Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
the City Fiscal - filed an opposition thereto, and on February 3, 1966 the
respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of
all the defendants on March 5 of the same year. In view thereof, petitioners
filed the present action for certiorariand prohibition.
evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place
where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use
of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the
crime of falsification of a private document; . . . .
Upon the foregoing facts the only question to be resolved is whether or not
the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal
Case No. C-2268 for alleged falsification of a private document by the
parties named in the information.
Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the
private document subject of the information was falsified by the persons
therein charged, the act of falsification - the signing of the document and the
coetaneous intent to cause damage - was committed and consummated
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the
falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for
which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or
essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor
could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the
City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond
question.
It is clear that petitioners are not charged with having used a falsified
document, in violation of the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code. The charge against them is that of having falsified a private
document by knowingly and willfully stating therein that Aurora M. Villasor
and Angelina M. Lopez were the "guardians" of their minor brothers George
and Alexander, respectively, when in fact they knew that, at the time they
made such written statement, it was Carolina M. de Castro who was the
judicial guardian of said minors.
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense
was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus,
under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal
courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction.
In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners - a claim supported by the
record - that Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private
document wherein they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact,
the first within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within
the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the province of Rizal.
We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed.
Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36
Phil. 146, that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and
penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually
falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified
document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended.
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that the information was
defective, in that it fails to set forth expressly the place where improper and
illegal use was made of the falsified document, an allegation which counsel
for appellant insists was absolutely essential for the proper determination of
the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the
definition of the crime of falsification of a private document as set forth in
Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense is consummated at the time when
and at the place where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or with
the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether the falsified document
is or is not put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is
although the accused in the case could have appealed in due time from the
order complained of, our action in the premises being based on the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy. In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43
Phil. 304, We also admitted a petition to restrain the prosecution of certain
chiropractors although, if convicted, they could have appealed. We gave due
course to their petition for the orderly administration of justice and to avoid
possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And in Arevalo vs.
Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari challenging the trial
court's action admitting an amended information was sustained despite the
availability of appeal at the proper time.
More recently, We said the following in Yap vs. the Hon. D. Lutero,
etc., G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959:
Manifestly, the denial, by respondent herein, of the motion to quash the
information in case No. 16443, may not be characterized as "arbitrary" or
"despotic", or to be regarded as amounting to "lack of jurisdiction". The
proper procedure, in the event of denial of a motion to quash, is for the
accused, upon arraignment, to plead not guilty and reiterate his defense of
former jeopardy, and, in case of conviction, to appeal therefrom, upon the
ground that he has been twice put in jeopardy of punishment, either for the
same offense, or for the same act, as the case may be. However, were we to
require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed
and petitioner required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the
mental agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on the merits in case
No. 16443, apart from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that
his trial and conviction therein would violate one of his constitutional rights,
and that, on appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the
judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would, obviously, be most
unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the
flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in
the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice.
Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles over the
criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to compel
the parties charged to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the
embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense
charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City
Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that,
therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further
proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
SECOND
[G.R.
DIVISION
Nos.
L-74053-54.
January
20,
1988.]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
and
SAN
MIGUEL
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding
Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga and MANUEL
PARULAN, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if all the acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one
municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the
sole jurisdiction to try the case (People v. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76
SCRA
624).
3. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA BY POSTDATING A BAD CHECK, A
TRANSITORY CRIME; UTTERANCE AND DELIVERY, OF DECISIVE
IMPORTANCE. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a
transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage
may arise independently in separate places (People v. Yabut, supra). In this
case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was
inflicted in Bulacan where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank in
that place (See People v. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be
entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court. For while
the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely
drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and
delivered. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The
delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation. (People v. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People v. Yabut, supra).
4. ID.; BOUNCING CHECKS CASE; OFFENSE TRANSITORY IN
NATURE; KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE DRAWER OF THE
CHECK OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS FUNDS, ESSENTIAL. In
respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be
continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact
of its performance (Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact
of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of
a bouncing check (People v. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA
523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in
Que v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987
"the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance
of the check." However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality,
whether the accused be within one territory or another (People v. Hon.
Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly,
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court
of
Pampanga.
5. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VENUE DETERMINED BY THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION. And, as pointed out in the
Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the
Information, which are controlling (Arches v. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193,
cited in Tuzon v. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The
Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court
below.
6. ID.; DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES BASED ON ALLEGED
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for Certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of
respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
and Criminal Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for being "bereft of jurisdiction to
pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these
cases."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was
charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22) for
having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but
which was dishonored for having been drawn against "insufficient funds"
and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make
good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80
in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was
3
funds in his bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
only
to
turn
out
later
on
that
this
was
not
so.
The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these
cases was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the
checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development
Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from
the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purposes. The
argument advanced by the prosecution in its memorandum filed herein that
the two checks were deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch,
San Fernando, Pampanga, where it maintained its accounts after receiving
these checks from its Guiguinto Sales Office which bank later on made the
corresponding deductions from the account of SMC in the amounts covered
by the dishonored checks upon receiving information that the checks so
issued by the accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa
Maria, Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the element of damage
was inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and at the
place where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is in Santa
Maria,
Bulacan."
Respondent
Judge
then
decreed:
"The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled."
This Petition for Certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting
to
lack
of
jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the
order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari,
and that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject
Respondent-accused
to
double
jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.
The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the
criminal cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that
make up the offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the
territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where
false assurances were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks he
had issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that
jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly
called attention to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the
subject of different penal laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June
13, 1983, Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa
Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of
Procedure,
"SEC.
14.
specifically
Place
where
action
is
provides:
to
be
instituted.
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or
any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place."
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In
transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some
in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it
being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will
exclude the others (Tuzon v. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA
235). However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite
of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of
that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People
v.
Yabut,
L-42902,
April
29,
1977,
76
SCRA
624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or
continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise
independently in separate places (People v. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit
took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in
Bulacan where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place
(See People v. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by
either
the
Bulacan
Court
or
the
Pampanga
Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not
completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
uttered and delivered. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof.
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation
as an obligation. (People v. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People v. Yabut,
supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the
payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as
a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer
title thereto. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check
must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof"
(Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law, cited in People v. Yabut, supra.)
Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the SMC Regional
Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat who, in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank in San
Fernando, Pampanga. The element of deceit, therefore, took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was legally issued and
delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the Court in that
locality.
"The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us
appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in
Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks
were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be
entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the
subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not
completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were
uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the
payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation (People v. Larue,
83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the
contract is revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And
the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which means" (t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession,
whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to
transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec.
190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the penalizing clause of the
provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: By postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check, Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and
delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos,
Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case."
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be
continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact
of its performance (Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact
of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of
a bouncing check (People v. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA
523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in
Que v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987
"the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance
of the check." However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality,
whether the accused be within one territory or another (People v. Hon.
Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly,
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court
of
Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling
(Arches v. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon v. Cruz, No. L-27410,
August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically
alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
therefore,
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
below.
B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge,
ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41054 November 28, 1975
JOSE
L.
GAMBOA
and
UNITS
OPTICAL
SUPPLY
COMPANY, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN
LU HAYCO, Respondents.
Assistant City Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles for petitioner Jose L. Gamboa.
5
filing, prosecution and trial of the seventy-five (75) estafa cases against him
is not only oppressive, whimsical and capricious, but also without or in
excess of jurisdiction of the respondents City Fiscal and the City Court
Judges of Manila. Private respondent asserts that all the indictments narrated
in the seventy-five (75) informations were mere components of only one
crime, since the same were only impelled by a single criminal resolution or
intent. On October 31, 1974, the lower court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the series of deposits and the subsequent withdrawals thereof
involved in the criminal cases were not the result of only one criminal
impulse on the part of private respondent.
As a consequence, private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On July 17, 1975, the Appellate Court reversed the order
of the lower court and granted the petition for prohibition. It directed the
respondent City Fiscal "to cause the dismissal of the seventy-five (75)
criminal cases filed against petitioner-appellant, to consolidate in one
information all the charges contained in the seventy-five (75) informations
and to file the same with the proper court." The raison d'etre of the ruling of
the Court of Appeals is that:
Where the accused, with intent to defraud his employer, caused the latter to
sign a document by means of deceit and false representation, which
document turned out to be a general power of attorney, and with the use of
said document he closed the accounts of his employer in two banks and at
the same time opened in his name new accounts in the same banks, and then
made collections from the customers of his employer, depositing them in the
bank accounts in his name, the series of deposits made by him which he later
withdrew for his own use and benefit, constitutes but one crime of estafa,
there being only one criminal resolution and the different acts performed
being aimed at accomplishing the purpose of defrauding his employer."
We thus readily recognize that the singular question in this present action is
whether or not the basic accusations contained in the seventy-five (75)
informations against private respondent constitute but a single crime of
estafa.
It is provided in Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act
No. 4000, that "(w)hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period." The intention of the Code in installing this
particular provision is to regulate the two cases of concurrence or plurality of
crimes which in the field of legal doctrine are called "real plurality" and
"ideal plurality". 2 There is plurality of crimes or "concurso de delitos" when
the actor commits various delictual acts of the same or different kind. "Ideal
plurality" or "concurso ideal" occurs when a single act gives rise to various
infractions of law. This is illustrated by the very article under consideration:
(a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
(described as "delito compuesto" or compound crime); and (b) when an
offense is a necessary means for committing another offense (described as
"delito complejo" or complex proper). "Real plurality" or "concurso real", on
the other hand, arises when the accused performs an act or different acts with
distinct purposes and resulting in different crimes which are juridically
The respondent Court of Appeals harps upon the act of private respondent in
allegedly inducing, with intent to defraud, Lu Chiong Sun "to sign a
document by means of deceit and false representation, which document
turned out to be a general power of attorney" and with the use of which, he
closed the accounts of the latter in two banks, at the same time opening in his
name new accounts in the same banks, for its conclusion that the acts
complained of against private respondent constitute one continuous crime of
estafa. It is striking to note, however, that the accusatory pleadings against
private respondent are founded on Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal
Code, which defines and penalizes estafa by conversion or misappropriation.
In this form of estafa, fraud is not an essential element. 14 According to
try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
case will exclude the other." 19
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, subject matter of
this proceeding, is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on August 7, 1975, enjoining the enforcement or
implementation of the said judgment is hereby made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Castro (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ.,
concur.
THIRD
[G.R.
DIVISION
No.
117488.
September
5,
1996.]
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
to
law.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 2756-G and Criminal Case No.
2757-G are similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 2755-G except as to
the date of the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the number of the checks, and the
amounts thereof. In Criminal Case No. 2756-G, the violation was committed
on 23 March 1984 and involved Check No. DAT 41910 in the amount of
P17,900.00. 5 In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, the violation was committed on
24 February 1984 and involved Check No. 41909 in the amount of
P15,576.30.
6
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, the
petitioner
pleaded
not
guilty
to
the
charges.
8
had equitably proved its case by the evidences [sic] presented, finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G,
2756-G and 2757-G, and imposes the penalty in each criminal cases [sic]:
In Criminal Case No. 2755-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of
P36,180.20.
In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of
P31,152.60.
12
In his Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300, the petitioner contended that the trial
court erred: (a) in not dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction; (b) in not
dismissing the cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt; (c) in not taking into consideration that
the liability of the accused should have been civil in nature and not criminal;
and (d) in not disregarding the testimony of Maria Negro vda. de Trivinio
since it is not clear and convincing and is incredible. 16
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the evidence offered by the
prosecution and, disregarding the theory of the defense, it opined and ruled
as
follows:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation
of worthless checks in the mainstream of daily business and to avert not only
the undermining the Banking System of the country, but also the infliction of
damage and injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the
indiscriminate issuance of such checks. By its very nature, the offenses
defined BP 22 are against public interest while the crime of Estafa is against
property.
Since the act and commission specified in BP Blg. 22 are not necessarily evil
or wrongful from their nature and neither are they inherently illicit and
immoral and considering that the law which penalize [sic] such act or
commission is a special statutory law, the offenses are considered mala
prohibita and considering the rule in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry
is whether or not the law has been violated (People v. KIBLER, 106, NY,
321, cited in U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy (People
v. Conosa, C.A. 45, O.G. 3953). The defense of good faith and absence of
criminal intent would not prosper in prosecution for violation (Res. No. 447,
S. 1980, Tomayo v. Desederio, Dec. 8, 1980 & Res. No. 624, S. 1981.
ESCOBAR v. SY, Sept. 1, 1981).
x
If is of no moment that by the evidence presented by the accused that a preexisting obligation took place and that the products delivered by the
deceased husband of complaining witness was [sic] below par; and that his
piggery suffered losses. This situation can be a basis for a civil action which
accused actually filed against complaining witness, but it cannot divest of the
glaring fact that the checks he issued bounced and was [sic] dishonored. 13
As
to
the
issue
of
jurisdiction,
the
trial
court
held:
drawing and issuance of the checks the petitioner had insufficient funds at
the drawee bank to cover the face value of the checks, the Court of Appeals
held that the mere issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the check
without
sufficient
funds.
21
The Court of Appeals also saw no reason to disregard the testimony of Maria
Negro.
Still unsatisfied with the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review.
In addition to reiterating the arguments he raised before the Court of
Appeals, the petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
doctrine that the mere issuance of a bad check is a crime in itself.
The petitioner admits that the checks he issued were dishonored. His main
defense as to the dishonored checks is that they were issued not for value but
for accommodation or guarantee and invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court
of Appeals, 22 where we held that there was no violation of B.P. Blg. 22
where the bounced check was issued to cover a required warranty deposit.
He also cites Ministry Circular No. 4 issued by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) on 15 December 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of
B.P.
Blg.
22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure
the payment of the obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not
criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
It was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 issued on 8 August
1984, which admitted its misinterpretation of B.P. Blg. 22. The pertinent
portion
of
the
latter
reads:
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having
interpreting authority may reverse its administrative interpretation of a
statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury
Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases
involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question
is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or
part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection will
no
longer
be
considered
as
a
valid
defense.
The petitioner also urges us to apply our ruling in Co v. Court of Appeals, 23
where we held that dishonored checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 to
guarantee or secure payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not,
are governed by Circular No. 4 of 15 December 1981 of the DOJ and the
drawer thereof cannot be liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In the resolution of 31 May 1995, 24 we denied the petition for failure of the
petitioner to show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration primarily on the basis of Co v. Court
sustain
the
petitioners
conviction.
goods is also able to sell or lease the same goods at the same time privately
financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker
of the check thus becomes an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under
the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all
from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an
accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for
value. Also, in Magno, the payee in the former was made aware of the
insufficiency of the funds prior to the issuance of the checks.
SO
ORDERED.
Equally untenable is the petitioners argument that since he issued the checks
prior to 8 August 1984 as accommodation or security, he is similarly situated
with Co in the Co case. In Co, we held that the rubber checks issued prior 8
August 1984 as a guarantee or as part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation or to facilitate collection was a valid defense in view of Ministry
Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice. In the case of the petitioner,
although he issued the checks prior to such date, they were issued in
payment of his indebtedness, and not for the accommodation of the Trivinios
nor
security
of
their
indebtedness.
Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made a favor to another, not
upon a consideration received. On the other hand, guarantee refers to a
promise to answer the debt of another, in case the latter should fail to do so.
33
Neither
occurred
in
this
case.
The petitioners theory of accommodation is debunked by the following
circumstances: (1) The checks were issued after all deliveries were made at
such time when the petitioners obligation was already in existence; (2) The
sum of the checks equalled the petitioners total obligation in the amount of
P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner prepared a statement of account, 34 where the
checks issued were applied to his accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The
act of the petitioner in issuing three checks of different dates is inconsistent
to his claim 35 that Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated check to show to
his creditors; and (5) After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered a
property for its replacement. 36 All these incidents verily indicate that the
checks were issued as payment and for value and not for accommodation.
Needless to state, the checks failed to bear any statement "for
accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the petitioners intent.
The fact that the object of the contract, the animal feeds, was not of good
quality is irrelevant in the prosecution of a case involving B.P. Blg. 22, for
the said law was enacted to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of making and
issuing a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. 37
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
the
petitioner.
11
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 170298 : June 26, 2007]
MANUEL
S.
ISIP, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
OF
THE
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
Amount of Check
147-84
17 March 1984
518644
P50,000.00
148-84
30 March 1984
518645
P50,000.00
149-84
12 March 1984
0300865
P150,000.00
155-84
25 March 1984
518674
P95,000.00
156-84
29 March 1984
518646
P90,000.00
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before
Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:
157-84
1 April 1984
518669
P25,000.00
Crim.
Case No.
Value
of Date of Agreed Date Check No./Date
Jewelry
Receipt of Return
257-84
P150,000
03-07-84 03-30-84
260-84
P95,000
03-20-84 03-27-84
261-84
P562,000
03-20-84 03-27-84
378-84
P200,000
02-03-84 -
Amount
030086/03-12-84 P150,000
518647/03-25-84 P95,000
518672/03-27-84 P562,000
518644/03-17-84 P50,000
518645/03-30-84 P50,000
When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not
guilty. There being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the
cases followed.
The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5)
counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No.
256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of
Appeals in the parties' respective briefs, are the following:
That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry,
to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings valued at P120,000.00, with
the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the
proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March
21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by
means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their own personal use and
benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March
29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount of P90,000
and P25,000, respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands
made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, failed to do
so, to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount of P120,000.00,
Philippine Currency.6
Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date
of receipt and agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the
checks issued in payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly
worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof.
Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30,
1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry.
i) Prosecution Version.'
12
The receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel
acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular men's ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for
Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated
March 17 and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84
and 148-84.
In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant's
residence in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1)
Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond
worth P150,000.00. The condition was that the proceeds be turned over to
complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30,
1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the Choker
Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for P150,000.00
(RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the
spouses and Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant's
residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a men's ring (7 carats)
worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he
return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984.
March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on
April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp.
41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 13684 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.
On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from
complainant one (1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds
valued at P120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be
returned or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 4852, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2)
personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984
for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome
shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the
spouses Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for
Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of
complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one
(1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon,
Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips
defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated
March 27, 1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22,
1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84
for Estafa against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for
Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant
informing him that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries.
Assorted pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a
receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit 'O' ) acknowledging the value thereof to
the tune of P562,000.00.
Exhibit 'O' contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit 'O',
Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984
in the amount of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry
(pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).
This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the
couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of
BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April
6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20,
ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who
had his residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on
(sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral
home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the
Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the
other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M.
Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and
Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) - appellant Manuel, in the brokerage
and trucking business; while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and
financing, as well as in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started
when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the
casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from
losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for
financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant
Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when
Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son,
complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium
aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19).
Beginning early 1983, at complainant's residence at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband
who participated only as a witness, started having transactions with
complainant who, on different dates in February, March and April, 1984,
extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged
jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold
on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to
complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the
payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed,
had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of
payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics,
and real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to
complainant who caused the same to be registered in the names of his son,
Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A,
7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant
have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 3739; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which
were initially dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr.,
3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed
against appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the
redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the
pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant
Marietta incurred some default in payment and complainant suspected that
she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the pledged jewelry,
complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they
do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain
good relations with complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document
acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant Manuel
witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the
transactions were entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein
before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24). 7
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion thereof reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra.
Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P.
22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year
of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the following
Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim. Case
No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and
One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
13
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 25784, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is
hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount
of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs. 8
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in
these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose's ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave
of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the
defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the transactions
occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of
Marietta Isip that the money with which the complainant initially agreed to
finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in
Cavite City further refuted the defense's claim that the transactions happened
in Manila. The trial court likewise found the defense's contention, that the
obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to complainant of
personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to human
nature to demand payment when the same had already been made and the
alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably and
subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutor's Office at the
instance of the complainant.
The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the
pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued
the checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 14984, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him
in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding
him to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in
said cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for
misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men's ring which he secured from the
complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning
the following as errors:
-ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND
DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN
WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
- II THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL
LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
City, and that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within its
territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges
on the ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August
1984, the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to
Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there
was no payment to speak of. It also found the defense's claim of
redemption/dacion en pago - that real and personal properties were conveyed
to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases - to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate
court ruled that though novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may
prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the
criminal information in court. In these five cases, it ruled that there was
novation because complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as
payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner, 11 but held them liable to
complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling of conviction. It found
petitioner's claims that he did not receive the jewelry worth P200,000.00
mentioned in the information; that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was
among those documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat of
criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship
with complainant, to be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his
deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration
insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and
adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of
Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an
Amended Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in
respect to par. 3 of the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as
follows:
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is
REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases
DISMISSED."13
Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No.
136-84. He raises the following issues:
14
136-84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on
approved leave of absence 17 from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been
shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner's task to prove
otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.18
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent
evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since
he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not
persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there.
Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he
can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in
the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife
to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the
number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioner's late wife in all the
transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in
Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite City.
It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe
directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is
in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial
evidence.19 It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial
court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 20 In the case at bar, we
find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold
that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took
place in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals' holding
that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received
by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the
receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution
but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that
there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner
insists there is no competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case
No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.
We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported
by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt 21 executed by
petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring in question.
Petitioner's claim that he did not receive any ring and merely executed said
receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves
scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import
and obligation of what he executed and signed. The following disputable
presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been
fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed 22 Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without
first informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that
petitioner understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment
receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his selfserving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with
complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said
presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant in
Cavite City.
Petitioner's argument that he did not receive the subject ring 23 is further
belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was
borrowed by him on 7 March 1984. 24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the
transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that
any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject
of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was
effectively extinguished by novation. The personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by
the fact that complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals
did not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his
claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of
prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court
should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said case
because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he
signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was but an alternative
defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the
novation rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation 25 cannot be applied in
Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real
properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations
incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to
complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of
all, not some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife.
This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties
15
conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he
received were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried
herein.26In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled eight
cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as
payment.27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his
spouse were not yet settled when the criminal cases herein tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation
in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his
(alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court
of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements
of novation are present. For novation to take place, four essential requisites
have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of
all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No.
136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the
Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks
issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of
jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither
petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring that
could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new
obligation.
From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is
clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the
offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies
receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that
the offender return the money or property. 28 All these are present in this
case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond (men's
ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his
own benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands
from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the
sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount
of P200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the
same to be in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
16
Syllabus
Opinion, Warren
CDInPart, Clark
Dissent, Harlan
Dissent, White
Syllabus
In each of these cases, the defendant, while in police custody, was
questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room
in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was
given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all four cases, the questioning elicited oral
admissions, and, in three of them, signed statements as well, which were
admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all convictions,
except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal.
Held:
1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. Pp. 444-491.
(a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it
exists today is inherently intimidating, and works to undermine the privilege
against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. Pp.
445-458.
(b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and
expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary
system, and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a period
of custodial interrogation [p437] as well as in the courts or during the course
of other official investigations. Pp. 458-465.
(c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, stressed the need for
protective devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege. Pp. 465-466.
(d) In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to
safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: the person in
custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right
to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court;
he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Pp. 467-473.
(e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an
attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Pp. 473474.
(f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to counsel. P. 475.
(g) Where the individual answers some questions during in-custody
interrogation, he has not waived his privilege, and may invoke his right to
remain silent thereafter. Pp. 475-476.
(h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a
fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement,
inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant. Pp. 476-477.
2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of
the individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference
with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures
of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions. Pp. 479-491.
Opinion
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles
long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a
thorough reexamination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it
announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic
rights that are enshrined in our Constitution -- that "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the
accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel" -- rights which were put in
jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights
were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and
struggle. And, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for
ages to come, and . . . designed to approach immortality as nearly as human
institutions can approach it," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821).
The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against
the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused
persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the
expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688 and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of
arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the
admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made,
have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused
17
TOP
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of
American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.
More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from
an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the
necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the [p445] process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to
be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.
I
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility
of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each,
the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting
attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none
of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his
rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the
questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements
as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient
features -- incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional rights.
An understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is
essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires at
such interrogations stems from the fact that, in this country, they have largely
taken place incommunicado. From extensive factual studies undertaken in
the early 1930's, including the famous Wickersham Report to Congress by a
Presidential Commission, it is clear that police violence and the "third
degree" flourished at that time. [n5] [p446] In a series of cases decided by
this Court long after these studies, the police resorted to physical brutality -beating, hanging, whipping -- and to sustained and protracted questioning
incommunicado in order to extort confessions. [n6] The Commission on
Civil Rights in 1961 found much evidence to indicate that "some policemen
still resort to physical force to obtain confessions," 1961 Comm'n on Civil
Rights Rep. Justice, pt. 5, 17. The use of physical brutality and violence is
not, unfortunately, relegated to the past or to any part of the country. Only
recently in Kings County, New York, the police brutally beat, kicked and
placed lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under
interrogation for the purpose of securing a statement incriminating a third
party. People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931
(1965).[n7] [p447]
The examples given above are undoubtedly the exception now, but they are
sufficiently widespread to be the object of concern. Unless a proper
limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved -- such as these decisions
will advance -- there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be
eradicated in the foreseeable future. The conclusion of the Wickersham
Commission Report, made over 30 years ago, is still pertinent:
To the contention that the third degree is necessary to get the facts, the
reporters aptly reply in the language of the present Lord Chancellor of
England (Lord Sankey):
It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong. . . . It is not
sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by irregular or improper
means.
Not only does the use of the third degree involve a flagrant violation of law
by the officers of the law, but it involves also the dangers of false
confessions, and it tends to make police and prosecutors less zealous in the
search for objective evidence. As the New York prosecutor quoted in the
report said, "It is a short-cut, and makes the police lazy and unenterprising."
Or, as another official quoted remarked: "If you use your fists,
you [p448] are not so likely to use your wits." We agree with the conclusion
expressed in the report, that
The third degree brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner against society,
and lowers the esteem in which the administration of Justice is held by the
public.
IV National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 5 (1931).
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically, rather than physically, oriented. As we have stated before,
Since Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, this Court has recognized that
coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused
is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). Interrogation still takes
place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy, and this, in turn, results in a gap
in our knowledge as to what, in fact, goes on in the interrogation rooms. A
valuable source of information about present police practices, however, may
be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures
employed with success in the past, and which recommend various other
effective tactics. [n8] These [p449] texts are used by law enforcement
agencies themselves as guides. [n9] It should be noted that these texts
professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently used
to obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By considering these
texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures observed and noted
around the country.
The officers are told by the manuals that the
principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation
is privacy -- being alone with the person under interrogation. [n10]
The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's
office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived
of every psychological advantage. In his own home, he may be confident,
indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights
and [p450] more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior
18
within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are
nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the
investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the
invincibility of the forces of the law. [n11]
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct
the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and, from
outward appearance, to maintain only an interest in confirming certain
details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator
should direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed
the act, rather than court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like
other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family life, had an unhappy
childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The
officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the
offense, [n12] to cast blame on the victim or on society. [n13] These tactics
are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but
an elaboration of what the police purport to know already -- that he is guilty.
Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator should possess
are patience and perseverance. [p451] One writer describes the efficacy of
these characteristics in this manner:
In the preceding paragraphs, emphasis has been placed on kindness and
stratagems. The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where
the sheer weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where
emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an
oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily
and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of surcease. He must
dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain
the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several hours, pausing only for
the subject's necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a charge of
duress that can be technically substantiated. In a serious case, the
interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and
sleep, but with no respite from the atmosphere of domination. It is possible
in this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or
coercion. The method should be used only when the guilt of the subject
appears highly probable. [n14]
The manuals suggest that the suspect be offered legal excuses for his actions
in order to obtain an initial admission of guilt. Where there is a suspected
revenge killing, for example, the interrogator may say:
Joe, you probably didn't go out looking for this fellow with the purpose of
shooting him. My guess is, however, that you expected something from him,
and that's why you carried a gun -- for your own protection. You knew him
for what he was, no good. Then when you met him, he probably started
using foul, abusive language and he gave some indication [p452] that he was
about to pull a gun on you, and that's when you had to act to save your own
life. That's about it, isn't it, Joe? [n15]
Having then obtained the admission of shooting, the interrogator is advised
to refer to circumstantial evidence which negates the self-defense
explanation. This should enable him to secure the entire story. One text notes
that,
Even if he fails to do so, the inconsistency between the subject's original
denial of the shooting and his present admission of at least doing the
shooting will serve to deprive him of a self-defense "out" at the time of
trial. [n16]
When the techniques described above prove unavailing, the texts recommend
they be alternated with a show of some hostility. One ploy often used has
been termed the "friendly-unfriendly," or the "Mutt and Jeff" act:
. . . In this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless
investigator, who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any
time. He's sent a dozen men away for this crime, and he's going to send the
subject away for the full term. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a
kindhearted man. He has a family himself. He has a brother who was
involved in a little scrape like this. He disapproves of Mutt and his tactics,
and will arrange to get him off the case if the subject will cooperate. He can't
hold Mutt off for very long. The subject would be wise to make a quick
decision. The technique is applied by having both investigators present while
Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur at some of Mutt's
tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not present in the
room. [n17] [p453]
The interrogators sometimes are instructed to induce a confession out of
trickery. The technique here is quite effective in crimes which require
identification or which run in series. In the identification situation, the
interrogator may take a break in his questioning to place the subject among a
group of men in a line-up.
The witness or complainant (previously coached, if necessary) studies the
line-up and confidently points out the subject as the guilty party. [n18]
Then the questioning resumes "as though there were now no doubt about the
guilt of the subject." A variation on this technique is called the "reverse lineup":
The accused is placed in a line-up, but this time he is identified by several
fictitious witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses. It
is expected that the subject will become desperate and confess to the offense
under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations. [n19]
The manuals also contain instructions for police on how to handle the
individual who refuses to discuss the matter entirely, or who asks for an
attorney or relatives. The examiner is to concede him the right to remain
silent.
This usually has a very undermining effect. First of all, he is disappointed in
his expectation of an unfavorable reaction on the part of the interrogator.
Secondly, a concession of this right to remain silent impresses [p454] the
subject with the apparent fairness of his interrogator. [n20]
After this psychological conditioning, however, the officer is told to point
out the incriminating significance of the suspect's refusal to talk:
Joe, you have a right to remain silent. That's your privilege, and I'm the last
person in the world who'll try to take it away from you. If that's the way you
want to leave this, O. K. But let me ask you this. Suppose you were in my
shoes, and I were in yours, and you called me in to ask me about this, and I
told you, "I don't want to answer any of your questions." You'd think I had
something to hide, and you'd probably be right in thinking that. That's
exactly what I'll have to think about you, and so will everybody else. So let's
sit here and talk this whole thing over. [n21]
Few will persist in their initial refusal to talk, it is said, if this monologue is
employed correctly.
In the event that the subject wishes to speak to a relative or an attorney, the
following advice is tendered:
[T]he interrogator should respond by suggesting that the subject first tell the
truth to the interrogator himself, rather than get anyone else involved in the
matter. If the request is for an attorney, the interrogator may suggest that the
subject save himself or his family the expense of any such professional
service, particularly if he is innocent of the offense under investigation. The
interrogator may also add, "Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and if you're
telling the truth, that's it. You can handle this by yourself." [n22] [p455]
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting
prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In
essence, it is this: to be alone with the subject is essential to prevent
distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence
in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the
preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and
persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a
confession, the interrogator must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry
into a position from which the desired objective may be
attained." [n23] When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result,
the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal
advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by
trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then
persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the specific
stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of
individuals. [n24] [p456] This fact may be illustrated simply by referring to
three confession cases decided by this Court in the Term immediately
preceding our Escobedo decision. In Townsend v. Sain,372 U.S. 293 (1963),
the defendant was a 19-year-old heroin addict, described as a "near mental
defective," id. at 307-310. The defendant in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S.
528 (1963), was a woman who confessed to the arresting officer after being
importuned to "cooperate" in order to prevent her children from being taken
by relief authorities. This Court, as in those cases, reversed the conviction of
a defendant in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), whose persistent
request during his interrogation was to phone his wife or attorney. [n25] In
other settings, these individuals might have exercised their constitutional
rights. In the incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they
succumbed.
19
Leveller, who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath
would have bound him to answer to all questions posed to him on any
subject. The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, 3 How.St.Tr. 1315
(1637). He resisted the oath and declaimed the proceedings, stating:
Another fundamental right I then contended for was that no man's
conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed to answer to questions
concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so.
Haller & Davies, The Leveller Tracts 1647-1653, p. 454 (1944)
On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial Court
of Star Chamber and went further in giving him generous reparation. The
lofty principles to which Lilburn had appealed during his trial gained popular
acceptance in England. [n28] These sentiments worked their way over to the
Colonies, and were implanted after great struggle into the Bill of
Rights. [n29] Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The privilege was elevated
to constitutional status, and has always been "as broad as the
mischief [p460] against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). We cannot depart from this noble
heritage.
Thus, we may view the historical development of the privilege as one which
groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen. As a
"noble principle often transcends its origins," the privilege has come
rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a
"right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the
hallmark of our democracy." United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579,
581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). We have recently
noted that the privilege against self-incrimination -- the essential mainstay of
our adversary system -- is founded on a complex of values, Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57, n. 5 (1964); Tehan v. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 414-415, n. 12 (1966). All these policies point to one overriding
thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government -- state or federal -- must accord to the dignity and integrity of
its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the
government "to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evidence 317
(McNaughton rev.1961), to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient
of compelling it from his own mouth. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
235-238 (1940). In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is
guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable during
a period of custodial interrogation. [p461] In this Court, the privilege has
It was in this manner that Escobedo explicated another facet of the pretrial
privilege, noted in many of the Court's prior decisions: the protection of
rights at trial. [n36] That counsel is present when statements are taken from
an individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the
factfinding processes in court. The presence of an attorney, and the warnings
delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling
circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that
eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. Without the protections
flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel,
all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by
an accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities in a
procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a
confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure
of the police.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (HARLAN, J., dissenting). Cf.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). [p467]
III
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings, and serves to protect persons
in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded
that, without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights, and the exercise of those rights must be
fully honored.
interrogation. [n39] Although the role of counsel at trial differs from the role
during interrogation, the differences are not relevant to the question whether
a request is a prerequisite.
Accordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the
privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain
silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount
of [p472] circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of
this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is
there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any
interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his
request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a
retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual has no relationship
to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against selfincrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need
for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as
the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who
can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance.
The cases before us, as well as the vast majority of confession cases with
which we have dealt in the past, involve those unable to retain counsel.
[n40] While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty,
they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the
administration of justice. [n41] Denial [p473] of counsel to the indigent at
the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford
one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar
situation at trial and on appeal struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights
under this system, then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the
right to consult with an attorney, but also that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will
be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the
admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as
meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds
to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not
couched in terms that would convey to the indigent -- the person most often
subjected to interrogation -- the knowledge that he too has a right to have
counsel present. [n42] As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and
of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to
the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a
position to exercise it. [n43]
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the
individual indicates in any manner, [p474] at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. [n44] At this point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth
Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in
producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity
to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that
he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to
remain silent.
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must
have a "station house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It does
mean, however, that, if police propose to interrogate a person, they must
make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that, if he cannot
afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If
authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable
period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may
refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment
privilege so long as they do not question him during that time. [p475]
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards
of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody
interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated
circumstances under which the interrogation takes place, and has the only
means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during
incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney, followed closely by a statement, could constitute a
waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of
the accused after warnings are given, or simply from the fact that a
confession was, in fact, eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), is applicable here:
Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer. Anything less is not waiver.
See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Moreover, where incustody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the
privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or
gives [p476] some information on his own prior to invoking his right to
remain silent when interrogated. [n45]
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an
accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration
before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly
waive his rights. In these circumstances, the fact that the individual
22
these four are far from alone in being subjected to arrest, prolonged
detention,
and
interrogation
without
the
requisite
probable
cause. [n53] [p483]
Over the years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an
exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or
arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not required to make
a statement, that any statement may be used against him in court, that the
individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice, and,
more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to
pay. [n54] A letter received from the Solicitor General in response to a
question from the Bench makes it clear that the present pattern of warnings
and respect for the [p484] rights of the individual followed as a practice by
the FBI is consistent with the procedure which we delineate today. It states:
At the oral argument of the above cause, Mr. Justice Fortas asked whether I
could provide certain information as to the practices followed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. I have directed these questions to the attention of
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and am submitting
herewith a statement of the questions and of the answers which we have
received.
(1) When an individual is interviewed by agents of the Bureau, what warning
is given to him?
The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both
suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing
and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used
against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in
the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136
(1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935.
After passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which provides free
counsel for Federal defendants unable to pay, we added to our instructions to
Special Agents the requirement that any person who is under arrest for an
offense under FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is contemplated following the
interview, must also be advised of his right to free counsel if he is unable to
pay, and the fact that such counsel will be assigned by the Judge. At the same
time, we broadened the right to counsel warning [p485] to read counsel of
his own choice, or anyone else with whom he might wish to speak.
(2) When is the warning given?
The FBI warning is given to a suspect at the very outset of the interview, as
shown in the Westover case, cited above. The warning may be given to a
person arrested as soon as practicable after the arrest, as shown in
the Jackson case, also cited above, and in U.S. v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844
(1964), cert. den., 379 U.S. 933, but, in any event, it must precede the
interview with the person for a confession or admission of his own guilt.
(3) What is the Bureau's practice in the event that (a) the individual requests
counsel and (b) counsel appears?
When the person who has been warned of his right to counsel decides that he
wishes to consult with counsel before making a statement, the interview is
terminated at that point, Shultz v. U.S., 351 F.2d 287 (1965). It may be
continued, however, as to all matters other than the person's own guilt or
innocence. If he is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some
question on whether he did or did not waive counsel. Situations of this kind
must necessarily be left to the judgment of the interviewing Agent. For
example, in Hiram v. U.S., 354 F.2d 4 (1965), the Agent's conclusion that the
person arrested had waived his right to counsel was upheld by the courts.
It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this issue until state
legislative bodies and advisory groups have had an opportunity to deal with
these problems by rulemaking. [n65] We have already pointed out that the
Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting
the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.
Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the
privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a
continuous opportunity to exercise it. In any event, however, the issues
presented are of constitutional dimensions, and must be determined by the
courts. The admissibility of a statement in the face of a claim that it was
obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights is an issue the
resolution of which has long since been undertaken by this Court. See Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional
dimension have evolved decade by decade. As courts have been presented
with the need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of
doing so. That was our responsibility when Escobedo was before us, and it is
our [p491] responsibility today. Where rights secured by the Constitution are
involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation which would abrogate
them.
(4) What is the Bureau's practice if the individual requests counsel, but
cannot afford to retain an attorney?
If any person being interviewed after warning of counsel decides that he
wishes to consult with counsel before proceeding, further the interview is
terminated, as shown above. FBI Agents do not pass judgment on the ability
of the person to pay for counsel. They do, however, advise those who have
been arrested for an offense under FBI jurisdiction, or whose arrest is
contemplated following the interview, of a right to free counsel if they are
unable to pay, and the availability of such counsel from the Judge. [n55]
The practice of the FBI can readily be emulated by state and local
enforcement agencies. The argument that the FBI deals with different crimes
than are dealt with by state authorities does not mitigate the significance of
the FBI experience. [n56]
The experience in some other countries also suggests that the danger to law
enforcement in curbs on interrogation is overplayed. The English procedure,
since 1912 under the Judges' Rules, is significant. As
recently [p487] strengthened, the Rules require that a cautionary warning be
given an accused by a police officer as soon as he has evidence that affords
reasonable grounds for suspicion; they also require that any statement made
be given by the accused without questioning by police. [n57] [p488] The
right of the individual to consult with an attorney during this period is
expressly recognized. [n58]
The safeguards present under Scottish law may be even greater than in
England. Scottish judicial decisions bar use in evidence of most confessions
obtained through police interrogation. [n59] In India, confessions made to
police not in the presence of a magistrate have been excluded [p489] by rule
of evidence since 1872, at a time when it operated under British
law. [n60] Identical provisions appear in the Evidence Ordinance of Ceylon,
enacted in 1895. [n61] Similarly, in our country, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice has long provided that no suspect may be interrogated
without first being warned of his right not to make a statement, and that any
statement he makes may be used against him. [n62] Denial of the right to
consult counsel during interrogation has also been proscribed by military
tribunals.[n63] There appears to have been no marked detrimental effect on
criminal law enforcement in these jurisdictions as a result of these rules.
Conditions of law enforcement in our country are sufficiently similar to
permit reference to this experience as assurance that lawlessness will not
V
Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent
significance in numerous cases, we have to this point discussed the
relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation without
specific concentration on the facts of the cases before us. We turn now to
these facts to consider the application to these cases of the constitutional
principles discussed above. In each instance, we have concluded that
statements were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did
not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.
No. 759. Miranda v. Arizona
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home
and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by
the complaining witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation Room
No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police
officers. The officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised that he
had a right to have an attorney present. [n66] Two hours later,
the [p492] officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written
confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed
paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats
or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be used against me." [n67]
24
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence
over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior
oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was
found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession, and affirmed the conviction. 98
Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized
heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
We reverse. From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of
respondent, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right
to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation,
nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively
protected in any other manner. Without these warnings, the statements were
inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a
typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does
not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. [p493] 503, 512513 (1963); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (opinion of MR
JUSTICE DOUGLAS).
No. 760. Vignera v. New York
Petitioner, Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on October
14, 1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn
dress shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in
Manhattan. Sometime thereafter, he was taken to the 66th Detective Squad.
There a detective questioned Vignera with respect to the robbery. Vignera
orally admitted the robbery to the detective. The detective was asked on
cross-examination at trial by defense counsel whether Vignera was warned
of his right to counsel before being interrogated. The prosecution objected to
the question, and the trial judge sustained the objection. Thus, the defense
was precluded from making any showing that warnings had not been given.
While at the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store
owner and a saleslady as the man who robbed the dress shop. At about 3
p.m., he was formally arrested. The police then transported him to still
another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for detention." At 11 p.m.,
Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a
hearing reporter, who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers. This
verbatim account of these proceedings contains no statement of any
warnings given by the assistant district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a
charge of first degree robbery, the detective testified as to the oral
confession. The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in
evidence. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge charged the jury
in part as follows:
The law doesn't say that the confession is void or invalidated because the
police officer didn't advise the defendant as to his rights. Did you hear
what [p494] I said? I am telling you what the law of the State of New York
is.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery. He was subsequently
adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced to 30 to 60 years'
no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation, nor is there
any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its
interrogation. The record simply shows that the defendant did, in fact,
confess a short time after being turned over to the FBI following
interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave
warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view, the
warnings came at the end of the interrogation process. In these
circumstances, an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be
assumed.
We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded from
questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other
authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A
different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by
the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original
surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an
opportunity to exercise them. But here, the FBI interrogation was conducted
immediately following the state interrogation in the same police station -- in
the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession from
Westover [p497]the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure
applied by the local in-custody interrogation. In these circumstances, the
giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege.
No. 584. California v. Stewart
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one
of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, respondent, Roy
Allen Stewart, was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of
dividend checks taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p.m., January
31, 1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of
the officers asked Stewart if they could search the house, to which he
replied, "Go ahead." The search turned up various items taken from the five
robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest, police also arrested Stewart's
wife and three other persons who were visiting him. These four were jailed
along with Stewart, and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the
University Station of the Los Angeles Police Department, where he was
placed in a cell. During the next five days, police interrogated Stewart on
nine different occasions. Except during the first interrogation session, when
he was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with his
interrogators.
During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed
the deceased and stated that he had not meant to hurt her. Police then brought
Stewart before a magistrate for the first time. Since there was no evidence to
connect them with any crime, the police then released the other four persons
arrested with him.
Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not
advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number of
instances, [p498] however, the interrogating officers were asked to recount
everything that was said during the interrogations. None indicated that
Stewart was ever advised of his rights.
25
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder.
At his trial, transcripts of the first interrogation and the confession at the last
interrogation were introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of
robbery and first degree murder, and fixed the penalty as death. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of California reversed. 62 Cal.2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43
Cal.Rptr. 201. It held that, under this Court's decision in Escobedo, Stewart
should have been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to
counsel, and that it would not presume in the face of a silent record that the
police advised Stewart of his rights. [n70]
We affirm. [n71] In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not
presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that
his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a
record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any
effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent
waiver of [p499] these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore,
Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses through eight of the nine
interrogations over a period of five days is subject to no other construction
than that he was compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme
Court Of Arizona in No. 759, of the New York Court of Appeals in No. 760,
and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 761, are reversed.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California in No. 584 is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
26
(a) There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point, (1)
because of the manner in which confrontations for identification are
frequently conducted, (2) because of dangers inherent in eyewitness
identification and suggestibility' inherent in the context of the confrontations,
and (3) because of the likelihood that the accused will often be precluded
from reconstructing what occurred, and thereby obtaining a full hearing on
the identification issue at trial. Pp. 388 U. S. 229-235.
(b) This case illustrates the potential for improper influence on witnesses
through the lineup procedure, since the bank employees were allowed to see
respondent in the custody of FBI agents before the lineup began. Pp. 388 U.
S. 233-234.
(c) The presence of counsel at the lineup will significantly promote fairness
at the confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification.
Pp. 388 U. S. 236-238.
4. In-court identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited
before trial in the absence of counsel must be excluded unless it can be
established that such evidence had an independent origin or that error in its
admission was harmless. Since it is not clear that the Court of Appeals
applied the prescribed rule of exclusion, and since the nature of the in-court
identifications here was not an issue in the trial and cannot be determined on
the record, the case must be remanded to the District Court for resolution of
these issues. Pp. 388 U. S. 239-243.
"put the money in the bag," the words allegedly uttered by the robber. Both
bank employees identified Wade in the lineup as the bank robber.
At trial, the two employees, when asked on direct examination if the robber
was in the courtroom, pointed to Wade. The prior lineup identification was
then elicited from both employees on cross-examination. At the close of
testimony, Wade's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal or,
alternatively, to strike the bank officials' courtroom identifications on the
ground that conduct of the lineup, without notice to and in the absence of his
appointed counsel, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
The motion was denied, and Wade was convicted. The
Page 388 U. S. 221
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and ordered a
new trial at which the in-court identification evidence was to be excluded,
holding that, though the lineup did not violate Wade's Fifth Amendment
rights, "the lineup, held as it was, in the absence of counsel already chosen to
represent appellant, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. . . ." 358
F.2d 557, 560. We granted certiorari, 385 U.S. 811, and set the case for oral
argument with No. 223, Gilbert v. California, post, p. 388 U. S. 263, and No.
254, Stovall v. Denno, post, p. 388 U. S. 293, which present similar
questions. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to
that court with direction to enter a new judgment vacating the conviction and
remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Neither the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was
required to do in the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
We have only recently reaffirmed that the privilege
identification purposes without notice to, and in the absence of, the accused's
appointed counsel.
The federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed on September 21,
1964. A man with a small strip of tape on each side of his face entered the
bank, pointed a pistol at the female cashier and the vice-president, the only
persons in the bank at the time, and forced them to fill a pillowcase with the
bank's money. The man then drove away with an accomplice who had been
waiting in a stolen car outside the bank. On March 23, 1965, an indictment
was returned against respondent, Wade, and two others for conspiring to rob
the bank, and against Wade and the accomplice for the robbery itself. Wade
was arrested on April 2, and counsel was appointed to represent him on April
26. Fifteen days later, an FBI agent, without notice to Wade's lawyer,
arranged to have the two bank employees observe a lineup made up of Wade
and five or six other prisoners and conducted in a courtroom of the local
county courthouse. Each person in the line wore strips of tape such as
allegedly worn by the robber, and, upon direction, each said something like
this case, it is urged that the assistance of counsel at the lineup was
indispensable
218 U.S. at 218 U. S. 252-253. The Court in Holt, however, put aside any
constitutional questions which might be involved in compelling an accused,
as here, to exhibit himself before victims of or witnesses to an alleged crime;
the Court stated, "we need not consider how far a court would go in
compelling a man to exhibit himself." Id. at 218 U. S. 253. [Footnote 1]
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person
for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no
compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance.
It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not
compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no different from
compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse,
and, as in those instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly,
compelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to
utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter
statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an
identifying
The Framers of the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for counsel than
under the practice then prevailing in England of merely advising his client in
"matters of law," and eschewing any responsibility for "matters of fact."
[Footnote 2] The constitutions in at least 11 of the 13 States expressly or
impliedly abolished this distinction. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45,287 U.
S. 60-65; Note, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1030-1033 (1964).
to protect Wade's most basic right as a criminal defendant -- his right to a fair
trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaningfully crossexamined.
it appeared that they were overheard by federal agents who, without notice to
the defendant's lawyer, arranged a meeting between the defendant and an
accomplice turned informant. We said, quoting a concurring opinion
in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 360 U. S. 326, that
"[a]nything less . . . might deny a defendant 'effective representation by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.'"
377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 204.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, we drew upon the rationale
of Hamilton and Massiah in holding that the right to counsel was guaranteed
at the point where the accused, prior to arraignment, was subjected to secret
interrogation despite repeated requests to see his lawyer. We again noted the
necessity of counsel's presence
"Though the colonial provisions about counsel were in accord on few things,
they agreed on the necessity of abolishing the facts-law distinction; the
colonists appreciated that, if a defendant were forced to stand alone against
the state, his case was foredoomed."
"The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial no more
than an appeal from the interrogation, and the "right to use counsel at the
formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the
conviction is already assured by pretrial examination." . . . "One can imagine
a cynical prosecutor saying: Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now.
They can't escape the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at
the trial.'""
Of course, nothing decided or said in the opinions in the cited cases links the
right to counsel only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, those
decisions "no more than reflect a constitutional principle established as long
ago as Powell v. Alabama. . . ." Massiah v. United States, supra, at 377 U. S.
205. It is central to that principle that, in addition to counsel's presence at
trial, [Footnote 4] the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court
or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a
fair trial. [Footnote 5] The security of that right is as much the aim of the
right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the
if the accused was to have a fair opportunity to present a defense at the trial
itself:
since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a
meaningful confrontation at trial, [Footnote 26] there can be
Page 388 U. S. 237
little doubt that, for Wade, the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of
the prosecution at which he was "as much entitled to such aid [of
counsel] . . . as at the trial itself." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S.
57. Thus, both Wade and his counsel should have been notified of the
impending lineup, and counsel's presence should have been a requisite to
conduct of the lineup, absent an "intelligent waiver." See Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U. S. 506. No substantial countervailing policy considerations
have been advanced against the requirement of the presence of counsel.
Concern is expressed that the requirement will forestall prompt
identifications and result in obstruction of the confrontations. As for the first,
we note that, in the two cases in which the right to counsel is today held to
apply, counsel had already been appointed, and no argument is made in
either case that notice to counsel would have prejudicially delayed the
confrontations. Moreover, we leave open the question whether the presence
of substitute counsel might not suffice where notification and presence of the
suspect's own counsel would result in prejudicial delay. [Footnote 27] And to
refuse to recognize the right to counsel for fear that counsel will obstruct the
course of justice is contrary to the
"[T]he fact that the police themselves have, in a given case, little or no doubt
that the man put up for identification has committed the offense, and that
their chief preoccupation is with the problem of getting sufficient proof
because he has not''come clean,' involves a danger that this persuasion may
communicate itself even in a doubtful case to the witness in some way. . . ."
basic assumptions upon which this Court has operated in Sixth Amendment
cases. We rejected similar logic in Miranda v. Arizona concerning presence
of counsel during custodial interrogation, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 480-481:
In our view, counsel can hardly impede legitimate law enforcement; on the
contrary, for the reasons expressed, law enforcement may be assisted by
preventing the infiltration of taint in the prosecution's identification
evidence. [Footnote 28] That result cannot help the guilty avoid conviction,
but can only help assure that the right man has been brought to justice.
[Footnote 29]
Page 388 U. S. 239
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments,
which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may
also remove the basis for regarding the stage as "critical." [Footnote 30] But
neither Congress nor the federal authorities have seen fit to provide a
solution. What we hold today "in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
effect." Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 384 U. S. 467.
V
We come now to the question whether the denial of Wade's motion to strike
the courtroom identification by the bank witnesses at trial because of the
absence of his counsel at the lineup required, as the Court of Appeals held,
the grant of a new trial at which such evidence is
Page 388 U. S. 240
to be excluded. We do not think this disposition can be justified without first
giving the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of
the suspect other than the lineup identification. See Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 378 U. S. 79, n. 18. [Footnote 31] Where, as
here, the admissibility of evidence of the lineup identification itself is not
involved, a per se rule of exclusion of courtroom identification would be
unjustified. [Footnote 32] See Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 308
U. S. 341. A rule limited solely to the exclusion of testimony concerning
identification at the lineup itself, without regard to admissibility of the
courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one.
The lineup is most often used, as in the present case, to crystallize the
witnesses' identification of the defendant for future reference. We have
already noted that the lineup identification will have that effect. The State
may then rest upon the witnesses' unequivocal courtroom identification, and
not mention the pretrial identification as part of the State's case at trial.
Counsel is then in the predicament in which Wade's counsel found himself -realizing that possible unfairness at the lineup may be the sole means of
attack upon the unequivocal courtroom identification, and having to probe in
the dark
Page 388 U. S. 241
in an attempt to discover and reveal unfairness, while bolstering the
government witness' courtroom identification by bringing out and dwelling
upon his prior identification. Since counsel's presence at the lineup would
equip him to attack not only the lineup identification, but the courtroom
identification as well, limiting the impact of violation of the right to counsel
to exclusion of evidence only of identification at the lineup itself disregards
a critical element of that right.
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that
quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 371 U. S. 488,
"'[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.' Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)."
See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 385 U. S. 309. Application of
this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for
example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the
defendant's actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another
person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup,
failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time
30
between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to
consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed
concerning the conduct of the lineup. [Footnote 33]
Page 388 U. S. 242
We doubt that the Court of Appeals applied the proper test for exclusion of
the in-court identification of the two witnesses. The court stated that
"it cannot be said with any certainty that they would have recognized
appellant at the time of trial if this intervening lineup had not occurred,"
and that the testimony of the two witnesses "may well have been colored by
the illegal procedure, [and] was prejudicial." 358 F.2d at 560. Moreover, the
court was persuaded, in part, by the "compulsory verbal responses made by
Wade at the instance of the Special Agent." Ibid. This implies the erroneous
holding that Wade's privilege against self-incrimination was violated, so that
the denial of counsel required exclusion.
On the record now before us, we cannot make the determination whether the
in-court identifications had an independent origin. This was not an issue at
trial, although there is some evidence relevant to a determination. That
inquiry is most properly made in the District Court. We therefore think the
appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a
hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent
source or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was
harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, and for the District
Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. See
United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233,355 U. S. 245-246.
Page 388 U. S. 243
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded
to that court with direction to enter a new judgment vacating the conviction
and remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins the opinion of the Court except for 388 U.
S. from which he dissents for the reasons expressed in the opinion of MR.
JUSTICE FORTAS.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins the opinion of the Court except for 388 U.
S. On that phase of the case, he adheres to the dissenting views in Schmerber
v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 772-779, since he believes that
compulsory lineup violates the privilege against self-incrimination contained
in the Fifth Amendment.
31
officers, petitioner was not free to go where he pleased, but was "under
arrest." The officers asked him if he had been to the El Farleto restaurant that
night and when he answered "yes" he was asked if he owned a pistol.
