STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

Indias Strategic Shift

From Restraint to Proactivism
Ali Ahmed

In abandoning strategic restraint

in favour of strategic proactivism,
India is transiting from a
strategic doctrine of offensive
deterrence to compellence.
This is not without its dangers
since the military doctrines of
India and Pakistan are presently
coupled in a volatile way. Moving
towards proactivism makes
them altogether combustible.
This makes the strategic logic
of the shift suspect, prompting
speculations as to its inspiration.

The author would like to thank the attendees

at a lecture arranged by the Centre for Studies
in Violence, Memory, and Trauma, Department
of English, University of Delhi, New Delhi, on
9 November 2016, where the views in this
article were discussed.
Ali Ahmed (aliahd66@gmail.com) blogs on
national security issues at www.ali-writings.
blogspot.in.

10

hat India has not articulated its

strategic doctrine in the form of a
national defence white paper
makes its strategic doctrinea states
approach to the use of forcedifficult to
pin down. However, the recent Uri terror
attack episode and its counter by India
in surgical strikes suggest that there is a
tendency from strategic restraint (reticence in the use of force) towards strategic proactivism (a propensity for the use
of force). The government, mindful of
the internal constituency in the run-up
to elections in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab,
has sought to give the military operations along the Line of Control (LoC) the
veneer of a decisive shift.
Perceptive observers, such as former
national security advisor Shivshankar
Menon, reckon that the difference is in
the government now making political
capital from military operations, whereas
the earlier practice was that these were
kept covert (Haidar 2016). However,
from the Bharatiya Janata Partys national general secretarys statement calling for such a shift, it appears India is
not quite there yet (Rajeev 2016). India
is constrained by deficiencies in capability, particularly in military equipment. This prompted for the first time
since Operation Parakram in 200203,
the fast-tracking of a major off-the-shelf
purchase of anti-tank, artillery, and air
ammunition to the tune of `5,000 crore
(Unnithan 2016), followed speedily by
another allocation of `80,000 crore for
acquisitions (Dubey 2016). It appears
India is getting the elements of the shift
in place.
This article examines the shift in the
light of whether it brings about stability
and security, as a viable strategic doctrine ought to. The article looks at the
military doctrines of India and Pakistan,
revealing that, in their interplay, they

form a volatile mix. The shift to strategic

proactivism makes this interplay combustible. Sensing that the shift does not
yield up security, the article concludes
that strategic rationality may not be the
guiding hand of the shift towards proactivism. Instead, rhetoric in the wake of
the surgical strikes must instead be taken
seriously to gauge the inspiration for the
shift. This makes for a worrying conclusion that strategic proactivism is the
influence of cultural nationalism on strategic thinking in India.
Strategic and Military
Doctrine Linkage
A national security doctrine is the overarching thinking of a state making known
what it deems as security. A strategic
doctrine is an offshoot of this on how it
wishes to employ force in the provision
of security for itself and its people.
Broadly, a strategic doctrine rests along
a band on a continuum with the choices
being between accommodation, defence,
deterrence, offence, and compellence. A
strategic doctrine is a necessary first step
for the articulation of lesser doctrines
such as military, nuclear, intelligence, and
information doctrines, and force-related
elements of foreign and internal security
policies. A strategic doctrine helps orchestrate the lesser doctrines for action and
response in the strategic environment.
It serves notice externally, and in its
internal messaging hopefully reassures
the public that national security is in
safe hands.
As late General K Sundarji imagined
it, Indias strategic doctrine serves as the
proverbial elephant being inspected by
the blind men of Hindoostan. It enables
limitless flexibility, going beyond confounding the adversary, to meaning
nothing to instruments of the state looking to it for guidance on writing up
respective doctrines. To illustrate, the
army came up with the so-called cold
start doctrine in the wake of the nearly
year-long mobilisation, Operation Parakram. However, even though organisational and equipping moves duly followed,
the doctrine reportedly failed to receive
governmental imprimatur. Successive

