Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96422 February 28, 1994

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
ESTELITO SALVADOR, MARGARITO SILOT, VALENTINA EUSTAQUIO, ANICIA CHICO and
GERMINIA PASCO,respondents.
Kenny H. Tantuico for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The petition mainly questions the withholding of one-half of petitioner's retirement benefits.
I
On January 26, 1980, petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) to
serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987. Petitioner had discharged the functions of
Chairman of the COA in an acting capacity since 1975.
On December 31, 1985, petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other
accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which
covered the period from 1976 to December 31, 1985. The clearance had all the required signatures
and bore a certification that petitioner was "cleared from money, property and/or other
accountabilities by this Commission" (Rollo, p. 44).
After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation to President Corazon C.
Aquino. He relinquished his office to the newly appointed Chairman, now Executive Secretary
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. on March 10, 1986. That same day, he applied for retirement effective
immediately.
Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. All
the signatures necessary to complete the second clearance, except that of Chairman Guingona,

were obtained. The second clearance embodies a certificate that petitioner was "cleared from
money, property and/or accountability by this Commission" (Rollo, p. 49). Chairman Guingona,
however, failed to take any action thereon.
Chairman Guingona was replaced by respondent Chairman. A year later, respondent Chairman
issued COA Office Order No. 87-10182 (Rollo, p. 50), which created a committee to inventory all
equipment acquired during the tenure of his two predecessors.
On May 7, 1987, respondent Chairman indorsed petitioner's retirement application to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), certifying, among other matters, that petitioner was
cleared of money and property accountability (Rollo, p. 52). The application was returned to the COA
pursuant to R.A. No. 1568, which vests in the COA the final approval thereof.
On September 25, 1987, the inventory committee finally submitted its report, recommending
petitioner's clearance from property accountability inasmuch as there was no showing that he
personally gained from the missing property or was primarily liable for the loss thereof (Rollo, pp. 5358).
Not satisfied with the report, respondent Chairman issued a Memorandum directing the inventory
committee to explain why no action should be filed against its members for failure to complete a
physical inventory and verification of all equipment; for exceeding their authority in recommending
clearances for petitioner and Chairman Guingona; and for recommending petitioner's clearance in
total disregard of Section 102 of P.D. No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines). The
members of the committee were subsequently administratively charged.
On January 2, 1988, respondent Chairman created a special audit team for the purpose of
conducting a financial and compliance audit of the COA transactions and accounts during the tenure
of petitioner from 1976 to 1984 (COA Office Order 88-10677; Rollo, pp. 66-67).
On February 28, 1989, the special audit team submitted its report stating: (i) that the audit consisted
of selective review of post-audit transactions in the head offices and the State Accounting and
Auditing Center; (ii) that the audit disclosed a number of deficiencies which adversely affected the
financial condition and operation of the COA, such as violations of executive orders, presidential
decrees and related rules and regulations; and (iii) that there were some constraints in the audit,
such as the unavailability of records and documents, and personnel movements and turnover. While
the report did not make any recommendation, it instead mentioned several officials and employees,
including petitioner, who may be responsible or accountable for the questioned transactions (Rollo,
pp. 73, 147-151).
Respondent Chairman rendered a Decision dated November 20, 1989, in the administrative case
filed against the principal members of the first inventory committee. He found them guilty as charged
and issued them a reprimand. The other members were meted a stern warning, except for one who
was exonerated for not taking part in the preparation of the inventory report.
In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by petitioner on December 27,
1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement
under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 68-69). However, respondent
Chairman added:

. . . In view, however, of the audit findings and inventory report adverted to above,
payment of only one-half () of the money value of the benefits due you by reason of
such retirement will be allowed, subject to the availability of funds and the usual
accounting and auditing rules. Payment of the balance of said retirement benefits
shall be subject to the final results of the audit concerning your fiscal responsibility
and/or accountability as former Chairman of this Commission.
In a letter dated January 22, 1990, petitioner requested full payment of his retirement benefits.
Petitioner was furnished a copy of the report of the special audit team in the letter dated December
21, 1989 of respondent Chairman on January 29, 1990, nearly a year after its completion. Attached
to a copy of the report was a letter dated November 14, 1989 from respondent Chairman, who
required petitioner to submit his comment within 30 days (Rollo, p. 153).
Petitioner submitted a letter-complaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the manner the audit was
conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not authorized by law since it covered closed
and settled accounts.
Upon petitioner's request, he was furnished a set of documents which he needed to prepare his
comment. He was likewise given another 30-days to submit it.
A series of correspondence between petitioner and respondent Chairman ensued. On September
10, 1990, petitioner requested a copy of the working papers on which the audit report was based.
This was denied by respondent Chairman, who claimed that under the State Audit Manual, access to
the working paper was restricted. Petitioner's reconsideration was likewise denied and he was given
a non-extendible period of five days to submit his comment.
Instead of submitting his comment, petitioner sought several clarifications and specification, and
requested for 90 days within which to submit his comment, considering that the report covered a tenyear period of post-audited transactions. Ignoring petitioner's request, respondent Chairman
demanded an accounting of funds and a turn over of the assets of the Fiscal Administration
Foundation, Inc. within 30 days.
II
Petitioner then filed the instant petition. As prayed for by petitioner, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order on January 17, 1991.
Petitioner argues that notwithstanding the two clearances previously issued, and respondent
Chairman's certification that petitioner had been cleared of money and property accountability,
respondent Chairman still refuses to release the remaining half of his retirement benefits a purely
ministerial act.
Petitioner was already issued an initial clearance during his tenure, effective December 31, 1985
(Rollo, p. 44). All the required signatures were present "is cleared from money, property and/or
accountabilities by this commission" with the following notation:

No property accountability under the Chairman's name as the person. Final

clearance as COA Chairman subject to the completion of ongoing reconciliation of
Accounting & P(roperty) records and to complete turnover of COA property assigned
to him as agency head.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility of the Chairman for the disbursement and collection accounts of
this Commission for CYs Sept. '75 to Aug. '85, were completely post-audited,
however as of Dec. 31, 1985, the suspensions and disallowances in the amounts of
P36,196,962.11 and P28,762.36 respectively are still in the process of settlement
(Rollo, pp. 44-45).
Petitioner also applied for a second clearance to cover the period from January 1 to March 9, 1986,
which application had been signed by all the officials, except the Chairman (Rollo, p. 49).
Whatever infirmities or limitations existed in said clearances were cured after respondent Chairman
favorably indorsed petitioner's application for retirement to the Government Service Insurance
System and recommended its approval to take effect on March 10, 1986. In said endorsement,
respondent Chairman made it clear that there were no pending administrative and criminal cases
against petitioner (Rollo, p. 52).
Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be discovered from the audit
concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot withhold
the benefits due petitioner under the retirement laws.
In Romana Cruz v. Hon. Francisco Tantuico, 166 SCRA 670 (1988), the National Treasurer withheld
the retirement benefits of an employee because of his finding that she negligently allowed the
anomalous encashment of falsified treasury warrants.
In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that the employee had
been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and property responsibility, and held that the
retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to
the government.
In Tantuico, we cited Justice Laurel's essay on the rationale for the benign ruling in favor of the
retired employees, thus:
. . . Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the
pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless
otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the
pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was
had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process,
but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the
prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by administrative
action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and enable the
respondent to do indirectly what they can not do directly under Section 3 of the Act
No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on February 21,

1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies Section 624 relied
upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Considering
Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority granted in Section
624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provisions is avoided
(Hunt v. Hernandez, 64 Phil. 753 [1937]).
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the
Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the
Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be
subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended
(The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not
be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes."
Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the
intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of
earning his livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).
Petitioner also wants us to enjoin the re-audit of his fiscal responsibility or accountability, invoking the
following grounds:
1. The re-audit involved settled and closed accounts which under Section 52 of the
Audit Code can no longer be re-opened and reviewed;
2. The re-audit was initiated by respondent Chairman alone, and not by the
Commission as a collegial body;
3. The report of the special audit team that recommended the re-audit is faulty as the
team members themselves admitted several constraints in conducting the re-audit,
e.g. unavailability of the documents, frequent turn-over and movement of personnel,
etc.;
4. The re-audit covered transactions done even after petitioner's retirement;
5. He was not given prior notice of the re-audit;
6. He was not given access to the working papers; and
7. Respondents were barred by res judicata from proceeding with the re-audit (Rollo,
pp. 19-40).
The petition must fail insofar as it seeks to abort the completion of the
re-audit. While at the beginning petitioner raised objections to the manner the audit was conducted
and the authority of respondents to re-open the same, he subsequently cooperated with the
examination of his accounts and transactions as a COA official.
With respect to the legal objections raised by petitioner to the partial findings of the respondents with
respect to his accountability, such findings are still tentative. As petitioner has requested, he is
entitled to a reasonable time within which to submit his comment thereon.