Petitioner admitted owning one. After being asked a second time where the
pistol was located, he admitted that it was in the washing machine in a back
room of the boardinghouse. Ballistics tests indicated that the gun found in
the washing machine was the gun that fired the fatal shot. At petitioner's
trial, held after the effective date [Footnote 2] of this Court's decision
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the trial court allowed one of
the officers,
[Footnote 3]
Syllabus
Use of admissions at petitioner's trial for murder which were obtained by
officers who, while he was in their custody in his bedroom at the
boardinghouse where he lived, questioned him about incriminating facts
without first informing him of his rights to remain silent, to have a lawyer's
advice before making a statement, and to have lawyer appointed to assist
him if he could not afford to hire one, held to have violated SelfIncrimination Clause of Fifth Amendment made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Pp. 394 U. S. 326327.
428 S.W.2d 666, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Reyes Arias Orozco, was convicted in the Criminal District
Court of Dallas County, Texas, of murder without malice and was sentenced
to serve in the state prison not less than two nor more than 10 years. The
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the conviction, rejecting
petitioner's contention that a material part of the evidence against him was
obtained in violation of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, that: "No person
Page 394 U. S. 325
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
[Footnote 1]
The evidence introduced at trial showed that petitioner and the deceased had
quarreled outside the El Farleto Cafe in Dallas shortly before midnight on
the date of the shooting. The deceased had apparently spoken to petitioner's
female companion inside the restaurant. In the heat of the quarrel outside, the
deceased is said to have beaten petitioner about the face and called him
"Mexican Grease." A shot was fired killing the deceased. Petitioner left the
scene and returned to his boardinghouse to sleep. At about 4 a.m. four police
officers arrived at petitioner's boardinghouse, were admitted by an
unidentified woman, and were told that petitioner was asleep in the bedroom.
All four officers entered the bedroom and began to question petitioner. From
the moment he gave his name, according to the testimony of one of the
The State has argued here that, since petitioner was interrogated on his own
bed, in familiar surroundings, our Mirandaholding should not apply. It is true
that the Court did say in Miranda that
"compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery."
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 461. But the opinion iterated and reiterated the
absolute necessity for officers interrogating people "in custody" to give the
described warnings. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1
Page 394 U. S. 327
(1968). According to the officer's testimony, petitioner was under arrest, and
not free to leave, when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours
of the morning. The Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were
required when the person being interrogated was "in custody at the station or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384
U.S. at 384 U. S. 477. (Emphasis supplied.) The decision of this Court
in Miranda was reached after careful consideration, and lengthy opinions
were announced by both the majority and dissenting Justices. There is no
need to canvass those arguments again. We do not, as the dissent implies,
expand or extend to the slightest extent our Mirandadecision. We do adhere
to our well considered holding in that case, and therefore reverse [Footnote
4] the conviction below.
Reversed.
[Footnote 1]
The state court also rejected a contention that use of the evidence also
violated the Fourth Amendment's provision against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Our holding makes it unnecessary for us to consider that
contention.
[Footnote 2]
which the Court found prevalent in the station house and which were thought
so threatening to the right to silence. Without such a
demonstration, Miranda hardly reaches this case or any cases similar to it.
Here, there was no prolonged interrogation, no unfamiliar surroundings, no
opportunity for the police to invoke those procedures which moved the
majority in Miranda. In fact, the conversation was, by all accounts, a very
brief one. According to uncontradicted testimony, petitioner was awake
when the officers entered his room, and they asked him four questions: his
name, whether he had been at the El Farleto, whether he owned a pistol, and
where it was. He gave his name, said he had been at the El Farleto, and
admitted he owned a pistol without hesitation. He was slow in telling where
the pistol was, and the question was repeated. He then took the police to the
nearby washing machine where the gun was hidden.
lawyer, just to discover his name. Even if the man is innocent, the process
will be an unpleasant one.
Since the Court's extension of Miranda's rule takes it into territory where
even what rationale there originally was disappears, I dissent.
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE STEWART.
Although there is much to be said for MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's position, I
join my Brother WHITE in dissent. It seems to me that those of us who
dissented in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, remain free not only to
express our continuing disagreement with that decision, but also to oppose
any broadening of its impact.
No. 399
Argued March 29, 1965
Decided June 7, 1965
381 U.S. 437
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Respondent was convicted under 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a crime for one who belongs to
the Communist Party or who has been a member thereof during the
preceding five years wilfully to serve as a member of the executive board of
a labor organization. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding 504 violative
of the First and Fifth Amendments.
Held: Section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, and is therefore
unconstitutional. Pp. 381 U. S. 441-462.
(a) The Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. I, 9, cl. 3, was intended to implement
the separation of powers among the three branches of the Government by
guarding against the legislative exercise of judicial power. Pp. 381 U. S. 441446.
(b) The Bill of Attainder Clause is to be liberally construed in the light of its
purpose to prevent legislative punishment of designated persons or
groups. Cummins v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. Pp. 381 U. S. 447-449.
(c) In designating Communist Party members as those persons who cannot
hold union office, Congress has exceeded its Commerce Clause power to
enact generally applicable legislation disqualifying from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use such positions to cause political
strikes. Pp. 381 U. S. 449-452.
(d) Section 504 is distinguishable from such conflict of interest statutes as
32 of the Banking Act, where Congress was legislating with respect to
general characteristics, rather than with respect to the members of a specific
group. Pp. 381 U. S. 453-455.
(e) The designation of Communist Party membership cannot be justified as
an alternative, "shorthand" expression for the characteristics which render
men likely to incite political strikes. Pp. 381 U. S. 455-456.
(f) A statute which inflicts its deprivation upon named or described persons
or groups constitutes a bill of attainder whether its aim is retributive,
punishing past acts, or preventive, discouraging future conduct. In America
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed (by the
Congress)."
Art. I, 9, cl. 3.
In this case, we review for the first time a conviction under 504 of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a
crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or (except
in clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of a labor union. [Footnote
1] Section 504, the purpose of which is to protect
"No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ."
Art. I, 10. A logical starting place for an inquiry into the meaning of the
prohibition is its historical background. The bill of attainder, a parliamentary
act sentencing to death one or more specific persons, was a device often
resorted to in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century England for
dealing with persons who had attempted, or threatened to attempt, to
overthrow the government. [Footnote 7] In addition to the death sentence,
attainder generally carried with it a "corruption of blood," which meant that
the attainted party's heirs could not inherit his property. [Footnote 8] The
"bill of pains and penalties" was identical to the bill of attainder, except that
it prescribed a penalty short of death, [Footnote 9] e.g., banishment,
[Footnote 10] deprivation of the right to
Page 381 U. S. 442
vote, [Footnote 11] or exclusion of the designated party's sons from
Parliament. [Footnote 12] Most bills of attainder and bills of pains and
penalties named the parties to whom they were to apply; a few, however,
simply described them. [Footnote 13] While some left the designated parties
a way of escaping the penalty, others did not. [Footnote 14] The use of bills
of attainder and bills of pains and penalties was not limited to England.
During the American Revolution, the legislatures of all thirteen States passed
statutes directed against the Tories; among these statutes were a large
number of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. [Footnote 15]
While history thus provides some guidelines, the wide variation in form,
purpose and effect of ante-Constitution bills of attainder indicates that the
proper scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance to
contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern
the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was designed
to eliminate. The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our
constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was
intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded)
prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a
34
pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to a small
number of partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it may
banish at discretion all those whom particular circumstances render
obnoxious, without hearing or trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he
may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The name of liberty
applied to such a government would be a mockery of common sense.
[Footnote 18] "
Page 381 U. S. 445
Thus, the Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one
implementation of the general principle of fractionalized power, but also
reflected the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited
as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the
blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific
persons.
"Everyone must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and
organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon
the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular
clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and
impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular
feeling is strongly excited -- the very class of cases most likely to be
prosecuted by this mode. [Footnote 19] "
Page 381 U. S. 446
By banning bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution sought to guard
against such dangers by limiting legislatures to the task of rulemaking.
"It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society
would seem to be the duty of other departments."
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 136. [Footnote 20]
The approach which Chief Justice Marshall had suggested was followed in
the twin post-Civil War cases of Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, and Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. Cummings involved the constitutionality of
amendments to the Missouri Constitution of 1865 which provided that no
one could engage in a number of specified professions (Cummings was a
priest) unless he first swore that he had taken no part in the rebellion against
the Union. At issue in Garland was a federal statute which required attorneys
to take a similar oath before they could practice in federal courts. This Court
struck down both provisions as bills of attainder on the ground that they
were legislative acts inflicting punishment on a specific group: clergymen
and lawyers who had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could not
truthfully take the oath. In reaching its result, the Court emphatically rejected
the argument that the constitutional
Page 381 U. S. 448
prohibition outlawed only a certain class of legislatively imposed penalties:
"The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be
punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation
determining this fact. Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in
cases of conviction upon impeachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of
a lawful avocation, or from positions of trust, or from the privilege of
appearing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or guardian,
may also, and often has been, imposed as punishment."
4 Wall. at 71 U. S. 320.
The next extended discussion of the Bill of Attainder Clause [Footnote 21]
came in 1946, in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, where the Court
invalidated 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, 57 Stat.
431, 450, which prohibited payment of further salary to three named federal
employees, [Footnote 22] as a bill of attainder.
"[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable
Page 381 U. S. 449
II
35
III
Under the line of cases just outlined, 504 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact
Page 381 U. S. 450
legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce
persons who may use such positions to bring about political strikes. In 504,
however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution.
The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any
person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts
and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate
political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leave to courts and juries the
job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possess
the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the
persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold
union office without incurring criminal liability -- members of the
Communist Party. [Footnote 24]
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, lends
support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the
Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist
action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64
Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. 781 et seq. (1958 ed.). The definition of "Communist
action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in 3 of the Act:
"[A]ny organization in the United States . . . which (i) is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in
section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of
such world
Page 381 U. S. 451
Communist movement. . . ."
64 Stat. 989, 50 U.S.C. 782 (1958 ed.). A majority of the Court rejected the
argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that 3 does not
specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations set forth in the
Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although
the Board had determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a
"Communist action organization," the Court found the statutory definition
not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:
"In this proceeding, the Board has found, and the Court of Appeals has
sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities
in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party
should at any time choose to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief."
367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 87. The entire Court did not share the view of the
majority that 3's definition constituted rulemaking, rather than
specification. [Footnote 25] See also Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S.
out the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the Communist Party, or
any other political organization, can be regarded as an alternative, but
equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteristics. For, as the
Court noted in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 320 U. S. 136,
"under our traditions, beliefs are personal, and not a matter of mere
association, and . . . men, in adhering to a political party or other
organization, notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly
Page 381 U. S. 456
to all of its platforms or asserted principles. [Footnote 30]"
Just last Term, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, we held 6
of the Subversive Activities Control Act to violate the Constitution because it
"too broadly and indiscriminately" restricted constitutionally protected
freedoms. One of the factors which compelled us to reach this conclusion
was that 6 inflicted its deprivation upon all members of the Communist
organizations without regard to whether there existed any demonstrable
relationship between the characteristics of the person involved and the evil
Congress sought to eliminate. Id. at 378 U. S. 509-511. These cases are
relevant to the question before us. Even assuming that Congress had reason
to conclude that some Communists would use union positions to bring about
political strikes, "it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shar[e]
their evil purposes or participat[e] in their illegal conduct." Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 353 U. S. 246. In utilizing the term
"members of the Communist Party" to designate those persons who are
likely to incite political strikes, it plainly is not the case that Congress has
merely substituted a convenient shorthand term for a list of the
characteristics it was trying to reach. [Footnote 31]
IV
The Solicitor General argues that 504 is not a bill of attainder, because the
prohibition it imposes does not constitute "punishment." In support of this
conclusion, he urges that the statute was enacted for preventive, rather
Page 381 U. S. 457
than retributive reasons -- that its aim is not to punish Communists for what
they have done in the past, but rather to keep them from positions where they
will in the future be able to bring about undesirable events. He relies
on American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, which upheld
9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, the predecessor of the statute
presently before us. In Douds, the Court distinguished Cummings,
Garland, and Lovett on the ground that, in those cases
"the individuals involved were in fact being punished for past actions,
whereas, in this case, they are subject to possible loss of position only
because there is substantial ground for the congressional judgment that their
beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future conduct."
Id. at 339 U. S. 413.
This case is not necessarily controlled by Douds. For, to prove its assertion
that 9(h) was preventive, rather than retributive, in purpose, [Footnote 32]
the Court in Douds focused
Page 381 U. S. 458
on the fact that members of the Communist Party could escape from the
class of persons specified by Congress simply by resigning from the Party:
"Here, the intention is to forestall future dangerous acts; there is no one who
may not by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action,
become eligible to sign the affidavit. We cannot conclude that this section is
a bill of attainder."
Id. at 339 U. S. 414.
Section 504, unlike 9(h), disqualifies from the holding of union office not
only present members of the Communist Party, but also anyone who has,
within the past five years, been a member of the Party. However, even if we
make the assumption that the five-year provision was inserted not out of
desire to visit retribution, but purely out of a belief that failure to include it
would lead to pro forma resignations from the Party which would not
decrease the threat of political strikes, it still clearly appears that 504
inflicts "punishment" within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It
would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment" to "retribution."
Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent -and preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of
crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make
imprisonment any the less punishment.
Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of
attainder ban to instances of retribution. A number of English bills of
attainder were enacted for preventive purposes -- that is, the legislature made
a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts and associations (as
504 is), [Footnote 33] that a given person or group was likely to cause
trouble (usually, overthrow the
Page 381 U. S. 459
government), and therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person or group
in order to keep it from bringing about the feared event. [Footnote 34] It is
also clear that many of the early American bills attainting the Tories were
passed in order to impede their effectively resisting the Revolution.
"In the progress of the conflict, and particularly in its earliest periods,
attainder and confiscation had been resorted to generally, throughout the
continent, as a means of war. But it is a fact important to the history of the
revolting colonies that the acts prescribing penalties usually offered to the
persons against whom they were directed the option of avoiding them by
acknowledging their allegiance to the existing governments."
"It was a preventive, not a vindictive, policy. In the same humane spirit, as
the contest approached its close, and the necessity of these severities
diminished, many of the states passed laws offering pardons
Page 381 U. S. 460
to those who had been disfranchised, and restoring them to the enjoyment of
their property. . . . [Footnote 35]"
Thus, Justice Iredell was on solid historical ground when he observed,
in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U. S. 399-400, that "attainders, on the
principle of retaliation and proscription, have marked all the vicissitudes of
party triumph." (Emphasis supplied.)
We think that the Court in Douds misread United States v. Lovett when it
suggested, 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 413, that that case could be distinguished
on the ground that the sanction there imposed was levied for purely
retributive reasons. In Lovett,the Court, after reviewing the legislative
history of 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 328 U.S. at 328
U. S. 308-313, concluded that the statute was the product of a congressional
drive to oust from government persons whose (congressionally determined)
"subversive" tendencies made their continued employment dangerous to the
national welfare:
"the purpose of all who sponsored Section 304 . . . clearly was to 'purge' the
then existing and all future lists of Government employees of those whom
Congress deemed guilty of 'subversive activities,' and therefore 'unfit' to hold
a federal job."
Id. at 328 U. S. 314. Similarly, the purpose of the statute before us is to
purge the governing boards of labor unions of those whom Congress regards
as guilty of subversive acts and associations, and therefore unfit to fill
positions which might affect interstate commerce. [Footnote 36]
Page 381 U. S. 461
The Solicitor General urges us to distinguish Lovett on the ground that the
statute struck down there "singled out three identified individuals." It is, of
course, true that 504 does not contain the words "Archie Brown," and that
it inflicts its deprivation upon more than three people. However, the
decisions of this Court, as well as the historical background of the Bill of
Attainder Clause, make it crystal clear that these are distinctions without a
difference. It was not uncommon for English acts of attainder to inflict their
deprivations upon relatively large groups of people, [Footnote 37] sometimes
by description, rather than name. [Footnote 38] Moreover, the statutes
voided in Cummings and Garland were of this nature. [Footnote 39] We
cannot agree that the fact that 504 inflicts its deprivation upon the
membership of the Communist Party, rather than upon a list of named
individuals, takes it out of the category of bills of attainder.
We do not hold today that Congress cannot weed dangerous persons out of
the labor movement, any more than the Court held in Lovett that subversives
must be permitted to hold sensitive government positions. Rather, we make
again the point made in Lovett: that Congress must accomplish such results
by rules of general applicability. It cannot specify the people upon whom the
sanction it prescribes is to be levied. Under our Constitution, Congress
possesses full legislative authority, but the task of adjudication must be left
to other tribunals.
Page 381 U. S. 462
37
This Court is always reluctant to declare that an Act of Congress violates the
Constitution, but, in this case, we have no alternative. As Alexander
Hamilton observed:
"By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass
no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this
kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of
the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. [Footnote 40]"
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
38
EN
[G.R.
BANC
No.
116437.
March
3,
1997.]
Solicitor
General
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
to
Law."
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in
Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty
years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left
her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to
prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a
striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags
containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00
in
cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wifes
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as
the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was
inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to
the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious
girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark.
Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to
their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot
high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a
39
bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girls body over the
fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head
with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the
face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence,
dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of
Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her
brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with
a
sanitary
napkin.
5.1
"1.
Abrasions:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
Abrasions/contusions:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
2.1
temple,
right.
2.2
cheek,
right.
2.3
upper
and
2.4
breast,
upper
2.5
breast,
upper
lower
inner
jaws,
right.
quadrant,
right.
outer
quadrant,
left.
elbow
joint,
Hematoma:chanrob1es
upper
temple,
and
lateral
upper
Lacerated
eyebrow,
to
posterior,
virtual
lower
the
and
outer
1aw
of
lower
wounds:chanrob1es
lateral
bilateral.
library
eyelids,
edge
border,
eyebrow,
right.
1aw
right,
right.
1/2
library
inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5.
Fractures:chanrob1es
virtual
External
minimal
genitalia
blood
present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and
exposed
vaginal
wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed
negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994,
by
Dr.
Wilfredo
S.
de
Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions
due
to
Traumatic
Injuries,
Face."
3
Mariannes gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look
for the criminal. Searching the place where Mariannes body was found, the
policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what
appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of
shoes
which
were
identified
as
Mariannes.
4
Appellants nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the
occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of
appellants wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife
and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles
consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some
reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The
clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly
belonged
to
appellant.
5
bilateral.
jaws,
virtual
right.
library
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from
right
to
left.
2.
bone,
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd
incisors.
7.1
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died
of
"traumatic
injuries"
sustained
as
follows:
maxillary
1aw
library
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police
team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents house. They took
him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where
he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Mariannes
death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victims clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented
and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where
Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. 6 Immediately, the police
took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier,
were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at
the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal
under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to
Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other
suspects
holding
the
bags.
7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters.
The following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on
the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha Patawaran. 8
Appellant
was
found
to
sustain:
"HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with
abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along
index
finger
1.5
cm.
in
size
Lt."
9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the
police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad
arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately.
The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there,
appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the
truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The
mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellants own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed
how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he
hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he
falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He
also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession,
appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. 13 His
confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the
mayor
and
reenacted
the
crime.
15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He
testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parents
house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He,
his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he
watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the
next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some
debts while he and his son went to his parents house where he helped his
father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon
and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the
police.
16
40
the
SO
ORDERED."
18
contends
that:
(2)
WITNESS First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard
of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen,
and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other companions in
the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that
time
and
whose
whereabouts
were
unknown,
sir.
Q
So
you
."cralaw
virtua1aw
possible
suspect?
Yes,
You
went
had
looking
sir.
for
Pablito
Andan?
viz:
"COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who
did
this
act?
Q
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias
"Bobby" is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime
charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in
accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8,
classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of Marianne
Guevarra the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra and
P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision
becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
crime,
library
Yes,
And
then,
what
sir.
else
did
you
do?
A We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we
learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there,
found him there and investigated him and in fact during the investigation he
admitted
that
he
was
the
culprit."
26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to
the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags
recovered from appellants house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the
investigating
team
testified:
"Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags
marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he
point
these
bags?
A At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the
canal
of
the
toilet.
Q In other words, you were given information where these two (2) bags were
located?
A
Yes,
sir.
Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what
did
you
do?
A We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would
know
where
the
two
(2)
bags
were
hidden,
sir.
41
Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to
the
place
where
the
bags
were
located?
A After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he
really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir." 28
The victims bags were the fruits of appellants uncounselled confession to
the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day,
Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant
confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness.
Mayor
Trinidad
testified,
viz:
"Mayor Trinidad: . . . During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the
Chief
of
Police,
mayor?
A While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin
mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So
when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the
door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him
again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even
covered by a television camera." 30
x
Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the
Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court:
He
said
to
you
the
following
words
going
to
say,
sir."
31
for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his
admission was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence
that was committed on his person because I knew that there were five other
suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the
policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of drugs but he
said
no,
and
"nakainom
lang,"
sir.
Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the
uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot
recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I dont know if it is the
place of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but
. . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station Commander,
there was no air of any force or any threatening nature of investigation that
was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to him freely
and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who raped
and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of
the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired during the
killing
of
Marianne
Guevarra.
Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from
the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A Yes, sir.
And
what
was
the
response
of
Pablito
Andan?
A His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible
Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the
Baliuag PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A
Q
Yes,
Who
sir.
accompanied
you?
Court:
A I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime
was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old
house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to
me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne
Guevarra,
sir.
Q
A
Did
Yes,
sir,
he
in
fact,
voluntarily
I
have
it
on
comply?
my
Yes,
sir.
39
Were
there
people?
A The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy
chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and
several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the
suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed
Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this
offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital offense? And
you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really
admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the
affirmative
answer.
Q And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while
ago?
A Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some
pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard
the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and
the
suspect
answered
the
same.
Q Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A
The
same
group
of
people
who
were
the
vernacular.
Q And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga
and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya,
"Oo." "Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo
pa ba na ikaw ang gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa
rin siya ng "Oo."cralaw virtua1aw library
A The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from
Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief
of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?
Did
videotape.
Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP
Baliuag up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A
Use
there,
sir.
Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered
you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
you
ask
him,
why
did
you
kill
Marianne?
A There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people.
There were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
A I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil
gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the
pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him,
reads
almost
everyday
before
the
crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the
court and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito
Andan?
A As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body that he was
really down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife
also
present?
Court:
A Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really
the wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the
questions that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife,
sir.
So
He
he
was
not
even
Court:
happy
about
admitted
it,
He
the
incident?
your
Honor.
was
happy?
How
about
the
other
representatives
from
the
media?
A Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were
people
from
the
radio
and
from
TV
Channel
9.
How
about
Channel
7?
A They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
it.
Q How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they
around?
crying?
A I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people there, sir.
A As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no
tear
that
fell
on
his
face.
Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May
we know what question did you ask and the answer.
Court:
He
admitted
it.
Court:
As
He
was
not
happy
Was
Was
I
observed
doing
he
he
it,
after
it
feeling
was
x"
only
slightly,
remorseful?
your
Honor.
41
Yes,
sir.
What
was
the
next
question?
A I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim
aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her
on
the
stomach.
Q
What
was
the
next
question
that
you
asked
him?
A He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the
victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
43
Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item
on
that?
A Yes, sir, based on what he told me. Thats what I did.
Q
Were
there
other
questions
propounded
by
Yes,
you?
sir.
"Ano
iyon?"
A He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of
the
fence?
A
cannot
remember
the
others,
sir.
Yes,
sir.
Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated
wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and
indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted
blood?
A This is the lacerated wound at 3 oclock and this is the lacerated wound at
6 oclock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on
the
edges
of
the
lacerated
wounds,
sir.
Q
What
could
have
caused
those
lacerations?
A Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into
that small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the
hymen,
sir.
Q If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
Q But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A
x
I
x
have
x"
xerox
copy
here,
sir.
43
Court:
Clearly, appellants confessions to the news reporters were given free from
any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as
news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting
under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellants confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant
them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on
separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by
the
news
reporters.
We rule that appellants verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered
by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need
of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48
Include
the
descriptive
word,
fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the
cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied
first
before
you
did
you
re-autopsy?
A
Yes,
sir.
Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could
have been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the
victim which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of
lacerated wounds could produce blood because there is no more circulation,
the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor
examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor,
then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible that the
lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because
the victim was already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce
any
bleeding.
Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with
clotted blood at 6 and 3 oclock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained while the
victim
was
alive?
It
is
possible,
sir.
53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina
does not negate the commission rape 54 nor does the lack of complete
penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be
penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified
that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victims
vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any
injury
in
the
first
autopsy.
Dr. Agudas finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant
are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an
investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:chanrob1es virtual
1aw
library
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road
near
appellants
house;
57
(2) At that time, appellants wife and her step brother and grandmother were
not
in
their
house;
58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellants
house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass
nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellants house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been
dragged over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was
thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellants bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry
hamper
in
his
house;
44
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found
positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the
victim. 61 Mariannes exact blood type was not determined but her parents
had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victims pants had bloodstains which
were found to be type "O," appellants blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to
explain;
64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident
and were later found at his parents house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan;
65
In fine, appellants extrajudicial confessions together with the other
circumstantial
evidence
justify
the
conviction
of Appellant.
Appellants defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His
alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the
commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away
from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour.
66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accusedappellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise
of
the
pardoning
power.
SO
ORDERED.
45
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133026. February 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD
ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to mans brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the
aid of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a
lady whose love they once shared.
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991,
an emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly
and without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the
chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and
succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed
towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out
of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis
staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim
Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near
death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but
Dennis expired even before he could receive medical attention. According to
the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab
wound which penetrated the heart." 1crlwvirtualibrry
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was
filed against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and
warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at
large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in
the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined
efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio,
Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the
Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched
from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3
Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be
tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station
where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the
interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to
his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38975 January 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON.
EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch VII, and PAQUITO YUPO, Respondents.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente for petitioner.chanrobles
virtual law library
Edelmiro A. Amante for private respondent.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
It is not easy to make out a case of improvident exercise of authority on
the part of a lower court when the assailed actuation was clearly inspired
by a desire to adhere to the literal and explicit mandate of the
Constitution. That is the difficulty confronting the prosecution when it
filed this certiorari proceeding resulting from respondent Judge Eduardo
P. Caguioa sustaining the objection of the defense to questions asked a
witness based on an alleged extrajudicial admission by an accused
private respondent Paquito Yupo, during a police interrogation conducted
on July 18, 1973, without his having been assisted by counsel. There
was, in the opinion of respondent Judge, a clear failure to abide by the
express prohibition in the fundamental law against the possibility of any
confession obtained from a person under investigation without his
having been informed of his right to keep silent and to have the benefit
of counsel. 1 Clearly then, the leading case of Magtoto v.
and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken. 6 After this
witness had Identified the statement of the accused and the waiver, he
was questioned on the incriminating answers in such statement to the
police, but there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel
based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible in evidence, as
the statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the
accused in the investigation. 7 Respondent Judge sustained the objection
of the defense on the view that such judicial confession of the accused is
inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the
accused was not assisted by a counsel when it was given. 8He likewise
stated that such right could not be waived. 9 Upon his refuse to
reconsider such ruling, this petition was filed.
Certiorari does not lie. The petition must be dismissed. It was not shown
that the alleged waiver was given freely and voluntarily. The questioning
was rather perfunctory. An even more telling circumstance against such
alleged waiver being given credence was that private respondent, a
native of Samar, then nineteen years old, was interrogated extensively in
Tagalog, no showing having been made that his acquaintance with the
language was such that he could fully understand the import of what was
asked him. On the specific question of whether or not the right to
counsel during custodial interrogation interrogation may be waived, the
Court rules that there is no bar to such a waiver if made intelligently and
voluntarily,
with
full
understanding
of
its
consequences.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Manguera 2 does not apply. the interrogation having taken place six
months after the effectivity Of the present Constitution. The prosecution
would deny its applicability, contending that there was a waiver.