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STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

army chiefs at times suggested that

there is nothing called cold start, and
at others times that the army has the
capability of reaching an operational
readiness within 4872 hours under its
proactive strategy.
Over the last quarter century of being
sorely tried by Pakistan, Indias strategic
doctrine has been located at various
times along the continuum in the segment of deterrence, oscillating between
defensive and offensive deterrence, with
an admixture of accommodationist vibes
thrown in as incentive for Pakistani
good behaviour. However, this confusing mix of postures and actions has provided Pakistans national security establishmentrun by its deep statean
alibi to keep up its hostility. The Pakistani military can but be expected to
solely see the business end of Indias
stick and not any carrots on offer. This
accounts for the periodic crises in India
Pakistan relations. The interplay of military doctrines of the two states imparts
these crises with an escalatory overhang. Even though Indias national security advisor advocates a doctrine of
defensive offense (Neelakantan 2016),
this is likely a misnomer serving to
obfuscate since India is not quite in the
defensive segment of the strategic
doctrinal continuum, but is transiting
from the offensive deterrence segment
towards compellence.
Military Doctrines
Military doctrines can be studied in relation to the spectrum of conflict that can
be imagined as the sub-conventional,
conventional, and nuclear levels arranged vertically atop each other so as to
convey best escalatory ramifications. The
regularity of crises in South Asia has
made the interplay of Indian and Pakistani military doctrines rather well known.
In a nutshell, Pakistani aggressiveness at
the sub-conventional level through its
proxy war is responded to by India
muscling its advantages at the conventional level through its doctrine of proactive operations. Pakistan, wishing to
stymie any gains by conventional forces,
brandishes tactical nuclear weapons
(TNWs). At the nuclear level, India desultorily discusses ridding itself of its No
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NOVEMBER 26, 2016

First Use (NFU) pledge, with the defence

ministers voicing of a personal opinion
on this being the latest instance (Singh
2016). Its official nuclear doctrine continuing to incredibly promise massive
nuclear retaliation, the circuit is complete between jihadis operating at the
lower end and city-busting at the upper
end of the spectrum of conflict.
This tight coupling of the military
doctrines of the two states explains the
speedy telephonic interaction between
the national security advisors of India
and the United States in relation to
Indias surgical strikes. It also explains
the great care with which the Indian
director general of military operations
highlighted the limited intent of the surgical strikes along the LoC in his statement to the press. This recognition of
the dangers is a good thing in itself, but
dangers persist. Indeed, the dangers are
leveraged by the two sides. Whereas
Pakistan includes terror attacks in India
and elsewhere, such as Indian interests
in Afghanistan, in its inventory, India has
possibly expanded its counter to include
as alleged by Pakistanintelligence
operations as far afield as Afghanistan
and Balochistan. Strategic proactivism
is a step further in this direction. Though,
perhaps, intended to make Pakistan
blink first, it might just provoke the
opposite reaction in Pakistan.
The first salvos were fired by Prime
Minister Narendra Modi from the ramparts of the Red Fort this year when,
in the context of the fresh round of
summer disturbance in Kashmir, he
reminded Pakistan of its strategic underside in making a mention of Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir, GilgitBaltistan and
Balochistan. The Uri incident, if seen as
Pakistans reply, was not long in coming.
In response, Indias surgical strikes have
led to an entirely predictable collapse of
the understanding on ceasefire at the
LoC dating to 2003.
Imagining Strategic Proactivism
The three levels of the spectrum of conflictsub-conventional, conventional and
nuclearcan each be subdivided into
two sublevels: lower and upper. At the
sub-conventional level, Pakistan is offensive at both its sublevels, fuelling as it
vol lI no 48

