Statutory Construction on People's Initiative

Statutory Construction
"innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and

1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of threefourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter
discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA,
and
MARIA
ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for
Reforms,
Modernization
and
Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.

Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
(hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
SENATOR
RAUL
S.
ROCO,
DEMOKRASYAIPAGTANGGOL
ANG
KONSTITUSYON
(DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD
INTEGRITY
AND
NATIONALISM,
INC.
(MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN
NG
DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over
the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation;
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of

the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a

petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this
system of initiative was unknown to the people of this
country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the
drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional
Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the
main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or
Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member

of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens
desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement
and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted
under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings
1
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify
the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before
the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for
the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the
COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the
electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the
said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures
shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and
local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in

the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions

sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of
the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a
"Petition
for
Initiative
on
the
1987
10
Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of
the provisions concerning term limits, and with the
following proposition:
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996,

the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers,
and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of
the
Philippines
(IBP),
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on
that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith

given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC,
through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin
"to cause the publication of the petition, together with the
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including
the
proposal,
proposed
constitutional
amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation
at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and
(b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at
10:00 a.m.
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL

ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF
ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin

and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first

be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator

Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
2
Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition
raising the following arguments:
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January

1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of
the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to

amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in
fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative,
which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November
1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the

Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people's initiative.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems
of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike
in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former
Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law
in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be
considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for

people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for
prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the
national treasury for general re-registration of voters
amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the
millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of
the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of
a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the
law after publication in print media. This indicates that the
Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY

ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC
IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO
ITS
"INITIATORY
JURISDICTION"
UPHELD
BY
THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the

respondents to comment on the petition within a nonextendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS

THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE
TO
PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS
TO
THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE
BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty

Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue
therein that:
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON

JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY
AND
JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL
USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO

THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN
BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED
TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER
DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.

1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE
COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE
OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
IS
NOT
A
"REVISION"
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT
ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION.
REVISION
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE
DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097
PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra

vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the
conduct
of
an
election,
plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735,
which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of,
but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks
to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does
not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in

his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an
assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to
a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . .
which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6
December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory
Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature
campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the
movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners,
Delfin maintains as follows:
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters,

Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure.
Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous
with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
requirements for initiative will be a priority government
expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law,

R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle
for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not
requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed

also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General
contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of
Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that
power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three
systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that

the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
5
and defines the same as the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later

than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is

not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in
scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang

Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their
Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend
that:
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a

material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(1)
The
Delfin
proposal
does
not
involve
a
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and
although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it
can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political
dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot
be
done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a

mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election
Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement
the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and

the limits provided for all other national and local elective
officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to
open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands
of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro

tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents
through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation
stating that he is the counsel for private respondents
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed
was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for
Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco
6
good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient

standard for a valid delegation of power.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of

initiative,
particularly
in
a
conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that
may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied
with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a
premium for good performance. 20
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling
law that implements the people's right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored
the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends
that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory
pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the
Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which
is signedby the required number of registered voters. He
also submits that the proponents of a constitutional
amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of
the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative
on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the
sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and
supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be

called
the
enabling
law
that
implements
the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It
fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of
gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3%
per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the
role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures
and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any
decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and
(g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for
a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to

Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to
which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the
following arguments:
7
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Funds
Therefor,
was
intended
to
include
or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if
so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the

required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

(In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum
on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on
the conduct of such initiative.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in

that it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the
Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention. 22
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and

local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a)

granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and
MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended
Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions
in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring
the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid
Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its
Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of
three days from notice, and the respondents to comment
thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from
receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has

jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an
order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature
stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication
of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties

argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised
in the pleadings so far filed:
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to

submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within
twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to
submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a

System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
8
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention
wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the
main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should
have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure
or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties

paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is
proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil
action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being
so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule
65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper
remedy.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of

portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill
No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes
on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ

issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to
an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case
the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive
and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent
climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for
judicial statesmanship.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their

Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties
thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due
course to this special civil action.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional

law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the
Supreme
Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount
majesty of the Constitution. 25
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we

shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.
I
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the

COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY

IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
thereon evidently because after having heard the
arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12
December 1996, it required them to submit within five days
their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or
specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due
course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and
its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and
viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65

of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in
his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities
of
procedure
in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of

any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT
IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
because the said petition is not supported by the required
minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN
also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not
contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a
10
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin

Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
stated:
After several interpellations, but before the period of

amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation
of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section
2; thus:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.

Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action,
in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional
action.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we

respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose

amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1

of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by
the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee
Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section
reads as follows:
This completes the blanks appearing in the original

Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for
carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

may be proposed:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory

questions.
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of

all its members; or
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition

of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the
11
provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand,
therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?
the people for ratification through the process of an

initiative.
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for

as long as the legislature does not pass the necessary
implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the

intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the
people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the

committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget
appropriations which would have to be legislated so that
the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this
matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In
any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the
power of initiative can be called until after five years from
the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore,
the first amendment that could be proposed through the
exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It
is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the
National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules
governing the exercise of this power.
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of
the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in
terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would
the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other
legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in
the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of
all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great
deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the
amendments of the Constitution?
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature

the details on how this is to be carried out is it possible
that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility

because even the legislature itself as a body could propose
that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it
fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute
itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy

of constituent power we have a separate article in the
constitution that would specifically cover the process and
the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
12
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the
provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining
the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's
initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we

clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to
the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very

well be placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not
unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics
that would adequately cover all the conceivable
situations. 33
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting

to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section
1 to include the process of revision; whereas theprocess of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
It was made clear during the interpellations that the

aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND
not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned

in the Committee. 35
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the

theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has
to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter

introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to
substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the
proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople,
de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as
follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in
the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable
to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2
as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting
it up as another separate section as if it were a selfexecuting provision?
13
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the

determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive
right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to
be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair
the right conceded here.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the
proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained in
Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we
accept the proposed amendment. 36
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the

procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified

amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified

amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is

it possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's

proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment."
Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
37
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and

"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments"
not "revision." 38
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not

prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words,
the implementation of this particular right would be subject
to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process

of proposing amendments through initiative must be more
rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
14
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this
proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of
three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would
require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue
of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the
process of amendment must be made more rigorous and
difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly
by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the Committee,
and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way
of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on
plenary sessions. 39
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS

CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions
was
approved
on
second
reading
on
9
July
41
1986. Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration,
Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved
on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent"
to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the
phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said
paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This
amendment was approved and is the text of the present
second paragraph of Section 2.
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were

subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3
against, reads as follows:
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system

of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as

amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the

exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
15
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence
or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph
of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
local government units. The Bicameral Conference

Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50and by the House
of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No.
6735.
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation

of the exercise of this right.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and
duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"
with
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent

COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said
section reads:
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress

of a power to provide for the rules implementing the
exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how
[the right] is to be carried out." 46
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people

under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,

intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the
House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with
the
initiative
and
referendum
mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum
under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and
initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative
and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a

delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
16
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only
do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact

that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No.
17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local
initiative and referendum and appropriately used the
phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in
whole or in part." 52
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than

one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the

Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative,
and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike
in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative

and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence
as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local
laws.
(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be;
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on

amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative
and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
17
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is
"local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can
pass.
This
classification
of
initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the
Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:
therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which

reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by
majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to
indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's

organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. . . .
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of

the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and localinitiative and
referendum.
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition

proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there
should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. 53
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts"

under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the

subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall

prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null
18
and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure.
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative

body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably
act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as
a consequence thereof;
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence

and care in providing for the details in the implementation
of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation
thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather
intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on
national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the

petition and the contents of the petition;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through

its official in the local government unit concerned as to
whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and
the required number of votes for its approval;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the

submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified
therein;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the

proposition;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the

Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines; and
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the

proposition. 55
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the

Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in
Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of
initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of

signatures of registered voters for the petition;
19
process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d)
reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number
of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for
the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body

exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority
under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is
one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. 62
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more

important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No.
6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735
is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be

delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions
to the rule are as follows:
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS
VOID.
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly

promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
60
20
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b)
a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.
theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable

by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of
the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such
petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63(2) to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and
(4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits,
and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election. 66
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the
right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under

R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No.
2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely
entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative
district is represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain
signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself
admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in
his drive to gather signatures. Without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of

whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective
national and local officials is an amendment to, and not
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for

initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
21
a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if
not academic.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December

1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
CONCLUSION
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC

should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan,
Padilla, J., took no part.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept
in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that
system.
Separate Opinions
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed

colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect
to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be
dismissed. With due respect:
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of

the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to
the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
I
22
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the
right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the
meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of
the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is
critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and the
controlling factor in its interpretation. 1 Stated otherwise,
intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to
its enactment. 2
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential

system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw
the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative powers between the Legislature and the
Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the
Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a republican
state where sovereignty resides in the people and all
sovereignty emanates from them.
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A.

No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this
intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was
a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No.
17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or
Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by
the Local Legislative Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No.
17 did not include people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator)
Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks: 6
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still

preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize direct
action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution,
the Constitution recognizes the power of the people,
through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve
powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the
same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest
possible time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to
share its legislative powers with the people.
xxx xxx xxx

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other

hand, vests in the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon
petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of
registered voters.
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder

on the constitutional basis of the proposed measure.
23
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's
response to the duty imposed on Congress to implement
the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system
of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited
Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in
the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports
of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in

American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said,
is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the
Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and
recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw the
system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he
claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even
as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws
which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and
liberties.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that

pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later
submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as
part of his sponsorship speech.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative

and referendum as advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He
stated that:
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar

to those contained in the instant Bill among which are the
constitutions of states in the United States which recognize
the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of
any statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in
a referendum. These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political

judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the general
electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely;
the initiative to amend the Constitution once every five
years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind

of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is also
without limitation, except for emergency measures, which
are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the
petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define rules and
regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent
of the people on measures that they have approved.
24
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a
referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting a
petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of
registered voters at which every legislative district is
represented by at least three percent of the registered
voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition,
the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the
petition, publish the same, and set the date of the
referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been
clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever since,
especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A
substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that
the form of democracy is there, but not the reality or
substance of it because of the increasingly elitist approach
of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution
has provided a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article
VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is

approved by the required number of votes, it shall become
effective 15 days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is

needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions. While
the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he
continued, it will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid
the government in forming an enlightened public opinion,
and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of
the Bill will also give street parliamentarians the
opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic forum,
he added.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed

that the Members cannot ignore the people's call for
initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared
text of his speech together with the footnotes be
reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed
by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture)
Salvador Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz: 7
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the
early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used for
the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House
Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside
their personal and political consideration for the greater
good of the people.
xxx xxx xxx

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
25
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference
Committee. 8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989, 9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be
consolidated and that the consolidated version should
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the
meeting states:
the court of its jurisdiction to declare it null and void for

want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of
local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence
namin, so we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so
ang sa inyo naman includes iyon sa Constitution,
amendment to the Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa
amin, if you insist on that, alright, although we feel na it will
in effect become a dead statute. Alright, and we can agree,
we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, and magiging basic
nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and magiging
basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is
the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una
iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the
Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh.
Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong
features ng national at saka constitutional, okay. ____
gagawin na natin na consolidation of both bills.
xxx xxx xxx

CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said,
because this is new in our political system, the Senate
decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to
the local government units because even with that stage
where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It has
been attempted on a national basis. Alright. There has not
been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And,
second, we consider also that it is only fair that the local
legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the
legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative
assembly or body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto,
there ought to be any reason for initiative, ano for initiative.
And, number 3, we feel that there should be some
limitation on the frequency with which it should be applied.
Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot enact any
ordinance that is beyond the scope of authority of the local
legislative body, otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng
power that is broader and greater than the grant of
legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition which has been the
result of a successful initiative can only carry the force and
effect of an ordinance and therefore that should not deprive
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.

CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and
House Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for
approval, then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by
Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
record of the House Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE.
Camarines Sur is recognized.
26
The
Gentleman
from
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which
refers to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated
the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are
totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for
local
initiative
and
referendum
and
the
House
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and
referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in

consonance with the provision of the Constitution whereby
it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that
we shall have a system which can be done every five years.
Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative

and referendum both in the constitutional amendment and
national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO.
resolutions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the

Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a
few questions?
And
provincial
as
well
as
municipal
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional

amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please

proceed.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only

difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version
there was a provision for local initiative and referendum,
whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple

initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial
difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for

local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate
which, as I said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial
and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two

provisions were incorporated?
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?

27
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL
OF
ON
S.B.
NO.
17
AND
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
H.B.
NO.
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people

under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(emphasis supplied)
C.C.R.
21505
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to

approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505.
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the

people to propose amendments to the constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called
for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process
by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the

motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to
implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it
was intended by the legislature. We have ruled that once
intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling
is as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a
law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the
manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for

initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that
"(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least threeper
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states
that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably

construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need
not torture the text of said law to reach the conclusion that
it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative
of the people.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the

amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in
an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite.
First, the policy statement declares:
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a

strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent
28
which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it
laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor
relevant to the policy thrust of section 2 and that the
statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable
English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills
with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose
like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good
policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the
ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente
Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which
have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or
inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if
the legislative intention can be ascertained. The same is
equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or
ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions and
words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a
construction necessitates a departure from the literal
meaning of the words used.
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that

refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No.
6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. It blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete
that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter
of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the
stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting
Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in
accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of
R.A. No. 6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The
Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of
power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case
of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given
the weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory
construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters
and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of
interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled
to very little weight, and they can never control the plain
terms of the enacting clauses. 14
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the

Government the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) to fix standard
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
29
necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how
initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC
should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a
proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be
held, 22 when the amendment takes effect 23 and what
matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any
measure, these standards are adequate.
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory

declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law,
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is
worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a

sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of
the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy
and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient
standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative
power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In
enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress
totally transferred its power to enact the law implementing
people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the
procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving
life to the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear
that the rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative
can be delegated, thus:
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not

meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation
of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the
standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's
implementing rules and regulations of the law. As
aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz:
"The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance
with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No.
6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to
the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it

is possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
30
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not
prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to

another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has
prudentially refrained from invalidating administrative rules
on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to
guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former
Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to
locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it
can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words,

the implementation of this particular right would be subject
to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive
the right conceded here.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the

procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a

particular standard to which orders of the military
commander are to conform, or require findings to be made
as a prerequisite to any order. But the Executive Order, the
Proclamations and the statute are not to be read in isolation
from each other. They were parts of a single program and
must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an
adoption by Congress of the Executive Order and of the
Proclamations. The Proclamations themselves followed a
standard authorized by the Executive Order the necessity
of protecting military resources in the designated areas
against espionage and sabotage.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution
Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to
questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the
extent of the power of the legislature over the process: it
could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also
authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the
authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide
concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive
the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition
against the legislature is to impair the substantive right of
the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is
not, however, prohibited from legislating the procedure to
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are brightlined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss
them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible
ink. The policy and standards can also be found in no less
than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold
31
that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are
insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate
more general standards such as "simplicity and
dignity," 30 "public interest," 31"public welfare," 32 "interest
of law and order," 33 "justice and equity," 34 "adequate and
efficient
instruction," 35"public
safety," 36 "public
37
38
policy", "greater national interest", "protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump
rates", 39 and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency
in government." 40 A due regard and respect to the
legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of
government, should counsel this Court to refrain from
refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against

the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is
that they are founding members of the PIRMA which
proposes to undertake the signature drive for people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA
itself as an organization was not impleaded as a
respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the
Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive
for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On
December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas
". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative
to amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority
to lift the temporary restraining order against the Pedrosas.
It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt
against them without equivocation.
III
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that

in soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in
any criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right
guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the
principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of
the people and their voice is part of the voice of the people.
They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but
no power can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he

dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the
Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records
show that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin
alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the
petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and
was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was
heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin
petition, the case at bar was filed by the petitioners with
this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin,
Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original
action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the

Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their
32
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political and economic decision-making
shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This
is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution
strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people.
In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the
Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making
process of our people. The Constitution says their right
cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put
a question mark on their right.
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is

change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people
power as expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On October 5,
1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth
but an article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September
30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted
to check excesses of government and that any effort to
trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be
rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . .
this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every
effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate
exercise."43 Just a few days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a
unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in
Caloocan City involving the mayor and ordered that he
submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of
the tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have succeeded in
transforming people power from an opaque abstraction to a
robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people
empowerment to blossom in full. The Court cannot halt any
and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution
without setting back the flowering of people empowerment.
More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people
who are pro-change but not those who are anti-change
without concerting the debate on charter change into a
sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and
not by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim
any infallibility.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas'

campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise of their
freedom of speech and expression and their right to
petition the government for redress of grievances. We have
memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental
laws from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution.
We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom
of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important
rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech
enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and
let think. For this reason, the Constitution encourages
speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit
signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A.
6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no
Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status
quo. To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there
are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of
progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

33
would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect,
to the COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to
schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to
cause the necessary publication of the petition "in
newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct
"Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:

The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin
Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the
part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on
all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What
is essential at this time would only be to resolve whether or
not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty.
Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a
people initiative certain modifications on the 1987
Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed
amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article
XVII, thereof provides:
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the

Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under
the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin
petition and must not be so understood as having intended
or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those
who reign are the governed themselves. The postulate is no
longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable
reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of
government lies not so much in the strength of those who
lead as in the consent of those who are led. The role of free
speech is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if it
comes with the correlative end of being heard.

thereafter.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient

in form and substance, it behooves the Court, I most
respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has
effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional
provision on right of the people to directly propose
constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated

The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of
complying with the constitutional imperatives, the petition
34
by the Court at this point would at best be only a nonbinding, albeit possibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates that
Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
constitutional
amendments,
because
constitutional
amendments take effect upon ratification not after
publication. 3
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and
for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did
not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to
campaign for constitutional amendments.
which
allegation
manifests
petitioners'
selective
interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr.
Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written
ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view
that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved

by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be construed together with the other
parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No.
6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative
intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute
as a whole. 5
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in

the people and all government authority emanates from
them. 1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987
Constitution has given more significance to this declaration
of principle for the people are now vested with power not
only to propose, enact or reject any act or law passed by
Congress or by the local legislative body, but to propose
amendments to the constitution as well. 2 To implement
these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted
Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative
and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply covers
an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view
maintained by petitioners is based principally on the
alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the
constitution and on their allegation that:
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines

initiative as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact
legislations
through
an
election
called
for
the
purpose". 6The same section, in enumerating the three
systems of initiative, included an "initiative on the
constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the constitution" 7 Paragraph (e) again of
Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by
35
which an initiative on the constitution is approved or
rejected by the people" And as to the material
requirements for an initiative on the Constitution, Section
5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact

in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the House of Representatives
correctly provided for initiative and referendum an the
Constitution and on national legislation.
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must

of the registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five years thereafter.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.

MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the
Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a
few questions?
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress

the intent being to provide for the implementation of the
right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way
of initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously
said, "must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage,
and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding
nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever
thereon". 8 That this is the legislative intent is further
shown by the deliberations in Congress, thus:
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?

MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please
proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only
difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version
there was a provision for local initiative and referendum,
whereas the House version has none.
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of

the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
was noted:
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for

local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the

disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the
consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the
system providing for the initiative and referendum,
fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the

two provisions were incorporated?
36
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative
and referendum both in the constitutional amendment and
national legislation.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission

on Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as
those contained in the Commission's orders dated
December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1])
indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over
private respondents' petition. This is so because from the
tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that
proof of procurement of the required percentage of
registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is
filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.

MR. ALBANO.
resolutions?
And
provincial
as
well
as
municipal
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in
consonance with the provision of the Constitution to enact
the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can
be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional

amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five
years." (Id. [Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960; quoted in
Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994];
emphasis supplied)
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the

required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is
without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once
compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily
shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of
an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections,
any determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have

comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included
initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws. 9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on
the constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners
foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached

in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate"
legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose
37
amendments to the Constitution. I, however, register my
concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private
respondents' petition for initiative before public respondent
Commission on Elections until the same be supported by
proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
6735.
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the

Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any
petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most
respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me
explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the
Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all
through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma,
not by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country
acting together. This decision will effectively but
unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile
the people's right to change the basic law. At the very
least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional
discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it,
when there is already one existing at present. This right to
amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed
by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.,
writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the "initiatory" Delfin
Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be
directly proposed by the people through initiative," there is
no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
"incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned."

thereafter.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes

rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void."
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too
sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning
the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the
patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an

initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district
no public funds may be spent and no government
38
preempt any future effort to exercise the right of
initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin
Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a
ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to
do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991.

Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to
govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not
by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then
composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms.
Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores,
Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired
from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile
motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and
exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our
people.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution,

RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to
Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the
majority openly concedes intended by the legislature to
cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. 1 I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly
consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on
Elections, 2 that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be)
liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate
and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any
"effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected."
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in

regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis
for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted
properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art.
XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300
provide more than sufficient authority to implement,
effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution.
Petitioner
Delfin
and
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
No law can completely and absolutely cover all

administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely
empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the
the
Pedrosa
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the

temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and
the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative.
39
In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against
private respondents should not have been issued, in the
first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be
stopped from using public funds and government resources
to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this
Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their
right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech
and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and
persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the
eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you
say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." After
all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but
as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we
hate." 5
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D.

Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission on
Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by
the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining
order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits
Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from
exercising their right to free speech in proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
G.R. No. 109404
January 22, 1996
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the

name
E
&
S
Delta
Village, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M.
DRILON,
HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
(HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my
Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the worldadmired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites,
they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They
are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as
their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism,
inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their
reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability
and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the
one hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck
down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be
carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal
justification for the non-payment of amortizations by a
buyer on installment under land purchase agreements
entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"?
This is the major question raised in the instant Petition
seeking to set aside the Decision of the respondent
Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No.
3761, which affirmed the order of the respondent HLURB
dated September 1, 1987.
40
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on
installment
basis
from
petitioner
and
his
coowner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta
Village in Quezon City.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed

the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to
complete the subdivision development and to reinstate
private respondent's purchase contract over one lot, and as
to the other, "it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 269546 has been issued to . . . spouses Rodolfo and
Ad(e)lina Relevo . . . , the management of E & S Delta
Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the
complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all
payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal
rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid."
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA

Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village
Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing
Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter
alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making
further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned
by him.
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed

the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been
filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending,
private respondent filed with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint
(Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo
and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA
resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations, but
that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said
spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property
was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he
suspended his payments because of petitioner's failure to
develop the village.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals

from judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the
President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . "
However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case,
which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half
years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the
said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to

the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the

Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in
concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta
Village justified private respondent's non-payment of his
amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land
purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to
the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern
the transaction.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision

upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the contract with
private respondent and dismissed private respondent's
complaint.
41
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent
Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that
P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even
those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over

helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations
and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers", and such intent is nowhere
expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent
portions of which read as follows:
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its

entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its

inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement
and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving
their quality of life;
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from
the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to
remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading
authority on statutory construction stressed:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate

subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers
have reneged on their representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other
similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health
and safety of home and lot buyers;
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital

part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is
the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of
the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute
when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. . . . In construing statutes the proper
course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best
with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the legislature. 1 (emphasis
supplied.)
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases

of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or
titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real
estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision
lots to different innocent purchasers for value;2 (emphasis
supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest
and unarguable that the legislative intent must have been
to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957
operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in
existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social

justice, the law must favor the weak and the
disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers
and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no
42
prospective application of the statute will effectively
emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise
its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and
practices perpetrated under or in connection with those
contracts and transactions which happen to have been
entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to
the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by
said law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative
authority intended to permit such a loophole to remain and
continue to be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers
well into the future.
provided in the preceding section within two years from the

date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed
in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or, developer to comply with the
obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall
constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39
of this Decree.
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment
payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be
forfeited in favor of the owner or developer, when the
buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists
from further payment due to the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the subdivision or condominium
project according to the approved plans and within the time
limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his
option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including
amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests,
with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied)
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D.

957 as a whole are certain of its provisions, viz., Sections
20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have
retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts
and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. Every owner or
developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development, including water supply and lighting facilities,
which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision
or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed
matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one
year from the date of the issuance of the license for the
subdivision or condominium project or such other period of
time as may be fixed by the Authority.
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive

Secretary, the application of P.D. 957 to the contracts in
question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the
contracts themselves, which expressly provides:
(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to
subdivide, develop and improve the entire area covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels
of lands subject of this contract is a part in accordance with
the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66 and
the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision

lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the
effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the
owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium
project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as
43
with and abide by all laws, rules and regulations respecting
the subdivision and development of lots for residential
purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be
required by laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines
or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the
General Registration Office and other government
agencies. (emphasis supplied)
General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by

private respondent had been effectively condoned by the
petitioner, by reason of the latter's tolerance of the defaults
for a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that
respondent Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering
the refund of private respondent's payments on Lot 12
although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the
subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted
that the supporting documents submitted substantiating
the claim of non-development justified such order inasmuch
as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of
amortizations on said Lot 12.
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the

contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had
been properly invoked by private respondent when he
desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to
petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project
according to the approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. (Such incomplete
development of the subdivision and non-performance of
specific contractual and statutory obligations on the part of
the subdivision-owner had been established in the findings
of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the
respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.)
Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due
weight to the following matters: although private
respondent started to default on amortization payments
beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he had
already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments,
nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation
option available to him under the contract, did not exercise
or utilize the same in timely fashion but delayed until May
1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the
contracts. But by that time the land purchase agreements
had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957,
promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out
by respondent HLURB and seconded by the Solicitor
Finally, since petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the

(Executive Secretary's) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was
filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision
had become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987,
which provides that "(d)ecisions/ resolutions/orders of the
Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided
for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof . . . , unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period."
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the petition is DENIED due course and is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Davide
Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
44
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO,
As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA
SERNA.
JR.,
as
complainant
all
private
prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO,
GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES
and MODESTO S SUELLO,respondents.
against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen

informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the
present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon,
province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a
portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed
and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to
the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease
Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has
been and is still against the win of the offended party; did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat
and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said
cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the
pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the
land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to the said applicantpossessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree
No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies
to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on
August 20, 1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence
or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or
possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be
punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to
one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more
than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd
paragraph is omitted.)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo

Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello
were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves,
Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833
and 1839, respectively).
Before
the
accused
could
be
arraigned,
Judge
Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated
December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the
grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered
the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the
decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio

R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information
45
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence
or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule
of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land.
Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the

Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation
Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City
and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions
including buildings on and along esteros and river banks,
those along railroad tracks and those built without permits
on public and private property." squatting is still a major
problem in urban communities all over the country;
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations

by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression
"with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the
ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The
fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and
that the amended informations be admitted.
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been

unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
affluent class;
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the

phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not
include agricultural purposes because its preamble does
not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes
reference to the affluent class.
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the

government's drive against this illegal and nefarious
practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers
to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is
complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which
provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of
public health, safety and peace and order.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this

Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of
merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree
does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating
complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on

public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in
this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes
it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to
forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law
provides:
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation

or association to enter or occupy, through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public
agriculture land including such public lands as are granted
to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the

issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2,
1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public
Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the
46
Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture
lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the
corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing
the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or
for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or
force another to commit such acts.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant

Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Antonio M.
Martinez for petitioner.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not

exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
ESGUERRA, J.:
Carlos J. Valdez & Associates for respondent.
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals

reversing the Commissioner of Customs' decision holding
respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc., (formerly the
Standard-Vacuum
Refining
Corporation
(Phil.)
and
hereinafter referred to as ESSO) liable in the total sum of
P775.62 as special import tax on certain articles imported
by the latter under Republic Act No. 387, otherwise known
as the Petroleum Act of 1949.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)

invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here,
the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool
of statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No.

2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum
refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of
Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years
following
the
granting
of
any
concession,
the
concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all
equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and
accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the
special import tax (which it paid under protest) on the
following separate importations:
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed.