Respondent Judge was of the view that this innovation in the
Constitution, intended to buttress and fortify the right against selfincrimination, was not susceptible of waiver. When he remained firm in
his stand, the petition was filed, a grave abuse of discretion being
imputed to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As
for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and
to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned." 14 chanrobles virtual law library
2. Tested by such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver
falls far short. It is clearly inadmissible. There was a perfunctory
opening statement asked by a certain Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the
Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na
ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa,
bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na
huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon
ng abogado na iyong gusto at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang
sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon o laban sa iyo,
magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" 15 Then came the monosyllabic answer
Opo. That was ala Even the very annex submitted to the petition merely
stated that there were signatures of private respondent Yupo, the
aforesaid Roca, and a certain Roberto Sales. The day when it was
subscribed and sworn to, allegedly before Municipal Judge Mariano
Mendieta was not even specified. Again, there was a statement that it
was a certified true copy by a certain Teresita M. Tecson, whose
connection with the case or with the court was not even shown. There
was no signature. There were only illegible letters, perhaps indicating
that they were the initials. The doubt that must have occurred to the
police officials of Meycauayan is evident from their submitting a onepage statement, presumably signed by the same people and certified by
the same Tecson, reading in fun as follows: "[Sa sinumang Kinauukulan
lpinabasa, ipinaalam at naintindihan ni Paquito Yupo y Gonzales], 19 na
taong gulang, binata tubo sa San Policarpio, Eastern Samar ang nasa
ibaba nito '[Ikaw ay sinisiyasat ngayon dahilan sa paglabag sa batas.
Karapatan mo ang huwag magsalita. Anumang iyong sasabihin ay
maaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo. At ikaw ay may karapatan sa
tulong at sa pagharap ng abogado na iyong napipisil sa habila ng
kabatiran ni [Paquito Yupo ng mga nilalaman ng nasa itaas, siya ay
48
the
Antonio,
J.,
concur
in
the
dissent
of
Justice
Aquino.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
SA SINUMANG KINAUUKULAN:
I would like to underline, however, the important point that the Court
rejects unanimously the view on which respondent judge based his ruling
under review, that the right to silence and to counsel during custodial
investigation is not subject to waiver. Both the main opinion of our
eminent Chief Justice as well as the dissenting opinion of our other
distinguished colleagues Justices Aquino and Antonio underscore the
point that said rights are indeed subject to waiver, the only requirement
in that regard being that such waiver must be proven to have been made
voluntarily
and
intelligently.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
But it is as to the legal significance or import of the "waiver made by the
accused Paquito Yupo, herein private respondent, that the dissenters
disagree with the main opinion. The dissenters feel that there is enough
showing in the record that said accused had freely and conscientiously
waived his right to silence and to counsel before he was interrogated by
Corporal Roca, the investigator. On my part, I agree with the Chief
Justice that merely informing a person under custody of his
constitutional rights under the circumstances hereinunder to be stated
and thereafter taking down his statement does not sufficiently safeguard
those rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, in the particular case at bar, the prosecution would deduce free and
intelligent waiver from no more than the following: chanrobles virtual
law library
(a) The perfunctory opening question and answer, which has been the
usual form ordinarily followed by practically all police investigators
reading thus: chanrobles virtual law library
Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa
batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo,
ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may
karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto at dapat mo
ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng
Pilipinas
Bulakan
SASABIHIN
AY
MAARING
GAMITING KATIBAYAN LABAN SA
IYO. AT IKAW AY MAY KARAPATAN
SA TULONG AT SA PAGHARAP NG
ABOGADO NA IYONG NAPIPISIL.
Sa kabila ng kabatiran ni PAQUITO YUPO ng mga
nalalaman ng nasa itaas nito, siya ay nagbigay pa rin ng
salaysay.
(SGD.) PAQUITO YUPO
NILAGDAAN SA HARAP NINA:
(SGD.) CONRADO B. ROCA (SGD.)
ROBERTO SALES"
On that same date, July 18, 1973, when Paquito Yupo executed the
waiver of his constitutional rights, his statement was taken by Corporal
Conrado B. Roca of the Meycauayan, Bulacan, police. That statement or
extrajudicial confession also contains a warning to Yupo as to his
constitutional rights to remain silent, not to incriminate himself and to be
assisted by counsel. The warning and waiver read as follows:
1.-Tanong: Ipinaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang
paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang
pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung
ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaruon ng abogado na iyong
gusto at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay
maaaring gamiting ng ayon o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin
ba? chanrobles virtual law library
.Sagot:
Opo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
2.-T: Ang salaysay mo bang ito ay sarili at kusa mo na
hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan, tinakot o pinangakuan ng
anumang pabuya?chanrobles virtual law library
S: Opo.
On the basis of Yupo's confession, the provincial fiscal filed against him
an information for murder in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view thereof, the Court believes that this Exhibit C of the prosecution
(the confession) is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional
and therefore the Court sustains all objections of counsel for the accused
objecting to the admission of any question with regards to the exhibits.
At the trial of that case, the prosecutor presented as witnesses (1) Miguel
Tribol, the victim's father, (2) Lydia Begnotia who heard the antemortem
statement of the victim pointing to Yupo as his assailant, (3) the
medicolegal officer who conducted the autopsy, (4) two policemen and
(5) Gracia Santos Wage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
enumeration
and
description
of
the
articles
follow]
to
Law.
of her right hand. She fell to the concrete floor, and after she had
recovered, she ran to the garage and hid under the car. After a few
seconds, she went near the door of the garage and because she could not
open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to
their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was
being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone
from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs.
Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's
enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of
water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27, August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark
Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad,
Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the
Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the
two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two
had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and
index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder.
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the
road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike
replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for
Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the
waiting shed. The two men boarded it. Mike again noticed that the taller
man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right
hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he
boarded it. In the investigation conducted by the Tuba police, he
identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the
hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered enough
courage to leave the room where they had earlier barricaded themselves
and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the
dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and
Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to
seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the
Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier.
They
just
stayed
near
the
road.
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF)
arrived. A team from the Baguio City Police Station, headed by police
Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the
City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial
investigation only because it found out that the scene of the crime was
within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however, was
difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the
body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a
sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location. They went around the house
and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt
her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When
informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the
team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting
him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness.
Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was
impaired, and she had double vision. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station
arrived at the Barker house to conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who
in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from
the Barker house by the Baguio City Police were first brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet,
and
then
to
the
court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral
Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr.
Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. He
found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a
blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock,
and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and
"R"). nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center where she was treated and confined for
eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first
saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose
state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations
primarily on the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear,
and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was
paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr.
Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt
instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been
left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due
to
bleeding
or
hemorrhagic
shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station,
Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of
several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted
REASONABLE
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his
arguments, which are anchored on his alibi that at the time the crime was
committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila, and the failure of the star witnesses for the prosecution to
identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the
hospital, pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene
Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids
gave a description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.
4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement "That
he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this
case;". This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession made to the
police at Calauag, Quezon Province. Although he claims that he did not
bother to read the motion as he was just told that his signature would
mean his release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which cannot be
given credence. Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could
have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that
their signatures were
already affixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker
house that fateful morning and his even more damaging admissions to
Ray Dean Salvosa as to what he actually did can be considered as
another circumstance to already bolster the increasing circumstances
against
the
accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long line of cases, alibi is
at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado,
G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given
credence, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same
was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People
vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247). This
defense easily crumbles down as prosecution witness Mike Tayaban
placed accused Maqueda at the vicinity of the crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus his extrajudicial
confession produce the needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that
indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay
(Exhibit "LL") of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno immediately after
Maqueda
was
arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief,
he pleads that we acquit him because the trial court committed this lone
error:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
DOUBT
OF
THE
CRIME
CHARGED.
12
Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to
prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the
admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It
said:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not
the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was
made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28,
1992,
206
SCRA
652).
18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between
the rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed
against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such
filing an accused "no longer, [has] the right to remain silent and to
counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have
any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so,
then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an
accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only
give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also
diminish the said accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the
Constitution.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are
not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary
source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20,
Article
II
of
the
1973
Constitution
which
reads:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right
.
.
.
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right
against
self-incrimination
reading:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
incorporation of the second paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In
that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an
innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long
recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its
ruling:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which
follow but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As
for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and
to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents
to
be
questioned.
20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph
of the aforementioned Section 20, the word custodial, which was used in
Miranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view
thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly
observed:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the
term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under' and
"investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any
person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of
the
Miranda
doctrine. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the
application of Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for
the commission of an offense of a person not in custody. 22 Accordingly,
as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule
adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin
upon arraignment. Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this
Court laid down this rule in Morales vs. Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right
to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to
it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation
of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the
person to be arrested of the reason for the arrest and show him "the
warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a
case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or
original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second
paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at any time before
arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an
offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III
of the present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a)
the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his own
choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he
must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived
except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the
right to counsel. 25 Thus, Section 12(2), Article III of the present
Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
"enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People vs.
Holgado,
26
this
Court
emphatically
declared:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is
that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
56
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney
of
his
own.
It was therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation
and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint
or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his
right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial
court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would
have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused
persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned
because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the
accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer
must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be
improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate
him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is
charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence
thereon
must
be
faithfully
complied
with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the
former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof,
Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the
said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel.
Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible
pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which
reads:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate
and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not
governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course
There
is
more
than
one
circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this
case. nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the
appellant must fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The
rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through the
unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not
controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a
companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed
in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the
house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his
companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was
committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that
Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7
October 1991, thereby belying his testimony that he started working on 5
July
1991
and
continuously
until
27
August
1991.
(3)
(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker
house an hour after the crime in question was committed there;
He
and
co-accused
Rene
Salvamante
are
friends;
57
ORDERED.
1.
Original
Records
(OR),
1.
2.
Id.,
37.
3.
Id.,
49.
4. Exhibit "HH"; Id., 62. Maqueda signed it together with his sister,
Myrna
M.
Catinding,
and
her
husband.
5.
Id.,
86.
6.
OR,
94.
7. Id., 922-949; Rollo, 48-75. Per Judge Romeo A. Brawner.
8. RTC Decision, 3-12, 14-15; OR, 924-933, 935-936; Rollo, 59-60, 6162.
9.
05,
933-934;
Rollo,
59-60.
10.
RTC
Decision,
14-15;
OR,
935-936.
11.
OR,
946-947;
Rollo,
72-73.
12.
Rollo,
87.
13.
U.S.
vs.
Corrales,
28
Phil.
362
[1914].
14. 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence 337 (12th ed., 1955). See also 2
Underhill's Criminal Evidence 385 (5th ed., 1956); Wigmore on
Evidence 821 (3rd ed., 1940); People vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 110290, 25
January 1995; and People vs. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 110107, 26 January
1995.
15.
OR,
943;
Rollo,
69.
16.
175
SCRA
216
(1989].
17.
OR,
945;
Rollo,
71.
18.
Id.,
939;
Id.,
65.
19.
384
U.S.
436
[1966].
20.
Id.
at
445.
21.
138
SCRA
294,
319-320
[1985].
22. See 1 JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of
the
Philippines
344
(1st
ed.
1987).cralaw
23.
37
SCRA
450
[1971].
24. 121 SCRA 538, 554 [1983]. See also People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA
546 [1992]; People vs. De Jesus, 213 SCRA 345 [1992]; People vs.
Tujon, 215 SCRA 559 [1992]; People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 [1993].
25.
BERNAS,
supra
note
23,
at
380.
26.
85
Phil.
752,
756-757
[1950].
27. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 113, Rules of Court.
28. Quinn vs. Buchanan, 298 SW 2d 413, 417 [1957].
29. Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 155, 167 [1972].
30. 16 Am Jur 2d 206, quoting Dumbauld in The Bill of Rights, 140
[1957].
31.
People
vs.
Marti,
193
SCRA
57
[1991].
32.
183
SCRA
196
[1990].
33. People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs. Dela Cruz, 229
SCRA
754
[1994].
34. People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992]; People vs. Dela Cruz,
207 SCRA 632 [1992]; People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992];
People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992].
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIAS, FEDERICO
AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN and
DIASCORO VIAS y ODAL, accused,
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No.
36930 finding accused-appellant Albino Bagas guilty of the complex
crime of robbery in band with double rape and sentencing him
accordingly.
58
complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accusedappellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to
be assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was
arrested by the police and placed on detention. He maintains that the
identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was as
much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.
SO ORDERED.4crlwvirtualibrry
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III
of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. 6 Custodial investigation starts when the police
From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accusedappellant Bagas appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1)
the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented by
counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due
weight to the open court identification of him which was based on a
suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial
courts improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
Accused-appellant maintains that from the time he was arrested until he
was presented to the complainants for identification, he was deprived of
the benefit of counsel. He narrates the circumstances surrounding his
arrest and investigation as follows:
On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of
policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a
suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where
accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were
looking for a certain Mario and searched the first and second floors of
the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the
back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang yata tayo ng
taong ito and Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino. It was at this juncture that
Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person
Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together
with accused Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused Ampatin told
him that he (Ampatin) committed an error in pointing him out to the
police, namumukaan lang niya ako, napagkamalian lang niya ako. They
were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed
under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias.
When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out,
instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he was asked to
talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo
and Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen
told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects.
This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting
him. They only stopped when one of the policemen
intervened. 5crlwvirtualibrry
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error
when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a
lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the
In a similar case, People vs. Cruz, 17 accused Cruz, a suspected coconspirator in a case of robbery with homicide, was presented to the
witnesses alone and made to walk and turn around in their presence.
Then the police pointed out to the accused and several others as the
persons suspected by the police as the perpetrators of the robbery
committed in Goso-on. The Court, in rejecting the subsequent
identification made by the witnesses, reasoned that:
following factors:
xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification process.
The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by
complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly
suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view
accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the detention
cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an
announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he
was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits. According
to accused-appellant Q: When the complaining witnesses arrived at the Urduja precinct at that
time you mentioned, were you immediately kicked by them?
A: No, sir.
Q: How long a time from the time they arrived at the Urduja precinct to
the time that you were kicked by them?
A: Around 10 minutes, sir.
Q: And how were you identified or recognized by the complaining
witnesses?
A: Because upon arrival at the Urduja police station, the policemen
announced that I am one of the suspects in this case and thereafter, the
complainants started kicking me, sir.
Q: So that the announcement of the policemen that you were one of the
suspects came first then they started kicking you?
A: Yes, sir.16crlwvirtualibrry
It is, thus, clear that the identification was practically suggested by the
police themselves when they announced to the complainants that
accused-appellant was the person pointed to by Ampatin. The fact that
this information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior to
their identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from
premises after 10 p.m. that night, by the time he reaches Kalookan, the
crime would have already been completed.
The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the
courts should not be too readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken
in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to reverse
the outcome of the case as found by the trial court and thereby rightly set
the accused free. 27 Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the
present case has been sufficiently established by corroborative
testimonies of credible witnesses and by evidence of physical
impossibility of accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime.
Alibi, therefore, should have been properly appreciated in accusedapellants favor.
Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is
the voluntary confession of accused Federico Ampatin absolving
accused-appellant Bagas of the crime. Ampatins testimony was clear and
categorical:
Q: When you reached that house where Bagas was working what
happened?
xxx
xxx
Q: Were you able to reached (sic) the ground floor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened there?
A: I pointed to Albino Bagas, sir, because he was the only first person I
saw there at the ground floor while his companions were on the other
side because I dont want to get hurt anymore, Your Honor.
Court: When you see (sic) Bagas was lying face down at the tme you
pointed to him?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Court: You did not bother to look at his face?
xxx
xxx
Court: You mean to say at the time you pointed to Albino Bagas you did
not know him?
Q: xxx what was the reaction of Albino Bagas when he was being
pointed to and arrested by the arresting officers?
A: The situation goes like this, sir, the policemen arrived there and they
were holding the persons of Ampatin and they were looking for a person
named Mario that was what I heard, sir, and then the policemen forced
us to be identified or to be seen by the guide. Ampatin at first at the
ground floor but since there was nobody there by the name of Mario they
proceeded to the second floor and upon looking one of the policemen
shouted, Wala rito, niloloko lang tayo ng taong ito.
Court: Then what happened next?
Witness: And I noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was
afraid, so, because of fear he was able to point on the person of Albino
Bagas but when asked he does not know the name of Albino Bagas, Your
Honor.
Atty. Pacis: Before going to the second floor, because according to you
the arresting officers and the guide went to the second floor, was Albino
Bagas at the ground floor seen by the guide and the policemen?
A: We were the first group of persons seen by the policemen and Albino
and I were beside each other, sir.
Q: And you want to impressed (sic) upon this Honorable Court that at
first at the ground floor, Albino Bagas was not identified by this Ampatin
before going to the second floor?
A: The guide was not able to identify the person of Albino Bagas and
that was the reason why they still made searches at the second floor, sir.
Q: How was Federico Ampatin able to identify Albino Bagas when he
was accompanied by the policemen went downstairs?
A: I noticed from the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid
after hearing the shout of the policemen, sir.
xxx 30crlwvirtualibrry
The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatins declaration in
court that he does not know herein accused-appellant and merely pointed
to him out of fear of the police. These testimonies remain unrebutted by
the prosecution as the arresting officers were not presented to refute or
deny the same. The foregoing testimonies exculpating accused-appellant
have sufficiently cast at least a shadow of doubt as to his guilt.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the trial court convicting accusedappellant Albino Bagas of the crime of robbery with multiple rape is
hereby REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His
62
* This case was transferred to the ponente pursuant to the resolution in AM No. 22 Id., at 17.
00- 9-03-SC. - Re: Creation of Special Committee on Case Backlog dated
23 TSN, August 21, 1991, pp. 14-23.
february 27, 2001
1 People v. Libag, 184 SCRA 707 (1990).
3 Id., at 138-140.
4 Id., at 44.
5 TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 20-21, TSN , August 15, 1991, pp. 2-10.
6 People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); People v. Andal, 279 SCRA 47429 People v. Victor, 181 SCRA 818 (1990).
(1997).
30 TSN of August 14, 1991, pp. 5-8.
7 People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1990); People v. Labtan, 320 SCRA
140 (1999).
8 People v. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471 (1995); People v. Dela Torre, 294 SCRA
196 (1998).
9 Ibid.
10 276 SCRA 55 (1997). The case of People v. Lamsing overturns the Courts
prior ruling in the case of People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 307, where
identification of an uncounselled accused made in a police line-up at the start of
the custodial investigation was held to be inadmissible.
11 See note 10.
12 People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994).
13 People v. Tiadula, 292 SCRA 596 (1998); People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA
751 (1998).
14 Brief for the Appellee, pp. 7-8 citing the case of People v. Espiritu, 191
SCRA 503 (1990).
15 People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, 95 (1995).
16 TSN, August 15, 1991, pp. 8-9.
17 32 SCRA 181 (1970).
18 241 SCRA 695 (1995).
19 288 SCRA 95 (1998).
20 TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 18-21.
21 Id. at 4-5.
63
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122142. May 17, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: HTML
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Manila, finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all
the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Nena
Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50,000.00 each and to
pay the sum of P4,000.00 representing the amount of money stolen.
The information alleged
That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with one, whose true name, identity
and present whereabouts are still unknown and
mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of
gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and
carry away the amount of P4,000.00 cash belonging
to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the damage
and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount
of P4,000.00 Philippine Currency; that on the
occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid
robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted
and used personal violence upon the person of
NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by
stabbing them to death, thereby inflicting upon the
said victims mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie
Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines,
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of
the Western Police District investigated the robbery with homicide. The
gist of his testimony is to the following effect:
even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he was
made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.
To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five
times is not the same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He
signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the
Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed again as proof that after
being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement. (Exh.
O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate
that page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third
page at the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name
again on the third page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of
Exh. O)
We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from
the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant five times. kirsten
Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed
from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and
information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the
extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason the
police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The
inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant
execute the confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign
the booking and information sheet.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the
same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the
crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have
stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera
(Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together with his
townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given to
him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper
(Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal
findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly
caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has been held that
voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with
details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting
spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which
violence and torture have been applied.[11] When the details narrated in
an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been
concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the
claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is
unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the
statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against
the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be
voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails
with the essential facts contained in such confession.[12] barth
65
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the
suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings:
(1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be
warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3)
he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[13]
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los
Reyes to establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully
satisfied when accused-appellant executed his extrajudicial confession.
Pat. Benjamin Ines testified:[14]
Q......What happened during the investigation of the
accused?
A......He consented to give a written statement to me,
sir.
Q......Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented
to give statement, Patrolman, was he assisted by
counsel?
A......Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer.
Q......And who was that lawyer that was provided by
you?
A......Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir.
Q......And who personally took down the statement
of the accused?
A......I was the one who personally took the
statement of accused Obrero. Jksm
Q......Do you know what was the gist of that
statement that was given to you, what was it all
about?
A......Its all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero,
the gruesome slaying of two househelps.
....
Q......Before having taken down the admission of
Jimmy Obrero, what investigative steps did you
SA
ATING
....
wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of
warnings, in several decisions[16]of this Court, has been found to be
merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to
the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously
observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was
specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the
fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v.
Januario:[17]
our time, we will not work our time during the police
duty, maam.
ATTY. ALISUAG:
That is all, Your Honor.[19]
The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:
As shown in Exhibit "O", accused consented to
giving his extrajudicial confession after he was
informed of rights under custodial investigation, by
affixing his signature thereto (Exhibit "O-3"). And
absent any showing that the assisting lawyer, though
a station commander but of another police station,
was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court holds
that the proceedings were regularly conducted. In
fact, he testified that he first asked the accused if he
is accepting his legal services (TSN, March 5, 1991,
p. 4); that he informed the accused of his Miranda
rights and despite the warning, he decided to give his
confession just the same; that he was at all time
present when the accused was being interrogated
with the accused giving his answers voluntarily
(Ibid, p. 4); that he read to the accused the questions
and answers before he signed his extrajudicial
confession (Ibid, p. 8). Clearly shown was the fact
that Atty. De los Reyes was equal to his duties as a
lawyer than a member of the police force, when he
lend his assistance to the accused during his incustody interrogation.[20]
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula,[21] the independent
counsel required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or
private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los
Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of
the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and
scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to
the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would
67
SECOND
[G.R.
DIVISION
No.
187725
January
19,
2011]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BENJAMIN
JESALVA, Petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
v. PEOPLE
OF
THE
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
CA, however, denied in its Resolution[34] dated April 7, 2009 for lack of
merit.chanrobles|lawlibrary
Hence,
this
Petition
based
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
on
the
following
affirming the RTC's ruling, did not err in convicting petitioner on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, because the particular circumstances
enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the
requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover,
the OSG claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4
Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and
were not elicited on custodial investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters
that petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he was never held for
questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the police station and,
besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona.[38]
Our Ruling
The
Petition
is
bereft
of
merit.chanrobles|lawlibrary
1.
4.
house is located;
5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband
Efren Aldemo;
6.
13.
7. At 12:30 o'clock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body
of Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the
crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
naked from the waist down. He lifted her up and brought the
body at Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away from the
highway.chanrobles|lawlibrary
8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at
around 2:15 a.m. of the same day, and brought her to the
Sorsogon
Provincial
Hospital
in
comatose
condition.chanrobles|lawlibrary
9. The police proceeded to inform the victim's sister, who in turn
informed the victim's husband of the incident.chanrobles|
lawlibrary
10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for
Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was not
able to find him.chanrobles|lawlibrary
11. At around 1:00 o'clock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin
Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose
Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon
headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the victim
Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30
in the early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael
Subdivision but upon reaching the crossing of OLV, Pangpang,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital, she jumped
out of his vehicle. These declarations were recorded in the
police blotter by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction
of SPO4 William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon Chief
Investigator.chanrobles|lawlibrary
12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together
with [petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St.
ORDERED.
72
Mapp v. Ohio
No. 236
Argued March 29, 1961
Decided June 19, 1961
367 U.S. 643
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant stands convicted of knowingly having had in her possession
and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and
photographs in violation of 2905.34 of Ohio's Revised Code. [Footnote
1] As officially stated in the syllabus to its opinion, the Supreme Court of
Ohio found that her conviction was valid though "based primarily upon
the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures
unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home . . . ."
170 Ohio St. 427-428, 166 N.E.2d 387, 388.
[644]
On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant's
residence in that city pursuant to information that "a person [was] hiding
out in the home, who was wanted for questioning in connection with a
recent bombing, and that there was a large amount of policy
paraphernalia being hidden in the home." Miss Mapp and her daughter
by a former marriage lived on the top floor of the two-family dwelling.
Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the door and
demanded entrance, but appellant, after telephoning her attorney, refused
to admit them without a search warrant. They advised their headquarters
of the situation and undertook a surveillance of the house.
The officers again sought entrance some three hours later when four or
more additional officers arrived on the scene. When Miss Mapp did not
come to the door immediately, at least one of the several doors to the
house was forcibly opened [Footnote 2] and the policemen gained
admittance. Meanwhile Miss Mapp's attorney arrived, but the officers,
having secured their own entry, and continuing in their defiance of the
law, would permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house.
It appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down the stairs from the upper
floor to the front door when the officers, in this highhanded manner,
broke into the hall. She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper,
claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers. She grabbed
the "warrant" and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the
[647]
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property. . . . Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are
circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion
of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the
condemnation . . . [of those Amendments]."
The Court noted that
"constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. . . . It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon." At p. 635.
In this jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of individual rights,
the Court gave life to Madison's prediction that "independent tribunals of
justice . . . will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights." I
Annals of Cong. 439 (1789). Concluding, the Court specifically referred
to the use of the evidence there seized as "unconstitutional." At p. 638.
Less than 30 years after Boyd, this Court, in Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914), stated that
"the Fourth Amendment . . . put the courts of the United States and
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints [and] . . . forever secure[d] the people, their
persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law . . . , and the duty of giving to it force and
effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the
enforcement of the laws." At pp. 391-392.
[648]
Specifically dealing with the use of the evidence unconstitutionally
seized, the Court concluded
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."
At p. 393.
"apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
Finally, the Court in that case clearly stated that use of the seized
evidence involved "a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused."
At pp. 398. Thus, in the year 1914, in the Weeks case, this Court "for the
73
first time" held that, "in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment
barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure." Wolf v. Colorado, supra, at 28. This Court has ever since
required of federal law officers a strict adherence to that command which
this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and constitutionally required-even if judicially implied--deterrent safeguard without insistence upon
which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of
words." Holmes, J., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385, 392 (1920). It meant, quite simply, that "conviction by means of
unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts . . . ," Weeks v. United States, supra, at
392, and that such evidence "shall not be used at all." Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, at 392.
[649]
There are in the cases of this Court some passing references to
the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and unequivocal
language of Weeks--and its later paraphrase in Wolf--to the effect that
the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed.
In Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927), a unanimous Court
declared that "the doctrine [cannot] . . . be tolerated under our
constitutional system, that evidences of crime discovered by a federal
officer in making a search without lawful warrant may be used against
the victim of the unlawful search where a timely challenge has been
interposed." At pp. 29-30 (emphasis added). The Court, in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), in unmistakable language restated
the Weeks rule:
"The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed it
was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment, although not
referring to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its
introduction if obtained by government officers through a violation of
the Amendment." At p. 462.
In McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), we note this
statement:
"[A] conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which is evidence
obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the
Constitution, cannot stand. Boyd v. United States . . . Weeks v. United
States. . . . And this Court has, on Constitutional grounds, set aside
convictions, both in the federal and state courts, which were based upon
confessions 'secured by protracted and repeated questioning of ignorant
and untutored persons, in whose minds the power of officers was greatly
mag[650]
nified' . . . or 'who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without
advice of friends or counsel.' . . ." At pp. 339-340.
III
Some five years after Wolf, in answer to a plea made here Term after
Term that we overturn its doctrine on applicability of
the Weeks exclusionary rule, this Court indicated that such should not be
done until the States had "adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the
[Weeks] rule." Irvine v. California, supra, at 134. There again, it was
said:
"Never until June of 1949 did this Court hold the basic search and
seizure prohibition in any way applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Ibid.
And only last Term, after again carefully reexamining the Wolf doctrine
in Elkins v. United States, supra, the Court pointed out that "the
controlling principles" as to search and seizure and the problem of
admissibility "seemed clear" (At pp. 212) until the announcement
in Wolf "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not itself require state courts to adopt the exclusionary rule" of
the Weeks case. At pp. 213. At the same time, the Court pointed out, "the
underlying constitutional doctrine which Wolf established . . . that the
Federal Constitution . . . prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by
state officers" had undermined the "foundation upon which the
admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally
rested. . . ." Ibid. The Court concluded that it was therefore obliged to
hold, although it chose the narrower ground on which to do so, that all
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure was
inadmissible in a federal court regardless of its source. Today we once
again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right to
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years
on our books, are led by it to close the only
[655]
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons
as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.
IV
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then, just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as
not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolfthat the
Amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court, as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal--it was
[656]
logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine--an
essential part of the right to privacy--be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the
admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right
but, in reality, to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year,
the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is
to deter--to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way--by removing the incentive to disregard
it." Elkins v. United States, supra, at 217.
state and federal courts." 364 U.S. at 221. Such a conflict, hereafter
needless, arose this very Term in Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U. S.
381 (1961), in which, and in spite of the promise made by Rea, we gave
full recognition to our practice in this regard by refusing to restrain a
federal officer from testifying in a state court as to evidence
unconstitutionally seized by him in the performance of his duties. Yet the
double standard recognized until today hardly put such a thesis into
practice. In nonexclusionary States, federal officers, being human, were
by it invited to, and did, as our cases indicate, step across the street to the
State's attorney with their unconstitutionally seized evidence.
Prosecution on the basis of that evidence was then had in a state court in
utter disregard of the enforceable Fourth Amendment. If the fruits of an
unconstitutional search had been inadmissible in both state and federal
courts, this inducement to evasion would have been sooner eliminated.
There would be no need to reconcile such cases as Rea and Schnettler,
each pointing up the hazardous uncertainties of our heretofore
ambivalent approach.
[657]
75
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest
law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[661]
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
For nearly fifty years, since the decision of this Court in Weeks v. United
States, [Footnote 1] federal courts have refused to permit the
introduction into evidence against an accused of his papers and effects
obtained by "unreasonable searches and seizures" in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado, decided in 1948, however, this
Court held that, "in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." [Footnote 2] I
concurred in that holding on these grounds:
"For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Adamson v.
California, 332 U. S. 46, 68, I agree with the conclusion of the Court that
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' is enforceable against the states. Consequently, I should be for
reversal of this case if I thought the Fourth Amendment not only
prohibited 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' but also, of itself, barred
the use of evidence so unlawfully obtained. But I agree with what
appears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment, but is a
judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."
[Footnote 3]
I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an
accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its
commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any
provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence, and I am
[662]
extremely doubtful that such a provision could properly be inferred from
nothing more than the basic command against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Reflection on the problem, however, in the light of cases
coming before the Court since Wolf, has led me to conclude that, when
the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures
is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against
should let them in. On her attorney's advice, she told them she would let
them in only when they produced a valid search warrant. For the next
two and a half hours, the police laid siege to the house. At four o'clock,
their number was increased to at least seven. Appellant's lawyer
appeared on the scene, and one of the policemen told him that they now
had a search warrant, but the officer refused to show it. Instead, going to
the back door, the officer first tried to kick it in and, when that proved
unsuccessful, he broke the glass in the door and opened it from the
inside.
The appellant, who was on the steps going up to her flat, demanded to
see the search warrant, but the officer refused to let her see it, although
he waved a paper in front of her face. She grabbed it and thrust it down
the front of her dress. The policemen seized her, took the paper
[668]
from her, and had her handcuffed to another officer. She was taken
upstairs, thus bound, and into the larger of the two bedrooms in the
apartment; there she was forced to sit on the bed. Meanwhile, the
officers entered the house and made a complete search of the four rooms
of her flat and of the basement of the house.
The testimony concerning the search is largely nonconflicting. The
approach of the officers; their long wait outside the home, watching all
its doors; the arrival of reinforcements armed with a paper; [Footnote 2]
breaking into the house; putting their hands on appellant and handcuffing
her; numerous officers ransacking through every room and piece of
furniture while the appellant sat, a prisoner in her own bedroom. There is
direct conflict in the testimony, however, as to where the evidence which
is the basis of this case was found. To understand the meaning of that
conflict, one must understand that this case is based on the knowing
possession [Footnote 3] of four little pamphlets, a couple of photographs,
and a little pencil doodle--all of which are alleged to be pornographic.
According to the police officers who participated in the search, these
articles were found, some in appellant's
[669]
dressers and some in a suitcase found by her bed. According to appellant,
most of the articles were found in a cardboard box in the basement; one
in the suitcase beside her bed. All of this material, appellant--and a friend
of hers--said were odds and ends belonging to a recent boarder, a man
who had left suddenly for New York and had been detained there. As the
Supreme Court of Ohio read the statute under which appellant is
charged, she is guilty of the crime whichever story is true.
The Ohio Supreme Court sustained the conviction even though it was
based on the documents obtained in the lawless search. For, in Ohio,
evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure is admissible in a
criminal prosecution, at least where it was not taken from the
77
Wolf v. Colorado, supra, was decided in 1949. The immediate result was
a storm of constitutional controversy which only today finds its end. I
believe that this is an appropriate case in which to put an end to the
asymmetry which Wolf imported into the law. See
[670]
As stated in the Weeks case, if evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment can be used against an accused, "his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and . . . might as well
be stricken from the Constitution." 232 U.S. at 393.
When we allowed States to give constitutional sanction to the "shabby
business" of unlawful entry into a home (to use an expression of Mr.
Justice Murphy, Wolf v. Colorado, at 46), we did indeed rob the Fourth
Amendment of much meaningful force. There are, of course, other
theoretical remedies. One is disciplinary action within the hierarchy of
the police system, including prosecution of the police officer for a crime.
Yet, as Mr. Justice Murphy said in Wolf v. Colorado, at 42, "Selfscrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we
expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well
meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the
District Attorney or his associates have ordered."
The only remaining remedy, if exclusion of the evidence is not required,
is an action of trespass by the homeowner against the offending officer.
Mr. Justice Murphy showed how onerous and difficult it would be for
the citizen to maintain that action, and how meagre the relief even if the
citizen prevails. 338 U.S. 42-44. The truth is that trespass actions against
officers who make unlawful searches and seizures are mainly illusory
remedies.
Without judicial action making the exclusionary rule applicable to the
States, Wolf v. Colorado, in practical effect, reduced the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures to "a dead letter," as Mr.
Justice Rutledge said in his dissent.See 338 U.S. at 47.
[671]
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117; Rea v. United States, 350 U. S.
214; Elkins v. United States, supra; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167. It is
an appropriate case because the facts it presents show--as would few
other cases--the casual arrogance of those who have the untrammelled
power to invade one's home and to seize one's person.
Thus, if the Court were bent on reconsidering Wolf, I think that there
would soon have presented itself an appropriate opportunity in which we
could have had the benefit of full briefing and argument. In any event, at
the very least, the present case should have been set down for
reargument, in view of the inadequate briefing and argument we have
received on the Wolf point. To all intents and purpose,s the Court's
present action amounts to a summary reversal of Wolf, without
argument.
I am bound to say that what has been done is not likely to promote
respect either for the Court's adjudicatory process or for the stability of
its decisions. Having been unable, however, to persuade any of the
majority to a different procedural course, I now turn to the merits of the
present decision.
[678]
II
Essential to the majority's argument against Wolf is the proposition that
the rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, excluding in federal
criminal trials the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, derives not from the "supervisory power" of this Court
over the federal judicial system, but from Constitutional requirement.
This is so because no one, I suppose, would suggest that this Court
possesses any general supervisory power over the state courts. Although
I entertain considerable doubt as to the soundness of this foundational
proposition of the majority, cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 39-40
(concurring opinion), I shall assume, for present purposes, that
the Weeks rule "is of constitutional origin."
At the heart of the majority's opinion in this case is the following
syllogism: (1) the rule excluding in federal criminal trials evidence
which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is "part and parcel"
of the Fourth Amendment; (2) Wolf held that the "privacy" assured
against federal action by the Fourth Amendment is also protected against
state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3) it is therefore
"logically and constitutionally necessary" that the Weeks exclusionary
rule should also be enforced against the States. [Footnote 10]
This reasoning ultimately rests on the unsound premise that,
because Wolf carried into the States, as part of "the concept of ordered
liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, the principle of
"privacy" underlying the Fourth Amendment (338 U.S. at 27), it must
follow that whatever configurations of the Fourth Amendment have been
developed in the particularizing federal precedents are likewise to be
deemed a part of "ordered liberty,"
[679]
and as such are enforceable against the States. For me, this does not
follow at all.
It cannot be too much emphasized that what was recognized in Wolf was
not that the Fourth Amendment, as such, is enforceable against the States
as a facet of due process, a view of the Fourteenth Amendment which,
as Wolf itself pointed out (338 U.S. at 26), has long since been
discredited, but the principle of privacy "which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment." (Id. at 27.) It would not be proper to expect or
impose any precise equivalence, either as regards the scope of the right
or the means of its implementation, between the requirements of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. For the Fourth, unlike what was
said in Wolf of the Fourteenth, does not state a general principle only; it
is a particular command, having its setting in a preexisting legal context
on which both interpreting decisions and enabling statutes must at least
build.
Thus, even in a case which presented simply the question of whether a
particular search and seizure was constitutionally "unreasonable"--say in
a tort action against state officers--we would not be true to the
Fourteenth Amendment were we merely to stretch the general principle
of individual privacy on a Procrustean bed of federal precedents under
the Fourth Amendment. But, in this instance, more than that is involved,
for here we are reviewing not a determination that what the state police
did was Constitutionally permissible (since the state court quite
evidently assumed that it was not), but a determination that appellant
was properly found guilty of conduct which, for present purposes, it is to
be assumed the State could Constitutionally punish. Since there is not the
slightest suggestion that Ohio's policy is "affirmatively to sanction . . .
police incursion into privacy," (338 U.S. at 28), compare Marcus v.
Search Warrants, post, p. 717, what the Court is now doing is to impose
[680]
upon the States not only federal substantive standards of "search and
seizure", but also the basic federal remedy for violation of those
standards. For I think it entirely clear that the Weeks exclusionary rule is
but a remedy which, by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at
deterring such conduct in the future.
I would not impose upon the States this federal exclusionary remedy.
The reasons given by the majority for now suddenly turning its back
on Wolf seem to me notably unconvincing.
First, it is said that "the factual grounds upon which Wolf was based"
have since changed, in that more States now follow the Weeks
exclusionary rule than was so at the time Wolf was decided. While that is
true, a recent survey indicates that, at present, one-half of the States still
adhere to the common law non-exclusionary rule, and one, Maryland,
retains the rule as to felonies. Berman and Oberst, Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and Seizure, 55
N.W.L.Rev. 525, 532-533. But, in any case, surely all this is beside the
point, as the majority itself indeed seems to recognize. Our concern here,
as it was in Wolf, is not with the desirability of that rule, but only with
79
for our federal system and a sound recognition of this Court's remoteness
from particular state problems, is, for me, the strength of that decision.
An approach which regards the issue as one of achieving procedural
symmetry or of serving administrative convenience surely disfigures the
boundaries of this Court's functions in relation to the state and federal
courts. Our role in promulgating the Weeks rule and its extensions in
such cases as Rea, Elkins, and Rios [Footnote 11] was quite a different
one than it is here. There, in implementing the Fourth Amendment, we
occupied the position of a tribunal having the ultimate responsibility for
developing the standards and procedures of judicial administration
within the judicial system over which it presides. Here, we review state
procedures whose measure is to be taken not against the specific
substantive commands of the Fourth Amendment, but under the flexible
contours of the Due Process Clause. I do not believe that the Fourteenth
Amendment empowers this Court to mould state remedies effectuating
the right to freedom from "arbitrary intrusion by the police" to suit its
own notions of how things should be done, as, for instance, the
California Supreme Court did in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282
P.2d 905, with reference to procedures in the California courts, or as this
Court did in Weeks for the lower federal courts.
relevance to the issue of the trial, the argument continues, this doctrine is
ample warrant in precedent that the way evidence was obtained, and not
just its relevance, is constitutionally significant to the fairness of a trial. I
believe this analogy is not a true one. The "coerced confession" rule is
certainly not a rule that any illegally obtained statements may not be
used in evidence. I would suppose that a statement which is procured
during
[684]
a period of illegal detention, McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, is,
as much as unlawfully seized evidence, illegally obtained, but this Court
has consistently refused to reverse state convictions resting on the use of
such statements. Indeed, it would seem the Court laid at rest the very
argument now made by the majority when, in Lisenba v. California, 314
U. S. 219, a state-coerced confession case, it said (at 235):
"It may be assumed [that the] treatment of the petitioner [by the
police] . . . deprived him of his liberty without due process, and that the
petitioner would have been afforded preventive relief if he could have
gained access to a court to seek it."
"But illegal acts, as such, committed in the course of
obtaining a confession . . . do not furnish an answer to
the constitutional question we must decide. . . . The
gravamen of his complaint is the unfairness of the use of
his confessions, and what occurred in their procurement
is relevant only as it bears on that issue." (Emphasis
supplied.)
right, and that its violation occurs at the time his improperly obtained
statement is admitted at trial, is manifest. For without this right, all the
careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an
accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities in a
procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a
confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised
pleasure of the police.
return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's
length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group
stopped drinking and left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
EN BANC
This, and not the disciplining of the police, as with illegally seized
evidence, is surely the true basis for excluding a statement of the accused
which was unconstitutionally obtained. In sum, I think the coerced
confession analogy works strongly against what the Court does today.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the majority opinion in this case is,
in fact, an opinion only for the judgmentoverruling Wolf, and not for the
basic rationale by which four members of the majority have reached that
result. For my Brother BLACK is unwilling to subscribe to their view
that the Weeks exclusionary rule derives from the Fourth Amendment
itself (see ante, p. 661), but joins the majority opinion on the premise
that its end result can be achieved by bringing the Fifth Amendment to
the aid of the Fourth (see ante pp. 662-665). [Footnote 12] On that score
I need only say that whatever the validity of
PUNO, J.:
[686]
the "Fourth-Fifth Amendment" correlation which the Boyd case (116
U.S. 616) found, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.1940), 2184, we
have only very recently again reiterated the long-established doctrine of
this Court that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is not applicable to the States. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117.
I regret that I find so unwise in principle and so inexpedient in policy a
decision motivated by the high purpose of increasing respect for
Constitutional rights. But, in the last analysis, I think this Court can
increase respect for the Constitution only if it rigidly respects the
limitations which the Constitution places upon it, and respects as well
the principles inherent in its own processes. In the present case, I think
we exceed both, and that our voice becomes only a voice of power, not
of reason.
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our
frailties, we are asked to play the role of an infallible God by exercising
the divine right to give or take away life. We cannot err in the exercise of
our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our error can
result
in
the
worst
of
crimes
murder
by
the
judiciary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the
crime of rape with homicide 1 in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down
one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking
her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings
causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily
fatal
and
which
were
the
direct
cause
of
her
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant
pleaded guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for the
appellant, if he so desired. 2
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994,
Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was
drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his
(Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo.
Appellant joined them but every now and then would take leave and
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a
half (1-1/2) arm's length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m.
of that day, she saw the victim at the window of appellant's house. She
offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she
heard the victim crying. She approached appellant's house and peeped
through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her
appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck.
She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together
and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about
what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily
left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He
did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock
in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the
Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she
knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window and asked
him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk
and did not know.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went
down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the
lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed
and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart.
She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant
committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated
by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession
and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered
from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which
were
presented
as
evidence
for
the
prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medicolegal officer. His autopsy report reveals the following injuries sustained
by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:chanrobles
virtual law library
1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia.,
from left and right anterior neck, down to the medial
portion of the left and right infraclavicular
area.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
81
VAGINAL
FINDINGS/ANAL
FINDINGS:chanrobles
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law
library
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette
up
to
the
dome
of
the
rectum..chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to
the
rectum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the
vagina up to the level of the promontory
of the sacrum with a length of 8
centimeters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarych
anrobles virtual law library
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms.,
easily passes the vaginal and anal
openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:chanrobles virtual
law library
A)
ASPHYXIA
BY
STRANGULATION.chanroblesvirtualaw
librarychanrobles virtual law library
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL
VERTEBRA.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryc
hanrobles virtual law library
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to death, viz:
the
virtual
SO ORDERED.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty
imposed by the trial court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the
cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant assails the decision of the
trial court as a travesty of justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to
death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The
conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence and
supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge
failed to follow section (1) (a) - of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section
provides:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. -chanrobles
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(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where
the complaint or information has been filed or assigned
for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by
the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him
and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses
other than those named in the complaint or information.
82
as
public
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.chanrobles virtual law library
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty
of conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the
transcripts reveal the following: 8
Note (After reading the
information
to
the
accused, accused pleads
guilty.)chanrobles virtual
law library
Court Question (sic) of
the
court
to
the
accused.chanroblesvirtual
awlibrarychanrobles
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Q Considering that this is
a crime and under the
amended law is a heinous
crime, because of your
plea of guilty without the
consent or even against
the discretion of the
court, the court will give
you a mandatory death
penalty because of the
crime charged, do you
understand?chanrobles
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Accused
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtuala
wlibrarychanrobles
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Q Did you enter a plea of
guilty on your own
voluntary will or without
any force or intimidation
from
any
one
or
whatever?chanrobles
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ready,
Your
Honor.chanrobles virtual
law library
Our first witness is Dr.
Tito
Doromal,
Your
Honor.chanrobles virtual
law library
Atty. Antiquiera: For the
accused,
Your
Honor.chanrobles virtual
law library
Court Before the court
will proceed with the
reception of evidence by
the prosecution Arnel
Alicando, please come
here. (at this juncture,
Arnel Alicando, come
near to the court)
The court is warning you
again
that
this
is
reception of evidence by
the prosecution after you
plead guilty to the crime
charged at, do you
understand?
A Yes.chanrobles virtual
law library
Q Do you still affirm and
confirm to your plea of
guilty of rape with
homicide?
A
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanrobles virtual
law library
Q Do you still insist that
your plea of guilty is
voluntary without force,
intimidation
or
whatsoever?
A Yes.chanrobles virtual
law library
arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had
suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, - P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP
MFC, informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about
9:00 AM this date when the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES,
24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and
mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II Rizal, Palapala, GP, in
connection of the Rape with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE
MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of same place who
was discovered dead under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over
to this office and put on lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry
inmates thus causing upon him hematoma contusion on different parts of
his body.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It
warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without
explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of
the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned
appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without
telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of
his are involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to
sentence him to death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of
guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea
of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable
doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in
capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the
information without need of further proof. The change is salutary for it
enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize
erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value
determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent
person than let a guilty man go free. 12
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of
guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the
trial
court
in
convicting
the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical
evidence presented by the prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
A After I finished
investigating the body of
the victim, Khazie Mae
Penecilla.chanroblesvirtu
alawlibrarychanrobles
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investigated
him.chanroblesvirtualawl
ibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Q Did it take you the
whole morning of June
13, 1994 in interrogating
and investigating Arnel
Alicando?chanrobles
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A
Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlib
rarychanrobles
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law library
Q And the investigation
you conducted continued
in the afternoon of the
same
date?chanrobles
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A
Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlib
rarychanrobles
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law library
Q The following day,
June 14, 1994, you still
investigated
and
interrogated
Arnel
Alicando.chanroblesvirtu
alawlibrarychanrobles
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A
Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlib
rarychanrobles
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law library
Q And when did you
stop, finally, investigating
and interrogating Arnel
Alicando?chanrobles
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A After I finished
recovering all the exhibits
in relation to this
case.chanroblesvirtualawl
ibrarychanrobles
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virtual
Court:chanrobles virtual
law library
Sustained.chanroblesvirtu
alawlibrarychanrobles
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Atty.
Antiquiera:chanrobles
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Q When did you inform,
the date when you
informed Alicando of his
Constitutional
rights?
chanrobles virtual law
library
A
On
June
13.chanroblesvirtualawlib
rarychanrobles
virtual
law library
Q On what hour did you
inform him?chanrobles
virtual law library
A After the witness
identified
him.chanroblesvirtualawl
ibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Q What constitutional
rights did you inform
Alicando of?chanrobles
virtual law library
A The right to remain
silent, and right to get his
lawyer and I have
interpreted in Visayan
language.chanroblesvirtu
alawlibrarychanrobles
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Q And during your
investigation for almost
two (2) days the accused
was never represented by
counsel, is that correct?
86
A
Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlib
rarychanrobles
virtual
law library
Atty.
Antiquiera:chanrobles
virtual law library
Q Are you aware of the
law that enjoins a public
officer to inform the
person
of
his
constitutional
rights?
chanrobles virtual law
library
A
Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlib
rarychanrobles
virtual
law library
That is all, Your Honor.
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized
as inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section
12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against
him.
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce
the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he
present any writing showing that appellant waived his right to silence
and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant
violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his
uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in
A
The
house
of
Imelda
Alicando.chanrobles virtual law library
Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?
A Yes, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q In what particular place is that
situated?
A Inside the room where the accused was
sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.chanrobles
virtual law library
Pros. Fama:
Pros. Fama:
the accused?
III of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver - the waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the
records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden.
It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to
make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally
proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy
burden
of
proof
that
rested
on
the
prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is no and there ought not to be any
disagreement on basic principles. The
Court should be concerned with the
heinousness of the crime at bar and its
despicable perpetration against a 4-year
old girl, an impersonation of innocence
itself. The Court should also be
concerned with the multiplication of
malevolence in our midst for there is no
right to be evil, and there are no ifs and
buts about the imposition of the death
penalty as long as it
remains unchallenged as part of the laws of our land. These concerns are
permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the transitoriness of
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not
only to convict and punish violators of our laws. We are equally
committed to the ideal that the process of detection, apprehension,
conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with
fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a
death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a
lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain
in our escutcheon of justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on
the basis of the procedural irregularities committed by, and the
inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court. In Binabay
vs. People, et al., 24 ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this
Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is
void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant,
and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court.
for further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that
allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness and
justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
88
BEAD
&
NECK/THORACOABDOMINAL
REGIONS:chanrobles
virtual law library
In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-yearold Khazi Mae, was having a drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez,
Remus Goddi and the appellant at his (Romeo's) house at Barangay
Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left,
except for the appellant. Appellant was residing at his uncle's house
about five (5) arm's length away from the Penecilla's
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not
find Khazi Mae. He and his wife looked for her until 1:00 in the morning
to no avail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his
life when, answering the call of nature outside his house, he chanced the
dead body of Khazi Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents were informed.
The
small,
lifeless
body
was
brought
to
their
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa
Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2 arm's length away from the house of
appellant related to the girl's distraught parents what she knew. 3
Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw
Khazi Mae at the window of appellant's house. She called out to her and
offered to buy "yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly closed the window.
Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity
aroused, she crept two steps up the appellant's house, peeped through an
opening between the floor and the door, and saw appellant naked on top
of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck. Rebada became
frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told
her compadre, Ricardo Lagranai who was in her house at that time, of
what she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening when she
heard that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she
called out from her window and asked appellant what time Khazi Mae
left his house. Appellant replied that he did not know since he was
drunk. 4 With
Luisa
Rebada's
revelation,
appellant
was
arrested.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily
admitted raping and killing Khazi Mae. 5 The police were able to
recover from appellant's house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow
BY
virtual
That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down
one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking
her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings
causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily
fatal and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I strongly disagree.
II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL
COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance
with
existing
rules
on
arraignment
and
plea.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the
record of the case that: 1) there is absolutely nothing on the record which
would warrant a finding the information was not read in the language or
dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does
not absolutely require that the same be indicated in the record of every
criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial
courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was read in
the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in
fact
actually
complied
with
by
the
lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:
Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court
by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint
or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and
must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and
plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
90
Appearing
as
public
prosecutor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
No,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
virtual
law
There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching
inquiry in the detailed manner suggested by the majority opinion,
although judges should ideally strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry as
would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot 13 we
held that:
A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably
that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress - and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given
improvidently - other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent
quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a
judge may conduct searching inquiry, as to the number
and character of questions he may put to the accused, or
as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since
each case must be measured according to its individual
merit, taking into consideration the age, educational
attainment, and social status of the accused confessing
guilt, among other things, the singular barometer is that
the judge must in all cases, fully convince himself
that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so
voluntarily, and (2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and
that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt,
based on his testimony. This Court leaves to judges,
considering their training, ample discretion, but expects
them at the same time, that they will be true to their
calling and be worthy ministers of the law.
The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the
defendant's plea was entered into voluntarily and that the defendant
understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and fast rule,
as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions
propounded. Judges are not required to go into obsessive detail about the
psychological, educational and sociological background of the accused if
from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable number of
questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There
is a world of difference between a fastidious attention to detail which
furthers the end of justice and an attention to detail and minutae
bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and
defeats the purpose of the law. Apropos to this there is B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or
dialect known to the appellant.
The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought
before us contain informations written in the English language without
any indication, whatsoever, that the same was translated from a language
or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone,
92
one observes that the bulk of proceedings in our trial courts, including
the process of arraignment, is conducted in the vernacular. On the record
of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly bother to point
out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated
into English. Because of this widespread practice, which the section on
arraignment in the Rules of Court does not proscribe - the presumption
of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to
review the criminal cases decided by this Court since the imposition of
the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there
was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal cases were, the
records therein then ought to show, conducted in a language known to
the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense then
becomes apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that
most of these proceedings were actually conducted in the vernacular, but
the fact was never put on record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of Rule 116 even
states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to
enter (the same) of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
Even the rule on placing the arraignment and plea on record is not
absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on
record whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where
in fact the proceedings were so conducted. The argument that the
information was not read in the language or dialect known to appellant
merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so
inconsequential
as
to
be
bereft
of
merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court,
especially in the provinces, an interpreter is always at hand to translate to
the parties all questions propounded to them in the language or dialect
known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of
stenographic notes submitted to the court only reflect the court
proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records
do not categorically indicate that the information was read in the
language or dialect known to the defendant or that the questions asked
were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is
presumed, as we have actually done in many cases before this, that such
duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary. 14 In the face of this common practice, the burden now lies on
the defense to prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal
application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in
the enforcement of procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY
NOT IMPROVIDENT
In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on
June 28, 1994, appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. The court took
pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of a plea of
guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he
had every opportunity, through his counsel, to ask the court for
clarification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly
inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the
plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he
was sure of his plea. At this time, appellant had more than sufficient time
or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible consequences of his
plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he
had enough time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to
recant or at least express reservations about the same. However, in spite
of several warnings given by the trial court on different occasions,
appellant
stood
pat
with
his
judicial
admission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his
plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He had the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses for the prosecution. He did not put up any defense
nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence
presented against him (in fact, it was appellant himself who directed the
police investigators to the location of the various physical evidence, e.g.
green slippers, earrings 15).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court
from the time of his arraignment and during his entire trial therefore
assumes a great deal of significance in the context of the majority's
insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and
therefore void. In the face of the seriousness of the accusations against
him, his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs. Pillones:
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific
accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a
quasi- confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and
emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of selfpreservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent,
will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's Criminal
Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.) 16chanrobles virtual law library
The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the
efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the
requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it
state that an extrajudicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction
based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities that
attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea
of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial confession,
which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case. An
vs. Superior Court was of the opinion that where a witness is discovered
as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is admissible is he
would have been discovered in the normal course of a normally
conducted investigation. 22These and other recognized limitations to the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do not have the effect of diluting the
effect of our exclusionary rules. Rather, they serve the purpose of the
rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance between the need to deny
evidence come by through the exploitation of an illegality on one hand
and the need to minimize opportunity for the defendant in a criminal
case
to reap an undeserved and socially undesirable
bonanza. 23 Certainly it could not be argued that with nothing in their
hands, the police would not have gone back to the site for a better
inspection.
THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL
COURT'S CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL
CERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the
pieces of evidence recovered by the police in the case at bench abovementioned, a thorough review of the evidence utilized by the trial court
leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have
been sustained, in any case, without the pieces of evidence objected
to. 24 Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a shifting of the pieces of
evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected
to would nevertheless still leave the prosecution with enough legal
evidence to convict the accused with moral certainty. These
include:chanrobles virtual law library
1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel
and in open court that he committed the acts charged;chanrobles virtual
law library
2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's
eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's
testimony, which the majority opinion let pass without comment. For a
better perspective of Rebada's testimony, allow me once again to quote
from the transcript:
Q Can you recall where were you on
June 12, 1994, at around 5:30 P.M.?
chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
And
then
she
squealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
Q After that, what did you do after
hearing that and she, the child squealed,
what did you do if there was any?
chanrobles virtual law library
A So, I went down from the house to the
house of Romeo Alicando, where I saw
between an opening between the two
slots.
I
went
up
two
steps.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Q And then what did you do?chanrobles
virtual law library
A And so, I peeped between the floor and
the door because there was an
opening.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
Q Have you seen anything inside that
house?chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Q What have you seen if there is any?
chanrobles virtual law library
A I saw Arnel Alicando who was
naked/nude at that time lying on top of
the child wherein his left hand was
holding
the
neck
of
the
child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Q When you said child, you are referring
to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla?
chanrobles virtual law library
A
I
was
inside
the
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
Q And you have observed what is
happening in your barangay at that time?
chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Q What have you observed?chanrobles
virtual law library
A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla
were
looking
for
her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
I
was
inside
my
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
Q Because you are very near neighbor to
each other?chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
None.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
A
None.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Q Do you know when the parents of the
victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla found their
daughter?chanrobles virtual law library
A
June
13,
1994.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
Q Why do you know that this Khazie
Mae Penecilla was only found by their
parents?chanrobles virtual law library
A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago,
when he went down from their house and
answered the call of nature, he found the
child under their house.25
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness,
free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an
accused even if uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's testimony was
positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be
given the credence and the weight that it deserves, without our ignoring
established principles in the law on evidence. Such factual findings of
the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case,
because the trial court had the every available opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the lone witness during the trial. Her belated reporting of
the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower court
to
accord
great
weight,
is
hardly
out
of
the
ordinary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental
factors. There is no standard norm of human behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. 26 Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It
is common for people to choose not to get involved when a crime is
committed, otherwise there should only be a few unsolved
crimes. 27 Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she
saw. Self-preservation and fear of possible reprisals from the appellant
would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her part to reveal what
she had seen during the incident. She tried her best to remain as calm
and casual as possible, and pretend that she did not see anything the
instant she saw Alicando, when she asked appellant what time Khazi
Mae got down from his house following the incident. 28 Given these
factors, it would have been too much to expect Rebada in her mixed state
of dread, fear, revulsion and instinctive self-preservation to harness
96
In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived
at the Pencilla's house to take a look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi
Mae's underwear and saw that it was bloodied. The underwear was sent
to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the
inadequate facilities of the NBI Laboratory at Iloilo, the underwear was
referred to Manila for examination. Since it will take time for the court
to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as
this would only serve as corroborating evidence to the fact of rape. 32
Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter
how slight into the genital organ of the victim. 33 The vaginal and anal
findings of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the
fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of
an object. In view of settled jurisprudence to the effect that rape is
committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the vagina,
it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm are present or absent.
Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she
saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she peeped through an
opening between the floor and the door of appellant's house and the
autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to
the crime committed and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was there for all to
see. The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing with the results of
the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine
the presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape was
established
by
definitive
legal
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I
repeat, sufficient evidence corroborating and unmistakably pointing to
the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last seen in the
company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked
on top of Khazi Mae. Recovered from the latter's house were Khazi
Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat
and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of these
pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces
should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face
of ample legally admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty
verdict.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was
asphyxiation by strangulation, it cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was
raped and killed on the same occasion. As we observed in People
v. Yu, 34 unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the
As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape
was not committed. He argues that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of
Khazi Mae, she did not see him in a push and pull movement 2) the
requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to
show the presence or absence of the male semen was not presented; and
3) the autopsy report revealed that the proximate cause of death was
asphyxiation by strangulation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I am
afraid, I have to dissent from the majority. The legal evidenceavailable to
us overwhelmingly supports the lower court's conclusions. We should
not shirk from our legal duty to impose the death penalty.
I
In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-yearold Khazi Mae, was having a drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez,
Remus Goddi and the appellant at his (Romeo's) house at Barangay
Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left,
except for the appellant. Appellant was residing at his uncle's house
about five (5) arm's length away from the Penecilla's
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not
find Khazi Mae. He and his wife looked for her until 1:00 in the morning
to no avail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his
life when, answering the call of nature outside his house, he chanced the
dead body of Khazi Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents were informed.
The
small,
lifeless
body
was
brought
to
their
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa
Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2 arm's length away from the house of
appellant related to the girl's distraught parents what she knew. 3
Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw
Khazi Mae at the window of appellant's house. She called out to her and
offered to buy "yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly closed the window.
Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity
aroused, she crept two steps up the appellant's house, peeped through an
opening between the floor and the door, and saw appellant naked on top
of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck. Rebada became
frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told
her compadre, Ricardo Lagranai who was in her house at that time, of
what she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening when she
heard that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she
called out from her window and asked appellant what time Khazi Mae
left his house. Appellant replied that he did not know since he was
drunk. 4 With
Luisa
Rebada's
revelation,
appellant
was
arrested.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily
admitted raping and killing Khazi Mae. 5 The police were able to
recover from appellant's house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow
with a blood stain in the middle, and a stained T-shirt owned by
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down
one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking
her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings
causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily
fatal and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I strongly disagree.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2)
Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the
exhibit custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo Tan; (5)
SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the
victim's father.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito
Doromal to show that the proximate cause of death was asphyxia by
strangulation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death
penalty on Arnel Alicando.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
A)
ASPHYXIA
STRANGULATIONchanrobles
law library
BY
virtual
II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL
COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance
with
existing
rules
on
arraignment
and
plea.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the
record of the case that: 1) there is absolutely nothing on the record which
would warrant a finding the information was not read in the language or
dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does
not absolutely require that the same be indicated in the record of every
criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial
courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was read in
the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in
fact
actually
complied
with
by
the
lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:
Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court
by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint
or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and
must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and
plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional
plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for
him.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
99
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
No,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
No,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
A
Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
virtual
law
A
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
Q Do you still insist that your plead of
guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?chanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
Q The court is warning you that after
reception of evidence, the imposable
penalty is mandatory death?chanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
Q Despite of that, you still insist of your
plea of guilty?chanrobles virtual law
library
A
Yes,
Your
Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
Court:chanrobles virtual law library
Okey, proceed. 12
It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the
appellant's arraignment that the trial judge made every effort to ascertain
the voluntariness of the plea, and that he repeatedly warned the
defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching
inquiry.
There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching
inquiry in the detailed manner suggested by the majority opinion,
although judges should ideally strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry as
out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated
into English. Because of this widespread practice, which the section on
arraignment in the Rules of Court does not proscribe - the presumption
of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to
review the criminal cases decided by this Court since the imposition of
the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there
was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal cases were, the
records therein then ought to show, conducted in a language known to
the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense then
becomes apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that
most of these proceedings were actually conducted in the vernacular, but
the fact was never put on record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of Rule 116 even
states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to
enter (the same) of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
Even the rule on placing the arraignment and plea on record is not
absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on
record whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where
in fact the proceedings were so conducted. The argument that the
information was not read in the language or dialect known to appellant
merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so
inconsequential
as
to
be
bereft
of
merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court,
especially in the provinces, an interpreter is always at hand to translate to
the parties all questions propounded to them in the language or dialect
known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of
stenographic notes submitted to the court only reflect the court
proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records
do not categorically indicate that the information was read in the
language or dialect known to the defendant or that the questions asked
were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is
presumed, as we have actually done in many cases before this, that such
duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary. 14 In the face of this common practice, the burden now lies on
the defense to prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal
application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in
the enforcement of procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY
NOT IMPROVIDENT
In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on
June 28, 1994, appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. The court took
pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of a plea of
guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he
had every opportunity, through his counsel, to ask the court for
clarification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly
inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the
plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he
was sure of his plea. At this time, appellant had more than sufficient time
or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible consequences of his
plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he
had enough time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to
recant or at least express reservations about the same. However, in spite
of several warnings given by the trial court on different occasions,
appellant
stood
pat
with
his
judicial
admission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his
plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He had the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses for the prosecution. He did not put up any defense
nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence
presented against him (in fact, it was appellant himself who directed the
police investigators to the location of the various physical evidence, e.g.
green slippers, earrings 15).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court
from the time of his arraignment and during his entire trial therefore
assumes a great deal of significance in the context of the majority's
insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and
therefore void. In the face of the seriousness of the accusations against
him, his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs. Pillones:
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific
accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a
quasi- confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and
emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of selfpreservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent,
will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's Criminal
Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.) 16chanrobles virtual law library
The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the
efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the
requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it
state that an extrajudicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction
based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities that
attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea
of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial confession,
which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case. An
extrajudicial confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of
guilty entered in open court. As between an extrajudicial confession and
A
I
was
at
home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
Q Where is your house situated?
chanrobles virtual law library
A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo
City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
Q Do you have any neighbor in that
residence of yours at Rizal Pala-pala?
chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir,
Arnel
Alicando.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando
from your house?chanrobles virtual law
library
A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's
length.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you
seen Arnel Alicando?chanrobles virtual
law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that
time?chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
Romeo
is
the
uncle
of
Arnel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
A
Khazie
Mae
was
his
companion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarych
anrobles virtual law library
A
And
then
she
squealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
The
child
cried.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
A
I
was
inside
my
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
A
Yes,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Rebada was finally driven by conscience to reveal what she knew the
following morning.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable
under these circumstances. However, it should be stressed here that the
trial court's conclusions were founded principally on the direct, positive
and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in
the crime. It is worthy to stress, moreover, that Rebada never wavered in
her oral testimony even on intense cross-examination from the defense.
In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi Mae at appellant's
house; that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry
and squeal, peeped into the opening and saw appellant on top of the
victim. These were the very same declarations she made when she took
the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor detail (as to
whether it was the right or the left hand of the appellant which was used
in choking the victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk her
credibility. 30She had no reason to falsely testify against the appellant
and there were no possible motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in
any way related to the Penecillas, and there was no evidence adduced to
show that she harbored any ill-feelings towards the appellant. In a sense,
her credibility is even enhanced by the absence any improper motive. 31
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I
repeat, sufficient evidence corroborating and unmistakably pointing to
the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last seen in the
company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked
on top of Khazi Mae. Recovered from the latter's house were Khazi
Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat
and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of these
pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces
should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face
of ample legally admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty
verdict.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape
was not committed. He argues that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of
Khazi Mae, she did not see him in a push and pull movement 2) the
requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to
show the presence or absence of the male semen was not presented; and
3) the autopsy report revealed that the proximate cause of death was
asphyxiation by strangulation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived
at the Pencilla's house to take a look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi
Mae's underwear and saw that it was bloodied. The underwear was sent
to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the
inadequate facilities of the NBI Laboratory at Iloilo, the underwear was
referred to Manila for examination. Since it will take time for the court
to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as
this would only serve as corroborating evidence to the fact of rape. 32
Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter
how slight into the genital organ of the victim. 33 The vaginal and anal
findings of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the
fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of
an object. In view of settled jurisprudence to the effect that rape is
committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the vagina,
it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm are present or absent.
Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she
saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she peeped through an
opening between the floor and the door of appellant's house and the
autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to
the crime committed and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was there for all to
see. The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing with the results of
the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine
the presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape was
established
by
definitive
legal
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was
asphyxiation by strangulation, it cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was
raped and killed on the same occasion. As we observed in People
v. Yu, 34 unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the
accused cannot be altered by the circumstances that both the crime of
rape and the crime of murder resulted. The accused had to choke and
strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her. 35
Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear and inescapable that appellant
committed the heinous crime or Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of
R.A. 7659 which provides:
Art. 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was
clearly imposed in conformity with the mandate of law and the
Constitution.
20 Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd Ed., pp. 6465.chanrobles virtual law library
21 G.R. No. 100910, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 407.chanrobles virtual
law library
Endnotes:
A: I let the witness identify the suspect and the witness pointed to
him.chanrobles virtual law library
1 Criminal Case No. 43663, RTC of Iloilo City, Br. 38.chanrobles virtual
law library
Pros. Fama:
1 The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp.
125-126, 1992 ed.chanrobles virtual law library
A: Luisa Rebada.
Q: After the witness positively identified the suspect what action did you
do?
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when
our nation was reeling from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and
outright violations of our peoples rights to life, liberty and
property.Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity
of human liberty and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial
investigations from ignorant, overzealous and/or incompetent peace
officers. The Constitution so dearly values freedom and voluntariness
that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense not only the services of
counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) competent but also (b)
independent and (c) preferably of his own choice as well.
In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of
appellants were their own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly
were extracted and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a
lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI.Such counsel cannot in
any wise be considered independent because he cannot be expected to
work against the interest of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a
few months later, he in fact was admitted into its work force.For this
violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants
deserve acquittal.After the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no
sufficient and credible evidence remains in the Courts records to
overturn another constitutional right:the right to be presumed innocent of
any crime until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case No.
TG-1392-89, viz.:
WHEREFORE, and premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused:
108
named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and
Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo.The team also discovered that the jeepney
was disposed of through Cid.[10]
Appellants Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur.The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on
the carnapping incident.The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with
its engine partly dismantled.Upon being informed by the NBI that the
jeepney had been found, an insurance company brought it back to
Manila.
From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office
on March 27, 1988, the team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took
Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where presumably they
were killed.Because appellants volunteered that their companions were
their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite who could be in Manila
already, the NBI team decided to take down their statements at the NBI
head office in Manila.The team traveled with appellants to Manila,
arriving there at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 28, 1988.
At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements
of appellants one at a time.They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was
"just around somewhere," to assist appellants during the
investigation.Agent Arlis Vela took the statement of appellant Januario
while Supervising Agent Toribio took that of Canape.The first portion of
the statement, Exhibit C, taken from appellant Januario reads:
"SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NA IBINIGAY NI RENE JANUARIO Y
ROLDAN SA HARAP NI NBI AGENT ARLIS E. VELA NGAYONG
IKA-28 NG MARSO 1988 SA NBI, NCR, MANILA.
xxx
xxx
xxx
1. TANONG
Mr. RENE JANUARIO ipina-aalam namin sa iyo na
ikaw ay aming inuusig sa salang pagnakaw ng isang jeepney at
pagkapatay sa driver at conductor nito.Gusto naming malaman mo na
ikaw ay hindi maaring pilitin na magbigay ng salaysay at kong (sic)
sakaling magbibigay ka ng salaysay, ano mang sasabihin mo rito ay
pueding (sic) gamitin laban sa iyo sa ano mang caso.Nauunawaan mo ba
ito?
SAGOT
2. T
ito?
S
3.
S
Mayroon po si Atty. CARLOS SAUNAR ay nandito para
tulongan (sic) ako.
109
4.
T
Nanunumpa ka na magsasabi ng katotohanan, buong
katotohanan at wala ng iba kungdi katotohanan lamang sa pagtatanong
na ito?
S
Opo.
S
Napansin ko na lang na maneho na ni TOTO Sarita ang jeep na
kanyang pinasibad habang ang driver ay nakatali na rin at ako naman ay
sinabihan ni DIGO na hawakan iyong conductor sa balikat habang
tinutukan ng patalim ni DIGO.Ang conductor ay nagsasalita na siya ay
nasasaktan dahil nakatusok na ang patalim sa kanyang leeg o batok.
5. T
Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at iba-ibang bagay tungkol
sa iyong pagkatao?
20. T
Ano ang nangyari matapos na matutukan ang conductor at
driver at habang nagmamaneho si TOTO?
S
RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN, 26 taong gulang, binata, isang
(sic) buy and sell hanapbuhay at naninirahan sa Puro Batya, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur.
S
Mula sa lugar na iyon pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay biglang
iniliko sa isang maliit na lupang kalsada na napapaligiran ng tubo at
talahib at doon ay hininto ang sasakyan.
xxx
xxx
xxx."[11]
21. T
Ano na ang sumonod (sic) na nangyari sa lugar na iyon
matapos na maihinto ang jeep?
S
Ako ang naunang sumakay pagtigil noong jeep. Bago maka-alis
ang jeep nagsalita si TOTO SARITA na nasa baba pa kasama sina
EFREN CANAPE at DIGO na `HINTAY ka muna may naiwanan pa
ako.'Sumakay si Digo sa tapat ng conductor na nasa loob ng jeep
samantalang si TOTO ay pumuesto sa bandang kanan sa unahan ng jeep
at si EFREN ay sa bandang kaliwa rin ng jeep tapat ng driver at sabay si
EFREN at TOTO na sumakay sa unahan ng jeep at mabilis na tinulak ni
EFREN ang driver patungo kay TOTO na siyang tumutok, (sic) sa driver
ng isang sandata balisong 29.Habang nangyayari iyon ay tinutukan
naman ni DIGO na nasa loob ng jeep ang conductor na pinasubsub ang
ulo habang tinutukan ng 29.Ang sabi sa akin ni DIGO ay REN igapos
mo ito' at inabutan niya ako ng isang panyong panali.Sa aking
kabiglaanan ako ay napasunod at tinali ko iyong conductor.
19. T
Ano na ang sumunod na nangyari matapos matalian mo ang
conductor?
S
Unang bumaba po ay si TOTO na hawak ang driver pababa at
itinulak ang driver sa may tobohan (sic).Si EFREN ay sumonod
(sic)hanggang sa may gilid ng karsada habang si TOTO ay tuloy sa
tobohan (sic) na dala ang driver.Si DIGO naman ay tinulak ang
conductor hawak-hawak sa buhok at ang sabi naman sa akin ay hawakan
ko ang balikat. Kinuha sa akin ang conductor ni DIGO at dinala sa may
tubuhan (sic) at akin na lang narinig na ang pag-ungol ng conductor
dahil malapit lang iyon sa sasakyan.
22. T
Nakikita mo ba sila DIGO at ang conductor habang siya ay
umuungol?
S
xxx
xxx
xxx."[12]
Appellant Januario described the driver as more than fifty years old, of
medium build, and with gray hair and a fine nose.Upon reaching
Libmanan, they went directly to Santiago Cid with whom appellant
Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep.Appellant
Januario did not know to whom the jeep was sold but he knew that Cid
approached Vicente Pons.The latter gave appellant Januario P1,000 cash
and rice and eggs worth around P600.A second jeep was brought by Toto
and Digo to Roger Abajero.Cid brought both appellants to the house of
Roger.Later, the jeep was impounded at the NBI Naga City office.
Appellant Januario signed and thumbmarked his statement which was
sworn before NBI Executive Director Salvador R. Ranin.It was also
signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar "as counsel."
Appellant Canape's sworn statement, Exhibit I, was taken by Atty.
Magno V. Toribio, a supervising NBI Agent. Quoted in full, the
statement reads:
"SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI IBINIGAY NI EFREN CANAPE y
BAYOT KAY AGENTS MAGNO V. TORIBIO AND TOMAS C.
ENRILE, MGA AHENTE NG NBI DITO SA NCR, NBI, MANILA,
NGAYONG IKA 27 NG MARSO 1988.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
25. T
Noong kayo ay umalis sa tubohan na iyon, nasaan na noon
ang driver at ang conductor?
1.
TANONG
Ginoong EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ikaw ay
aming iniimbistigahan ngayon tungkol sa pagkanakaw ng isang Izuzu
(sic) type jitney sa Silang, Cavite at sa pagkamatay ng conductor nito
noong buwan ng Septembyre (sic) 1988.Bago ka namin tanungin aming
ipinaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang
Batas.Una, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng salaysay sa
imbistigasyon na ito, at manahimik.Ano mang sabihin mo dito ay
puweding gamitin laban sa iyo sa asunto kriminal o civil.Ikalawa, ikaw
ay may karapatan na kumuha ng iyong abogado upang tulungan ka sa
imbistigasyon na ito.At kung gusto mo pero wala kang pambayad sa
sirbesyon (sic) nito, ikaw ay bibigyan ng NBI ng libre.Matapos mong
malaman ang iyong mga karapatan, ikaw ba ay nakahandang magbigay
ng kusang loob na salaysay?
ANSWER
23. T
Sila TOTO at ang driver nasaan sila habang naririnig mong
umuungol ang conductor?
S
24. T
Ano na ang nangyari matapos na dalhin ni TOTO ang driver
at ni DIGO naman ang conductor sa tobohan (sic)?
S
Mga ilang minuto lang po ay bumalik na sila sa sasakyan at kami
sumakay na at si TOTO ang nagmaneho ng sasakyan at tuloy-tuloy na
kami sa Bikol, sa Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
Wala na po.
26. T
May napansin ka ba kina DIGO at TOTO noong sila ay
sumakay sa jeep galing sa tubuhan (sic)?
S
Humihingal sila po na parang pagod at napansin ko na may dugo
ang kamay ni DIGO at ang damit at pantalon naman ni TOTO ay may
tilamsik (sic) ng dugo.
Opo, sir.
2. T
Kung ganoon sabihin mo ang iyong buong pangalan, tirahan
at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na pweding pagkakakilalanan sa iyong
pagkatao?
S
Ako si EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, 31 anyos ang idad (sic),
kasal kay AIDA ROLDAN, isang mag-sasaka (sic), nakatapos ng ikalimang baitang sa elemantarya, at sa kasalukuyan ay naninirahan sa Bgy.
Sibuho, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
110
3.
T
Ikaw ba ay may nalalaman sa pagkanakaw ng isang
Malaguea type jeepney sa Bulihan, Silang, Cavite noong buwan ng
Septyembre 1988?
S
Opo, sir.
4. T
Kung ganoon sabihin mo sa mga imbistigador na ito kung
paano ang buong pangyayari?
S
Kasi nuong (sic) minsan ako ay mapasyal sa Bgy. Crossing, sakop
ng Dasmarias, Cavite noong mga buwan ng Agosto 1987, kami ay
nagkita ng aking kaibigan na si TOTO' SARETA at ang kanyang kasama
na si DIGO (complete name unknown) at ako ay kanyang sinabihan na
humanap ng buyer ng isang jeep.Kaya, ng (sic) ako ay umuwi na ng
Libmanan, Camarines Sur ako ay humananp (sic) ng taong interesado na
bumili ng nasabing jeep, katulung si RENE JANUARIO na taga bayan
ng Libmanan.Ang aming nakitang interesado sa jeep ay si SANTIAGO
CID.Kaya ang aming ginawa ni RENE ay bumalik sa Bgy. Crossing,
Dasmarias, Cavite para ipaalam kina TOTO SARETA na kami ay
nakakuha na ng buyer. Ng gabing yaon na kami ay dumating kami ay
niyaya nina TOTO na mag inuman at habang kami ay nag-iinuman
sinabi ni TOTO na may makukuha na kami na jeep.Mga bandang alas
kuwatro ng madaling araw, kami ay niyaya na nina TOTO na kunin na
ang jeep. Kami ay lumakad na papuntang Bulihan, Silang,
Cavite.Pagdating namin doon, kami ay naghintay ng mga ilang
minuto.Ng (sic) dumaan ang isang jeep na wala pnag (sic) pasahero, ito
ay pinara ni DIGO at kami ay sumakay.Mga ilang minuto naman ang
lumipas, habang ang diyep (sic) ay tumatakbo papuntang Alabang ay
naglabas ng patalim sina TOTO at DIGO at tinutukan ang driver at ang
kundoktor.Tapos kami ni RENE ay sinabihan (sic) din nila na maglabas
ng patalim at tutukan din ang driver at ang kundoktor (sic).Pagdating
namin sa Bgy. Maguyam, sakop din ng Silang, sapilitana (sic) ibinaba
nina TOTO, DIGO at RENE ang driver at ang kundoktor (sic) at dinala
sa loob ng tubuhan.Ako ay naiwan sa loob ng jeep.Hindi naman
natagalan ay lumabas na ang tatlo galing sa loob ng tubuhan, hindi na
kasama ang driver at and kundoktor (sic).Tapos, narining ko kay TOTO
na `ayos na daw'.Ang sunod naming ginawa ay pinatakbo na namin ang
jeep papuntang Libmanan.Pagdating namin sa Libmanan kami ay
dumerretso (sic) kay SANTIAGO CID at ibinigay na namin sa kanya
ang jeep.Ang sabi naman ni SANTIAGO ay dadalhin niya ang jeep kay
VICENTE PONS na taga Libmanan din.
5. T
Alam mo ba ang nangyari sa driver at konduktor (sic) ng
jeep na inagaw niyo?
S
Ang pag-kaalam ko ho sa sabi ni TOTO na ayos na' ang ibig
sabihin ay patay na sila.
6.
S
Ang sabi sa amin ni SANTIAGO si VICENTE PONS ay ang
kanyang nakuhang buyer ng jeep.
7. Q
and jeep?
A
8.
Opo, sir.
T
18. T
Ano pa ang ibang alam mo tungkul (sic) dito sa pangalawang
jeep na ibenenta (sic) nila kay Mr. ABAJERO?
S
A
Hindi ko po alam kung magkano ang iksaktong halaga, pero ang
presyo sa amin ni SANTIAGO ay P25,000.00.
Wala na ho sir.
19. T
Iyung tungkol sa unang jeep na ibenenta kay Mr. VICENTE
PONS, alam mo ba kung nasaan na iyon ngayon?
S
9. T
Nang dalhin ba ninyo ang jeep kay SANTIAGO ay agad
ninyong dinala at pinagbili rin kay VICENTE PONS?
20. T
kakilala?
S
Matagal na ho sir, dahil sa ako ay ipinanganak din sa Dasmarias,
Cavite at doon din lumaki.Sila ho ay aking mga kababayan at matalik
kung mga kaibigan.
10. T
Magkano ba ang paunang bayad, kung mayroon man, na
ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS sa inyo?
A
Ang alam ko ho ay P4,000.00 ang ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS
kay SANTIAGO dahil siya ang kausap nito.
11.
S
12. T
Ito bang pag-pabili ninyo ng jeep kay VICENTE PONS ay
may kasulatan?
S
Wala po.
13. T
Kailan pa ang mga sumunod na bayad na ibinigay sa inyo ni
VICENTE PONS?
S
Hindi ko na ho masyadong matandaan ang mga iksaktong oras na
kanyang pagbayad at kung magkano, basta ang pag-kaalam ko ay mga
tatlong beses lang siyang nag-hulog at iyon ay kanyang ibinibigay kay
SANTIAGO.Si SANTIAGO naman ang siyang nag-bibigay (sic) sa
amin.
21. T
Nung ikaw ba ay sabihan nina TOTO na humanap ng buyer
ng jeep alam mo ba na ang jeep na iyon ay nanakawin lamang?
S
Opo, sir.
22. T
Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong sa iyo, ikaw
ba ay mayroon pa ibig sabihin?
S
14. T
Ito bang si SANTIAGO CID at si VICENTE PONS ay alam
kung saan at paano ninyo nakuha ang jeep?
(Signed)
15. T
S
16. T
S
Opo, sir.
Nasaan na ngayon sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO?
Sa Dasmarias, Cavite ho.
Hindi na ba sila napupuntang Libmanan?
Bihira na ho sir. Pumupunta lang ho sila kung kukuha ng pera.
17. T
Sa pagkaalam mo, mayroon pa ba silang ibang jeep na dinala
sa Libmanan?
S
Mayroon pa ho akong nalaman kay SANTIAGO CID na may isa
pang jeep na dinala daw sina TOTO at DIGO sa kanya at kanya namang
ibenenta kay Mr. ROGELIO ABAJERO, na taga Libmanan din.
On March 27, 1990, the Court denied defense counsel Claro's motion to
cancel the hearing scheduled for that day.Noting the presence of Atty.
Carlos Saunar, a prosecution witness whose attendance during scheduled
trial dates had been delayed, and citing the "imperatives of justice," the
trial court issued an order directing that the testimony of said witness
should be heard that day.[30] In the absence of the counsel of record for
the defense, the trial court reiterated the appointment of Atty. Oscar
Zaldivar as counsel de oficio.
Atty. Saunar testified that he joined the NBI sometime in May or June
1988.On March 1988, while still in private practice, he was at the NBI
head office handling a client case when Atty. Vela, an NBI agent,
approached him.The latter and Atty. Toribio introduced him to appellants
and Cid.Vela and Toribio told him that the three had verbally confessed
to participation in a crime and that they needed his assistance as they
were about to execute their sworn statements.[31] Saunar agreed to assist
the three suspects and allegedly explained to them the consequences of
their confession.He also supposedly told them individually and in
Tagalog, their constitutional rights, like their rights to be silent and to
counsel and that whatever they would say could be used against them.
[32]
Saunar identified his signature in the sworn statement of appellant
Januario.However, he could no longer recall which of the three accused
was appellant Canape although he admitted that the latter's face was
"familiar."[33] He was certain, however, that he participated in the
taking of appellant Canape's sworn statement on March 28, 1988.He
admitted that his signature does not appear on appellant Canape's sworn
statement but he could "only surmise" that he did not sign the same
sworn statement because either it was not presented to him immediately
after the statement was taken or that it could have been misplaced.[34]
After receiving Saunar's testimony, the trial court asked the prosecution
whetherit was presented as rebuttal testimony.Answering in the positive,
the prosecutor reminded the court that when Saunar could not be
presented as a witness, he had made a reservation to call him as
"additional evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal"
testimony.Clarifying, the court said that as against Cid, the testimony
was a principal one but a rebuttal as far as the appellants were
concerned.[35]
On May 11, 1990, the defense manifested that it was closing its case.
The prosecution having waived its right to present "any rebuttal
evidence," the trial court issued an order requiring the filing of the
parties' respective memoranda.[36] On June 27, 1990, the trial court
rendered the herein questioned Decision.[37]
The Issues
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of
trial may be modified accordingly." (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his
case or even after the defense has moved for dismissal, to present
involuntarily omitted evidence.[42] The primary consideration is
whether the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case.Thus
"The claim that the lower court erred in allowing the prosecuting
attorney to introduce new evidence is devoid of any merit, for while the
prosecution had rested, the trial was not yet terminated and the cause
was still under the control and jurisdiction of the court and the latter, in
the exercise of its discretion, may receive additional evidence.Sec. 3(c),
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that, in the furtherance
of justice, the court may grant either of the parties the right and
opportunity to adduce new additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue in question."[43]
Saunars testimony was admitted in evidence before the trial court
rendered its Decision.Undoubtedly then, the court a quo retained its
jurisdiction even though the prosecution had rested its case.As to
appellants, Saunar was an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal
witness, because the defense waived presentation of evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case.[44] Saunar was, therefore, a rebuttal
witness with respect to accused Cid.[45]
Q Now, when did Atty. Saunar give that advice to accused Canape,
was it before, during, or after the taking of this statement?
Now, may we know from you why Atty. Saunar was present there?
A
He was present there because he was then applying for the position
of NBI agent.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
xxx
xxx.
Q
xxx
A
At that time, he was at the NBI Office. He was just somewhere
around.
Q And it was the NBI who requested Saunar to assist Mr. Rene
Januario in the investigation?
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Yes, sir.
113
When was he employed at the NBI office? Tell us the exact date?
COURT:
If you can.
WITNESS:
Maybe in September.
ATTY. CLARO:
19?
A
1988.
He was applying.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Q Now, how many times have you requested Atty. Saunar to assist a
person under your investigation in the NBI office, other than this?
A
A
That was in connection with the vehicle I mentioned earlier, in
connection with the carnapping incident mentioned earlier.
Yes, sir.
That is not.
Q But you investigated Mr. Canape in Naga City at the NBI building,
am I right, tell the Court?
A
At that time, we were taking the statement of the woman, the
complainant, in the estafa case, and the other witnesses.
COURT:
You mean, at the time you investigated that estafa complaint, that was
the time when you also investigated Canape, is that what you mean?
FISCAL VELAZCO:
"Q Now, tell us, what was your purpose in inviting these two (2)
people?
ATTY. CLARO:
WITNESS:
Not yet. We were only asking him.
"COURT:
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
Q
All right. You were with Atty. Vela when you conducted an
investigation to (sic) Mr. Canape, am I right? In Naga City?
There is one thing that he would like to add, `that I talked to the accused
one by one,' you want to add something?
I just want to manifest into the record that they have already confessed;
that the witness has just repeated the word.
WITNESS:
A
And I confirmed with them whether they are confessing to their
crime, and they said yes.In fact, from what I observed, they have already
confessed to the NBI agents.
COURT:
COURT:
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, did you verify whether that confession was only verbal or in
writing?
Yes, sir.
Q And Mr. Vela at that time, was also conducting an investigation to
(sic) a certain Rene Januario in Naga City, is that right?
A. No. We took the statement in Manila.
COURT:
You took the statement in Manila. How about in Naga, that is the
question of counsel?
A
ATTY. CLARO:
Mr. Toribio, because you were with Mr. Vela, Mr. Vela did not conduct
any investigation to (sic) Mr. Januario, one of the accused in this case,
in Naga City? Tell the Court?
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, when they informed you that they intend to confess, now, did you
explain to them, to the accused or to the persons under investigation the
consequences of confessing?
A
Yes, that is basic.I informed them of their rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and whatever they will confess there will be used against
them during the trial of this case.
Q
A
Not yet at that time, because it was useless.The crime was
committed in Silang, Cavite.They will have to be brought to Manila for
the appropriate Judge or Fiscal.
Yes. I told them that if they confess, they will have to go to prison.
COURT:
A
Actually, they have already confessed to their crime before I talked
to them.
So, you are claiming that you did not conduct any investigation of
Canape?
A
We conducted an investigation.When we took the statement of the
other witnesses, complainant and witnesses.
COURT:
xxx
xxx.
xxx
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
Your Honor, the witness has just answered during the preliminary
question of the Fiscal that at the time his assistance was sought by the
NBI, the accused had in fact already confessed.
ATTY. CLARO:
COURT:
No.
COURT;
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
WITNESS: (con't.)
It is true that we were sometimes talking with those people, but not
investigating them yet."[58] (Emphasissupplied.)
COURT:
Note should also be taken of the fact that according to Atty. Saunar,
when he acceded to be the custodial investigation counsel of appellants,
the latter had already confessed.Thus:
A That was only verbal that is why there is a need for the sworn
statement to be taken.That was the time that I was telling them that they
can be put to jail."[59] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is therefore clear that prior to the execution of the sworn statements at
the NBI head office, appellants had already made verbal admissions of
complicity in the crime.Verbal admissions, however, should also be made
with the assistance of counsel.Thus:
"The verbal admissions allegedly made by both appellants of their
participation in the crime, at the time of their arrest and even
before their formal investigation, are inadmissible, both as
violative of their constitutional rights and as hearsay
evidence.These oral admissions, assuming they were in fact made,
constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions within the
meaning of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution."[60]
That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the
crime in Naga City is shown by the fact that the NBI agents brought
them to Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other culpritswho could
be either in Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral
admissions in Naga City resulted in the execution of their written
confessions in Manila, the latter had become as constitutionally infirm
as the former.In People vs. Alicando,[61] this Court explained the
ramifications of an irregularly counselled confession or admission:
"We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our
jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rules
known as the `fruit of the poisonous tree,' a phrase minted by Mr. Justice
Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States.
According to this rule, once the primary source (the `tree') is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the `fruit') derived from it is also inadmissible.Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the `fruit of the poisonous tree' is the indirect
result of the same illegal act.The `fruit of the poisonous tree is at least
once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but is equally
inadmissible.The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
115
obtained
evidence
Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the mandate of Section 12
of the Bill of Rights but, after making "inquiries" from appellants about
the crime, they likewise illegally detained appellants as shown by the
admission of one of the NBI agents that appellants were deprived of
their liberty while in their custody.[62] Appellants were even made to
travel for ten (10) hours[63] from Naga City to Manila just so their
formal confessions could be executed in the latter city.According to NBI
Agent Vela, they "actually arrested" the appellants when the court issued
the warrant for their arrest.[64] The records show however that the NBI
turned appellants over to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of SilangAmadeo in Cavite only on March 30, 1989.On the same day, the same
court turned them back to the NBI for "detention during pendency of the
case."[65]
Epilogue
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
EN
[G.R.
BANC
No.
134530.
December
4,
2000.]
DECISION
That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995, at about 6:30 oclock
in the evening, at Sitio Ilaya, Brgy. Bunducan, Municipality of Nasugbu,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of Lolita delas Alas y Andino against her will and
consent and by reason or on occasion of the said rape accused with intent
to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangled the said Lolita
delas Alas y Andino with the use of the latters T-shirt which directly
caused her instantaneous death. Further, the personal properties of Lolita
delas Alas y Andino consisting of a gold ring and a wrist watch in an
undetermined
amount
were
taken
by
the
accused.
Contrary
to
law.
have reached their home. Corazon returned to Sitio Ilaya but found that
Lolita was not yet home. Filled with apprehension, Corazon sought the
assistance of her neighbors, Renato Bauyon and Dalmacio Salao, to
locate her daughters whereabouts. At 8:00 oclock in the evening
Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon and Salao that the dead
body of Lolita was found in the sugar cane plantation of Perino
Desacola. The body of her dead daughter was already inside the house
when
she
regained
consciousness.
4
Corazon gave her sworn statement 5 to the police on December 8, 1995
in connection with the rape-slay case of her daughter Lolita delas Alas.
She knew accused-appellant Roberto Samontaez for the reason that he
was a resident of Sitio Balanggutan, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The death of her daughter was very painful to Corazon and
that she spent about P40,000.00 in connection with her wake and funeral
6
It appears that on November 26, 1995, Carlito Samontaez, who is a first
cousin of both the accused-appellant and the victim, was on his way
home after gathering fodder for his animals when, at a distance of twenty
(20) arms length, he chanced upon Roberto at around 6:30 oclock in the
evening while the latter was coming out of the sugar cane plantation of
Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
Carlito and Roberto were coming from opposite directions. However,
when they came close to two (2) arms length with each other, Carlito
observed that Roberto, who was naked from waist up with his T-shirt
placed on his shoulder, was perspiring, somewhat surprised and looked
pale ("medyo po namumutla"). Carlito greeted Roberto and asked him
where he just came from, but the latter did not answer and left hurriedly.
Carlito dismissed his cousins reaction, thinking that he (Roberto) may
have
been
merely
drunk.
7
After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for Lolita upon
learning that she was missing. At 8:00 oclock in the evening, the victim
was found dead in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio
Ilaya. Lolita was lying on her stomach, naked and a black T-shirt was
tied
around
her
neck.
8
Another prosecution witness, Melecio Mendoza, who is an uncle of
Roberto Samontaez by affinity, saw Roberto walking eastward to Sitio
Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon on
November 26, 1995. Melecio also saw Lolita at around 6:00 oclock in
the evening of the same day walking home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently,
at 7:00 oclock in the evening, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his
house, this time heading westward to Sitio Balanggutan in Barangay
Bunducan. Roberto was naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on
his
shoulder.
9
Melecio joined in the search for Lolita after having been requested by
117
Renato Bauyon. Lolita was totally naked and already dead when they
found her in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya
which was approximately one hundred (100) meters away from his
house
in
Sitio
Balanggutan.
10
Acting on the report that a dead woman was found in Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, SPO2 Buenaventura Masikat and other
police officers of Nasugbu, Batangas, together with Dra. Estela Hizon,
proceeded to the crime scene in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan,
Nasugbu, Batangas where the victim, Lolita delas Alas, was found dead
and lying on her stomach totally naked with a black T-shirt tied around
her neck. A panty was stuffed in her anal area. Her hands were stretched
upward
and
her
bra
was
half
removed.
11
Dra. Estela Hizon, M.D., Municipal Health Officer of Nasugbu,
Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Lolita
delas Alas which was already in a state of rigor mortis. Her findings are
contained in her post mortem certification 12 dated November 26, 1995,
thus:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
1.
Contusion
2.
Contused
3.
Presence
around
wounds
of
mark
the
at
the
upper
of
strangulation
left
eye.
and
lower
around
the
lips
neck.
Multiple
of
laceration
death
of
Asphyxia
the
by
hymen.
Strangulation.
Dionisio Calara took pictures 17 of the deceased victim and the scene of
the crime on the same evening. On November 27, 1995, police officers
Masikat and Calara returned to the crime scene and found the black bag
of the victim containing a lotion, a pair of maong pants and a pair of
shoes. 18 They also found the brown bag of the victim which contained
her Kim Harold identification card, coin purse, hair pin, powder kit and
powder puff. 19 In addition, they prepared a sketch of the scene of the
crime 20 and its vicinity. Thereafter, SPO2 Masikat conducted
interviews of the persons in the vicinity among whom were the
prosecution witnesses, Carlito Samontaez and Melecio Mendoza.
During the interview, SPO2 Masikat learned, among others, that the
suspect, Roberto Samontaez, could possibly be located at Hermogenes
Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite where he worked. 21
On November 28, 1995, SPO2 Masikat, together with police officers
Ramos, Malinay, Ocoma, Lejano and Ilao, all of the Nasugbu, Batangas
police found Roberto Samontaez at the Hermogenes Trading in
Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. After talking to his employer, they
invited Roberto to the Nasugbu Police Headquarters. During the
interrogation at the police headquarters, Roberto informed SPO2
Masikat and SPO2 Calara that some of the personal belongings of Lolita
delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez,
Cavite.
22
On December 4, 1995 SPO2 Masikat and his group returned to
Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite and
inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes about the bag of Roberto.
Accordingly, Mr. Hermogenes produced a black bag purportedly
belonging to Roberto containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop cologne
and a pawnshop receipt for a gold ring that was subsequently redeemed
by SPO2 Masikat for P500.00. The three (3) articles were positively
identified during the trial of the case by Corazon delas Alas as belonging
to her daughter, Lolita delas Alas. The police also found a fan knife
(balisong) and a Barangay Clearance inside the black bag of Roberto
Samontaez.
23
The prosecution rested its case on November 30, 1997. During the
scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998 for the presentation of
evidence of the defense, the accused took the witness stand and
reiterated his previous plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
information. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Accused Roberto
Samontaez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, of the
crime of Rape with Homicide as thus penalized and is hereby sentenced
to DEATH, together with the accessory penalties provided for in Article
40 of the same code. The accused is further condemned to pay to the
heirs of the victim the amount of P40,000.00 by way of compensatory or
ORDERED.
24
for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilty on the
part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since by admitting
his guilt before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty without
having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of
his
plea.
27
A:
The Court notes the trial courts efforts to ensure the propriety of
appellants plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as
evidenced by its lengthy inquiries to the appellant in separate hearings,
the transcript of which were reproduced in its assailed Decision. Hence,
during the scheduled hearing on March 14, 1996, the following
proceedings transpired, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Court:
Q:
Yes,
Where
Atty.
is
the
sir.
mother
Exchaure:chanrob1es
of
virtual
the
accused?
1aw
library
Court
Interpreter:chanrob1es
(After
reading
Your
She
is
here,
your
honor.
Teresita
Samontaez)
honor,
the
the
Court:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
the
Q:
Are
you
A:
He
is
mother
related
my
to
the
son,
your
accused?
honor.
1aw
Information
accused
Court:chanrob1es
(To
virtual
entered
virtual
library
in
Plea
of
Pilipino.)
Not
1aw
Guilty.
library
Place the accused on the witness stand. I want to clear this matter very
well,
because
of
the
gravity
of
the
offense.
Court:
(To
the
accused)
Q: Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this case?
A:
A:
library
Yes,
your
honor.
Yes,
sir.
Ready?
Atty.
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Your honor, just a moment ago I informed the accused the fact that we
will now proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, but as usual, the
accused intimated to this representation that he will be pleading guilty to
the offense charged against him. I informed him the gravity of the
offense as well as the corresponding severe penalty attached to the
offense which is death, considering that there is a new law. But the
accused insists on his desire to plead guilty, in fact I brought that desire
of his to the attention of his mother who is present, as well as his aunt,
and grandmother, and according to them, that is the wish of the accused
to
plead
guilty
to
the
charge
against
him.
Q: And as mother, did you counsel your son that pleading guilty will
mean
his
guilt
as
charged?
A:
Yes,
Court:chanrob1es
your
virtual
virtual
1aw
Prosecutor
Marajas:chanrob1es
Court
is
asking
the
library
virtual
1aw
your
Yes,
sir.
library
Q: And you are a Tagalog speaking because you were born and grew up
in
Brgy.
Bunducan,
Nasugbu,
Batangas?
honor.
A:
library
Q: Do you know that by pleading guilty as you did awhile ago, the Court
will impose on you the death penalty as provided for by law for this
offense?
Yes,
sir.
library
Court:chanrob1es
The
1aw
The accused can now be re-arraigned, but after his plea of guilty, the
prosecution still has to present evidence as required by the 1985 Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure.
Yes,
Court:chanrob1es
honor.
virtual
1aw
accused.
Make
your
motion,
Atty.
Exchaure:chanrob1es
Mr.
defense
virtual
1aw
counsel.
library
A:
Yes,
sir.
Q: And your pleading guilty was nobodys liking but of your own
volition
and
spontaneous
decision?
Q: And you are doing that with your clear mind, nobody forced you?
A:
Court:chanrob1es
library
Q:
accused.
A:
A:
Yes,
Yes,
sir.
sir.
Q: And did you reveal before to your counsel your decision to plead
guilty?
Re-arraign
virtual
the
1aw
A:
Yes,
Did
your
mother
tell
No,
sir.
you
to
plead
guilty?
sir.
A:
A:
No,
sir.
A:
Its
my
own
decision,
Yes,
sir.
sir.
Q: And in fact, you were asked by the Honorable Court if your having
pleaded
guilty
is
of
your
own
voluntary
act?
sir.
A:
A:
Q:
What
A:
A:
Q:
Did
the
prosecutor
A:
tell
you
to
plead
No,
None,
guilty?
sir.
Yes,
is
will
the
be
sir.
consequence
punished
of
with
your
a
pleading
grave
guilty?
penalty,
Yes,
Q: Now, up to the present time, do you confirm the fact that you pleaded
guilty
to
the
charge
against
you?
sir.
A:
Yes,
Q: Do you have an idea as to the grave penalty that the Court may
impose
on
you?
sir.
A:
Grade
IV,
sir.
None,
But
you
A:
can
read
and
Yes,
write?
Yes,
Q:
A:
Where
Brgy.
Bunducan,
did
Nasugbu,
sir.
sir.
A:
Yes,
Court:chanrob1es
And
sir.
virtual
even
now,
A:
1aw
nobody
is
library
threatening
Nobody,
you?
sir.
sir.
Q: As in fact, you are a registered voter, as you did vote in the last
election?
A:
Yes,
Q: At the time you pleaded guilty, nobody forced or coerced you to plead
guilty?
Q:
Q:
sir.
sir.
you
Batangas,
vote?
sir.
Q: In other words, you are admitting to have raped and killed the victim
in this case, Lolita delas Alas on that date in question and as charged in
the
information?
Q: Alright, you sign on the notes together with the assistance of your
counsel?
Atty.
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
A:
No,
During the scheduled hearing on January 14, 1998 for the presentation of
evidence of the defense, the following proceedings were duly recorded,
to
wit:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Court:chanrob1es
Atty.
A:
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Q:
Why
I
do
dont
virtual
you
say
know
sir.
1aw
you
dont
what
will
know
the
happen
library
consequences?
to
me,
sir.
Q: Dont you understand that by pleading guilty, the Court will just
penalize
you
for
the
crime
that
you
admitted?
Q: Nobody gave or promised you any reward for your act of pleading
guilty?
Court:chanrob1es
Q: And in fact, the charge to which you pleaded guilty calls for the
supreme
penalty
of
death?
A:
Proceed.
A:
Yes,
None,
sir.
sir.
virtual
1aw
library
A:
A:
Q: Did anybody threaten or coerce or cajole you to do so?
Atty.
A:
Q: Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that when you were re-arraigned, you
pleaded
guilty
to
the
charge
against
you?
None,
sir.
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
Yes,
Yes,
sir.
sir.
library
Q: And still you insist on or maintain your plea of guilty made before
and
you
are
confirming
the
same
this
morning?
A:
Yes,
sir.
120
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Q: And you are willing to accept whatever will be the penalty will be
imposed by the Honorable Court for having pleaded guilty, which you
still
maintain
up
to
now?
Q: Do you know that your repentance cannot bring back the life of the
victim?
A:
Q:
A:
Yes.
Yes,
And
you
virtual
1aw
Yes,
sir.
Q: You just pray to God that in the final day of reckoning, God will still
forgive
you?
A:
Yes,
sir.
29
Also, on January 29, 1998, the following verbal exchange were recorded,
thus:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Court:
(To
the
accused)
Yes,
sir.
Q: In other words, you have nothing more to say regarding your plea of
guilty?
A:
None,
sir.
Q: You have nothing more to present at least to mitigate your liability for
the offense which you admitted to have committed?
A:
Q:
A:
was
Were
then
you
high
a
on
user
Yes,
fate
to
this
Court?
marijuana,
of
Yes,
sir.
30
sir.
marijuana?
sir.
virtual
1aw
library
The prosecution having rested, the Court wants to hear from the defense
what
it
has
to
offer.
Atty.
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Yes,
Exchaure:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
library
Are you remorseful for the crime imputed to you and which you
admitted
to
have
committed?
A:
your
Sir.
A:
Court:chanrob1es
leave
sir.
Atty.
virtual
1aw
library
Court:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Granted.
Prosecutor
Marajas:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
I just manifest for the record that the accused is a detention prisoner if
what the defense counsel stated were true and correct that Mr. Roberto
Samontaez was just pressured, the more he should present the . . .
Court:chanrob1es
Precisely,
thats
virtual
why
he
is
1aw
asking
for
library
postponement.
31
The trial court perfunctorily brushed aside the aforesaid disclosure from
the appellant that he was pressured by a policeman to change his earlier
plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the charge in the information. It did
not propound any clarificatory questions about the matter on the same
occasion such as the identity of the concerned policeman, the nature of
the pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged pressure was
applied on the appellant. Although further inquiries were undertaken by
the trial court in the subsequent hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998, the
questions addressed to the appellant were primarily aimed at eliciting
affirmative responses or confirmations of his plea of guilty. The
statement of the appellant that he was pressured by a certain policeman
apparently escaped the memory or concern of the trial court as it did not
crop up in its inquiry during those subsequent hearings. Left
unventilated, the appellants allegation of pressure generates doubt on
the voluntariness of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the clarity of
appellants grasp of the true meaning, full significance and consequences
of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed to mention and explain clearly
to the appellant the elements of the crime of rape with homicide as
charged in the Information. 32 As a result, appellant was not properly
accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
the accusation against him, which is an integral aspect of the due process
clause under the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
sir.
121
Notably, the appellant who reached grade IV only stated that he did not
know the consequences of his plea of guilty during the hearing on
February 14, 1996 and again, during the hearing on January 14, 1998.
While the trial court informed the appellant that his plea of guilty meant
that he admitted liability for the crime of rape with homicide, as charged
in the information, which carries the penalty of death, it failed to
emphasize that his said plea of guilty would not, under any
circumstance, affect or reduce the death penalty, the imposition of which
is mandatory under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. 33 In which
event, the appellant must be made to understand in plain and simple
language the precise meaning of the term "mandatory." 34 Additionally,
the trial court failed to apprise the appellant of the civil liability (e.g.
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages) arising from the
crime of rape with homicide which shall be imposed on him as
perpetrator of the crime. 35 Despite appellants apparent willingness to
accept the penalty for his crime, it is not farfetched to say that appellant
was actually led to believe that the penalty for his crime may still be
reduced upon his plea of guilty thereto especially when the trial court
informed the appellant, through counsel, that he should adduce evidence.
Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent of securing
every material detail of the crime in its lengthy inquiries to the appellant
subsequent to his re-arraignment. Questions tending to elicit
corroborative responses to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
should have been asked of the appellant. Although there is no definite
and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a
proper "searching inquiry", it would be well for the trial court, for
instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate the incident that
spawned the charges against him, or by making him re-enact the manner
in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and
explain to the court missing details of significance in order to determine,
once and for all, his liability for the crime. 36 As it is, the Decision of the
trial court is devoid of any factual finding relative to the actual
commission of the crime of rape with homicide by the appellant. In the
final analysis, it is the quality rather than the number of questions
propounded during the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the
consequences of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous
tree." The facts show that the appellant Roberto Samontaez was
actually arrested by police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on
November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised
of his constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation
which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution. 37 It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel
during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver,
any confession obtained from the appellant during the police custodial
investigation relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured
by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the
same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant.
Thus, the personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch,
gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered and found inside the bag of
the appellant when the police authorities returned to the appellants place
of work at the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite after they illegally obtained a confession from the appellant. In
the case of People v. Alicando, 38 the Court had opportunity to reiterate
the rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained
confession is inadmissible, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our
jurisdiction We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule
known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result
of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito
Samontaez and Melecio Mendoza, both of which merely seek to
establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime
scene on or about the time when the crime took place. Ultimately, the
conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar rested
primarily on his plea of guilty which appeared to have been
improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section
3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, supra.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of
Nasugbu, Batangas dated May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032
convicting the appellant, Roberto V. Samontaez, of the crime of rape
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death
is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case is remanded to the
court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until
terminated.
SO
ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1. Penned by Judge Antonio A. De Sagun. Rollo, pp. 27-61.
2.
Rollo,
pp.
1-2.
3.
TSN
dated
March
14,
1996,
pp.
2-7.
4. TSN dated June 10, 1997, pp. 2-5; Exhibit "S" .
5.
Exhibit
"S"
.
6.
TSN
dated
June
10,
1997,
pp.
9-10.
7. TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 9-13; Exhibit "A" .
8.
Id.,
pp.
14-15.
9.
TSN
dated
June
26,
1996,
pp.
4-8;
10-11.
10.
Id.,
pp.
8-9.
11.
TSN
dated
July
11,
1996,
p.
5.
12.
Exhibit
"B"
.
13.
Exhibit
"C"
.
14.
Exhibit
"D"
.
15.
TSN
dated
March
27,
1996,
pp.
6-10.
16.
Exhibits
"Q",
"R",
"H"
.
17.
Exhibits
"f"
to
"F-4"
.
18.
Exhibits
"K"
to
"K-3"
.
19. Exhibits "L" to "L-3" ; Exhibits "M", "M-1" .
20.
Exhibit
"J"
.
21.
TSN
dated
July
11,
1996,
p.
13.
22.
Id,
pp.
13-14.
23.
Exhibits
"N"
to
"P-3"
.
24.
Rollo,
p.
61.
25. People v. Camay, 152 SCRA 401, 403 (1987); People v. Derilo 271
SCRA 633, 651 (1997); People v. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519, 528 (1999);
People v. Bello, G.R Nos. 130411-14, October 13, 1999.
26.
People
v. Dayot 187 SCRA 637,
641 (1990).
27. People v. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, 145-146 (1995) citing 14 Am. Jur.,
Criminal Law, Sec. 271, p. 951; People v. Gonzaga, 127 SCRA 158, 163
(1984); People v. Havana 199 SCRA 805, 811 (1991).
28.