does the Kashmiri militancy at the lower

sublevel and hurling jihadists in terror
attacks at the upper sublevel. India, for
its part, has been suppressive at the
lower sublevel, stopping just short of the
three-figure mark of deaths in Jammu
and Kashmir. At the upper sublevel, it
appears to have been responding in kind
to Pakistani terror attacks through covert
operations along the LoC. The reference
to Balochistan figuring in the joint statement in the Manmohan SinghYousuf
Raza Gilani meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh
as far back as in 2009 indicates that India
has not quite been as inactive on the
intelligence front as it makes it out to be
either. The increased likelihood of future
surgical strikes indicates a fraying of the
sub-conventionalconventional divide,
since these will likely have greater
punch against a more alert adversary.
Likewise, at the conventional level,
India is primed to unleash limited offensives by the pivotostensibly defensivecorps at the lower sublevel. At the
upper sublevel, the military exercises it
undertakes each year indicate that it has
not abjured from strike corps operations. Even though it claims to be cognisant of Pakistani nuclear thresholds,
ordinarily strike corps have the weight
and punch triggering Pakistani nuclear
redlines. In response, Pakistan has
unveiled its TNWs, pushing the war into
the nuclear level. Thus, while India is
forthrightly offensive at both the sublevels, at the upper sublevel, Pakistan obliterates the firebreak at the conventional
nuclear level. Alongside, in war, there
would be intelligence and information
war operations only serving to sandwich
the two levelssub-conventional and
conventionalinto a hybrid war unsparing of populations.
The nuclear level can also be similarly
subdivided into two sublevels. Pakistan
has advertised its vertical proliferation,
messaging thereby that it has a second
strike capabilitythe ability to strike
back even if its nuclear capability is targeted in a degrading attackanchored
in its higher numbers. In effect, South
Asia is in its era of mutually assured
destruction (MAD). The upper sublevel
comprises mutual nuclear suicide. The
lower sublevel can be imagined as
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STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

nuclear exchanges short of this involving lower order nuclear exchange(s).

Since a MAD situation does not permit
India the luxury of following through
with its official nuclear doctrine predicated on extensive nuclear targeting,
India may well be having a confidential
operational nuclear doctrine envisaging
nuclear warfighting. This is not altogether for the worse, since it enables
nuclear war termination at lower thresholds than after counter-city exchanges.
Nevertheless, it shows one side mirroring the offensiveness of the other.
Essentially, what has occurred is that
the increase in the offensive content and
intent in strategic doctrines of the two
states, as reflected in their respective
military doctrines over this century, has
led to greater instability and insecurity.
While India shifted to proactive offensive at the conventional level, Pakistan
went offensive at the conventional
nuclear divide with its TNWs. Indias
current-day shift obliterates the divide
bet ween the sub-conventional and conventional levels. In the main, strategic
restraint was, in India, keeping a check
on itself at the conventional level. Deeming from the terror attacks in Gurdaspur,
Pathankot, and Uri, that this has not
paid dividend, it intends to be proactive
at the upper end of the sub-conventional
level. Thus, the two divides between the
three levels that could have served as
firebreaks now stand erased.
Is South Asia More Secure?
There are two parts to Indias new Pakistan strategy: the first is to project irrationality la Nixon, and the second goes
by the term escalation dominance strategy. The shift to proactivism implies
mounting the tiger with little leeway for
getting off unscathed. India is projecting
that it has stepped on the accelerator,
and thrown away the keys and the steering wheel. This is intended to ensure that
Pakistan steers away. It is to frighten Pakistan that, by abandoning strategic rationality which informed its strategic restraint, India has taken its gloves off. In so
far as this is a well thought through strategy to deter the other side, this is not outside the realm of strategic rationality. It
goes by the term strategy of irrationality.
12