No costs.
SO ORDERED. Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad
Santos, J., concur.
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
ESSO
STANDARD
EASTERN,
INC.,
(Formerly:
Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent.
1) One carton, scientific instruments with C & F value of

assessed a special import tax in the amount of P31.98
(Airport Protest No. 10);
47
2) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $221.56;
assessed special import tax in the amount of P43.82
The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed

the decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs
and ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to respondent
ESSO which the latter had paid under protest. 4
3) One carton of valves with C & F value of $310.58;

This decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is now before this

Court for review.
4) One box of parts for Conversion boilers and Auxiliary

Equipment with C & F value of $2,389.69; assessed special
import tax in the amount of P467.00 (Airport Protest No.
15);
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under

Republic Act No. 1394 is separate and distinct from the
customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code,
and that the exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from
the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of
1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the
special import tax provided in R.A. No. 1394. 5
5) One carton of X-ray films with C & F value of $132.80;

(Airport Protest No. 16); and
For its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale:
6) One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $750.39;

(Airport Protest No. 17). 1
A perusal of the provisions of R.A. No. 1394 will show that

the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax
distinct from customs duties as witness the fact that
Section 2(a) of the said law made separate mention of
customs duties and special import tax when it provided that
... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein,
the total revenue derived from the customs duties and from
the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the
United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds
from the exchange tax imposed under Republic Act
Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such
goods, articles or products during the calendar year 1955,
the President may, by proclamation, suspend the reduction
of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar
year ....
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that

respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special
import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended
by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest. 2
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the
Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of Customs who,
on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector
of Customs. 3
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the
Court of Tax Appeals for review of the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs.
48
If it were the intention of Congress to exempt the holders of
petroleum refinery concessions like the protestant
(respondent herein), such exemption should have been
clearly stated in the statute. Exemptions are never
presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest and
most unambiguous language and not left to mere
implication. 6
products imported or brought into the Philippines" in

explicit and unambiguous terms simply means customs
duties. It is hardly necessary to add that "customs duties"
are simply taxes assessed on merchandise imported from,
or exported to a foreign country.
And being a charge upon importation, the special import
tax is essentially a customs duty, or at least partakes of the
character thereof.
Specifically, petitioner in his brief submitted two

assignment of errors allegedly committed by the Court of
Tax Appeals in the controverted decision, to wit:
Citing numberous American decisions and definitions of

terms "customs duties," "duties," "imposts," "levies," "tax,"
and "tolls," and their distinctions, including some
pronouncements of this Court on the subject, the Court of
Tax Appeals in its decision, went to great lengths to show
that the term "special import tax" as used in R.A. No. 1394
includes customs duties. It sees the special import tax as
nothing but an impost or a charge on the importation or
bringing into the Philippines of goods, articles or products. 7
1st assignment of error:

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TERM "CUSTOMS DUTY" IN ARTICLE 103 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 387 INCLUDES THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX IMPOSED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1394;
2nd assignment of error:
To clinch its theory the Court of Tax Appeals cited the

similarity in the basis of computation of the customs duty
as well as the similarity in the phraseology of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 1394 (which established the special import
tax) and Section 9-01 of the Tariff & Customs code (the
basic law providing for and regulating the imposition of
customs duties and imposts on importations). 8
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF CUSTOMS DUTIES UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX.
On the other hand, the Court of Tax Appeals rationalized the
ground for its ruling thus:
For its part, private respondent, ESSO, in its answer to the

petition, leaned heavily on the same arguments as those
given by the Tax Court, the burden of which is that the
special import tax law is a customs law. 9
If we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and obvious

meaning of words in consonance with settled rules of
interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is
an impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into
the Philippines of all goods, articles or products subject
thereto, for the phrase "import tax on all goods, articles or
It is clear that the only issue involved in this case is

whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein private
49
respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs
duties granted by Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum
Act of 1949, should embrace or include the special import
tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the Special Import Tax
Law.
... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein

the total revenue derived from the customs duties and from
the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the
United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds
from the exchange tax imposed under Republic Act
Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such
goods, articles or products during the calendar year 1955,
the President may, by proclamation, suspend the reduction
of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar
year ...
We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and

carefully considered the arguments presented by both
parties and We are convinced that the only thing left to this
Court to do is to determine the intention of the legislature
through interpretation of the two statutes involved, i.e.,
Republic Act No. 1394 and Republic Act No. 387.
Petitioner further argues:
It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is

ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts
may examine both the printed pages of the published Act
as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in
construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history
of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and
purposes to be accomplished by the measure. 10
Customs duties are prescribed by the Tariff and Customs

Code, while the special import tax is provided for by
Republic Act No. 1394. If our legislature had intended to
classify the special import tax as customs duty, the said Art
would not have expressly exempted from payment of the
special Import tax importations of machinery, equipment,
accessories, and spare parts for use of industries, without
distinguishing whether the industries referred to are the
industries exempt from the payment of Customs duties or
the non-exempt ones (Sec. 6). It is sufficient that the
imported machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry. 11
Petitioner in the first assignment of error took exception to

the finding of the Court of Tax Appeals that "The language
of Republic Act No. 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt
that the law intends that the phrase 'Special import tax' is
taken to include customs duties" and countered with the
argument that "An examination of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1394 will indubitably reveal that Congress
considered the special import tax as a tax different from
customs duties, as may be seen from the fact that Section
2(a) of said law made separate mention of customs duties
and special import tax ..." Thus:
A study of petitioner's two assignments of errors shows that

one is anchored on practically the same ground as the
other: both involve the interpretation of R.A. No. 387 (The
Petroleum Act of 1949) in relation with R.A. No. 1394 (The
Special Import Tax Law).
While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and
phrases found in the two cited laws, which in a way was
likewise resorted to by the respondent ESSO, it would do Us
50
well to restate the fundamental rule in the construction of a
statute.
AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND

NATURAL RESOURCES TO CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION
UNIT AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE BUREAU OF MINES;
TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the

particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should
receive such construction as will make it harmonize with
the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Act
to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be
avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the
legislature that such antagonism should arise and one
amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by
implication.
Art. 103 of said Act reads:

ART. 103. Customs duties. During the five years following
the granting of any concessions, the concessionaire may
import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery,
material, instruments, supplies and accessories.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 102 of the Same law insofar as pertinent, provides:
Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may

take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes
which they are called upon to construe and administer, and
of facts which affect their derivation, validity and
operation. 12
ART. 102. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be

charged. ...; nor shall any other special taxes or levies be
applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires
under this Act be subjected to any provincial, municipal, or
other local taxes or levies; nor shall any sales tax be
charged on any petroleum produced from the concession or
portion thereof, manufactured by the concessionaire and
used in the working of his concession. ....
Applying the above stated rules and principles, let us

consider the history, the purpose and objectives of Republic
Act No. 387 as it relates to Republic Act No. 1394 and other
laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines insofar as
they relate to each other.
Art. 104, still of the same Act, reads:
Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, has this
for its title, to wit:
ART. 104. No export to be imposed. No export tax shall

be levied upon petroleum produced from concessions
granted under this Act.
AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT,

EXPLOITATION, AND UTILIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM
RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO ENCOURAGE THE
CONSERVATION OF SUCH PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO
The title of Republic Act No. 387 and the provisions of its
three articles just cited give a clue to the intent of the
Philippine legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation
and development of the petroleum resources of the country.
51
Through the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no
uncertain terms that the intensification of the exploration
for petroleum must be carried on unflinchingly even if, for
the time being, no taxes, both national and local, may be
collected from the industry. This is the unequivocal
intention of the Philippine Congress when the language of
the Petroleum Act is examined. Until this law or any
substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or repealed
by subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature
must be upheld.
SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall

be levied, collected and paid as special import tax on all
goods, articles or products imported or brought into the
Philippines, irrespective of source, during the period and in
accordance with the rates provided for in the following
schedule:
xxx xxx xxx
It would appear that by the provision of Section 1 of this
Act, the pertinent provision of the Petroleum Law, for which
there appears to be no proviso to the contrary has been
modified or altered.
Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is

the subsequent legislation, R.A. No. 1394, the Special
Import Tax Law, which, according to the herein petitioner,
shows that the legislature considered the special import tax
as a tax distinct from customs duties.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 declares that the tax

provided for in its Section I shall not be imposed against
importation into the Philippines of machinery and/or raw
materials to be used by new and necessary industries as
determined in accordance with R A. No. 901 and a long list
of other goods, articles, machinery, equipment, accessories
and others.
Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special

Import Tax Law, is entitled as follows:
AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS,
ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE
PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED
SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN,
EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY-FIVE. ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN
AND THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE.
We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R.A. No.

1394, namely:
R.A. No. 601 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 17%
on foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank or its agents.
This is known as the Exchange Tax Law;
The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior

statutes. As will be seen later, all these laws dealt with the
imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or
other form of levy on importation of goods into the country.
R.A. No. 814 amended Sections one, two and five and
repealed Sections three and four of R.A. No. 601;
R.A. No. 871 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No.
601, as amended earlier by R.A. No. 814;
Section I of Republic Act No. 1394 reads as follows:

52
R.A. No. 1175 amended further Sections one and two of
R.A. No. 601, as amended;
product which falls under the exemption provisions of said

law, it inquired into the purpose of the legislature in
establishing the exemption for agricultural products. We
held:
R.A. No. 1197 amended furthermore R.A. No. 601 as

amended previously by R.A. No. 1175;
The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the

legislature had in mind in establishing the exemption
contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems
reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the
part of the law-making body that by exempting agricultural
products from this tax the farming industry would be
favored and the development of the resources of the
country encouraged. .... 13
R.A. No. 1375 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No.
601 as amended by R.A. Nos. 1175 and 1197.
As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop,
Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and revoked six earlier
statutes which had something to do with the imposition of
special levies and/or exemption of certain importations
from the burden of the special import taxes or levies. On
the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387, the
Petroleum Act, had been spared from the pruning knife of
Congress, although this latter law had granted more
concessions and tax exemption privileges than any of the
statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A.
No. 1394. The answer must be that the Congress of the
Philippine saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under
the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open
to the exploitation and development of the petroleum
resources of the country with such incentives as are given
under that law.
Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which

extrinsic aids the history of the enactment of the statute
and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or
provision in the law had been applied in determining the
true intent of the lawmaking body, We are convinced that
R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to
encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of
the petroleum resources of the country by giving it the
necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is
the raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions
to those who would invest their financial resources towards
the achievement of this national economic goal.
This ascertained will and intention of the legislature finds a

parallelism in a case brought earlier before this Court.
On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions

enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been
abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by
implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing
ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing
A fishpond owner was slapped with taxes as a "merchant"

by the Collector of Internal Revenue. He paid under protest
and filed an action to recover the taxes paid, claiming that
he was an agriculturist and not a merchant. When this
Court was called upon to interpret the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Law on whether fish is an agricultural
53
a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to the same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but
also clear and convincing as a result of the language used,
or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of
the earlier. 14
Castro (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ.,

concur.
G.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(PAFLU), petitioner
vs.
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
RELATIONS,
HONORABLE
CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE
LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO., INC., respondents.
As observed earlier, Congress lined up for revocation by

Republic Act No. 1394 six statutes dealing with the
imposition of special imposts or levies or the granting of
exemptions from special import taxes. Yet, considering the
tremendous amount of revenues it was losing under the
Petroleum Law of 1949, it failed to include the latter statute
among those it chose to bury by the Special Import Taw
Law. The reason for this is very clear: The legislature
wanted to continue the incentives for the continuing
development of the petroleum industry.
Guevara, Pineda, Guevara & Castillon for petitioner.

Olalia Dimapilis & Associates for respondent Union (NAFLU)
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Jesus V. Diaz for respondent Bureau of Labor Relations, etc.,
et al.
It is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to

the theory of the herein petitioner, R.A. No. 387 had not
been repealed by R.A. No. 2352 which expressly abrogated
Section 6 of R.A. No. 1394 but did not repeal any part of
R.A. No. 387. Therefore, the exemption granted by Republic
Act No. 387 still stands.
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations,
Carmelo C. Noriel, that respondent National Federation of
Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining
agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills,
Company, Inc. disregarding the objection raised by
petitioner, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU), is assailed in this certiorari proceeding. Admittedly,
in the certification election held on February 27, 1976,
respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of
petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by

this Court to the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Tax Appeals on a matter it is well-equipped to handle, which
findings and conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the
petition of the Commissioner of Customs to reverse the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals should be, as it is
hereby, denied.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
54
Consolidated, Inc. 7 "is that every labor organization be
given the opportunity in a free and honest election to make
good its claim that it should be the exclusive collective
bargaining representative." 8 Petitioner cannot complain. It
was given that opportunity. It lost in a fair election. It came
out second best. The implementing rule favors, as it should,
respondent Union, It obtained a majority of the valid votes
cast. So our law Prescribes. It is equally the case in the
United States as this excerpt from the work of Cox and Bok
makes clear: "It is a well-settled rule that a representative
will he certified even though less than a majority of all the
employees in the unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is
enough that the union be designated by a majority of the
valid ballots, and this is so even though only a small
proportion of the eligible voters participates. Following the
analogy of political elections, the courts have approved this
practice of the Board." 9
majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of

the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent. 1 There were four votes cast by
employees who did not want any union. 2 On its face
therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in
accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner,
undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in
the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v.
Court of Industrial Relations 3 that spoiled ballots should be
counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering
there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission
that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Director. Implicit in the comment of respondent
Director of Labor Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is
the controlling weight to be accorded the implementing rule
above-cited, no inconsistency being shown between such
rule and the present Labor Code. Under such a view, the
ruling in the Allied Workers Association case that arose
during the period when it was the Industrial Peace Act 5,
that was in effect and not the present law, no longer
possesses relevance. It cannot and should not be applied. It
is not controlling. There was no abuse of discretion then,
much less a grave one.
2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at

present embarked on a wide-scale industrialization project.
As a matter of fact, respondent firm is engaged in such
activity. Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith,
Merrifield and Rothschild, "can thrive only as there is
developed a. stable structure of law and order in the
productive sector." 10 That objective is best attained in a
collective bargaining regime, which is a manifestation of
industrial democracy at work, if there be no undue
obstacles placed in the way of the choice of a bargaining
representative. To insist on the absolute majority where
there are various unions and where the possibility of invalid
ballots may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate that
goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out, protracted
process is not easy to dismiss. That is not unlikely given the
This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of

respondent Director, not to mention the decisive fact
appearing in the Petition itself that at most, only ten of the
spoiled ballots "were intended for the petitioner
Union,"6 thus rendering clear that it would on its own
showing obtain only 424 votes as against 429 for
respondent Union. certiorari does not lie.
1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as
noted in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Pilipino v. Benguet
55
statute. 14 That was not even attempted here. All that
petitioner did was to set forth in two separate paragraphs
the applicable rule followed by respondent Director 15 and
the governing article. 16 It did not even bother to discuss
why such rule was in conflict with the present Labor Code.
It failed to point out any repugnancy. Such being the case,
respondent Director must be upheld.
intensity of rivalry among unions capable of enlisting the

allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such a
contingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the
implementing rule. It speaks categorically. It must be
obeyed. That was what respondent Director did.
3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be
imputed to respondent Director presumably because of
failure to abide by the doctrine or pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Allied Workers Association case. The
reliance is on this excerpt from the opinion: "However,
spoiled ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or
marked (Rules for Certification Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j])
should be counted in determining the majority since they
are nevertheless votes cast by those who are qualified to
do so." 11 Nothing can be clearer than that its basis is a
paragraph in a section of the then applicable rules for
certification elections. 12 They were promulgated under the
authority of the then prevailing Industrial Peace Act. 13 That
Legislation is no longer in force, having been superseded by
the present Labor Code which took effect on November 1,
1974. This certification election is governed therefore, as
was made clear, by the present Labor Code and the Rules
issued thereunder. Absent a showing that such rules and
regulations -are violative of the Code, this Court cannot
ignore their existence. When, as should be the case, a
public official acts in accordance with a norm therein
contained, no infraction of the law is committed.
Respondent Director did, as he ought to, comply with its
terms. He took into consideration only the "valid votes" as
was required by the Rules. He had no choice as long as they
remain in force. In a proper showing, the judiciary can
nullify any rule it found in conflict with the governing
4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support

from the deservedly high repute attached to the
construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with
the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were
issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor
and took effect on February 3, 1975, the present Labor
Code having been made known to the public as far back as
May 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed
to November 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was
postponed to November 1, 1974. It would appear then that
there was more than enough time for a really serious and
careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to
avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly
cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the
Rules. As far back as In re Allen," 17 a 1903 decision, Justice
McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading
American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in
1891:
"The
principle
that
the
contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to
great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction
of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support
it." 18There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a
56
pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty," 19 a 1918 decision:
"Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers
whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation
is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled
thereby." 20 Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated
in numerous decisions . 21 As was emphasized by Chief
Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of
a Code should he given controlling weight. "22
The role of the telecommunications industry in Philippine

progress and development cannot be understated. Time
was when the industry was dominated by a few -- an
oligarchy of sorts where the elite made the decisions and
serfdom had no choice but acquiesce. Sensing the need to
abrogate their dominion, the government formulated
policies in order to create an environment conducive to the
entry of new players. Thus, in October 1990, the National
Telecommunications Development Plan 1991-2010 (NTDP)
was formulated and came into being. Designed by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
the NTDP provides for the framework of government
policies, objectives and strategies that will guide the
industry's development for the next 20 years. As expected,
with it came the increase in the demand for
telecommunications services, especially in the area of local
exchange carrier service (LECS).1
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs

against petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU). Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion
Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 135992
July 23, 2004
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC.

and
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, respondent.
Concomitantly, the DOTC issued guidelines for the

rationalization of local exchange telecommunications
service. In particular, the DOTC issued on September 30,
1991, Department Circular No. 91-260, with the purpose of
minimizing or eliminating situations wherein multiple
operators provide local exchange service in a given area.
Pursuant thereto, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) was tasked to define the boundaries of
local exchange areas and authorize only one franchised
local exchange carrier to provide local exchange service
within such areas.
DECISION
Thereafter, on July 12, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos

issued Executive Order No. 109 entitled Local Exchange
Carrier Service. Section 2 thereof provides that all existing
International Gateway Facility (IGF) operators 2 are required
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
57
Telecommunications Corporation or Bayantel,4applied for
and was given by the NTC a Provisional Authority (PA) 5 on
March 3, 1995, to install, operate and provide local
exchange service in Quezon City, Malabon and Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and the entire Bicol region. Meanwhile,
petitioner Telecommunications Technologies Philippines, Inc.
(TTPI),
as
an
affiliate
of
petitioner
Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), was granted by
the NTC a PA on September 25, 1996, to install, operate
and maintain a local exchange service in the Provinces of
Batanes, Cagayan Valley, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva
Vizcaya, Ifugao, Quirino, the cities of Manila and Caloocan,
and the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila.
to provide local exchange carrier services in unserved and

underserved areas, including Metro Manila, thereby
promoting universal access to basic telecommunications
service.
The NTC promulgated Memorandum Circular No. 11-9-93 on
September 17, 1993 implementing the objectives of E.O.
No. 109.3 Section 3 of the Circular mandates existing IGF
operators to file a petition for the issuance of Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate
and maintain local exchange carrier services within two
years from effectivity thereof. Section 4 further requires
IGF operators to provide a minimum of 300 local exchange
lines per one international switch termination and a
minimum of 300,000 local exchange lines within three
years from grant of authority.
It appears, however, that before TTPI was able to fully

accomplish its rollout obligation, ICC applied for and was
given a PA by the NTC on November 10, 1997, to install,
operate and maintain a local exchange service in Manila
and Navotas,6 two areas which were already covered by
TTPI under its PA dated September 25, 1996.
To cap the government's efforts, Republic Act No. 7925,

otherwise known as the Public Telecommunications Policy
Act of the Philippines, was enacted on March 23, 1995.
With regard to local exchange service, Section 10 thereof
mandates an international carrier to comply with its
obligation to provide local exchange service in unserved or
underserved areas within three years from the grant of
authority as required by existing regulations.
On
September 25, 1995, the NTC issued the Implementing
Rules and Regulations for R.A. No. 7925 per its NTC MC No.
8-9-95.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the

Court of Appeals with application for a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46047, arguing that the NTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting a
provisional authority to respondent ICC to operate in areas
already assigned to TTPI.
On April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed 7 the
petition for review on the ground that the NTC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the PA to
TTPI. It sustained the NTC's finding that ICC is "legally and
financially competent and its network plan technically
Taking advantage of the opportunities brought about by the

passage of these laws, several IGF operators applied for
CPCN to install, operate and maintain local exchange carrier
services in certain areas.
Respondent International
Communication Corporation, now known as Bayan
58
feasible." The Court of Appeals also ruled that there was no
violation of the equal protection clause because the PA
granted to ICC and TTPI were given under different
situations and there is no point of comparison between the
two.8
NTC, and that the area is underserved, as required under

Section 23 of MC No. 11-9-93;
(3)
The facts and figures cited by the NTC, i.e., ICC's
alleged remarkable performance in fulfilling its rollout
obligation and the growth rate in the installation of
telephone lines in Manila and Navotas, do not justify the
grant of the PA in favor of ICC, nor are they supported by
the evidence on record as these were not presented during
the proceedings before the NTC;
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, raising

the following issues:
I
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
a serious error of law in upholding the Order of the NTC
granting a PA to Respondent to operate LEC services in
Manila and Navotas which are areas already assigned to
petitioner TTPI under a prior and subsisting PA.
(4)
ICC did not comply with the requirement of "prior
consultation" with the NTC before it filed its application, in
violation of Sections 3 and 3.1 of MC 11-9-93;
(5)
ICC did not comply with Section 27 of MC 11-9-93
requiring that an escrow deposit be made equivalent to
20% and a performance bond equivalent to 10% of the
investment required for the first two years of the project;
II
Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to restrain Respondent from installing LEC
services in the areas granted to it by the Order under
review.9
In support
arguments:
thereof,
petitioners
posit
the
(6)
ICC is not financially and technically capable of
undertaking the project;
(7)
The grant of a PA in favor of ICC to operate in
areas covered by TTPI will render it difficult for the latter to
cross-subsidize its operations in less profitable areas
covered by it and will threaten its viability to continue as a
local exchange operator.10
following
(1)
The assignment to ICC of areas already allocated
to TTPI violates the Service Area Scheme (SAS), which is
the guidepost of the laws and issuances governing local
exchange service;
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds no

grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of
Appeals in sustaining the NTC's grant of provisional
authority to ICC.
(2)
ICC did not make any showing that an existing
operator, TTPI in this case, failed to comply with the service
performance and technical standards prescribed by the
59
The power of the NTC to grant a provisional authority has
long been settled. As the regulatory agency of the national
government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications
entities, it is clothed with authority and given ample
discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. 11 It also
has the authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience
and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of communications facilities and services,
radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems, including the authority to determine the areas of
operations
of
applicants
for
telecommunications
12
services. In this regard, the NTC is clothed with sufficient
discretion to act on matters solely within its competence. 13
The Court will not interfere with these findings of the NTC,
as these are matters that are addressed to its sound
discretion, being the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under its special and
technical forte.15 Moreover, the exercise of administrative
discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be
discharged by the government agency concerned, and not
by the courts.16
Petitioner insists compliance with the service area scheme
(SAS) mandated by DOTC Dept. Circular No. 91-260, to wit:
1.
The National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) shall define the boundaries of local exchange areas,
and shall henceforth authorize only one franchised Local
Exchange Carrier (LEC) to provide LEC service within such
areas.
In granting ICC the PA to operate a local exchange carrier

service in the Manila and Navotas areas, the NTC took into
consideration ICC's financial and technical resources and
found them to be adequate. The NTC also noted ICC's
performance in complying with its rollout obligations under
the previous PA granted to it, thus:
With the proven track record of herein applicant as one of
the pacesetters in carrying out its landlines commitment in
its assigned areas, applicant can best respond to public
demand for faster installation of telephone lines in Manila
and Navotas.
The Court is not persuaded. Said department circular was

issued by the DOTC in 1991, before the advent of E.O. No.
109 and R.A. No. 7925. When E.O. No. 109 was
promulgated in 1993, and R.A. No. 7925 enacted in 1995,
the service area scheme was noticeably omitted therefrom.
Instead, E.O. No. 109 and R.A. No. 7925 adopted a policy of
healthy competition among the local exchange carrier
service providers.
The grant of this application is, therefore, a fitting

recognition that should be accorded to any deserving
applicant, such as herein applicant ICC whose remarkable
performance in terms of public service as mandated by
Executive Order 109 and Republic Act No. 7925 has
persuaded this Commission to affix the stamp of its
approval.14
The need to formulate new policies is dictated by evolving

goals and demands in telecommunications services. Thus,
E.O. No. 109 acknowledges that there is a "need to
promulgate new policy directives to meet the targets of
Government through the National Telecommunications
Development Plan (NTDP) of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), specifically: (1)
60
to
ensure
the
orderly
development
of
the
telecommunications sector through the provision of service
to all areas of the country; (2) to satisfy the unserviced
demand for telephones; and (3) to provide healthy
competition
among
authorized
service
providers."
Likewise, one of the national policies and objectives of R.A.
No. 7925 is to foster the improvement and expansion of
telecommunications services in the country through a
healthy
competitive
environment,
in
which
telecommunications carriers are free to make business
decisions and to interact with one another in providing
telecommunications services, with the end in view of
encouraging their financial viability while maintaining
affordable rates.17
and even finality to factual findings of administrative bodies

such as the NTC, if substantial evidence supports the
findings as in this case. The exception to this rule is when
the administrative agency arbitrarily disregarded evidence
before it or misapprehended evidence to such an extent as
to compel a contrary conclusion had it properly appreciated
the evidence. PILTEL gravely failed to show that this
exception applies to the instant case. Moreover, the
exercise of administrative discretion, such as the issuance
of a PA, is a policy decision and a matter that the NTC can
best discharge, not the courts.
PILTEL contends that the NTC violated Section 23 of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 11-9-93, otherwise known as the
"Implementing Guidelines on the Provisions of EO 109"
which states:
Recently, in Pilipino
Telephone
Corporation
vs.
18
NTC, the Court had occasion to rule on a case akin to the
present dispute, involving the same respondent ICC, and
the Pilipino Telephone Corporation (Piltel). In the Piltelcase,
ICC applied for a provisional authority to operate a local
exchange service in areas already covered by Piltel, which
includes Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Sur, Davao
del Sur, South Cotabato and Saranggani. Piltel opposed
ICC's application but the NTC denied it, and granted ICC's
application. The Court of Appeals dismissed Piltel's petition
for review, and on certiorari before this Court, we affirmed
the dismissal. The Court found that the NTC did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion when it granted the ICC a
provisional authority to operate in areas covered by Piltel.
We held:
Section 23. No other company or entity shall be authorized

to provide local exchange service in areas where
the LECs comply with the relevant provisions of MTC MC
No. 10-17-90 and NTC MC No. 10-16-90 and that the local
exchange service area is not underserved. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 23 of EO 109 does not categorically state that the
issuance of a PA is exclusive to any telecommunications
company. Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an
exclusive "franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization" to operate a public utility. In Republic v.
Express Telecommunications Co., the Court held that
"the Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a
public utility shall not be exclusive." Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution provides:
We will not disturb the factual findings of the NTC on the

technical and financial capability of the ICC to undertake
the proposed project. We generally accord great weight
61
Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate
or
authorization
be
exclusive
in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither
shall any such franchise or right be granted except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to

improved technology, fast and handy mobil[e] service, and
reduced user dissatisfaction."
PILTEL's contention that the NTC Order amounts to a
confiscation of property without due process of law is
untenable. "Confiscation" means the seizure of private
property by the government without compensation to the
owner. A franchise to operate a public utility is not an
exclusive private property of the franchisee. Under the
Constitution, no franchisee can demand or acquire
exclusivity in the operation of a public utility. Thus, a
franchisee of a public utility cannot complain of seizure or
taking of property because of the issuance of another
franchise to a competitor. Every franchise, certificate or
authority to operate a public utility is, by constitutional
mandate, non-exclusive. PILTEL cannot complain of a
taking of an exclusive right that it does not own and which
no franchisee can ever own.
Thus, in Radio Communications of the Philippines,

Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, the
Court ruled that the "Constitution mandates that a
franchise cannot be exclusive in nature."
...
Among the declared national policies in Republic Act No.
7925, otherwise known as the "Public Telecommunications
Policy Act of the Philippines," is the healthy competition
among telecommunications carriers, to wit:
Likewise, PILTEL's argument that the NTC Order violates

PILTEL's rights as a prior operator has no merit. The Court
resolved a similar question in Republic v. Republic
Telephone Company, Inc. In striking down Retelco's claim
that it had a right to be protected in its investment as a
franchise-holder and prior operator of a telephone service
in Malolos, Bulacan, the Court held:
Obviously, "the need for a healthy competitive environment

in telecommunications is sufficient impetus for the NTC to
consider all those applicants, who are willing to offer
competition, develop the market and provide the
environment necessary for greater public service."
RETELCO's foremost argument is that "such operations and

maintenance of the telephone system and solicitation of
subscribers by [petitioners] constituted an unfair and
ruinous competition to the detriment of [RETELCO which] is
a grantee of both municipal and legislative franchises for
the purpose." In effect, RETELCO pleads for protection from
Furthermore, "free competition in the industry may also

provide the answer to a much-desired improvement in the
62
the courts on the assumption that its franchises vested in it
an exclusive right as prior operator. There is no clear
showing by RETELCO, however, that its franchises are of an
exclusive character. xxx At any rate, it may very well be
pointed out as well that neither did the franchise of PLDT at
the time of the controversy confer exclusive rights upon
PLDT in the operation of a telephone system. In fact, we
have made it a matter of judicial notice that all legislative
franchises for the operation of a telephone system contain
the following provision:
which will tend to influence or effect a review or a

modification of the Commission's quasi-judicial function.
The power of the NTC in granting or denying a provisional

authority to operate a local exchange carrier service is a
quasi-judicial function,20 a sphere in which the DOTC cannot
intrude upon. If at all, the service area scheme provided in
DOTC Dept. Circular No. 91-260 is only one of the factors,
but should not in any way, tie down the NTC in its
determination of the propriety of a grant of a provisional
authority to a qualified applicant for local exchange service.
"It is expressly provided that in the even_t the Philippine