But in order to prepare his comment, petitioner should be given access to the working papers used
by the special audit team. The audit report covered a period of ten years (1976-1985) and involved
numerous transactions. It would be unfair to expect petitioner to comment on the COA's findings of
the report without giving him a chance to verify how those findings were arrived at.
It has been seven years since petitioner's retirement. Since then he was only paid half of his
retirement benefits, with the other half being withheld despite the issuance of two clearances and the
approval of his retirement application. As of the filing of this petition on December 21, 1990, no
criminal or administrative charge had been filed against petitioner in connection with his position as
former Acting Chairman and Chairman of the COA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the
COA to pay petitioner's retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions beginning in March 1991.
The petition is DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify COA Office Order No. 88-10677 and the audit
report dated February 28, 1989 but petitioner should be given full access to the working papers to
enable him to prepare his comment to any adverse findings in said report. The temporary restraining
order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 88278 August 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONALD BALLAGAN, defendant-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the March 30, 1989 Decision 1 in Criminal Case No. 86-CR-0345 which the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet, Branch 8 in La Trinidad, Benguet resolved as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused, Donald Ballagan y Binayan is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known

as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
The dried marijuana leaves subject matter of this case is hereby declared forfeited in favor of
the Government, and it is hereby directed that the same be forthwith turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
In the evening of August 20, 1986, Major Basilio Cablayan of the Philippine Constabulary (PC),
acting on the confidential information that Ballagan would be arriving with prohibited drugs, ordered
the installation of a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet. With Lt. Jerry Valeroso as the leader, the
other members of the team who manned the checkpoint were Sgts. Amado Ablang, Oscar Parajas
and Fontanilla.
From 6:30 o'clock in the evening when they started checking all vehicles passing the area, the team
flagged down 10 to 13 vehicles, some of which had passengers carrying marijuana, before they
were able to apprehend the object of the checkpoint. At 1:45 o'clock in the morning of August 21,
1986, they stopped an Isuzu Elf truck with plate No. 269, laden with vegetables on its way to Baguio
City from Buguais. The truck had four passengers including the driver.
Sgt. Parajas climbed the cargo portion of the truck and found Ballagan, one of the passengers
sleeping, using a brown traveling bag as his pillow. Near the sleeping passenger's back was a rattan
bag locally known as pasiking. Sgt. Parajas woke him up and asked permission to check his
baggage. When Ballagan turned them over to him, he found out that both the bag and
the pasiking contained marijuana. Sgt. Parajas then handed them to Sgt. Ablang who, upon opening
them, confirmed that the pasiking had two bundles of marijuana while the bag had two or three
bundles of the same contraband. Sgt. Ablang handed all the bundles to Lt. Valeroso.
The team questioned the driver and learned that Ballagan had hitched a ride with him. Thereafter,
they brought Ballagan and the confiscated marijuana to the PC detachment at 51 General Luna
Road, Baguio City. The marijuana was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Bado
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet where, Capt. Carlos V. Figueroa, a forensic chemist, applying the
Duguenois Levine Test and the Thin Layer Chromatography on the submitted specimen, positively
identified the same as "marijuana," a prohibited drug. 2 He found as marijuana the 2.4 kilos dried
flowering tops in two bundles wrapped in a plastic container and in a pink straw sack inside
the pasiking as well as the 1.7 kilos dried flowering tops placed in transparent plastic bags inside the
brown-colored bag marked "ADIDAS."
At the General Luna Road detachment, Ballagan executed a waiver of Article 125 3 of the Revised
Penal Code 4even as the Constabulary operatives tried to ferret out more information from him about
drug-trafficking. On December 24, 1986, the following information charging Ballagan with violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, was filed against Ballagan:
That on or about the 20th day of August, 1986; along the Halsema Road at Acop,
Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, without any authority of law, nor any permit from any
government agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess, carry,

