the parameters of
the Composite Test Waveform can, in principle, be generated by several different types of waveform and the
so called Composite Test Waveform is not actually a waveform.
J.14.5
J.14.5.1
Indirect Effects Test on Parts of Aircraft

Applicability
Although aircraft may comprise an extensive interconnected system, it is often desirable to evaluate the
voltages likely to be induced by lightning in individual sub-systems or components, for example when these
are thought to be particularly vulnerable, such as aerials and external sensors. The tests noted in Leaflet
1/2, (see J.4) are therefore needed when measurements are being made of voltages which could cause
sparking or stress insulation on the wiring and electrical equipment in parts of aircrafts, such as radomes or
external probes, and a 'whole aircraft' test is not appropriate. It should be noted that exposure to resistive
and/or flux penetration coupling is capable of causing gross common mode voltages of several kV, which
can severely threaten insulation. Usually if flash-over voltages are being assessed, Leaflet 1/2 (see J.4)
Section 10, or Leaflet 1/1 (see J.3) Section 5.4 will apply (as required by D.5) x does not have a (b) and the
comments of section 6 below are relevant. Such measurements, often referred to as 'remote earth tests',
give a worst case situation, giving the maximum open circuit common-mode voltage that can ever be
available to drive current around the cable/aircraft skin loop. Hence if all insulation can withstand that voltage
there is no problem. Sometimes, however, it may be necessary to find out how that voltage divides between
impedances in the loop, or it may be necessary for other reasons (for example, to see if sparking or arcing
could occur between two conductors where remote earth tests are not appropriate) to measure the actual
voltages generated, either common-mode, differential-mode, or both. When that is so, the test in Leaflet 1/2
(see J.4) Section 9, is appropriate.
J.14.5.2
Test Current Waveform
Ideally a test for indirect effects should employ a current waveform having the specified full-threat values for
both the important parameters, but owing to the limitations of existing test facilities the Waveform D2a of
Annex G, which has a lower peak value is generally employed and the magnitude of the measured
transients extrapolated to full threat values. Those values should be established taking into account Annex
G.2 note 2.
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J.14.5.3
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Return Current Conductors
The design of return conductors for whole aircraft tests has been discussed above. For tests on parts of
aircrafts the return current conductors should be distributed around the test object in cross-section and follow
the contours of the object axially, thus forming an approximately co-axial system, as illustrated in Figure 38.
Depending on the shape of the object, 3 or 4 conductors are usually adequate and they should be placed so
that the magnetic contours near the object are as nearly as possible the same as they would be in the
operating environment (remote return current). The distance of the conductors from the object is a
compromise between distortion of the field (too near) and excessive inductance requiring high driving
voltages (too distant).
J.14.5.4
Data from Measured Waveforms
When analysing the waveforms obtained during induced voltage measurements, it should be remembered
that voltages due to resistive or diffusion-flux coupling follow approximately the current waveform although
the peak may be reached at a slightly different time. Voltages due to direct flux coupling follow approximately
the rate of change of current and they therefore have a steep rise at switch-on and pass through zero at the
time of peak current. For large test objects there may be high frequency damped oscillations superimposed
on the slower waveform.
J.14.5.5
Combination with Indirect Effect Tests
If the Group I tests include a Waveform A of Annex G, this has one of the requirements for indirect effects
tests (200 kA peak) and measurement of induced voltages can often be made provided that the rate of rise
of the waveform is at least 0.3 x 1011 As-1, as that value is the 2% level of first strokes in a negative flash. If
Component D is being used the rate of rise shall be as specified in waveform E. Depending on which
waveform is used either the di/dt component or the IR component must be extrapolated to full threat, as is
explained below.
J.14.6
Assessment of Voltages Liable to Stress Insulation or Cause Voltage Flashover
When evaluating common-mode voltages which are liable to stress insulation or cause voltage flashover it is
often convenient, and sometimes necessary, to measure the voltage available to drive current around the
loop formed by the conductor carrying the excitation current and the conductors and associated impedances
in which the induced current will flow if there is voltage break-down. This may be done by connecting one
conductor to the other at a convenient place (e.g. at the connections to an external sensor) and then
measuring the open loop voltage at the other end of the circuit. The di/dt and IR components of the
measured waveform must be identified and extrapolated to full threat and then added together to give the
maximum voltage which can stress insulation or which could be available to cause flashover. The two
components have to be added as in the real lightning waveform peak di/dt occurs at about the same time as
peak current whilst Lightning Test Waveforms give maximum di/dt at the start of the waveform. This will then
give a worst case, as a given probability of occurrence of one parameter does not correspond to the same
probability for another and therefore there is generally no need for additional safety factors.
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Survey Installation and

Decide Attachments for
worse case coupling to
cable of interest
Modelling not done
use default categories
and levels for initial
ETDLs
A
Model & decide
CTLs
Design Return
Conductor System
Add agreed
margin and decide
initial ETDLs
Select from
previously tested
equipment and
declare EQLs
Make pulse tests and

obtain MTLs
Select Systems and
cables of interest on
which to make Pulse
Tests
Extrapolate
MTLs to TTLs
Compare
TTLs
Test New equipment
and declare EQLs
Establish cause and

rework modelling or
correct TTLs
accordingly
Ye
Decide TCLs as
worse case
response from
all
considered
A & B routes
Add Agreed margin to

TCLs and decide
substantiated ETDLs
Test any equipment not

previously qualified
Back to
Start
TTLs
&CTLs
agree within
6dB
Compare TCLs with equipment qualification levels (EQLs) of

routes C & D and note where
margins are equal or exceed agreed margins
Margins
or >
agreed
Margins?
Yes
No
Redesign & Retest

Equipment or Harden
the Installation to
provide lower TCLs to
give the necessary
Margins
Back to START
Accept as Cleared
Figure 25
137
Route to Compliance when Modelling is Necessary
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200
150
100
50
0
CTL
Initial ETDL Equipment

cleared to at least this
level
EQUIPMENT
QUALIFICATION
LEVEL
TTL
compare TTL to CTL

worse case = TCL
TCL + margin
=Substantiated ETDL
NOTE The TTL is lower than the CTL, therefore CTL is used as TCL and margin added to give
substantiated ETDL which is lower than equipment qualification level so clearance is obtained.
Figure 26
The Various Levels Illustrated TTL<CTL
Clearance obtained without change to equipment qualification or design
250
200
150
100
50
0
CTL
=Initial ETDL Equipment

cleared to at least this
level
EQUIPMENT
QUALIFICATION
LEVEL
TTL
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Compare TTL to CTL

worse case =TCL
TCL + margin
=Substantiated ETDL
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NOTE
The TTL is higher than the CTL, therefore TTL is used as TCL and margin added to give substantiated ETDL
which is greater than equipment qualification level so no Clearance
250
200
150
100
50
0
CTL
= INITIAL ETDL
Equipment chosen
must be cleared at
least to this level
EQUIPMENT
QUALIFICATION
LEVEL
TTL
TCL
TCL + margin
=Substantiated ETDL
NOTE
TCL> CTL but equipment has been redesigned and is now cleared to a higher qualification level so
Clearance obtained
Figure 27
The Various Levels Illustrated TTL > CTL,
Clearance initially not obtained, equipment re-qualification
J.15
J.15.1
Leaflet 2/5 - Fuel Hazard Assessment and Design Guidance

Introduction
This Leaflet gives information concerning fuel characteristics as background to some of the design problems
to obviate lightning related fuel hazards and gives some assessment and test guidance.
J.15.2
J.15.2.1
Fuel Characteristics and Criteria for Explosion or Combustion

Some Fuel Related Terms
Some fuel related terms are given in 4.5. For convenience they are reproduced below:Flammability Limits (Explosion Limits) The Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) of a fuel occurs when the
percentage volume of fuel vapour to air is just sufficient for ignition to occur about 1.3% for AVTUR at
ground level pressure. The upper explosive limit (UEL) occurs when the fuel vapour air ratio is just sufficient
to give an over rich situation, and prevent combustion about 7.9% for AVTUR at ground level pressure.
Stoichiometry, Stoichiometric Ratio The stoichiometric ratio = 1.0 occurs when the proportions of fuel
and air taking part in combustion result in all of the oxygen in the air reacting completely with all of the fuel. If
there is twice as much fuel as there is available oxygen = 2.0, if twice as much oxygen as fuel = 0.5.
Flashpoint The temperature of a fuel sample at which the vapour over the liquid surface ignites when
challenged with a small flame.
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Ignition Energy (ERI), Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) The Energy Required for Ignition (ERI) depends
on several factors but principally upon fuel vapour/air ratio, temperature, pressure and degree of oxygen
enrichment of the air. For given values of temperature, pressure and oxygen content, it is least at a certain
stoichiometric ratio. That least energy is known as the Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE).
Auto Ignition, Auto-Ignition Delay The temperature at which a fuel/air mixture spontaneously ignites. There
will be a delay between addition of fuel to the hot air and ignition while low temperature reactions take place
leading to the ignition. This delay may be tens of minutes long with a very high statistical scatter at the
minimum auto-ignition temperature.
Thermal Sparking
Thermal Sparking occurs when a very high current is forced to cross a joint
between two conducting materials, which have imperfect mating between their surfaces.
Voltage Sparking
Voltage sparking occurs when the voltage difference between two conductors rises to
a value high enough to break down the intervening medium, whether this is air or other dielectric.
J.15.2.2
Common Misconceptions
Reference L2/5.1 (see I.10) notes that there are several misconceptions that engineers succumb to when
certifying aircraft fuel systems. Those misconceptions are discussed appropriately below and are as follows:a)
That MIE is a single value below which it is always impossible to ignite.
b)
That lightning generated sparks are the same sort as are used to determine MIE and that
c)
MIE is applicable to the lightning scenario.
d)
That 0.2mJ MIE is necessarily applicable to aircraft fuel.
e)
That we are always dealing with clean fuel.
f)
That some gases (in explosive gas tests) have a greater probability of ignition than others.
J.15.2.3
Fuel Characteristics
J.15.2.3.1 There are two commonly encountered fuels in both civil and military use. These are the general
kerosene type (typically known as AVTUR, JP8, JetA1, etc) and wide cut gasoline fuel (such as AVTAG or
JP4 etc). The several names reflect the various specifying agencies otherwise within each type the fuels are
compatible and interchangeable. Kerosene, which has a flash point not lower than 38C, is the fuel of choice
for most civil use owing to its better fire safety. Wide-cut fuel is ignitable over a very wide range of
temperatures and has largely been replaced in service by kerosene. However it is still in use particularly in
very cold climates on account of its superior freezing point characteristics. Many aircraft and engines will be
specified to operate on either fuel, at least on an emergency basis. For those that are not designed to
operate on both fuels cross contamination, especially of wide-cut fuel into kerosene fuelled aircraft, is a
clear risk area.
J.15.2.3.2 The differences between, say, JP8 and JP4 are quite profound and produce widely dissimilar
risks at different points in the aircraft mission. In spite of this many features such as Minimum Ignition Energy
(MIE) and the underlying combustion chemistry are closely similar. For example both fuel types are produced
by the distillation of petroleum feed stock and both contain many hundreds of different hydrocarbon
compounds. Figure 28 shows a chromatographic analysis which resolves a few of the major compounds.
Although the distillation temperature ranges are different they overlap to a significant extent and the two fuel
types will contain a large number of molecular species in common. For example when it is distilled the JP4
begins to boil at about 68C and the final boiling point is about 230C. A material like nonane which boils at
151C will be a major component of the fuel. JP8 which distils over the range 150 - 260C also contains
nonane as a major component, (see Figure 28). Both fuels will contain in the region of 80% paraffinic
hydrocarbon molecules, about 19% of aromatic (benzene type) hydrocarbons and in the region of 1% of
naphthenic material.#
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J.15.2.3.3 The significance of this is that although jet fuels are made up of a huge cocktail of different
molecular species these molecules are relatively stable, commonplace materials whose ignition behaviour
will not produce any undesirable surprises. This is true at least for today. However in order to provide fuel to
the expanding air transport industry, future fuel supplies could include substantial quantities of material such
as olefins which are significantly less stable and for which less ignition information exists. Figure 29 shows
results of the Specification flash point tests performed on AVTUR in the UK in 1997. This is a robust test
where the vapour above the liquid fuel is challenged with relatively huge quantities of ignition energy (a small
flame). It clearly defines the flammability of the vapour over a quiescent specimen of fuel and, if there should
be some component of the fuel which is more reactive than the others this is taken into account.
J.15.2.4
Ignition Criteria
J.15.2.4.1
Chemistry of Ignition
J.15.2.4.1.1 It is clear that there is a profound difference between not burning and burning that needs to
be resolved in order to understand the ignition process. For example why is starting-to-burn through to
burning not a gradual process? Why does ignition of most hydrocarbon/air mixtures start at about 1600K
rather than, say a variable temperature depending on type?
J.15.2.4.1.2 In fact, of course, if a flammable mixture of fuel and air is heated there will be slow
combustion reactions in progress at much lower temperatures than 1600K. However if the heat is removed
this reaction will slow down and eventually stop. Combustion takes place by reactions of radicals highly
energetic, short lived, sometimes exotic fragments of the original fuel and air. This is because there are two
competing reaction processes in progress (see Figure 30 and Ref L2/5.2 see I.10) one a chain branching
reaction and one a chain breaking reaction. Until the ignition temperature is reached at about 1650K the
chain breaking is more effective than the chain branching reaction. After 1650K the rate of chain branching
becomes higher than the rate of chain breaking and there is a sudden exponential avalanche in the creation
of reacting radicals ignition has occurred.
J.15.2.4.2
Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE)
J.15.2.4.2.1 The MIE level varies for different hydrocarbons but usually lies between 0.2 and 0.3 mJ at
normal (21%) oxygen concentration at ground level pressure. It has been a certification requirement over
many years that fuel systems must be shown to be free of sparking, and hence possible ignition, down to a
MIE level of 0.2 mJ.
J.15.2.4.2.2 A lot of emphasis is given to MIE and it seems a simple concept prevent energies in excess
of MIE and never can there be an ignition that is MIE is the energy below which it will always be impossible
to ignite. Unfortunately there is not one fixed value of MIE, but it is dependant on several factors. The way
combustion people regard MIE is that it is the minimum energy for a given set of circumstances. This is the
first of the five misconceptions noted above.
J.15.2.4.2.3
Misconception (a)
MIE is not a single value below which it is always impossible to ignite, but is dependent on spark duration
and length, reactant temperature, oxygen concentration and pressure in the ullage as discussed below.
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J.15.2.4.3
Unclassified
Effects of Spark Duration and Spark Length
In general spark durations in the range 10 to 50 microseconds provide the best conditions for MIE. Both
longer and shorter durations quickly require much higher energies to be successful. In the case of long
duration sparks it may be that energy is still being delivered to the initial source of ignition, heating already
burned gasses, whilst the energy deficient combustion wave that may have occurred at the start of the spark
has travelled outwards failing to achieved propagation. During the duration of the spark delivery the
combustion wave will have travelled away from the spark source by about 1mm. Similarly, increasing spark
length serves to dissipate energy in an unnecessarily large mass of reactant.
The significance of this is that in an explosive gas test, even though the gas has been proved explosive by
the calibration spark, there is no guarantee that a spark of the same energy produced by the test will ignite
the mixture. This is because the spark in the test sample could have a significantly different duration and
length to that of the calibration spark.
J.15.2.4.4
Effects of Reactant Temperature
Because a fuel air mixture has to reach a prescribed temperature before combustion will take place (see
Misconception v below), it is clear that any increase in initial mixture temperature must reduce the ignition
energy that is required at any given stoichiometry and will widen the lean and rich limits. Figure 31 shows
that the effect of increasing temperature is strongly to reduce MIE by as much as 25% for a 50 degree rise
over an approximate ambient temperature range. This produces about 50K margin over the critical ignition
temperature described below. On this basis the extent of the MIE reduction compares reasonably well,
qualitatively, with what might be expected, since the raising of the ignition temperature by temperature
increase only has to compare with the excess temperature provided by the initial spark. It is interesting and
probably significant that the best fit curves predict MIE to be insignificantly small at about 250 300C which is
the temperature when auto-ignition would be likely to occur given a very long inception time. In other words
at such temperatures the amount of electrical sparks energy or extra thermal energy required to provoke
ignition is very small indeed.
At normal oxygen content the MIE at 50C and normal pressure would be approximately 0.15mJ. As the
fuels currently used can work at temperatures up to 160C, and even higher temperature fuels might be
developed, there could be a case for even lower MIEs.
J.15.2.4.5
Effects of Oxygen Concentration
Oxygen enrichment of the fuel/air vapour occurs due to dissolved oxygen in the fuel being released at
altitude. The effect on MIE of oxygen enrichment of the air up to 35% for propane can be seen in Figure 32.
This shows a decrease of almost an order of magnitude in MIE at the optimum mixture strength.
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J.15.2.4.6
Misconception (b)
Most if not all of the information available concerning MIE has been obtained by the study of capacitive
sparks, hence lightning generated sparks are not the same sort as used to determine MIE, as it is difficult to
imagine that a lightning event will ever produce a capacitive spark unless there are large areas of glass
composite construction or large glass composite access panels. So it is seldom, if ever, that there will be a
lightning generated capacitive spark in an aircraft environment. Voltage sparks will be inductively driven
whilst thermal sparks, which will predominate over voltage sparks, generally have greater energy than the
MIE value. MIE values derived from inductive sparks might be different from those derived from capacitive
sparks.
The occurrence of a 0.2mJ spark from a lightning event must be a very low probability as generally sparking
will be at much higher energies, see section J15.2.4.3 below.
J.15.2.4.7
Misconception (c)
An MIE value of 0.2mJ is not necessarily applicable to aircraft fuel as MIE values have only been evaluated
for the lower hydrocarbons and not for aircraft fuel. As illustrated in Figure 28, jet fuels are made up of a
huge cocktail of different molecular species. The ignition properties of jet fuel are basically those of large
hydrocarbon molecules. i.e., much more like hexane than methane, ethane and propane etc. The higher the
molecular weight the more unstable the compound, the easier it is to break down and the lower the energy
that is needed to ignite it, so that there is a tendency for MIE values to decrease with increasing molecular
weight, see Figure 33.
J.15.2.4.8
Energy Required for Ignition (ERI)
J.15.2.4.3.1 Apart from the considerations noted under Misconception b), the ullage will generally be in a
condition where considerably more energy than the MIE value is required to ignite it. This is so because as
the ullage state moves towards the upper and lower flammability limits from the most sensitive condition the
Energy Required for Ignition (ERI) increases. This is illustrated by Figure 34, which is a curve of ERI against
percentage propane in air.
J.15.2.4.3.2 Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) is taken in fuels literature to mean the minimum energy
required to ignite for any given set of circumstances, encompassing for example, electrode gap, temperature
of reactants, ambient pressure, mixture ratio etc. In the lightning community MIE is usually taken to mean a
particular value of the Energy Required to Ignite (ERI), which is the least that can ever occur at normal room
temperature and pressure for a specific hydrocarbon, which is also assumed to apply to aircraft fuel.
J.15.2.4.4
Probability of Ignition
J.15.2.4.5
Critical Temperature
It is noted in Leaflet.2.4.1 above that a hydrocarbon/air mixture must be raised to a critical temperature of
about 1650K for ignition to occur. A mixture at a temperature below the critical value may burn slowly but
there will not be an explosive ignition. This fact has a profound significance on the understanding of ignition
probability as explained below.
J.15.2.4.6
Ignition Probability
J.15.2.4.7
Misconception (d)
Perhaps the biggest misconception is that some gases have a greater probability of ignition than others, for
example when used in an explosive gas test (J.14.4.4 below). An explosive gas test is used to demonstrate
that ignition sources due to a lightning event are not present in a fuel system sample when that sample is
subjected to the lightning threat. The sample is filled with a mixture of the explosive gas and air, which is
shown to be ignitable at the certification level (0.2mJ) before and after the test. Propane and ethylene are
two of the test gases that have been used and for a long time the writer thought that propane (C3H8) had a
probability of ignition at the MIE value of less than 0.2%, whilst ethylene (C2H4) had a probability of 50%.
Thus ethylene was often preferred as the test gas. However, it is noted in Reference L2/5.1 (see I.10) that
that supposition is completely erroneous when viewed from the viewpoint of combustion theory; in-as-much
that if the spark put sufficient energy into a gas/air mixture to heat the flame kernel to the critical ignition
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temperature (1650K) the mixture would ignite and it would always ignite if exactly the same energy was
applied to it and nothing else changed in the experiment. Conversely, if there was insufficient energy to get
the mixture to 1650K then the mixture would not ignite and it never would do so, no matter how many
sparks of exactly the same energy were applied to it. Note that there are competing reactions in the
combustion process. Below the critical temperature the reaction is predominantly chain breaking and above
it, it is predominantly chain branching see Figure 35. Below the critical temperature there are low
temperature reactions going on which, if the energy is insufficient, do not progress to the ignition point.
All this must have a profound significance with regards to explosive gas tests and the repeatability of such
experiments. The apparent probability noted above, however, needs to be explained. Assuming that the
mixture properties such as stoichiometry, temperature, pressure, are essentially the same from test to test
and the previous test gas is thoroughly purged from the system before the next experiment, it could be that
the apparent probability is due to variations in spark energy. Alternatively, the author ventures to suggest
that there is another factor which comes into play, which is that high molecular weight ions disperse better,
whilst low weight ions cluster around hot spots. This could effectively change the mixture strength at the
spark. Ethylene, being a lower molecular weight molecule than propane, supports the feeling that there could
be an explanation in this idea.
The probability of ignition due to a lightning event is, however, a different matter and that is discussed at
section J15.5 below.
J.15.2.6
Explosive Limits and Stoichiometric Ratio
J.15.2.6.1 The explosive limits of fuel vapour air mixture are defined 4.5. These limits depend on fuel
temperature and air pressure and curves for Avtur (JP1 or F34) and Avtag (JP4 or F40) at Reid Vapour
Pressure 3 are given in Figure 36. From those curves it is immediately obvious why Avtur is a much safer
fuel than Avtag, certainly in temperate climates, as the former cannot form an explosive vapour mixture at
temperatures below about 30C at 3,000 m and about 35C at ground level. The curves given in Figure 36
relate to steady state conditions in a closed volume without air flow.
J.15.2.6.2 Fuel misting, for example due to condensation when a tank is cooled, will lower the LEL.
Oxygen enrichment, due to air dissolved in the fuel outgassing as altitude increases, will raise the limits,
moving the curves of Figure 36 to the right. Operation of booster pumps will also cause oxygen enrichment
and normal aircraft vibration can cause misting.
J.15.2.6.3 The maximum energy of an explosion occurs when the stoichiometric ratio (see 4.5) of the
mixture is unity (for Avtur at ground level about 4% vapour concentration) and gives a maximum over
pressure of 7 times the pressure in the vessel before the explosion (Ref L2/5.5 see I.10).
J.15.2.6.4 From the above it will be seen that apart from the need for an ignition source there are several
factors which will decide whether or not an explosion would occur in a tank and the strength of that explosion
if it occurs.
J.15.2.6.5 The mixture strength at which minimum ignition energy occurs (that is the most sensitive
mixture) varies widely with different hydrocarbons. For example with methane it is 0.9 stoichiometric and for
hexane it is 1.8 stoichiometric, whilst ethane and propane are 1.2 (Ref L2/5.6 see I.10). The most sensitive
mixture for aircraft fuels is about 2 stoichiometric and for ethylene 1.4.
J.15.2.7
J.15.2.7.1
Effect of Unclean Fuel