Government should desire to maintain and operate for itself
the system and enterprise herein authorized, the grantee
shall surrender his franchise and will turn over to the
Government said system and all serviceable equipment
therein, at cost, less reasonable depreciation." 19
True, NTC MC No. 11-9-93 requires prior consultation with

the NTC of the proposed service areas. As petitioners
themselves argue, prior consultation allows the NTC to
assess the impact of the proposed application on the
viability of the local exchange operator in the area desired
by the would-be applicant and on the viability of the entire
telecommunications industry as well as rationalize the
plans to minimize any adverse impact. 21 In this case, prior
consultation was substantially complied with and its
purpose accomplished, when ICC filed its application and
the NTC was given the opportunity to assess ICC's viability
to render local exchange service in the Manila and Navotas
areas, and its impact on the telecommunications industry.
Similarly in this case, the grant of a PA to ICC to operate in

areas covered by TTPI is not tainted with any grave abuse
of discretion as it was issued by the NTC after taking into
account ICC's technical and financial capabilities, and in
keeping with the policy of healthy competition fostered by
E.O. No. 109 and R.A. No. 7925.
In addition, Section 6 of R.A. No. 7925 specifically limits the
DOTC from exercising any power that will tend to influence
or effect a review or a modification of the NTC's quasijudicial functions, to wit:
It is also true that NTC MC No. 8-9-95 allows a duly

enfranchised entity to maintain a local exchange network if
it is shown that an existing authorized local exchange
operator fails to satisfy the demand for local exchange
service.22 In this case, the NTC noted the increasing rate in
the demand for local lines within the Manila and Navotas
Section 6. Responsibilities of and Limitations to Department

Powers. -- The Department of Transportation and
Communications (Department) shall not exercise any power
63
areas, and in order for these areas to catch up with its
neighboring cities, installation of lines must be sped
up.23 This, in fact, is tantamount to a finding that the
existing local exchange operator failed to meet the growing
demand for local lines.
GENERAL
ICC's technical and financial capabilities, as well as the

growth rate in the number of lines in particular areas, are
matters within NTC's competence and should be accorded
respect. The NTC is given wide latitude in the evaluation of
evidence and in the exercise of its adjudicative functions,
and this includes the authority to take judicial notice of
facts within its special competence. 24
(a)
Until the local exchange service is priced reflecting
actual costs, the local exchange service shall be crosssubsidized by other telecommunications services.
(c)
The subsidy need by the LE service operator to
earn a rate of return at parity with other segments of
telecommunications industry shall be charged against the
international and domestic toll and CMTS interconnect
services.25
Both issuances allow a local exchange operator to crosssubsidize its operations from its other telecommunications
services, and not solely on the revenues derived from the
operator's local exchange service.
TTPI anticipates that allowing ICC to enter its service areas

will make it difficult for it to cross-subsidize its operations in
the less profitable areas. Such argument, however, is
futile. The cross-subsidy approach is apparently the
government's response to the foreseen situation wherein
given its policy of universal access, a local exchange
provider will find itself operating in areas where the
demand and the public's capacity to subscribe will be lesser
than in other areas, making these areas more of a liability
than an asset. Thus, Section 4 of E.O. No. 109 provides:
Notably, R.A. No. 7617, as amended by R.A. No. 7674,

grants TTPI the legislative franchise to install, operate and
maintain telecommunications systems throughout the
Philippines but not limited to the operations of local
exchange service or public switched network, public-calling
stations,
inter-exchange
carrier
or
national
toll
transmission, value-added or enhanced services intelligent
networks, mobile or personal communications services,
international gateway facility, and paging services, among
others.<sup26< sup=""></sup26<> From these services,
TTPI has other sources of revenue from which it may crosssubsidize its local exchange operations.
SEC. 4.
Cross-Subsidy. Until universal access to
basic telecommunications is achieved, and such service is
priced to reflect actual costs, local exchange service shall
continue
to
be
cross-subsidized
by
other
telecommunications services within the same company.
Meanwhile, NTC MC No. 8-9-95 provides:
The Court, however, agrees with petitioners that the NTC

erred when it failed to require ICC to make an escrow
ACCESS CHARGES
64
deposit and a performance bond. Section 27 of NTC MC No.
11-9-93 specifically provides:
Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 is silent as to whether

the posting of an escrow deposit and performance bond is a
condition sine qua non for the grant of a provisional
authority. While the provision uses the term "shall," said
directive pertains to the NTC, which shall require the public
telecommunications carrier to make such deposit and
posting. In any event, records show that as of May 20,
2004, ICC has been granted an extension of its provisional
authority up to November 10, 2006.28 Records also show
that ICC has already been providing local exchange carrier
service in the areas concerned, having installed 16,000
lines in the City of Manila, 12,000 of which have already
been subscribed, 624 lines in Caloocan City, all of which
have been subscribed, while the roll-out plan for facilities
and provisioning in the City of Navotas is being
finalized.29 Hence, so as not to disrupt ICC's rollout plan
compliance, it would be more judicious for the Court to
merely require ICC to comply with Section 27 of NTC MC No.
11-9-93, within such period to be determined by the NTC.
SEC. 27.
Authorized public telecommunications
carriers shall be required to deposit in escrow in a
reputable bank 20% of the investment required for the first
two years of the implementation of theproposed project.
In
addition
to
escrow,
the
authorized
public
telecommunications carriers shall be required to post a
performance bond equivalent to 10% of the investment
required for the first two years of the approved
project but not to exceed P500 Million. The performance
bond shall be forfeited in favor of the government in the
event that the authorized PTC fail to comply with the terms
and conditions of the authority granted. (Emphases Ours)
The escrow deposit and the posting of a performance bond
are required in each proposed and approved project of a
local exchange operator. Project refers to a planned
undertaking.27 ICC's project for local exchange service in
the Manila and Navotas areas is separate and distinct from
its projects in other areas; hence, the NTC should have
directed ICC to submit such requirements. Evidently, the
escrow deposit is required to ensure that there is available
money on hand to defray ICC's expenditures for its project,
while the performance bond will answer for the faithful
compliance and performance of ICC's rollout obligation and
to compensate the government for any damages incurred
in case of ICC's default. Without these, the government will
be left holding an "empty bag" in the event ICC reneges in
its rollout obligation.
Furthermore, it is well to stress that petitioner TTPI cannot

claim any exclusive right to render telecommunications
service in areas which the NTC considers to be in need of
additional providers. R.A. No. 7925 is quite emphatic on
this score, viz.:
SEC. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications
Industry. Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or
immunity granted under existing franchises, or may
hereafter be granted, shall ipso factobecome part of
previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
grantees of such franchises: Provided, however, That the
foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions
65
of
telecommunications
franchises
concerning
territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the
franchise, or the type of service authorized by the
franchise. (Emphasis Ours)
(1)
Deposit in escrow in a reputable bank 20% of the
investment required for the first two years of the
implementation of the proposed project; and
(2)
Post a performance bond equivalent to 10% of the
investment required for the first two years of the approved
project but not to exceed P500 Million.
More than anything else, public service should be the

primordial objective of local exchange operators. The entry
of another provider in areas covered by TTPI should pose as
a challenge for it to improve its quality of service.
Ultimately, it will be the public that will benefit. As pointed
out in Republic of the Phils. vs. Rep. Telephone Co,
Inc.:30
within such period to be determined by the National

Telecommunications Commission. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Free competition in the industry may also provide the

answer to a much-desired improvement in the quality and
delivery of this type of public utility, to improved
technology, fast and handy mobil service, and reduced user
dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public
utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in
view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise
certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in character or
shall last longer than fifty (50) years (ibid., Section 11;
Article XIV, Section 5, 1973 Constitution; Article XIV,
Section 8, 1935 Constitution).
G.R. No. 87416
April 8, 1991
CECILIO
S.
DE
VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and
ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is

PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Order of the National
Telecommunications Commission dated November 10, 1997
in NTC Case No. 96-195 is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and
set aside the decision* of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled
"Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and
Respondent International Communication Corporation, in

accordance with Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93, is
required to:
66
Roberto
Z.
Lorayes,"
for certiorari filed therein.
dismissing
the
petition
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That

no offense was committed since the check involved was
payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and
void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure
Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of

Appeals, is as follows:
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was
charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:
On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued

questioned orders stating:
its first
Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied

for lack of merit.
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the

municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors
Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987,
payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S.
$2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds
in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment which check when presented to
the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason
"INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign

checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made
payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn
and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said
law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against
current accounts in foreign currency.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated
September 6, 1988, and which reads:
Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9,
1988, which was opposed by the prosecution, is denied for
lack of merit.1wphi1
The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn
against current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of
the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in
Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's
The Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5).
(Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified

on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the
Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court
67
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the
aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6,
1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
wherein he contended:
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its

resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).
(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the
dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated
extending its coverage over dollar accounts;
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second

Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional

Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in
question.
(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in

connection with a private transaction between petitioner
and private respondent, the payment could not be legally
paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
The petition is without merit.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding
cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147
[1988]).
(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the

questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable
with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon
such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the
questioned check cannot be said to have violated the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A",
Decision, p. 22).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the

action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings
(Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a

decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the

statute in force at the time of commencement of the action
(De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs

against petitioner.
The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this

review, can not be questioned.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

specifically provide that:
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed

by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6)
68
Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The
complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the
essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element
of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense
charged.
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa

Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People
vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following
guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December
15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check
was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check
was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the
place where it was executed, as what is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res.
No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October
28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by
Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos.
11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject

to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or any of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279
[1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue
is determined by the allegations in the information."
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed

and delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent
at Makati, Metro Manila.
The information under consideration specifically alleged

that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and
therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action
(Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was

drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign
bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks
Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the
currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of

the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of
People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of
the issuance of the check."
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign

checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within
the coverage of said law.
69
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish.1wphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where
the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify
it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]).
checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks,

in our currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker,
and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This
would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check
may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs.
(sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.
More importantly, it is well established that courts may

avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body to assist in determining the construction of a statute
of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125
[1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision
of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during
the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318
[1978]).
MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis

supplied).
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that

the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to
whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The
discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully
sustains this view, as follows:
xxx
xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
xxx
G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994
THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by

its Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C.
Natividad, Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig.
Gen. Virgilio H. David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P.
Enriquez, Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D.
Macasiano
Director
for
Personnel, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt.
MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of
the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be
involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about
70
Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt. Ricardo Trinidad, Jr., Sr.
Supt. Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr.
Supt. Tranquilino Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I.
Navarro,
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr.
Supt. Agaton Abiera, Chief Insp. Bienvenido Torres,
and the National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc.
(NARRA), represented by its President Col. Benjamin
Gundran,
and
Director
Hermogenes
Peralta,
Jr., respondents.
general, the Commission may allow his retention in the

service for an unextendible period of one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of
retirement to private respondents who are all members of
the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the
age of fifty-six (56).
In response, private respondents filed a complaint on
December 19, 1991 for declaratory relief with prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction
(docketed as Civil Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142. In their complaint,
respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six
(56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them
since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which
provides:
The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.
Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and

within the transition period of four (4) years following the
effectivity of this Act, the following members of the INP
shall be considered compulsorily retired:
BIDIN, J.:
The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the
compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec.
39, RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department
of the Interior and Local Government", which took effect on
January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a
uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39
thereof reads:
a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first
year of the effectivity of this Act.
b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the
second year of the effectivity of this Act.
c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the
third year of the effectivity of this Act.
Sec. 39. Compulsory Retirement. Compulsory retirement,

for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of
age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with
the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director
d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the

fourth year of the effectivity of this Act.
71
It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP"
includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier
constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue
of
PD 765 in 1975.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4year transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to
the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily,
at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire
Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the
retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six
(56) under the AFP law.
In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge

observed, among others, that:
Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992

seeking the reversal of the above judgment. On January 12,
1993, the Court resolved to treat the respondents'
Comment as Answer and gave due course to the petition.
It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the

local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to
define who or what constituted the INP. The natural
recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as
courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same
subject and to investigate the antecedents involved. There
is nothing extant in the statute books except that which
was
created
and
established
under
PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article XV of the 1973
Constitution providing that the "State shall establish and
maintain an integrated national police force whose
organization, administration and operation shall be
provided by law." Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the
said law categorically declared the PC "as the principal
component of the Integrated National Police" (Sec. 5, PD
765).
On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a

restraining order followed by a writ of injunction on January
8, 1992 upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private
respondents.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings,
the case was submitted for resolution and on August 14,
1992, the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term "INP"
in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the
present Philippine National Police, irrespective of the
original status of the present members of the Philippine
National Police before its creation and establishment, and
that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the
lapse
of
the
four-year transition period.
The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein)

with excerpts taken from the discussion amongst the
members of Congress concerning the particular provision of
Section 89. The court is not persuaded by said discussion; it
was a simple matter for the members of the legislature to
state precisely in clear and unequivocal terms their
meaning, such as "integrated police" as used in PD 765.
The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.

72
Instead, they employed "INP", a generic term that includes
the PC as the principal component of the INP, supra. In
failing to categorically restrict the application of Section 89
as the members of legislature are said to have intended, it
gave rise to the presumption that it has not limited nor
intended to limit the meaning of the word when the bill was
finally passed into law. It is not difficult for the court to also
presume that in drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the
legislators were aware of the historical legislative origin of
the "INP".
Sec. 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police.

There is hereby established and constituted the Integrated
National Police (INP) which shall be composed of the
Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated
police forces as established by Presidential Decrees
Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under
the Department of National Defense.
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being
the nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD
765, former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
should not be discriminated against from the coverage of
the term "INP" in Sec. 89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the
term "INP" found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP
in PD 765. Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish.
xxx xxx xxx

The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is
found in the Transitory Provisions of the law which do not
provide for any distinction between the former PC officers
and those belonging to the civilian police forces. These
provision are specifically enacted to regulate the period
covering the dissolution of the PC and the creation of the
PNP, a period that necessarily would be attended by
imbalances and or confusion occasioned by the wholesale
and mass integration. In fact, the retirement payment
scheme of the INP is still to be formulated, leaving the
impression that nothing is really settled until after the
transition of four years has lapsed. Section 89 therefore
prevails over Section 39 up to the year 1995 when the
retirement age for the members of the PNP shall then be
age 56; after the year 1995, Section 39 shall then be the
applicable law on retirement of PNP members. (Rollo, pp.
27-28; emphasis supplied)
Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC?

Petitioners submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85
to stress the point, viz.:
Sec. 23. Composition. Subject to the limitations provided
for in this Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter
referred to as the PNP, is hereby established, initially
consisting of the members of the police forces who were
integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP) pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the officers and enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). . .
xxx xxx xxx
The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP,
Narcotics Command, CIS and the technical command of the
AFP assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing
officers holding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by
Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP
in Sec. 89 does not imply the same meaning contemplated
under PD 765 wherein it is provided:
73
the Department as employees thereof, subject to existing
laws and regulations.
Commission and
Management.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 86 of the same law further provides:
Sec. 85. Phase of Implementation. The implementation of

this Act shall be undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit:
Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. The

PNP shall absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and the
Narcotics Command upon the effectivity of this Act.
Phase I Exercise of option by the uniformed members of

the Philippine Constabulary, the PC elements assigned with
the Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the
technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC to
include the regular CIS investigating agents and the
operatives and agents of the NAPOLCOM Inspection,
Investigation and Intelligence Branch, and the personnel of
the absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking
(NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, to be
completed within six (6) months from the date of the
effectivity of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel
from the INP, PC, technical Services, NACAH, and
NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence
Branch shall have been covered by official orders assigning
them to the PNP . . .
the
Department
of
Budget
and
From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears

therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous
with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have
just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement purposes and
not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC
and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89
includes the members of the PC.
And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge
that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec.
90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon the
effectivity of this Act, the present National Police
Commission and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to be a
major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component
of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police,
shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof,
a new police force shall be established and constituted
pursuant to this Act. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

. . . Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the
twelve-month period from the effectivity of this Act,
retire . . .
Phase III . . . To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the
Commission shall create a Board of Officers composed of
the following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and
one (1) representative each from the PC, INP, Civil Service
74
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the
legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are.
In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed
to categorically restrict the application of the transition
period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police
forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC
component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six
(56).
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people

really want is one common rule, so if it is fifty-six, fifty-six;
of course, the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it is
not acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this up really
to the question of: If you are lax in allowing their (the PC)
entry into the PNP, then tighten up the retirement. If we will
be strict in, like requiring examinations and other conditions
for their original entry, then since we have sifted out a
certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a longer
retirement age. That was the rationale, that was the tie-up.
Since we are relaxing the entry, we should speed up . . .
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not
have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the
term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation,
courts are not without recourse in determining the
construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they
may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v. Court
of
Appeals,
195 SCRA 722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of Manila, 41
Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318
[1978]).
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). Exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA) . . . the retirement, the
exit.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear,
Mr. Chairman. Fifty-six, let's say, that will not make any
adjustment in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at
age) fifty-six.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang
masasabi.
Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of

the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent (Yellow
Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers' Association v.
Manila Yellow Taxi Cab. Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police,

since they are retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it will
be
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a
total period of four years transition. (Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense, March 12, 1990)
Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference

Committee, we find that the legislature did intent to
exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec.
89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned, thus:
REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will

retire at 60 years.
75
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.
undue preferential treatment in favor of the other group. On

the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the real
intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the
enactment of RA 6975.
REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.
REP. GUTANG. On the third year, 58.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that

Section 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police
force is clear. The question now is whether the classification
is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) It must be based
upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) It must apply equally to all members of
the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So 'yung 55, on

the third year, 58, doon siya re-retire.
REP. GUTANG. Oo.
SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes
effective . . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon
siya aabot.
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions.

The PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were
already retirable at age 56 while the local police force were
retirable at 60, and governed by different laws
(P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant
for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the local
police force to plan for their retirement which would be
earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is
merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force
and effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed.
Finally, it applies not only to some but to all local police
officers.
REP. UNICO. Pwede.

SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil 'yon, may time to . . .
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa
transition ng pulis, acceptable ito, eh.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa
kanila, 56 ang retirement age nilang talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw
ko
ngang dagdagan 'yung 56 nila at 'yon din ang sa Armed
Forces, 56. (Ibid., May 22, 1990)
It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems

absurd that a law will grant an extension to PC officers'
retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back
to 56 without any cogent reason at all. Why should the
retirement age of PC officers be increased during the
In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local

police force as established in PD 765, the Court does not, in
any
manner,
give
any
76
transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who
would retire at age 56 after such period? Such absurdity
was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its
purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP
members.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions

of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the
Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing
a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for
applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as
provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in
November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture
of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer
by plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde
which are the main raw materials in the production of said
glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee
aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made
another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of
P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of

injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and
the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor
General
of
the
Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor
of the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni
&
Jamir
for
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first

sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last
importation of these products, petitioner made a similar
request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin
fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the
corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said
amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit
and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in
petitioner.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor
General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
77
accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of
Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the
Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the
Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
of Science and Technology has expressed, through its

Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low
cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
The only question for determination in this case is whether

or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from
the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent
portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to
the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:.
xxx
xxx
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product,

which is patently distinct and different from urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
"and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea"
and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements
do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less
do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives
(see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off.
Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727
[February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the
enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon
xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood

and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as
"ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of
the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute
78
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14,
1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic

organization for that purpose, should find themselves
enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from
a community member allegedly without the required permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last
quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known
as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno,
the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of
Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It
is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge

Angeles, an information 1 was filed against petitioner Martin
Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation
Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No.
2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information 2 on
the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute
an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only
covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such
as the construction of a chapel. This was denied 3 by the
trial court, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration
having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN
CENTENO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch
10,
and
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered

judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who

were moved by their desire to devote their remaining years
79
Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing
them to each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial
court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the
basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the
fact that it believed that the latter should not have been
criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential
Decree
No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in
the instant case.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree

No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for
religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term
"religious purpose" is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not
include,
it
excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to
State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose
would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under the Constitution.
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional

Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10. However,
accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the
case proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On
May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed
the decision of the lower court but modified the penalty,
allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed
which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by
sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an increased
penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of
P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the decision
was denied by the court. 6
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No.

4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law),
provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association
desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or
public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization
Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for a permit in
the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development, the
Regional Director or his duly authorized representative
may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary
permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of the
public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit
issued under Act 4075.
Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the

lowest court in the judicial hierarchy eventually reached
this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of
whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the
financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question
of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is gratified
that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final
adjudication.
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase

"charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the
negative.
80
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction
that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. 7
public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the

framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so
stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the
church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities
depend
for
their
support
on
voluntary
contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not
interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose."
While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is
not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not
equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which
is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. 9 Although
the term "charitable" may include matters which are
"religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which
are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction
between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose,"
except where the two terms are obviously used
synonymously, or where the distinction has been done
away with by statute.10 The word "charitable," therefore,
like most other words, is capable of different significations.
For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from
taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under Presidential
Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given
such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to
petitioners.
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as

several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and
"religious" separately and independently of each other.
Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and
personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in
statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated
and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e)
(corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E)
(exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal
Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization of
non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the
Local Government Code.
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally

construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there are
cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious
purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in the
law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes."
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out

"charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or
81
Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of
a statute providing that the succession of any property
passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only
of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is
deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A gift for "religious
purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use"
as regards exemption from inheritance tax. 12
themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be

criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression
of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not
plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be
regarded as without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word
"charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise
definition, and each case involving a determination of that
which is charitable must be decided on its own particular
facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in
vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by
circumstances in the abstract.
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of

the solicitation within the concept of "charitable" purpose
which
under
Presidential
Decree
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of
Social Services and Development, under paid of penal
liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to
petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be
strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for
"religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the
fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal
legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as
would favor the accused.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the

statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given
which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make
use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as
used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used,
the various members of the enumeration are to be taken
separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious,"
which are integral parts of an enumeration using the
disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and
disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration
why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be
made applicable to the questioned provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1564.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be

construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by
implications,
intendments,
analogies
or
equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction
to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal
statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and
to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights
of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of
two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which
operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is
to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious

purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise,
82
it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free
exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at

some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may
protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly
to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and
his authority to act for the cause which he purports to
represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time
and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a

social concern of the people and, consequently, solicitations
appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public
welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory
powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to
solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such
an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause
under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the
efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate
the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable
restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional

guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything
which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said
that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is
not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free
exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has
a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more
religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public
interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious
test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the
collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional
objection, even though the collection be for a religious
purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited
previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or
interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of

religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted
by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of
the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution
embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
must have appropriate definitions to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to
regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible
end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is

surprising how many operations are carried on by persons
and associations who, secreting their activities under the
guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and
defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how
profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to
people who manipulate them. The State has authority
83
under the exercise of its police power to determine whether
or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for
fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under
the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly
abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the
solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy
purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be
lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the
worthy from the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of
unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper
charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the
public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is
lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public
solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. 24
upon a doubtful and difficult question of law can be the

basis of good faith, especially for a layman.
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge
which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that petitioner
and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This
could be reflective upon her objectivity, considering that
the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the
Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at
this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against
any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist
any pressure from whatever source. 26
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be

subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable
therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by

respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed by the
trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of
petitioner's act which thereby caused damage to the
complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial
court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even
recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner
and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in
good faith in making the solicitation from the complainant,
an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J.:
I concur in the result reached in this case that the
solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not
covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the
84
Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an
ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one
may engage in business could not be applied to the
appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose a
condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for
the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from
the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and
other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree,
therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for
religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that
it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is not fairly
possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.
solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare

purposes." My reasons are three-fold.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a
church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious
purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare
purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a
church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims
of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the
like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines,
it is part of the propagation of religious faith or
evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid
may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such
solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as
the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.
For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed

from and to acquit petitioner. Padilla, J., concurs.
G.R. Nos. 136149-51
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public

against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns
for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand,
since religious fund drives are usually conducted among
those belonging to the same religion, the need for public
protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in
as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to
justify state regulation.
September 19, 2000
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WALPAN
LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL
alias
"WARPAN," appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that the person arrested committed "no
other crime." Furthermore, if the person is held liable for
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an
aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense.
Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for

religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint
on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed,
may well justify requiring a permit before a church can
make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
85
with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed
M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a
search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate
offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such
unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct
assault.
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of

Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with
one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other
than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their
possession and under their custody and control, the
following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN
1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live
ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and
twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1)
homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live
ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with
five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with
SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell
of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber
paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced
M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained
the necessary license and or permit therefor from
authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the
aforementioned law."7
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan,"
appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16),
which found him guilty of three out of the four charges
lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations, 2 all signed
by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron
and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information 3 was
for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It
reads as follows:
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan
Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house
located at Rio Hondo,4 this City, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x
his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y
Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated
drug [was] used in any form."5
The third Information,8 for multiple attempted murder with

direct assault, was worded thus:
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then
armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and
other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x
one another and with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill
The second Information6 charged appellant with illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it below:
86
SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,]
SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then
and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16
Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives,
aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the
above-named police officers, well known to the accused as
members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City
Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority,
who at the time of the attack were engaged in the
performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when
said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally
issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of
the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of
multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused
did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the
above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their
own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact
that all the above-named police officers were able to seek
cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and
explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said
police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the
accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan
and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and
subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2
Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and
has remained at-large."9
conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the

lower court. The accused were consequently released from
jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took
place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of
not guilty.11 After pretrial, the assailed Decision was
rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE,
the
Court
finds
accused WALPAN
LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN "1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article
III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and
SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of
Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said
crime with costs de oficio;
"3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294,
and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal

possession of drugs.10
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam
and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon
motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had
87
"4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with
Multiple
Attempted
Homicide
and SENTENCES said
accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as
minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) and to pay the costs." (emphasis in the
original)
"After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed

by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the
house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board
several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22,
1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house,
three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the
house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998,
pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen
were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the
house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming
from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire
at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
Hence, this appeal.12

The Facts
"SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3

Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen saw
appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew
appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together
with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent
Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the
movements at the second floor of the house while other
policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp.
50-51).
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the
facts in this wise:
"At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos
Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does
(Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30
p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the
office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City
Police Office in connection with the service of the search
warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe
Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the
briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor
of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3
Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search.
Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN,
March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
"In front of the house was an extension building connected

to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76).
Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut
entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting
opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other
members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and
Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went
inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen
surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala
together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the
88
old women took the children to the second floor while the
young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the

presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998,
pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with
fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50),
each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
"Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor

where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at them
through the window. While they were going upstairs,
appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the
bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies,
jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house.
Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from
the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant.
Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the
policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second
floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar
Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a
brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
"Other items were found during the search, namely,

assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN,
April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber
revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1)
M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty
shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of
an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
"Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the AntiVice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the
morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2
Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson
knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998,
p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen (15)
times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at
appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of
shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of
shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go
behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six
(6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene
lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They
asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He
placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the
table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
"At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh.

B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the
second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225.
He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet
inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17)
live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more
M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live
ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21)
live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16
rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor
(TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
"After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house,
Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and entered
the house. After identifying themselves as members of the
PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old
women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera
"While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire

coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered
89
appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through]
the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house.
Appellant told them to escape because the police are
already here. They scampered and ran away because
there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence
and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near
the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home
(Ibid., pp. 17-19).
Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh.
B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4).
They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination
(TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
"With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination
conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise
a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service
Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils
each containing white crystalline granules with a total
weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive
results
for
the
presence
of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination
of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh.
K) yielded negative results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
"The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the

police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating
what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997.
"After the search and before returning to the police station,
P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized
(Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search.
The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer,
and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio
reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was
given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the
properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
"The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of

the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant
had not applied/filed any application for license to possess
firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to
carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)" 14
"An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D.

Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both
hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates
(Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had
fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p.
11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on
September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms
were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade)
with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber
revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts
given by the lower court.15 Hence, we quote the pertinent
parts of the assailed Decision:
"Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30
years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling (tsn,
p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and
bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes
(tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul
Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam
90
[was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more
people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul
Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified
that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he
was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of
Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in
Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a
sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for
Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his
neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots.
He woke up and went out of the house and that was the
time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at]
the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence
where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p.
7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering
that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate.
He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who
arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and
placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary
School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the
policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the
policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5,
id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would]
die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my
house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which
according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun
does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that
(tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he
does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said
that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle
magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14
magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two
(2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50)
aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50)

placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins
placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline
stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the
policemen just produced those things as their evidence.
The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by
the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue
bag containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I
think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their
evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
"Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who
were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns
that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension
house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is
Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already
because they were afraid when the police raided the place.
(tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution
witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson
recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and
he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell
anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not
selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are plenty
of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place,
in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is
Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
"After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the
police station where he stayed for one day and one night
before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the
police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes
two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police
station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his
younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match.
91
From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional
Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to
paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a

bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not
seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams
house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
"During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy

Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the
younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam
said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot
them[,] only I do not know his name." They were killed at
the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed
against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33May 4, 1998).
"Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified

that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen
arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go
to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring
to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist
bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie
down in prone position and a policeman searched his back.
They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch.
He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead
leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to
the police station where he was detained for one day and
one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months
and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29,
May 5, 1998).
"Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was

in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id
at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother
of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two
small children and a helper when soldiers entered the
house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns)
even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were
armed with short and long firearms. They searched the
house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They
entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open
a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the
bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and
poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not
in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A
Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search
was conducted and just before the policemen left the place.
Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the
afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search
Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin
Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman
Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost
"Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the

afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the house of
her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma.
There is only one house between her parents house and
the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman
is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When
Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was
looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband.
When her husband went down, he was instructed by the
policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the
policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other
companions who also shot her husband while he was lying
down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).
92
"Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n
the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the
door of her house watching her children playing when a
motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The
driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went
down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at
Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got
her children and when she was about to enter the room of
her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there
was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died,
namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali
(tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of

Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id)."16
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was
raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant
No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court
nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for
more than one specific offense, 17 in violation of Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 18 The courta quo ruled:
"It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No.
20 is totally null and void because it was issued for more
than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule
1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense xxx . In Tambasan vs.
People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that
a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot
warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised
Rules of Court and is totally null and void." 19(emphasis in
the original)
"Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old,

testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at
Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of
traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already
late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside
the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the
gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police
advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was
already over and things were already taken inside the
house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things
that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the
shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search
Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered
during the search which were being listed. They were being
counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the things that
were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt
(Exh. "P"; "P-1") of the things x x x taken during the search"
(tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at
the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as

valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who
were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was
established by the testimonies of several police
officers,20 who were participants in the raid, and confirmed
by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on
the firearms and appellant.21 Additionally, the judge noted
that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his
Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in
open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire
93
during the raid.22 The trial court concluded that the
testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants
narration that he was not in his house when the raid was
conducted.
and three other M16 rifle magazines.25 The trial court

observed that these items were in "plain view" of the
pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same
items were "evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or
contraband and therefore, subject to seizure" 26 since
appellant "had not applied for a license to possess firearm
and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside
his residence."27
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the

arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
"Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to
pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the
firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter
his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the
firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of
Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An
offense is committed in the presence or within the view of
an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the
time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who
intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused
was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was
pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of
shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the
Search Warrant."23
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence,

appellants claim that the items that were seized by the
police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial
court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant
evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so
during the previous raids or those conducted after his
arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would
choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by
the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might
testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations,
saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak
defense.28
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of
maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
"The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by
SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr.
clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and
maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu
or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was
sold, and where persons or customers bought and used
shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the
said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of
an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the

following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a
magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)24 used by
appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines,
94
where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or
are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct
evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and
circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation
of the house, or its general reputation among police
officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an
extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly
buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail
over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and
SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the
extension house but he alleged that there were four (4)
occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the
name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly
from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being
uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by
evidence as to when or for how long was the extension
house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other
document showing that the extension house was in fact
rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the
weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary
weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration
of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements
of the accused, the former deserve more credence." 29
"x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the

policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a
search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted
murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman
was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance
was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted
murder.
"The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be
held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article
III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as
amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum
foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found
in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him
considering that they were seized after [a] search
conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is
totally null and void as it was issued for more than one
offense, and were not found in plain viewof the police
officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be
held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225
and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition
and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and
twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering
that the policemen who recovered or seized the other
firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue
bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the
accused
Walpan
Ladjaalam
a.k.a. Warpan because
according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in

this manner:
95
do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins
should be turned over to the National Treasury." 30
discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on

appellant.
The Issues
The Courts Ruling
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of

Errors:
The appeal has no merit.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his

request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam residence.
He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded
the lower court "a better perspective and an idea with
respect to the scene of the crime."32 We do not agree.
"The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police
officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant
upon him which led to an exchange of fire between
Ladjaalam and the police officer.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case,

especially in the light of the clear testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.33 We note in particular that the
defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to
sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly
good idea of appellants house.34 Viewing the site of the
raid would have only delayed the proceedings. 35 Moreover,
the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event
has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the
trial judge.36 Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise
of that discretion.37
II
"The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right
and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of the
firefight and where the house of the appellant [was]
located.
III
"The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded] the
claim
of
the
appellant
that
the
firearms
and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted
by the police."31
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.38 Suffice it to state that the trial
courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded
respect, even finality.39 After carefully examining the
records and finding no material inconsistencies to support
appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these

issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular
inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and
(c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also
96
general rule.40 Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these
witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon
the approaching police elements, and that he had
subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol
Jr.41 testified thus:
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
"PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
A: Yes.
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the

accused?
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went
inside the house, right?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the

main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the
ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of
his house[;] I saw two old woman.
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
COURT:
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you
were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were fired
upon?
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?

A: I did not mind those two old women because those two
women were sitting on the ground floor. I was concentrating
on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards
our group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went
upstairs to the second floor of the house.
A: More or less, five (5) meters.

xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the
gate was opened by your colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I
will reform that question.
A: Yes.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
Q: What happened when you were already on the second

floor?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos

Obut.
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan

[sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately
97
went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went
immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x
x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14
rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the
second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
xxx
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find
this?
xxx
xxx
COURT:
A: At the sala set.
Reform. That is leading
Q: This sala set where is this located?
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the

roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs

and asked the assistance of the members of the raiding
team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
xxx
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you
recovered from the sale set?
xxx
A: Yes.
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
A: Yes.
Q: Were you able to go down?
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: Yes.
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my

initial.
Q: What happened when you were there?

A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of
the members of the raiding team and the investigator of
the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to
manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam."42
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where
is the Serial No. of this?
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police

Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,43 as follows:
FISCAL NUVAL:
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine,

one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?

98
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the
chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over to
the investigator.
A: In the corner.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Can you identify them?
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
A: Yes.
Q: Where are your initials?
Q: Why?
A: On the magazines.
A: I put x x x markings.
Q: RJL?
xxx
A: RJL."44
xxx
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
xxx
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests

conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during
the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons,
particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for
gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro
explained in open court:
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you
found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle
magazines and three M14.
"Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination,

Madam Witness?
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?

A: Empty.
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of

the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder nitrates.
Q: How about the M14?
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that

indicate?
A: Found with [ammunition].

xxx
xxx
xxx
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?

99
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are
so many circumstances [why] a person [would be] positive
on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing

of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
A: Yes.
xxx
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.

xxx
xxx
COURT:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired,
during the incident?
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is

the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: Yes.
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the
barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and traces of
brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the

brown residue?
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: Yes, Your Honor."45 (emphasis supplied)
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements 46 of

the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the
established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon
the approaching police officers clearly showed the
existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession
thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the
prosecutions Certification47 stating that he had not filed
any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he
had not been given authority to carry any outside his
residence.48 Further, it should be pointed out that his
possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously
unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in
favor of, or carried by, a private individual. 49
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be
possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

100
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by
appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is
frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house
were "planted," and that the entire Zamboanga police force
was out to get him at all cost.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in

this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was resting and
sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the
shots were directed towards our house.. and I inspected
and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was
apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house;
[the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose
house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring
to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from]
which you said you heard gunshots?
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up

is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly
difficult to disprove.50 Absent any showing of an improper
motive on the part of the police officers,51coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty,
such defense cannot be given much credence. 52 Indeed,
after examining the records of this case, we conclude that
appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the
contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial. 53 He
testified thus:
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated
and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24,
1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two
old women and my children, is this correct?
"Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an

Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A They were not there.

Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you
were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your
house or you were in your neighbors[] house at that time
when you heard gunshots?
A I could not remember.

Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before
this representation on the 8th day of December 1997[;] tell
us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten
name
A I was in the house near my house.
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your

Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house at
Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?

(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct."54
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Crime and Punishment

101
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1)
maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with
attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms.
We will discuss each of these.
Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him
also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms
under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced
him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor.
Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of
maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was
correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was
clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension
house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions,
including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was
corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified
before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of
the house and its extension lent credence to the
prosecutions story.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the

ground that the trial court should not have applied the new
law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the
applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior
to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify
the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the
changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now
are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new
law, which provides as follows:
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of
direct assault55 with multiple counts of attempted homicide.
It found that "[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle
[at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to
serve a search warrant x x x" constituted such complex
crime.56
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as

amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of
not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and
other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries

the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the
penalty of prision correccional.57 Hence, for the present
complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which
constitutes the "most serious crime," should be imposed
and applied in its maximum period.58
102
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition:Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any

person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor."
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a

fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if
the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45
and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.
Citing People v. Jayson,59 the OSG argues that the foregoing

provision does not cover the specific facts of this case.
Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful
homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted
of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second
paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since
there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot
be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third
paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the
OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but
PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes
simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime
is committed at the same time.60
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an

unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that

appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however.
Considering that it could not have been ignorant of
the proviso61 in the second paragraph, it seemed to have
construed "no other crime" as referring only to homicide
and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms
is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime
other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may
still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this
case, the other crime committed was direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found
appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner,

president, manager, director or other responsible officer of
any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the
provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or
knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of
their residence in the course of their employment.
103
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because
they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple
reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if
the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession
of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance,
not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant
can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of
firearms.
which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained

the specific proviso that "no other crime was committed."
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson65 is
misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of
appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had
also committed homicide. We explained, however, that "the
criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for
consideration."
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court.
We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the second
paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the
accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by
the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the
second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and
murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the

accused.62 In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s
simple language is most favorable to herein appellant.
Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language
of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor
the accused.63 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted
of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover,
since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot
be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates

appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense
which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first isprision mayor, for
the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of
firearms by using such weapons in committing an even
lighter offense,66 like alarm and scandal67or slight physical
injuries,68 both of which are punishable by arresto
menor.69 This consequence, however, necessarily arises
from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject
to the Courts review. Any perception that the result
reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded

prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in
this case.1wphi1 When the crime was committed on
September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had
already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took
effect on July 6, 1997.64 In other words, no longer in
existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which
justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms
separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294
104
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give
statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence70 to the proven facts, and we have done so in
this case.
The legal issue presented in this petition for review is

whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the
private respondents on October 23, 1973 bar an action for
recovery of deficiency income taxes under P.D.'s Nos. 23,
213 and 370.
On April 15, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila, Branch XVI, to collect from the spouses Antonio
Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for
the years 1955 to 1959 in the amount of P17,117.08 with a
5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, and costs.
WHEREFORE,
the
appealed
Decision
is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and
multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for
which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years
of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for
which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court
to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the

motion was denied.1wphi1 On August 2, 1975, they filed
an answer admitting there was an assessment against
them of P17,117.08 for income tax deficiency but denying
liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of
the tax amnesty under P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had
paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting to
P10,400 or 10% of their reported untaxed income under
P.D. 23, P2,951.20 or 20% of the reported untaxed income
under P.D. 213, and a final payment on October 26, 1973
under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government's Official
Receipt No. 1052388. Consequently, the Government is in
estoppel to demand and compel further payment of income
taxes by them.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the

Philippines for a possible review, at its sound discretion, of
RA 8294.
SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-69344
April 26, 1991
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES
ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR, respondents.
The parties agreed that there were no issues of fact to be

litigated, hence, the case was submitted for decision upon
the pleadings and memoranda on the lone legal question
of: whether or not the payment of deficiency income tax
under the tax amnesty, P.D. 23, and its acceptance by the
Roberto L. Bautista for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
105
Government operated to divest the Government of the right
to further recover from the taxpayer, even if there was an
existing assessment against the latter at the time he paid
the amnesty tax.
the very assessment for the questioned years. By accepting

the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the
Government, therefore, waived its right to further recover
deficiency incomes taxes "from the defendants under the
existing assessment against them because:
It is not disputed that as a result of an investigation made

by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1963, it was found
that the private respondents owed the Government
P1,283,621.63 as income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959,
inclusive of the 50% surcharge and 1% monthly interest.
The defendants protested against the assessment. A
reinvestigation was conducted resulting in the drastic
reduction of the assessment to only P17,117.08.
1. the defendants' amnesty income tax returns' Summary

Statement included therein the deficiency assessment for
the years 1955 to 1959;
2. tax amnesty payment was made by the defendants
under Presidential Decree No. 213, hence, it had the effect
of remission of the income tax deficiency for the years 1955
to 1959;
It appears that on April 27, 1978, the private respondents

offered to pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the sum of
P5,000 by way of compromise settlement of their income
tax deficiency for the questioned years, but Assistant
Commissioner Bernardo Carpio, in a letter addressed to the
Pastor spouses, rejected the offer stating that there was no
legal or factual justification for accepting it. The
Government filed the action against the spouses in 1980,
ten (10) years after the assessment of the income tax
deficiency was made.
3. P.D. No. 23 as well as P.D. No. 213 do not make any

exceptions nor impose any conditions for their application,
hence, Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 which excludes certain
taxpayers from the coverage of P.D. No. 213 is null and
void, and
4. the acceptance of tax amnesty payment by the plaintiffappellant bars the recovery of deficiency taxes. (pp. 3-4,
IAC Decision, pp. 031-032, Rollo.)
The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant
Court (AC G.R. CV No. 68371 entitled, "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Antonio Pastor, et al."), alleging that the
private respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax
amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are
available only to persons who had no pending assessment
for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos.
8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending
assessment against them, they were precluded from
availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.'s Nos. 23 and 213.
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the

Government, which the spouses did not oppose, the trial
court rendered a decision on February 28, 1980, holding
that the defendants spouses had settled their income tax
deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or
P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213, as shown in the Amnesty
Income Tax Returns' Summary Statement and the tax
Payment Acceptance Order for P2,951.20 with its
corresponding official receipt, which returns also contain
106
The Government further argued that "tax exemptions
should be interpreted strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer."
On November 23, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court

(now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the
Government's appeal and holding that the payment of
deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213,
and the acceptance thereof by the Government, operated
to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency
income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the
existing deficiency tax assessment against them. The
appellate court held that if Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 did
provide an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, such
provision was null and void for being contrary to, or
restrictive of, the clear mandate of P.D. No. 213 which the
regulation should implement. Said revenue regulation may
not prevail over the provisions of the decree, for it would
then be an act of administrative legislation, not mere
implementation, by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that

P.D. 213 contains no exemptions from its coverage and
that, under Letter of Instruction LOI 129 dated September
18, 1973, the immunities granted by P.D. 213 include:
II-Immunities Granted.
Upon payment of the amounts specified in the Decree, the
following shall be observed:
1. . . . .
2. The taxpayer shall not be subject to any investigation,
whether civil, criminal or administrative, insofar as his
declarations in the income tax returns are concerned nor
shall the same be used as evidence against, or to the
prejudice of the declarant in any proceeding before any
court of law or body, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative, in which he is a defendant or respondent,
and he shall be exempt from any liability arising from or
incident to his failure to file his income tax return and to
pay the tax due thereon, as well as to any liability for any
other tax that may be due as a result of business
transactions from which such income, now voluntarily
declared may have been derived. (Emphasis supplied; p.
040, Rollo.)
On February 4, 1986, the Republic of the Philippines,

through the Solicitor General, filed this petition for review of
the decision dated November 23, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the dismissal, by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, of the Government's complaint against
the respondent spouses.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment of
P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since
the latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount
to the Government by way of amnesty taxes under P.D. No.
213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an
amnesty, for their past tax failings, the Government is
estopped from collecting the difference between the
There is nothing in the LOI which can be construed as

authority for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to introduce
exceptions and/or conditions to the coverage of the law.
107
deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid by
them as amnesty tax.
disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of

fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absense of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Thelma
Fernan
vs.
CA,
et
al.,
181
SCRA
546, citing Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; People vs.
Traya, 147 SCRA 381), none of which is present in this case.
A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional

overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties
on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a
revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or
waiver by the Government of its right to collect what
otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, prejudicial
thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent
and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby
become a part of the new society with a clean slate
(Commission of Internal Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and
Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).
The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be

construed strictly against the Government and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to
be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this
case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares (Commission
of Internal Revenue vs. La Tondena, Inc. and CTA, 5 SCRA
665, citing Manila Railroad Company vs. Collector of
Customs, 52 Phil, 950).
The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency

income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by
the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to
persons who are required by law to file income tax returns
but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect
and may not be disturbed except under exceptional
circumstances which have already become familiar (Rule
45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; e.g., where: (1) the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence in
which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied. No costs.

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 108524 November 10, 1994
MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT
OF
FINANCE
SECRETARY,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE (BIR), AND REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER,
BIR MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.
Damasing Law Office for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
108
This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to
nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin
the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value
Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of
petitioner organization. 1
Under 103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural

non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT
only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of
the land from which the same are produced. The sale made
by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not
exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under 103(b) the
sale of agricultural food products in their original state is
exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution
regardless of who the seller is.
Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc.

is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or
collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra
in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the
issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June
11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was
classified as agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt
from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.
The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or

non-food product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC.
On June 11, 1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued the circular in question, classifying copra as
an agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt
from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer
pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." 2
Respondents represent departments of the executive

branch of government charged with the generation of funds
and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other
imposts.
The reclassification had the effect of denying to the

petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra
was classified as an agricultural food product under 103(b)
of the NIRC. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various
grounds, which will be presently discussed although not in
the order raised in the petition for prohibition.
The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:

Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. The following shall be
exempt from the value-added tax:
First. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug

of the Department of Health and not the BIR is the
competent government agency to determine the proper
classification of food products. Petitioner cites the opinion
of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to
the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it
is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut
products are edible.
(a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products

in their original state by the primary producer or the owner
of the land where the same are produced;
(b) Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural
and marine food products, livestock and poultry of a kind
generally used as, or yielding or producing foods for human
consumption, and breeding stock and genetic material
therefor;
109
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the opinion
of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the
implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is
entitled to great respect.
should be classified as an agricultural food product since

copra is produced from coconut meat which is food and
based on available information, more than 80% of products
derived from copra are edible products.
We agree with respondents. In interpreting 103(a) and (b)

of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a
strict construction consistent with the rule that tax
exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar
said that his classification of copra as food was based on
"the broader definition of food which includes agricultural
commodities and other components used in the
manufacture/processing of food." The full text of his letter
reads:
Very truly yours,

QUINTIN
L.
KINTANAR,
M.D.,
Ph.D.
Director
Assistant Secretary of Health for Standards and Regulations
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the
enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is
plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling
was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the
exercise of his power under 245 of the NIRC to "make
rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of
the provisions of internal revenue laws,including rulings on
the classification of articles for sales tax and similar
purposes."
10 April 1991
Mr.
VICTOR
Chairman
VAT
Bureau
of
Diliman, Quezon City
A.
DEOFERIO,
JR.
Review
Committee
Internal
Revenue
Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process

because it was not heard before the ruling was made. There
is a distinction in administrative law between legislative
rules and interpretative rules. 3 There would be force in
petitioner's argument if the circular in question were in the
nature of a legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere
interpretative rule.
Dear Mr. Deoferio:

This is to clarify a previous communication made by this
Office about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990
stating that copra is not classified as food. The statement
was made in the context of BFAD's regulatory
responsibilities which focus mainly on foods that are
processed and packaged, and thereby copra is not covered.
The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in

the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of
public hearing, it is generally required that before a
However, in the broader definition of food which include

agricultural commodities and other components used in the
manufacture/ processing of food, it is our opinion that copra
110
legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this
connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its

judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. 6
Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an

agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.
In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that

respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as
an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of
103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends,
"copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for
human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for
food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not
reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the
ruling of his predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the overruling
of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid

unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall
be observed. 4
Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is

discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and
copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not,
although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add
that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT
payment of traders and dealers.
In addition such rule must be published. 5 On the other

hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free
to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the
delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii)
whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued
pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to
substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of
the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to
administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In
the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the
validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As
a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the
The argument has no merit. There is a material or

substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra
producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers,
on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the
latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid
the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a
reasonable basis for classifying them differently. 8
It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant
to 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the
111
sale of services. Under 104 of the Tax Code, they are
allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by
traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is
made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT
exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are
allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by other
traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is
made by the producer.
RAMON
CORPORAL, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
and
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE
SYSTEM,respondents.
Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is

counterproductive because traders and dealers would be
forced to buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt
from the VAT and that to the extent that prices are reduced
the government would lose revenues as the 10% tax base
is correspondingly diminished.
QUIASON, J.:
This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is

exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer
or owner of the land from which the same is produced, but
in the case of agricultural food products their sale in their
original state is exempt at all stages of production or
distribution. At any rate, the argument that the
classification of copra as agricultural non-food product is
counterproductive is a question of wisdom or policy which
should be addressed to respondent officials and to
Congress.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of

the Employees' Compensation Commission which denied
petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended.
Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school

teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November
28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves
Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and
premature ventricular contractions.
On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero
Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk
three kilometers to and from said school as no
transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers
from the national highway to the school. During her fourth
pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was
hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital.
After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994
In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in

September of the same year, she was transferred to the
112
Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more
than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984,
she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An
hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception
Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a
hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day
due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a
"prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old
when she died.
Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation

Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to reevaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine
compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is
denied once more by the System, the entire record of the
case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial
of petitioner's claim.
On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also
denying petitioner's claim. It said:
Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a

claim for compensation benefit with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied
petitioner's claim thus:
Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in

infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas.
Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the
supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first
two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually
elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal
tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak
cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree or
complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the
uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire
vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585).
Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and

evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death
of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage,
Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational
disease as contemplated under the above-mentioned law
(P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her
position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of
contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23).
Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of
the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation
of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting
Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter
its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that
her cause of death is non-work-connected as contemplated
under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase
the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25).
On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms

often used to describe a syndrome characterized by
prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by
vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe
inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this
condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina
pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings
associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The
syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of one's
coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to
113
the heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy,
pp. 100-101).
during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner

asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge
her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her
pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus.
Based on the above medical discussion of the subject

ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal
illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and
working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing
that the nature of her duties caused the development of
prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of
childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late
stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as
non-work-connected illness for the reason that it is caused
by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to
supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no
damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no
recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant
claim (Rollo, pp. 29-31).
Petitioner also contends that the findings of the

respondents contravene the constitutional provision on
social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's
compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions
should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees
whose rights it intends to protect.
Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the
resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the
claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set
therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182
[1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of
aggravation and presumption of compensability under the
old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies
(Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213
SCRA 715 [1992]).
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting

compensability of the death of his wife.
II
Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not
one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim
should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors
such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or
before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical
tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of
Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition
was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her
place of teaching Banadero Elementary School, which is
situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the
roads leading to the school are full of ruts and rocks, and,
Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment

which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he
merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must
positively show that the risk of contracting Norma's illness
was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to
satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law.
114
The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday
and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one
kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient
to establish that such condition caused her to develop
prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present
medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma
had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her
vagina and rectum.
at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated with

the prolapse.Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in
women who have never borne children, and in these the
prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus
through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor(Emphasis
supplied).
The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also
describes the condition as follows:
Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was

multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite
beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to
her fifth child she was already forty years old.Novak's
Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus
(descensus uteri) as follows:
Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result

of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the
transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired
obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and
perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the
pelvic structures with aging and congenital weakness can
accelerate the development of prolapse.
An extremely common condition, being far more frequent

in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by the
increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial
structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may
thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine
prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies
in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications,
as noted by Piver and Spezia.
The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's

uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is
therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the
physiological structure and changes in the body on
pregnancy and childbirth.
With the evidence presented in support of the claim,
petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor
and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed
in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule
that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor
laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of
the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear
and leave no room for interpretation.
The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is

undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor, and
especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the
bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is
usually extensive injury to the perineal structures,
producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent
injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls,
with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually,
various combinations of these conditions are seen, although
115
The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children
for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the
importance of the services rendered by public elementary
school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are
not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding
the values and character of the youth in this country (De
Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA
685 [1984]).
The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is the

widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever"
while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal
High School, Las Pias Rizal, on May 8, 1975.
The petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service
Insurance for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626.
In a letter dated June 19, 1975, the Government Service
Insurance denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of
Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational
disease.
But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest,
not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form
of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's
wife.
G.R. No. L-44899 April 22, 1981
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the

ground that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in
perfect health when admitted to the service and that the
ailment of said deceased was attributable to his
employment.
MARIA
E.
MANAHAN, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GSIS
(LAS PIAS MUNICIPAL HIGH SCHOOL),respondents.
The Government Service Insurance System affirmed the

denial of the claim on the ground that enteric fever or
paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the
sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation

Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System on a finding that the ailment of
the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or
aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan,
Jr. as a teacher. 2
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0070 (Nazario
Manahan,
Jr.,
deceased),
entitled "Maria
Manahan,
Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System,
(Las Pias Municipal High School), Respondent" affirming
the decision of the Government Service Insurance System
which denied the claim for death benefit. 1
To support her theory that the disease of Nazario Manahan,

Jr., enteric fever, resulted from his employment as
classroom teacher of the Las Pias Municipal High School,
the petitioner cites the following authority:
116
EPIDEMOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY
the disease, Mr. Harrison states that recovery (from enteric

or paratyphoid fever) may be followed by continued
excretion of the causative organism in the stools for several
months (id., p. 817). This lingering nature of the species
producing enteric fever points out the possibility that the
illness which afflicted the deceased in 1974 was the same
as, or at least, related to, his 1975 illness.
OF ENTERIC FEVER
THE SOURCE OF INFECTION is feces or urine from patients
and carriers. Family contacts may be transient carriers and
2 to 5% of patients become chronic carriers. In poorly
sanitized communities, water is the most frequent vehicle
of transmission; food, especially milk, is the next most
important. In modern urban areas, food, contaminated by
healthy carriers who are food handlers, is the principal
vehicle. Flies may spread the organism from feces to food.
Direct contact infection is infrequent.
The medical record of the deceased shows that he had a

history of ulcer-like symptoms (p. 3, ECC rec.). This
butresses the claimant's claim that her husband had been
suffer from ulcer several months before his death on May 8,
1975. This is likewise sustained by the medical certificate
(p. 12, ECC rec.) issued by Dr. Aquilles Bernabe to the effect
that "Nazario Manahan was treated for epigastric pain
probably due to hyper-acidity on December 10, 1974."
Epigastric pain is a symptom of ulcer, and ulcer is a
common complication of typhoid fever. There is even such a
thing as "typhoidal ulcer" (p. 812, supra).
The organism enters the body through the gastrointestinal

tract, invading the blood stream by way of the lymphatic
channels. There is hyperplasia and often ulceration of
Pyeris patches, especially in the ileum and cecum. When
the ulcers heals, no scar results. The kidneys and liver
usually show cloudly swelling and the latter may reveal a
patchy necrosis The spleen is enlarged and soft. Rarely, the
lungs show pneumonic changes. (Merck Manual 10th Edit.,
P. 842) 3
Because of these circumstances, the illness that claimed

the life of the deceased could have had its onset months
before December 10, 1974. Such being the case, his cause
of action accrued before December 10, 1974.
The factual findings of the respondent Commission indicate

that the deceased was in perfect health when he entered
government service on July 20, 1969, and that in the course
of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric
pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975.
In the case of Corales vs. ECI (L-44063, Feb. 27, 1979), We

ruled that:
... Article 294, Title III (Transitory and Final Provisions) of the
New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims
accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time
of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article
292, Title 11 Prescription of Offenses and Claims,
Enteric fever is referred to in medical books as typhoid

fever (Dorlands Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Ed., p.
548) or paratyphoid fever (Harrison's Principles of Internal
Medicine, 6th Ed., p. 817). Its symptoms include abdominal
pain (id., p. 810). In discussing the clinical manifestations of
117
workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to the
effectivity of this Code and during the period from
November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be
processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and
rules at the time their causes of action accrued. Hence, this
Court applied the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon
petitioner's claim.
ingestion of contaminated food or drinks. Contamination of

food or water may come from the excretion of animals such
as rodents flies, or human beings who are sick or who are
carriers, or infection in meat of animals as food. Meat, milk
and eggs are the foods most frequently involved in the
transmission of this type of species, since the organism
may multiply even before ingestion. ..." These findings of
the respondent Commission lead to the conclusion that the
risk of contracting the fatal illness was increased by the
decedent's working condition.
Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions

of the Workmen's Compensation Act in this case, the
presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the
claimant.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is

meritorious.
In any case, We have always maintained that in case of

doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker,
and that social legislations like the Workmen's
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give
relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event
that the former should die or sustain an injury.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside the
Government Service Insurance System is ordered:
1. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS (P6,000.00) as death compensation benefit;
2. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P600.00) as attorney's fees;
Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of social justice and

protection to labor make Us take a second look at the
evidence presented by the claimant.
3. To reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for

medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the
deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper
receipts; and
As a teacher of the Las Pias Municipal High School at Las

Pias Rizal, the deceased used to eat his meals at the
school canteen. He also used the toilet and other facilities
of the school. Said the respondent Commission," ... it is not
improbable that the deceased might have contracted the
illness during those rare moments that he was away from
his family, since it is medically accepted that enteric fever
is caused by salmonella organisms which are acquired by
4. To pay administrative fees.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and De Castro,
JJ., concur.
118
G.R. No. 110170 February 21, 1994
attaching thereto P200.00 in cash as payment for docket

fees. In a letter 4 dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch
28, informed Pahilan that the correct fees that where
supposed to be paid amounted to P620.00, and that,
accordingly, the petition would not be entered in the court
docket and summons would not be issued pending payment
of the balance of P420.00.
ROLETO
A.
PAHILAN, petitioner,
vs.
RUDY A. TABALBA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
HONORABLE JUDGE SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR.,
BRANCH 28, MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, respondents.
Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for
petitioner.
On June 16, 1992, upon receipt of the latter, Pahilan paid

the required balance in the total amount P470.00. 5
Marciano Ll. Aparte, Jr. for Rudy A. Tabalba.
Subsequently, on June 22, 1992, Tabalba filed his answer

with Counterclaim, 6 alleging as one of his affirmative
defenses lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to
entertain the election protest for having been filed beyond
the ten-day period provided by law.
REGALADO, J.:
This original action for certiorari impugns the Order 1 of
respondent Commission on Elections, dated January 19,
1993, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Roleto A.
Pahilan for the latter's failure to file a notice of appeal with
the Regional Trial Court of Mumbajao, Camiguin, and,
necessarily
on
the
same
rationale,
the
2
Resolution promulgated by said respondent on May 6,
1993 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On August 17, 1992, Pahilan filed a Motion for Inhibition,

dated August 14, 1992, because of alleged serious and
grave doubts that the presiding judge could impartially hear
and decide his election protest with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge, as the latter allegedly belongs to and had
supported a political group adverse to the candidacy of
petitioner.
Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were

candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin during the
local elections held on May 11, 1992. On May 13, 1992, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as the
duly elected Mayor of Guinsilban, the latter having
garnered 1,087 votes as against 806 votes for Pahilan.
On August 18, 1992, the trial court

trial conference, heard the defense
of jurisdiction for non-payment
thereafter ordered the parties to
memoranda.
proceeded with the preon the allegation of lack

of docket fees, and
submit their respective
Tabalba filed his Memorandum in Support of Affirmative

Defense of Lack of Jurisdiction, 7 dated September 4, 1992.
Under date of September 22, 1992, Pahilan filed a
Thereafter, Pahilan filed an election protest 3 which he sent

by registered mail on May 23, 1992, addressed to the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin,
119
Memorandum 8 as well as a Motion to Resolve Motion for
Inhibition Prior to Resolution of Affirmative Defenses. 9
aforestated resolution
reconsideration.
On October 2, 1992, the trial court issued an

Order 10 denying the motion for inhibition and dismissing
the election protest for "non-payment on time of the
required fees for filing an initiatory pleading." Pahilan's
counsel received a copy of said order on October 12, 1992
in Cagayan de Oro City.
Hence, this petition on the bases of the following assigned

errors:
denying
Pahilan's
motion
for
1. Whether or not respondent Commission validly dismissed

the verified "Appeal" of petitioner which contains all the
elements of a "notice of appeal" and more expressive of the
intent to elevate the case for review by said appellate body,
and furnishing copies thereof to the respondent trial judge
and counsel for the adverse party, aside from the
incomplete payment of the appeal fee; and
On October 17, 1992 and within the 5-day period to appeal,

Pahilan filed a verified appeal brief 11 in respondent
Commission on Elections, with copies duly served on the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin and the counsel
for herein private respondent.
2. Whether or not the respondent trial judge validly

dismissed the petition of protest of petitioner for nonpayment on time of the required fee.
On December 12, 1992, the Comelec Contests Adjudication

Department directed the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Camiguin, Branch 28, to immediately transmit the
complete records of EP case No. 3(92) which was being
appealed
by
herein
petitioner. 12 Thereafter,
in
a
13
letter dated January 7, 1993, the said Clerk of Court
informed respondent Commission that "to this very late
date, this office has not received any notice of appeal from
the aggrieved party." As a consequence, respondent
Commission, in an Order dated January 19, 1993, dismissed
Pahilan's verified appeal for failure to appeal within the
prescribed period.
We find cogency and merit in the petition.