TSN
dated
March
14,
1996,
pp.
2-7.
29.
TSN
dated
January
14,
1998,
pp.
2-5.
30. Minutes dated January 29, 1998. Original records, pp. 164- 165.
31. Minutes dated November 13, 1997. Original records, pp. 152-153.
32.
People
v.
Sevilleno
supra,
p.
528.
33. People v. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204, 212 (1989); People v. Sevilleno,
supra, pp. 528-529; People v. Bello, supra, G.R. Nos. 130411-14.
34. People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293, 308 (1995).
35.
Ibid.
36. People v. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 429, 437 (1996) citing People v.
Dayot,
supra.
122
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 145566 - March 9, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. DINDO "BEBOT"
MOJELLO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of
death.1 rll
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of
rape with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows: 2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe,
Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal
knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with
mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on
the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in
pursuance of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill,
treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill
the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on
the different parts of her body which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not
guilty." Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal
lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped. 10 He observed
that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her neck show that
she was strangled and died of asphyxia.11 He indicated the cause of
death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and
physical injuries to the head and the trunk. 12 rll
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence;
and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15,
1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks
with a group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and the
spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located
at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3 rll
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way
home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a
nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some thirty meters away
towards the direction of Sitio Kota. 4 Since he was used to seeing them
together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this.
He proceeded to his house.5 rll
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family
was informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio
Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw the
lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by
what he saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to
protect his niece. He even attempted to take his own life several days
after the incident.6 rll
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor
launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2
Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the
dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during
his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay
Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos
testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were
read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. 7 Appellant's
extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. 8 On
December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver
by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region VII.9 rll
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial
investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what
jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v.
Arizona.15 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the
ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial
investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and
will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to
an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will
be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
123
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x.
where the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness
should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative
weight of the confession.
126
FIRST DIVISION
HO WAI PANG,
Petitioner,
Factual Antecedents
Present:
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16,
2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459
affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his coaccused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,[5] Wu Hing Sum, Tin San
Mao[6] and Kin San Ho[7] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 15, Article III[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA
Resolution[9] denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the
passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang
was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which
contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of
the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu
Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the
baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or
three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from
the baggages of the six accused.
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated
stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined
them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the
representative samples were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
[12] Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No.
6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed
against petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation[13] which the trial court granted. The reinvestigation
conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this
resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information[14] under Criminal Case
No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the other Informations.[15] The Amended
Information reads:
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost
identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no
knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
127
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all the accused guilty
of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal
portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED.[19]
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the
case records were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.
[20] Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their
respective withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after being satisfied that the
withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action,
Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief[25] for the
respondent People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30,
2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the
RTC. While conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the
custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that
there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also
rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory
right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE
CONSTITUTION.[30]
I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER
WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS
OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS
Section 12,
Article III of
the
Constitution
prohibits as
evidence only
confessions
and
admissions of
the accused
as
against
himself.
128
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not
assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial
investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the
CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals
of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of
his constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we
must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically ruled that
the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are]
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during
his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement
was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused,
the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v.
Buluran,[33] [a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation
is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not excluding
evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen
Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are
semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the
present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the
trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective
decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied
heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and
on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their
signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the
accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their
signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what
the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence
being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another
case when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be
decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was
not denied of
his right to
confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to
confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel
cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the
proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it
before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless
able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination
suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against
him.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco
despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the
lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is
that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the
other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:
Conspiracy
among
the
accused was
duly
established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding
of conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision,
and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:
slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of
her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence in its Order[44] of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
Petitioners
guilt
was
proved
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes
were found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed
that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him
the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she
declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in
petitioners bag.[42] Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that
she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were
still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any
chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were at the ICU.[43] To us, this
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court
is convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing
else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he
130
was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his coaccused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his
luggage considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it
bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is
a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As
such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and
same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the
act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials,
petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence
for the prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.
[47]
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging
petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into
the country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused,
have, as to him, a retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court
upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine
imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justic
Penalty
SO ORDERED.
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the
appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should
be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No.
1683.[48] The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced
new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section
15 was changed from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty
provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
131
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO
A.
GAANAN, Petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act
(RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the
issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between
the
two
parties
using
a
telephone
line.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's
decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and
his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August
26, 1981, pp. 3-5).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who
is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
(Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 45).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant
heard complainant enumerate the following conditions
for withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the
figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of
the P8,000.00 had been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher
Constabulary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit
stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant.
Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant's consent, complainant charged
appellant and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November
22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1
of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner
appealed to the appellate court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore,
covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to
overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico
is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No.
4200.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the
appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the
telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico
was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is
covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200;
(c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said
telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is
ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:chanrobles virtual law library
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
132
never
intended
for
such
mischievous
results.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves
around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is
an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would
subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with
extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use
answering or recording devices to record business conversations between
a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message
for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would
a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?chanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when
Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the
Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used
instruments, probably the most popularly known communication
device.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable
was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized
into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of
devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone
or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The
omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally
deleted
from
the
provisions
of
the
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced
and covered by the term "device" within the context of the
aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set
of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver
not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or
removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to
be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired
communication
corning
from
the
other
party
or
end.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
135
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern
District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with
transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to
Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. [Footnote 1] At trial,
the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to
introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations,
overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which
he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals
rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment,
Syllabus
because "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the
petitioner]." [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari in order to consider the
constitutional questions thus presented. [Footnote 3]
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which
the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he
was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had
remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. He did not
shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place
where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office,
[Footnote 10] in a friend's apartment, [Footnote 11] or in a taxicab,
[Footnote 12] a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in
this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for
the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical
penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his
calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time
thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 457, 277 U. S. 464, 277 U. S.
466; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 316 U. S. 134-136, for
that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of
tangible
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of
the individual States. [Footnote 7]
property. [Footnote 13] But "[t]he premise that property interests control
the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 304. Thus,
although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance
without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell
outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the
narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly
held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
136
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the
parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner
has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected
area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not.
138
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurred in the judgment for the reasons set
forth in his dissent in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347,389 U. S. 364.
P. 401 U. S. 754.
Fourth Amendment and, in any event, erred in applying the Katz case to
events that occurred before that decision was rendered by this Court.
[Footnote 2]
No. 13
"unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a
seizure."
In 1966, respondent James A. White was tried and convicted under two
consolidated indictments charging various illegal transactions in
narcotics violative of 26 U.S.C. 4705(a) and 21 U.S.C. 174. He was
fined and sentenced as a second offender to 25-year concurrent
sentences. The issue before us is whether the Fourth Amendment bars
from evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain
conversations which had occurred between defendant White and a
government informant, Harvey Jackson, and which the agents
The Court of Appeals read Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967),
as overruling On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747(1952), and
interpreting the Fourth Amendment to forbid the introduction of the
agents' testimony in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the
court reversed, but without adverting to the fact that the transactions at
issue here had occurred before Katz was decided in this Court. In our
view, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted both the Katz case and the
unaffected
141
way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the
cabin. Pp. 460 U. S. 280-285.
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982), and we now reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), this Court held that
the wiretapping of a defendant's private telephone line did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the wiretapping had been effectuated
without a physical trespass by the Government. Justice Brandeis, joined
by Justice Stone, dissented from that decision, believing that the actions
of the Government in that case constituted an "unjustifiable intrusion . . .
upon the privacy of the individual," and therefore a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 277 U. S. 478. Nearly 40 years later, in Katz v.
United
States, 389
U.
S.
347 (1967),
the
Court
overruled Olmstead, saying that the Fourth Amendment's reach "cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure." 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 353. The Court said:
"The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the
electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to
penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance."
Ibid.
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), we elaborated on the
principles stated in Katz:
"Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
invoking its protection can claim a "justifiable," a "reasonable," or a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" that has been invaded by government
action. [Citations omitted.] This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly
noted in his Katzconcurrence, normally embraces
Page 460 U. S. 281
two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his
conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,"
389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 361 -- whether, in the words of the Katz majority,
the individual has shown that "he seeks to preserve [something] as
private." Id. at 389 U. S. 351. The second question is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable,'" id. at 389 U. S. 361 -- whether, in
the words of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed
objectively, is "justifiable" under the circumstances. Id. at 389 U. S.
353. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 439 U. S. 143-144, n.
12; id. at 439 U. S. 151 (concurring opinion); United States v. White,401
U.S. at 401 U. S. 752 (plurality opinion)."
facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only
on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper to signal the
presence of Petschen's automobile to the police receiver, does not alter
the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police
from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.
In United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559(1927), the Court said:
Page 460 U. S. 283
"But no search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the
boatswain shows that he used a searchlight. It is not shown that there
was any exploration below decks or under hatches. For aught that
appears, the cases of liquor were on deck and, like the defendants, were
discovered before the motor boat was boarded. Such use of a searchlight
is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not
prohibited by the Constitution."
Id. at 563.
We have recently had occasion to deal with another claim which was to
some extent a factual counterpart of respondent's assertions here.
In Smith v. Maryland, we said:
outside the cabin. Just as notions of physical trespass based on the law of
real property were not dispositive in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347 (1967), neither were they dispositive in Hester v. United States, 265
U. S. 57 (1924).
We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of our inquiry in
discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the beeper signals complained of
by respondent invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part?
For the reasons previously stated, we hold it did not. Since it did not,
there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of
the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
therefore
Reversed.
* Respondent does not challenge the warrantless installation of the
beeper in the chloroform container, suggesting in oral argument that he
did not believe he had standing to make such a challenge. We note that,
while several Courts of Appeals have approved warrantless
installations, see United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (CA9
1980); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382 (CA5 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190
(CA8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Miroyan, 577
F.2d 489 (CA9), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v.
Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887 (CA5), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United
States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978); United States v. Ael, 548 F.2d 591 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
956 (1977); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (CA9), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), we have not before, and do not now, pass
on the issue.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I join JUSTICE BLACKMUN's and JUSTICE STEVENS' opinions
concurring in the judgment. I should add, however,
Page 460 U. S. 286
that I think this would have been a much more difficult case if
respondent had challenged not merely certain aspects of the monitoring
of the beeper installed in the chloroform container purchased by
respondent's compatriot, but also its original installation. See ante at 460
U. S. 279, n. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), made quite
clear that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental
invasions of a person's reasonable "expectation[s] of privacy," even
when those invasions are not accompanied by physical intrusions. Cases
such as Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 509-512
(1961), however, hold that, when the Government does engage in
physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain
information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment even if the same information could have been obtained by
other means. I do not believe that Katz, or its progeny, have eroded that
principle. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 75, 203204 (1980).
I am also entirely unconvinced by the Court of Appeals' footnote
disposing of the installation issue with the statement:
"we hold that the consent of the owner [of the chloroform drum] at the
time of installation meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
even if the consenting owner intends to soon sell the 'bugged' property to
an unsuspecting buyer.Caveat emptor."
662 F.2d 515, 517, n. 2 (1981) (citation omitted). The Government is not
here defending against a claim for damages in an action for breach of a
warranty; it is attempting to justify the legality of a search conducted in
the course of a criminal investigation. I am not at all sure that, for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, there is a constitutionally significant
difference between planting a beeper in an object in the possession of a
criminal suspect and purposefully arranging that he be sold an object
that, unknown to him, already has a beeper installed inside it. Cf. Gouled
v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 255 U. S. 305-306 (1921); Lewis v.
United States, 385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 211 (1966).
Page 460 U. S. 287
Respondent claimed at oral argument that, under this Court's cases, he
would not have standing to challenge the original installation of the
beeper in the chloroform drum because the drum was sold, not to him,
but to one of his compatriots.See ante at 460 U. S. 279, n. If respondent
is correct, that would only confirm for me the formalism and confusion
in this Court's recent attempts to redefine Fourth Amendment
standing. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 448 U. S. 114(1980)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 439 U. S.
156 (1978) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE
MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the
judgment.
The Court's opinion gratuitously refers to the "open fields" doctrine, and
twice cites Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57(1924). Ante at 460 U. S.
282 and 460 U. S. 285. For me, the present case does not concern the
open fields doctrine, and I regard these references and citations as
unnecessary for the Court's decision. Furthermore, and most important,
cases concerning the open fields doctrine have been accepted by the
Court for argument and plenary consideration. State v. Brady, 406 So.2d
1093 (Fla.), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982); United States v.
Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (CA6 1982), cert. granted,459 U.S. 1168
(1983). See also United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (CA5 1982), cert.
pending, No. 82-508.
144
I therefore do not join the Court's opinion. I concur only in the result it
reaches.
the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed
on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners property; 11 that respondents, through their
SECOND DIVISION
AND
VICTORIA
CHOACHUY, SR. AND
CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION
Ruling
01473.
Factual
Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint 5 for
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land
(Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817
situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; 6that respondents
are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; 7 that
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear
Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
II.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Aggrieved,
respondents
filed
with
the
CA
Petition
for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for
a
TRO
and/or
Writ
of
Preliminary
Injunction.
Ruling
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision 26 granting the Petition
for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a
clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. 27 The CA explained
that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is
not used as a residence. 28 The CA also said that since respondents are
not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video
surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has
a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper
parties.31 The fallo reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the
petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated
October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the
respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
I.
Petitioners
Arguments
IV.
Our Ruling
The
Arguments
The
Petition
right
to
privacy
is
is
the
right
meritorious.
to
be
let
alone.
is
the
right
to
be
let
alone.47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects
them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one,
not even the State, except in case of overriding social need and then
only under the stringent procedural safeguards, can disturb them in the
privacy
of
their
homes.48
The
right
to
privacy
under
Article
26(1)
of
the
Civil
Code
covers
business
offices
where
the
public
are
excluded
therefrom
and
only
certain
individuals
are
allowed
to
enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses
that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other
relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(1)
Prying into the privacy
residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of
anothers
[petitioners].
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend
to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence,
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society,
other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA,
therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code
only
to
residences.
The
test
is
is
a
reasonable
used
violation
to
of
expectation
of
determine
whether
the
right
to
privacy
there
privacy.
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his
right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes
any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter. 49 The phrase
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should
these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is
a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
prying into the privacy of anothers residence, however, does not mean
that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law
expert Arturo M. Tolentino:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
xxxx
July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
CEB-SP
No.
01473
are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,
2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue
City
in
Civil
Case
No.
MAN-5223
are
hereby REINSTATEDand AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
wlibrary
awlibrary
reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a
Complaint against respondents before the RTC. 61 He also admitted that
as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and
the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective
properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that
respondents
are
the
proper
parties
to
be
impleaded.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 174629 : February 14, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), Petitioner, v. HON.
ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC,
MANILA, BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA
CHENG, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 assails
the orders and resolutions issued by two different courts in two different
cases. The courts and cases in question are the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 24, which heard SP Case No. 06-114200 1and the Court
of Appeals, Tenth Division, which heared CA-G.R. SP No. 95198. 2 Both
cases arose as part of the aftermath of the ruling of this Court in Agan v.
PIATCO3 nullifying the concession agreement awarded to the Philippine
International Airport Terminal Corporation (PIATCO) over the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport - International Passenger Terminal 3 (NAIA
3) Project.
I.
Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations
concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were
undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation
Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). On
24 May 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the
AMLC requesting the latter's assistance "in obtaining more evidence to
completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the [NAIA
3] Project," and also noting that petitioner Republic of the Philippines
was presently defending itself in two international arbitration cases filed
in relation to the NAIA 3 Project. 4 The CIS conducted an intelligence
database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals
involved in the award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez)
who had been the Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee, NAIAIPT3 Project.5 By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the
Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019. 6 The
search revealed that Alvarez maintained eight (8) bank accounts with six
(6) different banks.7
On 27 June 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 75, Series of
2005,8 whereby the Council resolved to authorize the Executive Director
of the AMLC "to sign and verify an application to inquire into and/or
examine the [deposits] or investments of Pantaleon Alvarez, Wilfredo
Trinidad, Alfredo Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of
accounts wherever these may be found, as defined under Rule 10.4 of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations;" and to authorize the
AMLC Secretariat "to conduct an inquiry into subject accounts once the
Regional Trial Court grants the application to inquire into and/or
examine the bank accounts" of those four individuals. 9 The resolution
enumerated the particular bank accounts of Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad
(Trinidad), Alfredo Liongson (Liongson) and Cheng Yong which were to
be the subject of the inquiry.10 The rationale for the said resolution was
founded on the cited findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred
from a Hong Kong bank account owned by Jetstream Pacific Ltd.
Account to bank accounts in the Philippines maintained by Liongson and
Cheng Yong.11 The Resolution also noted that "[b]y awarding the
contract to PIATCO despite its lack of financial capacity, Pantaleon
Alvarez caused undue injury to the government by giving PIATCO
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, in violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019."12
Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an
application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of
Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati,
Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto
Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. 13 The
Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC,
Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC.14 Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an
Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the
authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that
there existed "[p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various
bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application,
are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as
attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G." 15 Pursuant
to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and
examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the
four.16
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting
the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several
other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to
probable cause to believe that the bank accounts "were used in the
commission of unlawful activities that were committed" in relation to the
criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. 17 Attached to
the letter was a memorandum "on why the investigation of the [accounts]
is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan."18
In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC
promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of
2005,19 which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire
into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the
name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the
memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutor's letter as "extensively
justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the
persons and entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful
activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended."20
Following the December 2005 AMLC Resolution, the Republic, through
the AMLC, filed an application 21 before the Manila RTC to inquire into
and/or examine thirteen (13) accounts and two (2) related web of
accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA
3 Project. Among said accounts were the DBS Bank account of Alvarez
and the Metrobank accounts of Cheng Yong. The case was raffled to
Manila RTC, Branch 24, presided by respondent Judge Antonio Eugenio,
Jr., and docketed as SP Case No. 06-114200.
On 12 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order (Manila RTC bank
inquiry order) granting the Ex Parte Application expressing therein
"[that] the allegations in said application to be impressed with merit, and
in conformity with Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001 and Rules
11.1 and 11.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations."22 Authority was thus granted to the AMLC to inquire into
the bank accounts listed therein.
On 25 January 2006, Alvarez, through counsel, entered his
appearance23 before the Manila RTC in SP Case No. 06-114200 and
filed an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of January 12,
2006.24 Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry
order, which was issued following an ex parte application, and he argued
that nothing in R.A. No. 9160 authorized the AMLC to seek the
authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte.25 The day after Alvarez
filed his motion, 26 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an
Order26 staying the enforcement of its bank inquiry order and giving the
Republic five (5) days to respond to Alvarez's motion.
The Republic filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration 27 of the 26
January 2006 Manila RTC Order and likewise sought to strike out
Alvarez's motion that led to the issuance of said order. For his part,
149
Alvarez filed a Reply and Motion to Dismiss 28 the application for bank
inquiry order. On 2 May 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Omnibus
Order29 granting the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, denying
Alvarez's motion to dismiss and reinstating "in full force and effect" the
Order dated 12 January 2006. In the omnibus order, the Manila RTC
reiterated that the material allegations in the application for bank inquiry
order filed by the Republic stood as "the probable cause for the
investigation and examination of the bank accounts and investments of
the respondents."30
Alvarez filed on 10 May 2006 an Urgent Motion 31 expressing his
apprehension that the AMLC would immediately enforce the omnibus
order and would thereby render the motion for reconsideration he
intended to file as moot and academic; thus he sought that the Republic
be refrained from enforcing the omnibus order in the meantime. Acting
on this motion, the Manila RTC, on 11 May 2006, issued an
Order32 requiring the OSG to file a comment/opposition and reminding
the parties that judgments and orders become final and executory upon
the expiration of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, as it is the period
within which a motion for reconsideration could be filed. Alvarez filed
his Motion for Reconsideration33 of the omnibus order on 15 May 2006,
but the motion was denied by the Manila RTC in an Order 34 dated 5
July 2006.
On
11
July
2006,
Alvarez
filed
an
Urgent
Motion
and
application with the RTC; and that the AMLC be directed to refrain from
using, disclosing or publishing in any proceeding or venue any
information or document obtained in violation of the 11 May 2006 RTC
Order.40
On 25 July 2006, or one day after Alvarez filed his motion, the Manila
RTC issued an Order41wherein it clarified that "the Ex Parte Order of
this Court dated January 12, 2006 can not be implemented against the
deposits or accounts of any of the persons enumerated in the AMLC
Application until the appeal of movant Alvarez is finally resolved,
otherwise, the appeal would be rendered moot and academic or even
nugatory."42 In addition, the AMLC was ordered "not to disclose or
publish any information or document found or obtained in [v]iolation of
the May 11, 2006 Order of this Court."43 The Manila RTC reasoned that
the other persons mentioned in AMLC's application were not served with
the court's 12 January 2006 Order. This 25 July 2006 Manila RTC Order
is the first of the four rulings being assailed through this petition.
In response, the Republic filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration44 dated 27 July 2006, urging that it be allowed to
immediately enforce the bank inquiry order against Alvarez and that
Alvarez's notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal
from an order of inquiry is disallowed under the Anti money Laundering
Act (AMLA).
Meanwhile, respondent Lilia Cheng filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction45dated 10 July 2006,
directed against the Republic of the Philippines through the AMLC,
Manila RTC Judge Eugenio, Jr. and Makati RTC Judge Marella, Jr.. She
identified herself as the wife of Cheng Yong 46 with whom she jointly
owns a conjugal bank account with Citibank that is covered by the
Makati RTC bank inquiry order, and two conjugal bank accounts with
Metrobank that are covered by the Manila RTC bank inquiry order. Lilia
Cheng imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati and
Manila RTCs in granting AMLC's ex parte applications for a bank
inquiry order, arguing among others that the ex parte applications
violated her constitutional right to due process, that the bank inquiry
order under the AMLA can only be granted in connection with violations
of the AMLA and that the AMLA can not apply to bank accounts opened
and transactions entered into prior to the effectivity of the AMLA or to
bank accounts located outside the Philippines. 47
On 1 August 2006, the Court of Appeals, acting on Lilia Cheng's
petition, issued a Temporary Restraining Order 48 enjoining the Manila
and Makati trial courts from implementing, enforcing or executing the
respective bank inquiry orders previously issued, and the AMLC from
enforcing and implementing such orders. On even date, the Manila RTC
1. Did the RTC-Manila, in issuing the Orders dated 25 July 2006 and 15
August 2006 which deferred the implementation of its Order dated 12
January 2006, and the Court of Appeals, in issuing its Resolution dated 1
August 2006, which ordered the status quo in relation to the 1 July 2005
Order of the RTC-Makati and the 12 January 2006 Order of the RTCManila, both of which authorized the examination of bank accounts
under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 9160 (AMLA), commit grave abuse of
discretion?
(a) Is an application for an order
authorizing inquiry into or examination
of bank accounts or investments under
Section 11 of the AMLA ex-parte in
nature or one which requires notice and
hearing?cralawred
(b) What legal procedures and standards
should be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings for the issuance of said
order?cralawred
(c) Is such order susceptible to legal
challenges and judicial review?
2. Is it proper for this Court at this time and in this case
to inquire into and pass upon the validity of the 1 July
2005 Order of the RTC-Makati and the 12 January 2006
Order of the RTC-Manila, considering the pendency of
CA G.R. SP No. 95-198 (Lilia Cheng v. Republic)
wherein the validity of both orders was challenged? 62
After the oral arguments, the parties were directed to file their respective
memoranda, which they did,63 and the petition was thereafter deemed
submitted for resolution.
II.
Petitioner's general advocacy is that the bank inquiry orders issued by
the Manila and Makati RTCs are valid and immediately enforceable
whereas the assailed rulings, which effectively stayed the enforcement of
the Manila and Makati RTCs bank inquiry orders, are sullied with grave
abuse of discretion. These conclusions flow from the posture that a bank
inquiry order, issued upon a finding of probable cause, may be issued ex
parte and, once issued, is immediately executory. Petitioner further
argues that the information obtained following the bank inquiry is
necessarily beneficial, if not indispensable, to the AMLC in discharging
its awesome responsibility regarding the effective implementation of the
AMLA and that any restraint in the disclosure of such information to
appropriate agencies or other judicial fora would render meaningless the
relief supplied by the bank inquiry order.
The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under
Section 10 and in proscribing the same under Section 11. A freeze order
under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving monetary
instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities
as defined in Section 3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary
instruments or property would thus be inhibited from utilizing the same
for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded
by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow
for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could be
issued.
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not
necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account
holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the
particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank
financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited
with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical
sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's
record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the
freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order
cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records
are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the
instance of the account holder alone as that would require the
extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.
parte proceedings were introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in
the case of the freeze order which now can only be issued by the Court
of Appeals. It certainly would have been convenient, through the same
amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the case of a
bank inquiry order had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the
provision itself, or even the available legislative record, explicitly points
to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for a bank inquiry
order, unlike in the case of the freeze order.
the case of inquiry orders under Section 11.76 These implementing rules
were promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, 77 and if it
was the true belief of these institutions that inquiry orders could be
issued ex parte similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would
have been incorporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because the
implementing rules could authorize ex parte applications for inquiry
orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but rather because the
framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex parte applications.
Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No. 05-1104-SC78 to enforce the provisions of the AMLA specifically
authorize ex parte applications with respect to freeze orders under
Section 1079 but make no similar authorization with respect to bank
inquiry orders under Section 11.
order would be that such orders cannot be issued unless notice is given
to the owners of the account, allowing them the opportunity to contest
the issuance of the order. Without such a consequence, the legislated
distinction between ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and those
which are not ex parte under Section 11 would be lost and rendered
useless.
There certainly is fertile ground to contest the issuance of an ex
parte order. Section 11 itself requires that it be established that "there is
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful
activities," and it obviously is the court which stands as arbiter whether
there is indeed such probable cause. The process of inquiring into the
existence of probable cause would involve the function of determination
reposed on the trial court. Determination clearly implies a function of
adjudication on the part of the trial court, and not a mechanical
application of a standard pre-determination by some other body. The
word "determination" implies deliberation and is, in normal legal
contemplation, equivalent to "the decision of a court of justice."81
The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot simply take
the AMLC's word that probable cause exists that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity. It will have to exercise its
own determinative function in order to be convinced of such fact. The
account holder would be certainly capable of contesting such probable
cause if given the opportunity to be apprised of the pending application
to inquire into his account; hence a notice requirement would not be an
empty spectacle. It may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry
order may become more cumbersome or prolonged because of the notice
requirement, yet we fail to see any unreasonable burden cast by such
circumstance. After all, as earlier stated, requiring notice to the account
holder should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the bank
records subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and control
of the bank.
Petitioner argues that a bank inquiry order necessitates a finding of
probable cause, a characteristic similar to a search warrant which is
applied to and heard ex parte. We have examined the supposed analogy
between a search warrant and a bank inquiry order yet we remain to be
unconvinced by petitioner.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular
requirements attaching to search warrants that are not imposed by the
AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional warrant
requires that the judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, 82 such examination
being in the form of searching questions and answers. 83 Those are
impositions which the legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the
bank inquiry order under the AMLA, and we cannot find sufficient legal
basis to apply them to Section 11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank
not specifically deny that Lilia Cheng holds rights of ownership over the
three said accounts, laying focus instead on the fact that she was not
named as a subject of either the Makati or Manila RTC inquiry orders.
We are reasonably convinced that Lilia Cheng has sufficiently
demonstrated her joint ownership of the three accounts, and such
conclusion leads us to acknowledge that she has the standing to assail
via certiorari the inquiry orders authorizing the examination of her bank
accounts as the orders interfere with her statutory right to maintain the
secrecy of said accounts.
While petitioner would premise that the inquiry into Lilia Cheng's
accounts finds root in Section 11 of the AMLA, it cannot be denied that
the authority to inquire under Section 11 is only exceptional in character,
contrary as it is to the general rule preserving the secrecy of bank
deposits. Even though she may not have been the subject of the inquiry
orders, her bank accounts nevertheless were, and she thus has the
155