Misconception (e)
Aircraft do not always have clean fuel in their tanks as it can be contaminated near the point of use, for
example with materials such as aviation gasoline. Wide cut fuel is ignitable over a very wide range of
temperatures and has largely been replaced in service by kerosene. However, it is still in use, particularly in
very cold climates. Many aircraft and engines will be specified to operate on either fuel, at least on an
emergency basis. For those that are not designed to operate on both fuels, cross contamination is a risk
area. Reference L2/5.4 (I.10) notes that particular chemicals could have an affect on the MIE with a widening
of ignition limits. Although those chemicals will not normally be present in the fuel, they may be present in the
ullage environment. For example acetaldehyde is evolved from heated wiring insulation. Peroxides are
produced by sparks and arcs and oxides of nitrogen are produced by lightning and engine exhausts.
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J.15.2.8
Basis of Certification
J.15.2.8.1 For the purposes of Def Stan 59-113 it is assumed that fuel systems are certified to an MIE of
0.2 mJ and that such a certification level gives a sufficient factor of safety. More work however is required to
establish whether or not sparking down to the MIE level can occur in fuel system components. If it can, a lot
more work needs to be done to establish, on a probability basis, the correct MIE to work to.
J.15.2.8.2 If such low energy sparks can not occur in a lightning event, work is also needed to establish a
safety margin when certifying to 0.2mJ.
J.15.2.8.3 As noted above, whether or not an explosive mixture occurs depends on several factors but for
the purpose of this specification it is assumed that such a mixture can always occur and that therefore fuel
hazard assessment must show that all ignition sources have been avoided. Therefore it is necessary to
demonstrate that arc penetration, hot spots, internal arcing and sparking do not occur. Sparking is the most
difficult of those mechanisms to eliminate and demonstrate its absence.
J.15.2.8.4 The absence of sparking can be demonstrated either by a sparking test or a flammable gas test
(see section J.15.4). A sparking test is usually preferable, as it is generally a more simple test to do than a
flammable gas test. Moreover the detection of sparking is a more discriminating test able to provide
information on the location of the sparks and therefore assisting in remedial design measures in contrast to
the crude pass/fail nature of the flammable gas test. However there will be occasions when the latter test is
the only way to demonstrate the absence of sparking.
J.15.2.8.5 It is virtually impossible to quote an acceptable energy value for thermal sparking, but the
methods available to detect 0.2 mJ voltage sparks are sensitive enough to detect thermal sparks.
If low energy sparks as small as the MIE value can occur, then the clearance energy level must be the MIE
value (which can mean less than 0.2 mJ in certain ambient and ullage conditions). It is thought that this is
unlikely but using a certification value of 0.2 mJ should give a reasonable factor of safety, and it is
recommended that certification should continue at that level until it can be shown that a higher level is
acceptable. The question is, can sparks with energies as low as or lower than 0.2 mJ ever occur, and if they
do, does the probability of the ullage being in such a sensitive condition that such sparks can ignite it, give
an acceptable probability of catastrophic loss?, see section J.15.5 below.
J.15.3
Hazard Mechanisms
J.15.3.1 Fuel hazards can arise in integral fuel tanks and in other locations, where fuel or its vapour may
be exposed to the effects of a lightning strike. Not only must hazardous vapour air mixtures that normally
occur be considered (for example the fuel vapour air mixture in the ullage space of a fuel tank) but also
where such vapours could form in otherwise dry areas due to seepage and leakage. All potentially ignitable
fluids and vapours including for example oils and hydraulic fluid must be considered. It is fuel, however, that
causes the most problems and the subject of aviation fuel flammability is complex, complicating parameters
are the oxygen enrichment of the fuel/air vapour due to dissolved oxygen in the fuel being released at
altitude, and the formation of mist within the tank which may render flammable vapour space which would
normally be considered too weak in vapour to ignite. Fuel ignition can result from burn through of the fuel
tank skin; hot spot formation; puncture of a CFC skin by arc root damage, or by acoustic shock wave;
puncture of a dielectric tank skin; thermal or voltage sparking. Thus the mechanisms of ignition include both
Direct and Indirect effects and in a fuel tank can vary with the method and material used for its construction.
J.15.3.2 Both Civilian and Military aircraft have crashed due to lightning initiated fuel explosions. A list of
those accidents known to the author is given in Table 15.
J.15.3.3 Fuel tanks made of dielectric material usually contain metal parts such as brackets, pipes, drain
valves, connectors and wiring and these may become centres of electric stress as a lightning leader
approaches. This stress may be sufficient to cause breakdown of the dielectric skin, resulting in puncture or
shattering; thus fuel is spilled and may be ignited. Even a nominally empty tank will contain sufficient residual
fuel to produce a combustible mixture in the tank. A partially empty tank may also have an explosive fuel/air
mixture in the ullage above the fuel and it is necessary that internal pipe work, bonding and electrical wiring
be correctly designed and installed so that sparking and arcing does not occur.
145
Unclassified
Unclassified
J.15.3.4 Dielectric tanks may be protected from puncture by a thin metal coating, or by a framework of
metal strips bonded to the airframe which preferentially "attract" the lightning discharge and divert it to the
airframe. It may be necessary to do a dielectric puncture test (see Leaflets 1/6 J.8J.8 and 2/8 see J.18)
when assessing the lightning protection.
J.15.3.5 In aluminium alloy tanks situated in Zones 1 or 2 the main hazard (depending on skin thickness)
is burn-through of the skin at a lightning attachment point, although hot spots can also be a problem with
tanks constructed with high melting point alloys, such as titanium (see section J15.4.1). The sparking hazard
in a metal tank is generally low because the good conductivity of metal keeps most of the lightning current on
the outside, but the possibility has to be considered, especially for high melting point alloys, which have a
lower conductivity than aluminium. Also access doors and complex construction can cause problems.
J.15.3.6 CFC tanks present a variety of hazards. Because of the nature of the erosion at the arc root,
purely thermal burn-through is less likely than with metal and generally the arc root does not penetrate more
than 5 plys but a hot-spot hazard is more likely. Moreover the mechanical properties of CFC make it more
likely to be damaged by acoustic shock. Above all, the high resistivity of CFC means that its electrical skin
effect is low, so that voltage gradients on the inside of the skin are high and a substantial proportion of the
skin current can penetrate to the interior, giving a high sparking hazard. Protective measures such as a
metal coating on the skin will thus almost certainly be needed and it will be necessary to confirm their
effectiveness, probably by testing for all hazards.
J.15.4
J.15.4.1
Fuel Hazard Assessments and Tests