The bone of contention in this petition is the alleged
erroneous dismissal of petitioner's appeal by respondent
Commission because of the failure of petitioner to file a
notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao, Camiguin which, in turn, dismissed the election
protest of petitioner for non-payment of docket fees.
The COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE provide for the
manner in which appeals from decisions of courts in
election contests shall be made, to wit:
Pahilan filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the order

dismissing his appeal. Both parties were required by
respondent Commission to file their respective memoranda.
Finally, on May 6, 1993, respondent Commission issued its
RULE 22 Appeals
in Election Protest Cases
from
Decisions
of
Courts
Sec. 1. Caption and title of appealed cases. In all election

contests involving the elections, returns, and qualifications
120
of municipal or barangay officials, the party interposing the
appeal shall be called the "Appellant" and the adverse
party the "Appellee", but the title of the case shall remain
as it was in the court of origin.
Sec. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. The appeal may

be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance
of the Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee;
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Failure of the appellant to file copies of his brief within

the time provided by these rules;
Sec. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after

promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved
party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve
a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse
party.
(c) Want of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's

brief; and
(d) Failure to file notice of appeal within the prescribed
period.
Sec. 4. Immediate transmittal of records of the case. The

Clerk of the court concerned shall, within fifteen (15) days
from the filing of the notice of appeal, transmit to the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department the complete
records of the case, together with all the evidence,
including the original and three(3) copies of the transcript
of stenographic notes of the proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the trial

court's order dismissing his election protest on October 12,
1992. As earlier stated, herein petitioner, instead of filing a
notice of appeal as required by the rules, filed with
respondent Commission a verified appeal brief within the
five-day reglementary period by registered mail under
Registry Receipt No. 43093, dated October 17, 1992. It will
be noted, however, that on even date, petitioner likewise
sent by registered mail copies of his appeal brief to the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, under Registry
Receipt No. 43091, and to the counsel of herein private
respondent, under Registry Receipt No. 43092. 15
Sec. 5. Filing of briefs. The Clerk of Court concerned,

upon receipt of the complete records of the case, shall
notify the appellant or his counsel to file with the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department within thirty (30) days
from receipt of such notice, ten (10) legible copies of his
brief with proof of service thereof upon the appellee.
The question now posed by the foregoing factual situation

is whether the notice of appeal can be validly substituted
by an appeal brief. We firmly believe and so hold, under the
considerations hereinunder discussed, that the same may
be allowed.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the brief of the

appellant, the appellee shall file ten (10) legible copies of
his brief with proof of service thereof upon the appellant.
xxx xxx xxx
121
First, in cases where a record on appeal is required under
the Rules of Court, it has been consistently held that the
filing or presentation and approval of the record on appeal
on time necessarily implies or involves the filing of the
notice of appeal, 16 because the act of taking or perfecting
an appeal is more expressive of the intention to appeal
than the filing of a mere notice to do so. 17
protract
action. 18
and
delay
the
trial
of
an
ordinary
For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose

upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means
within their command who is the real candidate elected in
as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered
by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the
will of the people may not be frustrated.19
If the courts can deign to be indulgent and lenient in the

interpretation of the rules respecting ordinary civil actions
involving private parties representing private interests, with
more reason should the rules involving election cases,
which are undoubtedly impressed with public interest, be
construed with the same or even greater forbearance and
liberality.
It is true that perfection of an appeal in the manner and

within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an
appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating
the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate
court
from
acquiring
jurisdiction
over
the
20
case. Nevertheless, in some instances, this Court has
disregarded such unintended lapses so as to give due
course to appeals on the basis of strong and compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing
a grave miscarriage thereof in the exercise of our equity
jurisdiction. 21
It has been frequently decided, it may be stated as a

general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued
with public interest since it involves not only the
adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty
which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with
respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office
within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep
in office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is
under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can only be
achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure with
It is our considered opinion that public interest is of far

greater importance than the justifications of substantial
justice and equity in seeking an exception to the general
rule. Hence, election cases, by their very nature, should
and ought to merit a similar exemption from a strict
application of technical rules of procedure.
Second, it has been shown and it is not even denied that
the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin, as well as the counsel
for private respondent, was furnished copies of the appeal
brief which were sent by registered mail on October 17,
122
1992, within the reglementary period to appeal. This fact
was never refuted by the Solicitor General in his Comment.
Concomitantly, although the Clerk of Court claimed that he
had not received any notice of appeal from herein
petitioner, it would be safe to assume, under the
circumstances, that the appeal brief duly directed mailed
was
received
in
the
regular
course
of
the
mail 22 and was, therefore, deemed filed with the trial court
as of the date of mailing.
We now proceed to resolve the issue anent the dismissal of

petitioner's election protest by the Regional Trial Court for
non-payment, or more accurately the incomplete payment,
of docket fees. Ordinarily, with the reversal of the
respondent Commission's questioned order, this case
should be remanded to said court for adjudication on the
merits. Considering, however, the exigencies of time
appurtenant to the disposition of election cases, and
considering further that the issue has at any rate been
squarely raised in this petition, it is now incumbent upon
this Court to act on the propriety of the trial court's order
dismissing the election protest for failure of petitioner to
pay the correct amount of docket fees.
Third, applying suppletorily the provisions of the Rules of

Court, 23 particularly Section 4, Rule 41 thereof, the
requirement is that a notice of appeal shall specify the
parties to the appeal; shall designate the judgment or
order, or part thereof, appealed from; and shall specify the
court to which the appeal is taken. A perusal of herein
petitioner's appeal brief will disclose the following
information: that the parties to the case are Roleto A.
Pahilan as protestant-appellant and Rudy A Tabalba as
protestee-appellee; that appellant therein is appealing from
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin, dismissing the petition for election contest in
Election Case No. 3(92); and that the appeal is being made
pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7166, that is,
before the Commission on Elections.
In dismissing petitioner's action, the trial court relied on the

rulings enunciated in the cases of Malimit vs. Degamo24 (an
action for quo warranto), Magaspi, et al. vs. Ramolete, et
al. 25 (a suit for recovery of possession and ownership of
land), Lee vs. Republic 26 (a petition for declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen), Manchester
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 27 (an
action for a sum of money and damages), Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd., (SIOL) et al. vs. Asuncion. 28 (a suit for a sum of
money and damages), and Tacay, et al. vs. Regional Trial
Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, etc., et al. 29 (an action
for damages). It bears emphasis that the foregoing cases,
except for Malimit vs.Degamo, are ordinary civil actions.
This fact alone would have sufficed for a declaration that
there was no basis for the dismissal of petitioner's protest
for the simple reason that an election contest is not an
ordinary civil action. Consequently the rules governing
ordinary civil actions are not necessarily binding on special
Accordingly, there is no gainsaying the fact that the

particulars which ought to be reflected in the notice of
appeal have been specifically and categorically spelled out
in the appeal brief of petitioner. Perforce, and in light of the
foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that petitioner
is entitled to the relief prayed for.
123
actions like an election contest wherein public interest will
be adversely affected.
purpose of election cases, especially if we consider the fact

that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in
their interpretation and application, bearing in mind always
that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary civil
actions would generally involve private interests while all
elections cases are, at all times, invested with public
interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or
technical infirmities.
The case of Malimit vs. Degamo, on its part, is not on all

fours with the present case. In that case, the petition
forquo warranto was mailed to the clerk of Court on
December 14, 1959 and was received by the latter on
December 17, 1959. The docket fee was deemed paid only
on January 5, 1960, because the petitioner therein failed to
prove his allegation that a postal money order for the
docket fee was attached to his petition. Hence, the petition
for quo warranto was correctly dismissed.
Again, the Court in Manchester made its ruling in view of its

finding that there existed the unethical practice of lawyers
and parties of filing an original complaint without specifying
in the prayer the amount of damages which, however, is
stated in the body of the complaint. This stratagem is
clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees by misleading the docket
clerk in the assessment thereof. Thus, the court therein
held that jurisdiction shall be acquired only upon payment
of the prescribed docket fee.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the sum of

P200.00 was attached to the petition mailed to the Regional
Trial Court of Camiguin and this fact was even
acknowledged by the Clerk of Court thereof when he
requested herein petitioner to pay the balance of the
correct docket fee. In Malimit, there was no docket fee paid
at all at the time of mailing; in the present case, the docket
fee was paid except that the amount given was not correct.
Considering the fact that there was an honest effort on the
part of herein petitioner to pay the full amount of docket
fees, we are not inclined to insist on a stringent application
of the rules.
That ruling was later relaxed in the case of Sun

Insurance which allowed the subsequent payment of the
correct docket fees provided it is made within the
reglementary period or before prescription has set in. The
reason given was that there was no intent on the part of
the petitioners therein to defraud the government, unlike
the plaintiff in the case of Manchester.
Furthermore, there are strong and compelling reasons to

rule
that
the
doctrine
we
have
established
inManchester and cases subsequent thereto cannot be
made to apply to election cases.
In Tacay, et al. vs. Tagum, et al., it was stated that this

Court,
inspired
by
the
doctrine
laid
down
in Manchester,issued Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988,
which was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit
from the prayer of their complaints any specification of the
amount of damages, the omission being clearly intended
As we have earlier stated, the cases cited are ordinary civil

actions whereas election cases are not. The rules which
apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the
124
for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees by deluding the docket clerk in his
assessment of the same. In all these cases, the rule was
applied for failure of the plaintiff to include in the prayer of
the complaint the total amount of damages sought against
the defendant. The reason for this, according to
the Tacaycase, is because the amount of damages will help
determine two things: first, the jurisdiction of the court;
and, second, the amount of docket fees to be paid.
came to mind, and this was the reason why only two
hundred pesos was remitted at the same time with the
petition." 30
To summarize, the evil sought to be avoided
in Manchester and similar cases can never obtain in
election cases since (1) the filing fee in an election cases is
fixed and not dependent on the amount of damages sought
to be recovered, if any; and (2) a claim for damages in an
election case is merely ancillary to the main cause of action
and is not even determinative of the court's jurisdiction
which is governed by the nature of the election filed.
In the case now before us, and in election cases in general,

it is not the amount of damages, if any, that is sought to be
recovered which vests in the courts the jurisdiction to try
the same. Rather, it is the nature of the action which is
determinative of jurisdiction. Thus, regardless of the
amount of damages claimed, the action will still have to be
filed with the Regional Trial Court. In such a case, the evil
sought to be avoided in Manchester and like cases will
never arise. Peremptorily, there will be no occasion to apply
the rulings in the cases mentioned. In addition, the filing
fee to be paid in an election case is a fixed amount of
P300.00. There will consequently be no opportunity for a
situation to arise wherein an election contest will have to be
dismissed for failure to state the exact amount of damages
and thus evince an intent to deprive the Government of the
docket fees due.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Commission on Elections

dated January 19, 1993, as well as its Resolution
promulgated on May 6, 1993, both in EAC No. 24-92; and
the Order of the Regional Trial court of Mambajao,
Camiguin, dated October 2, 1992, in Election Case No.
3(92) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
records of this case are hereby ordered REMANDED to the
court a quo for the expeditious continuation of the
proceedings in and the adjudication of the election protest
pending therein as early as practicable.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Finally, in Manchester, there was a deliberate attempt on

the part of the plaintiffs therein to evade payment of the
correct docket fees. In the case of petitioner, he already
explained, and this we find acceptable and justified, that
"since the schedule of the new rates of court fees was not
then available and the filing of the petition for election
contests was done thru the mails, the old rates readily
G.R. No. L-36378 January 27, 1992

PIO
vs.
125
BALATBAT, petitioner,
COURT
OF
APPEALS
PASION, respondents.
and
DOMINGO
In his amended answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied

having received any notice from the private respondent and
by way of special and affirmative defenses, he alleged that:
(a) the jurisdictional requirements of the law have not been
complied with by private respondent; (b) the latter has
another palay landholding situated at Santiago, Sta. Ana,
Pampanga
with
an
area
of
2 1/2 hectares which is being worked by a hired helper; (c)
private respondent is physically unfit to perform the
different phases of farm work; and (d) that private
respondent filed the case merely to harass petitioner
because of the latter's adoption of the agricultural
leasehold system and refusal to shift back to the 50-50
sharing arrangement with the former. In his counterclaim,
petitioner sought to exercise his right of redemption over
the subject landholding pursuant to the provisions of R.A.
No. 3844 in view of the failure of the former owner, Daniel
Garcia, to notify him beforehand of the intended sale of the
landholding. Private respondent filed his Answer to the
Counterclaim.
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioner.

Roberto Y. Miranda for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by an agricultural lessee who was
ordered ejected in an action for ejectment filed by the new
owner of the landholding on the basis of the latter's claim
that he will personally cultivate the land pursuant to
Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844.
The antecedent facts, as gathered from the pleadings, are
not controverted.
Petitioner is the agricultural lessee of a parcel of land
located at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing an area
of 18,490 square meters, more or less, which is owned by
Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land to private respondent
Domingo Pasion and had declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 126. Sometime after the sale,
Domingo Pasion, on a claim that he will personally cultivate
the land, filed on 15 June 1970 with the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch II at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint to eject petitioner alleging therein
that he had notified petitioner of his intention to personally
cultivate the landholding, but despite the lapse of one (1)
agricultural year from receipt of the notice thereof,
petitioner refused to vacate the land.
At the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties could

only stipulate on their being of legal age, their residences
and on the fact that private respondent is the owner of the
landholding in question, which is cultivated by petitioner
under the leasehold system.
After trial on the merits, the agrarian court rendered a
decision against petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered granting authority to plaintiff Domingo Pasion to
eject defendant Pio Balatbat from the landholding in
126
question described in the complaint and to personally
cultivate his landholding, and ordering said defendant to
vacate the said premises and to deliver the possession
thereof to the said plaintiff, subject, however, to the second
proviso contained in Section 36(1) and to the provisions of
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844.
besides, in this age of advanced technology, most of the

back-breaking processes of farming have been lightened by
machinery. As regards the asserted right of redemption
pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 3844, the Court held that
the petitioner "failed to comply with the requirements" and
took note of petitioner's petition before the lower court to
litigate as pauper as "a circumstance that is highly
indicative of lack of funds on his part." 4 His motion to
reconsider 5 the decision having been denied in the
resolution of 25 January 1973, 6 petitioner took the instant
recourse to present the following legal issues for this
Court's resolution:
The claim for damages of plaintiff is DENIED for lack of

basis.
The counterclaim of the defendants is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
1. What is the effect of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389,

abolishing personal cultivation by landowners as a ground
for dispossession of tenants from their landholdings, on
pending appealed cases?
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals

which docketed it as C.A.-G.R. No. 00479-R; he urged said
court to reverse it because the agrarian court gravely erred
in: (a) ordering his ejectment, completely denying the fact
that private respondent, due to his sickness, is physically
incapable of personally cultivating the subject landholding
and that private respondent filed the complaint out of
vindictiveness, and (b) in dismissing the counterclaim for
redemption, contrary to the facts and law. 2
2. Should pending appealed cases on personal cultivation

be decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389?
Expectedly, petitioner maintains that this case should have
been decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389
since, in view of the appeal, the private respondent did not
yet acquire a vested right to personally cultivate the
landholding. In short, the application of the repealing law
warrants the dismissal of the action for ejectment.
On 16 December 1972, the Court of Appeals promulgated

its decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. No. 00479-R affirming the decision
of the agrarian court. In disposing of the assigned errors,
said Court ruled that private respondent complied with the
requirement of notice of at least one (1) agricultural year.
And although private respondent was already 69 years old
at the time he testified, there is nothing on record to
indicate that he is suffering from any physical ailment;
Republic Act No. 6389 took effect on 10 September 1971,

during the pendency of this case before the Court of
Appeals.
After private respondent filed his comment 7 in compliance
with the resolution of 13 March 1973, this Court resolved to
give due course to the petition 8 and thereafter required
127
the petitioner to file his Brief, 9 which he complied with on
22 June 1973; 10 he makes the following assignment of
errors:
or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into

residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes:Provided, That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition
to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead
of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to
an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided,
further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossession.
I
The Court a quo gravely erred in ordering the ejectment of
herein petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing
private respondent's complaint for cultivation in view of the
repeal of Section 36(1) Rep. Act 3844 by Section 7 of Rep.
Act 6389.
Private respondent filed his Brief on 25 September 1973.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that
during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals,
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6389, Section 7 of which
amended Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844. As amended,
personal cultivation is no longer a ground to dispossess an
agricultural lessee of his landholding. Section 36(1) of R.A.
No. 3844 originally read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Section 36(1) of the same Code is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.

Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue
in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in
a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it
is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head

upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission
to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to
five times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
(1) The agricultural lessorowner or a member of his

immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding
128
Since under the original provision of Section 36(1) of R.A.
No. 3844, the dispossession of the agricultural lessee on
the ground of personal cultivation by the agricultural lessorowner can only take place when "authorized by the Court in
a judgment that is final and executory," it follows then that
since the repeal of the provision took effect before the
judgment in this case became final and executory, private
respondent may no longer dispossess petitioner on that
ground because it had been removed from the statute
books. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Greta-Diosa Quitorio,
Trial Attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance,
made a thorough study of the history of R.A. No. 6389 and
came up with the conclusion that, as gathered from the
questions and answers of Senators Diokno and Laurel, the
legislative intent to give retroactive effect to said law or to
make it applicable to pending cases of ejectment on ground
of personal cultivation, appeared clear. She further
summoned to the aid of petitioner an arsenal of impressive
doctrines in statutory construction to protect the cause and
strengthen the case of the petitioner. All of her efforts,
which are undoubtedly commendable, are futile. As early as
1984, in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and Castro
vs. Castro, 11 this Court, per Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
ruled that Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given
retroactive effect because, while during the debates on the
bill which was eventually enacted into Republic Act No.
6389, there were statements made on the floor that "the
owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this
measure" even in cases where the owner has not really
succeeded
in
ejecting
the
12
tenants, Congress failed to express an intention to make
Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover ejectment
cases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending

adjudication by the courts. This Court thus stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil
Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive
effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this
provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive
effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect
be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be
understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore,
it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to
guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted,
wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to
future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to
the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland
as ponente announced:
The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a
retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there anything
found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an
effect. Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment,
prospective.
It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to
construed as having only a prospective operation unless
the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the
129
doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. The
cases supporting this rule are almost without number. . . .
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and

disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits." The Constitution also
ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage
which should assure for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a
better life (Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53
SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).
xxx xxx xxx

The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case
of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543.). Thus
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute
operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless
the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest
either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication. Following the lead of the United States
Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a
statute ought not to receive a construction making it act
retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong,
and imperative that no other meaning can annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be
otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be
retroactive when the legislature has not said so. . . . (Farrel
v. Pingree (1888), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of
Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306)
In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the

constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, which
decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil and transferred to them the ownership of the land
they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294). We noted
the imperative need for such a decree in Chavez
v. Zobel (55 SCRA 26). We held in the latter case that "on
this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the
need for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine
sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential
Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. . . . There is no doubt
then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and
parcel of the law of the land according to the present
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation

of the tenant from the bondage of the soil, transfers to him
the ownership of the land he tills, and provides instruments
and mechanisms therefor, has (sic) recognized personal
cultivation as a ground for retention and, therefore,
exemption from the land transfer decree. Personal
cultivation cannot be effected unless the tenant gives up
the land to the owner.
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory

provision gains added strength from later developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized
that property ownership is impressed with a social function.
This means that the owner has the obligation to use his
property not only to benefit himself but society as well.
Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article
II that in the promotion of social justice, the State "shall
130
Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:
The
subsequent
cases
of Diga
vs. Adriano,
et
13
14
al. and Gallardo vs. Borromeo reiterated the rule We
laid in the Niloand Castro cases.
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more

than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating
such area or will now cultivate it.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
The redistribution of land, restructuring of property

ownership, democratization of political power, and
implementation of social justice do not require that a
landowner should be deprived of everything he owns and
that even small parcels as in these two cases now before us
may not be worked by the owner himself. The evil sought to
be remedied by agrarian reform is the ancient anachronism
where one person owns the land while another works on it.
The evil is not present in cases of personal cultivation by
the owner.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 104215 May 8, 1996
ERECTORS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON.
JULIO
ANDRES,
JR.
and
FLORENCIO
BURGOS,respondents.
Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict

requirements. In addition to proof of ownership and the
required notices to the tenant, the bona-fide intention to
cultivate must be proved to the satisfaction of the court.
And as earlier stated, the tenant is protected in case the
owner fails to cultivate the land within one year or to work
the land himself for three years.
PUNO, J.:p
Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and
decide the complaint 1 for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of overtime pay filed by private respondent
Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.
The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable

only to landowners who do not own other agricultural lands
containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares or
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other
urban purposes where they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their families. (Letter of Instruction
No. 472 dated October 21, 1976).
The facts are undisputed:

In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent
to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for a
period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00
and an allowance of US$165.00 per month. They further
131
agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus
of US$1,000.00 if after the 12-month period, he renews or
extends his employment contract without availing of his
vacation or home leave. Their contract dated September
20, 1979, was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor

Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for underpayment
of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and contractual
bonus.
On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation
stage, Executive Order (E.O. No. 797 creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took effect.
Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA with "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas employment." 2
The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In December,

1979, petitioner notified private respondent that the
position of service driver was no longer available. On
December 14, 1979, they executed another contract which
changed the position of private respondent into that of
helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an allowance
of US$105.00 per month. The second contract was not
submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for
approval.
Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded

to try the case on the merits. On September 23, 1983, he
rendered a Decision 3 in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country

and worked at petitioner's Buraidah Sports Complex project
in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a helper/laborer. He
received a monthly salary and allowance of US$210.00, in
accordance with the second contract. Private respondent
renewed his contract of employment after one year. His
salary and allowance were increased to US$231.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the

respondent to pay the complainant as follows:
1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on August
25, 1981 as difference between his allowance as Service
Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer;
Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August

24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded from the petitioner the difference between
his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract,
and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual
bonus which should have been awarded to him for not
availing of his vacation or home leave credits. Petitioner
denied private respondent's claim.
2. The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of the

same date, as his contractual bonus.
The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of overtime
pay and unpaid wages or commission are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. 4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). It questioned the jurisdiction of the
132
Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of E.O.
No. 797.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is

determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. 9 On March 31, 1982, at the
time private respondent filed his complaint against the
petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No.
1691 10 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 11 which vested
the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor
Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases involving employer-employee relations including
money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment." 12 At the time of
the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear
jurisdiction over the same.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991, 5 respondent NLRC

dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Labor
Arbiter's jurisdiction. It ruled:
To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide
this case. On May 29, 1978, the Labor Arbiters were
integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391. On
May 1, 1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and Employment
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment. There is no dispute that
the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority over the case on
hand, which accrued and was filed when the two above
mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force. 6
Petitioner
filed
this
special
civil
for certiorari reiterating the argument that:
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to
hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior
to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect
is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. 13 We fail to perceive in the language of E.O.
No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.
action
The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount

to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Labor Arbiter's void
judgment in the case a quo. 7
The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela

Cerna 14 cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case
at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than
the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development
Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor and Employment over cases involving workers'
money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law
in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in
the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June
29, 1989. 15 It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111,
It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of his
authority to try and resolve cases arising from overseas
employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad
Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Cerna, 8petitioner argues
that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending
cases, including the complaint filed by private respondent.
133
amending Article 217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional
Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and
the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases
involving money claims. However, on November 9, 1989,
the Court, in a Resolution, 16reconsidered and set aside its
June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter
for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of
Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional
Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears
emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A.
6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes,
they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of
laws.
to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public

authorities which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain existing legal requirements.
The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was
not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the
POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board and the
overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment, including
seamen." 17 The rule on prospectivity of laws should
therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect
jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity.
E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to

widen the workers' access to the government for redress of
grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor
Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money
claims. This amendment, however, created a situation
where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the
Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further
amended Article 217 by delineating their respective
jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money
claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer
or person employed in domestic or household service, or
househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer
being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the
aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper
does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O.
No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A
curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or
Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs. NLRC 18 is

more apt to the case at bar. In this case, PSPC hired Jardin
to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint against
PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages on
January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that time,
the power to hear and decide cases involving overseas
workers was vested in the Bureau of Employment Services.
We held:
When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on
January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of the Labor Code provided
that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have "exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide" all cases arising from
employer-employee relations "unless expressly excluded by
this Code." At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had been
134
amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9,
1978. The pertinent provision of the said presidential
decree states:
Employment Services may, in the case of the National

Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the Minister
of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional
offices or the Bureau of Employment Services if so
authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this
Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations
Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223
hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission shall be final and inappealable.
Art. 15. Bureau of Employment Services.