transport and deliver from Bad-ayan, Buguias, Benguet to Baguio City five (5) kilos of dried
marijuana leaves which are sources of prohibited or dangerous drugs which is in violation of
the said law.
Contrary to Law.
The date of arraignment of the accused was set by the trial court but the prosecution filed a motion
to suspend proceedings in the case on the ground that the accused had filed a petition for review
before the then Ministry of Justice, as evidenced by the letter-request dated January 12, 1987 of
counsel for the accused. 5 After the trial judge granted the motion, 6 the prosecution manifested that the
Department of Justice had denied the accused's petition for review and prayed that the case be set for
arraignment. 7 The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge on March 31, 1987. 8 The prosecution then
proceeded to present its evidence to prove the commission of the crime.
A camote farmer who did not go beyond the fifth grade, Ballagan was 24 years old when he testified.
On August 20, 1986, he was sent by his brother, Vice-Mayor Leon Ballagan, to his sister who was a
housegirl in Bekkel, La Trinidad, to inform her that their mother was seriously ill of TB at the Tinok
Emergency Hospital. He left their house in Barrio Iheb, Tinok, Ifugao at around 11:00 o'clock in the
morning and hiked the 14 to 15-kilometer distance from Iheb to Bad-ayan from where he intended to
get a ride to Baguio City.
In Bad-ayan, he was able to hitch a ride at the back of the Elf truck of a vegetable dealer. At that time
there were five passengers in the truck three in front and two in the back. Because he was
rushing to see his sister, he did not carry any baggage.
At around midnight, the group had dinner at Km. 32 and Ballagan paid fifty pesos of his P250 pocket
money for their food. 9 After eating, a man holding a brown bag and a pasiking asked their driver for
permission to hitch a ride at the back of the truck.
As the truck proceeded to Baguio City, Ballagan slept and was awakened by armed soldiers at Acop
near the toll gate. As he was getting off the truck, he saw someone running away who was chased
by the soldiers while the rest of the truck passengers were ordered to lie face down on the ground.
The soldiers who identified themselves as members of the NARCOM frisked all of them and then
mauled them. The soldiers took them to a jeep and brought them with their truck to Baguio City.
Since the jeep had a flat tire before reaching the city, Ballagan's group were transferred to their Elf
truck.
The group was investigated at the General Luna station of the PC. The soldiers showed Ballagan
the pasikingand the bag with the marijuana and when he was asked who owned them, he told the
soldiers that the articles belonged to the man who ran away. After the investigation, the soldiers once
again mauled them. After four days, except for Ballagan, the rest of the apprehended persons were
released after each of them had handed over P5,000 to the NARCOM. He, too, was asked to shell
out P5,000 but he could not produce the amount. The P200 remaining of his pocket money was
taken from him by the NARCOM. His brother Leon visited him at the NARCOM office but when he
told Leon about the P5,000 demand of the NARCOM for his release, Leon told him that he had no
money. Ballagan stayed at the NARCOM office for 21 days until he was transferred to the provincial
jail.

Philip Tanawe, one of the vegetable dealers apprehended with Ballagan, testified that he was with
Genaro Tomayan, Teofilo Wanay and Tony Patian in the Elf truck driven by Rogelio Goyong. While
they were in Badayan loading peppers into the truck at around 6:00 o'clock, a person who introduced
himself as Donald Ballagan, asked permission to ride with them. He noticed that Ballagan had no
baggage at all and that he rode at the back of the truck. Along the Halsema Road, they had supper
at a place called Guerilla Saddle. 10
It was then between midnight and 1:00 o'clock in the morning. After eating, a man approached them
and asked for a ride. He was slender and in his mid-30's, had a traveling bag and a knapsack or
rattan bag and climbed in the front part of the truck where Tanawe was seated. In Acop, soldiers
ordered them to alight from the truck and they were made to face the wall of a nearby house while
the soldiers frisked them with guns pointed.
Introducing themselves as NARCOM operatives, the soldiers boxed the members of the group after
finding the traveling bag and the knapsack with the marijuana. The man who last hitched a ride with
hem ran away and the soldiers tried to chase him but since only the tollgate was lighted, the soldiers
gave up. The soldiers did not shoot the man who ran away because there were many trucks coming
along the road. The group was then asked to ride in a jeep which Tanawe failed to describe because
it was dark and raining. Since the jeep had a flat tire, they were transferred to the Elf truck which
proceeded to the General Luna station.
At the NARCOM office, they were asked to tell the truth about the marijuana while the soldiers boxed
them. The investigation lasted all night. He stayed in the office for two nights only while the others
stayed for four nights because his wife was able to produce the P5,000 demanded from each of
them by the NARCOM. However, he did not report the matter to the proper authorities because he
was afraid that he might get "salvaged."
To fortify his claim that he had no baggage when he left home for Baguio City, Ballagan presented
Gabino Botatta, the barangay captain of Iheb (Eheb). Botatta swore that when Ballagan dropped by
his house for a glass of water, Ballagan carried no baggage.
On March 30, 1989, the trial court rendered the aforementioned decision. Ballagan now appeals the
same on the ground that in convicting him, the trial court erroneously gave full faith and credit to the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies while disregarding the testimonies of the defense
witnesses which were the "true and accurate version" of the crime.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that the findings of facts of a trial judge,
who has seen the witnesses testify and who has observed their demeanor and conduct while on the
witness stand, should not be disturbed on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have
been overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. 11 When the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's findings. 12
In its decision, the trial court unequivocally stated that it found "the testimonies of the two
eyewitnesses for the prosecution to be forthright and convincing enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused" and that it was "not convinced by the version of
the defense." We quote with approval the following findings of the trial court which sealed the
culpability of the appellant:

The testimony of the defense's witness, in the person of Barangay Captain Gabino Botata,
36 years old, is to the effect that the accused was not carrying anything when he (accused)
was on his way to Baguio. Even assuming this to be true, that would not necessarily mean
that along the way from the Barangay Captain's house in Eheb, Tinoc, Ifugao, to Bad-ayan
where he was to take his ride and which is admittedly 10 to 11 kilometers away (TSN, March
14, 1988, pp. 4-5), he could not have picked up some baggages. The testimony of another
defense witness, Philip Tanawe, a vegetable dealer who was then one of the passengers of
the same Isuzu Elf that the accused was then riding on, to the effect that he saw the accused
without any baggage in boarding the back portion of the truck cannot be believed. Said
witness is admittedly seated in the front part of the truck along with the driver and another
passenger, and the truck is likewise admittedly fully loaded with 1,500 kilos of vegetables
(TSN, Feb. 23, 1988, pp. 18-19). How could he have seen the accused climb the rear part of
the truck carrying no baggages? Then, again, corroborating the testimony of the accused, he
claims to have seen another person request permission to hitch a ride at Guerilla Saddle; but
unlike the accused who was introduced to him by name, this witness did not know the
second hitch-hiker's name, and even his description except that "I think he is slender" and
"mid-30's" (TSN, supra, pp. 26-27). On the matter of the alleged extortion by the NARCOM
agents of P5,000.00 from each of the six of them who were brought to the NARCOM office,
the witness corroborates a similar claim of the accused. However, this witness did not
explain how his wife came to know of his predicament such that she visited him ready with
the amount for him (TSN, supra, p. 28); and he was evasive and hazy about why, although
he wanted to help the accused, he did not give his statement that would exculpate said
accused before the Fiscal's office; how he came out for the first time to testify in court on
February 8, 1988, for the accused, how the sickly mother of the accused was able to get him
to testify (TSN, supra, pp. 29-30). That story about the alleged P5,000.00 extortion by the
NARCOM agents appear to be a figment of the imagination of the accused and this witness.
If it is true that they were afraid to report this matter to the authorities such as the
investigating fiscal or the defense counsel because of the threat that they would be
salvaged, it is not credibly explained why said accused and this witness are now no longer
afraid. 13
Moreover, if the arresting NARCOM agents indeed prevaricated, no reason therefor was volunteered
by defense. 14 No improper motive was ever imputed to them who, as arresting officers, are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 15 Neither was
there proof of an evil design on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against appellant or
mendaciously implicate him. 16 The lack of any ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers to testify
falsely and impute to appellant a grave offense is of considerable evidentiary weight in assessing the
credibility of witnesses. 17
Appellant's claims that the prosecution witnesses made "fantastic, unnatural and contradicting
statements" 18 are unfounded as the statements singled out by appellant are not really contradictory. He
merely points to what he believes should have been presented by the prosecution. Thus, he bewails the
fact that while the prosecution proved that the checkpoint was installed on account of a confidential
information that appellant would be transporting marijuana, it failed to show "how the information was
obtained or relayed." 19 We find such "lacking evidence" to be a peripheral one which would not add a
shred to the solid prosecution evidence. It should be remembered that the matter of what evidence to
present or who to present as witnesses is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor. Such matter is
definitely not for the courts to dictate. 20 Moreover, the presentation of the informant in a drugs case is not
essential for conviction or indispensable to its successful prosecution. 21 His testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative. 22

The other "fantastic story" which appellant underscores is the established fact that he was caught
sleeping by the soldiers at the checkpoint. To his mind, a person engaged in an illegal activity would
not be so nonchalantly unconcerned as to sleep peacefully with the contraband as pillow. It may now
seem strange to appellant but the fact is, that was how he was caught by the arresting officers. The
situation was not actually "fantastic" or outside the realm of reality the truck was hailed at the
checkpoint during the wee hours of the morning when sleeping was not "unnatural." Be that as it
may, the "inconsistencies" marked by appellant are not major ones which may affect the result of this
appeal. But, if taken into account, they may only be considered the understandable result of natural
differences in the perception of the same set of facts. 23
The appellant claims that there was "unreasonable delay in forwarding the person of the accused
and the transmittal of the records to the proper authorities." 24 An explanation. for this may be gleaned
from the records. In the course of appellant's testimony, he was confronted with the document marked as
Exhibit "F" wherein he "waived" the effects of his detention vis-a-vis Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant admitted having signed it 25 and in the absence of any evidence rebutting it or showing that
appellant was under duress when he executed the "waiver," he cannot now complain about his detention
or the perceived delay in delivering him to the provincial jail.
Moreover, contrary to his contention, such delay does not in any way prove that he was maltreated
while in custody. 26 In fact, appellant himself admitted that while detained in the NARCOM office, he was
free to roam around even if he was not free to go out. 27 Appellant's claim is further handicapped by his
failure to have himself medically examined to prove his alleged mauling and maltreatment. The purported
corroborative testimony of Philip Tanawe on the matter was discredited by the trial court.
The defense of denial interposed by the appellant cannot save him from conviction for denial, which
is self-serving negative evidence, cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 28
Appellant has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, specifically
for transporting marijuana. This law has been amended further by Republic Act No. 7659 which took
effect on December 31, 1993. In People v. Simon, 29 the Court explicitly states that the beneficent
provisions of the law shall be given retrospective effect, specifically the provision which bases the
penalties imposed upon the quantity of the regulated drugs involved subject to certain exceptions
particularized therein. Thus, the provisions beneficial to the accused were applied in such cases
as People v. Martinez, 30People v. Basilgo, 31 People v. Caeja 32 and People v. David. 33
As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizing transportation
of prohibited drugs now reads:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be

the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed.
Section 20 of the Act, as amended also by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the penalty
of reclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be
imposed upon a violator of Section 4 if the marijuana involved is "750 grams or more." If the quantity
is less than 750 grams, the penalty shall "range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity."
The marijuana transported in this case being more than 750 grams, the penalty imposable shall
be reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos. Section 27 of the Revised Penal Code has also been amended by Republic Act No. 7659
such that the duration of reclusion perpetua is now "from twenty years and one day to forty years"
whereas before its amendment, any person sentenced with the penalty "shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty of thirty years."
On the other hand, the penalty of life imprisonment, which was correctly imposed on herein appellant
because no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were proven, 34 has no definite extent or duration.
Thus, in People v. Baguio,35 the Court, through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, clarifies: "Reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not
the same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration." In People v. Gerona, 36 which is also a prohibited drugs case, the Court states:
. . . . The penalty prescribed by Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 for the
commission of the described offense is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
twenty to thirty thousand pesos, and not reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment and reclusion
perpetua are two distinct penalties and are not interchangeable for the latter carries with it
the accessory penalties enumerated in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which
the convict becomes eligible for pardon; whereas life imprisonment does not appear to have
any definite extent or duration.
In all the drugs cases decided by this Court wherein the trial court erroneously interchanged "life
imprisonment" and reclusion perpetua, Court invariably ruled that the former, being the penalty
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6425, should be imposed. With the amendment of the law by
Republic Act No. 7659, however, the penalty is now reclusion perpetua which has a definite duration
of twenty years and one day to forty years. 37 Under these circumstances, which penalty is more
favorable to the appellant life imprisonment which, not having a fixed duration, may, therefore, span the
rest of the natural life of the convict, or reclusion perpetua with a twenty-year minimum penalty?
First, the wealth of jurisprudence in cases wherein "life imprisonment" is imposed is to the effect that
said penalty, unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry accessory penalties. In the event that
Republic Act No, 7659 is applied retrospectively to appellant, he has to suffer not only reclusion
perpetua but also the accessory penalties.
Second, the fine imposed upon appellant is the minimum imposable of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), whereas if he were penalized under the new law, he would have to bear the minimum
fine of P500,000.00. Thus, retrospective application of Republic Act No. 7659, the "heinous crimes

law", in cases wherein the penalty of "life imprisonment" has been imposed by the trial court, would
prove more burdensome upon the appellant and would contradict the basic principle that all penal
laws shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Donald Ballagan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20.000.00)
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87119

April 16, 1991

HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, and THE CITY COUNCIL OF
MANILA, respondents.
The City Legal Officer for petitioner.
Lacuna, Bello & Associates Law Offices for Danilo B. Lacuna.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The only question in this petition, denominated as a "direct appeal under Article VIII, Section 5 (2)
(e), of the Constitution and Section 9(3), of Batas Blg. 129," is whether the City Council of Manila still
has the power to appoint Council officers and employees under Republic Act No. 409, otherwise
known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether the power is now vested with the City Mayor
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code. The facts are as follows:
On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of
Manila, the Hon. Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional
Director of the National Capital Region, the appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the
Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 15, of said Republic Act No. 409, as amended, which reads:

Sec. 15. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other
employees of the Board.
1

The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's office
"comment and/or recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the
City Council may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. The Personnel
Bureau then forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer who, in a 3rd endorsement dated
September 19, 1988, rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and
not the City Council. This opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to the City Mayor to the
Commission.
2

On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to
the opinion of the City Legal Officer, it is the City Council to which the appointing power is vested.
The dispositive portion thereof is as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to rule, as it
hereby rules that the proper appointing authority of the officers and employees of the City
Council of Manila is the City Council and the signatory of individual appointments thus issued
is the City Vice-Mayor of Manila.
4

As we stated at the outset, the issue is whether or not Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of
Manila has been repealed, and as a result, the City Council can no longer tender appointments to
Council positions.
As we also mentioned at the outset, this petition has been brought by way of a "direct appeal" from
the resolution of the Civil Service Commission pursuant supposedly to the Constitution and Batas
Blg. 129. In this connection, we have held that no appeal lies from the decisions of the Civil Service
Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to Section 7,
Article IX, of the Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
5

As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this
Court's certiorari jurisdiction.
6

The petitioner's omission notwithstanding, we are nevertheless accepting the petition and because
of the important public interest it involves, we are considering it as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, considering further that it was filed within the thirty-day period.
7

As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended has supposedly been
repealed by Republic Act No. 5185, specifically, Section 4 thereof, which we quote, in part:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police and City Chief of Fire Department
and other heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or
deputies shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the City
Mayor: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to Judges, Auditors, Fiscals, City
Superintendents of Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health Officers
and City Engineers.
xxx

xxx

xxx

All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds,
road and bridge funds, school funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil service law,
rules and regulations, be appointed by the Provincial Governor, City or Municipal Mayor
upon recommendation of the office head concerned. . . .
8

and by Batas Blg. 337, we likewise quote:

Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers, and Duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) The city mayor shall:

(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and
employees of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code;
9

There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the
Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas
Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws. As the Solicitor
General points out, and we agree with him, it is a canon of statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passage and the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general.
10

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction
is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two
statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.

11

Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put by the Court as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of the particular
case. The Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the
particular case in granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by
adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and
without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to
amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis vs. Cook County, 74 I11. App., 151;
Philippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting 34 Phil., 401.)
1wphi1

12

In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power
under the Charter of the City of Manila to approve the city budget.
13

We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving
mayors the power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds and those of Batas Blg. 337,
empowering local executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the
city," were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to
underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the
President to the local governments and to highlight the autonomy of local governments. They were
not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power granted
by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both
the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.
14

15

In the light of an the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the
respondent Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.