The second part is to acquire such military muscle at all levels so that India can
choose to punish Pakistan at the level of
its choice, leaving Pakistan no leeway to
escape punishment by upping the ante.
Since it would suffer like punishment at
the higher level too, Pakistan is expected
to throw in the towel.
The problem with the first part is
that irrationality is a better strategy for
a weaker side. A stronger side normally
should be able to point to its strengths.
For India to reinforce the strategy of irrationality with surgical strikes in domains
other than security, such as the currently
unfolding demonetisation episode, suggests an inapt adaptation of the strategy
of irrationality. On the other hand,
Pakistan, as the weaker power, has resorted
to a projection of irrationality. Its initiation of the Kargil intrusion is a case in
point. Though it did take care to intrude
in an insignificant area, enabling India to
limit its counter, to rely on Pakistani
strategic rationality to sensibly veer off
on espying the Indian juggernaut is to put
ones eggs into a Pakistani basket. Earlier,
Indias sobriety reflected in its strategic
restraint was a good foil for Pakistan,
but now with both states mirroring each
others irrationality, South Asia can be
likened to a nuclear tinderbox.
As regards escalation dominance, first,
it is questionable as to whether India
has the strategic wherewithal to think
through such a strategy. Its national security instruments are far too disjointed to
put together such a complex strategy.
Second, even if strategic rationality in
the conservativerealist perspective is
conceded to Indias strategic minders,
the baleful influence of their ideological
masters cannot be discounted. The latter
may not be seeking security and stability, but are liable to be engaging in their
imagination in a millennial struggle.
Therefore, it is not the weaker side that
might consider upping the ante, as the
escalation dominance strategy foretells,
but an India that is out to impose its own
version of shock and awe.
The answer to the question as to
whether regional and national security are
better served is by now self-evident. Strategists on the Indian payroll have apparently not worked this out. Clearly, other

influences are at play. Doctrine-making

is never left to professional strategists,
but is an intensely political exercise. Paying attention to the defence ministers
remarks on the cultural nationalist
inspiration of proactivism provides a
hint (Times of India 2016). By this yardstick, strategic proactivism is only chimerically about external security in relation to Pakistan and its internal security
blowback in Kashmir. Instead, structural
proactivism is the cultural nationalist
imprint on national security.
References
Dubey, Ajit Kumar (2016): Defence Minister
Manohar Parrikar Clears Defence Deals Worth
`80,000 Crore, Mail Today, 8 November,
viewed on 15 November 2016, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/parrikar-clears-defencedeals-worth-rs-80000-crore/1/ 805088.html.
Haidar, Suhasini (2016): Earlier Cross-LoC Strikes
Had Different Goals: Former NSA, Hindu,
12 October, viewed on 15 October 2016, http://
www.thehindu.com/news/national/formernational-security-adviser-shiv-shankar-menonon-crossloc-strikes/article9208838.ece.
Neelakantan, Shailaja (2016): When NSA Ajit
Doval Outlined Indias New Pak StrategyDefensive OffensePerfectly, Times of India,
4 October, viewed on 15 November 2016,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
When-NSA-Ajit-Doval-outlined-Indias-newPakistan-strategy-defensive-offense-perfectly/
articleshow/54670600.cms.
Rajeev, K R (2016): Time for Strategic Restraint
Over, Says Ram Madhav, Times of India, 18
September, viewed on 20 October 2016, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Time-forstrategic-restraint-over-says-Ram-Madhav/
articleshow/54393643.cms.
Singh, Sushant (2016): Manohar Parrikar Questions Indias No-first-use Nuclear Policy, Adds
My Thinking, Indian Express, 11 November
2016, viewed on 15 November 2016, http://
indianexpress.com/article/india/india-newsindia/manohar-parrikar-questions-no-firstuse-nuclear-policy-adds-my-thinking-4369062/.
Times of India (2016): RSS Teaching May Have
Been at Core of Surgical Strike Decision: Manohar Parrikar, 17 October, viewed on 15 November 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/RSS-teaching-may-have-been-at-coreof-PoK-raid-decision-Manohar-Parrikar/articleshow/ 54900927.cms.
Unnithan, Sundeep (2016): Preparing for the
Worst, India Today, 27 October, viewed on
30 October 2016, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/
story/ministry-of-defence-ammunition-procurement-indian-army-cag/1/796684.html.

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