(a) . . .
(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employeremployee relations including money claims, arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The
decisions of the Bureau shall be final and executory subject
to appeal to the Secretary of Labor whose decision shall be
final and inappealable.
Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent

jurisdiction between the regional offices of the then Ministry
of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services "in the
National Capital Region." It is noteworthy that P.D. No.
1691, while likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code,
did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters shall have
jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee
relations "unless expressly excluded by this Code."
Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims

undeniably arose out of an employer-employee relationship
with petitioner PSPC and that private respondent worked
overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment
Services and not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the
case. . . .
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were

subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the
POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,
including seamen." (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA],
200 SCRA 663 [1991]). This development showed the
legislative authority's continuing intent to exclude from the
Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising from overseas
employment.
Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took

effect on May 1, 1990. Such amendment qualifies the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as
follows:
(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or
cases involving employer-employee relations including
money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contracts
involving
Filipino
workers
for
overseas
employment except seamen:Provided that the Bureau of
135
These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint
for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31, 1979, under
Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the Bureau of
Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the case
and not the Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod
v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which gave
the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor concurrent
jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services, was
promulgated more than a year after the complaint was
filed. (emphasis supplied)
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat
asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated
petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private
respondent against the petitioner.
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang

22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case
eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his
being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty
(60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum
of P361,528.00.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought

exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for
the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its
verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September
21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987) 3 i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of
the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior
to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on
September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or
"bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO
S.
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CO, petitioner,
PEOPLE
OF
THE
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.
136
considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement
made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular
(No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as
follows:
Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455

(1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this
date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or
part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection
will no longer be considered a valid defense.
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa

nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which

affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that
the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law
but was merely a construction or interpretation of a preexisting one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to

guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether
pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for
either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s.
1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981;
Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo,
October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs.
Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589,
s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino

Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the
Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration
under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required
comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The
latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13,
1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's
theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by
him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co
filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on
the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved,
in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal
and adjudicate the same on its merits.
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by

another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12)
almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the
"bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1,
1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that
Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have
been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the
Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the
original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the
issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of
an obligation," as follows: 4
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative

agency having interpreting authority may reverse its
administration interpretation of a statute, but that its
review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury
137
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal . . . 5
repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not

be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161
SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only
prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177
SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or

amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961),
holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the
Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay
certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer
of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling
that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961,
granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship
cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence
of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the
effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90,
amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive
application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that
a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of
the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before
publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar
v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to
P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment
of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D.
No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging
that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a
ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given
retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement
for retroactivity;Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to

administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA
142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA
317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission
on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez
v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent
appointment an employee whose temporary appointment
had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to
judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this
being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret
Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964,
138
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by
Us
in People
v. Macarandang (1959)
and People
6
v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision
in People
v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant
be
acquitted
on
the
basis
of
Our
rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand
in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
true in the construction and application of criminal laws,

where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws,

are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this
is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally
passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported
by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and where he
was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that

the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24,
1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a
foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the
petitioners on September 29, 1979.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and

Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA
515, 527-528: 8
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting

section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated
in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan
and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these
decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the
familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application
of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
139
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines.
Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the

Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566.
It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult
of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of

judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case
of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308
US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual
existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an
operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus,
in
this
Court's
decision
in Taada
9
v. Tuvera, promulgated on April 24, 1985 which
declared "that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published,shall have no force and
effect," and as regards which declaration some members of
the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done
in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ."
the Court said:
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429

concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act
No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued
Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President
Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all
debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v.
Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in

the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
140
'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged
a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the
same observations, to wit: 11
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and

justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view

that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive
order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties.
Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared
results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap
of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative
or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision:

'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,
with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official
(Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US
371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with
approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002
[1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores
(99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the
opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in
Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21
SCRA 1095).
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of

simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It
does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of
nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must
have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so
as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties
may have acted under it and may have changed
theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a
fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its

decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12
declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the
martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in
the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons
this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled
as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that
Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only
to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when
that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no
141
retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision.
Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State.
Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the
State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be
declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of
the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the
Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the
accused should be released since judgment against him is
null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights
and denial of due process.
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA

160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated,
who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice
that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg.
22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General
invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar
doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive
of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry
being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go
Chico are substantially different from those in the case at
bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the
Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing
the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed,
among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest
misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not
be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on
the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not
on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official
pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the
Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions,
though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of
the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by
the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as
regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos
vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent
Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case,
xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before
the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year
period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created
under general orders issued by President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that
may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of
the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings
did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was
promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying
Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the
question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a
municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the
local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is
decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's
142
as
in U.S. v. Go
Chico, supra,
no
administrative
interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed
by the Court on the law invoked.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to reverse or set

aside the judgment of public respondent Court of Appeals
dated May 8, 1987 which affirmed the trial court's decision
finding petitioner guilty of violation of Presidential Decree
No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for one (1) year, with the accessories
provided by law and to remove the house constructed on
the land in question within thirty (30) days from the finality
of judgment, otherwise, private respondent University of
the Philippines was authorized to demolish or dismantle the
house at the expense of the petitioner.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which,

pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the
Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and
its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed,
negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals
and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside,
and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner
is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
The facts are not disputed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 15, 1984,
the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force received a
telephone call; the caller reported that somebody was
constructing a house at the U.P. Arboretum.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
Villanueva, Ladip and Ernesto were directed to investigate

(pp. 4-5, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 4, TSN, July 22, 1985).
G.R. No. 79060 December 8, 1989
Villanueva and Ladip are members of the U.P. Police Force

connected or assigned with the U.P. Squatter's Relocation
Team. The U.P. Arboretum is located at the back of the U.P.
Petron, beside the U.P. Hydraulic Research Center (p. 5,
TSN, June 21, 1985). They proceeded to said place and
there they saw some people constructing a house. They
asked the carpenters who owned the house and were told
that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is the owner. Aniceto
Ocampo who was present at the time, was asked whether
he had a building permit. The accused admitted that he had
no building permit, although he claimed that he bought the
parcel of land on which his house was being constructed
ANICETO
C.
OCAMPO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
(University
of
the
Philippines),respondents.
Pedro F. Martinez for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
143
from a certain Roberto Pael (p. 5, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 6,
TSN, June 21, 1985).
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the

presentation of his evidence and instead filed a motion to
dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground that the
prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title No.
192689 to prove ownership of the land in question and that
it failed to prove that the land on which the petitioner
constructed his house belongs to the University of the
Philippines.
The accused was informed that the land belongs to the

University of the Philippines and that he should stop the
construction of his aforesaid house. The accused complied
(pp. 6-7, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 6, TSN, July 22, 1985).
However, on August 24, 1984, the accused resumed the
construction of his aforesaid house. The aforenamed
prosecution witnesses reminded the accused that he was
violating Presidential Decree No. 772 (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 21,
1985; pp. 6-7, TSN, July 22, 1985).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of

merit, arriving at the following conclusion:
The prosecution did not present in evidence Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove that the land in
question, indeed, belongs to the University of the
Philippines. The absence of this piece of evidence, in the
considered view of this Court, did not cripple the fact that
the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is not the owner of said
property. And since there is no showing that the accused
occupied the lot in question and constructed his residential
house thereat with the knowledge and/or consent of the
owner thereof, the accused is a squatter within the
contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 772. "Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 772 reads:
The accused was again told to stop the construction of his

house. The accused ignored the U.P. Police Squatter's Team,
and insisted that he bought the land from Mr. Pael (p. 9,
TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 10, TSN, June 21, 1985).
The team reported the matter to their Chief, Captain
Madrigal, and executed an affidavit (Exh. "A") which they
submitted to the U.P. Legal Department (p. 9, TSN, July 22,
1985; p. 10, tsn, June 21, 1985).
A picture of the house constructed by the accused was also
taken" (Exhibit "B"). (pp. 2-3, Comment; pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Any person, who with the use of force, intimidation or

threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine
of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand
pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
After the preliminary investigation had been conducted, an

information dated March 25, 1985, was filed against
Aniceto Ocampo charging him with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-38997.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded "not guilty".
(now
petitioner)
144
(p. 5, Comment; p. 25, Rollo)
Petitioner alleges that the very essence of the case is the

proof of ownership of the land involved herein. We do not
agree.
On October 7, 1985, the trial court found Aniceto Ocampo

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
The law involved in this case is Section 1 of Presidential

Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting
Law, which embraces three (3) elements, namely: (a)
accused is not the owner of the land; (b) that he succeeded
in occupying or possessing the property through force,
intimidation, or threat or by taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the owner; and (c) such occupation
of the property is without the consent or against the will of
the owner. In the case at bar, all three (3) elements have
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused then appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging

that the trial court erred in: (a) applying Section 15, Rule
119 of the 1985 Rule of Criminal Procedure; (b) convicting
appellant on the basis of evidence which does not measure
to the degree of proof as required by law; and (c) not
applying the principle of presumption of innocence in favor
of appellant.
Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court, finding said appealed decision to be in
accordance with law and supported by evidence as well.
The evidence presented by the prosecution manifested that

Aniceto Ocampo was not the owner of the land on which he
constructed his house and that he did so against the
owner's will or without its consent. Prosecuution witnesses
testified that as early as May, 1983, petitioner was told that
the area is U.P. property; that he began constructing his
house without a permit from the owner; that petitioner had
no building permit and that he had been informed that he
was violating the Anti-Squatting Law. Besides, it was also
confirmed that petitioner had never shown title to the land
he claims to have purchased from one Roberto Pael. Yet, he
failed to present any deed of sale or any title in his name.
This alleged sale is a defense which the petitioner could
have successfully utilized to his advantage but failed to
substantiate it with evidence at the trial. When petitioner
moved for dismissal of the case, he forfeited his chance to
prove his claim. It must be noted also that this Roberto Pael
was shown by testimonial evidence to be not the owner of
Hence, accused-appellant filed the instant petition for

review on certiorari.
In this petition, two issues are presented involving purely
questions of law:
1. Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present
evidence of ownership is not a fatal defect in finding the
accused-petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of squatting; and
2. Is the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused-petitioner a bar
for him to present evidence?
For failure of the petitioner to file his reply within the period
which expired on December 20, 1987, this Court, in a
resolution dated February 3, 1988, resolved to dispense
with the aforesaid reply and considered the case submitted
for deliberation.
145
the land and that said land is the subject of a criminal case
against Pael for squatting.
files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,

he waives the right to present evidence and submits the
case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Emphasis supplied).
Neither did the petitioner exhibit any building or sanitary

permit to the U.P. Security Force or in court, such being
attached only to his motion for reconsideration. Worthy of
note is the fact that such permits are both dated June 26,
1985, which is more than ten (10) months after the illegal
construction took place and three (3) months after the case
had been filed against petitioner. (p. 29, Rello)
The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules

on Criminal Procedure took effect only on October 1, 1988,
but the same was given retroactive effect in the case of
Bonalos vs. People, in its resolution dated, September 19,
1988. Well-settled is the rule that "statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent" (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 784;
Alday vs. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522). The amendment would
therefore apply in this case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial

court's decision which maintained that the failure of the
prosecution to present title to prove ownership by the
University of the Philippines of the land in question is not
material in proving the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in
this case. Withal, the property has been widely and publicly
known to be part of the U.P. grounds. The crucial issue is
the act of squatting of the petitioner and his non-ownership
of the property, both of which have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that

accused-petitioner's demurrer to evidence was filed with
prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of the
amendment aforestated would therefore work against
herein petitioner.
As regard the second issue presented, the answer is in the

affirmative. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides:
By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence, accused-petitioner waives his right to present
evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. This is exactly what petitioner did, and he
cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own
evidence. As the Solicitor General aptly opined, "petitioner
gambled on securing an acquittal, a gamble which he lost."
(pp. 31-32, Rollo)
Section 15. Demurrer to Evidence. after the prosecution

has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or
(2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused
may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused
146
More than that, petitioner raises as issue whether his
motion to dismiss bars him from presenting his evidence,
but nowhere in his petition does he endeavor to argue in his
favor. Such a question should have been raised by the
petitioner in the court a quo and on appeal yet he failed to
do the same.
SO ORDERED.
SEVERINO,
MARLON
RESONABLE,
ROLANDO
ALDANESE, ALICIO SEBIAO, CARLINTO PAQUERO,
JULIAN GOSONA, ROLANDO CASIMERO, ALFREDO DE
LEON, VICTORIANO MACHANG, ARMANDO SALAZAR,
ANITO DE JESUS, FRANCISCO DELGADO, PAQUITO
PITULAN, DANILO CENTINO, ROMEO DELOS SANTOS,
RUBEN LARA, ROGELIO MAGHUYOR, BEN ABDANI,
RUDY PALASUGLO, WILLIAM BALDADO, ROMEO
LABIGAN,
TANNY
JANOLO
and
EDGAR
A.
OREZ, respondents.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Corazon R. Paulino for petitioner in G.R. No. 82805.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.
Raoul B. Agrava & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No.

83225.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the

public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 82805 June 29, 1989
Lar, Comia, Manala & Associates for respondents in G.R. No.

82805.
BRIAD
AGRO
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA SERNA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)-WFTU
LOCAL CHAPTER NO. R01-005, ALFRED DELA CRUZ,
ET AL., * respondents.
Jesus Balicanta for respondents in G.R. No. 83225.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Submitted for decision are these two consolidated cases,
both in the nature of challenges to the jurisdiction of the
various Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and
Employment to act on money claims. 1
G.R. No. 83225 June 29, 1989

L.M. CAMUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE HON.
UNDERSECRETARY
DIONISIO
C.
DELA
SERNA,
VICTORIANO ATIENZA, JR., JOSNERI DIOCARES,
REYNALDO
PAREO,
WINNIE
ORTOSIT,
NELEN
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

I. G.R. No. 82805.
This case originated from a complaint filed on February 21,
1987 to recover unpaid wages and wage supplements filed
147
with Regional Director Filomeno Balbin of the Labor
Department's Regional Office No. I sitting in San Fernando,
La Union. The facts appear in his order:
Respondent's repeated failure to appear during the

scheduled conferences despite due notices, is construed as
a waiver of its right to adduce evidence to controvert the
above-noted claims. Likewise, its failure to present the
required employment records is presumed to mean that the
presentation of the same will be against the interest of the
respondent and said records will prove the claims of herein
complainants.
This case arose out of a complaint filed by TRADE UNION OF

THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU Local
Chapter No. ROI-005, against respondent agricultural firm,
for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage,
ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift
differential pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay.
Based on the records on hand, the workers/members of the

complaining Union have been found to be underpaid of
their wages and unpaid of their ECOLA, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from January 1984
to April 1987. The claims for non-payment of overtime pay
and night shift differential pay have not been clearly shown
and proven, hence, are not included in the computed
deficiencies. 2
Acting on this complaint and pursuant to a corresponding

authority issued, a routine inspection was conducted on
subject establishment by Labor Standards and Welfare
Officer Dalo T. Basa on May 20, 1987, but the same did not
materialize since no records were presented for
examination, as the same are allegedly all being kept at the
firm's Manila Office. Nevertheless, LSWO Basa advised the
firm's Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Virgilio Villa-Real to present the
said records for verification at our Dagupan Labor Office.
However, to date and despite the fact that respondent has
been duly notified to present the same, no records were
presented for verification.
Director Balbin then held against Briad Agro Development

Corporation, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, and considering
further that said deficiencies form part of the legal
remuneration of herein employees, respondent is hereby
ordered to satisfy the a and pay the total amount of FIVE
MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY NINE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED NINE PESOS and 30/100 (P5,369,909.30) in the
manner above-stated, within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof, and to submit proof of payment within the same
period. Otherwise, a Writ of Execution win be issued to the
proper sheriffs to enforce this Order. The claims for nonpayment of overtime pay and night shift differential pay,
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
xxx xxx xxx
148
Let the parties be notified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
the project engineer were out of town, except the internal

auditor who informed the Labor Regulations Officer (now
known as Labor Standards and Welfare Officer) that he had
no authority to produce the employment records needed;
that the internal auditor promised to inform the project
manager and the project engineer about the required
employment records but no information was received since
then. Consequently, a subpoena duces tecum was issued
by the Regional Director on August 20, 1982, addressed to
the Manager of respondent company ordering the latter to
submit the pertinent employment records before the Field
Service Division, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City on
August 25, 1982 at 9:30 a.m. Notwithstanding receipt of
such subpoena duces tecum and the follow-up letter to the
said Manager of respondent, plus another subpoena
addressed to respondent's project manager, respondent
failed to submit the required pertinent records.
Consequently, on October 25, 1982 the Regional Director
issued the Order in dispute, copy of which was received by
respondent on November 1982.
In its appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission,

Briad Agro Development contended that the Regional
Director has no authority to entertain pecuniary claims of
workers, following this Court's ruling in Zambales Base
Metals, Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 4 in which we held that
money claims are the exclusive domain of the labor
arbiters. The National Labor Relations Commission
dismissed the appeal on the strength of Executive Order
No. 111, 5 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, in
which jurisdiction to so act on monetary claims was
supposedly granted to regional directors. In its petition to
this Court, Briad Agro Development reiterates its
jurisdictional challenge.
II. G.R. No. 83225.
The money award in this case, as and for unpaid
emergency cost of living allowances, and thirteenth-month
and holiday pays, was granted originally in favor of
seventy-four employees of L.M. Camus Engineering
following an inspection by Regional Director David Kong of
the Department of Labor's Regional Office No. IX,
Zamboanga City. In his order, issued on May 16, 1983,
Director Kong condemned the corporation to pay a total of
P146,181.20. Forty-seven employees were, however, later
dropped from the case following an amicable settlement
with the petitioner. The facts are as follows:
On November 18, 1982, counsel for respondent, Atty.

Nicolito L. Bustos, filed a motion for extension of time to file
his motion to set aside and/or reconsider Order dated 25
October 1982.
On November 24, 1982, respondent filed a Motion to Set
Aside and/or Reconsider the Order dated 25 October 1982
on the following grounds namely:
1. That the Order dated 25 October 1982 was issued
without notice and hearing.
Records disclosed that on the basis of the complaint filed by

the herein complainants, an inspection was conducted in
respondent's premises but both the project manager and
149
2. That the questioned Order is not supported by the facts
and the law of the case.
On May 27, 1983, a Motion to Dismiss was filed alleging

that "the parties have agreed to settle amicably the
individual claims of the various complainants who are listed
in the order of 25 October 1982."
Respondent argues that the awards are void because the

composition of each award was not indicated; that
complainants were either its employees or that of its
subcontractor Carlos Balinagay; that of the 74 complainants
only three, namely: Julian Gajana, Jose Casimora and Jose
Roxas failed to execute quitclaims; and that for these
reasons the disputed Order may be validly set aside and/or
reconsidered.
Respondent likewise moved for the reconsideration of the

May 16, 1983-Order on the ground that the Regional Office
never had any jurisdiction over the nature of the dispute. 6
The petitioner then appealed to the Office of the Secretary
of Labor, an appeal that did not prosper. On behalf of the
Secretary, Undersecretary Dionisio de la Serna affirmed
Director Kong's award, as modified.
Complainants, thru counsel, filed their opposition to the

aforesaid Motion to Set. Aside Order dated 25 October
1982. They maintain that the Order in question was issued
in the valid exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power
of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment,
thru the Regional Director as his duly authorized
representative; that before the said Order was issued,
respondent or its representative was directed time and
again by the Regional Director to submit the pertinent
employment records of complainants but respondent chose
to ignore the said directives; that during the hearing of
respondent's motion on November 25, 1982 each
complainant testified that no quitclaim was ever executed
by them, although they remembered having signed a
certain document which respondent thru its representative
made them believe to be simply an evidence of payment of
salary and not a quitclaim.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, impugning the

authority of the Regional Director. Undersecretary Dionisio
dela Serna denied reconsideration and sustained the
Regional Director's jurisdiction.
The petitioner, in this petition, primarily questions Regional
Directors' jurisdiction to pass upon money claims.
III. The cases before the Court; the question of jurisdiction.
The petitioners in these two consolidated cases submit that
the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive on the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission, by
force of Article 217 of the Labor Code:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working
days after submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
On May 16, 1983, the Regional Director issued an Order

denying respondent's motion.
150
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
enforcement of their orders except in

employer contests the findings of the
officer and raises issues which cannot be
considering evidentiary matters that are
the normal course of inspection. 8
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of

work and other terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on
non- payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided
by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits.
case where the

labor regulation
resolved without
not verifiable in
He further submits that, as a consequence, Zambales Base

Metals, Inc. v. Minister of Labor is no longer controlling
(although in his comment in G.R. No. 83225, he maintains
that it is still in force and effect. 9 )
IV. The Court's decision.
4. Cases involving household services; and
The Court rules that, in view of the promulgation of

Executive Order No. 111, Zambales Base Metals v. Minister
of Labor is no longer good law. Executive Order No. 111 is in
the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was
intended to remedy a defect that, in the opinion of the
legislature (the incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in
the exercise of her lawmaking powers under the Freedom
Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the
amendment. This is clear from the proviso: "The provisions
of
Article 217 of this Code
to the contrary
notwithstanding . . ." Plainly, the amendment was meant to
make both the Secretary of Labor (or the various Regional
Directors) and the Labor Arbiters share jurisdiction.
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this

Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. 7
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, relies on the
provisions of Executive Order No. 111, amending, among
other things, Article 128, paragraph (b), of the Labor Code:
(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists the Minister of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to order and administer, after due notice
and hearing, compliance with the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on
the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety
engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue
writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this

jurisdiction. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done
that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied with. They are, however,
subject to exceptions. For one, they must not be against the
Constitution and for another, they cannot impair vested
151
rights or the obligation of contracts. 10 It has not been
shown in this case that these exceptions apply.
was our reading of Section 128(b) of the Code that the

aforesaid labor officials' authority stopped there, 13 but we
have, in view of the amendment under Executive Order No.
111, since taken a second look. As we said, the Executive
Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction, "[t]he
provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding", it would have rendered such a provisoand the amendment itself-useless to say that they
(Regional Directors) retained the self-same restricted
powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that
a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life
into it, rather than defeat it. At any rate, and as we have
observed, the language of Executive Order No. 111 is
comprehensive enough to extend to the resolution of
employer-employee controversies covered by Article 217.
That Executive Order No. 111 intended to. make the

jurisdiction to pass upon money claims, among the other
cases mentioned by Article 217 of the Labor Code,
concurrent between the Secretary of Labor (or Regional
Directors) and the Labor Arbiters is clear from its
perambulatory clauses, to wit:
WHEREAS, the welfare of the workers is a primary concern
of the government.
WHEREAS, it is necessary to amend or repeal provisions of
laws that repress the rights of workers and of their trade
unions. 11
It is interesting to note that the Government itself (through

the Solicitor General) considers Zambales Base Metals v.
Minister of Labor as Executive Order No. 11l's very raison
d'etre. 14 If this is so, the intent of the legislator to grant
Regional Directors the jurisdiction now impugned cannot
any more be clearer.
Executive Order No. 111, it is obvious, was enacted to

widen workers' access to the Government for redress of
grievances.
The language of the provision is indeed broad enough to
encompass cases over which Labor Arbiters had hitherto
exercised exclusive jurisdiction. We quote, in part:
Being a curative statute, the Executive Order in question

has retrospective effect. In Garcia v. Martinez, 15 we held
that legislation "which is in the nature of a curative
statute" 16 has "retrospective application to a pending
proceeding." 17Hence, these cases should be decided in the
light of the presidential issuance in question, although they
might have come pending further proceedings. Be that as it
may, the records show that G.R. No. 82805 had come about
during the effectivity of Executive Order No. 111. (In G.R.
No. 82805, the complaint was filed on February 21, 1987; in
G.R. No. 83225, the material dates do not appear in the
... the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly

authorized representatives shall have the power to order
and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance
with the labor standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation ... 12
We can no longer accept the contention that the Regional
Directors' singular concern, under the said provision, is to
ensure compliance with labor standards, such as industrial
safety and similar concerns. In Zambales Base Metals, it
152
records but the order decreeing the money award was
issued on October 25, 1982 and a subpoena duces tecum
appears to have been issued, in connection with the
inspections that prefaced the complaint, on August 20,
1982. 18 ) With respect to G.R. No. 82805, therefore, the
Executive Order squarely applies, while insofar as G.R. No.
83225 is concerned, we give it a retroactive operation.
BAUZON, LUCRECIA BILBAO, MA. LUISA CABRERA,

FRANCIS BAACLO GUADALUPE CAMACHO, LUZ DE
LEON, MIKE VILLAVERDE, NEPOMUCENO MEDINA,
EDGARDO MENDOZA, JENNIFER VELEZ, AMELIA
MEDINA,
EDUARDO
ESPEJO
and
RICARDO
BATTOrespondents.
The Chief Legal Officer for petitioner.
With respect moreover, to Camus Engineering's petition

(G.R. No. 83225), it is the Court's considered opinion that
the petitioner is estopped from assailing Director Kong's
jurisdiction. The rule is that a party may not attack a
tribunal's jurisdiction and at the same time ask for
affirmative relief 19 The records disclose that the petitioner
had entered into an amicable settlement with a total of
forty-seven employees and had it approved by Director
Kong. The petitioner must, therefore, be said to have
accepted Director Kong's jurisdiction. It cannot now assail it.
Romualdo C. Delos Santos for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The focus of the instant petition for certiorari is the
application of Article 110 of the Labor Code. The said article
provides that workers shall enjoy first preference with
regard to wages due them in cases of bankruptcy or
liquidation of an employer's business.
Accordingly, we sustain the jurisdiction of the respondents

Regional Directors.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1980 Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX)
laid-off about seventy percent (70%) of its employees
because it was experiencing business reverses. The
retained employees constituting thirty percent (30%) of the
work force however, were not paid their wages. This nonpayment of salaries went on until July 1982 when AMEX
completely ceased operations and instead entered into an
operating agreement with T.M. San Andres Development
Corporation whereby the latter would be leasing the
equipment and machineries of AMEX.
WHEREFORE, these petitions are DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Cruz, Gutierrez, Jr. JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80593 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK, petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA
CRUZ,
JOSE
AGRIPINO,
BERNARDO
The unpaid employees sought redress from the Labor

Arbiter 1 who, on August 27,1986 rendered a decision
153
Yrs.
Service
finding their claim valid and meritorious. The dispositive
part of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the claims of complainants for
payment of unpaid wages and separation pay to be valid
and meritorious, respondents Aggregate Mining Exponent
and its president Luis Tirso Revilla should, as they are
hereby ordered to pay the same to said complainants in the
following amounts:
of Rate
Separation Pay
Backwages
1,200.00
3,000.00
4,287.10
920.00
1,840.00
832.10
740.00
740.00
4,287.66
740.00
740.00
6,822.81
P1,300.00
P5,200.00
P6,174.96
970.00
1,940.00
234.10
1,900.00
8,550.00
11,712.85
3,000.00
10,500.00
9,874.70
2,300.00
8,050.00
19,247.00
83,360.00
136,092.03
12
2,700.00
16,200.00
23,485.70
1,800.00
2,700.00
5,004.35
3,500.00
12,550.00
32,986.90
1,300.00
3,900.00
3,227.15
1,300.00
3,250.00
3,110.85
1,500.00
4,500.00
in the total amount of P219,452.03. To properly effectuate

the payment of the same, the necessary arrangement
should be made between respondents Amex and T.M. San
Andres Development Corp. and Philippine National Bank
(PNB) on their respective role and participation herein. For
should the principal respondent be unable to satisfy these
Awards, the same can be satisfied from the proceeds or
fruits of its machineries and equipment being operated by
respondent T.M. San Andres Dev. Corp. either by operating
agreement with respondent Amex or thru lease of the same
from PNB.
To obviate any further differences between complainants
and their counsel to the latter's attorney's fees which
4,793.80
154
seems to be the cause of their earlier misunderstanding, as
can be gleaned from the Charging Lien filed by said
counsel, respondents are, moreover, ordered to segregate
and pay the same directly to said counsel, the amount of
which is to be computed pursuant to their agreement on
July 14, 1983 (Annex A of Position to Enter Attorney's
Charging Lien in the Record of the Case). 2
At the outset, petitioner PNB did not question the validity of

the workers' claim for unpaid wages with respect to the
mortgaged properties of AMEX, provided that the same be
limited to the unpaid wages, and to the exclusion of
termination pay. In the instant petition however, PNB starts
off with the question of whether or not the workers' lien
take precedence over any other claim considering that this
Court has ruled otherwise in Republic vs. Peralta.5
AMEX and its President, Tirso Revilla did not appeal from
this decision. But PNB, in its capacity as mortgagee-creditor
of AMEX interposed an appeal with the respondent
Commission, not being satisfied with the outcome of the
case. The appeal was primarily based on the allegation that
the workers' lien covers unpaid wages only and not the
termination or severance pay which the workers likewise
claimed they were entitled to. In a resolution 3dated
October 27, 1987, the National Labor Relations Commission
affirmed the decision appealed from. Hence the instant
petition filed by the petitioner bank based on the following
grounds:
This Court cannot allow the petitioner to alter its stance at

this stage inasmuch as it is deemed to have acquiesced in
the decision of the labor arbiter concerning payment of
unpaid wages. The records reveal that the petitioner failed
to question the same on appeal. Hence, it is now barred
from claiming that the workers' lien applies only to the
products of their labor and not to other properties of the
employer which are encumbered by mortgage contracts or
otherwise.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attempt on the part of
the petitioner to seek relief from that portion of the decision
would still be in vain.
I. ARTICLE 110 OF THE LABOR CODE MUST BE READ IN

RELATION TO ARTICLES 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244 AND 2245
OF THE CIVIL CODE CONCERNING THE CLASSIFICATION,
CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CREDITS.
Article 110 of the Labor Code provides that:

Art. 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. In the
event of bankcruptcy or liquidation of an employer's
business - his workers shall enjoy first preference as
regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims, any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such
unpaid wages and monetary claims, shall be paid in full
before claims of the government and other creditors may
be paid. 6
II. ARTICLE 110 OF THE LABOR CODE DOES NOT PURPORT

TO CREATE A LIEN IN FAVOR OF WORKERS OR EMPLOYEES
FOR UNPAID WAGES EITHER UPON ALL OF THE PROPERTIES
OR UPON ANY PARTICULAR PROPERTY OWNED BY THEIR
EMPLOYER. 4
155
This Court must uphold the preference accorded to the
private respondents in view of the provisions of Article 110
of the Labor Code which are clear and which admit of no
other interpretation. The phrase "any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding" indicates that such preference
shall prevail despite the order set forth in Articles 2241 to
2245 of the Civil Code. 6-a No exceptions were provided
under the said article, henceforth, none shall be considered.
Furthermore, the Labor Code was signed into Law decades
after the Civil Code took effect.
said case the Court held that the State must prevail in that
instance since "it has been frequently said that taxes are
the very lifeblood of government. The effective collection of
taxes is a task of highest importance for the sovereign. It is
critical indeed for its own survival ." 10
Nevertheless, under Article 110 of the Labor Code as
amended, the unpaid wages and other monetary claims of
workers should be paid in full before the claims of the
Government and other creditors. Thus not even tax claims
could have preference over the workers' claim.
In Herman vs. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 7 this

Court declared that whenever two statutes of different
dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the statute of later date
must prevail being a later expression of legislative will.
Applying the aforecited case in the instant petition, the Civil
Code provisions cited by the petitioner must yield to Article
110 of the Labor Code.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in Volkschel Labor

Union vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 11 this court adopts the
doctrine that "(i)n the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration." 12 Bearing this in
mind, this Court must reiterate the dictum laid down in A.C.
Ransom that the conflict between Article 110 of the Labor
Code and Article 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code must be
resolved in favor of the former. A contrary ruling would
defeat the purpose for which Article 110 was intended; that
is, for the protection of the working class, pursuant to the
never-ending quest for social justice.
Moreover, Our pronouncement in A. C. Ransom Labor

Union-CCLU vs. NLRC, 8 reinforces the above-mentioned
interpretation where this Court, speaking through Associate
Justice Melencio-Herrera, explicitly stated that "(t)he worker
preference applies even if the employer's properties are
encumbered by means of a mortgage contract ... So that,
when (the) machinery and equipment of RANSOM were sold
to Revelations Manufacturing Corporation for P2M in 1975,
the right of the 22 laborers to be paid from the proceeds
should have been recognized ... " 9
Petitioner next advances the theory that "even if the

worker's lien applies in the instant case, the same should
cover only unpaid wages excluding termination or
severance pay. 13 To support this contention, petitioner cites
Section 7, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code which provides that:
Reliance by the petitioners on Republic vs. Peralta is

without basis. The said case involved a question of workers'
preference as against the tax claims of the State. In the
156
The just causes for terminating the services of an employee
shall be those provided under article 283 of the Code. The
separation from work of an employee for a just cause does
not entitle him to termination pay provided in the Code,
emphasis supplied)
remunerations or earnings payable by an employer for

services rendered or to be rendered, but also covers all
benefits of the employees under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement like severance pay, educational allowance,
accrued vacation leave earned but not enjoyed, as well as
workmen's compensation awards and unpaid salaries for
services rendered. All of these benefits fall under the term
"wages" which enjoy first preference over all other claims
against the employer. 19
Based on that premise, petitioner contends that the claim

for termination pay should not be enforced against AMEX
properties mortgaged to petitioner PNB because Article 110
of the Labor Code refers only to "wages due them for
services rendered during the period prior to bankcruptcy or
liquidation." 14 Citing serious financial losses as the basis
for the termination of the private respondents, petitioner
alleges that the employees are not entitled to the
termination pay which they claim.
Furthermore, in Peralta, this Court held that for purposes of

the application of Article 110, "termination pay is
reasonably regarded as forming part of the remuneration or
other money benefits accruing to employees or workers by
reason
of
their
having
previously
rendered
services..." 20 Hence, separation pay must be considered as
part of remuneration for services rendered or to be
rendered.
This contention is, again, bereft of merit.