Assessments
J.15.4.1.1 When making fuel hazard assessments it should be remembered that such hazards are not
limited to areas where there is obvious current flow between lightning attachment points, as currents decided
by the laws of electro-magnetic induction will flow on the remainder of the vehicle. Hence, for example,
current would cross the tank pylon interface of an aircraft pylon mounted wing tank when there is a lightning
attachment to the wing and the tail of the aircraft, without a direct attachment to the tank. Also a voltage
sufficient to cause sparking in the contents monitoring system of such a tank could occur due to induction to
that part of the fuel system wiring contained in the fuselage, due to lightning current flow in the fuselage.
J.15.4.1.2 If the approved test plan includes testing for such a situation the test arrangement will need to
include an adjacent conductor through which the test current shall be passed instead of the test object itself.
J.15.4.2
Thermal and Voltage Sparking
J.15.4.2.1 Thermal sparking is that phenomena whereby small incandescent particles of material are
ejected from the surface of a conductor, due to current concentrations forming hot spots together with the
resultant magnetic forces acting in the area concerned. Almost certainly small arcs also occur and generate
high pressures which tend to blow out the particles. The current concentration may be caused by limited
contact areas at the junction of two conductors or by acute changes in geometry in a single conductor.
J.15.4.2.2 Because the sparking is thermal, the appropriate test waveforms are those with high peak
current and high action integral, namely Components A and D. Thermal sparks are usually more significant
for fuel ignition as that is the predominant sparking mechanism for direct effects and in practice the sparks
which occur within a fuel tank are almost always thermal. Voltage sparking occurs when the flow of current
produces a voltage difference between two conductors which rises to a value high enough to break down the
intervening medium, whether this is air or other dielectric. It can arise inductively in a loop or bend in a
conductor, by flux coupling to an adjacent conductor, or from the resistive drop in a high resistance material
such as CFC. Voltage sparking is a function of rate of change of current (inductive) or of peak current
(resistive voltage gradients) and the appropriate test current is therefore Waveform E.
J.15.4.2.3 In practice a combination of thermal and voltage sparking will often occur and the test
waveform used to investigate such combined sparking must contain the parameters important for both
mechanisms.
Unclassified
146
Unclassified
J.15.4.3
Sparking Tests
J.15.4.3.1 As noted above the occurrence of sparking is detected either by a "sparking test" or by a
flammable gas test. The latter is discussed below at section J15.4.4, this paragraph gives background on the
optical methods of detecting sparking. Sparking may be detected by employing either a still camera or lightsensitive transducers (Methods A and B defined in Leaflet 1/7 see J.9). In either case, the detectors shall be
positioned so that they cover all possible sparking locations; this may be achieved by the use of a sufficient
number of detectors or by a system of mirrors or by repetition of the tests with the detectors in different
positions (but see Leaflet 1/4 J.6, Sec 3). The field of vision shall be completely shielded from all light and
tests shall be made to confirm this. Care shall be taken to ensure that the detectors themselves do not
create a possible sparking location, if for example they are inside a fuel tank.
J.15.4.3.2 Low energy voltage sparks and incendive thermal sparks are very dim and photographic
techniques need to be sensitive to detect them. The film speed should be not less than ASA.3000 and the
aperture should be not less than F4.7. Also, because of the smallness of the sparks and the fineness of the
thermal particle tracks, the actual image size is important and so therefore is the type of lens. This means
that shorter focal length lenses have to be closer to the light source for the same sensitivity (see the table in
Leaflet 1/7 J.9).
J.15.4.3.3 Arrangements shall be made to demonstrate that during each test the camera was capable of
recording sparks if they had occurred, for example that the shutter had not inadvertently been left shut. This
may be achieved by arranging for a low level light source to be in the field of vision, but care shall be taken
that this cannot be confused with a spark and that it does not interfere with the recording of any sparks. The
light source, which can conveniently be provided by a fibre optic cable, must briefly illuminate each time the
camera shutter is opened. A procedure shall be followed that locates any sparks as exactly as possible; for
example if sparking is so intense as to completely over-expose the film then the test shall be repeated with
the camera aperture adjusted to a lower sensitivity.
J.15.4.3.4 When light-sensitive transducers (photomultipliers) are used, light from possible sparking
sources may be conveyed to the transducers by means of optical fibres (Method B in Sec 3 of Leaflet 1/7
J.9). The sensitivity of the transducers and the associated optical fibres shall be not less than that specified
for still camera systems. A photomultiplier/ fibre optic arrangement can provide greater sensitivity than a
camera system and may be used as the prime means of detecting sparks. It is very useful when a camera
would have a restricted field of view and is sometimes the only method available, for example when looking
for sparking inside a fuel pipe.
J.15.4.4
Flammable Gas Tests
As has already been mentioned the flammable gas test is a method of checking for sparking and should not
be regarded as an attempt to simulate actual explosive conditions. Explosion tests using an aircraft fuel
vapour/air mixture have sometimes been used in the past as a pass/fail test but are unreliable due to the
difficulty of obtaining the correct mixture strength. Either ethylene air in a mixture 1.4 times richer than
stoichiometric, or hydrogen may be used as the test gas but hydrogen is preferred as it less luminescent and
so gives a greater chance of detecting sources of sparking if optical detection methods are also used. A
flammable gas test must always be used when there is any doubt of detecting sparking by other means. The
test is usually used on major assemblies although of course it can also be used with part assemblies and
panels by constructing a gas cell over the fuel side of the test sample. The test can also detect small hot
spots and may be necessary to show that hot spots on the inside of a titanium panel are acceptable. The
mixture should be obtained by continuously mixing the gas and air (as in a welding torch) and should be
checked for flammability by passing it through a test cell and obtaining ignition with a calibrated 0.2 mJ spark
source before it is allowed to flow into the test object. When that has been done the mixture should flow
through the test sample until ignition of the outflow mixture is consistently obtained in the test cell.
Immediately before and after each test shot both the inflow and outflow mixture should again be proved
flammable, except that there is obviously no need to prove the outflow mixture if ignition occurred during the
test. If ignition of the outflow mixture does not occur after a test, that test is invalid and must be repeated
after the mixture has been corrected and the outflow again gives ignition.
147
Unclassified

J.15.5
Unclassified
Risk Assessments, Overall Probabilities and Safety Margins
J.15.5.1 A Risk Assessment (see Leaflet 2/10 see J.20 is a requirement of D.4 g). The overall probability
of ignition due to a lightning event is a different matter to that of ignition probability where the latter, given a
flammable mixture, will either be zero or unity, depending on whether or not there is sufficient energy to heat
the mixture to the critical temperature.
J.15.5.2 Reference L2/5.7 (see I.10) required, for Civilian aircraft, that the probability of a single
Catastrophic Effect, such as might be caused by lightning, shall be less than 10-9 fleet hours; a catastrophic
effect being any event that would cause loss of the aircraft or fatalities. Def Stan 59-113 assumes that the
same criteria apply to military aircraft. This means that there must not be more than one lightning
catastrophic effect in 109 fleet flying hours. A fuel explosion must be regarded as a catastrophic effect and
consequently the probability of that occurring must be less than 10-9, say 10-10. If a fuel system is cleared
down to an energy level of 0.2 mJ at normal temperature, pressure and oxygen concentration it is assumed
that means that all sparking above that level, of whatever type, has been suppressed but that ignition will
occur at that level.
J.15.5.3 If it can be shown that an MIE of 0.2 mJ gives a probability of say <10-11 and if it is assumed that
any other condition of temperature, pressure and oxygen concentration does not increase the probability by
more than an order of magnitude, then 0.2 mJ is satisfactory as a clearance figure. Moreover, it is immaterial
as to what the value of MIE appropriate to the more severe conditions should be.
J.15.5.4 Reference L2/5.2 (see I.10) considers the overall probability of a catastrophic fuel related
lightning event in some detail and notes that there are several separate probabilities that need to be
evaluated to arrive at an overall probability. An analysis is made where it is assumed that 0.2 mJ is the
correct value of MIE for aircraft fuel vapour air mixtures at normal temperature, pressure and oxygen
concentration, and that the methods available to detect capacitive sparks of that energy will also detect
inductive and thermal sparks that would cause ignition to the same probability. It is assumed that a fuel
system is cleared down to an energy level of 0.2 mJ and that that means that all sparking above that level, of
whatever type, has been suppressed but that ignition will occur at that level.
J.15.5.5
The separate probabilities that have to be evaluated are:-
a)
the probability of a lightning strike occurring
b)
the probability of lightning current interaction with the fuel system
c)
given that all sparks above 0.2mJ are suppressed the probability of such a spark occurring
d)
the probability that test methods used have verified the non existence of sparks of energies down to the
certification level.
NOTE 1
ignition).
The probability of a 0.2mJ spark causing ignition is taken as unity (given an ullage condition optimum for
NOTE 2
It should be noted that there can never be clearance confidence from a single test sample surviving the test
threat. For example when dealing with munitions, Reference L2/5.8 see I.10 notes that a single item on test is 50%
reliably insensitive to the test threat with a 50% confidence level, rising to an 85% reliability that the item is insensitive
with an 80% confidence if 10 items are tested.
Unclassified
148
Unclassified
Date
Nationality
Type
(No crashes)
Location
Summary
1975
USAF1
NRF4C2
Florida
Fuel explosion
1978
USAF1
C130E
South Carolina
Fuel explosion (crew fatalities)
1980
USAF1
C130H
Turkey
Fuel explosion (crew/passenger fatalities)
1976
USAF1
KC1352
Spain
Fuel system explosion (crew fatality)
1964
RDAF
Hunter
Denmark
Plastic fuel tank explosion
Pre 1984
RDAF
T33
Denmark
Fuel explosion
1978
RDAF
Draken
Denmark
Fuel explosion
1983
RDAF
F16
Denmark
Fuel explosion, metallic ventral tank,

debris took out hydraulic systems
05/1976
IIAF
7472
Madrid
Wing tank fuel explosion,

sparking at fuel valve motor
1962
UK
Jet Provost
UK
Plastic fuel tank explosion
05/1984
UK
Tornado
N Germany
Under wing tank explosion and fire.

Problems with EJ
1963
US
7072
Elkton,
Maryland
Fuel explosion
1951
SM 95B
Fuel ignition
1959
L1694A
Wing tank explosion
1971
L1882
Pacallpa Peru
Wing tank explosion
1950s
Constallation2
Milan Italy
Fuel explosion
probable
NOTE 1
Source document: Lightning interaction with USAF aircraft, John C. Corbin, Aeronautical Systems
Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1983 Fort Worth ICOLSE.
NOTE 2
NTSB Report AAR-79-12 postulates that the combination of events for the Madrid 747 could have
occurred, as evidence of a lightning strike to a wing followed by an explosion in the same wing exists in each of
these cases, yet no specific lightning-related cause, such as ignition at a vent outlet, was found.
NOTE 3
Entries in italics indicate civilian type aircraft
Table 15
149
Some Aircraft Losses Due To Lightning Initiated Fuel Explosion
Unclassified
Figure 28
Figure 29
Unclassified
Chromatographic Analysis of an Aircraft Fuel
Specification Flash Point Tests for Avtur
Unclassified
150
Unclassified
Figure 30
Figure 31
151
Competing Reaction Processes
Effect of Temperature on Minimum Ignition Energy for Several Hydrocarbons
Unclassified
Figure 32
Figure 33
Unclassified
Effect of Oxygen Enrichment on Ignition Energy for Propane
Spark Ignition vs. Mixture Composition for Mixtures of Various Straight Chain Saturated
Hydrocarbons with Air at One Atmosphere (From Kuchta 1975)
Unclassified
152
Unclassified
Figure 34
Ignition Energy with Mixture Strength for Propane
Figure 35
153
Competing Reaction Processes

Unclassified
Figure 36
Unclassified
Limits of Flammability of Avtag and Avtur in Air
Unclassified
154
Unclassified
J.16
J.16.1
J.16.1.1
Leaflet 2/6 - Techniques and Guidance for Direct Effects Tests

Simulation of the Environment
Simulation of the Correct Current Distribution
J.16.1.1.1 In laboratory tests, transmission lines or cables are used to connect the test object to the
lightning current generator. The magnetic fields associated with these conductors will influence the current
distribution within the test object. The coupling conductor layout will need to be designed in a manner that
will satisfy these two main requirements:a)
Firstly, and most important, the current distribution within the test object must be as close as possible to
that which will exist under natural lightning strike conditions.
b)
Secondly, the total circuit inductance must be kept as low as possible in order to ease the problem of
driving currents of very high di/dt and high peak values in the circuit.
J.16.1.1.2 One solution to this problem is to have a co-axial or quasi co-axial system of multi-path return
conductors. A schematic diagram of such a system is shown in Figure 37. This has four equally spaced
return conductors, but the principle can be extended to any number as required.
Metal end plates
Test Piece or arc Path

Coax inners terminated
to end plate (4 off)
Figure 37
Coax outer's
terminated to end
plate
A Basic Quasi Co-Axial System
J.16.1.1.3 The principle has been refined as indicated in Figure 38 where three return conductors are
used. In this technique the magnetic lines around the test object are plotted, and the three return conductors
are placed at a convenient distance from the test object and on the same magnetic surface. The conductors
are arranged on this surface in such a way that the value of the function H.dl is the same between each
conductor and those either side.
155
Unclassified
Figure 38
Unclassified
Cross Section of a Three Conductor Quasi Co-Axial System Around an Object of

Complex Geometry
Unclassified
156
Unclassified
J.16.1.1.4 Figure 39 shows how the correct current distribution can be achieved in a CFC test panel using
two return conductors and a metal enclosure to represent a box as in an aerofoil section.
Front Spar
(a)
Composite
Panels
(b)
Test Rig
Return
Conductors
Metal
Enclosure
Figure 39
A Two Conductor System to Test a Composite Panel using a Metal Enclosure to

Represent an Aerofoil Section
NOTE
The test current chosen must give the same peak current density in the panel as it would have in the wing,
and also the same rise time and decay time.
J.16.1.2
The Jet Diverting Electrode
J.16.1.2.1 In the early work on arc root burn through of metal panels, the results were strongly influenced
by the arc length employed in the tests. This was found to be due to the presence of jets of ionised and
neutral particles emitted from the arc root on the test object and also on the test electrode. High speed cine
film showed these jets to be very active up to 50 mm or so from each arc root. In natural strike to a body only
the jet from the arc root on the body exists and a true simulation requires that the jet emanating from the test
electrode in a laboratory test should be eliminated. It has been shown that this jet is always normal to the
surface of the electrode, and so the electrode jet can be separated from the arc channel, and directed away
from the test object by redirecting the arc root to an appropriately angled facet of the electrode, by means of
a suitable insulator. Figure 40 shows a typical jet diverting electrode.
J.16.1.2.2 Experiments with this type of electrode has given results sensibly independent of arc length in
excess of 15 mm, indicating that the electrode jet effect has been virtually eliminated.
NOTE
157
To prevent the polarity of the test waveform influencing the test, the arc length should be at least 50 mm.
Unclassified
Figure 40
J.16.1.3
Unclassified
Jet Diverting Electrodes
Other Environmental Considerations
There are no requirements at present to simulate either the effects of forward speed, or the effects of
altitude, e.g. reduced atmospheric pressure. The effect of forward speed, viz the swept stroke effect, is
allowed for by defining the dwell time in Zone 1A and 2A to be 50 ms for test purposes.
J.16.2
Test Current Generation
J.16.2.1 Because of the very high power rate of the simulated lightning stroke, the generation of lightning
simulation currents can only be achieved in practice by storing energy at a lower power rate over a long
period, and releasing it at the very high power rate and short duration of the simulated lightning pulse.
J.16.2.2 Capacitive storage and inductive storage are the two forms most suitable for lightning simulation
although heavy duty battery systems have been used by generation of component C.
J.16.2.3 In general the capacitive storage system is the most convenient and easiest to control practically,
but the inductive system gives the best simulation. A practical solution is the use of the "clamped" CLR
discharge circuit. In this system, energy is stored in a capacitor and discharged into the test object. The initial
discharge current will be oscillatory in nature due to the inductance in the load. The first quarter cycle of this
discharge will form the "rise" portion of the test waveform. At the moment of maximum current (zero
capacitor voltage) all the energy will have been stored in the load inductance. The clamp switch may then be
closed and the energy stored in the inductance will discharge in the load forming the "tail" part of the required
waveform. Extra inductance can be added as required to produce the correct waveform. The basic system is
indicated in Figure 41. Further design guidance may be found in Reference L2/6.1. (see I.11)
Unclassified
158
Unclassified
Figure 41
J.16.3
Basic Circuit for a Lightning Generator
Reference to Earth Potential
Diagnostics of high current pulsed circuits can be very difficult, and the first requirement is the elimination of
all earth current loops. This can only be achieved successfully if the entire system including the high current
circuit, the control circuit, and the diagnostic circuits are referenced to earth potential at one point and one
point only. This is termed "the experimental earth reference point". For this purpose the screened room will
also be considered as part of the diagnostic circuit. Those parts of the control circuit of the diagnostic circuits
which are completely isolated from the system by pneumatic or fibre optic links, may be separately
referenced to earth potential for safety reasons, but great care must be taken to ensure that there are no
unintentional connections which can occur from many sources, such as connection to a recording device in
common use with a diagnostic probe that is not isolated from the high current pulse circuit, or through a
common mains connection. Earth loops resulting from multipoint earthing will almost certainly disturb the
diagnostics so that what is recorded may not be what is actually happening. In the extreme they can distort
the current path through the test object, so that the intended test is not actually conducted. The results of any
test conducted under conditions of multi earthing should be considered as unreliable and should be
discarded.
J.16.4
Diagnostics
J.16.4.1
Voltage and Current Measurement
J.16.4.1.1 Voltage measurement can conveniently be made using suitable potential dividers. The low
voltage end of the divider must be connected directly to the experimental earth reference point, and care
taken to avoid earth loops.
J.16.4.1.2 When analysing test results it is sometimes helpful to be able to compare waveforms of the
voltage across the load with the current through the load. Those waveforms may therefore be recorded on a
common time base, as is recommended for Tests L1/5.6 and L1/5.8 of Leaflet 1/5 (see J.7).
J.16.4.1.3
Current measurements can be made in a number of ways. These include:-
a)
Low inductance resistive shunts;
b)
Magnetic probes, pick-up coils, and Rogowski coils;
c)
Other magnetic field effects probes.
159
Unclassified
Unclassified
J.16.4.1.4 Shunts are useful for intermediate and continuing current tests for currents from 100 A to some
tens of kiloamperes, where the di/dt is low and the circuit can tolerate the insertion inductance. Calibration is
absolute, and the diagnostic is robust consistent, and reliable. The shunt must be capable of carrying the
action integral of the pulse without significant temperature rise, and must be introduced at the experimental
earth reference point only.
J.16.4.1.5 Rogowski coils and magnetic probe coils may be used for the higher currents with di/dt in
excess of 5 x 109 As-1. The magnetic probe coil has the better high frequency performance. Neither system
need be in metallic contact with the high current circuit, and therefore need not be connected to the
experimental earth reference point. They are both susceptible to any high frequency electrical noise. This
may best be counteracted by the use of balanced twin cables run in solid copper tubes. The copper tubes
must be kept directly against and in electrical contact with the high current transmission lines from the
position of the probe to the experimental earth reference point.
J.16.4.1.6 Other magnetic field effects transducers include Hall Effect probes and Faraday Rotation Effect
Transducers. These are also electrically isolated from the main circuit but any cables to them must be run as
described for Rogowski coils.
J.16.4.2
Other Diagnostic Tools
Other diagnostic tools that can be employed include:a)
Photographic instruments, e.g. High speed cine cameras for arc root studies; still cameras using high
speed film or fibre optics and light sensitive transducers for spark detection.
b)
Thermocouples, heat sensitive paints, or thermal imaging cameras for hot spot detection or surface
temperature measurements.
J.16.4.3
Test Waveforms
Details of the Composite Test Waveform components (Annex G) to be used in a particular test are given in
Leaflet 1/5, (see J.7). see also Note 2 in this Leaflet.
J.16.5
J.16.5.1
Factors Affecting the Need for Testing

Regarding Test Number L1/5.1 (see J.7). (Metal Melt Through)
The Aircraft Project Director will normally require that 'Metal Melt Through' Tests be conducted on metal
skins unless:a)
it can be shown that melt-through of the skin does not constitute a hazard to the aircraft;
b)
the surface is in a Zone 1A or 2A region and the skin is manufactured from aluminium alloy having a
thickness in excess of 2 mm;
c)
special approved lightning protection methods have been adopted (for example sandwich panels);
d)
in the case of skins manufactured from special alloys (for example titanium alloy) it can be
demonstrated, beyond all reasonable doubt from previous experience, laboratory experiments,
interpolation of earlier results, or by calculation, that skin melt through cannot occur as the result of
lightning attachment.
J.16.5.3
Regarding Test Number L1/5-3 (Arc Root Damage to CFC Skins)
The Aircraft Project Director will normally require that arc root damage tests shall be conducted on all CFC
skins except:a)
for any parts that lie in Zone 3 areas;

Unclassified
160
Unclassified
b)
when a zoning relaxation can be applied and for any Zone 2A surface protected by an approved system
of surface protection such as a sacrificial metal layer;
c)
where it can be shown that any structural damage such as delamination of a composite is of minor
nature and:-
d)
will be restricted to the immediate arc root area;
e)
will not be extended during subsequent flight by aerodynamic forces or by other means to the point
where safety or suitability for service is threatened.
J.16.5.4
Regarding Test Number L2/5-7 (Ohmic Heating Tests)
J.16.5.4.1 The Aircraft Project Director will normally require that an analysis be made of the probable
lightning current distribution, with particular reference to areas of very high current concentration in small
section conductors in confined spaces, and that all items likely to be at risk from ohmic heating, shall be
tested, or otherwise shown to be safe. Also when ohmic heating tests are to be made on parts of aircraft of
CFC construction, the Aircraft Project Director will normally require that an assessment be made of the
probable lightning current distribution in the test object, with particular reference to CFC/CFC or CFC/Metal
Junctions, or where current flows in thin CFC skins or in CFC/Metal Honeycomb Panels. Tests will normally
be required on all such areas shown in the analysis to be potentially at risk unless it can be demonstrated
beyond all reasonable doubt (from previous experience, interpolation of earlier results, or by calculation) that
no hazard exists.
J.16.5.4.2 When tests are made the temperature rise of the test item should be less than the value agreed
with the Aircraft Project Director.
J.16.5.5
Regarding Test Number L1/6-8 (Magnetic Forces)
J.16.5.5.1 The Aircraft Project Director will normally require that an analysis of the geometry of the aircraft
be made to identify areas of very high current density, where hazards from mechanical forces may exist.
J.16.5.5.2 As noted in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12), the effect of magnetic forces on a structure is a complex
function of peak current, action integral, current rise time, current decay time, and the mechanical response
of the structure. Determination of the effect by calculation alone, or by measurement of the peak forces
alone, is very difficult and frequently impossible due to the large number of unknowns that usually exist. For
those reasons the most satisfactory method of estimating the effect is by full threat testing with visual
inspection or non-destructive testing conducted both before and after the lightning test.
J.16.5.6
Regarding Test Number L1/5-.9 (Acoustic Shock Wave Tests)
Significant and serious damage from an acoustic shock wave is rare and only occurs in the immediate arc
root area, either due to an initial attachment or to a restrike. It does not occur as a result of a swept stroke
attachment unless that attachment is the result of a restrike. With metal skins the damage is seldom
noticeable and rarely exceeds a small indentation in the skin at the arc root. In thin CFC panels however,
puncture of the skin can occur. Consequently the Aircraft Project Director will normally require tests for
acoustic shock wave damage to be conducted on CFC skins which are less than 1 mm thick and which are
situated in Zones 1A, 1B or 2B, even if such a skin forms the outer skin or a honeycomb sandwich panel.
J.16.5.7
Regarding Test No L1/6 (Dielectric Puncture)
To compare different materials or protection schemes the Aircraft Project Director will sometimes
recommend that dielectric puncture tests should be carried out as an 'engineering test' on all dielectric skins
covering sensitive equipment or material, or where penetration by lightning currents could present a
significant hazard. Dielectric puncture tests will not normally be used as certification tests.
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J.17
J.17.1
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Leaflet 2/7 - Techniques and Guidance for Equipment Tests

Introduction
As explained in Leaflet 2/2, (see J.12), Section 5, an aircraft struck by lightning, or influenced by nearby
lightning, will have transient voltages and currents induced in its electrical wiring. These in turn may cause
upset of equipment or possibly permanent damage if the equipment is not adequately hardened. There are
various coupling modes between the lightning current or fields and the internal wiring, each of which tends to
produce a transient of a particular waveform. Thus the total transient may be a complex composite of several
waveforms, and transient testing of equipment needs to include a variety of voltage and current waveforms
selected to cover the principal coupling modes. The purpose of such tests is to determine whether the
equipment can experience a given level of transient (of representative waveform) without damage or
functional upset.
J.17.2
J.17.2.1
Determination of Transients to be Applied to Equipment

When Transient Control Levels are Not Known
J.17.2.1.1 In the early stages of development before Transient Control Levels (TCLs) are known, for the
purpose of designing and testing equipment against the effects of transients it is necessary to formulate a
standard set of waveforms which are most likely to represent the threat. This is necessary because
equipment has to be developed simultaneously with the weapon itself; it is impossible for the equipment to
wait until the weapon has been developed and its transients measured in a simulated lightning test. The
waveforms applicable to the equipment are therefore based on experience of measured transients in
simulated lightning tests on aircraft supplemented by the in-flight information available. Although the
waveform shapes are standard, the amplitudes were chosen according to equipment categories which
depend on how critical the operation of the equipment is for weapon flight safety and on the electromagnetic
environment of the equipment (shielded or exposed). Four standard voltage waveforms given in Annex H
are at present employed, namely:
a)
A long pulse simulating diffusion/redistribution coupling (the LP waveform)
b)
An intermediate pulse simulating resistive coupling (the IP waveform)
c)
A short pulse which is the differential of b) simulating aperture flux coupling (the SP waveform)
d)
Damped sinusoidal oscillations in the frequency range 2 to 50 MHz (the DS waveform)
J.17.2.1.2 Several amplitude levels are specified for each waveform (except waveform d) according to the
equipment category (H.3). When that category is decided for a new equipment, the appropriate level then
becomes the Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) to which the equipment is initially qualified.
J.17.2.2
When Transient Control Levels are Known
When TCLs have been established by the analysis and tests required in Annex E, the margin between those
TCLs and the initial test or selection ETDLs is ascertained. If that margin for any equipment interface is less
than the agreed value, that equipment must be requalified to the higher levels. If the equipment then fails at
that level, either additional equipment hardening must be incorporated, or measures taken to reduce the
relevant TCL. Alternatively, if the equipment has not previously been tested, the test current limits (see
Leaflet 1/3, see J.5 Sections 3.3 and 4.4) are given by the TCLs + the agreed margin.
J.17.3
J.17.3.1
Bulk Cable Injection

General
J.17.3.1.1 Bulk cable injection methods are used for the damped sinewave injection test of Leaflet 1/3,
Section 3 see J.5), whereby transients are injected into each cable bundle in turn by close coupling to a
pulse generator through a pulse transformer injection probe. The transformer core is usually made of ferrite
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and the cable itself forms the secondary. Each end of the cable being injected should be connected to the
appropriate equipment but it is not essential for the entire system to be connected for all cable injections
(unless malfunctions cannot be monitored without the whole system being operative). All types of
connection, whether power supply or control and signal lines, should be included. The probe has of course to
be designed to operate over the frequency spectrum of the transient being applied and attention has to be
paid to both its voltage and current rating. The open- circuit voltage being injected is measured by means of
the voltage induced in an additional single-turn coil around the magnetic core of the probe. The injected
current is monitored by means of a separate monitoring transformer probe embracing the cable; current
transients in other cables of the system (or at different points in the same cable) may be monitored with
additional probes if required. It is often advisable to do that to ensure that such cables are not over-tested.
J.17.3.1.2 As indicated in section J.17.1.1 above, for the test to be a true representation of weapon
conditions, it has to be performed at a late stage of development when the cable installation details are
known. However, in default of the actual cables, tests with 'standard' cables may be usefully employed to
detect equipment susceptibilities at an early stage of development.
J.17.3.2
Damped Sinusoids
J.17.3.2.1 For a given level of injection with sinusoidal currents (whether damped or not) the voltage
actually reaching critical components in the equipment under test is often highly sensitive to frequency
because of the natural resonances of the system formed by the equipments and interconnecting cables.
Reference L2/7.1 see J.17 gives examples of how the CW transfer impedance (ratio of voltage at a
particular point in equipment to the injected bulk cable current) has been found to vary with frequency.
Figure 42 shows a typical result; sharp resonances are evident. For this reason, tests at small frequency
intervals over a wide range should be employed and the selected test frequencies should include those
corresponding to maximum and minimum cable impedance (denoting system resonances); these are
determined by swept frequency CW tests carried out previously, possibly as part of EMC testing. Also, if
EMC CW testing has shown equipment susceptibilities at certain frequencies, those frequencies should also
be included in the damped sinusoid lightning tests as required by Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5), Section 3.5.
e)
J.17.3.2.2
When TCLs are not known, the amplitude of the injected transient must be selected
according to the input impedance of the cable at the test point since a fixed voltage would produce
excessive current in a low impedance and a fixed current would produce an excessive voltage in a high
impedance. Leaflet 1/3, Section 3.7(c), specifies three limits (see J.5) Figure 14 Annex H) namely
current, voltage and volt-amp product; the level is initially low and is then raised to whichever limit is
reached first. If susceptibilities (upsets) are noticed before a test limit is reached, the threshold of
susceptibility is recorded and the test continued.
J.17.3.3
Long, Intermediate and Short Pulses: Ground Voltage Injection
J.17.3.3.1 In principle the cable injection method by means of a transformer type probe similar to that
employed for damped sine-waves could also be used for the long and short lightning pulses, that is,
waveforms b) and c) of section J17.2.1 above. However, because of the low frequency content of such
pulses the design problems for the probe would be very great and an alternative method of injecting the
transient is therefore required. One method, which does not employ an injection probe, is ground voltage
injection, which also has the characteristic that it corresponds fairly closely to two of the mechanisms
(resistive and diffusion/redistribution coupling) by which transients are injected in actual lightning strikes.
J.17.3.3.2 In this method, a generator producing a transient voltage of the desired shape is connected
between the ground plane and the case of the equipment under test, as illustrated in Figure 19 of Leaflet
1/3 (see J.5). This corresponds closely to resistance coupling where a portion of the lightning current in an
actual strike passes along the ground plane connecting two equipments, producing a potential difference
proportional to the current and the resistance of the ground plane. If we consider a two-wire circuit
(unscreened) connecting the equipments, then this voltage will appear as a common-mode voltage between
the circuit and the case, the voltage relative to case at each end of the wire-pair depending upon the local
impedance to case. If the connecting cable between the two equipments has an overall screen connected to
case at each end, then the impedance of the loop will be low and the current that flows around the loop will
effectively be limited only by its inductance.
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J.17.3.3.3 In an actual lightning strike, resistance coupling is not the only mechanism by which long, short
and intermediate lightning pulses may be injected; as magnetic coupling, may also occur producing a voltage
proportional to the rate of change of the ambient magnetic flux. Even here, however, the ground voltage
injection test is reasonably realistic provided the output impedance of the transient generator (which is
inserted between the equipment case and the ground plane) is not too high.
J.17.3.3.4 Ideally the long and intermediate pulses should be unidirectional but limitations of the pulse
generator design usually mean that the waveform crosses the zero line at some point; this is not important
provided the time to reach cross-over is sufficiently long.
J.17.3.3.5 The ground voltage test is probably the most practical way of applying the long and short
lightning pulses and it is therefore becoming generally accepted, but there are possible disadvantages. As
mentioned, the impedance of the pulse generator may reduce the realism of the coupling mechanism and
cause the pulse shape actually applied to be different for different loads, and in fact the insertion of this
impedance could possibly interfere with normal operation of the system, a possibility which has to be
checked before transients are applied. The design aim should be to keep the output impedance of the
generator low (probably less than 0.5 ohm) over the frequency range of the pulse and even lower at dc.
J.17.3.3.6 As is noted in section J.17.2.1 above, before TCLs are known, the initial amplitudes to be
applied to equipments are decided by the criticality of the function of the equipment and the degree of
shielding of its location in the weapon (References L2/7.2 and L2/7.3 I.12). Limits are set on both voltage
and current, and the amplitude of the transient is raised until one of the limits is reached. It is important to
test with transients of each polarity relative to ground.
J.17.3.3.7
J.17.4
It is important that equipments should be progressively tested up to the ETDL.
Characteristics of the Pulse Generator
J.17.4.1 The load presented to the pulse generator can vary widely, depending on the system under test,
and the generator should therefore be designed to provide substantially the same waveform into this range
of loads. This implies a low output impedance, which is desirable also for other reasons. In the case of
transformer injection, the load on the generator of course includes the characteristics of the injection
transformer.
J.17.4.2 The generator has to be capable of delivering the maximum specified voltage and current,
including the case of both limits being reached simultaneously except where there is an overriding volt-amp
limit. The output amplitude should be smoothly adjustable and so should the frequency in the case of the
damped sine-wave generator. Either polarity relative to ground should be available by means of a simple
adjustment.
J.17.4.3 It is desirable that the generator should have means for external triggering (to synchronise the
transient with some event in the system under test) and for controlling the point of application of the pulse on
ac power lines with respect to the phase of the ac waveform. There should also be a pulse repetition mode
with selectable repetition rate.
J.17.4.4 Usually the transient is formed directly at the required high voltage level by charging a capacitor
to a suitable voltage and then discharging it into a network of inductances and resistances. However another
possibility is to form the transient at a low level and then pass it through a power amplifier.
J.17.4.5
J.17.5
J.17.4 gives information on the design of pulse generators.
Provision of Equipment for Test
Equipment must always be tested in association with at least one other equipment and sometimes with the
complete system, see section.J.17.2.1 above. This arrangement of more than one equipment is known as
the Equipment Under Test (EUT) and the actual equipment being tested as the Unit Under Test (UUT).
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J.17.6
J.17.6.1
The Damped Sinewave Injection Test

Test Development
J.17.6.1.1 The Damped Sinewave and Ground Voltage Tests of Leaflet 1/3 Sections 3 and 4, are based
on Tests DCS08 and 09 of UK Standard DEF STD 59-41 (Ref L1/3.1 see I.5). The Damped Sinewave test
was developed by the RAE (now QinetiQ) EMC Section so that it could be used to confirm that equipments
would withstand electrical transients induced on their cable bundles without damage or malfunction as a
result of being exposed to either a Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP) or the high frequency transients
described in Section 5.1 of Leaflet 2/2.
J.17.6.1.2 QinetiQ Farnborough (previously RAE) has undertaken considerable development of the use of
bulk current injection techniques for both CW and transient upset and damage investigation. The
development of the transient test technique as described in RAE Technical Memoranda FS(F)457/510 (Refs
L2/7.5 and L2/7.6 see I.12) was based on the results of considerable research into the response of aircraft
and the associated wiring within the aircraft to transients. The nature of resonances within electronic systems
which may lead to particularly low levels of upset or damage tolerance were investigated leading to the
development of the present test procedures.
J.17.6.1.3 Only bulk current injection techniques were adopted for this test as the requirement was the
ability to determine upset levels as well as damage levels and the disadvantages of voltage injection
outweighed the advantages.
J.17.6.1.4 At QinetiQ Farnborough a large number of equipments were examined in detail to establish the
'Q' factor of the resonances. This was performed by means of network analysis techniques whereby a small
amount of current was injected onto cable bundles. The induced cable current and voltage at individual
component pins with respect to local ground or power lines was measured. This measurement enabled
"transfer impedance" versus frequency plots to be made. Figure 42 shows a typical result. It was
demonstrated that most equipments had high Q coupling paths into components that in many cases did not
couple directly with external wiring. Since typical coupling figures for cable bundle currents to the voltages on
individual wires will have many resonant frequencies, it is necessary to inject at sufficient test frequencies to
gain confidence that the system under test will not suffer upset in system function or damage to components
in service.
J.17.6.1.5 It was therefore considered that the previous simplistic approach, used elsewhere, injecting a
damped sinusoid at either 1 MHz or 10 MHz, dependant on whether a large transport aircraft or small military
or civil aircraft was to house the equipment, did not take into account the actual nature of system responses
to transient stimulation.
J.17.6.2
Test Guidance
J.17.6.2.1 When the additional 30,000 F capacitor is used between positive and negative in the power
supply side of the LISN to improve its low frequency performance (Leaflet 1/3 see J.5, Section 2.3),
protection circuitry may be necessary to reduce switch-on surges. For safety reasons a bleed resistor (10k
ohms, 1 watt) should be connected across the capacitor.
J.17.6.2.2 The method of arranging surplus cable in a zig-zag at the back of the test bench (Leaflet 1/3
see J.5, Section 2.4) is preferred to that of coiling the cable, as coiling could increase the cable inductance
by as much as ten times for a very long cableform. Some installations require very long cable runs and these
cannot be accommodated on the test bench; therefore the maximum length of the interconnecting cableform
for those tests should not exceed 15m. Duplication of an actual installation cableform is the ideal
representation. The lengths of the cableforms must be recorded in the equipment test report.
Ideally the transient test should be performed on a complete system or sub-system.
J.17.6.2.3 As noted in Leaflet 1/3, Section 2.6 (see J.5), EUTs interfacing with other units, which for
practical reasons are not part of the EUT, should be suitably loaded to simulate its application. Care should
be taken to ensure that any active loads do not contribute to the susceptibility of the EUT. This may be
achieved by filtering the load inputs or outputs.
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J.17.6.2.4 When practically possible the EUT shall be exercised by the same means as in the actual
installation. For example, if a solenoid or a relay is switched by a thyristor or similar semiconductor device, a
mechanical switch should not be used to operate the solenoid or relay. Voltage and/or current regulators
which function intermittently should be exercised during the test, as described in the Test Plan, to simulate
real life conditions.
J.17.6.2.5 It should be noted that the transient waveshape and the damping specified in Figure 13 of
Annex H, is that which occurs when injecting into an effective loop impedance of 100 ohms (see Section 3.4
of Leaflet 1/3 see J.5). When applying the transient to a cable loom, the damping may vary considerably
from the calibration value. This is normal and is a function of the response of the bundle under test.
J.17.6.2.6 Before transients are applied to the cable bundles of the EUT, it is necessary to measure the
bulk RF impedance of the bundle over the frequency range 2 to 50 MHz at the entry points to the EUT
boxes. As noted in section J17.2.2 above, these measurements will determine whether there are frequencies
where the cables have maximum and minimum impedances (i.e. maximum voltage and current coupling to
the cable). These cable bundle resonances could have a significant effect on the apparent equipment
susceptibility and hence need to be determined.
J.17.6.2.7 At Section 3.5 of Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5), the requirement for a minimum of 50 frequencies and
the selection of individual frequencies is such that an even distribution is obtained. Obtaining exact
frequencies is not critical, it is more important that the frequency range be covered adequately. If it is found
that the tuning arrangement on the pulse generator used, will lend itself to a higher number of injection
frequencies with greater ease of use, is acceptable.
J.17.6.2.8 The number of test frequencies used in Section 3.5 of Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) ensures that any
resonances in the UUT internal circuitry are excited, so subjecting any active or passive devices to the
maximum voltage or current threat.
J.17.6.2.9 The test limit will have been reached when any one of the criteria given in Section 3.3 of
Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) has been met. For low impedance cables the current limit will usually be reached first,
for high impedance cables the voltage limit will be reached first and for others the volt-amp product. The voltamp product is that obtained by taking the product of the maximum induced current value and the maximum
probe voltage taking no account of the relative time at which the maxima occur or of their sign. Using this
approach gives a reasonably simple method of ensuring that the test takes account of variations of cable
impedance and hence reduces the possibility of an over test. An alternative to the voltage monitoring probe
is to use a high impedance voltage divider/matching network.
J.17.6.3
Susceptibility Criteria
J.17.6.3.1 The Test Plan must specify the criteria for malfunction or degradation of performance such that
the test engineer may readily determine whether or not the UUT has failed during test. Whilst not every
possible failure mode can be predicted, nonetheless the normal operating requirements of the UUT should
be clearly described. The threshold of susceptibility is the minimum level of interfering signal at which a
specified malfunctions or degradation takes place and should be noted.
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J.17.7
J.17.7.1
The Ground Voltage Injection Test

Referring to Leaflet 1/3 (see J.5) :-
a)
Section J5.4.2(c) requires that non-representative inductive coupling should be avoided when laying
out the interconnecting cables of an EUT. That requirement can normally be achieved by ensuring that
cables that normally run together are bunched together and those that are normally separated are kept
apart.
b)
With regard to the selection of the UUT (see section J5.4.1), some of the more complex EUTs may
require clarification of the test method with the Aircraft Project Director.
c)
With regard to section J.17.6.2.1 above, it is of particular importance to ensure that the required 10 F
feed-through capacitors are connected at the power inputs of the LISNs and it is strongly recommended
that power supply filtering is used. Both of these measures are to ensure that the power supplies
feeding the EUT are not upset or damaged by the equipment test transients. Care must also be taken to
ensure that the LISNs used will withstand the currents and voltages used in the test.
d)
With respect to Section J.17.4.2 d, if special type test/exercising equipment and/or other units which do
not comprise the EUT are present, it must be confirmed that the grounding and bonding philosophy is
fully representative of the weapon installation. This is to ensure that the injected currents and voltages
will be distributed around the EUT in a representative manner. It must also be ensured that these
equipments that do not form part of the EUT are not themselves upset by the testing and cannot give
rise to erroneous fault conditions.
e)
With regard to Section 4.3, Figure 11 of Annex H shows the Short pulse waveform that shall be applied
to all EUTs. If it is known that a particular equipment is intended to be installed in an weapon with a well
bonded, low impedance, largely metallic structure Figure 10 shows the Intermediate pulse waveform
that shall be applied in addition to the Short pulse. For equipment that is intended to be installed in
largely CFC structure, or equipment whose interconnecting wiring is run in areas covered by CFC
panels, Figure 12 shows the Long pulse waveform that shall be applied in place of the Intermediate
waveform. If it is not known where the equipment is to be installed, guidance should be sought from the
Aircraft Project Director.
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J.17.7.2 Some branches of the EUT harness will be very low impedance (screened cables) and some high
impedance (unscreened cables). The low impedance cables will have high current flow (up to 10,000 Amps)
and the high impedance cables will have high voltages induced at the maximum generator outputs. It is
important to note that the applicable limit is met when either the peak current or voltage reaches the required
level.
Figure 42
J.18
J.18.1
Curve Showing Typical Cable Bundle Current To Pin Voltage Transfer Function
Leaflet 2/8 - Techniques for Leader Phase Tests

Dielectric Puncture Tests
The objective of the tests is to determine whether a lightning attachment to the test object would lead to a
puncture of the dielectric or whether the lightning currents would flashover the surface to some conducting
part of the skin. As noted in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12), the tests are predominantly engineering tests but may
be used in support of certification. In order to devise suitable test procedures, some knowledge of the
flashover and puncture mechanisms is essential. The voltage level required to cause failure of a dielectric by
pulse voltages both for solid dielectrics (puncture) and gaseous dielectric (flashover) will depend upon the
rate of rise of pulse voltage. In both cases the voltage to cause dielectric failure is increased as the time to
reach failure voltage is decreased. The breakdown processes are slower however for gaseous dielectrics
than for solid dielectrics, and so HV pulses with a slower rate of rise will favour flashover against puncture,
while HV pulses having a fast rate of rise will favour puncture against flashover.
J.18.2
Selection of Test Waveform
J.18.2.1 Surfaces will acquire charge due to the high ambient 'quasi dc' E field which often exists before
the strike and also due to the rapidly increasing field (above the quasi dc level when present) as the leader
approaches. That charge, together with the rise time of the E field pulse at leader attachment, can
significantly influence the probability of puncture or flashover of the dielectric. Consequently when assessing
the risk of dielectric puncture, it had been argued that a 1.2/50 s pulse should be superimposed on a dc
level, this giving time for surface change to develop and what was thought to be the correct rise time for
puncture studies. A study concerning the mechanisms and attachments to radomes, some of which is
reported in Reference L2/8.1 has shown, however, that the change of E field is a much slower process than
that which would occur with a 1.2/50 s waveform at least in Zone 1. Furthermore tests have shown that a
radome protected with segmented strips can be punctured using a slow waveform (voltage waveform D of
Ref 2.2) but cannot be punctured with a 1 s rise time waveform.
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Consequently it was thought that the correct waveform to use for puncture studies was a 50 to 200/2000 s
waveform (the so-called switching waveform) for the environment where a leader is approaching. For
triggered lightning the field is even slower and in this case no test method has been approved. The latest
thinking, however, is that the dc level, although possibly present in the real environment at some level, is not
required for test purposes provided that a 50-200/2000 waveform is used. For fairings in Zone 2, a shorter
waveform is appropriate.
J.18.2.2 The pulse generator should be capable of at least 1.5 MV output, although for large test objects,
voltage outputs of up to 4 MV may be required. A 50 to 200/2000 s waveform should be used which is the
switching waveform of Reference L2/8.2 see I.13.
J.18.3
Test Guidance
Wherever possible the test objects should be standard production hardware suitably inerted, but complete
with all structural components. If this is not possible, a full-scale model of the production hardware can be
used. In this case conducting structural components can be made from wood or other convenient material
covered with aluminium foil to simulate the conducting component, thus ensuring the correct electric field
distribution during the tests. The dielectric section however must be production hardware and cannot be
substituted. For very large objects, where testing of the complete component is impractical, the test object
should consist of the dielectric component under investigation plus between 1.5 and 2 metres of the actual or
simulated structural components adjacent to or surrounding the dielectric component. All conducting parts
under the dielectric skin must be included, either as production hardware or simulated items.
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J.19
J.19.1
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Leaflet 2/9 - Guidance Concerning Some Design Requirements

Introduction
This Leaflet gives some guidance concerning certain design requirements for ensuring that aircraft can
withstand the effects of lightning strikes. It should be read in conjunction with Annex C and Leaflet 2/2 (see
J.12) which outlines hazard mechanisms.
J.19.2
J.19.2.1
CFC Construction
Ohmic Heating and Arc Root Damage
General considerations concerning ohmic heating and arc root damage in CFC structures are discussed in
Leaflet 2/2 see J.12, Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
J.19.2.2
Areas of Hazard
Severe structural damage can occur to CFC structures due to the passage of lightning currents during a
lightning strike and the resulting acoustic shock wave. This is caused mainly by the increased ohmic heating
resulting from the high bulk resistivity of the material. This effect is compounded by the low thermal
tolerance, the low thermal conductivity, and the anisotropic nature of the electrical resistivity, the thermal
conductivity and the thermal expansion of CFC. It is also less malleable than metal and will tend to fracture
rather than deform plastically under impact forces. The main areas of hazard are as noted below:a)
Structural sections of small cross-sectional area which may be required to carry lightning currents where
the action integral density exceeds the safe limits.
b)
Glued (adhesively bonded) joints or interfaces either CFC/CFC or CFC/Metal that may be required to
carry lightning currents. In these cases the glue line is usually a dielectric, and the current tends to seek
out voids in the glue line, which are then subjected to high current densities and high action integral
densities. The hazard is then threefold. First there is the risk of localised high ohmic heating, second
there is the risk of explosive expansion in the occluded air in the void, and thirdly there is the possibility
of magnetically generated high parting forces.
c)
Bolted joints or interfaces, either CFC/CFC or CFC/Metal that may be required to carry lightning
currents. In these cases there is usually a surface layer of surplus resin on the CFC. A good electrical
contact is therefore hard to establish and current therefore tends to cross the interface in a few selected
places giving rise to high local current densities and high local action integral densities.
d)
Metal inserts moulded into CFC. Except in the case of very small inserts, these are usually in very good
electrical contact with the CFC and do not normally represent a grave hazard.
e)
The region in the CFC immediately adjacent to a joint or interface. In this region the current is crossing
interlamina boundaries while it is redistributing itself in the CFC. Under these conditions the bulk
resistivity is difficult to determine, and the voltage/current characteristic is non-linear. The voltage tends
to be proportional to i0.85 Failure mechanisms, therefore, tend to become more difficult to predict.
f)
Sparking at joints and interfaces. There is a tendency for all CFC/CFC and CFC/Metal interfaces and
joints to spark when carrying lightning currents. Although both voltage and thermal sparking can occur,
the most common form with CFC joints is thermal sparking. Thermal sparking is usually at a lower
temperature than voltage sparking but due to the higher energy content and longer duration, it
represents a greater hazard to fuel ignition.
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J.19.2.3
Surface Protection
J.19.2.3.1 Due to the high bulk resistivity of CFC, CFC skins can suffer severe damage in the area
immediately surrounding the arc root due to ohmic heating during the high current, high action integral
phases of the lightning flash. In addition, arc root damage can occur due to the prolonged heating during the
intermediate and continuing current phases of the lightning flash. All parts of the aircraft except Zone 3 are
therefore subject to possible surface damage in the arc root area during a lightning strike. This damage will
take the form of erosion or volatilisation of the resin material over an area up to several centimetres radius,
and may also include severe delamination between plies over an even greater distance. There is usually no
latent or incipient damage beyond the visibly damaged area. The damage does not normally penetrate more
than 3 or 4 plies deep. However the region of delamination can be extended by aerodynamic forces during
flight subsequent to the lightning strike. In addition, CFC skins are less malleable than metal skins and may
fracture rather than deform plastically under impact forces.
J.19.2.3.2 All CFC surfaces in Zones 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B must be protected against surface damage in the
arc root area unless it can be shown that either a)
there is a low probability of an arc attachment to the unprotected surface, or
b)
the aircraft will not be endangered by severe surface damage in the arc root area on the unprotected
surface and the damaged section can be repaired or replaced easily and economically.
J.19.2.4
J.19.2.4.1
Particular Considerations
Structure
At an early stage of development, high current tests should be conducted on samples having the same (or
very similar) fibre lay-up and the same resin system as the various sections of the structure. High current
tests should be conducted on those samples, using the methods recommended in Leaflet 1 see J.2, to
determine the safe action integral density appropriate to the lay-up and resin system used. The safe level of
action integral is defined as that which gives a temperature rise in the test sample of 230C or less. The
LHDA should include calculations of the probable lightning current distribution throughout the CFC structure
as related to the total lightning discharge, having the parameters of 200 kA peak current with an action
integral of 2.25 x 106 As-1. The design should ensure that the safe action integral will not be exceeded in any
part of the CFC structure.
J.19.2.4.2
Joints and interfaces
All joints and interfaces, whether CFC/CFC or CFC/Metal, and whether glued, bolted, or moulded in, that
may be required to carry lightning currents must be considered as potential hazards. Representative
samples of each type of joint should be prepared and high current tests conducted as indicated in Leaflet 1
(see J.3)to determine the safe levels of peak current and action integral density appropriate to that type of
joint. Those results may then be used to demonstrate that each joint or interface may be safely used in each
particular application. Previous experience of the results or earlier tests may be quoted if it can be
demonstrated by the Aircraft Manufacturer that the information arising there from is relevant to the
application in hand. Further considerations particular to fuel systems are given in section J19.10 below.
J.19.2.4.3
CFC Fuel tanks
Tests should be conducted on all fuel tanks having CFC skins or CFC structural parts that have joints or
interfaces, whether CFC/CFC or CFC/Metal, and whether glued or bolted, that may carry lightning currents
and which are, or may be, in contact with fuel or fuel vapour. The tests should be conducted as
recommended in Leaflet 1.
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J.19.2.4.4
Unclassified
CFC Skin thickness
Where CFC skins of less than 2 mm thick are used in Zones 1A and 1B, the Aircraft Manufacturer should be
satisfied that:a)
the skin will not suffer impact fracture from the acoustic shock wave associated with the first return
stroke and
b)
that any such damage will not be extended by aerodynamic forces during flight subsequent to the
lightning strike and that the damage will not endanger the aircraft, and that the damaged section can be
repaired or replaced easily and economically.
J.19.2.4.5
Indirect effects below CFC skins
J.19.2.4.5.1 Because of the high resistivity and reduced 'skin effect' and electro-magnetic shielding
properties of CFC compared with metal, precautions should be taken in regions of the aircraft where the skin
is of CFC construction to ensure that a lightning strike does not produce voltages or currents of a hazardous
nature. Factors to be considered shall include the following:a)
The voltage gradient produced on the inside surface of a CFC skin due to lightning current flowing in the
skin.
b)
The amplitude and waveform of voltages induced in wiring due to leaking with the magnetic flux that
penetrates the CFC skin when lightning current flows in it.
c)
The possibility that a significant proportion of the actual lightning current may penetrate the skin and
cause sparking, heating or other effects.
d)
The possibility that even when lightning current does not flow in the CFC skin itself, the electro-magnetic
field from lightning current flowing in another part of the aircraft may penetrate the CFC skin and induce
voltages in internal wiring.
J.19.2.4.5.2 To obviate the above effects, it may be necessary to provide electro-magnetic shielding
measures on the CFC skin, such as a metallic coating. When that it so, it should be co-ordinated with
considerations of surface protection against direct effects.
J.19.2.4.5.3 Further information concerning the correct design of CFC structures to withstand lightning
effects is given in References L2/9.3 and L2/9.2 see I.14.
J.19.3
Dielectric Surfaces
J.19.3.1 Dielectric surfaces have been discussed in Leaflet 2/2, Section J.12.8 (see J.12). As currents
cannot flow in a dielectric skin puncture is the only damage mechanism applicable to dielectric surfaces. The
extent of such damage can be quite severe and may take the form of extensive delamination over a wide
area (maybe a metre or more across, especially if there is moisture in the laminate). This damage may be
further extended by aerodynamic forces. The lightning channel can also attach to metal or equipment below
the surface and a high current arc may be formed by the return stroke in the space beneath the dielectric
skin. The rapid heating of the air in that space will generate explosive pressures which can lead to the loss of
part of, or all of, the dielectric skin (Leaflet 2/2 see J.12, Section 4.7).
J.19.3.2 Dielectric puncture may take place on any dielectric surface in Zones 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B,
particularly when conductive stress raisers exist below the surface of the dielectric, such as antennas,
electrical wiring and structural metal or hydraulic or other pipes.
J.19.3.3
a)
All dielectric surfaces in Zones 1 and 2 should be protected against puncture unless:-
Such protection would invalidate the operation of equipment below the dielectric and damage to the
surface and equipment due to lack of protection is not flight safety critical.
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b)
It can be shown that the inception of flashover is well below that of puncture, for example with small
surfaces such as navigation light lenses.
J.19.3.4 Protection of dielectric surfaces may be achieved by the use of thin conductive coatings when the
surface may be opaque to light and radio frequencies, or by a suitably designed system of lightning
protection conductors. Thin foil or wire strips are to be avoided whenever possible; due to the risk of damage
to the dielectric (and especially 'sandwich' surfaces) should the strips fuse explosively when carrying
lightning current.
J.19.3.5 Cockpit canopies and windscreens will generally not require protection, due to their position on
the aircraft and their favourable flashover/puncture voltage ratio, although it must be remembered that the
effect of de-icing films close to the surface should be assessed.
J.19.4
Surface Damage to Metal Skins
J.19.4.1 As is noted in Leaflet 2/2 see J.12, Section 4.3, the high current short duration phase of the
lightning flash in the arc root area does not cause significant damage to a metal skin. The lower current long
duration phase, however, can cause appreciable melting, erosion and even complete burn through of the
metal. All parts of the aircraft in Zones 1A, lB, 2A and 2B are therefore subject to possible melting, erosion,
or burn through during a lightning strike.
J.19.4.2 Where there could be any fuel, fuel vapour, hydraulic fluid, oil or other flammable liquid or gas, or
any explosive solid, in contact with the skin, or where severe melting, erosion or burn through could
endanger the aircraft for any other reason, tests should be made on all metal skins in Zones 1A, 1B, 2A and
2B, to establish that burn through and, in the case of high melting point alloys such as titanium, ignition due
to hot spots (see section J19.10.1 below and Leaflet 2/2 see J.12, Section 4.3) cannot occur; unless it can
be shown from theoretical considerations or results of previous tests that such hazards are non-existent or
maybe neglected. When tests are made, they should be conducted according to the methods recommended
in Leaflet 1/4.
J.19.4.3 Methods of preventing burn through of thin metal skins would include sandwich panel
construction or sacrificial layer techniques.
J.19.5
Bonding and Installation of Conductors Carrying Lightning Current
J.19.5.1 Conductors which are specifically intended to carry lightning current, such as bonding straps or
the lightning diverter strips on a radome, and also those which by reason of their position on the aircraft, are
likely to be subjected to lightning current, should be designed to carry that current without hazard.
Conductors in the latter category include electrical bonds intended for electrostatic, EMC or other purposes.
The design of conductors in both categories should be such that magnetic forces arising from the passage of
the lightning current will not cause damage, such as for example, excessive distortion or breaking away from
the fasteners.
J.19.5.2 Consideration of the magnetic forces on a conductor shall include those arising from interaction
with its own current (if it is not straight), with the current in other conductors and, where appropriate, with the
current in the lightning channel itself. Cross-sectional areas for stranded and solid conductors are given in
Annex C. Where more than one conductor shares the current, those cross-sections can reduced in area as
indicated in. Bonding straps shall be designed so that the temperature rise due to the passage of lightning
current does not cause softening, melting, fuel ignition or any other hazard. In order to minimise the
inductance of magnetic forces, bonding straps shall be as short and as straight as possible. Soldered
connections should not be used.
J.19.5.3 A control surface is often a lightning attachment point and in consequence when metallic bearings
are used they have to carry the discharge currents. This is known to cause considerable pitting of the
bearings such that they can be temporarily locked, but no cases are known of those seizures not being
overcome by the operation of the controls. The conclusion is that the torque required to free bearings locked
by lightning discharge currents would be insignificant. This is more or less confirmed by simulated tests in
the laboratory.
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J.19.5.4 The use of bonding jumpers across the bearings of control surfaces is therefore not made a
requirement. Further, it could not be guaranteed that such jumpers would effect a cure, since there is no
guarantee that the discharge currents would follow the path of the jumper, which path must of necessity be
longer and more tortuous in shape than the bearing itself. Also each and every bearing would need an
associated local jumper.
J.19.5.5 It is, however, recommended that subsequent to any lightning strike, control surface bearings be
examined and any pitted metallic bearings replaced. Damaged plastic bearings should also be replaced.
J.19.5.6 With plastic control surface bearings, current obviously cannot cross the insulating bearing
surface and the most likely route for lightning current from control surface to airframe is via flashover and
arcing across the metallic housing of the bearing. Such arcing could cause welding and will almost certainly
damage the plastic part of the bearing and there is an even greater need, therefore, to inspect plastic
bearings after a lightning strike. Available control torque, as with metallic bearings, is likely to be greatly in
excess of the torque needed to free the bearing.
J.19.5.7 Lightning strike damage to plastic bearings, when it occurs, is likely to be more severe than to
metallic bearings and consideration should be given to designing bearing systems which direct the lightning
current away from the actual bearing and which can arc over between adjacent moving parts without risk of
welding.
J.19.6
Installation of Cables and Wiring
J.19.6.1 The protection of wiring against lightning induced transients shall be considered in conjunction
with EMC requirements and nuclear EMP protection requirements if the latter are applicable. Account should
be taken of the different electro-magnetic shielding properties of different constructional materials, for
example, a dielectric composite provides no shielding, CFC provides some but less than metal, while metal
provides the highest degree of shielding. Where necessary, wiring should be provided with additional
shielding, such as by the use of screened cable and the placing of the wires in grounded metallic conduits or
ducts. Conduits and the screens of cables should be bonded to the airframe at both ends.
J.19.6.2 Particular attention should be paid to the protection of wiring associated with systems that are
critical to flight safety, such as automatic flight control systems, engine control and fuel systems. Further
guidance concerning the latter will be found in Leaflet 2/5.
J.19.6.3 The configuration of signal circuits should be such as to minimise susceptibility to transients. In
particular, the return conductor connection of each circuit should be by means of a separate wire, and the
airframe should not be employed for that purpose. Differential (balanced) circuits should be employed in
preference to single-sided (unbalanced) circuits. Consideration should be given to the employment of circuit
coupling techniques which prevent the transmission of common-mode interference, as for example, optical
or transformer coupling.
Further guidance concerning the installation of cables and wiring will be found in Reference L2/9.3 and, for
CFC structures, in L2/9.2 see I.14.
J.19.7
Lightning Surge Suppressors and Diverters
J.19.7.1 Where lightning current may have a path directly into the aircraft (for example, at an aerial) or
there may be large transients in wiring near a lightning strike point (for example, the heater wiring of a pitot
probe) consideration should be given to fitting a protective device, such as a surge suppressor or diverter,
close to the entry point of the wiring into the aircraft in order to block the surge or divert its energy to the
airframe.
J.19.7.2 Where the wanted signal is in a restricted frequency band well removed from the frequency
spectrum of a lightning current pulse, the possibility should be considered of providing a combination of
inductance and capacitance for filtering out the lightning transient.
J.19.7.3 In other cases, consideration should be given to fitting a device, which switches to a low
impedance on the occurrence of a surge.
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J.19.7.4 The protective device should be chosen for high reliability and should have a most-probable
failure mode which is 'fail-safe'. It should operate on a surge of either polarity and should be designed safely
to withstand the high current to which it will be subjected when operating to suppress the surge.
J.19.7.5 It should be determined that the effect of the device on the normal operation of the circuit (by
reason, for example, of its capacitance or any permanent current consumption), is acceptable. When the
device is fitted across a powered circuit, its design should be such that it switches back to its original high
impedance state at the end of the surge.
J.19.8
J.19.8.1
Flight Control Systems

Lightning induced transients in a flight control system may produce the following types of fault:-
a)
A transient error with return to normal operation during the flight after a recovery period.
b)
A deviation from correct functioning, known as an upset or mal-function, which does not correct itself
during the flight, but no permanent damage has been done and the system is returned to normal
operation after the flight by resetting or by reloading the software.
c) Permanent damage to hardware.

J.19.8.2 The system shall be so designed that type a) faults are of an acceptable magnitude and duration,
and type b) and c) faults do not occur.
J.19.8.3 In order to increase their reliability, Flight Control Systems usually incorporate a degree of
redundancy (multiplexing). However, this is not necessarily effective against a lightning strike, which may
affect all channels equally. The design shall therefore incorporate the maximum practicable degree of
dissimilar redundancy, such as different wiring routes and methods of coupling for the various channels.
J.19.8.4 Because sensors are usually designed to have a high resistance to airframe compared with that
of the flight control unit at the other end of the circuit, a high proportion of the common-mode lightning
induced voltage in the circuit will appear as a voltage stress in the sensor insulation. The sensors should
therefore be designed to withstand that stress.
J.19.9
J.19.9.1
Propulsion Systems and Installations

Engine and propulsion installations are susceptible to damage during lightning strike from both direct and
indirect effects. The position on the aircraft is important and where the power unit is mounted external to the
main airframe, e.g. in an under wing nacelle, the details of the mounting methods must also be considered. A
study of the probable lightning current paths in and around the engine should be made. Lightning strikes
close to engine intakes have been known to cause engines to surge or 'flame out', probably caused by the
over-pressure (and possibly temperature) wave from the lightning arc channel inducing 'compressor stall'.
Over-pressures of one atmosphere are possible 5 metres away from a lightning channel.
J.19.9.2
Propellers and Rotors
The methods of protecting composite propellers and rotors are discussed and similar methods may be
applied to protect wooden blades. For the most part, all-metal propeller and rotor blades are not at risk from
lightning strike except in the case of unusual design, e.g. the use of metal honeycomb sandwich panels.
However, while lightning currents may pass safely through a well-designed blade, there is the danger that
serious erosion of bearing surfaces may occur should the lightning currents need to cross bearings in order
to get to the main airframe.
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J.19.9.3
Unclassified
The Nacelle
J.19.9.3.1 Where the power unit is installed externally in a nacelle, the nacelle becomes the first line of
defence against lightning strike. Those sections of all-metal nacelles situated in Zone 1A or Zone 2 should
have a skin of such a thickness as to prevent metal burn through in areas where there is a possibility of the
presence of inflammable gases or liquids. Similarly, individual panels of the nacelle skin should be in good
electrical contact with each other to reduce the risks of thermal sparking in fuel laden areas.
J.19.9.3.2 For non-metallic nacelles, consideration must be given to the danger of skin puncture and the
possibility of delamination and loss of parts of the nacelle skin. In particular, the air-intake fairings on jet
engines should be protected from the danger of sections breaking away and becoming sucked into the
engine.
J.19.10
Fuel Systems
Comments are given below on some design requirements, particular to fuel systems.
J.19.10.1
Hot Spots
J.19.10.1.1 Carbon-fibre hot spots tend to be of long duration which means that internal skin temperatures
must not exceed 230C., the auto ignition temperature of fuel (see 4.3 of Leaflet 2/2). With metal skins the
hot spot is quickly dissipated and as noted in 4.3 of Leaflet 2/2, there cannot be a hot spot problem as the
aluminium would melt before a hot spot ignition temperature was reached.
J.19.10.1.2 There is little data concerning titanium hot spots however and the Aeroplane Project Director
will generally require a "Flammable Gas Test" to demonstrate absence of hazard, if a safe hot spot
temperature cannot be established.
J.19.10.2
Lightning Current Flow Inside Fuel System Structures
J.19.10.2.1 The LHDA must detail what measures have been taken to prevent the flow of lightning current
within a fuel system structure or fuel system component. When such current flow cannot be excluded by
reasonable design measures the LHDA must show to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project Director what
measures have been taken to prevent that current flow being a hazard. Particular attention should be paid to
any unavoidable bonding connections to ensure good metal to metal contact. Similarly, the use of fuel
sealant (PRC), for example in a skin joint across which current must flow, must be balanced against the need
for good electrical contact of area adequate to limit the current density to a value below which local heating
and thermal sparking does not occur.
J.19.10.2.2 The Aeroplane Project Director will normally require a careful analysis to show that lightning
current cannot flow in the fuel system fuel and air pipes especially with CFC structures and particularly inside
fuel tanks. Alternatively in Aluminium structures where full compliance with this requirement would be
unreasonable, the correct use of bonding techniques to limit current flow through couplings should be
demonstrated.
J.19.10.2.3 If continuous metal pipes were to be used in CFC Structures without the use of insulating
sections to prohibit lightning current flow, as is required by C.3.1.8, very large currents (in the order of 10kA
or more) could flow in them. Reference L2/9.1 (see I.14) recommends that isolating sections of pipework
should not be longer than 300mm if they are made from non conducting material, due to the possibility of fuel
charging electro-static hazards. Sections of pipe longer than 300mm should be made from partially
conducting material with conductivity in the range of 10-5 to 10-9 siemens/m in the bulk material.
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J.19.10.3
Skin Thicknesses
Although there are at least two documented cases where puncture has occurred (Ref L2/9.4 see I.14), over
many years practical aviation experience has shown that 2 mm thick aluminium alloy provides acceptable
protection against penetration in a swept stroke zone. When for structural reasons aluminium alloy skins less
than 2 mm thick are to be used in Zones 1A, 2A and 1C, the LHDA must identify the means of protecting
such skins (e.g. by using an ablating layer). For skins in Zones 1B and 2B and when Titanium construction is
used an acceptable skin thickness must be established by the Aircraft Manufacturer, following part tests
(including flammable gas tests if necessary) to investigate burn through and hot spots. It is advisable that
CFC skins enclosing fuel should be provided with surface protection. They should in any case be not less
than 5 mm thick (Section 8.2.1 of Reference L2/9.1 see I.14).
J.19.10.4
Joints and Fasteners
J.19.10.4.1 The prevention of sparking at joints and fasteners is often a very difficult task to accomplish,
especially with CFC structures. With such structures it is unlikely that sparking can be prevented without the
use of surface protection over joints and fasteners and by the use of sealant (PRC) below the fasteners, also
special arrangements are sometimes made to share the current between more than one fastener. The above
approach is sometimes called "multipath protection", as each part of the protection lowers the probability of
the occurrence of sparking.
J.19.10.4.2 When evaluating sparking at fasteners and joints it should be remembered that the tendency
to spark reduces with the repeated passage of current through the joint. This should therefore be borne in
mind when deciding how many test samples are required and to what level the test current should be.
J.19.10.4.3 Not only can sparking at joints be extremely dangerous from the point of view of fuel vapour
ignition but such sparking in CFC structures can also damage the joint as the spark products vent away from
the fastener, possibly causing delamination in the immediate area of the fastener.
J.19.10.4.4 As noted in section J19.2.2 b) above, another problem with CFC construction is that of
preventing lightning current crossing adhesively bonded joints. For such a joint to carry current, electrical
breakdown of the insulating adhesive must occur and that will be followed by sparking and arcing, which will
not only produce an ignition hazard but also explosive forces which are likely to de-bond the joint.
J.19.10.5
Installation of Fuel System Wiring
It should be remembered that if cable screens bonded at each end are not used induced voltages of a few
hundred volts/metre may be generated when wiring runs along exposed areas, such as between control
surfaces and the trailing edge of a wing. The need for screening can be reduced if the wiring route is
carefully chosen to take advantage of any inherent screening that may be provided by the structure.
However if the structure is largely made from carbon fibre composite or other resistive material, external
screens bonded at both ends must always be used, no matter what the wiring route. As the current
redistributes out of the carbon fibre such screens will eventually take a large proportion of the lightning
current. Hence there is a need for cable connectors, cable screens and bonding to carry current levels of
several kiloamps. Guidance concerning the installation of cables and wiring will be found in Reference L2/9.3
and (for CFC structures) L2/9.4 see I.14.
J.19.10.6
Fuel Filler Caps
The cap locking mechanism should not be on the fuel side of the fuel seal.
J.19.10.7
Fuel System Electrical Components
Fuel system electrical components shall be designed to withstand the maximum voltage to ground likely to
be generated in the fuel system wiring without flashover or sparking. The electrical components of fuel
system equipment when used in CFC structures shall be insulated from the structure.
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J.19.11
Unclassified
Radome Protection
J.19.11.1 Radar antenna, and therefore the radomes protecting them, often need to be placed in Zone 1
areas on the aircraft, they are therefore in areas where the conditions giving rise to dielectric puncture are
the most severe. In addition the surface areas concerned are often very large and the dielectric surface is
often graded in thickness or of a sandwich type construction and therefore can be very thin in places. When
that is so, it follows that there is a high probability of dielectric puncture. Consequently, a system of
protection as discussed in section J.19.3.3 is then needed. The diverter strips should be so placed as to give
minimum radar obscuration and an acceptably low level of degradation of the radar performance, whilst at
the same time offering reasonable lightning protection. These are obviously conflicting requirements and a
choice will sometimes have to be made between acceptable radar performance and the occasional risk of
severe damage to the radome and radar, which may even compromise flight safety.
J.19.11.2 The efficacy of a radome protection system will normally be demonstrated by expert
assessment of the results of high voltage tests conducted as recommended in Leaflet 1/6 see J.8.
J.19.12
Antenna System Protection
J.19.12.1 As far as other design considerations permit, antennas should be installed at locations on an
aircraft least likely to receive severe lightning strikes, that is Zone 3, with Zone 2A the next preference; the
worst location in this respect if Zone 1B. The prominence of the antenna, that is the amount by which it
protrudes from the aircraft surface, should be a minimum consistent with the performance of its function. The
design should take into consideration that a prominent antenna, in what would normally be Zone 3, could
attract a lightning attachment and hence be classified as being in Zone 1 or 2.
J.19.12.2 As is required by C.3.5, protection to antenna systems shall be designed according to the
following order of priorities:a)
Prevention of damage to other systems, for example by the propagation of transients through the aircraft
electrical system.
b)
Prevention of damage to the antenna system electronics, cables and connectors.
c)
Prevention of damage to the antenna itself.
J.19.12.3 Protected measures should include precautions against damage to dielectric covers, to
conductors by heating or magnetic forces, to cables and connectors and to electrical components.
J.19.12.4 With regard to dielectric cover protection, consideration should be given to the provision of
diverter strips connected to airframe, insofar as such provision is compatible with the operational
performance of the antenna.
J.19.12.5
Further information concerning aerial systems can be found in Reference L2/9.5.
J.19.12.6 Precautions shall be taken against transients arising from the lightning strike penetrating further
into the system than the antenna itself. Protective measures to be considered shall include shunting transient
currents to the airframe and blocking access, by means of shunt and series components respectively.
Protective circuits to be considered should include those dependent on frequency discrimination (filtering,
usually employing inductors and capacitors) when the operation frequency of the equipment is well removed
from the frequency spectrum of the lightning pulse, and those dependent on amplitude discrimination, as for
example, a shunt spark gap which breaks down when the voltage across it exceeds a chosen value.
Combinations of these methods should also be considered, such as a shunt spark gap and a series blocking
capacitor.
J.19.12.7 An analysis of lightning induced transients throughout the antenna system should be carried out
as part of the design of protective measures. Special attention should be paid to the response of Antenna
Tuning Units, because when stimulated by a lightning transient, they can produce high voltage oscillations at
the operating frequency of the equipment which therefore cannot be filtered out.
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J.19.13
De-Icing Systems
The aircraft can be put in hazard if lightning currents enter directly or by induction into the de-icing heaters.
By nature the de-icing systems are installed in regions where severe icing can take place to the detriment of
the aircraft performance. This is normally in Zone 1 regions which experience the conditions most likely to
cause dielectric puncture, and which experience those components of the lightning flash which contain the
highest action integral and the highest di/dt, and the highest peak current. It is in these regions that there is
the greatest risk of direct lightning attachment by puncture of the electrical insulation. Any lightning currents
flowing in the heater wires will have a high probability of carrying a high action integral. There is therefore a
high probability of the heaters melting or fusing explosively, thus causing severe structural damage to the
aircraft. Where no direct lightning attachment occurs to the heater, there is still the risk of induced voltages
appearing on the heaters from direct flux coupling, diffusion flux coupling, or by resistive coupling. These
induced voltages are likely to be high because of the high di/dt, and the high peak current. Apart from the
damage that these voltages may do to the heaters themselves, they may also produce potentially disruptive
transients on the general aircraft wiring.
J.19.14
Canopy and Personnel Protection
J.19.14.1
Electric Shock and Flash Blindness
J.19.14.1.1 A lightning strike or a very near flash, especially at night, may cause the crew to experience
temporary blindness, usually lasting a few seconds although durations up to 30 seconds have been reported.
J.19.14.1.2 Crew in the exposed type of canopy of a strike aircraft may experience electric discharges
from their helmets or shoulders due to the high electric field, or may feel mild to severe shocks due to the
induced voltage in the loop formed by body, arm, control column, floor and seat when linked with the
magnetic fields. Tests with simulated lightning indicate that this loop voltage may be as much as 6 kV. The
longer durations of flash blindness mentioned above have usually taken place below such exposed canopies
rather than in the more enclosed transport aircraft. This suggests that, whereas the shorter durations of
blindness are probably due to the usual ocular effect of seeing a very bright light, the longer durations may
be partly caused by electrical effects to the body causing a temporary disturbance in the transmission of
sensory information between the retina and visual cortex. Protection where practicable would take the form
of enclosing the crew more nearly in a metal cage by means of one or more overhead conducting bars.
J.19.14.2
Inadvertent Ejection by Explosive Devices
Lightning has been known to cause inadvertent operation of explosive devices. Such devices may include
those causing detachment of the canopy and ejection of the seat. These systems should therefore be
carefully assessed and protection provided where necessary. Insidious risks (for example 'safety earths' on
both sides of an EED) should be particularly guarded against.
J.19.14.3
Induced Transients and Damage to Screens and Canopies
C.3.7 requires that canopies and screens shall be designed so that puncture does not occur due to the
interaction of lightning or static charging with electrically heated films. Due to their usual location on the
aircraft, canopies and screens are unlikely to be a lightning initial attachment point and the only threat will be
from swept strokes which are far more likely to attach to 'window bars'. The greatest puncture threat is
probably that due to electrostatic charging of the external surface causing a very strong E field between the
surface and the underlying film. The releases of that external charge, possibly triggered by a nearby lightning
discharge, or direct attachment to the aircraft can cause transients to be injected on aircraft wiring and
appropriate suppression techniques should be used to deal with that threat.
179
Unclassified
J.20
J.20.1
Unclassified
Leaflet 2/10 - Preferred Format for Lightning Protection Plan Status Report
Introduction
J.20.1.1 This Leaflet gives the preferred format for reporting the degree of progress of the Lightning
Protection Plan. D.8 requires that a Lightning Protection Plan Status Report be prepared. That Status Report
should be a statement concerning the position of the items noted in D.4 and should be reissued as
necessary as the Project develops. It should be clearly understood that it is a progress report and that it is
not intended that it should replace any of the items listed in section J.20.2 below, although it could be
incorporated into the LHDA report. As noted in Annex D the LHDA is a continuing process which should be
started at Project Definition and re-issued as necessary.
J.20.1.2
J.20.2
It is recommended that the form of the report should be as given in section J.20.3 below.
Headings To Include In Report
The Lightning Protection Plan Status Report should include the following headings, as illustrated in section
J.20.3 below:a)
Criticality List
b)
LHDA Report-Part 1
c)
LHDA Report-Part 2
d)
LHDA Report-Part 3
e)
Test Report Status
f)
Lightning Transient Assessment
g)
Hazardous Vapour Assessment
h)
Other Tests
i)
Risk Evaluation
Unclassified
180
Unclassified
J.20.3
Report Format
A suggested layout for the LPPSR is given below, Some example entries are given in italics.
LIGHTNING PROTECTION PLAN STATUS REPORT FOR AIRCRAFT TYPE XXXX BUILD XXXX
Issue No .
1.
Date
Criticality List
List all equipments, systems and structure which could be affected by lightning noting criticality from manufacturers FHA (Function, Hazard, Assessment) if available. If not
available, decide criticalities with aircraft manufacturer. Ascribe criticalities against Flight Safety (FS), Mission Accomplishment (MA) and Cost of Ownership (CO).
Item
Criticality
Unclassified
181
Unclassified

2.
LHDA REPORT PART 1

LHDA Task & Title
Summary Position
References Report
(see D.5)
Approved by
i) Zoning
Zoning analysis complete and final Zoning Report prepared XXXXX 2006
ii) Test Parameters
As Def-Stan 59-113 Annex A1
iii) Aircraft Construction
Report prepared and issued
iv)
Structure where specific
lightning protection required
Entered in Clearance Report
Areas of Concern
Areas of insulating composite are:
Date
Rpt Ref 999/1,Iss3
Rpt Ref 999/2, Iss1

Protection Measures
Rpt Ref 999/3, Iss2
Flame Spray
Fin with internal metal

Areas of partially conductive
composite are:
Other areas are:
v) Attachments and current paths
Aircraft Configuration
Possible Current Paths
Rpt Ref 999/1,Iss3
Configuration 1
Gear up, no pylons or stores
See Zoning report
Configuration 2
Gear up, pylons and stores fitted
See Zoning report
Rpt Ref 999/1,Iss3
Configuration 3
Gear down, no pylons or stores
Configuration 4
Gear down, pylons and stores fitted
See Zoning report
Rpt Ref 999/1,Iss3
See Zoning report
Rpt Ref 999/1,Iss3
Unclassified
182
Unclassified
vi) Interconnected Wiring
List by Cable Bundle
Protective Measures
vii) Wiring and insulation at risk

to common mode voltage
List by Cable Bundle and

Location
Bundle AAA to pylon
mounted lamp
Protective Measures
viii) Lightning Transient

Assessment
ix)
Hazardous Vapour
Assessment
xii) Testing Required other than

for
Transient
and
Fuel
Assessments
183
Triple screened
Annex E Evaluation Initial evaluation made Jan 1 2006

Final evaluation made Sep 29 2007
See Sec 3.1 below
Insulation Breakdown Threat Initial evaluation made Jan 1 2006

Final evaluation made Sep 29 2007
See Sec 3.2 below
Fuels System Evaluation completed Feb 28 2007
See Sec 4.1 below
Dry Bays Evaluation completed Feb 28 2007
See Sec 4.2 below
x) Exploding Arcs
xi) Other Specific Lightning
Risks Identified
Summary Position
Risk
Protective Measures
See Section 5 below
Unclassified
Unclassified

3.
LHDA REPORT PART 2, Lightning Transient Assessment
3.1 D.5.h)1)
Yes, evaluation of Annex E -1 Section 2 applies
Modelling Essential or Not

Annex E Task & Title
Summary Position
E.2.2Modelling and Predictions
Modelling and predictions completed 21 May 2007
References
Report
Rpt 777/1
E.2.5 Pulse Tests
Pulse Tests completed 1 Oct 2007
Rpt 777/2
Verification of Return Conductor

System
E.2.2..2. Multiple Burst Analysis

Approved by
Date
Rpt 777/2
Analysis completed 5 Nov 2007
Rpt 777/3
E.2.6
Linearity,
cable
resonances & derivation of TCLs
2.8.2 Equipment
EQL
Level
Substantiated TCL
Margin
References
Report
(EQL-TCL)
Test Date and Ref
3.2 D.5.h) 2)
Item at Risk
Likely Breakdown Voltage
Max Voltage
Developed in Loop
Safety Margin (Volts)
Unclassified
References
Report

Approved by
Date
184
Unclassified
4.
LHDA REPORT PART 3 Hazardous Vapour Assessment
4.1 Fuel System

Annex F Task & Title
Summary Position
References
Report
F.2.1 Survey of fuel system

F.2.3 Hotspots
F.2.4 Skin type and thickness
F.2.5
Current flow in fuel
system
F.2.6 Joints and fasteners
F.2.7 Adhesively bonded joints
F.2.8
Current
flow
in
pressurisation and fuel pipes
F.2.9 Wiring inside fuel tanks
F.2.10 Electrical components
and wiring
F.2.11 a) Testing identified
panels,
components
and
sections
F.2.11 b) Testing identified
major assemblies

Approved by
Date
Rpt 666/1-1
Rpt 666/1-2
Rpt 666/1-3
Rpt 666/1-4
Rpt 666/1-5
Rpt 666/1-6
Rpt 666/1-7
Rpt 666/1-8
Rpt 666/1-9
Rpt 666/1-10
Rpt 666/1-11
4.2 Dry Bays

Definition of Risk
Area at Risk
185
Fuel
Summary Position
Hydraulic
Fluid
Other
References
Report

Approved by
Unclassified
Date
Unclassified

5
TEST REPORT STATUS

Report Designation
Topic
Report Title
Report
Ref
Summary Position
Issue
No
Date
Test
Plan Ref
Entered in Clearance
Report
Approved
by
Date
Lightning
Transient
Assessment
Hazardous
Vapour
Assessment
Other Tests
Unclassified
186
Unclassified
6
RISK EVALUATION
Risk Definition
Item
Description
187
Proposed Mitigation
Probability of
Occurrence
Penalty if Ignored
Entered in Clearance
Report
Approved
by
Unclassified
Date
Unclassified
J.21
J.21.1
Leaflet 2/11 - Flight Restrictions to Minimise Risk of Lightning Strikes

Introduction
J.21.1.1 It is noted in Leaflet 2/2 (see J.12) that an aircraft in flight is struck by lightning for one of two
reasons, either it triggers from a charge centre a discharge which would not have occurred had the aircraft
not been present, or it diverts and intercepts a naturally occurring discharge. If an aircraft cannot distort the
field near a naturally occurring discharge to give it an easier path, the discharge will not be diverted towards
the aircraft and the aircraft cannot intercept it. Intercepted strikes can occur for all types of discharges - inter,
intra and cloud to ground, although, depending on the altitude of the aircraft and whether or not it is in cloud,
it is likely that the majority of intercepted events are intra cloud discharges.
J.21.1.2 If a development aircraft has not got a full lightning clearance, a flight restriction is needed to
preclude lightning strikes as far as is realistically possible. RAE Farnborough developed lightning flight
restrictions for several development aircraft and GAOC took that work further for Eurofighter (Typhoon) as
reported in Reference L2/11.1 (see J.21). Some extracts from that Reference are given below.
J.21.2
J.21.2.1
Discussion
Triggered and Intercepted Strikes
The triggered variety of strike may occur during natural lightning activity but very often does not. In fact the
majority of strikes reported to Farnborough seem to be of the triggered variety, occurring in cloud but in
meteorological conditions where lightning would otherwise be absent. These triggered strikes probably
always occur in cloud. In fact, it is somewhat difficult to conceive a triggered strike outside of cloud, as will be
seen from the considerations noted below.
J.21.2.2
Triggered Strike Avoidance
The triggering processes are not fully understood. For an aircraft, however, to trigger a discharge, it must
have some effect on the charge centre from which the discharge originates and if the field strength and
distribution of the charge are unaffected by the aircraft, nothing can happen. When dealing with electrostatic
charging of aircraft, it is usual to take the distance from an aircraft where the ambient field is undisturbed by
the aircrafts presence, whether or not the aircraft carries a net charge, as being five effective aircraft
diameters. An effective diameter is the circle that would enclose the aircraft and the ionised exhaust plume at
full reheat. The length of the latter is difficult to estimate but probably cannot be greater than the length of the
aircraft. Thus 30 m could very safely be taken as the effective aircraft diameter of an aircraft such as
Eurofighter and hence 150 m as the distance at which the aircraft can have no effect on a charge centre and
beyond which it cannot possibly trigger a strike.
J.21.2.3
Intercepted Strike Avoidance
If an aircraft cannot distort the field near a naturally occurring discharge to give it an easier path, the
discharge will not be diverted towards the aircraft and the aircraft cannot intercept it. As is noted above, the
field local to an aircraft will be undisturbed by its presence five aircraft diameters away and the avoidance
distance from a naturally occurring discharge to preclude its diversion to an aircraft may again be
conservatively taken as 150 m. In fact it is likely to be less than that, as it is thought that a stepped leader is
only influenced by what occurs about 50 m or so away from the advancing tip of the leader.
Unclassified
188
Unclassified
J.21.2.4
Avoidance Distance
J.21.2.4.1 From the above it can be said that an aircraft can prevent a triggered strike by avoiding the
proscribed cloud conditions horizontally and vertically by 150 m. Also if an aircraft were more than 150 m
away from a naturally occurring discharge it could not divert that discharge to it. There is the possibility,
however, that the discharge might occur at the instant when the aircraft was closer than 150 m. Two
conditions need to be considered, a cloud to ground discharge and a discharge between clouds. (The
conditions where the discharge leaves the top of a cloud into clear air before proceeding to ground can be
neglected as a very remote possibility in UK). The former can be eliminated by forbidding flight beneath a
cloud system capable of giving discharges to ground, but nothing can be done about the latter possibility
other than making the horizontal avoidance distance sufficient to preclude an aircraft flying between two
clouds, or accepting the very low probability of intercepting such a strike.
J.21.2.4.2 Although 150 m should be a safe avoidance distance, it would not be a very practical distance
to observe during development flying. If a factor of safety of 10 is allowed, the distance becomes 1.5 km or in
round figures one mile, which should be far less onerous to judge.
J.21.2.5
A Practical Avoidance Criteria
J.21.2.5.1 If the vertical avoidance is made 1.5 km and the restriction allows over-flight of the proscribed
cloud system and under-flight of the lowest precipitation from the system by the same margin, flight below Cb
and most Cu is prohibited (thus completely eliminating the risk of intercepting a strike to ground), whilst flight
below the harmless precipitation of cirrus is allowed.
J.21.2.5.2 If the horizontal avoidance distance is made one mile, the risk of intercepting a flash between
two clouds is made extremely remote, as the probability of such a discharge between clouds more than two
miles apart is very small and can be neglected.
J.21.2.6
Proscribed Cloud Conditions
J.21.2.6.1 The Eurofighter restrictions were based on a restriction developed for the Tornado CFC
Taileron Demonstrator. When those restrictions were formulated, the Met Office considered the case
histories of 16 strikes to Nimrod not associated with Cb activity and found that all but two of those strikes
(one of which was marginal) would have been avoided by adherence to the following criterion:a)
The aircraft must remain more than 15 km horizontally from a cloud system which extends upwards
continuously or in layers to temperatures of less than minus 10 degrees Celsius and through which it is
judged that precipitation could be falling.
b)
An aircraft may overfly the highest cloud in a) by a vertical separation of 5000 ft, and underfly the lowest
precipitation by a similar margin.
J.21.2.6.2 It was thought that the restriction should be easy to interpret and forecast and that it should
cover the vast majority of cases where a lightning strike could occur, without unduly penalising the
Demonstrator flight programme.
J.21.2.7
J.21.2.7.1
Eurofighter Restriction and some other Restrictions

The lightning flight restriction for Eurofighter development flying was as follows:-
a)
The aircraft should remain more than 1 nautical mile horizontally from a cloud system which extends
upwards continuously or in layers to a temperature of -10C and through which it is judged that
precipitation could be falling.
b)
The aircraft may over-fly the highest cloud as defined above, by a vertical separation of 5000 ft and
under-fly the lowest precipitation or cloud base, whichever is the lower, by the same margin.
189
Unclassified

J.21.2.7.2
Unclassified
The same restriction was recommended to QinetiQ for an aircraft flying a development radome.
J.21.2.7.3 For a large aircraft about to go into service, the safety factors referred to above were not used
and the possibility of flying between 2 clouds 1km apart at the time of a naturally occurring flash ignored, and
the restriction proposed was:a)
Unless essential for operational reasons once airborne the aircraft should always remain more than
0.5km horizontally from Cu cloud of large development and Cb, and should whenever possible avoid
flying in cloud systems which extend upwards continuously or in layers to a temperature of -10C and in
which it is judged that precipitation could be falling.
b)
The aircraft may over-fly the highest cloud as defined above, by a vertical separation of 2000 ft (600m)
and under-fly the lowest precipitation by the same margin.
J.21.2.8
Nimrod MRA4 Restriction
There are problems however, it seems, in forecasters recognising when the prescribed cloud conditions will
occur and for flight crew knowing when they are likely to be in them. For Nimrod MRA4 which was thought to
be safe to all but the most severe lightning threat, the restriction was the same as the Eurofighter Restriction
with continuous Met updating during MR4 sorties. That ended up as:
To minimise the risk of lightning strike during flight, the following limitations apply, except when safety
considerations dictate otherwise.
a)
The aircraft must remain outside areas of cloud that are indicated in colours amber and red on the
weather radar display, and avoid green areas where possible.
b)
The aircraft should remain more than 3 nautical miles horizontally from cirrus anvils, which are remnants
of previous cumulonimbus clouds.
c)
The aircraft may overfly the highest clouds, as defined at a) and b) above, by a vertical separation of
5000 ft.
J.21.2.9
Lightning Risk States
It should be remembered that the Meteorological Lightning Risk States 1-5 apply to operations on the ground
and are not usable in flight, apart from avoidance of naturally occurring lightning activity in the immediate
vicinity of the airfield. They are as follows:State 1 Very High
When the probability of Cb over the area is extremely high. Lightning

may or may not have been reported.
State 2 High
When Cb clouds over the area are probable.
State 3 Moderate
When Cb clouds over the area are improbable.
State 4 Low
When Cb clouds are extremely improbable but large Cu (cumulus clouds

are expected).
State 5 Nil
When Cb clouds over the area are extremely improbable and any other
convective type clouds are expected not to develop beyond the fair
weather Cu stage.
Unclassified
190
Crown Copyright 2006
Copying Only as Agreed with DStan
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updated weekly and supplemented regularly by Standards in Defence News (SID News). Any person
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and appropriate action taken.

Def Stan 59-113

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Interim Defence Standard 59-113

Lightning Strike Protection

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0141 224 2585

0141 224 2531

0141 224 2503

3rd March 2006

BRANCH: TES DSTAN SPM 2

1. Does any part of the Standard create problems or require interpretation:

If yes state under section 3:

2. Is the Defence Standard restrictive:

If yes state in what way under section 3.

3. Comments, general or any requirement considered too rigid:

AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Submitted by (print or type name and address)

INTERIM DEF STAN 59-113 Issue 1

Normative References .........................................................................................................................1

Applicability and Reference Information...........................................................................................1

Informative References ..................................................................................................................10

Relationship to Other Documents ................................................................................................10

Protection Aim Requirements .......................................................................................................10

Background and Guidance ............................................................................................................11

General Considerations .................................................................................................................12

Air Side External Environment......................................................................................................12

Annex B Lightning Zoning Requirements for Rotary Wing Aircraft .........................................................16

Zoning Concepts for Rotary Wing Aircraft ..................................................................................16

General Considerations and Assumptions...............................................................................16

Main Rotor ....................................................................................................................................17

Tail Rotor (non-enclosed type)...................................................................................................18

Main Body of Aircraft ..................................................................................................................19

Zoning Diagram ..............................................................................................................................20

Annex C Some General and Particular Design Requirements...................................................................21

General Design Requirement ........................................................................................................21

CFC Construction and Surface Protection ...............................................................................21

Dielectric Surfaces ......................................................................................................................22

Surface Damage to Metal Skins .................................................................................................22

INTERIM DEF STAN 59-113 Issue 1

Bonding and Installation of Conductors Carrying Lightning Current ...................................22

Installation of Cables and Wiring...............................................................................................22

Requirements for the Design and Installation of Avionic Equipment to Withstand

Life Cycle Aspects.......................................................................................................................23

Particular Design Requirements ...................................................................................................24

Flight Control Systems ...............................................................................................................27

Pylons, Missile Launch Rails and Stores..................................................................................27

Canopy and Personnel Protection.............................................................................................29

Lightning Environment and Design Parameter ...........................................................................30

Aim of Lightning Protection Plan..................................................................................................30

Scope of Lightning Protection Plan..............................................................................................30

Scope of Lightning Hazard Design Analysis ...............................................................................31

Lightning Test Waveforms ............................................................................................................32

Test Plan and Schedule .................................................................................................................32

Presentation of Documentation, Risk Evaluation and Recommendations for Approval........32

Evaluation Requirements when Modelling is Essential .............................................................33

Testing of Equipment ..................................................................................................................35

Evaluation Requirements when Modelling is not Essential.......................................................35

Equipment Testing ......................................................................................................................36

Margins to be Applied ....................................................................................................................37

Additional Evaluation Requirements For EED's & Fuzing Devices...........................................37

Annex F Evaluation of Fuel and Explosive Vapour Hazards .....................................................................38

Evaluation Requirements ..............................................................................................................38

Mandatory Tests .............................................................................................................................39

INTERIM DEF STAN 59-113 Issue 1