RULE 114

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004]
PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant, vs. Judge ELIODORO G. UBIADAS,
Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch 72 respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By a Sworn Complaint[1] dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court
Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta (complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the
Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of
authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, on motion of the accused, by
Order[2] of July 9, 1997, Crim. Case No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia Say Chaw, et al., for illegal
entry.
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 219-97 [d]espite . . . the provision of P.D. 1599
which established the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and [the apprehension of the accused]
within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone, respondent virtually surrender[ed] our sovereignty and
criminal jurisdiction to the Chinese government.[3]
Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve, the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the lapse of more than
two years since the filing of the motion. By such failure, complainant charges respondent with violation of
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which
requires lower courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months or ninety days from
date of submission.
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, without giving notice to the prosecution, the
petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of
Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act).[4]
Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him (complainant) from appearing in Crim Case
No. 634-99, People v. Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainants) designation to handle the prosecution of
the case by the Ombudsman.
By Second Indorsement-Comment of March 20, 2000, [5] respondent contends that petitioner has no
personality to initiate the complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof.
On the merits of the charges, respondent counters that territorial jurisdiction over the area where the
accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were arrested within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal has not yet been
established by controlling jurisprudence, given the conflicting claims thereover by the Philippines and
China and the absence of an inter-country agreement determining the common boundaries of the
Exclusive Economic Zone.[6]
As to his failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of his July 9, 1997 Order dismissing, for lack
of jurisdiction, Crim. Case No. 212-97, respondent points out that said motion was filed after the accused
were already released from detention. He further points out that during the pendency of said motion,
representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) informed him that said office was not interested
in setting aside the order of dismissal but that it was suggesting an amendment of the order. [7] Respondent
explains though that since the accused had already been released from detention and had left the
Philippines, and the interest of the DFA was merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the
motion had already become academic.

As to the second charge, respondent informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who was then under
preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a copy of said
petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4,
2000 during which there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office; and that as the offense for which
Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense, respondent granted him bail.
As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No. 634-99, respondent explains that he had
already reconsidered the same through his February 10, 2000 Order, [8] he having earlier failed to see
petitioners designation by the Ombudsman.
In its August 16, 2002 Report, [9] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found, as to the first
charge, that it was not shown that respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith sufficient to find
him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared that respondent based his dismissal order on
his interpretation of a provision of law. The OCA thus concluded that as respondents conclusions in his
assailed order are not without logic or reason, and unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith,[10] he could not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The OCA hastened to add, however, that
respondent is nonetheless required to act on the motion for reconsideration.
As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of Court requires a movant to serve notice of
his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof, hence, respondent erred
in granting the petition for bail without hearing the prosecutions side.
Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents explanations were fraught with
inconsistencies since his allegation that he failed to see complainants designation as OmbudsmanProsecutor in Crim. Case No. 634-99 is belied by his December 17, 2000 Order [11]wherein he noted that
complainant was deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA in fact noted
that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001 Order reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was
issued only after the latter order had attained finality and the instant case was filed.
The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos.
By Resolution of February 26, 2003,[12] this Court noted the OCA Report and required the parties
to MANIFEST within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are submitting the case on the basis of
the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003, [13] complainant proffered additional charges against respondent
and submitted in support thereof, among other things an administrative complaint filed by one Dr. Reino
Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders issued by respondent. Dr. Rosetes complaint, which
was addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, is both undated and unsigned, however. In
the same Manifestation, complainant submitted the case for decision.
On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance Division of this Court received an undated
manifestation[14] of respondent stating that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed in the case.
This Courts Findings
I. On the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the Code of
Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed
to apply to a given controversy.[15] They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired
professional competence.[16]
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of Crim. Case No. 212-97 on jurisdictional
grounds is, however, a matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by the
decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an administrative complaint. [17]
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous.[18] Only in cases where the error is gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith may administrative sanctions be imposed. [19] There is no showing that this was the case
here.

With respect to the non-resolution of the prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of Crim. Case No. 212-97 no resolution of which has been issued, complainant, in his Reply to the
Comment of respondent, refutes respondents explanation in this wise:
When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the Chinese fishermen were not yet released
from detention. It was during the pendency of the motion that the Chinese fishermen were allowed to
leave by the Chief of Police of Subic, Zambales despite our representation that they should not be released
from jail as another case for illegal fishing was still pending investigation. . . . The representatives from the
Foreign Affairs merely wanted to convey to Judge Ubiadas the serious implications of his Order of dismissal
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity and national security of our country. In fact,
Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge Ubiadas as
evidenced of an article which appeared in the July 13, 1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of
said article is hereto attached as Annex A and made integral part hereof.
There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no longer interested in the setting aside of his
Order of dismissal. In fact, the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal was already filed in
his Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 July 1997 submitting the said Motion for resolution. Copy
of said Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto attached as Annex B and made integral part hereof. Since the
said Motion for Reconsideration of his Order of dismissal was already considered by him as submitted for
resolution as of 18 July 1997, Judge Ubiadas should have resolved one way or the other, the said motion.
[20]
(Underscoring supplied)
Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 212-97 were already released at the time of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration did not relieve respondent from resolving it as in fact he even issued an order
stating that it was submitted for resolution.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the prescribed periods, failing which
they are liable for gross inefficiency.[21]
To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with, this
Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13[22] which provides, inter alia, that:
Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for
the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters
must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts
while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. (Underscoring supplied)
This injunction is reiterated in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 [23] which requires all judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, failure to observe which
is a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases. [24]
Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent is liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
II. On the grant of bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 271-99
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against
a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or
at least his recommendation must be sought. [25] So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca[26] instructs:
[A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and
guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence
that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the

absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied) [27]
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at
8:30 a.m.[28] Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that
the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a
copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the prosecution should be
afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is
strong.[29]
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the
court to give a reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of motions
under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in
the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into
account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the
hands of the prosecution.
In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610,
[30]
which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for
statutory rape[31] qualified by relationship which is punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due
process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure [32] which is a serious charge under
Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[33]
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the
interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to
conviction,[34] against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements.[35]
III. On the failure to recognize complainants special designation from the Ombudsman in Crim. Case No.
634-99
The brushing aside by the OCA of respondents explanation on the matter is well taken.
In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, [36] the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or
lawyers in the government service for assistance.[37] Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.Those
designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
It is on the basis of the above-quoted provision of law that Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus
Guerrero endorsed Case No. OMB-1-98-2418 (Chan v. Esmane-Diaz) to complainant with the instruction to
file the Information and to prosecute the case. [38] The indorsement included an order to submit a monthly
report to the Office of the Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the case.
Respondents December 17, 1999 Order[39] which states, inter alia, as follows:
The Officer-in-Charge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby directed to designate any of the Assistant
Prosecutors of the City Prosecutors Office to take the place of Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z.
Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta appears to have been deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman to
prosecute this case, no special reason was given for such authority. Instead, it appears that such
designation was merely based on the premise that the offense charged was committed in Subic
municipality as erroneously indicated in the original Information filed with this Court.

Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows that the
place of the commission of the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
does not have the authority to continue prosecuting this case for the People of the Philippines (Section 2,
Rule 117, 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For this reason, the Office of the City Prosecutor should take
his place inasmuch as the Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged.[40] (Underscoring supplied),
shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation, hence, belying his explanation that he
must have overlooked the same. It also shows his ignorance of the above-cited provision of the
Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special reason for the designation or
deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.
It would appear though from respondents above-quoted December 17, 1999 Order that he was of the
belief that it was the City Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had territorial jurisdiction
over the offense. It is in this light that he is given the benefit of the doubt, absent any showing that he was
motivated by malice or bad faith.
With respect to the charges raised against respondent in complainants April 1, 2003 Manifestation, by
which complainant submitted an unsigned and undated complaint by a certain Dr. Reino Rosete and copies
of respondents other assailed decisions: While Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
allows the institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous complaint, the veracity of Rosetes
complaint is doubtful as it does not bear his signature. It is clearly not intended to be an anonymous
complaint.
Finally, on the rest of the charges against respondent, this Court is unable to pass upon them as
complainant merely submitted photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating clearly and
concisely the alleged acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for
judges by law, the Rules of Court or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 72, Olongapo
City, is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the law or procedure in
granting an application for bail without affording the prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in
the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with WARNING that repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ
November 26, 2004
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint 1 dated January 15, 2003 of Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, 2 then
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession
of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte
against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers,
Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with
this Court a petition for change of venue but was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2001. 3 On
October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration. 4 In the meantime, the proceedings before
respondent's court were suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order 5 granting bail to the
accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for
accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued the Order
without the accused's application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration.6 Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge
issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was
patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment,7 respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order dated
November 5, 2002 granting bail to the accused without any hearing, "the same was premised on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial." There was delay in the proceedings due to
complainant's frequent absences and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court,
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the
accused.8 He added that the administrative complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is not the
appropriate remedy to question his alleged erroneous Order. Accordingly, and considering his forty (40)
years of government service, he prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law and recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution9 dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both parties submitted the required manifestations that they
are submitting the case for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, 10 we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially
in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a
matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a
matter of right or discretion.11 It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is
a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong,
and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. 12 In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.13
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial
but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless
the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."
"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule,
the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation. (18a)"

In Cortes vs. Catral,14 we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused.15
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. 16 He did not
conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity
to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence
cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. 17
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its recommendation on whether or not bail
should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be
held administratively liable for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,18 we held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
"Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the
accused will not justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.
Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judge's
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary
release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, the respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing
and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail
application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
fixing of the amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these
requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail."
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged absence of objection on the part of
the prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their right to a speedy trial, hence, he
granted bail without a hearing. He blames the prosecution for the delay.
Respondent's contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that
the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does
not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail
hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the
very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render justice
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards.

It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly rendering unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and partiality. We ruled that in order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad faith, with malice or in willful disregard
of the right of a litigant.19 A perusal of the records, specifically the assailed Order, hardly shows that any of
these incidents has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that to constitute such infraction, it is not
enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. 20 In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.21 we categorically held that "good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge." In Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee, 22 we ruled that "a judge
may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order he renders. For liability to attach
for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it must
be motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive." Complainant, having failed to
present positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in granting bail without
hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the same. It is merely based on complainant's
speculation. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove this charge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to
produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice, 23 which are not present here.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail. This administrative offense is considered a less
serious charge, punishable under Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same Rules, thus:
"Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
x
x
x
"4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;
x
x
x
"Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x
"B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00."
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of violation of Supreme
Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675
April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by

respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated
April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ),
petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting
bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were
issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional
arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent.
That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the
validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on
April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733,
raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in
the same case,-a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It
was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing
private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for
bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest

before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court
soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in
favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in
the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time
that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not
apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17,
1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case
like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings
for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot
ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in
public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries
to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court
to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person
may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects
of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past
century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against

peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the
other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained
in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles set forth in that Declaration
are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is
in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to
secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the
prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as
a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a
criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions
relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the
finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as
"the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign

authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty
of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It is not a trial to determine the
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted
of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section
20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention"
may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated
until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had
been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.
In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings.
In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.
However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is
a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance
of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this

standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight
risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE

JINGGOY ESTRADA,
Respondents.
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
*
CHICO-NAZARIO,

G.R. No. 158754

GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 10, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x

GARCIA, J.:

DECISION

The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the
Resolution[1] of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal
Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for
brevity), as effectively reiterated in its Resolution[2] of May 30, 2003, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this proceeding are set forth in
Courts Decision[3] of February 26, 2002, inG.R. No. 148965, to wit:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against
the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators
were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the
former President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the
crime ofplunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the respondents was
herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor ofSan Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, the case was assigned to [the] respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. xxx.
(Emphasis added.)

the

The amended information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with
the former President and several others, with plunder, defined and penalized under RA No. 7080, as
amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659, allegedly committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, , by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES,SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then
and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more
or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by
receiving OR collecting,
directly
or
indirectly,
on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY
IN
THE
AGGREGATE
AMOUNT
OF (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused Jose Jinggoy

Estrada, , [and] JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION

OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with
co-accused
Charlie
Atong
Ang,
Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OREleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION
IN
THE
AMOUNT
OF
MORE
OR
LESS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR
A
TOTAL
OF
MORE
OR
LESS[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS,FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by
unjustly
enriching
himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
the amount ofMORE OR LESS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK.[4]
What transpired next are narrated in the same February 26, 2002 Decision in G.R. No.
148965, thus:
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for [Jinggoy] and his coaccused. On its basis, [Jinggoy] and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no
probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he
was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or
criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of
right. [He] prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information . In the alternative,
[he] also prayed that he be allowed to post bail ..
On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix
Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its
Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To
Him.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying [Jinggoys] Motion to
Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion. [His] alternative prayer to post bail
was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The following day, July 10, 2001, [Jinggoy] moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign
[him]. [He] refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not
guilty for him.[5] (Emphasis and words in brackets added)
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for
certiorari before this Court claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for alleged offenses and with alleged
conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Pending resolution of
this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Second Motion
for Bail for Medical Reasons. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. For three (3) days in September 2001,
the Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail, with one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of
the Makati Medical Center appearing as sole witness for Jinggoy.[6]
On December 18, 2001, Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of
his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with

the Sandiganbayan. On the same day, the Court referred the motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution
and directed said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.[7]
The
report
was
submitted
as
directed. Attached
to
the Report was
a
copy
of
the
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying Jinggoys motion for bail for lack of factual
basis. According to the graft court, basing its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy
failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused
requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail. [8]
On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No. 148965, on the following rationale:
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the
trial court conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show
strong evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter requires evidentiary
hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent
court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medicalevidence
only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not
show that evidence on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy], respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of [Jinggoys] guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to
[him].[9] (Underscoring and words in brackets added).
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail [10] against
which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by
the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda.
In the herein assailed Resolution[11] of March 6, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted
the omnibus application for bail, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, JOSE JINGGOY
ESTRADAs OMNIBUS APPLICATION FOR BAIL dated April 16, 2002 is GRANTED. Bail for
accused-movant is fixed at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) to be paid in cash
and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval, unless movant is being
held for some other legal cause.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto which the respondent court denied via the herein
equally assailed May 30, 2003Resolution,[12] the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the prosecutions MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [RE:
GRANT OF JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADAS PETITION FOR BAIL] dated 13 March 2003 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition on the submission [13] that respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction I.
IN GRANTING BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA,[CONSIDERING] THE WELLESTABLISHED THEORY OF OVERLAPPING CONSPIRACIES AND, THUS, GRIEVOUSLY
DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF ACCEPTED CRIMINAL LAW PRECEPTS AND THEREBY SET
A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.
II.
xxx WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA POINTED TO A
CONCURRENCE OF SENTIMENT OR CRIMINAL DESIGN INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF A
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA AND JINGGOY ESTRADA.
III.
xxx WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA CONSIDERING THAT THE
UNDISPUTED FACT CLEARLY EVIDENCES THAT RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, EVEN

WITHOUT A FINDING OF CONSPIRACY, IS EQUALLY GUILTY AND LIABLE AS ACCUSED JOSEPH

ESTRADA HIMSELF BY HIS INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION AND/OR DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
IV.
xxx WHEN IT LIMITED THE CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE, AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL
[LIABILITY] OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, TO SUBPARAGRAPH A OF THE AMENDED
INFORMATION.
The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent is untenable.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to
bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. [14] Here, ever since the promulgation
of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by
Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently
respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed,
that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in
mind his conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his
escape in this case seems remote if not nil.[15]
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10,
2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who
usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long
as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a
respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot
accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan
to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice.
Petitioners first argument denigrates as grave abuse of discretion the public respondents rejection of the
theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first
level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next
level of which the actor is not an active party. As the petitioners logic goes following this theory,
respondent Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President Estrada in the acquisition of illgotten wealth from jueteng under par. (a) of the amended information. He has also a culpable connection
with the conspiracy, under par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving commissions
and kickbacks from the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other illegal sources
under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three paragraphs. And since the central figure
in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense, all those within
the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.
Explaining its point, petitioner cites People v. Castelo[16] which, as here, also involves multiple levels of
conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead accused is a former President no less, the prime
suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking government official a former Judge who later rose to
hold, in a concurrent capacity, the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National Defense, to
be precise. In Castelo, charges and countercharges were initially hurled by and between Castelo and
Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star witness against Castelo in a
scandal case.Castelo left the Philippines for Korea. While away, someone shot Monroy dead. Evidence
pointed to a conspiracy led by a certain Ben Ulo (who appears to be the mastermind) and a group of
confidential agents of the Department of National Defense, one of whom was the
triggerman. Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the Solicitor General
tagged Ben Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the Court held
Castelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for desiring Monroys
demise. The conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be overlapping with the
conspiracy between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of whom was the triggerman.

Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies, petitioner cites the ruling in People v. Ty Sui
Wong,[17] featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the heart of
Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano was found with
multiple stab wounds in a dark alley in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among Sampaloc hoodlums
who had no direct link with Victor. However, one of the neighbors of the Sampaloc hoodlums was a
classmate of Victor. In the end, on the basis of interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor and his
classmate together with all the Sampaloc hoodlums guilty of murder.
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, petitioner presently argues:
It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Joseph Estrada conspiring with
former Gov. Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng protection money); and
of former Gov. Singson involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet another level of
conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e., the regular collection of jueteng protection money for
accused Joseph Estrada; and, respondent Jinggoy Estrada, aware of the details of the
conspiracy between accused Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson, agreeing to remit the greater
part of his collection of bribes to accused Joseph Estrada as its ultimate beneficiary. Thus,
respondent Jinggoy Estrada reached an agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed the
plan and participated in furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and collection
ofjueteng protection money, i.e., collecting P3 Million in jueteng protection money every
month; remitting P2 Million thereof to former Gov. Singson for delivery to accused Joseph
Estrada and retaining P1 Million thereof for himself.
Similarly, therefore, respondent Jinggoy Estrada should have been denied bail since he is as
guilty and liable as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-bailable offense of Plunder. [18]
As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing
sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoys release on bail.
As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his
virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually
dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been
adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the
bail application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent
Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of the main case. In the words of
the public respondent:
As a cautionary parting word, it must be categorically stated herein that in making the
above pronouncements, this Court [Sandiganbayan] is not making any judgment as to the
final outcome of this case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with respect to accused
Estrada. This Court [Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the
evidence of movant's guilt is strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail. xxx.[19]
Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies
that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Sandiganbayans ongoing
determination of the facts and merits of the main case.
Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the
crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to
cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite of the other. For while the
second argument attempts to establish an implied conspiracy between Jinggoy and his father - hence,
the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but
respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally guilty as President Estrada because of his indispensable
cooperation and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.
By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[20] Venturing into the gray areas of the concept of
conspiracy, petitioner cites the following obiter defining implied conspiracy, thus:
When by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same
felonious object, with each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent
were in fact connected, showing a closeness of formal association and concurrence of
sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.[21]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in
conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were
in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a

concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among

them to concert is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. [22]
From the above pronouncements, petitioner then proceeds to present voluminous documents and
transcripts of stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had been deep inside the web of implied
conspiracy under the second argument of this petition. From the implied conspiracy theory, it then shifts
gears to embrace the equally guilty hypothesis under the fall-back third argument.
Regardless, however, of whatever legal strategy petitioner may have in mind, the fundamental principle
that the Court is not a trier of facts remains. Petitioners second and third arguments are to be sure
relevant to the proceedings for the grant or denial of bail that were pending before in the
Sandiganbayan. They are of little moment here where the only issue now is whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting bail to the private respondent.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its assailed resolutions,because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary
appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the
right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the
same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. As
jurisprudence teaches:
xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial
judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an
uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course. [23]
Petitioners last argument is, at bottom, an attempt to have the Court reverse in this case its earlier
holding in another case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we stated:
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner [Jinggoy] and his
other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while
the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most
of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the
predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the coconspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts
alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d)
of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection
of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner [Jinggoy] as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate
act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province ofIlocos
Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the
law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of
the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts that of ordering the
(GSIS) and the (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or
receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of
the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts
fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly
committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, subparagraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and
deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused
named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former
President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth . As
the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the
former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the
former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation
to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held
accountable only for the predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly committed
as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly

done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass illgotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.[24](Emphasis added.)
Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for
predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now
argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case,
respondent Jinggoy Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to
participate, as he did participate and later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses whose
testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the
Amended Information under sub-paragraphs b, c and d.[25]
We disagree.
At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded benefits to respondent Jinggoy that were
inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into the
Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent
Jinggoys participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs b, c and d, did not
change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For
when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended
Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In
legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. [26] In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No.
148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light
of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed
individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended
Information.
In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when, afterconducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions
evidence, it determined that the evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis
of that determination, resolved to grant him bail.
As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court which adds an
appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed
resolution of March 6, 2003:
xxx Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility that, in
case of conviction, [respondent Jinggoys] criminal liability would probably not warrant the
death penalty or reclusion perpetua. (Underscoring in the original; Words in bracket added).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150185. May 27, 2004]
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and
CECILIA MARUYAMA,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, that
part of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 dismissing her petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of the August 25 and 28, 2000 Orders
of the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
The Antecedents
Cecilia Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint [2] and filed the same with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, on December 29, 1999, charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita
Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. In her affidavit, Maruyama alleged, inter alia, that on
December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner,
who was engaged in the business of door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that
the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount
but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant, respondent Maruyama, submitted the affidavit
of her witnesses, namely, Hermogena Santiago, Wilma Setsu and Marilette G. Izumiya and other
documentary evidence. In her affidavit, Setsu alleged that the money which was entrusted to the
petitioner for delivery to the Philippines belonged to her and her sister Annie Hashimoto, and their mother
Hermogena Sanchez-Quicho, who joined respondent Maruyama in her complaint against petitioner Okabe
and Tanghal. Respondent Maruyama, likewise, submitted a reply [3] to the petitioners counter-affidavit. After
the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a
resolution dated March 30, 2000, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner.[4]Attached to the
resolution, which was submitted to the city prosecutor for approval, was the Information [5] against the
petitioner and Maruyamas affidavit-complaint. The city prosecutor approved the resolution and the
Information dated March 30, 2000 attached thereto.[6]
On May 15, 2000, an Information against the petitioner was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0749. The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the court presided by
Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.[7] The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 12, 1998 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded Cecilia Maruyama and Conchita Quicho,
complainant herein, in the following manner, to wit: said accused received in trust from Cecilia Maruyama
the amount of Japanese Yen 1141 (sic) with peso equivalent to P3,839,465.00 under obligation to deliver
the money to Conchita Quicho at the NAIA International Airport, Pasay City, immediately upon accused
arrival from Japan, but herein accused once in possession of the same, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal benefit the said amount, and
despite demands accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants in
the aforesaid amount.
Contrary to law.[8]
Appended to the Information was the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution
of Investigating Prosecutor Vibandor. On May 19, 2000, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000. On June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail
bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79
of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the
petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on June 21, 2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was
furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal complaint which formed
part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without
the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew
on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.
On July 14, 2000, the trial court issued an Order setting the petitioners arraignment and pre-trial at
2:00 p.m. of July 16, 2000. On the same day, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the
issuance of the hold departure order, alleging as follows:

3. It has come to the knowledge of private complainant that there is an impending marriage within the
Philippines of either the son or daughter of the above-named accused and that the above-named
accusedwho has businesses in Japan, and is presently in Japanwill soon exit Japan and enter the Philippines
to precisely attend said wedding;
4. Given [a] the bail was fixed at merely P40,000.00 and b] the considerable financial capability of the
accused, it is a foregone conclusion that the above-named accused will, upon arrest, readily and
immediately post bond, and leave for Japanthereby frustrating and rendering inutile the administration of
criminal justice in our country. The speed with which accused Teresita Sheila Tanghal Okabe can post bond
and leave for Japaneffectively evading arraignment and pleathus necessitates the immediate issuance of a
Hold Departure Order even before her arrival here in the Philippines; [9]
The trial court issued an order on the same day, granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the
issuance of a hold departure order and ordering the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines. [10] For her part,
the petitioner filed on July 17, 2000 a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to
defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted
by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the
respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached
thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were
not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her. She
further averred that conformably to the rulings of this Court in Lim v. Felix[11] andRoberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,[12] it behooved the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial court to enable it to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented during
the said investigation.
On July 19, 2000, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated
July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan alleging, thus:
3. Accused is (sic) widow and the legitimate mother of three (3) children, two (2) of whom are still minors,
namely:
3.1. Okabe, Jeffrey-18 years old born on 13 August 1981.
3.2. Okabe, Masatoshi-14 years old and born on 16 October 1985, 3rd year High School student at
Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205,
Telephone No. 043-224-5804.
3.3. Okabe, Tomoki-13 years old and born on 13 March 1986, 2nd year High School student at Hoshikuki,
Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043224-5804.
3.4. The accused has to attend the Parents Teachers Association (PTA) at the Hoshikuki High School where
her two (2) minor sons aforesaid are presently enrolled and studying because Okabe, Masatoshis
graduation will take place on 26 July 2000.
3.5. The two (2) minor children of the accused absolutely depend their support (basic necessities) for
foods, clothings, medicines, rentals, schooling and all other expenses for their survival to their legitimate
mother who is the accused herein.
3.6. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will impair the inherent custodial rights of the accused
as the legitimate mother over these two (2) minor children which is repugnant to law.
3.7. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly restrict the accused to her custodial rights
and visitation over her aforesaid minor children who are permanently living in Japan.
3.8. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly deprived (sic) these minor children to their
right to obtain education and survival.
4. Accuseds only source of income and livelihood is door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines and
vice versa which has been taking place for a very long period of time and in the process she has been

constantly departing from the Philippines on a weekly basis and arriving in Japan on the same frequency,
as evidenced by xerox copies of the pages of her Philippine Passports which are hereto attached as
Annexes A, A-1, A-2 up to A-30, respectively. To deprive her of this only source of her livelihood to which
the aforesaid two (2) minor children are deriving their very survival in a foreign land will (sic) tantamount
to oppression rather than prosecution and depriving the said minor sons of their right to live even before
trial on the merits of this case that will (sic) tantamount to the destruction of the future of these minor
children.[13]
The private prosecutor opposed the petitioners motions during the hearing on July 21, 2000 which was
also the date set for her arraignment. The hearing of the motions as well as the arraignment was reset to
2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000. On the said date, the petitioner filed a manifestation objecting to her
arraignment prior to the resolution of her pending motions. She alleged that her arraignment for the crime
charged should not be made a condition for the granting of her motion to recall the hold departure order
issued against her. The arraignment of the petitioner was again reset to 2:00 p.m. of August 28, 2000,
pending the resolution of her two motions. On August 25, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for the
postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely thereon, she would
refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court. The court denied the petitioners motions on
the following grounds:
(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the affidavit-complaint of
respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the city
prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners arrest.Since the petitioners motion for a
determination of probable cause was made after the court had already found probable cause and issued a
warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty,
such motion was a mere surplusage;
(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby waived her
right to question the courts finding of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and submitted herself
to the jurisdiction of the court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order
the court issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings and her arraignment; and
(c) The hold departure order issued by the trial court was in accord with Supreme Court Circular No.
39-97 dated June 19, 1997, as well as the ruling of this Court in Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[14]
When the case was called for the petitioners arraignment at 2:00 p.m., on August 28, 2000, she
refused to plead.[15] Her counsel advised her, in open court, not to enter a plea and, with leave of court, left
the courtroom. The court then entered a not guilty plea for the petitioner. [16] It also issued an order, on the
said date, setting the pre-trial and initial presentation of the evidence of the prosecution at 8:30 a.m. of
September 20, 2000.[17]
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with a plea for a writ of preliminary injunction. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60732. The
petitioner ascribed the following errors to the trial court:
I
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED
WARRANT OF ARREST DESPITE OF (SIC) LACK
OF PROBABLE CAUSE
II
RESPONDENT COURT HAS VIOLATED THE
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS
III
RESPONDENT COURT HAS ALREADY PRE-JUDGED
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR ESTAFA

IV
RESPONDENT COURT HAS EXHIBITED ITS APPARENT
PARTIALITY TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION AND
AGAINST THE PETITIONER
V
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC) THE MOTION FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ROBERTS, JR.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC)
THE LIFTING/RECALL OF THE HDO AND/OR ALLOWING THE
PETITIONER TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN REGULARLY FOR
HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION
VII
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS[18]
On January 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision [19] partially granting the petition in that the assailed
order of the trial court denying the petitioners motion to lift/recall the hold departure order was set
aside. However, the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was denied and her
petition for the nullification of the August 25, 2000 Order of the respondent judge was dismissed. The CA
ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the petitioner waived her right to
assail the respondent judges finding of the existence of probable cause. The appellate court cited the
ruling of this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.[20] Thus, the appellate court affirmed the assailed
order of the RTC, based on the respondent judges personal examination of respondent Maruyamas
affidavit-complaint, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the Information approved by the city
prosecutor, a finding of probable cause was in order. However, the appellate court allowed the petitioner to
travel to Japan under the following conditions:
(1) That petitioner post a bond double the amount of her alleged monetary liability under the
Information filed against her, as recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General;
(2) That petitioner inform respondent Court of each and all of her travel itinerary prior to leaving
the country;
(3) That petitioner make periodic reports with respondent Court;
(4) That petitioner furnish respondent Court with all the addresses of her possible place of
residence, both here and in Japan; and
(5) Such other reasonable conditions which respondent Court may deem appropriate under the
circumstances.[21]
The appellate court did not resolve the issue of whether the trial court had prejudged the case and
was partial to the prosecution. The decretal portion of the decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED insofar as the denial of petitioners Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated 14 July,
2000 and/or Allow the accused to Regularly Travel to Japan is concerned. In all other respect, the same is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[22]

On March 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for a partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA
contending that the appellate court erred in applying the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals[23] instead of Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The petitioner
posited that the said rule, which took effect on December 1, 2000, before the court rendered its decision,
had superseded the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco case. However, the appellate court held that
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied retroactively, because
the petitioner had posted bail on June 15, 2000 before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the
CA and praying that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents as follows:
(a) GIVING DUE COURSE to the instant petition;
(b) ORDERING the REVERSAL and PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE of the Decision promulgated on 31 January
2001 (Annex A hereof) of the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 as well as its Resolution
promulgated on 27 September 2001 (Annex B hereof);
(c) ORDERING the DISMISSAL of Crim. Case No. 00-0749 for lack of probable cause;
(d) DECLARING the entire proceedings in Crim. Case No. 00-0749 as null and void;
(e) ORDERING the private respondents to pay the petitioners the following amount:
(i) at least P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(ii) at least P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(iii) at least P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and for other expenses of litigation.
(f) ORDERING the private respondent to pay the costs of this suit.
(g) Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. [24]
The petitioner asserts that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY
DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 26, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 01 DECEMBER 2000 WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO
THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT WHATEVER
INFIRMITY THERE WAS IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST, THE SAME WAS CURED
WHEN PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE RESPONDENT COURTS JURISDICTION
WHEN SHE POSTED BAIL AND FILED MOTIONS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS MOTION
TO LIFT/RECALL HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER AND TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO TRAVEL REGULARLY
TO JAPAN (Last paragraph, Page 9 DECISION dated 31 January 2001).
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE
RULING IN THE CASE OFCOJUANGCO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [300 SCRA 367 (1998)] WHEN IN
FACT SAID RULING IS NOW OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER APPLICABLE.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE

ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE, WHEN THE RESPONDENT

COURT MERELY RELIED ON [THE] (i) COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF CECILIA MARUYAMA; (ii)
RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR; AND (iii) CRIMINAL INFORMATION.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON
THE PARTIALITY OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN HANDLING THE CASE BELOW WHICH IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
VI
THE FILING OF CRIM. CASE NO. 4297 (MTC, ANGAT, BULACAN) FOR ESTAFA ENTITLED PEOPLE
VS. SHEILA OKABE; CIVIL CASE NO. 331-M-98 (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) FOR SUM OF MONEY
WITH PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT ENTITLED CONCHITA SANCHEZ-QUICHO VS. SHEILA TERESITA
TANGHAL OKABE; AND CRIM. CASE NO. 00-07-19 (RTC, PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119) ENTITLED
PEOPLE VS. TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON NONFORUM SHOPPING.[25]
By way of comment, the Office of the Solicitor General refuted the petitioners assigned errors,
contending as follows:
I
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
II
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in ruling that the infirmity, if any, in the
issuance by the respondent Judge of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was cured when
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction when she posted bail and filed
motions seeking for affirmative reliefs from the trial court, such as the motion to lift/recall Hold
Departure Order (HDO) and to allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.
III
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in applying the ruling in
the Cojuangco case.
IV
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in finding that respondent Judge
complied with the constitutional requirements on the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
V
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did not rule on the partiality of
the respondent Judge in handling Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
VI

The Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did not rule on
petitioners claim of forum shopping.[26]
The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they are interrelated.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent judge could not have determined the existence of probable
cause for her arrest solely on the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the undated affidavitcomplaint of respondent Maruyama. She posits that the respondent judge should have ordered the
investigating prosecutor to submit the affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters
documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner and the transcripts of the
stenographic notes, if any, taken during the preliminary investigation. The petitioner adds that the
respondent judge should have personally reviewed the said documents, conformably to the rulings of this
Court in Lim v. Felix,[27] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[28] and Ho v. People,[29] before determining the
presence or absence of probable cause. She posits that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying her motion for a determination of probable
cause, and the alternative motion for a dismissal of the case against her for lack of probable cause.
The petitioner further asserts that the appellate court erred in affirming the ruling of the respondent
judge that, by posting a personal bail bond for her provisional liability and by filing several motions for
relief, she thereby voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived her right to
assail the infirmities that infected the trial courts issuance of the warrant for her arrest. She avers that the
appellate courts reliance on the ruling of this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[30] is misplaced, and
submits that the appellate court should have applied Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
retroactively, as it rendered the ruling of this Court in theCojuangco, Jr. case obsolete.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, asserts that the respondent judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion when he found probable cause against the petitioner for estafa, and
thereafter issued a warrant for her arrest. It argues that the respondent judge personally determined the
existence of probable cause independently of the certification of the investigating prosecutor, and only
after examining the Information, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, as well as the affidavitcomplaint of the private complainant. It asserts that such documents are sufficient on which to anchor a
finding of probable cause. It insists that the appellate court correctly applied the ruling of this Court in
the Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals case, and that the respondent judge complied with both the
requirements of the constitution and those set forth in the Rules of Court before issuing the said warrant. [31]
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate court erred in not applying Section
26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or
the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his
plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the
case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one,
intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the
accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon.[32] The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red.
[33]
The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their
essence retroactive in application. [34] Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively,
even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other
words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. [35] Before the appellate court rendered its
decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behooved
the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her
motion for partial reconsideration.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be
argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause.
[36]
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. [37] In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by
the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan.When
the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her
arrest and secure her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved
the bond and issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a
personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be
deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest. So this Court ruled in People v. Red:[38]
The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and Province of
Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there
were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the number of the
accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of
not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary
examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear
from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that
they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the
summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708,
page 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13,
General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.[39]
Moreover, the next day, or on June 16, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, received certified true
copies of the Information, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the affidavit-complaint of the
private complainant, respondent Maruyama, and a certification from the branch clerk of court that only the
Information, resolution and affidavit-complaint formed part of the entire records of the case. The next day,
June 17, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and to defer the proceedings and her arraignment. All the foregoing are inconsistent with a waiver of
her right to assail the validity of her arrest and to question the respondent judges determination of the
existence of probable cause for her arrest.
Neither can the petitioners filing of a motion for the lifting of the hold departure order and for leave to
go to Japan be considered a waiver of her right to assail the validity of the arrest warrant issued by the
respondent judge. It bears stressing that when the petitioner filed the motion to lift the hold departure
order issued against her by the respondent judge, her motion for a determination of probable cause was
still unresolved. She sought a lifting of the hold departure order on July 14, 2000 and filed a motion for
leave to go to Japan, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to reconsider the said order, preparatory
to assailing the same in the appellate court in case her motion was denied.
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing his August 25, 2000 Order. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reasons of passion or personal
hostility.[40] Hence, when the court has jurisdiction over the case, its questioned acts, even if its findings are
not correct, would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.[41]
We agree with the petitioner that before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest under Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court [42] in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must
make a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot

abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a
preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable
cause for the filing of the Information.
Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in
conducting a preliminary investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for
the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
[43]

If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information against the
respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence presented,
there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not
binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. [44]
In contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included
therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. [45] In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence
of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.[46] A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction.[47]
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial:
It must be stressed, however, that in these exceptional cases, the Court took the extraordinary step of
annulling findings of probable cause either to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect
the orderly administration of justice. The constitutional duty of this Court in criminal litigations is not only
to acquit the innocent after trial but to insulate, from the start, the innocent from unfounded charges. For
the Court is aware of the strains of a criminal accusation and the stresses of litigation which should not be
suffered by the clearly innocent. The filing of an unfounded criminal information in court exposes the
innocent to severe distress especially when the crime is not bailable. Even an acquittal of the innocent will
not fully bleach the dark and deep stains left by a baseless accusation for reputation once tarnished
remains tarnished for a long length of time. The expense to establish innocence may also be prohibitive
and can be more punishing especially to the poor and the powerless. Innocence ought to be enough and
the business of this Court is to shield the innocent from senseless suits right from the start.[48]
In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the RTC
judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding
probable cause for the filing of the Information. After all, as the Court held in Webb v. De Leon,[49] the judge
just personally reviews the initial determination of the investigating prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence. [50] However, in determining the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report.[51] The
judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits
and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to
the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. [52] Indeed, in Ho v. People,
[53]
this Court held that:

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation
be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging
them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the
arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which
to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely
solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and
functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
commands the judge to personallydetermine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This
Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or
the report of the investigating officer.[54]
The rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that an Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the
affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting
evidence of the resolution:
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in
court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together
with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.
If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause on the basis of the
records submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be a need to order the elevation
of the rest of the records of the case. However, if the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by
the investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or direct the
investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary
investigation, to enable him to discharge his duty. [55] The judge may even call the complainant and his
witness to themselves answer the courts probing questions to determine the existence of probable cause.
[56]
The rulings of this Court in Soliven v. Makasiar[57] and Lim v. Felix[58] are now embodied in Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, with modifications, viz:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the respondent judge only his resolution after
his preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant, and failed
to include the affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant, and the latters reply affidavit, the
counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the private complainant as required
by case law, and now by Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The aforecited
affidavits, more specifically the fax message of Lorna Tanghal and the document signed by her covering
the amount of US$1,000, are of vital importance, as they would enable the respondent judge to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause.
First. When respondent Maruyama handed the money to the petitioner, she did not require the latter
to sign a document acknowledging receipt of the amount. The petitioner avers that it is incredible that

Maruyama would entrust P3,993,500 in Japanese Yen to her without even requiring her to sign a receipt
therefor, especially since respondent Maruyama was not even the owner of the money;
Second. The affidavit of Hermogena Santiago, a witness of the respondent, is unreliable, because it is
based on information relayed to her by Lorna Tanghal that she (Tanghal) saw the petitioner carrying a Louis
Vuitton bag while on board a Mitsubishi L300 van with the petitioner. It appears that Tanghal failed to
submit any counter-affidavit to the investigating prosecutor;
Third. The affidavit of Marilette G. Izumiya, another witness of the respondent, is also unreliable, as it
was based on information relayed to her by Thelma Barbiran, who used to work for the petitioner as a
housemaid, that she (Barbiran) had in her possession a fax message from Lorna Tanghal, implicating the
petitioner in the crime charged. Barbiran did not execute any affidavit;
Fourth. There is no indication in the resolution of the investigating prosecutor that the petitioner
received the fax message of Lorna Tanghal;
Fifth. The private complainant claims that the petitioner tried to reimburse the P3,993,500 by remitting
US$1,000 to her. However, the latter admitted in her affidavit-complaint that the document evidencing the
remittance was signed by Lorna Tanghal, not by the petitioner.The petitioner claimed that Lorna Tanghal
had to remit US$1,000 to respondent Maruyama because the latter made it appear to Tanghal that the
police authorities were about to arrest the petitioner, and Tanghal was impelled to give the amount to
respondent Maruyama to avert her arrest and incarceration;
Sixth. In her counter-affidavit, the petitioner alleged that respondent Maruyama had no case against
her because the crime charged in the latters affidavit-complaint was the same as that filed against her in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Bulacan, which was withdrawn by the complainant herself;
Seventh. The investigating prosecutor stated in his resolution that the private complainant established
the element of deceit. However, the crime charged against the petitioner as alleged in the Information
is estafa with abuse of confidence.
In sum, then, we find and so declare that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for the petitioners arrest in
the absence of copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant and her reply affidavit,
the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, and the evidence adduced during the preliminary investigation
before the investigating prosecutor.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, there is no more need to resolve the other issues raised by the
petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749 are SET ASIDE. The records are
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119. The respondent judge is hereby
DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner
based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

THIRD DIVISION
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- v e r s u s - NACHURA,
PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 17, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required, [1] is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing
question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious
interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? [2] Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring
the accusedspresence at trial.[3]
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,the accused who has been sentenced to prison must
typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. [4] An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper.
An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never
owed.[5] Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending
appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance
of potential hardships of prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself
by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time. [7] Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal
include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the community from
potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. [8] Under what circumstances an accused may
obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.[9]
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by
the trial court.[10]
THE FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prisionmayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11]
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. [12] Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence
of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. [13] It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be

exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled
that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. It found that petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the
physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician. [14]
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary
evaluation
of
petitioners
case
and
made
a prima
faciedetermination
that
there
was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[15]
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that
none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than
six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5
are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

THE ISSUE
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or

conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional
Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
FORBID GRANT OF PETITION
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial
by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said
remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [16]
Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to
justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution,
[17]
however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse
of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged
the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from nonbailable tobailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an
error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction.[18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.[19] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition

for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion.[20]
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of
Appeals exercised its judgmentcapriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of
its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was
the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of
the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was
frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its
discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.[21] In this connection, Lee
v. People[22] is apropos:

Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to
correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However,
this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To
tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari
will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.
[23]
(emphasis supplied)

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,

RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape
from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances
indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates
the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired
Supreme Court JusticeFlorenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:
xxxxxxxxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter
of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5
or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said
court (Sec. 5); x x x[24] (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment. On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied.[25] (emphasissupplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bailnegating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the
appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that
is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it
has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants
bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed
from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court
must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present;
this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming
the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate
court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either
allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts
stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the
proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are
governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment
that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the
grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 to coverall situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is
always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of
the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such
circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by
the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners
interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.[28] Choice occurs where, between two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more than one possible outcome,
with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. [29] On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. [30] Thus, by severely clipping the appellate
courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending
appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications
for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The
court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts
and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. [31] In view of the grave caution required of it, the
court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his
punishment if his conviction is affirmed. [32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters
beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant,
[33]
among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail
pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court.
[34]
In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro
forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. [35] This must be so; otherwise,
the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of
taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with
the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,
[36]
specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified
by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.[37]
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly
mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius estexclusio alterius[38] rule in statutory construction.
However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the
enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to
the following or other similar circumstances. Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other

than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial
or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of
the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed
is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is
present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment
may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?
PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY
AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on
bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance.
After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the
discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is
an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of
the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a
capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read
as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is
an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of
the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated
January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in
Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusionperpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as
a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court
of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of
his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the
Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint
or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be
applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending
appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules
are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days
from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the
fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement
pending resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10)
days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The
appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994
which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but
not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent,
or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole,
under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion
and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these
Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to
bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal
should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by
the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments
made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction
in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusionperpetua was a matter of
right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not
for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the
matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court
has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
situations. More importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative
Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. [40] Under the present rule, bail is a
matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending
appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is
more in conformity with anex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the
automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant
circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels
the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on
bail emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment
of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal
is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be
exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. [42] In fact, it has even been pointed
out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted
accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114,
Section 5.[43]
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption
of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of
view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced
by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction.[44] (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared
in Yap v. Court of Appeals[45] (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective),
that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.

A FINAL WORD
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the
history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is
likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in
prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect
of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions.Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Levistedocketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of
the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecutions case, albeit a
good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the
primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that

the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and hisMotion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.chanrobleslaw
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile
respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix
Bail,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. 13 In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk,
and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a
matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder,
the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him isreclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua. He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he
is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. Accordingly, it may be said that the
crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the
accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and
his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are

considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the
Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused
Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 14cralawlawlibrary
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enriles motion for
reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution. 15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may
be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances:
(i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt
is strong.
xxxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is
the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence
of two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and
his social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with
a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine
whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.chanrobleslaw
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 18The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence
at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution,viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetuawhen evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of
its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right
to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable withreclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b)

That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;

(c)

That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d)

That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e)

That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens
v. Elma,30 such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of

the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court
unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. 31 The indispensability of the hearing with
notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:32
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc.,
et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital
offense, in this wise:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later,
over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of
three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the
time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima faciedetermining whether or not there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the
persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
xxxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present
nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary
hearing means:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.33cralawlawlibrary
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and
8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances

that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. 35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix
Bail has only argued that
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is
only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that
the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is charged with an offense punishable by. It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor. 36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable
with reclusion perpetua,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to
be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail.38cralawlawlibrary
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. 39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. 40 With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment
of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his admission to
bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations
conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2)

Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:

a.

Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and

vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)

b.
c.

Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex
1.6)

(3)

Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter

monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4)

Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5)

Ophthalmology:
a.
b.

(6)

Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,

s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)

Historical diagnoses of the following:

High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
Alpha thalassemia;
Gait/balance disorder;
Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant
risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like
excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with
asthma or COPD.43
.

a.
b
c.
d.
e.
f.

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, 44was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile
at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile,are you happy or
have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities
of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition
of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor. 45
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowedindependently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to
be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held inDela
Rama v. The Peoples Court:46
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the
law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; 47 x x x
xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner is
actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis, and that in said institute they have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages
when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail; taking into consideration that the
petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on the ground that the petitioner
was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in
sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition
of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to
act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court has
adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which
the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement
in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the
petitioner on bail.48cralawlawlibrary
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his
choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of
the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose
existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts
can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The Court
thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to

be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorariANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL
RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of
P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Velasco, Jr., J., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.
Reyes, J., on sick leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I joint the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part, prior OSG action.
DISSENTING OPINION
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. - Const., art. III, sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal bread.
The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France, French novelist (1844-1924)
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion
to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on
bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the
basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail1 filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer
for the grant of bail in this Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a
ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The

Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of
an impartial court to find what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the
prosecution and the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very special treatment is a
question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth contained in a certification coming from one
doctor. This doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be subjected to both direct and
cross-examination so that he can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his inferences as well
as the nature of the medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be presented by the
prosecution should also be considered. All this would be proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of
this was considered by the Sandiganbayan because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a
matter of right on grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majoritys opinionother than the invocation of a general human rights principledoes
not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of
the Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for one person
petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with
motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or
dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former
Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape,
serious illegal detention, and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will
have to decide whether this is applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and not to the
aging or sick detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal discretion causing petitions for
certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on clear
legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded on the presence or absence of
human compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and the stability of our entire
judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime of plunder punishable
under Republic Act No. 7080.2 Section 2 of this law provides:
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SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he be allowed to
post bail if the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against him. 3 On July 3, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no warrant of arrest had
been issued at that time. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enriles arrest. 4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City. 5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and voluntary surrender were
mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower the imposable penalty to reclusion
temporal.6 He also argued that his alleged age and physical condition indicated that he was not a flight

risk.7 His prayer states:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post bail, and forthwith set the
amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating
circumstances of at least 70 years old and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty
to reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8cralawlawlibrary
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail 9 dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a
Reply10 dated July 11, 2014.
Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that his advanced age and frail medical condition 12 merit hospital
arrest in the Philippine National Police General Hospital under such conditions that may be prescribed by
the Sandiganbayan.13 He also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency that cannot be addressed
by the Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside medical
facility.14 His prayer states:
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WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place him under hospital
confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing authority given to
the hospital head or administrator to exercise his professional medical judgment or discretion to allow
Enrile's immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in case
of emergency or necessity, secured with appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate
medical treatment or procedure, he be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital. 15cralawlawlibrary
After the prosecutions submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine National
Police General Hospital for medical examination until further orders of the court. 16
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital is not the subject of
this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this Order be declared invalid or null and
void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution 17 denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature,18 stating that:
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[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a
matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.19cralawlawlibrary
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 20 reiterating that there were mitigating and extenuating
circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail health proved that he was not a
flight risk.21 The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8, 2014. 22 Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari was filed.
II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion to Fix Bail for
prematurity. It was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail based upon the Constitution and
the Rules of Court.
A trial courtin this case, the Sandiganbayanacquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused
through his or her arrest.23 The consequent detention is to ensure that the accused will appear when
required by the Rules and by order of the court trying the offense. 24 The provisions on bail provide a
balance between the accuseds right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due process rights of
the state to be able to effect the accuseds prosecution on the other hand. That balance is not exclusively
judicially determined. The Constitution frames judicial discretion.

Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:

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Article III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court. The grant of bail is
ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of
discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide:
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SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable
by
death, reclusion
perpetua,
or
life
imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
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SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the
other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the 1945 case of Herras Teehankee v.
Rovira25 where this court ordered the Peoples Court to conduct a bail hearing despite the accused being
charged with a capital offense.26 This court reasoned that the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the
Peoples Court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in
force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail. 27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the Peoples Court and gave the following instructions:
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(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail,
the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the
approval
of
the
bail
which
it
should
fix
for
the
purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutors attitude is not justified, it may ask
him questions to ascertain the strength of the states evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of
bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that
the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public
interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the
Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control
of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he

does not want to introduceprovided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the
defendant or detainee.28cralawlawlibrary
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:29
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We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule,
therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to
provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing
that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7 . The
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case,
a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. 30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge
of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this courts instructions on the application of the
constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative cases promulgated from 1981 to
1996.34Unfortunately, there were still administrative complaints filed against judges for failing to hold a
hearing for bail even after the promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for granting bail to
the accused charged with capital offenses.36 This court could only lament on the deluge of these
administrative cases, stating:
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It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence
on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that
as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court
as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether
or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study
them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous
decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A
number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge
their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the
administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench
cannot justly be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 37cralawlawlibrary
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be filed against judges who
failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.

In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was charged with murder.39 Judge Bugtas initially denied
the accuseds petition for bail but granted his motion for reconsideration and set his bail without a
hearing.40 As a result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 41 for being grossly ignorant of
the rules and procedures in granting or denying bail[.]42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for granting
bail to the accused charged with rape without a hearing.44
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuo v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge Cabebe was fined P20,000.00 for granting bail,
without the requisite hearing, to the accused charged with possession of illegal drugs. 46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail or the prosecutor
already recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
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Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be
held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The
Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due
process
occurs.
.

Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court
regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that
it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for
the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance
of the law and the rules.48cralawlawlibrary
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that bail be granted without
any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. During the hearing on
petitioners Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail should be based only on their
failure to establish the strength of the evidence against him. 49 The prosecution had no opportunity to
present rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners Motion to Fix Bail for
being premature. The denial is neither capricious, whimsical, arbitrary [nor] despotic 50 as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the Constitution, jurisprudence, and
long-standing rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it denied petitioners Motion to Fix Bail.
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to release petitioner on bail for
medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical
condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent developed
their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to establish the legal and factual basis
for this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioners grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be
deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

o
o

It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile falls
within the exception and exclusion from the right; and not the burden of Enrile to show
entitlement to his right.
The prosecution failed to establish that Enriles case falls within the exception; hence, denial
of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of discretion.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
o The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the Anti-Plunder Law
itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but also the penalty next lower
in degree (or reclusion temporal) by consider(ing) the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code.
o Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles guilt (if ever) is
strong;
hence,
Enrile
is
entitled
to
bail
as
a
matter
of
right.

o Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise in issue, in its
Opposition to Enriles motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong, in the light of the
prosecutions continuing muteness to the defenses repeated challenge for the prosecution
to produce any single piece of paper showing that Enrile received even a single peso of
kickback, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted that Enrile must first initiate, and
formally apply for, the formal proceedings (bail hearing) before the prosecution may be
called upon to discharge its duty of proving evidence of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
o The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (shall be bailable) does not become a
prohibition (shall not be bailable). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory right (shall) is a
permissive right (may).
o A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive innocence and nondeprivation of liberty without due process, and the theory behind the exception to right-tobail.
o Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is demonstrated not
being a flight risk), then bail may be granted to him.
o Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail physical and medical condition, and
having voluntarily surrendered.
o Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile is not a flight risk.
o Other circumstances negating Enriles disposition to become a fugitive from justice are also
present.
o The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that at this stage of the
proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of right. 51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
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WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated July
14, 2014, and the Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT BAIL in favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable. 52cralawlawlibrary
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of this court in and out of
formal deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the discussion was triggered by the
submission of the member in charge of a draft early this year. The draft mainly adopted the legal
arguments of the Petition which was centered on this court taking judicial notice of evidence to establish
two generic mitigating circumstances that would lower the penalty to be imposed even before trial or a
hearing for the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong happened before the
Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member submitted their reflections on
this issue. Refutations and arguments were vigorously exchanged in writing.

Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common position that there was no
grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition should be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail
could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or application for bail as in all cases where the
statutorily imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela
Perlas-Bernabe and this member differed only in the treatment of mitigating circumstances and the
interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et al.53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on August 11, 2015, the
member in charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all discussion on the legal points
pertaining to whether bail was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds.
The member in charge committed to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This member
expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical condition of petitioner was
circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this member responded with a letter addressed
to all the justices, which stated:
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In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in the proposed ponencia that need
to be threshed out thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an accused charged
with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on bail for humanitarian reasons.
Among

these

are

as

follows:

First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
applied the text of the Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical interpretations of these
legal
texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the certification of a certain Dr.
Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross examination and not
appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or have been presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in appreciating the facts relating to the
medical condition of the accused? Or, are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused to be
brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot be treated by the PNP hospital
subject only to reportorial requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the Sandiganbayans
decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of the accused were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail? Or, if we are able to hurdle the
factual issues and find that there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention rather be modified?
Do we have clear judicial precedents for hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his medical condition can be attended
to, should he be returned to detention when he becomes well? If he reports for work, does this not nullify
the
very
basis
of
the
ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established rules on what to consider when
setting the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his circumstances, what is our basis for setting
this amount? What evidence have we considered? Should this Court rather than the Sandiganbayan
exercise
this
discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical condition of the accused entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder? Is it
simply his advanced age? What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical conditions that come with
advanced age? Would this apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing trial for
plunder? Is he suffering from a unique debilitating disease which cannot be accommodated by the best
care provided by our detention facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules
to
support
our
conclusion?

Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law provisions, other than the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an accused in his condition? Or, are
we now reading the general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply specifically to the condition
of this accused? What entitles the accused in this case to a liberal application of very general statements
on human rights?54cralawlawlibrary
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015. The member in charge,
however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written reflection on the points raised.Insisting on a
vote, he thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14, 2015 circulated draft centering
on release on bail on humanitarian grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea that
bail was a matter of right based on judicial notice and the judicial declaration of the existence
of two mitigating circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The only amendment to the
majority opinion accepted by the member in charge was the increase of the proposed amount of bail to
P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the member in charge, emerging as
the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente passed
around a final copy of the majority opinion which was not the version voted upon during the
mornings deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for signature was substantially the August 14, 2015
circulated version granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioners entire argument, stating that:
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Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable
with reclusion perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to
be made by the trial court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of the court at the time
that the case was voted upon. But because the final version for signing was not the version voted upon,
this member had to substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue of mitigating circumstances and bail as
a matter of right was no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided
to graciously offer her points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to abandon her filing of a
Separate Opinion and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus,
in Rule 13, section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
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SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion. - A Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its
conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a
dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the
result of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence
in the result should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main
opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The
dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the writer of
the majority opinion presents the decision for the signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other
dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started to speculate on the
contents of the majority opinion. This may have created expectations on the part of petitioners friends,
family, and counsel. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting that the Decision had as
yet not been promulgated and served, made announcements as to their readiness to receive the cash
bond and process the release of the accused even if August 19, 2015 happened to be a holiday in Quezon
City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote and the date of
promulgation of this judgment.

V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioners arguments, the majority, instead of denying the Petition for
Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not even argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the certification in a
Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that
petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. 56 This certification was submitted as an annex
to a Manifestation57 before this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of the accused
not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctors
certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with crossexamination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales findings on petitioners health in a hearing whose main
purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
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SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
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Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.59cralawlawlibrary
Petitioners medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now
deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any
other medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand this
matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales findings and to ensure that that is still the condition that
prevails at present.
That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is obviously
politically privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the
accused, without the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence, and
without consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a hearing be held,
casts serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical
procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is
to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a petition for bail is filed by the
accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require immediate medical
attention, this court has not established clear guidelines for such releases. The closest that the majority
opinion reaches for a standard is:
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Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to

be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during trial. 60 (Emphasis in the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to their health OR
whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are humanely treated. Under A.M.
No. 07-3-02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are mandated to conduct monthly jail visitations in order to
[e]nsure the promotion and protection of the dignity and well being 62 of detention prisoners. Detention
prisoners may also be released to a medical facility on humanitarian grounds if their continuous
confinement during the pendency of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their life. 63
In many instances, alternative detentionwhether temporary or permanentis granted upon a clear
showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the physical condition of the accused, as proven
through evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring medical attention that could not be
accommodated within the current custodial arrangements. Care should, however, be taken that such
alternative custodial arrangements do not take place more than the time necessary to address the medical
condition of the accused. Likewise, the Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial
arrangements are not borne by the state and, therefore, should be sensitive to the possibility that these
alternatives are not seen as a privilege given to the wealthy or powerful detainees.
On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the Sandiganbayan already issued Resolutions allowing accused to
remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital and continue medical examinations until further
orders from the court, subject to reportorial requirements and at accuseds personal expense. In particular,
the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
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Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzaless report], the Court will hold in abeyance action on accused Enriles
motion for detention at the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to remain thereat until further
orders from this Court. The Director or Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY to
allow accused Enrile to access another medical facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in case of emergency
or necessity, and (2) the medical procedure required to be administered on accused Enrile is not available
at, or cannot be provided for by the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE PERSONAL
EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE. After completion of the medical treatment or procedure outside Camp
Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital. The said director or
administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such visit/s of accused Enrile to
another medical facility on the day following the said visit/s. 66 (Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly authorized representative/s
from the Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the medical examination of accused
Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a report and recommendation to the Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt hereof. The necessary medical examination/s and/or procedure/s as determined the said doctor/s
shall be undertaken at PGH or any government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the
appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical apparatus and competent personnel to
undertake the procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE.
Pending the completion of the aforesaid medical examination/s and/or procedure/s and submission of the
required report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at the Philippine
National Police General Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in its Resolution dated
July
9,
2014.
SO ORDERED.67cralawlawlibrary
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be brought to any hospital
immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital subject only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting bail to petitioner, we are, in

effect, declaring that the Sandiganbayans decisions in relation to its supervision of the accuseds
detention were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does not seem to be suffering
from a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be provided for by our detention facilities and
temporary hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the majority arrived at a conclusion
different from the Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue
become the subject of intense discussion by the parties through their pleadings.
It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioners incarceration aggravates his medical
conditions or if his medical conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is
no showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him.
There is also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the
best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his detention that is the most
significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the hospital necessary, courts
do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the accuseds detention. There is now no clarity as
to when special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical condition is applicable only to
those of advanced age and whether that advanced age is beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance
as to whether this is applicable only to cases involving plunder. There is no guidance in the majoritys
opinion as to whether this is only applicable to the medical conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:68
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Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit
bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the selective
decarceration of older prisoners based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases.69cralawlawlibrary
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special kind of bail. Thus, the
majority asserts:
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It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his
choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.70cralawlawlibrary
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried, friends, family, and
colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This strongly
indicates that the majoritys inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have
been too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled motu
propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to cancel bail should be filed before
the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
The crime charged in petitioners case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after granting the prosecution the

opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is
unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties would be to
blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian
considerations extends even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a case of a decision
especially tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The original
proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00 in its revised
proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member who voted with the
majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. 71 The majority opinion is
sparse on the evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the more prudent course of
action would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting the
amount of bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court to release petitioner
given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority
opinion, is a general declaration72 to uphold the value and dignity of every person.73 It does not prohibit the
arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of
crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out in a dignified and humane manner.
The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr. 74 as
basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75 However, Government of Hong Kongdoes not apply to
this case because the issue was on whether bail could apply to extradition cases. This court stated that
because of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles are now embodied in the
Constitution, bail applies to all instances where an accused is detained pending trial, including
administrative proceedings such as extradition. This court, however, does not state that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights mandates that bail must be granted in instances where the accused is of
advanced age and frail health.
Petitioners remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that safeguard his fundamental
right to liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution clearly states that
bail is available to all persons before conviction except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong[.] Even Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the same document used by the majority opinion, provides that:
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(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to grant bail without evidence
presented that the accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded the case to the trial
court76 instead of applying the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically
stating that based on these principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect for human dignity and the
protection of human rights. These rights are applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law,
were illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for
these rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It should not be
cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and the

norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights does not mean that the Rule of Law is
suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want. Rather, human rights are
best entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these
provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our humanity to fight for it and ensure that it
allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will consider meaningful. This applies to petitioner as
accused. Yet it also applies with equal force to all the individuals in our communities and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and collective meaningful existence, is put at
risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned
circumstances. Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us who are elite. Otherwise, we
concede that there are those among us who are powerful and networked enough to enjoy privileges not
shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled with discomfort with the consequences of the
majoritys position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.
X.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the following crimes, among others, carry this as maximum
penalty:
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(1)
Parricide;77
Murder;78

(2)
(3)

Kidnapping

and

(4)

Robbery

(5)
Robbery

homicide;80
rape;81

with

with

Attempted

detention; 79

illegal
with

Robbery

(6)
(7)

serious

serious

or

frustrated

injuries; 82

physical
robbery

homicide; 83

with

Rape;84

(8)
(9)

Rape

of

children

(10)

under

12

old; 85

years

assault;86 and

Sexual

(11) Incestuous rape.87cralawlawlibrary

Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the maximum penalty of life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua:
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(1)
Carnapping
with
homicide
or
rape; 88
(2)

Sale

of

illegal

drugs

regardless

of

quantity

and

purity; 89

(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of
shabu,
500
grams
or
more
of
marijuana,
or
10
grams
or
more
of
ecstasy; 90
(4)

Illegal

possession

of

10

grams

to

less

than

50

grams

of

shabu; 91

(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy; 92

(6)

prostitution;93

Child

(7)

trafficking;94

Child

(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a means of living; 95
(9)
(10)

Forcing

Forcing

street
a

child

street

or
child

any
or

child
any

to

be
child

conduit
to

in

drug

commit

any

trafficking
illegal

or

pushing; 96

activities; 97 and

(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries of a child under 12 years
old.98cralawlawlibrary
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there are those accused of murder,
trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape of minors, multiple counts of rape, or even
serious illegal detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities all over our country. We know this
because the members of this court encounter them through cases appealed on a daily basis. Many of them
suffer from diseases that they may have contracted because of the conditions of their jails. But they and
their families cannot afford hospitals better than what government can provide them. After all, they remain
in jail because they may not have the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the
creativity of well-networked defense counsel. After all, they may have committed acts driven by the twin
evils of greed or lust on one hand and poverty on the other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to them is often brute, banal, and
canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused, this court has
had no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to set bail where the crime charged carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we have had no difficulty reading the
plain meaning of Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution. With those who are less fortunate in life, there
are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and legal result. In my view, it is not
right, just, and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without clearly articulating why the
Sandiganbayans actions were arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with sufficient compassion. It did not gravely
abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be
tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political accommodation rather than a
judicious consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful public official at the
cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective justice. If it is
meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the administration of justice
because the judicial standards are not clear.
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan hearing these complex and
politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted. Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or
favor, the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the demands of those who have political influence.
After all, in their minds, even if they do what is expected of them, this court may still declare that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the bounds of the Constitution. Our duty is to
ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in difficult cases. This case does not really present any kind
of legal complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is complex only because it is political.

The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our
own opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations
should be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth of knowledge and
experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual formulation of the fundamental
document written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the text of the Constitution will provide us
with a stable anchor despite the potential political controversies that swirl over the legal questions that we
need to decide. It is also this fealty to the text of the Constitution that gives this court the legitimacy as
the final bastion and the ultimate sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from whom all other courts
like the Sandiganbayanshould find inspiration and courage, we should apply the law squarely and
without fear or favor. We should have collectively carried the burden of doing justice properly and denied
this Petition.
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and compassion should never replace
justice. There is injustice when we, as the court of last resort, conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of
enforcing the Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous, deliberate, and conscious analysis of the
issues raised by the parties. There is injustice when we justify the result we want with ambiguous and
unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of this court. It also fails us in our own
humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should be treated by the
Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.