The respondent Commission noted that "AMEX failed to
adduce convincing evidence to prove that the financial
reverses were indeed serious." 15 After a careful study of
the records of the case, this Court finds no reason to alter
the findings of the respondent Commission.
Indeed Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended,

aforecited, now provides that the workers' preference
covers not only unpaid wages but also other monetary
claims.
In Garcia vs. National Labor Relations Commission , 16 it was

held that "it is essentially required that the alleged losses in
business operations must be proved. " 17 This policy was
adopted to obviate the possibility of an employer
fabricating business reverses in order to ease out
employees for no apparent reason. Hence, no departure
shall be made by this Court from the ruling in Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. National Mines and
Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-MIF)18 where it was
categorically stated that the term "wages" includes not only
The respondent Commission was, therefore, not in error

when it awarded the termination pay claimed by the private
respondents. As far as the latter are concerned, the
termination pay which they so rightfully claim is an
additional remuneration for having rendered services to
their employer for a certain period of time. Noteworthy also
is the relationship between termination pay and services
rendered by an employee, that in computing the amount to
be given to an employee as termination pay, the length of
service of such employee is taken into consideration such
157
that the former must be considered as part and parcel of
wages. Under these circumstances then, this Court holds
that the termination or severance pay awarded by the
respondent Commission to the private respondents is
proper and should be sustained.
HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as

City
Mayor
of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R.
LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, and THE CITY
COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.
Lastly, it must be noted that the amount claimed by

petitioner PNB for the satisfaction of the obligations of
AMEX is relatively insubstantial and is not significant
enough as to drain its coffers. By contrast, that same
amount could mean subsistence or starvation for the
workingman. Quoting further from Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, this Court supports the equitable
principle that "it is but humane and partakes of the divine
that labor, as human beings, must be treated over and
above chattels, machineries and other kinds of properties
and the interests of the employer who can afford and
survive the hardships of life better than their workers.
Universal sense of human justice, not to speak of our
specific social justice and protection to labor constitutional
injunctions dictate the preferential lien that the above
provision accord to labor. 21 In line with this policy,
measures must be undertaken to ensure that such
constitutional mandate on protection to labor is not
rendered meaningless by an erroneous interpretation of the
applicable laws.
The
City
Legal
Officer
for
petitioner.
Lacuna, Bello & Associates Law Offices for Danilo B.
Lacuna.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The only question in this petition, denominated as a "direct
appeal under Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), of the
Constitution and Section 9(3), of Batas Blg. 129," is whether
the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint
Council officers and employees under Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or
whether the power is now vested with the City Mayor
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization
Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code. The
facts are as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and

Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon.
Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service
Commission, through the Regional Director of the National
Capital Region, the appointments of nineteen officers and
employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the
Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ, concur.
G.R. No. 87119
April 16, 1991

158
provisions of Section 15, of said Republic Act No. 409, as
amended, which reads:
As we stated at the outset, the issue is whether or not

Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has
been repealed, and as a result, the City Council can no
longer tender appointments to Council positions.
Sec. 15. . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
As we also mentioned at the outset, this petition has been

brought by way of a "direct appeal" from the resolution of
the Civil Service Commission pursuant supposedly to the
Constitution and Batas Blg. 129. In this connection, we have
held that no appeal lies from the decisions of the Civil
Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby
may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof, pursuant to Section 7, Article IX, of the
Constitution. We quote:
. . . The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign
all appointments of the other employees of the Board. 1
The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the
Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's office "comment and/or
recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly
appointed employees of the City Council may be paid on
the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. 2 The
Personnel Bureau then forwarded the query to the City
Legal Officer who, in a 3rd endorsement dated September
19, 1988,3 rendered an opinion that the proper appointing
officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This
opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to the City Mayor
to the Commission.
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by

law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.5
On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated

Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to the opinion
of the City Legal Officer, it is the City Council to which the
appointing power is vested. The dispositive portion thereof
is as follows:
As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the

Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to
the civil service and as such, its judgments are
unappealable
and
subject
only
to
this
Court's certiorari jurisdiction.6
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
premises
considered,
the
Commission resolved to rule, as it hereby rules that the
proper appointing authority of the officers and employees
of the City Council of Manila is the City Council and the
signatory of individual appointments thus issued is the City
Vice-Mayor of Manila.4
The petitioner's omission notwithstanding, we are

nevertheless accepting the petition and because of the
important public interest it involves, we are considering it
as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, considering
further that it was filed within the thirty-day period. 7
159
As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No.
409 as amended has supposedly been repealed by Republic
Act No. 5185, specifically, Section 4 thereof, which we
quote, in part:
xxx
xxx
(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and

regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose
appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code; 9
There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides
specifically for the organization of the Government of the
City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act
No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal
governments in general, are general laws. As the Solicitor
General points out, and we agree with him, it is a canon of
statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law regardless of their dates of passage and
the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to
the general.10
xxx
The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police and

City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of offices
entirely paid out of city funds and their respective
assistants or deputies shall, subject to civil service law,
rules and regulations, be appointed by the City
Mayor: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply
to Judges, Auditors, Fiscals, City Superintendents of
Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health
Officers and City Engineers.
xxx
xxx
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict

between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the
laws must be reconciled in that manner.
xxx
All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial,

city or municipal general funds, road and bridge funds,
school funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the
Provincial Governor, City or Municipal Mayor upon
recommendation of the office head concerned. . . . 8
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored,

and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be
very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in
time repeals the other.11
Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put
by the Court as follows:
and by Batas Blg. 337, we likewise quote:
xxx
Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers, and

Duties.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the

circumstances
of
the
particular
case.1wphi1 The
Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and
circumstances in the particular case in granting a special
charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by
adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to
xxx
(2) The city mayor shall:

xxx
xxx
xxx
160
the provisions of the charter, and without making any
mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter,
intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis
vs. Cook County, 74 I11. App., 151; Philippine Railway Co.
vs. Nolting 34 Phil., 401.)12
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not
divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the Charter
of the City of Manila to approve the city budget. 13
HON. RICHARD J. GORDON, in his capacity as City

Mayor
of
Olongapo, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II and Spouses
EDUARDO and ROSALINDA YAMBAO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-55230 November 8, 1988
We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the

provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors the
power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city
funds14 and those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local
executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and
employees of the city,"15 were meant not to vest the city
mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to
underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over
local officials and employees from the President to the local
governments and to highlight the autonomy of local
governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive
the City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power
granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement
is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the
Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that
is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is the conflict between the Food
and Drug Administration and the mayor of Olongapo City
over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the
operation of drug stores in the said city. While conceding
that the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims he
may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power, prevent
the operation of drug stores previously permitted by the
former.
There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit,
the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug
Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda
Yambao. 1 They are located a few meters from each other
in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo
City. 2 They were covered by Mayor's Permits Nos. 1954
and 1955, respectively, issued for the year 1980, 3 and
licenses to operate issued by the FDA for the same year. 4
In the light of an the foregoing, we do not find any grave

abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
161
This case arose when on March 21, 1980, at about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, a joint team composed of agents
from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine
Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug
Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth
P410.00 without a doctor's prescription.. 5
On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a

letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the
revoca tion of Mayor's Permit No. 1954. 11 On May 7, 1980,
having received no reply, she and her husband filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint for
mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, against the petitioner and ViceMayor de Perio. 12
A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner,

as mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9, 1980. 6 On April 17,
1980, he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayor's Permit
No. 1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of
R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." 7 Later, when
the petitioner went to Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de
Perio, Jr. caused the posting of a signboard at the San
Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. 8
On the same date, Yambao requested permission from the

FDA to exchange the locations of the San Sebastian Drug
Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store for reasons of
"business preference." 13
The request was granted. 14 But when informed of this
action, the petitioner, in a letter to the private respondent
dated May 13, 1980, disapproved the transfers and
suspended Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City
Drug Store. 15
Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy,"

and after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala, on
April 25, 1980, directed the closure of the drug store for
three days and its payment of a P100.00 fine for violation of
R.A. No. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambao
against a repetition of the infraction. 9 On April 29, 1980,
the FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the
penalties imposed had already been discharged and
allowed the drug store to resume operations. 10
The Yambaos then filed on May 15, 1980, a supplemental

complaint questioning the said suspension and praying for
the issuance of a preliminary writ of prohibitory
injunction. 16 On the same day, the respondent judge
issued an order directing the maintenance of the status quo
with respect to the Olongapo City Drug Store pending
resolution of the issues. 17
On May 21, 1980, the petitioner wrote the FDA requesting
reconsideration of its order of April 29, 1980, allowing
resumption of the operation of the San Sebastian Drug
Store. 18 The request was denied by the FDA in its reply
dated May 27, 1980. 19
162
A motion for reconsideration of the status quo order had
earlier been filed on May 1, 1980 by the petitioner. After a
joint hearing and an exchange of memoranda thereon, the
respondent judge issued an order on July 16, 1980,20 the
dispositive portion of which read as follows:
First, let us compare the bases of the powers and functions

respectively claimed by the FDA and the petitioner as
mayor of Olongapo City.
The task of drug inspection was originally lodged with the
Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners pursuant to Act 2762,
as amended by Act 4162. By virtue of Executive Order No.
392 dated January 1, 1951 (mandating reorganization of
various departments and agencies), this was assumed by
the Department of Health and exercised through an office
in the Bureau of Health known as the Drug Inspection
Section. This section was empowered "to authorize the
opening of pharmacies, drug stores and dispensaries, and
similar establishments after inspection by persons
authorized by law."
WHEREFORE, the defendants' motion for reconsideration of

the status quo order dated May 15, 1980, is hereby DENIED
and the letter of the defendant city mayor dated April 17,
1980, for the revocation of Mayor's Permit No. 1954 for the
San Sebastian Drug Store is declared null and void.
Accordingly, a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction is
heretofore issued enjoining defendants from doing acts
directed towards the closure of the San Sebastian Drug
Store and the suspension of the Olongapo City Drug Store
both situated at Hospital Road, Olongapo City. Further, the
signboard posted at San Sebastian Drug Store by the
defendants is ordered removed in order that the said drug
store will resume its normal business operation.
The Food and Drug Administration was created under R.A.

No. 3720 (otherwise known as the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act), approved on June 22, 1963, and vested with all drug
inspection functions in line with "the policy of the State to
insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug and
cosmetics, and to regulate the production, sale and traffic
of the same to protect the health of the people." Section 5
of this Act specifically empowers it:
The hearing of the main petition for damages is set on

August 14, 1980, at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above
stated order was denied in an order dated September 4,
1980. 21 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary,
injunction, to challenge the aforesaid orders.
(e) to issue certificates of compliance with technical

requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of license
and spotcheck for compliance with regulations regarding
operation of food, drug and cosmetic manufacturers and
establishments.
We issued a temporary restraining order against the

respondent judge on October 2 7, 1980, 22 but lifted it on
December 10, 1980, for failure of the petitioner to file his
comment on the private respondents' motion to lift the said
order and/or for issuance of a counter restraining order. 23
For a more effective exercise of this function, the

Department of Health issued on March 5, 1968,
Administrative Order No. 60, series of 1968, laying down
163
the requirements for the application to be filed with the FDA
for authorization to operate or establish a drug
establishment. The order provides that upon approval of
the application, the FDA shall issue to the owner or
administrator of the drug store or similar establishment a
"License to Operate" which "shall be renewed within the
first 3 months of each year upon payment of the required
fees." This license contains the following reservation:
For his part, the petitioner, traces his authority to the

charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter
aliaempowers the city mayor under Section 10 thereof:
k. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or
permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation
of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
prohibited by law or city ordinances are being committed
under protection of such licenses or in the premises in
which the business for which the same have been granted
is carried on, or for any other good reason of general
interest.
However, should during the period of issue, a violation of

any provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and/or
the regulations issued thereunder be committed, this
License shall be subject to suspension or revocation.
The charter also provides, in connection with the powers of

the city health officer, that:
When the drug addiction problem continued to aggravate,

P.D. No. 280 was promulgated on August 27, 1973, to give
more teeth to the powers of the FDA, thus:
Sec. 6 (k). He and his representatives shall have the power

to arrest violators of health laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations and to recommend the revocation or
suspension of the permits of the different establishments to
the City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules
and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, the Food and Drug Administrator is hereby
authorized to order the closure, or suspend or revoke the
license
of
any
drug
establishment
which
after
administrative investigation is found guilty of selling or
dispensing drugs medicines and other similar substances in
violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, or other laws regulating the
sale or dispensation of drugs, or rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto.
An application to establish a drug store in Olongapo City

must be filed with the Office of the Mayor and must show
that the applicant has complied with the existing
ordinances on health and sanitation, location or zoning, fire
or building, and other local requirements. If the application
is approved, the applicant is granted what is denominated a
"Mayor's Permit" providing inter alia that it "is valid only at
the place stated above and until (date), unless sooner
revoked for cause." 24
Sec. 2. The administrative investigation shall be summary

in character. The owner of the drug store shall be given an
opportunity to be heard. (P.D. 280, emphasis supplied.)
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently

conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same
164
instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against
the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy
is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible,
bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the
same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the
same time also according due respect to a coordinate
department of the government. It is this policy the Court
will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws abovecited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
exercise of his own authority under the charter, refuse to

grant the permit sought.
The power to approve a license includes by implication,.
even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By
extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to
grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place.
Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the
applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of
the general laws and the implementing administrative rules
and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA
may revoke the said license. By the same token, having
granted the permit upon his ascertainment that the
conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City
have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such
conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.
A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to

operate issued by the FDA is a condition precedent to the
grant of a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to
operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is
imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the
drug store is conformable to the national policy and the
laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA.
Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not
previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will
be a nullity.
Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on

the ground that the compliance with the conditions laid
down and found satisfactory by the FDA when it issued its
license is in his own view not acceptable. This very same
principle also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not revoke
its license on the ground that the conditions laid down in
the mayor's permit have been violated notwithstanding that
no such finding has been made by the mayor.
This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the

mayor's permit is mandatory once it is shown that the FDA
has licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This
is not a necessary consequence. For while it may appear
that the applicant has complied with the pertinent national
laws and policies, this fact alone will not signify compliance
with the particular conditions laid down by the local
authorities like zoning, building, health, sanitation, and
safety regulations, and other municipal ordinances enacted
under the general welfare clause. This compliance still has
to be ascertained by the mayor if the permit is to be issued
by his office. Should he find that the local requirements
have not been observed, the mayor must then, in the
In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug

Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its own
conditions, which it certainly had the primary power to
enforce. By revoking the mayor's permit on the same
ground for which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already
been penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in effect
reversing the derision of the latter on a matter that came
under its jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the
165
pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct
responsibility to execute, the mayor had no authority to
interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute
them for the decision already made by the FDA.
P100.00. 26 Notably, the criminal charges filed against the

private respondent for the questioned transaction were
dismissed by the fiscal's office. 27
It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store
was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing held on April
25, 1980, at which private respondent Yambao, assisted by
her lawyer-husband, appeared and testified. 28By contrast,
the revocation of the mayor's permit was communicated to
her in a letter 29 reading simply as follows:
It would have been different if the offense condoned by the

FDA was a violation of, say, a city ordinance requiring
buildings to be provided with safety devices or equipment,
like fire extinguishers. The city executive may ignore such
condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just the same.
In this situation, he would be acting properly because the
enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In
the present case, however, the condition allegedly violated
related to a national law, not to a matter of merely local
concern, and so came under the 'jurisdiction of the FDA.
April 17, 1980

Rosalinda
c/o
San
Sebastian
Hospital Road, Olongapo City
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative

authorities are accorded great respect because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to
which they are assigned. 25 Even the courts of justice,
including this Court, are concluded by such findings in the
absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion,
which is not present in the case at bar. For all his
experience in the enforcement of city ordinances, the
petitioner cannot claim the superior aptitudes of the FDA in
the enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws.
He should therefore also be prepared, like the courts of
justice themselves, to accept its decisions on this matter.
Drug
Yambao
Store
Madame:
Based on a report submitted by PC Major Virtus V. Gil, Chief
3 RFO, Dis. B, Task Force "Bagong Buhay," "you are
rampantly violating the provisions of Republic Act 5921
otherwise known as the 'Pharmacy Law."
Aside from this, there is evidence that you are dispensing
regulated drugs contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
In view of the above, Mayors Permit No. 1954 heretofore
issued in your name for the operation of a drug store (San
Sebastian) at the Annex Building of the Fil-Am (IYC), along
Hospital Road, this City, is REVOKED effective April 18,
1980.
The petitioner magnifies the infraction committed by the

San Sebastian Drug Store but the FDA minimizes it.
According to the FDA Administrator, Valium is not even a
prohibited drug, which is why the penalty imposed was only
a 3-day closure of the drug store and a fine of
PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.

166
Very truly yours,
If only for the violation of due process which is manifest

from this letter, the mayor's arbitrary action can be
annulled.
Olongapo City Drug Store at No. 1-B Fil-Am Bldg., Hospital

Road, the said permit was "hereby suspended." We find that
that reason was valid enough. The permit clearly allowed
the drug store to operate in the address given and not
elsewhere. No hearing was necessary because the transfer
without the mayor's permission is not disputed and was in
fact impliedly admitted by the private respondent.
The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for

Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer thereof
to the site of the San Sebastian Drug Store as approved by
the FDA but without permission from the petitioner. On this
matter, the Court believes that the final decision rested
with the mayor. The condition violated related more to the
location in Olongapo City of business establishments in
general than to the regulation of drug stores in particular. It
therefore came under the petitioner's jurisdiction.
If the private respondent wanted to transfer her drug store,

what she should have done was to secure the approval not
only of the FDA but also, and especially, of the mayor.
Merely notifying the petitioner of the change in the location
of her drug stores as allowed by the FDA was not enough.
The FDA had no authority to revoke that particular condition
of the mayor's permits indicating the sites of the two drug
stores as approved by the mayor in the light of the needs of
the city. Only the mayor could.
The FDA would have the right to disapprove the site of the
drug store only if it would impair the health or other
interests of the customers in contravention of the national
laws or policies, as where the drug store is located in an
unsanitary site. But the local executive would have reason
to object to the location, even if approved by the FDA,
where it does not conform to, say, a zoning ordinance
intended to promote the comfort and convenience of the
city residents.
We assume that Mayor's Permit No. 1954 could also have

been validly suspended for the same reason (as the sites of
the two drug stores were exchanged without amendment of
their respective permits) were it not for the fact that such
permit was revoked by the petitioner on the more serious
ground of violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
(SGD.)
City Mayor
RICHARD
J.
GORDON
It is understood, however, that the suspension should be

deemed valid only as the two drug stores have not returned
to their original sites as specified in their respective
permits. Indefinite suspension will amount to a permanent
revocation, which will not be a commensurate penalty with
the degree of the violation being penalized.
The reason given by the petitioner in disapproving the

transfer was violation of Mayor's Permit No. 1955, which by
its terms was valid only at the place stated therein. In the
letter of May 13, 1980 30 the private respondent was
clearly informed that for violation of the condition of
Mayor's Permit No. 1955 granting her the of operating the
167
The Court adds that denial of the request for transfer, if
properly made by the private respondents, may not be
validly denied by the judge in the absence of a clear
showing that the transfer sought will prejudice the residents
of the city. As the two drug stores are only a few meters
from each other, and in the same building, there would
seem to be no reason why the mere exchange of their
locations should not be permitted. Notably, the location of
the two drug stores had previously been approved in
Mayor's Permit Nos. 1954 and 1955.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders of July 6, 1980 and

September 4, 1980, are MODIFIED in the sense that the
suspension of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 shall be considered
valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store and the
Olongapo City Drug Store return to their original sites as
specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's permits or
until the request for transfer, if made by the private
respondents, is approved by the petitioner. The rest of the
said Orders are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking

Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after the FDA had authorized the
resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store
following the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it.
However, it was competent for the petitioner to suspend
Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo
City Drug Store in violation of the said permit. Such
suspension should nevertheless be effective only pending
the return of the drug store to its authorized original site or
the eventual approval by the mayor of the requested
transfer if found to be warranted.
Narvasa
(Chairman),
Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gancayco,
G.R. No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
CITY
OF
vs.
GENARO
N.
TEOTICO
APPEALS, respondents.
Grio-Aquino
MANILA, petitioner,
and
COURT
City
Fiscal
Manuel
T.
Reyes
for
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
The petitioner is to be commended for his zeal in the

promotion of the campaign against drug addiction, which
has sapped the vigor and blighted the future of many of our
people, especially the youth. The legal presumption is that
he acted in good faith and was motivated only by his
concern for the residents of Olongapo City when he directed
the closure of the first drug store and the suspension of the
permit of the other drug store. It appears, though, that he
may have overreacted and was for this reason properly
restrained by the respondent judge.
and
OF
petitioner.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico
was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five
minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to
a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered
168
and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking
his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his
vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled
him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the
Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated,
after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated
wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions
on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the
upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella
region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by
anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital,
required further medical treatment by a private practitioner
who charged therefor P1,400.00.
engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days.

Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his
incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was
subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business
associates and friends. During the period of his treatment,
plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare
of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to
the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay
his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral
and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section,
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of
the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P.
Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24,
1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit
4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was
reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover
was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the
City Engineer never received any report to the effect that
the catchbasin in question was not covered between
January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of
the said office, which is charged with the duty of
installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of
Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever
source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is
immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing
the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel
matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business
then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was
rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed
complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers;
that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed,

with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint
which was, subsequently, amended for damages against
the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the
decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the
Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public
accountant, a businessman and a professor at the
University of the East. He held responsible positions in
various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co.,
the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing
Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also
associated with several civic organizations such as the
Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal.
As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from
169
has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the
City by constructing them under the sidewalks with
concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the
gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the
city from time to time whenever funds were available.
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their

control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail
over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the
Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of

Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the
theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended
complaint, without costs.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and,

we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special
law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards
the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section
4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to
persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189
of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription
making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person
by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision." In other words,
said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by

the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the
City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present
case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
170
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to
Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him
took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
article requires is that the province, city or municipality

have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an

allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his
amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the
defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the
streets aforementioned were and have been constantly
kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the
storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been
ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by
law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall

have the following legislative powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for

the laying
out,
construction and improvement,
and
to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public
places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of
streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection
of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the
same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes,
the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and
all structures in and under the same and the erecting of
poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and
regulate
cross-works,
curbs,
and
gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the
streets and
other
public
places;
to
provide
for
the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the
authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction
and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges,
viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing,
kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which
may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or
frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of
horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars,
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a

national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which
had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be
set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the
rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion
for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
171
and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the
lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to
provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of
railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its
tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to
require railroad companies to fence their property, or any
part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to
persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches,
drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks,
so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent
property shall not be obstructed.
connection with the maintenance of said road, which were

decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of
fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject
to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is
so ordered.1wph1.t
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by

Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated
May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs
the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and
the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets
within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No.
113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act
No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the
highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the
construction, maintenance and improvement of national
primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and
city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District
Engineers
and
Highway City Engineers
under
the
supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and
shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or
special appropriation Acts."
ISIDRO
G.
ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL
OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN
POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO,
CATALINA
B.
CAGAMPAN,
EUGENIO
RAMOS,
FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO
LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO
PAULINO, in their official capacities as City Mayor,
City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer,
respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT
OF
FIRST
INSTANCE
OF
SAN
CARLOS
CITY
(PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos

Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of
Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in
FERNANDEZ, J.:
172
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City,
Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil
Case No. SCC-182. 1
whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the same; that it

is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the necessary
budget providing for the payment of the salary of the
petitioner as provided for in Republic Act No. 5967; that
petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy
except the present action for mandamus; and that because
of the refusal of the respondent to comply with their
obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the
petitioner was forced to engage the services of a lawyer to
file this action for which he was to pay the sum of
P2,000.00
as
attorney's
2
fees.
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos

City (Pangasinan), instituted against the City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and the Mayor,
Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer of San Carlos
City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is
the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan,
that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its
creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as a
third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became
effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries
of city judges of second and third class cities shall be
P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then
actually receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which
P350.00 was the share of the national government and
P650.00 is the share of the city government, which salary
was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City Judge
of a third class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the
difference between the salary actually being received by a
City Judge and the basic salary established in said act shall
be paid by the city government; that from June 21, 1969 up
to the filing of the petition on January 21, 1971, the
petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of P9,500.00
with the respondent City of San Carlos (Pangasinan); that
the petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to
enact the necessary budget and to pay him the said
differential but the respondents, without any justification,
In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents

admitted and denied the allegations in the petition and
alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among
other things, that the salary of the city judge shall at least
be one hundred pesos per month less than that of a city
mayor; that the city judge receives an annual salary of
P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than the salary
being received by the city mayor which is P13,200.00
yearly; that assuming the existence of a salary difference,
in view of the provision of Republic Act No. 5967, that the
payment of the salary difference shall be subject to the
implementation of the respective city government, which is
discretionary on the part of the city government as to
whether it would or would not implement the payment of
the salary difference, and in view of the financial difficulties
of the city which has a big overdraft, the payment of the
salary difference of the city judge cannot be made; and that
the petitioner should pay his lawyer and should not charge
the attorney's fees to the respondents who have not
violated any rights of the petitioner. 3
173
The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City (Pangasinan),
Branch X, rendered its decision dated May 31, 1971
dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs.
a City Mayor (particularly in the case of second and third

class cities) would be rendered totally useless." The
petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of
the legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is
to increase the salary of the city judges, then the last
proviso of said Section 7 should give way to the provisions
of said section preceding said proviso."
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967

reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides
higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities shall receive
a basic salary which shall not be lower than the sums as
provided thereinbelow:
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took
effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was a
third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received an
annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of San
Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00 which
was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary of the
city judge.
xxx xxx xxx

(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand
pesos per annum;
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No.

17046, which became Republic Act No. 5967, the following
discussion took place:
xxx xxx xxx

For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less
than that fixed for the district judge, and for second and
third class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand
five hundred pesos less than that fixed for the district
judge, and for other cities, the city judge shall receive two
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge:
Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be
at least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the
city mayor.
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I

recall that there will be some cities where the city judges
will receive salaries higher than those of the mayors. And in
all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a
department head theoretically, at least, under the mayor.
It would not be fair for the purposes of public administration
that a city department head should receive a salary higher
than that of the chief executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I would
like to congratulate Your Honor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would be interpreted as
the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city
judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the
salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that of
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the

concern of the distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in
this particular amendment prepared by the distinguished
174
lady from La Union, thiswill not require the council to pay it
at P100.00 exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is
just the limit the maximum but they may fix it
at much less than that. That is why the words "at least"
were suggested by the Committee. It need not be exactly
just P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages 27732787. (Emphasis supplied .) 4
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the
intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 5967 was
that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the
salary of the city mayor. The saving clause "Provided,
however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least
P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor"
qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of city
judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per
annum.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the

cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod or Manila for that matter. The
Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now, under
the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva Ecija and
Davao which has already been accepted by the sponsor
does it mean that if the salary of the city mayor is
P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general

language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the
statute the former is given precedence over the latter on
the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of
the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his attention to
lines 13 to 20. We presented this amendment because it
says here: "For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and
other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge".
So it will happen, and my attention was called by the
gentlemen from Iloilo that the city judge win be receiving
more salary than the city mayor. Hence the amendment,
Mr. President.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan)

was receiving an annual salary of P13,200.00, the
respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual
salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge of the
said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed
and the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to cost.
xxx xxx xxx

I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas,
and this was their objection. We have proposed this
amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city
judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they
will be receiving less than what is proposed in this Bill. (Vol.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman)
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
175
Makasiar,
Muoz
Palma
and
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
PADOLINA,
PRESIDING
JUDGE,
BRANCH
162,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA;
IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING
CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and
TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN
and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT
OF
BINANGONAN
RIZAL;
FLEET
DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A.
MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON
FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.;
MUNICIPALITY
OF
JALA-JALA
and/or
MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE
BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR.
TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF
TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D.
PAPA, JR., respondents.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A.
MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH
VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT
ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A.
MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD
VENTURES
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S.
LABITORIA,
PRESIDING
JUDGE,
BRANCH
161,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA;
SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON
FISHING
CORP.;
MINAMAR
FISHING
CORP.;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S.
176
environment impact of development on the water quality
and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the
inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial,
domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced
the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are
not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan
Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence
the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme
of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and
its river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation
of the Authority.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump
created by affluence and profligate consumption and
extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of
the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in
the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to
understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental
protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal
interests of people, on the other?
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as

follows:
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational

safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850
created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This
Government Agency is supposed to carry out and
effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the
act clearly named, within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic
development.
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the

national policy to promote, and accelerate the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred
to as the region, within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic
development and to carry out the development of the
Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 1
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand

E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No.
4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns
of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective
uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the
Government and the general public over: the
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in

this case, include:
177
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further
amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be
known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which
shall read as follows:
determine new areas of fishery development or activities

which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the
overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay
and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the
Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of
the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which
shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de
Bay which shall take into consideration among others the
following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide resident
fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of
cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan
for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing
ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to
lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery
projects;
xxx xxx xxx

(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other
aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of
water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to
conduct studies and make experiments, whenever
necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in
view
of
improving
present
techniques
and
practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or amended
by the procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph,
the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations
remain in force;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within

the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other
regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives
of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance
of the Authority;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring

activities in Laguna de Bay,the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the
lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said lake including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to
impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and
management and to collect necessary fees for said
activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for
fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other
government agencies and political sub-divisions in such
proportion as may be determined by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's
Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary

notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters
within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to
carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental
agencies in establishing water quality standards for
industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into
the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the
government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards,
or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as
178
provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate
water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be
resolved thru the NEDA Board. 2
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna

de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and
Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon,
Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and
Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and
Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon
Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig,
Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under

Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No.
813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief
Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna
Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring
judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure
renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the
competing options for the use of such resources and
conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created
undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the
Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its
charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and
enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and
named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby

empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and
its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial,
agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal
purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be
collected, and the sharing with other government agencies
and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to
the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen
fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20
percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project
Development Fund which shall be administered by a
Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the
share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within
the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning
and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as
follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore
local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project
Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be
retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of
LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be
remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following

provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in
particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies
of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and
monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities
in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like.
179
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis
supplied)
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; .

...
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree

No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry,

prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish
from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing
gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee,
charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is
used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay
which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at
the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50
meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean
lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such
elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said
lake.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant
exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens,
or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawagkawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal
waters.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government

Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region
interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the
newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
xxx xxx xxx

Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to
issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the
Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July,
1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water
surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from
7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995.
The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages
were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by
the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake
carrying capacity.
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.

(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental
fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions
of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a
180
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore
municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already
saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating
the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.
amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws.

Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment
of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five
Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal in accordance with the
foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27
October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
should not be demolished/dismantled.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority

served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency
PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila,
Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by
Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of
1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the
Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal
Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the

concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them
to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed
injunction cases against the Authority before various
regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development,
Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for
Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by
IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR
Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for
Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business
Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil
Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP
Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures

in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or
to which no application for registration and/or permit has
been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of
March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which
shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal
Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to
demolition of their structures be criminally charged in
accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as
181
Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris
Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch
79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial
Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case
No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern
Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local

Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify
the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the
Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the
Authority the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's
consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of
Appeals.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it

on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were
invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining
order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued
in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the
Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar
structures in question.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals

dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court
of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasijudicial agencies of government whose decision or order are
appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA
charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar
as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA
charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are
concerned had been repealed by the Local Government
Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power
to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their
respective local government units concerned.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and

injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority
with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are
concerned regional trial courts and respective private
parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of
Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for
the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the

Authority has returned to this Court charging the following
errors:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of

preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759
and 566;
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY

COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA
LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCY.
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts

from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the
Authority which is a co-equal body;
182
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS
AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS
BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING
IS
CONTRARY
TO
ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES
AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,

mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO
ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN
DEVOLVED
TO
CONCERNED
(LAKESHORE)
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any

express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there
was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of
laws should be made clear and expressed.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the

main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the
Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or
the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake

Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute,
provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law." 3
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake

Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide
that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting
the said region, including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the
like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a

special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
183
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special
law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication. 4
"Managing the lake resources would mean the

implementation of a national policy geared towards the
protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the intergenerational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this
part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have
foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the
special law designed to govern the management of our
Laguna de Bay lake resources."
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the

Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991.
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to

fragmented concepts of management policies where
lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The
garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake,
abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens
by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific
portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to
conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de
Bay." 5
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the

Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational
safety, and sustainable development, there is every
indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to
proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner
Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay,
like any other single body of water has its own unique
natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the
eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller
rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or
watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite,
Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated
delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with
uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of
attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible
natural resource a very limited one which requires
judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure
renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and
balance."
The power of the local government units to issue fishing

privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is
evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local
Government Code empowering local governments to issue
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power
Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant
permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
184
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section
2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of all State powers including the
power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority
which embodies a valid exercise of police power should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the

surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA,
by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA
is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by
local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where
such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of
the LLDA for the development of the region.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,

fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna
de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides
for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a
quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304,
306, which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative
agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it
by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA
to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
xxx xxx xxx

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another
forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA,
as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and
185
there is no question that the Authority has express powers
as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to
pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist
order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is
co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions
against it may only be instituted before the Court of
Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the
resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the
Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction.
authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to

grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by
Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge
Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and
Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila,
are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby
prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within
the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being
declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by
Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo
D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega,
Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared
null and void and ordered cancelled.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149

of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions
of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment
of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise
such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures

put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by
Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region,
specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and
Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc.,
represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield
Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion
Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading
Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation,
Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing
Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish
Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat;
SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing
Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing

authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region.
Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would
render useless its reason for being and will in effect
denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had
never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the
186
declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority.
Tomas
C. Leynes by
Oriental Mindoro.
SO ORDERED.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the

presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned to
theMunicipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such,
his salary and representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court.
In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance
of P944 from
the
local
funds[2] of
[3]
the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.
[G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003]

JUDGE
TOMAS
C.
LEYNES, petitioner,
vs. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON. GREGORIA S.
ONG, DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON.
SALVACION
DALISAY,
PROVINCIAL
AUDITOR, respondents.
the Municipality of Naujan,
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan,

through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the
Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer
regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a
monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner judge.
On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges
monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase
of P656) starting May 1993.[4] By virtue of said resolution,
the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan) approved a supplemental budget
which
was
likewise
approved
by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial
Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro. In 1994, the
Municipal Government of Naujan again provided for
petitioner judges P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual
budget
which
was
again
approved
by
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation
to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision[1] dated September 14,
1999 of the Commission on Audit (COA), affirming the
resolution of COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong dated
March 29, 1994 which in turn affirmed the opinion dated
October 19, 1993 of the Provincial Auditor of
Oriental Mindoro, Salvacion M. Dalisay. All three denied the
grant of P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge
187
theSangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial
Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.[5]
4. Funding
Source: In
all
cases,
commutable
and
reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount
appropriated for the purpose and other personal services
savings of the agency or project from where the officials
and employees covered under this Circular draw their
salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source.[6] (emphasis supplied)
On February
17,
1994,
Provincial
Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal
Mayor
and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing
them to stop the payment of theP1,600 monthly allowance
or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the immediate
refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She
opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA
to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was
already receiving from the Supreme Court. Her directive
was based on the following:
Petitioner
judge
appealed
to
COA
Regional
Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion
of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and who added that Resolution
No.
101,
Series
of
1993
of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated September
1, 1993 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances
to judges and other national officials or employees by the
local government units (LGUs). Section 3 of the said budget
circular provides that:
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of

1993
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The
following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
determined by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) while in the actual performance of their respective
functions are hereby granted monthly commutable
representation and transportation allowances payable from
the programmed appropriations provided for their
respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated
below . . .
Sec. 3 Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional

compensation
to
the
national
government
officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates
authorized by law, rules and regulations and subject to the
following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality,
city or province as certified by the Accountant concerned
will allow the grant of the allowances/additional
compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1,

1992, of the Department of Budget and Management
Subject: Representation and Transportation Allowances of
National Government Officials and Employees
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of

RA 7160 including the full requirement of RA 6758 have
been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as certified
xxxxxxxxx
188
by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU
concerned;
No. 67 dated 01 January 1992 is subject to the following

conditions to wit:
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of

personnel/functions in accordance with the provisions of RA
7160;
1. Payable from the programmed /appropriated amount and

others from personal services savings of the respective
offices where the officials or employees draw their salaries;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions

prescribed in RA 7160; and
2. Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual

General Appropriations Act;
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not

granted
by
the
national
government
to
the
[7]
officials/employees assigned to the LGU.
3. Officials /employees on detail with other offices or

assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall be paid
from their parent agencies;
Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the

Regional Director to the Commission on Audit. In the
meantime, a disallowance of the payment of the P1,600
monthly allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he
received
his P1,600
monthly
allowance
from
the Municipality of Naujan only for the period May 1993 to
January 1994.
4. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than

one source.
On the other hand, the municipal government may provide
additional allowances and other benefits to judges and
other national government officials or employees assigned
or stationed in the municipality, provided, that the finances
of the municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to
Section 447, Par. 1 (xi), R.A. 7160, and provided further,
that similar allowance/additional compensation are not
granted
by
the
national
government
to
the
official/employee assigned to the local government unit as
provided under Section 3(e) of Local Budget Circular No. 53,
dated 01 September 1993.
On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision

affirming
the
resolution
of
Regional
Director Gregoria S. Ong:
The main issue . . . is whether or not the Municipality
of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its
Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the
Supreme Court.
The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the

Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 36 of the
General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] have been
harmonized by the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01
September 1993, issued by the Department of Budget and
Management pursuant to its powers under Section 25 and
Generally, the grant of (RATA) [sic] to qualified national

government officials and employees pursuant to Section 36
of R.A. 7645 [General Appropriations Act of 1993] and NCC
189
Section 327 of the Local Government Code. The said
circular must be adhered to by the local government units
particularly Section 3 thereof which provides the
implementing guidelines of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 in the grant of allowances
to national government officials/employees assigned or
stationed in their respective local government units.
MONTHLY BY SANGGUNIANG MEMBERS IN PESOS: ONE

THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P1,600.00) EFFECTIVE 1993, IS
VALID.
II
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
POWER
OF
MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENTS TO GRANT ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND
OTHER BENEFITS TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
STATIONED IN THEIR MUNICIPALITY IS VERY EXPLICIT AND
UNEQUIVOCAL UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 IN RELATION TO
SECTIONS 17 AND 22 THEREOF.
Consequently, the subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11

May
1993 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro, having failed to comply with the inherent
precondition as defined in Section 3 (e). . . is null and
void. Furthermore, the Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes,
being a national government official is prohibited to receive
additional RATA from the local government fund pursuant to
Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act (R.A. 7645 for
1993) and National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated 1
January 1992.[8] (emphasis ours)
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT (DBM) CAN, BY THE ISSUANCE OF BUDGET
CIRCULARS, RESTRICT A MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FROM
EXERCISING ITS GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF PROVIDING
ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO
NATIONAL EMPLOYEES STATIONED OR ASSIGNED TO THEIR
MUNICIPALITY FOR AS LONG AS THEIR FINANCES SO ALLOW.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above decision but it was denied by the Commission in a
resolution dated May 30, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed
the instant petition, raising the following assignments of
error for our consideration:
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 (a) (1) (xi) WAS
EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY REPEALED OR MODIFIED BY
REPUBLIC ACT 7645 AND THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
ACT OF 1993.
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 1O1, SERIES OF 1993
OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO, WHICH GRANTED
ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE TO THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL JUDGE
OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO AND INCREASING HIS
CURRENT REPRESENTATION AND TRAVELLING ALLOWANCE
(RATA) TO AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THAT RECEIVED
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
THE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES GRANTED TO HIM BY THE
190
MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO BY VIRTUE
OF ITS RESOLUTION NO. 101, SERIES OF 1993.
POSITION OF PETITIONER
Petitioner judge, on the other hand, asserts that the
municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by
RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) to enact
appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other
benefits to judges stationed in its territory. Section 447(a)
(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 imposes only
one condition, that is, when the finances of the municipal
government allow. The Code does not impose any other
restrictions in the exercise of such power by the
municipality. Petitioner also asserts that the DBM cannot
amend or modify a substantive law like the Local
Government Code of 1991 through mere budget circulars.
Petitioner emphasizes that budget circulars must conform
to, not modify or amend, the provisions of the law it seeks
to implement.[11]
POSITION OF COA
Respondent Commission on Audit opposes the grant by
the Municipality of Naujan of the P1,600 monthly allowance
to petitioner Judge Leynes for the reason that the
municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to
the RATA already received from the Supreme Court.
[9]
Respondent bases its contention on the following:
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67 (hereafter NCC
No. 67) dated January 1, 1992 of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) which provides that (a) the RATA of
national officials and employees shall be payable from the
programmed appropriations or personal services savings of
the agency where such officials or employees draw their
salary and (b) no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from
more than one source;
HISTORY OF GRANT OF
ALLOWANCES TO JUDGES
2. the General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) which

provided that the RATA of national officials shall be payable
from the programmed appropriations of their respective
offices and
The power of local government units (LGUs) to grant

allowances to judges stationed in their respective territories
was originally provided by Letter of Instruction No. 1418
dated July 18, 1984 (hereafter LOI No. 1418):
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53 (hereafter LBC No. 53) dated

September 1, 1993 of the DBM which prohibits local
government units from granting allowances to national
government officials or employees stationed in their
localities when such allowances are also granted by the
national government or are similar to the allowances
granted by the national government to such officials or
employees.[10]
WHEREAS, the State is cognizant of the need to maintain

the independence of the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, the budgetary allotment of the Judiciary
constitutes only a small percentage of the national budget;
WHEREAS, present economic conditions adversely affected
the livelihood of the members of the Judiciary;
191
WHEREAS, some local government units are ready, willing
and able to pay additional allowances to Judges of various
courts within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
1. That the continuance of payment of subject allowance to

the recipient judge shall be entirely voluntary and noncompulsory on the part of the Local Government Units;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of

the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby direct:
2. That payment of the above shall always be subject to the

availability of local funds;
1. Section 3 of Letter of Implementation No. 96 is hereby

amended to read as follows:
3. That it shall be made only in compliance with the policy

of non-diminution of compensation received by the
recipient judge before the implementation of the salary
standardization;
3. The allowances provided in this letter shall be borne

exclusively
by
the
National
Government. However,
provincial, city and municipal governments may pay
additional allowances to the members and personnel of the
Judiciary assigned in their respective areas out of available
local funds but not to exceed P1,500.00; Provided, that in
Metropolitan Manila, the city and municipal governments
therein
may
pay
additional
allowances
not
[12]
exceeding P3,000.00. (emphasis ours)
4. That the subject allowance shall be given only to judges

who were receiving the same as of June 30, 1989 and shall
be co-terminous with the incumbent judges; and
5. That the subject allowance shall automatically terminate
upon transfer of a judge from one local government unit to
another local government unit. (emphasis ours)
On October 10, 1991, Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.[13] The
power of the LGUs to grant allowances and other benefits
to judges and other national officials stationed in their
respective territories was expressly provided in Sections
447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)(xi) of the Code.
On June 25, 1991, the DBM issued Circular No. 91-7

outlining the guidelines for the continued receipt of
allowances by judges from LGUs:
Consistent with the constitutional provision on the fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary and the policy of the National
Government of allowing greater autonomy to local
government units, judges of the Judiciary are hereby
allowed to continue to receive allowances at the same
rates which they have been receiving from the Local
Government Units as of June 30, 1989, subject to the
following guidelines:
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular

No. 55 (hereafter LBC No. 55) setting out the maximum
amount of allowances that LGUs may grant to judges. For
provinces and cities, the amount should not exceed P1,000
and for municipalities, P700.
On December 3, 2002, we struck down the above circular
in Dadole, et al. vs. COA.[14] We ruled there that the Local
192
Government Code of 1991 clearly provided that LGUs could
grant allowances to judges, subject only to the condition
that the finances of the LGUs allowed it. We held that
setting a uniform amount for the grant of allowances (was)
an inappropriate way of enforcing said criterion.
Accordingly, we declared that the DBM exceeded its power
of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did
not jibe with the Local Government Code of 1991. [15]
appropriate, depending on availability of funds,

accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991.
in
OUR RULING
We rule in favor of petitioner judge. Respondent COA erred
in opposing the grant of the P1,600 monthly allowance by
the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes.
DISCUSSION OF OUR RULING
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government

Code of 1991, provides:
From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant

allowances to judges, the following principles should be
noted:
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the

municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
1. the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges has long

been recognized (since 1984 by virtue of LOI No. 1418) and,
at present, it is expressly and unequivocally provided in
Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code
of 1991;
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for

an efficient and effective municipal government, and in this
connection shall:
2. the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated June 25,

1991 and LBC No. 55 dated March 15, 1994 indicates that
the national government recognizes the power of LGUs to
grant such allowances to judges;
xxxxxxxxx
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow,
provide for additional allowances and other benefits to
judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school
teachers, and other national government officials stationed
in or assigned to the municipality; (emphasis ours)
3. in Circular No. 91-7, the national government

merely provides the guidelines for the continued receipt of
allowances by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the
national government merely tries to limit the amount of
allowances LGUs may grant to judges and
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section

has been repealed, modified or amended by NCC No. 67
dated January 1, 1992, RA 7645 (the General Appropriations
Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53 dated September 1, 1993.[16]
4. in the recent case of Dadole, et al. vs. COA, the Court

upheld the constitutionally enshrined autonomy of LGUs to
grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed
193
It is elementary in statutory construction that an
administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify
or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an
administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or
amend it.[17] In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere
administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law like
RA 7160.
is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character,

considers and makes special provisions for the particular
circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so,
the legislature, by adopting a general law containing
provisions repugnant to those of the special law and
without making any mention of its intention to amend or
modify such special law, cannot be deemed to have
intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the
latter.[20]
It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction

that repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless
it is manifest that the legislature so intended. The
legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and cannot be presumed to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. [18] Respondent COA
alleges that Section 36 of RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993)
repealed Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160 (the LGC of
1991). A review of the two laws, however, shows that this
was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645 merely provided for the
different rates of RATA payable to national government
officials or employees, depending on their position, and
stated that these amounts were payable from the
programmed appropriations of the parent agencies to which
the concerned national officials or employees belonged.
Furthermore, there was no other provision in RA 7645 from
which a repeal of Section 447(a) (l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be
implied. In the absence, therefore, of any clear repeal of
Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160, we cannot presume such
intention on the part of the legislature.
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special

law[21] which exclusively deals with local government units
(LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in consonance
with the constitutionally mandated policy of local
autonomy. RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993), on the other hand,
was a general law[22] which outlined the share in the
national fund of all branches of the national government.
RA 7645 therefore, being a general law, could not have, by
mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160
should be taken as the exception to RA 7645 in the absence
of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion. [23]
The controversy actually centers on the seemingly
sweeping provision in NCC No. 67 which states that no one
shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
Does this mean that judges cannot receive allowances
from LGUs in addition to the RATA from the Supreme Court?
For reasons that will hereinafter be discussed, we answer in
the negative.
Moreover, the presumption against implied repeal becomes

stronger when, as in this case, one law is special and the
other is general.[19] The principle is expressed in the
maximgeneralia specialibus non derogant, a general law
does not nullify a specific or special law. The reason for this
The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read:

3. Rules and Regulations:
194
3.1.1 Payment
of
RATA,
whether
commutable
or
reimbursable, shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed for each of the following officials and employees
and those of equivalent ranks, and the conditions
enumerated under the pertinent sections of the General
Provisions of the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA):
RATA
from
more
than
one
source
(the
controversial prohibition) immediately follows the sentence
that RATA shall be paid from the budget of the national
agency where the concerned national officials and
employees draw their salaries. The fact that the other
source is another national agency is supported by RA 7645
(the GAA of 1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in
fact, by all subsequent GAAs for that matter, because
the GAAs all essentially provide that (1) the RATA of
national officials shall be payable from the budgets of their
respective national agencies and (2) those officials on detail
with other national agencies shall be paid their RATA only
from the budget of their parent national agency:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Funding Source:
In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be
paid from the amount appropriated for the purpose and
other personal services savings of the agency or project
from where the officials and employees covered under this
Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to
collect RATA from more than one source. (emphasis ours)
Section 36, RA 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993:

Representation and Transportation Allowances. The
following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
determined by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) while in the actual performance of their respective
functions are hereby granted monthly commutable
representation and transportation allowances payable from
the programmed appropriations provided for their
respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below,
which shall apply to each type of allowance:
In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in

statutory construction that force and effect should not be
narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law
but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in
one rational view.[24] Because a statute is enacted as a
whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as
important as the others, the statute should be construed
and given effect as a whole. A provision or section which is
unclear by itself may be clarified by reading and construing
it in relation to the whole statute.[25]
xxxxxxxxx
Officials on detail with other offices, including officials of
the Commission of Audit assigned to serve other offices or
agencies, shall be paid the allowance herein authorized
from the appropriations of their parent agencies. (emphasis
ours)
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent

is the dual collection of RATA by a national official from the
budgets of more than one national agency. We emphasize
that the other source referred to in the prohibition
is another national agency. This can be gleaned from the
fact that the sentence no one shall be allowed to collect
195
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only
against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a national
official from the budgets of two or more national
agencies. Stated otherwise, when a national official is on
detail with another national agency, he should get his RATA
only from his parent national agency and not from the
other national agency he is detailed to.
By no stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be

construed as nullifying the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges under the Local Government Code of
1991. It was issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to
national officials under the national budget uniform. In
other words, it applies only to the national funds
administered by the DBM, not the local funds of LGUs.
Since the other source referred in the controversial

prohibition is another national agency, said prohibition
clearly
does
not
apply
to LGUs like
the Municipality of Naujan. National agency of course refers
to the different offices, bureaus and departments
comprising the national government. The budgets of these
departments or offices are fixed annually by Congressin the
General Appropriations Act.[26] An LGU is obviously not a
national agency. Its annual budget is fixed by its own
legislative
council
(Sangguniang Bayan, Panlungsod or Panlalawigan), not by
Congress. Without doubt, NCC No. 67 does not apply
to LGUs.
To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to

judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will
subvert the principle of local autonomy zealously
guaranteed by the Constitution. [27] The Local Government
Code of 1991 was specially promulgated by Congress to
ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by
the Constitution. By upholding, in the present case, the
power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to
their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to
grant, depending on the availability of local funds, we
ensure the genuine and meaningful local autonomy
of LGUs.
We now discuss the next contention of respondent COA:
that the
resolution
of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting
the P1,600
monthly allowance to petitioner judge was null and void
because it failed to comply with LBC No. 53
dated September 1, 1993:
The prohibition in NCC No. 67 is in fact an administrative

tool of the DBM to prevent the much-abused practice of
multiple allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA
by national agencies. Thus, the purpose clause of NCC No.
67 reads:
This Circular is being issued to ensure uniformity and
consistency of actions on claims for representation and
transportation allowance (RATA) which is primarily granted
by law to national government officials and employees to
cover expenses incurred in the discharge or performance of
their duties and responsibilities.
Sec. 3 Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional

compensation
to
the
national
government
officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates
authorized by law, rules and regulations and subject to the
following preconditions:
196
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality,
city or province as certified by the Accountant concerned
will allow the grant of the allowances/additional
compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
already stated, a circular must conform to the law it seeks

to implement and should not modify or amend it. [30]
Moreover,
by
prohibiting LGUs from
granting
allowances similar to the allowances granted by the
national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically
prohibits LGUs from granting allowances to judges and, in
effect, totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being
unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power
of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and being violative of
their autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3,
paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared null and
void.
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of

RA 7160 including the full requirement of RA 6758 have
been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as certified
by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU
concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
personnel/functions in accordance with the provisions of RA
7160;
Paragraphs (a) to (d) of said circular, however, are valid as

they are in accordance with Sections 324 [31] and 325[32] of
the Local Government Code of 1991; these respectively
provide for the budgetary requirements and general
limitations on the use of provincial, city and municipal
funds. Paragraphs (a) to (d) are proper guidelines for the
condition provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 that LGUs may grant
allowances to judges if their funds allow. [33]
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions

prescribed in RA 7160.
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not
granted
by
the
national
government
to
the
officials/employees assigned to the LGU.
Though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within
the ambit of the President's power of general supervision
over LGUs,[28] we rule that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof
is invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal
governments may grant allowances to judges as long as
their finances allow.Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53,
by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to
judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by
the national government or (2) similar to the allowances
granted by the national government, violates Section
447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. [29] As
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of

the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null and
void.
The argument is misplaced.
Guidelines
(a)
to
(d)
were
met
when
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Oriental Mindoro approved
Resolution
No.
101
of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting
the P1,600
197
monthly allowance to petitioner judge as well as the
corresponding budgets of the municipality providing for the
said monthly allowance to petitioner judge. Under Section
327
of
the
Local
Government
Code
of
1991,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to
review the appropriation ordinances of its component
municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and
325
of
the
Code.
Considering
said
duty
of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, we will assume, in the
absence
of
proof
to
the
contrary,
that
Oriental Mindoro performed what the law required it to do,
that is, review the resolution and the corresponding
budgets of the Municipality of Naujan to make sure that
they complied with Sections 324 and 325 of the Code. [34] We
presume
the
regularity
of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigans official act.
despite its non-compliance with the requirements of the

law. It failed to discharge such burden. On the contrary, we
find
that
the
resolution
of
the Municipality of Naujan granting
the P1,600
monthly
allowance to petitioner judge fully complied with the law.
Thus, we uphold its validity.
In
sum,
we
hereby
affirm
the
power
of
the Municipality of Naujan to
grant
the
questioned
allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes in accordance with the
constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy and the
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. We also
sustain the validity of Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993, of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan for being in accordance
with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated September 14, 1999 of the
Commission of Audit is hereby SET ASIDE and Section 3,
paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
Moreover, it is well-settled that an ordinance must be

presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it
is not in accordance with the law. [35] Respondent COA had
the burden of proving that Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan did not comply with the
condition provided in Section 447 of the Code, the
budgetary requirements and general limitations on the use
of municipal funds provided in Sections 324 and 325 of the
Code and the implementing guidelines issued by the DBM,
i.e., paragraphs (a) to (d), Section 3 of LBC No.
53. Respondent COA also had the burden of showing that
Oriental Mindoro erroneously approved said resolution
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
198

Statutory Construction on People's Initiative

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Statutory Construction on People's Initiative

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Statutory Construction

"innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member

twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996,

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters,

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law,

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that

and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro

for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a)

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY