I.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
J-LAMAT REVIEWER

INTRODUCTION
I.

Concept/definition of administrative law

The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the

government and determines competence of authorities who execute
the law and indicates to individual remedies for the violations of his
rights.

II. Scope of administrative law

Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is
intended to control, the administrative operations of the government.

Concept

A.
Definition
of
administrative
agency
An
administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body
charged with administering and implementing particular
legislation. Examples are workers' compensation commissions,
x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any
department,
independent
establishment,
commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau x x x ."

Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226

Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank
questioned the decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of the
former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue.
Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof?

III. Classification of administrative law

A. That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative
agencies and endowing them with power and duties;
B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and
orders promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial functions;
C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of public
agents which conflict with private rights;
D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of
administrative bodies made in the settlement of controversies
arising in their particular fields.

IV. Origin and development of administrative law

V. Advantages of the administrative process

NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only

such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as
government body charged with the administering and implementing
particular
legislation
examples
are
workers
compensation
commissions and the like. The term agency includes any
department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority or bureau.

B.

Test for determining administrative nature

1. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the

protection of the citizens and by a disregard of which their
rights are injuriously affected;

2. Directory if no substantial right depend on it and no

injury can result from ignoring it and purpose of legislature

can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed

and substantially, the same results attained.

C.
Administrative function, defined - Administrative
functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved
upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

Facts: Its a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the
appointment by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo
farinas as the member of ilocos norte provincial committee on justice
created pursuant to presidential order. That his membership in
committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his
present position as executive judge of branch xix, RTC, first judicial
region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue: What is an administrative agency?

Ruling:
Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved
upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence

The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of

members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear

meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the

work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and

controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The
issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the

executive machinery of government and the performance by that
machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions,
determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer
the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of
positive action, of supervision or control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and

control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence "we can
readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on
Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving
the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor
and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences
of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be
adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or
administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

D.
law

Public office, defined in relation to administrative

Fernandez vs Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194

Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C.
Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No.
94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission and the authority of the
Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director
of the Office of the Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of
the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila.
While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by
public respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr.,
Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was
issued .
Issues :
1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to
issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office
of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to
form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and

(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners'

constitutional right to security of tenure.

Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority

and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the
public (radlapsbip)

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the

OCSS, OPERA and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices, consist
of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a
grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises

groups of positions within the agency called the Civil Service

Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable
function or functions these functions are related to one another, each
of them being embraced by a common or general subject matter.
These offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No.

94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as
"effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the
Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These
changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the
one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's
functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and
ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the
country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought
closer physically to the government employees that they are mandated
to serve.
N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the
Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but
rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus a person
may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the
position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records
Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case,
petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without
specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with
respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of
Director IV of the Commission.
E.

Reasons for creation of administrative agencies -

Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987

Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court
dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave
abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.

government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in

their handling of said funds by government auditors.
Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989
Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it
has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies
to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from
the legislature or the courts of justice.

Reyes vs Caneba
Ruling:
"(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary
administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies
is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency
must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a
rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency
acting within the perimeters of its own competence."
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988
Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to
audit them. They contend that they are outside the ambit of
respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or
controlled corporations. This argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of
Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on
Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by
or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. x x x (d)
such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or
indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law
or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity." (Italics supplied) The Constitution formally
embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle

E. Types of administrative agencies

1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is
offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege; (SSS, GSIS,PAO)
2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to carry on certain functions of government; (BIR, LRA,
BoC, BI)
3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is
performing some business service for the public; (Bureau of Posts,
PNR, MWS)
4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to regulate business affected with public interest; (LTFRB,
ERB, HLURB)
5. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking under the police power to regulate private business and
individuals; (MTRCB, GAB, DDB)
6. Those agencies to set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because
of some strong social policy involved. (NLRC, ECC, DAR, COA)

F. Relation between administrative agencies and courts

Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers
which allows them to interpret and apply rules and regulations.
Findings of these administrative agencies are rendered conclusive on
the courts.

G. Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive

Order No. 292)

Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538

1.
Definition of Government of the
Republic of the Phils. - refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.

2.
Definition
of
Agency
of
the
government - refers to any of the various units of the
Government,
including
a
department,
bureau,
office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the

National Government, not integrated within the department
framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

4. Definition of Administration -

US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332

Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with
the crime of libel together with Eduard OBrian.
The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in
the complaint, and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment
at hard labor and a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this
judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.

During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the

defendants asking that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for
in Article 111, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and
under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which motion was
denied by the court, and an exception was also taken to this ruling.
Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the
Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury are in force
in the Philippine Islands.
Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose
hands the reins of government are for the time being.

1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has

been acquired by and belongs to the United States, there is a
difference between such territory and the territories which are a partof the United States with reference to the Constitution of the United
States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the
treaty of Paris, under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from
Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded territory was to be
determined by Congress.
3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States
did not extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within
the general principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal
rights formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, and which
exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution,
and except those express provisions of the Constitution which prohibit
Congress from passing laws in their contravention under any
circumstances; that the provisions contained in the Constitution
relating to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions, and,
consequently, the right to trial by jury has not been extended here by
the mere act of the cession of the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of
the Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence
in the Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession, for trials by jury,
and consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling
the defendants in this case to such trial; that the Court of First

Instance committed no error in overruling their application for a trial

by jury
The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled An Act temporarily to
provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the
Philippine Islands, and for other purposes, in section 5 extends to the
Philippine Islands nearly all of the provisions of the Constitution
known as the Bill of Rights. But there was excepted from it the
provisions of the Constitution relating to jury trials contained in
section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth amendment.
The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a
body expressly recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having
the power to pass laws, and has the power to pass the libel law under
which the defendants where convicted.

II.

A.

Creation,
reorganization,
administrative agencies

and

abolition

of

Creation of administrative agencies

Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196

Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank, On August 2, 1993, she was given a CES
eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. All
was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent
Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 934359. The
resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as
Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.
Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive
service board.

Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution,
the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so
far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by
constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may
decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to
determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether
these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of
existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within
the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit,
abolish the office."

B.

Abolition of administrative agencies

Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787

Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and

qualified pre-war toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission, but was laid off due to the destruction of the
bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was reconstructed and
reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial
Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties, but he
was refused reinstatement.

Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the
position of toll collector.
Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are
more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are
subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not
saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be
impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.

De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294

Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its
enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the president his authority to fix compensation and
allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general interposed a
defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa.

Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion
flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may
abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject
to certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.

Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134

Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting
the Phil College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its
objectives, organizational structure and functions, and expanding its
curricular offerings.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the
former PCC into what is now the PUP.
Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the
educational institution not in its corporate life.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking
authority says so.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its
existing structure and organization bring about the abolition of an

educational institution and the creation of a new one only an express

declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC
were to be understood as transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the
institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing
institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be
added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal
existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization
bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an
express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.

C.

Reorganization of administrative agencies

1. Reorganization, defined

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221

SCRA 145
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of
Laws graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed
Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position
was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD
1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under
permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more
or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on
February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary
status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to
the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia

moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On

October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case
was pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was
renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then
Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the
termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the
ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of
Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of
an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn
referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).

Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the

qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of
Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649
(Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or
NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC
as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and
implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.

Ruling: If the newly created office has substantially new, different or

additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to
create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be
considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or
different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties,
for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and
better systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission.
A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the
requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the
NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new
development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly

held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in
the NILTDRA. The additional qualification was not intended to remove
her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a
valid reorganization measure.

III.

A.

Power of control, supervision and investigation by

the President

Executive power, defined

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of
the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall
determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the
Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare and decided to bar their return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of
the marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the

State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,

under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil
service.
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the
scopes of presidential power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1].
However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to
grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to
Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of
the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these
enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"?
Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to
those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they
assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius."
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollary, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he

prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and
that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance
the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people.
Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII,
Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to
grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to

Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
(more than the sum of the powers enumerated)

B.
Power of control, defined power of the president to
nullify, modify, alter or set aside the decisions of a subordinate.

Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290

Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975
otherwise known as the PNP Organic law placing the Philippine
National Police under the reorganized Department of Interior and
Local Government in pursuant to the provision of the constitution
that the state shall establish and maintain one police force which is
national in scope and civilian in character. The petitioner alleged that
the said law limits only the power of the National Police Commission
into an administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained
with the Department Secretary under whom both the PNP and
NAPOLCOM were placed.

Issue
Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the
Department Secretary of the DILG.

Ruling
The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power
of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. This
Presidential power of control over the executive branch of government

extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the

lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the
Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control
the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in
the executive department.

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised
Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129
creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with
prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit
any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null
and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A
no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue

delegation of legislative power.

Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is

essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be
complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate of determinable

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter,
the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than

that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof

perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same
or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact
an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to
pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials
take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set
aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope
of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may
not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision
of the corresponding provincial board.

Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders
restricting the banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However,
a group of other trawl operators questioned the said executive orders
alleging the same as null and void.

Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.

Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or

ban trawl fishing, the President, in the exercise of his power of control,
can take over from him such authority and issue the executive order
to exercise it. The Presidents power of control means that if a cabinet
secretary or a head of a bureau or agency can issue rules and
regulations, as authorized by law, the President has the power not
only to modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by
another set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.

C.
Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined alter ego
doctrine;

Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47

Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land

titles (Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of
Rizal were amended on the basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by
increasing the respective areas covered by said titles. The
corresponding certifications of the verifications of these resurveys
were issued by the Land Registration Office, headed then by petitioner
Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the court, in instances where
the subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office being
sufficient where the subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however,
it turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far
in excess of the respective corresponding real areas of the lands
involve, so much so that even vast portions of lands and waters of the
public domain not capable of appropriation by any private person or
entity have been included within the expanded titles.
Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the
accused because it used him as a prosecution witness in cases similar
to this case and because Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino, with the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, exonerated the defendant from
any criminal complicity in resurveys with expanded areas.
As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code
places him under the 'general supervision and control' of the
Department of Justice together with other prosecuting officers and
under Section 74 of the same Code, the Secretary of Justice as
'Department Secretary shall assume the burden and responsibility of
all activities of the Government under his control and supervision.
Consequently, the constitutional power of the President of control of
all executive departments, bureaus or offices (sec. 10, Art. VII,
Constitution of the Philippines) should be considered as embracing
his office.
Issue: Can the agent act for and in behalf of the principal.
Ruling: The power of control . . . . implies the right of the President
(and naturally of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. The provisions of
the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific
power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of
bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as

also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have
authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or
revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or
service. Accordingly, the law confers upon the Secretary only 'general
supervision and control' may not be construed as limiting or in any
way diminishing the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control
which is constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of the
President. Acts of the (alter ego) secretary is presumed to be that of the
president.
D.

Limitations on the power of control

Does not include:

1. the abolition or creation of an executive office;
2. the suspension or removal of career executive officials or
employees without due process of law;
3. the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions
of quasi-judicial agencies, including the office of the President,
on contested cases to have become final pursuant to law or to
rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law;

E.

Power of supervision

Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143

Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954
Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1)
rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than
the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary
indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April
the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to
his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the
provincial governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the
provincial, governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the

petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to

hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with the
hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration
that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial
governor is illegal and without legal effect.

Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction

Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct

control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and, offices under
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of
any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the
provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head
direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments
and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of
a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article
VII, of the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The

power to oversee that the officials concerned performs their duty and
if they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action or steps
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973

Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme Court
by the Provincial Governor and the members of the Provincial Board of
Pangasinan to nullify the disapproval of the Secretary of Finance of
their Resolution abolishing the positions of three special counsel in
the province, to prohibit the provincial treasurer and the district from
paying the salaries if three special counsel and to prevent the latter
from continuing to occupy and exercise the functions incident to their
positions.
Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the
Secretary of Finance.
Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance
has the power to revise their budget, local governments should be
given a large degree of freedom in determining for themselves the
propriety and wisdom of the expenses that they make provided that
the expenses contemplated are within their financial capacity. The
supervisory authority of the President over local governments is
limited by the phrase as provided by law and where there is no law
in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised, it must be
exercised in accord with general principles of law. The Secretary of
Finance is an official of the central government, not of provincial
governments, which are distinct and separate. The power of general
supervision granted to the President over local governments, in the
absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be
interpreted to mean that hem or his alter ego the Secretary of
Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall
perform or comply with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the
act of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three
special counsel not being contrary to law, nor an act of
maladministration, nor an act of abuse, the same may not be
disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting as a representative of

he President by virtue of the latters power of general supervision over

local governments.

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the
absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the
Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila
Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a
letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local
Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and
seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted.

Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the

officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and
ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided
by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it

was denied by respondent Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to
entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the
Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that the
respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with
jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of
the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to
promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the
Local Government Code.

Presidential power over local governments is limited by the

Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." The general
supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of
Local Government.

F.

Power of review of other executive officers, defined

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294

Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is
necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is
necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the
subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice,
unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is
called to his attention by the official exercising the power of
supervision and review over him.

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned

anywhere by such name in the 1987 Constitution, can be inferred
from its provisions. The heart of the doctrine is that the basic powers
of the government must be kept separate from each other, each power
being under the principal control of a branch of government. The
legislative power is granted to the Congress, the executive power to the
President, and the judicial power to the Judiciary. The President as
Chief Executive exercises control over agencies and offices which
perform rule-making or adjudicatory functions. If the agency is
created by Congress, consider the law that created it. If the law is
silent as to the control which the President may exercise, the
President can only supervise, i.e., to see to it that the laws are
faithfully executed.

B.

Purpose of doctrine

So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one

department (one person or group of persons) that would lead to
abuse.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I.

Distribution of powers of government:

C.
Blending of powers though each department has their
own duties and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same
in concert that they can work with other departments and
conduct checks and balances regarding the actions of each.

1.
Legislative power is the power to propose,
enact, amend and repeal laws.

Doctrine of separation of powers

A.

2.
Executive power is the power to execute and
implement the laws.
3.
Judicial power is the power of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving legal
rights which are demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Basis for blending of powers:

1.
No function is capable of exact definition.
Description is only a generalization concerning its
principal but not all of its characteristics;
2.
The Constitution allocated to the several
departments specific powers which in their nature did
not ordinarily pertain to them.

3.
Practical necessity of exercising powers
incidental to those that are express or are appropriate
to it, even if such incidental powers should fall within
the category of functions pertaining to another
department.

a. Doctrine of non-delegation of powers - what has been

delegated cannot be delegated.

i.

General rule

US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327

Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where
the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it
must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed.

ii.

Exception to the general rule

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726

Facts: Calalang, in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public
works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of
Public Works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn
vehicle for a specific time.

The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public

Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to
legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the

country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is invalid

delegation of legislative power.

The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of

rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.

Issue: WON the said constitute an invalid delegation of legislative

power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid
delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.
iii.

Prohibition against re-delegation; exceptions

KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386

Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the

memoranda no. 92-009 issued by the DOTC and LTFRB which,
among others, to authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to
increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without
application there for with the LTFRB and without hearing and
approval thereof by said agency and other matters.

Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?

Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid.
Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the
power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the
existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under
Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said
executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve
and periodically review and adjust reasonable fares, rates and other
related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation
services provided by motorized vehicles."

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is

permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern
life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the
difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining
sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the
transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the
power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an
administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB may implement broad
policies laid down in a statute by neither filling in" the details which
the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide.
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the
regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate
that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public
service.

The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to

set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal
and invalid as it is tantamount to art undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been
delegated cannot be delegated.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing and its
far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not
relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit
and profit from the industry.

American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803

Oct. 14, 1975
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus
with preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending
interference and cancellation proceedings, questions the validity of
Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases as amended which authorized the Director
of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear inter
partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also provided that judgment
on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment made by
the Director on the Rule vesting hearing officers authority to hear
their cases was illegal and void because under the law, it is the
Director who should personally hear the cases of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his
functions.

Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an

administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is
entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed
necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and provisions

may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular

function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it
has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law and
RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the
designation of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the
power and authority entrusted to the Director suggests that the
aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid
official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and
expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws.
Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since that the
parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of law nor
the requirements of fair hearing require the actual taking of testimony
before the same officer who will make the decision.

b. Powers of administrative agencies, in general

A.

months which limited the time period to legitimize such clandestine

operations by certain taxicab operators.

Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal
taxicab operators under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.

Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of

such powers granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its
promulgation. It is a settled principle of law that in determining
whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority
given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for
which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being
germane to the law.

Sources of powers of an administrative agency

Heirs of Santiago Pastral vs Secretary of Public Works 162 SCRA 619
1.
Constitution is the body of rules and
principles by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established, limited and defined.
2.
Statutes rules and regulations promulgated by
the legislature.

B.

Limitations to the powers of an administrative agency

Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a

case against herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works
and Communications for the reason that latter were encroaching a
part of the river with their fishpond. The petitioner countered that
they were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries. The secretary
of public works designated the City Engineer to conduct hearings on
the same and eventually ordered the same be removed. Petitioners
went to the Court of First Instance to assail the decision of the
secretary and obtain an injunction which were ruled in their favor.
The secretary appealed the lower courts decision.

Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1

Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators.
Private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent board for
the legalization of their unauthorized taxicab units citing PD 101 in
order to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine
operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and
responsible operators. Petitioners contend that the BOT does not have
jurisdiction over the case since the law provided a period of six (6)

Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an

investigation and order the removal of the encroachment made on the
river.

Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any

provision or provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
construction or building of dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into
any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other

navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered removed

as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein provided x
x x. The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was issued
in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the
Secretary's more specific authority to remove dikes constructed in
fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of any
navigable river or stream or would cause inundation of agricultural
areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover, the
power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear public
streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was
granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has
been upheld by this Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth
(69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same
rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos etc., et al. v.
Secretary of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).

C.

Nature of the powers of administrative agencies

Quasi legislative consists of issuance of rules and

regulations; general applicability; and prospective in
application;

Quasi Judicial refers to orders, rewards or decision; applies

to a specific situation; and determination of rights,
privileges,etc. (fact finding investigate)

Depends on the enabling statute

D.

Express and implied powers

against policemen shall be referred by the mayor and investigated by

the city or municipal council.

Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec.

22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service
exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separate
policemen and employees of the City of Manila in competitive service.

Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not

inconsistent with the power of the City Council under Republic Act
557 to decide cases against policemen and the power of the City
Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove city
employees in the classified service.

Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal,
suspension or separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor,
can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Nonetheless, the Commissioner's "final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension" of classified service employees
presupposes, rather than negates, the power vested in another official
to originally or initially decide the removal, separation or suspension
which the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to pass upon.

Such power, furthermore, is subject to an express limitation contained

in Section 16(i), namely, the saving clause "Except as otherwise
provided by law." Accordingly, it does not obtain at all in those
instances where the power of removal is by law conferred on another
body alone, with no appeal therefrom, as in the case provided for in
Section 14 of Republic Act 296.

Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498

Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum
which provided for the procedure of removal and suspension of
policemen. Petitioner herein contends that the Civil Service Act
impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others, that charges

LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292

Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the deleterious

effect of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the

surrounding area. It has the power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order under RA 4850 and its amendatory laws. Moreover, the
power to make, alter, or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution is also impliedly bestowed upon LLDA by EO 927.

Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers

It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency has only
such power as are expressly granted to it by law, likewise an
administrative agency has also such power as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers.

Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750

Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of
explanation and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued by the
COA. The case stemmed from the hiring of a private lawyer, Atty.
Satorre, who was compensated by virtue of a contract entered by the
NPC and the former. The COA held several persons liable for payment
of the amount due to said lawyer which included herein petitioner.
Petitioner contends the nature of services that was contracted with
the lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a memorandum
prohibiting the hiring of private lawyers without following the
necessary procedures required by the COA.

Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in
this case?

Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that

government agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their
hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or handle their cases.
No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private lawyers
unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity
and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular
is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of

public funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the

government. This is in line with the Commission on Audits
constitutional mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411

Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several government
departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the
year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19,
1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued
Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum
amount of P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section
7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of
productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.
Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in
excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby
directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within
a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the
issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their
salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before the Supreme
Court to seek relief.

Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid.

Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards

promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each
department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary

expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers

and employees of the government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts
contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts
or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to,
their official employment." (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V).

Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or

agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in
the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of
the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly
empowered alter ego.

RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237

Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645

Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman

directing the preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of graft
and corruption.

Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend

government officials and employees pending investigation of
administrative complaints.

Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively

suspend officers as contained in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.

E.

Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty

Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593

Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued
by the respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further
hearing thereof. AMA Computer College situated in Davao city
operated as an Educational Institution without the required
authorization that must be secured first before the DECS. As a
consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the
said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two
governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the
RTC Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure
pending the approval of the request to operate of the said school. The
said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the
requirements prescribed by the Department. The said case was
dismissed, undaunted the private respondent appeal before the CA
which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The private
respondent then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati with the
same cause of action now using the organization of the parents of
their students. The said court presided by the respondent Judge
issued the preliminary injunction sought by the private respondent.
Hence, this petition. The private respondent contended that the same
should be permitted to operate because DECS is only performing a
ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on the other hand
contended that it exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the
provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.

Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or

discretionary function.

Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised

discretionary power with respect to the issuance of permit to operate
as an educational institution. The Court further distinguished
ministerial and discretionary powers. A purely ministerial act or
duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act

done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the

judgment of the DECS in securing the quality education that an
educational institution should provide pursuant to the constitutional
provision on education and the organic law authorizing said
department to issue rules and regulations pertinent thereto.

Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280

Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land.
RTC ruled in favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for
private respondent. Petitioner filed relief from judgment. Judge denied
petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus.

Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from

judgment is ministerial?

Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging

on the appeal is discretionary.

1.
Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment (remedy
mandamus)

2.
Discretionary power, defined - If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives

him the right to decide how or when the duty shall

be performed (remedy certiorari)

3.
Importance of knowing distinction
determine the remedies available

4.
Delegation
power

of

ministerial

and

to

discretionary

Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154

Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement to
the Office of General Manager in the Department of Tourism. In 1986,
petitioner was designated by then Minister Gonzales as General
Manager of the PTA. The Minister sought the approval of the president
which was favored by the latter. In 1990, respondent was the new
Secretary of Tourism and asked for the resignation of the petitioner.
The president issued a memorandum to Garrucho designating him as
General Manager for the reason that petitioner was not appointed by
the President as required by PD 564 but only by the Secretary of
Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends that he was validly
appointed to the position since that the act of then Minister Gonzales
was also the act of the president which presumes that the act of the
department heads were the act of the president.

Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his position.

Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General

Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment
involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot
be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister
Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of
the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was

not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly

performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be
a member of the Cabinet.

thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of the total amount

collectible as informers reward.

Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to
another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was
deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion,
and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been
given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

F.
Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory
duties and powers

Article 5 Civil Code

Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity.

1.
Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and
effect
Sarina vs CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715
Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either
positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or
negatively that something be not done, leaving the person concerned
no choice on the matter except to obey.
2.

Permissive/directory statute, defined and effect

Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by

law with the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the
collection of taxes has after a mature and thorough study rendered
his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision
is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of Finance (whose act is
that of the President unless reprobated), such decision or ruling is a
valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and
cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary
view, whereby any stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and
control the official functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption
of the operations of the government.

Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or

discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such
a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose
can be accomplished in a manner other that prescribed and
substantially the same result obtained.

G.

Error in the exercise of powers

1.
Doctrine of non-suability of the state
inapplicable the state cannot be sued without its
consent.

Meralco Securities Corp. vs Savellano 117 SCRA 804

Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus
issued by Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities
Corporation to pay and petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to collect from the former the amount of 51M by way of alleged
deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests and surcharges due

Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713

Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in
a school (navy based) which was denied even though she was

qualified. Filed a case against the military officials concerned because

of discrimination. The military invoked the non-suability of the state.

Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules
and decision had became moot.

Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.

Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly
performed; and it is 'particularly strong as regards administrative
agencies x x vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in
connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of
activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a
technical or special training, 'aside from a good knowledge and grasp
of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the
nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our
Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the
findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is
absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial.

Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the

petitioner is questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the
officials not their office by virtue of their official capacity.

2.

Estoppel inapplicable

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348

Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of
administrative agency cannot bind the government, therefore
estoppels does not apply.

Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.

c. Investigatory Powers
i.

3.

Scope and extent of powers

Presumption of regularity

Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716

Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut
Authority and established a coconut stabilization fund. The members
were originally 11 but reduced to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman
of the coconut authority initiated a special coconut end-user
companies which included the petitioner. The chairman directed to
collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply the same to
settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to
release the subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of
the disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that
the COA Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused the
withholding of the subsidy case endorsed to the court.

De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to

inspect, secure, require the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise. They are conferred on
practically all administrative agencies. In fact, the investigatory
powers of administrative agencies, or their power and facilities to
investigate, initiate action, and control the range of investigation, is
one of the distinctive functions which sets them apart from the court.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and alliance
of concerned teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as mass
concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been bought to the latters

attention. As a result of the said action, the DECS secretary dismissed

from the service one of the private respondents and the other nine
were suspended.

Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of
cases. 2. Won the CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice
even quasi-judicial bodies do?

Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of

controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in
controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions.

Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power

over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation
involving civil or political rights.

The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication
power is that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make
findings of facts as regard claimed human rights violation involving
civil and political rights.

The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of

controversy is not judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in controversy
may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes or review as may be provided by law.

The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to

adjudicate.

Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to

investigate?
Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to
investigate depending on the law granting such power.

Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without

quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power? Yes. For the reason that
some agencies are formed for the sole purpose of investigation
only (fact finding, etc.)

Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502

Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project
in order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8
million people in the Metropolitan area. The project was financed by
funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the
National Government.

MWSS caused the publication or an invitation for pre-qualification

and bids. The major factors considered in the evaluation were the
applicants financial condition, technical qualification and experience
to undertake the project. Private Respondent Phil. Large Diameter
Pressure Pipes Manufacturers Association sent letters offering
suggestions on the technical specifications.

Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE

recommended F.F Cruz and Inc. but other members both disagreed
and opted for a rebidding bating the contract to be awarded to Joint
Venture. But MWSS Board Committee on construction Management
and Board Committee on Engineering that contract be awarded to F.F.
Cruz and Co., Inc. being the lowest complying bidder.

PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the

Ombudsman a letter-complaint protesting the public bidding

conducted by the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes and

urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation there on.

Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power,

functions and duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS
was diverted to set aside the recommendation of MWSS to award
contract.

Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that

respondent
Ombudsman
acted
beyond
the
jurisdiction
notwithstanding that Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act, which
enumerated the administrative act, or omission that may not be the
subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts the same by
his office.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take

cognizance of PLDPPMAs complaint and to correspondingly issue its
challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to se
aside the recommendation of the PBAC-CTSE.

Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory

power and public assistance duties that can be found in the first and
second part of Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution. While the broad
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which
xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient may be yielded, it is
difficult to equally concede however, that the constitution and the
Ombudsman Act have intended to confer upon it veto or provisory
power over an exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.

While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or

omission of any public officer or employee, other than those
specifically excepted under the Constitution and Republic Acts No.
6770, which appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, is broad,
the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to confer
upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of

judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of

whether to accept or reject a bid and award contract vested by law in a
government agency, which involves the exercise of discretion, the
Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the award and
granting it to another bidder.

Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545

Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor
Delloso who was charged before the Special Prosecutor with
multiple murder. Governor Delloso questioned the said referral to
the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no jurisdiction over the
case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official
function as governor.
Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the
case.
Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the
people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and
duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of any
public officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. Ombudsman is also empowered to
direct the officer concerned, in this case the Special Prosecutor, to
take appropriate action against a public official and to recommend
his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not
required that the act or omission be related to or be connected with
or arise from the performance of official duty.

Requirement of notice and hearing when the law is

silent, notice and hearing may be dispensed with, which
depends upon the stage of the proceedings. (substantial right
can be given notice and hearing)

ii.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for
alleged violation of many criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a

panel of lawyers to review and study the request. Pending the review,
MJ requested copies of all documents and papers relative to the
request that the proceedings be suspended for the meantime. The
DOJ denied the request, hence MJ filed a petition for mandamus
before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish him the
documents. The RTC of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a status quo
ante, hence the DOJ filed an appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during the
preliminary or the evaluation stage of the extradition treaty against
him.

Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the
propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly
granted to the prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the law is
silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.

with the comment of the Solicitor General for the public respondents
it being that the pleadings and papers already filed were already
adequate for them to act on said petition.

Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse
of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed administrative orders. / Was the petitioner
entitled to be informed of the findings of an investigative committee
created to inquire into charges against him?

Ruling : Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and

recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire
into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative
decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the
evidence presented against him during the hearings of the
investigating committees.

Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439

Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695
Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of
the court of appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari
and prohibition to review the decision of the executive secretary.

Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University

who was dismissed by the President of the Philippines from his
position after investigation of a committee on several charges against
him. Petitioner undertook to ask for a reconsideration on the same
which respondent Drilon, as executive secretary denied. Petitioner
filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with a prayer for TRO which
granted the latter prayer. After eight days, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
TRO. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition
was not meritorious and a case of forum shopping. The SC dispensed

Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and

injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who
was later replaced by Secretary Pefianco, praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and
that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Moral was
ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did not
appeal the judgement .

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of

cause of action but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which sustained the
trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the

petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss.

Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be

informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial
evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the
charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of
the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded
these rights.

administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the

investigation.

Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the
authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.

Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as

a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege
would thus be unwise.

v.

Executive power to investigate, source

iii.

Right to counsel in administrative investigations a

counsel may or may not assist a person under investigation.
(Remolona v. CSC)

Section 64c Revised Administrative Code

iv.

Importance of administrative investigations

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99

Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order
of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al.
which order that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from
further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding
investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in

the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the
power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum,

Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good

of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action
or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and
in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or
person by whom such investigation shall be conducted.

Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code

Residual Powers unless congress provides otherwise, the

President shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for under the laws
and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are
not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713

Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise
tax service of the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino.
Sometime in 1992, a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan
convicting petitioner of grave misconduct. Acting on a report by then
acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through its executive

secretary, issued a memorandum creating an executive committee to

investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner submitted a position paper as required by the committee.
Consequently, the president issued a memorandum which streamlined
the operations of the BIR abolishing some of the offices which
included the office of excise tax and another memorandum dismissing
herein petitioner from office as a result of the investigation. Petitioner
contends that he is a Career Executive Service officer and he cannot
be removed. On the other hand, respondents contended that since
petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining
authority of the president.

Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the
president have the power to order an investigation against herein
petitioner?

Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of

the Career Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the
president. As a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of
the Civil Service, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of
the president in line with the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the Constitution. The
memorandum issued by the president which created a committee to
investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant
to the power of removal by the president. However, the power of
removal is not absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service
officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may only be
removed through a cause enumerated by law.

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the

Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in

the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the
power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum,
administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.

Issue : Whether or not PARGO has the power to issue subpoenas

Ruling : The subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to

respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence
of the Agency to issue.

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course

of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether
or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a
complaint.

Requirements in issuing a subpoena:

1. Within the authority of the agency

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order
of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al.
which order that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from
further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding
investigation against petitioner.

2. Information is reasonably relevant

3. Demand is not indefinite

d. Quasi-legislative /Rule-Making Powers

Remolona vs CSC 362 SCRA 304

Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office
service in Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired
from the Civil Service Commission as to the status of the Civil Service
eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of 81.25% of as per report
of rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. After an
investigation, Remolonas name is not in the list of passing and failing
examinees. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring
the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge and that he
did it because he wanted them to be together.

A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C.

Remolona and Atty. Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility,
falsification and dishonesty. CSS found Estelito Remolona and Nery
remolona guilty but Nery Remolona was absolved from legibility. On
appeal, CA dismissed the petition and therefore a review by the SC.

People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450

Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation,
penalizing electro fishing in fresh water.

Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84

penalizing electro fishing.

Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to
declare what act constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now
punishable by virtue of PD 704. Thus, an administrative regulation
must be in harmony with law; it must not amend an act of the
legislature. In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it
must clearly appear that the order falls within the scope of the
authority conferred by law.

Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of
the fact that the offense committed was not done in the performance
of his official duty.

Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty

of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are
not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in
office.

1.
Ordinance power of the President/Delegation to
the President

The president has the power to issue rules and regulations

(executive orders, proclamations, etc.)

Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution

Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.

i.

Nature of power, definition Administrative agencies

are endowed with powers legislative in nature or quasilegislative, and in practical effect, with the power to make law.
However, the essential legislative functions may not be
delegated to administrative agencies and in this sense, it is
said that administrative agencies have no legislative power and
are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.

Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code

Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated
in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate
to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made
to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have
the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which
only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters
relating to internal administration, which the President desires to
bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance,
shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the
President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders
restricting and banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a

group of other trawl operators questioned the said executive orders

alleging that the same is null and void.

Issue

: Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was valid.

Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality

allowed thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays
down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at
least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the
administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to
implement or enforce said policy.

EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the
agencies functions.
Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259
Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in
the manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the
Philippines assailed the constitutionality of Act 2613, allegedly
depriving them of their right of exporting cigars to the United States
due to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue
certificate of origin and that the cigars were not manufactured of long
filler tobacco produced exclusively in the province of Cagayan, Isabela
or Nueva Viscaya.

Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized

to make rules and regulations which are not within the scope of Act
2613.

Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue

was that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed
and defined and that all of these who produce tobacco of the same
standard would have equal rights and opportunities. Such delegated
power the rules and regulations promulgated should be confined to
and limited by the power conferred by the legislative act.

The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules and

regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and
regulations for the classification, marking and packing of leaf or
manufactured tobacco of good quality and the handling of it under
sanitary conditions.

2.

Delegation to the Supreme Court

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition by
changing scope of its reg product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic
stiles. Mariwasa oppose filed motion for reconsideration. Mariwasa
filed petition for review with respondent CA. it is temporarily
restrained BOI from implementing decision, 20 days lapsed without
respondent court issuing preliminary injunction. Lepanto filed motion
to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over BOI vested with SC.

Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI.
It simply deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to
regulate by virtue of its cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91
repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as the manner of appeal.
Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to be filed with
SC, are brought to CA.
3.

Delegation to LGUs

Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject
to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees,
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral
representation as may be prescribed by law.

Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160

SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted

by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
Sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or
city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief
executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on
each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to
reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned may override the
veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its
members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all
legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive
concerned to the Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a
province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality;
otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had
signed it.

(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon

approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the Punong
Barangay.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The
local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on
the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare,
stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have
the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations
ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development
plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the
payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall
not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item
or items shall not take effect unless the Sanggunian overrides the veto
in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the
appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those
vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only
once. The Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief
executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members,
thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of
the local chief executive concerned.
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal
Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a)
Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sanggunian
Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the
resolutions approving the local development plans and public
investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances
and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the
documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of
ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which

may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its

decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or
resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after
its enactment, the Sangguniang Barangay shall furnish copies of all
Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent
with law and city or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case
may be, fails to take action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case
may be, finds the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or
municipal ordinances, the Sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and
recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay concerned for
adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity
of the Barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the
revision called for is effected.

ii.

Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330

Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil

Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26)
years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In
1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department
of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage free and active
participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4)
years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon
approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of
deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy
industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation
of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall
be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because
it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional

and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180
is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as
cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the
Constitution.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a

valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the

sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running not.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our

constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative
power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity
of the task of government. To cede to the Executive the power to make
law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of
separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict
scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action
cannot infringe the terms of agency.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533

Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern
shipping lines for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that
herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower
court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA.

The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner

insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars.
Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its
constitutionality.

Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional

Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port

authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its

duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA

circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is
dismissed.

of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in

view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.

Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70

Phil. 221

With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication

of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty
of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and towards
the approval of the practice by the courts.

Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in

transporting passengers in Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija and
Zambales by means of TPU buses for 20 years. It filed with Public
Service Commission to be authorized to operate ten additional new
Brockway Trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with
the terms and conditions of its current certificates. As a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The Public Service
Commission denied it. Motion for Reconsideration denied. Petition for
a writ of certiorari filed.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public
Service Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454
constitute a complete and total abdication of the Legislatures
functions and thus unconstitutional and void.
(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its
authority.

Held:
(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8
of Art. XIII of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or
any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be for a longer period than fifty years and when it was
ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public Service Commission
may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate. That it
shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the
period shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been
delegated to the commission is the admin function\, including the use

(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is

founded upon the police power, applicable not only to those public
utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation.

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726

Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the

constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public
works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of
Public works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn
vehicle for a specific time.

The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public

Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to
legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the
country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is an invalid
delegation of legislative power.

The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of

rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.

Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of

legislative power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid
delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President
of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.

iii.

Limitations on the rule-making power

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003

Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission,
Commissioner
Joseph
A.
Santiago,
Deputy
Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C.
Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that
the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the

Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the

Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in
the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum

Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such,
petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional
Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs NLRC 106 SCRA 444

Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of

Labor issued on May 1, 1977 a set of rules which exempts not only
distressed employers but also "those who have granted in addition to
the allowance under P.D. 525, at least P60.00 monthly wage increase
on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those who paid less than
this amount shall pay the difference (paragraph k of said rules).

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory

authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore
void. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the administration of the statute, necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. It is of
elementary knowledge that an act of Congress cannot be amended by
a rule promulgated by an administrative agency. "It seems too clear for
serious argument that an administrative officer cannot change a law
enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of
the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a
nullity."

iv.

Requisites for valid delegation of quasi-legislative power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330

Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26)
years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In
1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department
of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage free and active
participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4)
years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon
approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of
deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy
industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation
of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.

Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall
be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because
it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional

and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180
is not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy
but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law
violates the Constitution. The right call therefore should be for
Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms to the
Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a
law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may
cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in
tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in
pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal
profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental
principles of the Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the
Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest
it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and
guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The
Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the
people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The
protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of
greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the
exoteric of living and less with the esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as
long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be
vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from

the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic

rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

1.
Completeness test the law must be complete in
all its items and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the
only thing they will have to do is enforce it (Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)

What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative

in nature. He cannot determine what the law shall be.

US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern
shipping lines for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that
herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower
court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner
insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars.
Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its
constitutionality.

Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional

Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port

authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its
duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA
circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is
dismissed.

People vs Vera 65 Phil 56

Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November
1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter
alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that
he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in
the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred
the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition
for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng.
The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not
been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason
that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with
the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of
the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised
concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge
Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng
"es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands
convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's
petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention
to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937.
This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration
submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for
hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the
petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had

just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of
the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance
of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and
forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear
before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for
execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu
Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both
motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for
execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion
for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on
19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to
the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to
what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila
which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable
Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of
the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a
final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly
suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the
Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present
case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the
present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without

saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of
the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws.

2.
Sufficient standard test to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority by defining
legislative policy and indicating circumstances under
which it is pursued.

Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.

Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253

Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734,
authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the
establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order
issued by the President pursuant to such authority, Providing for the
Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanano. Four
provinces includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi
voted in favor of creating an autonomous region, thus became ARMM.
After the plebiscite, E.O 429 as amended by E.O 439 was issued by
the Chief Executive providing for the Reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The contentions of the
Petitioners contends that R.A 6734 is unconstitutional because 1.) it
unduly delegates the legislative power to the President by authorizing
him to merge the existing regions. 2.) the power granted is not
expressed in the title of the law.

Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard by

which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power
granted.

Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the subject

expressed in the title of the law.

Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be

gathered or implied, nor it be found in the law challenged because it
may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the
challenged legislation.

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an
index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all provisions of the statute are pertinent to that subject. The
Reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is pertinent to
the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be

gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as
that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge
existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the
same policy underlying the grant to the President in the law.

Cervantes vs Auditor General L-4043 26 May 1952

Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers
Corporation. Its board of directors granted quarter allowances to
petitioner. Submitted to the control of the government enterprise
council created in EO 93 in pursuance to RA 51 for approval, the
resolution was disapproved on recommendation by auditor general. 1.
That quarter allowance constituted additional compensation
prohibited by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition of NAFCO.

Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by

certiorari/

Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is

unconstitutional being an undue delegation of legislative power to
executive.

Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative lays down policy and a
standard is established by the statute there is no undue delegation.
RA 51 is authorizes the president to make reforms and changes in the
government controlled corporation for the purpose of promoting
simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. This lays down
a standard and policy. pursuant to this authority, the president
promulgate EO 93 creating government enterprises council with
power to pass upon the program of activities and yearly budget of
member corporations. Petition is dismissed.

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised
Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129
creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with
prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit
any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null
and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A
no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue

delegation of legislative power.

Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is

essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be
complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate of determinable

1.
power which is not directly or exclusively
a legislative one and has no relation whatsoever
to personal or property rights;

Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659

Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order
issued by the President of the Philippines prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No.
626 particularly with respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner was
affected to the said order with the contention that the said order is an
invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the industry. The
Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper delegation of
legislative power to the President of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of

power.

Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation
of power. The court further ruled that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion
in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons,
the court declared Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
3.
Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient
legislative standards

2.
power to regulate a mere matter of
privilege

v.

Issues on validity of legislation

1.
Against the delegating statute itself --- whether
or not the requisites of valid delegation are present;
2.
Against the exercise of the delegated power --whether or not the rule or regulation conforms with
what the statute provides and whether the same is
reasonable.

Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837

Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's
driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991,
from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the
Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain
conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine
National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office
had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with
the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum.

Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.

Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2)
enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from
removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized
under LOI 43) and confiscating driver's licenses for traffic violations
within the said area.

Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the

challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion,

whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a
statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605
remains effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license
plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI
43) and of driver's licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.

An ordinance to be valid:

Must not be in contravention of the constitution

Must not be oppressive

Must not be discriminatory

Must not regulate or prohibit trade

Must not be against a statute

vi.

Rule and rule-making, defined

Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in,
or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The
term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights
of, or procedure available to, the public.
Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation,

amendment, or repeal of a rule.

Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161

Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State
University asked the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied
honoraria and per diems claimed under the National Compensation
Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel including petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are
valid.
Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any
applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or
propriety of which it does not agree at least not before such law or
regulation was set aside by authorized agency of government as
unconstitutional or illegal and void.
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative
bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to
great respect.
Supplementary legislation A statute which leaves to the executive
the power to fill in the technical details in view of the latters expertise
is a recognized delegation of legislative power.

Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not

1.

Classification of rules and regulations

a. Those issued by an administrative superior
and directed exclusively to the subordinates --rules and regulations of internal administration
to be observed by subordinate officials for the

prompt and efficient dispatch of government

business and to facilitate the transactions of the
general public with the government;
b. Those directed not only to the inferior
officers but also and primarily to private
individuals, fixing the manner by which the
terms of a statute are to be complied with.
2.

Types of rule-making powers

2.1.
Rule-making by reason of particular
delegation of authority (supplementary or
detailed legislation)--- refers to the power to
issue rules and regulations which have the force
and effect of law;
2.2.
Rule-making by the construction and
interpretation of a statute being administered
(interpretative legislation)--- refers to the power
to interpret and construe the statutes entrusted
to them for implementation;
2.3.
The ascertainment of facts which will
form the basis for the enforcement of a statute
(contingent legislation or determination).

vii.

Supplementary/detailed legislation
1.

Source enabling law;

2.

Requisites for validity:

Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22

Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that
part of the decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister
of Natural Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned
and lost their rights over their mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or
encroachment between two mining claims.

Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against

private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the
"Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no
conflict between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.

Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974,
the provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres.
Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in
order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of
the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to
the claim will be lost.

Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass

upon the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of
mining claims; and (2) should public respondents have such
jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse of discretion
or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have abandoned
their mining claim.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction.

Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463
which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests
involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of
Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines,
the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry
out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the
statutory grant of rulemaking power.

Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents

as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it
was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly delegated

rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of

Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree.
Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the
general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the
provisions of the statute

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate

to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.

Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an
instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly come within the
purview of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the CFIs of their
jurisdiction to act on internal evenue cases, a matter which is foreign
to it and which comes within the exclusive province of Congress. This
the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated by
Congress alone has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various department.

Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329

4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation

must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law

conform to the standards that the law prescribes

must be reasonable

must be related to carrying in to effect the general provisions

of law

UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376

Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its
income as an educational institution was taxable. Later on UST
submitted a memorandum before the Sec. of Finance disputing the
decision of the latter as regard the taxability of the formers income
from tuition fees.

Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary

regulation issued by the Department of Labor and Employment
Secretary regarding the application and implementation of 13th month
pay law. The Department order included commission as part of the
computation of determining the 13th month pay of the employees.
Upon inspection, the petitioners were found to be violators of the law
for not including the commission on its employees in the computation
of the 13th month pay. The petitioner contended that the Secretary
Drilon is acting in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The Secretary however
contended that the said order was just a supplementary to the law
which the same tried to erase the cloud thereof.

Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative

regulation.

The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in accordance
with the rules romulgated by said Board under E.O. No. 401-A,
whereby the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of respondent to
take cognizance of the petition for review.

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further
ruled that the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic in declaring that
earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic
salary shall not be included in the computation of the l3th-month pay.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for the
reason that it deprives the CFIs
of their jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases involving recovery of taxes.

"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic
salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to
an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling

Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically exclude

from the definitions of basic salary earnings and other remunerations
paid by employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of
Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad
inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary
Rules and Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former rules
to include all remunerations and earnings within the definition of
basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations' which
are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning
payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works
performed on rest days and special holidays, pays for regular holidays
and right differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic
salary and shall not be considered i the computation of the 13th
month pay. If they were not excluded it is hard to find any 'earnings
and other remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of
the 13-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be
idle and with no purpose.

GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79

Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and
reversal of the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2
declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter,
NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 and
ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en bane, i.e., with the
concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of
its quasi-judicial functions.

of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of

Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming
from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive
at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the
National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak
for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body,
and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is
subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.

Toledo vs CSC 264 SCRA 19

Grego vs COMELEC 274 SCRA 481
Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of
manila of serious misconduct and dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits with prejudice to reinstatement to
any position in the national or local government, its agencies and
instrumentalities or GOCC.

Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In

the 1992 election he run again and this time his victory not without
unchallenged.

A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second
time petitioner Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for
disqualification and suspension of his proclamation. Basco was
proclaimed and assume office; petitioner filed an urgent motion
seeking to annul a hasty and illegal proclamation.

Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body

Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a

majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to
validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone

Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively
to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?

Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly

indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that
[Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the
present case. Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all
under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said
earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January
1, 1992.

"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to

promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely
to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'

Conte vs COA 264 SCRA 19

China Banking Corp vs HDMF 307 SCRA 44
Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777
Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the
existence of a plan providing for both provident/retirement and
housing benefits for exemption from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage
under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.

Issue: WON the amendments are valid

Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that
an employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a

housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to

qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage.
Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667

3.

Requirement of reasonableness

a.
Bears a reasonable relation
purpose sought to be accomplished;
b.

to

the

Supported by good reasons;

c.
Free from constitutional infirmities or
charge of arbitrariness

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend
any review class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall
receive any handouts, review material or any tip from school or any
review center during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day.

Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.

Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of

administrative law administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.
To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held invalid.

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and

regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to
carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment.

5.

Interpretative legislation
1.

Distinction between rule and interpretation

Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555

Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, in the exercise of its rule making power delegated to it by
the legislature, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid
law. When it renders an opinion, or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law, hence, merely advisory.

2.

Types of executive construction/interpretation

a.
Construction by an executive officer
directly called to implement the law. It may be
express (embodied in a circular, directive or
regulation) or implied (practice or mode of
enforcement of not applying the statute to
certain situations; by usage or practice);
b.
Construction by the Secretary of Justice
as chief legal adviser of the government. May be
reversed by President in the exercise of the
power to modify, alter or reverse;
c.
Interpretation handed down in an
adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by
an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial
power.
2.

Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in the

silence of the Tariff and Customs Code which extends the period of
exportation of a specific containers in which the petitioner was
directly affected. The petitioner questioned the said order alleging that
the construction of a specific statute by an administrative body must
not be observed.

Weight accorded to administrative constructions

Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617

Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative

construction.

Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not
previously interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will give
considerations to construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state. The construction of the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be
given controlling weight.

Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262

Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed
resolution without complying with the provisions of Sections 5 and 6
of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1
to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of

Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections. After the counting of the votes, petitioner (Concepcion) was
proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997,
private respondent (Melendres) filed an election protest against
petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-seven (47)
precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch 68.

On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it

was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant
therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss
the case on the ground of failure to comply with this requirement. In
the contested Order, public respondent denied the motion to dismiss
on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee
is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not
jurisdictional.

Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved

that the payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest
and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance
therewith at the outset will not operate to deprive the Court of
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired pursuant to the
Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is
hereby denied.

When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a

statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the
administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court that
finally determine what the law means.

ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority

under SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late
premiums.

RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the

SSC precisely enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from
the said powers may it shown that the commissioner is granted
expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties
imposed by the act.

3.
Construction
regulations

of

administrative

and

Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072

Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules
and such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown
to be erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is
entitled to recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better
qualified to interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority
that issued it. Thus, its interpretation that the rule it issued is not
retroactive, not being unreasonable, should be followed.

6.

Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts

Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425

Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234
United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982
Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of
commissioner in dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the
absence of express provision in Social Security act, vesting in the
commission the power to condone penalties. Petitioners contention
that they had under the impression that international organization,
they were not cover under SSC. They paid their premiums and ask for
condonation, which was denied by commissioner.

rules

People vs Vera 65 Phil 56

US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557

7.

Penal rules and regulations

1.
Requisites
regulations

for validity of penal rules

and

Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843

US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of
Province of Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the
quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous diseases known as
rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on illegal and voluntary act
of herein accused by way of permitting and ordering the carabaos on
issue to be taken from the corral while the quarantines against the
same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein defendant
interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute a
crime.

Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute
a crime.

Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case
at bar do not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760.
However, the said finding does not prevent the court from finding the
accused guilty of a violation of an article of the revised penal code.

People v. Exconde 101 Phil 1125

People v. Maceren 79 SCRA 450

2.
Imposition
authorities

of

penalties

by

administrative

Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul

and set aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the NTC, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates
which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its
services by 15% with the reservation to make further reduction later,
for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power and a denial or procedural, as well as
substantial due process of law. The said provisional reduction is
allegedly under the contemplation of E.O. 546, providing for the
creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers; and E.O. 196,
placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC.

Issue: Whether or not the order in issue is constitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order,

particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of
due process clause is void and should be nullified . Thus, temporary
rate-fixing order is not exempt from the procedural requirement of
notice and hearing. Moreover the temporary rate-fixing becomes final
legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case.

In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the

legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the admin
authority is that the rate reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. The fixing of rate is
quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines, in which case,
notice and hearing are not required for their validity.

9.
8.

Rate-fixing power

Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218

Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations

1.

Publication requirement

Section 2, Civil Code

Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following their completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette unless otherwise provided.

Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided.

Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

Chapter 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary,
shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule
in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make
emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall:

(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed
with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and
remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate
tables.
Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the
Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification
any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available
on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall
contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule
and new copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which,
pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall
in all cases be published in full text.
Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University
of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of
every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to
the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the
National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made
available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the
Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to
cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the
certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or
the codified rules.
Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law,
an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless
the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.

Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini)
seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity
as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la
Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office), and
Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to
publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates
Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil
Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further,
publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons

affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital

significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are
kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the lawmaking process of the President. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of its contents.

2.

Notice and hearing requirement

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63

3.
Application, general rule that the issuance of
rules and regulations to implement the law does not
require that there be prior notice and hearing
conducted by the administrative agencies. However, if
the statute making the delegation requires such

hearing, then one must be conducted before such rules

and regulations are issued. On the other hand, if the
statute is silent on the matter, a public hearing, if
practicable, may be conducted.

VI. Adjudicatory Powers

a.

Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined

Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.

Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and

other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule making power.

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission,
Commissioner
Joseph
A.
Santiago,
Deputy
Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C.
Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that
the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in
the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such,
petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional
Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of

an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and

draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public
elementary school. As the school year was then about to end, the
"Committee On the Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by
the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the
"honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, as
chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated and finally
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr.
as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation
exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before
that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his
mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the
"ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the abovementioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the
part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than
to a real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction
may not be corrected by means of certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not

impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts,
and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari, it is
clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather
than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines

whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial

function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when
applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi
judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their
decision, whatever may be their public character. . ..'

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative dudes, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a
matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA

433
Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a
"Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in
the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed
and registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments,

Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his
purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell
sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to
ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its
contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent
respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their
contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer
Agreement."

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil

courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a
decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged
contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated.
The OIC negated the existence of such right because the stipulation is
an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed
respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within
which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil
Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC
denied it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide

contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed

reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express
provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and
decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil
company. It is of course a well-settled principle of administrative law
that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like
respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of
administrative functions, but in so doing, the legislature must state its
intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such
quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only
to those incidental to, or in connection with, the performance of
administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of
jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts."

b.

Distinguished from judicial power

Judicial Power is the power to courts of justice to settle actual case

of controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there is grave abuse of
discretion.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS
premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work
in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report
and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of
P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D.
807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction,

adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violation involving civil or political rights.

Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have

no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated

powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power
on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and,
in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance
with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted
by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine
those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA

162
Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank
(LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining

Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April
1994, on promotion.

Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a

voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to
voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter
are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode
of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator.

c.

Distinguished from administrative function

Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and

control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature as such are devoled upon the admin
agency by the organic law of existence.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force,

the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called
"dollar salting" activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants
against certain companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants

under the 1973 Constitution?

Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of

government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as
follows:

(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein

the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or
special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans
Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA,
and Philippine Veterans Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein
the government is seeking to carry on certain
government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special
Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service
Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein
the government is performing some business service for
the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings
Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority,
Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein
the government is seeking to regulate business affected
with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board,

the Philippine Patent office, office of the Insurance

Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein
the government is seeking under the police power to
regulate private business and individuals, like the
Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food
Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures,
and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to adjust individual controversies
because of some strong social policy involved, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian
Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the
Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Women and Minors Bureau.

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate

claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are
seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same
attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No.
1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the
Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial
functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments.
As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar
salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is
tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such
activities, but nothing more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to
prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds.
Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task
force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all
persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the
creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the
PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in

the recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by

the former President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases of graft
and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from
time to time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a
preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor
General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal
protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such
preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse
of coconut levy funds.

Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the
authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2)
freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that,
as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima
facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze
order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it
and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured
under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG.

The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it

may be divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is
called the criminal investigation stage is the factfinding inquiring
which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby
they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess
the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the
purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the
preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this
stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient
evidence to bring a person to trial.

It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and

judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the
complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with
impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this
time as a public prosecutor.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and
the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should
be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent
constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio
Sarenas and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive
right to the use of the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation
purposes. The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when the
predecessor in interest of his father constructed a dam in these
waters; the use of the dam was afterwards interrupted by outside
causes such as imprisonment and war, but again reasserted in 1911,
1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention is, is not
quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that they made
application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet with the
opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted
the two Sarenas the right, in preference to all other persons, to use
the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was
entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of Sideco and
confirming the decision of the administrative authorities, with the
costs against the plaintiff.

The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the

correctness of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its
judgment.

Issue: WON

Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to

the use of waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended.
Controversies must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications through the Director of Public Works. The "decision"
of the Secretary thereon is final "unless appeal therefrom be taken to
the proper court within. thirty days after the date of the notification of
the parties of said decision. In case of such appeal the court having
jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more
extensive method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral
system, which makes it the duty of the Director of Public Works to
make a technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of
priorities. In the performance of this work, the Director of Public
Works or any official especially authorized by him, may examine
witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted each
appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the
Director of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in
which the property is situated. Such action must be brought within
ninety days of the date of the publication of the approved list of
priorities. (Sec. 10.)

DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL

RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by
the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing as it
does the technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation
engineering, should invariably be made a part of the judicial record
because (1) the determination of these officials would be most useful
to the courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment since
it decides whether the appeal was taken in time.

Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

d.

Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent
provisions:

"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the
like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any
of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days
immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be
subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take
the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf
and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter
from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution

No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the
examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or
preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be

refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review
classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the
examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a
rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find
out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt
officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be
it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be
observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are
committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are
all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom
of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed.

e.
Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with
quasi-judicial power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville
Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to
private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having
been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of
title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville
complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance
and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The
case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss
was denied by the court contending that it had jurisdiction over the
matter.

provides that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive

authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered
the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the
enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasijudicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate
the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman;
and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lots or condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers
is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond
swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

f.
Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative
agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known
as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree,"

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed

six (6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having
allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass
of supplies and materials. Five of these six dismissed employees

appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals
to be illegal because affected without formal charges having been filed
or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the
remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By
Resolution, the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was
indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of
the CSC with a modification that it eliminated the payment of back
salaries until the outcome of the investigation and reinstatement of
only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs of the
deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC which was
granted. GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending
that the CSC does not have any power to execute its resolution or
judgment.

Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or

judgment.

Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on

Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional
commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only
with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasijudicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779

adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of
procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant
to the authority granted by the constitutional and statutory
provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with
the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject
to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all
the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear
absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority
to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders
which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the years.
It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is

inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,
should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless
the law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the

initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the
continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees.
Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4,
1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in
the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of
back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a
useless exercise.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by
Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission.

Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess

of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or

duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of

members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might
have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the
Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to
be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as
such member.

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : Petitioner PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a
Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows
gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of
matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified
persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the
Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of
incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood

and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International

Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from
Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers
of matches from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural
Resources and
Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available
softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila
a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and
AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "woodderivative" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and
releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case
asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of
the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence

with the Bureau of Customs
contesting the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would
preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining
Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized

administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial
review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate

relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and
forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to
seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the
same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude
recourse to the courts by way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs should
gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the
court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such
act which is with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its
authority it clearly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at
bench, we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Baez offered to sell to petitioner
Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent
corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a
reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the
consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale and which
amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to
reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent
corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which
resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the return of his
reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the same and petitioner
brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money.
Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the
jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The same was denied and
respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner

argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale

between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that
of the HSRC.

Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation
fee.

Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and other
claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision
of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that
has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be
understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money. Under
the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a
buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said
powers have since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is

therein provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, and dealers,
among others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial

functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to
its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of
said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored.
Since in this case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a
proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Cario vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and

resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking

Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do;
and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has
no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a
strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or
not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular
acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original

jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of
the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law,
and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

g.

Classification of adjudicatory powers

2.
Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective
powers of public utility commissions, powers of
assessment under the revenue laws, reparations under
public utility laws and awards under;
3.
Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit
or authorization;
1.
Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt
from or relax a general prohibition, or authority to
relieve from affirmative duty. The licensing power sets
or assumes a standard, while the dispensing power
sanctions a deviation from a standard;

2.
Summary powers. To designate administrative
power to apply compulsion or force against person or
property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial
warrant to authorize such action;
3.
Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal
having power to determine the law upon a particular
state of facts has the right to and must consider and
make proper application of the rules of equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390
Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic
which required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law.
Caamic was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against
her. When she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the
subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and demanded 8K from
her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy of one
Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by
Generosa Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she
could not get a share of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her
dead husband whose beneficiary was Caamic.

Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process
directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted
under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his deposition."
Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a
form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued

in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his
court nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant
to law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific
purpose, viz., administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way
connected with or related to some of his administrative duties because
he knew from the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the
complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a
share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received
by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's
court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court
concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for
respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official
and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely
related to his official functions and duties, accommodating the
request and using his official functions and office in connection
therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the

questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is
afforded his full rights of redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair
competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the
presentation of some of private respondents witnesses, they requested
the court for a subpoena duces tecum as regards to the books of
herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground that it can only be regarded as a fishing bill to discover
evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a
case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a

case for unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction

and damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for
infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting
and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark,
as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies
in cases of unfair competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair
trader is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains on a
principle analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits
acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust,
and defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the
compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by
him.

In order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces

tecum, " it must appear. By clear and unequivocal proof, that the book
or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and
material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book,
paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated
or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once
issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance
therof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books.
documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of
production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the

subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the
complaint of private respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was
charged with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it
opened 3 boxes without the presence of the persons and/or parties
indicated in its Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why
they should not be punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced
Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a
petition for review with the SC.

VIII.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for
his acts.

Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also
the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we
said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of
justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article
VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise
quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision of law come under its jurisdiction.

When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot

exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is
inherently judicial in nature.

". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial

duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it
could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in
the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

The power to punish for

existence is essential to
proceedings, and to the
mandates of courts, and,
justice.

contempt is inherent in all courts; its

the preservation of order in judicial
enforcement of judgments, orders and
consequently, in the, administration of

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary

incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570

Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does
not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials
or bodies, unless said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly
defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of
the revised administrative code. The refusal to comply with order of
tenancy law, enforcement division is neither contempt nor a penalized
offense.

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

Scotys Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762
Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's
Department Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was
owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and
Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena
Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above
employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her
membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her
separation, said employers had been questioning their employees
regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with
their right to organize under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant
was dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and
serious disrespect to the management and her co employees so much
so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city
fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding
informations against her and the same are now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to

impose the penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.

Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to

impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No.
875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial
Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the
industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners
is illegal and should be nullified.

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of

Industrial Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates
those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so
because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling
and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of
Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing Examiners shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law, or
procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound
solely by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail
itself of all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections
and questioning of well-informed persons which results must be made
a part of the record". All-this means that an accused may be tried
without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be
convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond
reasonable doubt.

This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may

be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court
of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to
criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this
would be tantamount to amending the law which is not within the
province of the judicial branch of our Government.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction

A.

Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600

Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity.

He filed an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore
his criminal liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General
entered an opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the
scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the
Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded that the
marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his
liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or
not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against
chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished
by the marriage of the accused with the offended party.

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773
was that the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended
party should extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of
seduction, abduction and rape and those involving offenses included
in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction
or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is
extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a
stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse
against chastity is not denominated rape, it is only for the lack of the

intention to lie, both crimes being identical in every other respect,

though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the
crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape
mentioned in section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, the
marriage of the accused with the offended party in the present case
has extinguished his criminal liability.

B.
Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies
performing quasi-judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the
absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the
Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila
Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales. Respondent Leandro L
Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis T.
Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of
the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent
Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of
the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new
one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the
Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it

was denied by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari
before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of
respondent for being null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to

entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the

Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the

respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling:
The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with
jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of
the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to
promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the
Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions,
plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly

empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers.19
The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely
upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they
cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to
give validity to their determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or

even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local
Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect
involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the
constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary
has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election
of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do
so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It
will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will
permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan
activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component
of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may
be achieved.

b. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

i.

regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
ineffective.

Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed
the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district, for having received the most number of votes, the petitioner
took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the
herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things,
that said respondent be declared elected member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified.

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess

of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power
claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate

rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule
of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also included. The incidental power
to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

ii.

Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of

procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

iii.

Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of
employment of publics respondents. The arbitrations decision is
appealed to the NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal questioned
the validity of the NLRCs decision on the ground that the NLRC
erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that
the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the
rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following
reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers

Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear

and represent petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on
appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters
and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and selfserving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to
due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of
due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of
the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in
obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission,
Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to
the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.

fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and

investigations of an administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the
decision of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of
Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and void its decision in
Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio C.
Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo
of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position
as policeman of the same municipality with back salaries from the
date of his suspension up to the date of his actual reinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that

respondent Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law
because the Police Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48
even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing
further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in
the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however,
that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can,
in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as

falling short of the legal requirements of due process, because it
decided the subject administrative case without stenographic notes
(which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the
proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not
provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of record,"
and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and
stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of
the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and
summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative
rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses."
The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be
present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties
are heard and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective
evidence.

iv.

Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC
of its powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a
stock transfer agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant
petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court
erred in setting aside the decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered
the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed
fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.

Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both

regulatory and adjudicative functions.
Under its regulatory
responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon applications for, or may
suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of
registration of corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding
cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel
legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and impose
fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as
well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be
warranted.

The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to
"jointly replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the
transfer thereof in the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an
exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who have
been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons to whom the
forged certificates have ultimately been transferred by the supposed
indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an appropriate
adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as can occasion an
exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion of a
right by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The
proper parties that can bring the controversy and can cause an
exercise by the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction would be
all or any of those who are adversely affected by the transfer of the

pilfered certificates of stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC,

without such proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a

P50,000 fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely
different matter. This time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which
is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter set
aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant
petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real
party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.

Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Intl Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
v.

Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction

Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704

vi.

Pre-trial conference; default

Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110

vii.

Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396

Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700

viii.

Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349

Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548

State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505

1.

4.

Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557

2.

Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515

5.

Clear and convincing evidence

Finality of decisions

Blacks Law Dictionary 5 ed. P. 227

Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987

Preponderance of evidence

Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7

New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266

Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607

th

3.

4.

Substantial evidence

Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666

Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28

6.

Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380

ix.

Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid

Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812

Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497

Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963

Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1.

Form of decision

Application of the doctrine of res judicata

Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429

x.

Administrative appeal in contested cases

Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273

Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965

Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616

PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560

Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283

2.

Publication of decisions

Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

3.

Finality, promulgation and notice of decision

De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584

Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92

Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354

Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261

Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25

Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673

xi.

Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235

headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or directing the

General Court Martial composed of the respondents to arraign and try
however was already an existing court trying another case.

The validity of the court martial proceeding was challenged by

the petitioner at the regular court on the ground of due process.

c. Due process of law in administrative adjudication

i.

Substantive and procedural due process, defined

DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard

before judgment is rendered, affecting ones person or property. It is
designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by
paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over
form.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as

the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal

By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it

condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial

The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of

life, liberty and property without due process of law, which
clause optimizes the principle of justice which hears before it
condemns which upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.

Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356

Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War
96 and 97. He was arraigned though without summons and subpoena
afforded to him. From the proven facts and the admission likewise of
the respondents, the court martial which tried his case was not
properly convened. There was no special order published by the

Issue: WON failure to comply with law on conveying a valid court

martial amount to denial of due process

Held: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE LAW A DENIAL OF

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.- The failure to comply with the
dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a valid court
martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process. There is
such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the
scope and reach of the due process requirement, but also under one
of the specific elements of procedural due process.

LACK OF AUTHORITY OF COURT-MARTIAL TO TRY PETITIONER.Nor is such a reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole
ground on which the lack of jurisdiction of die court-martial convened
in this case could be predicated. Recently, stress was laid anew by us
on the first requirement of procedural due process, namely, the
existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial, or quasijudicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. This is a
requirement that goes back to Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, a
decision rendered half a century ago. There is the express admission
in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court martial, were
not convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken
against petitioner being induced solely by a desire to avoid the effects
of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent
court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of
due process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try
petitioner. The writ of certiorari and prohibition should have been
granted and the lower court, to repeat, ought not to have dismissed

his petition summarily. The significance of such an insistence on a

faithful compliance with the regular

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes
in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the
suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and
the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty
with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to
enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the
need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the
proper implementation of said treaties. The Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the United States. private respondent, through
counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Petitioner
refused because it is not included in the procedure of the RP-US
Treaty.

Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing

during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of
the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RPExtradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there
really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?

Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to

furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which
to file his comment with supporting evidence. From the procedures
earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during

the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of

notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee.
However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to
the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking

and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases,
1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory
power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz,
Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and

analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.

Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948

Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for
breach of contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and
Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator, was substituted. Finally,
defendant's liability was determined by this Court in L-15275.
Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from judicial
demand.

From the inception of the suit below up to the time the

judgment in L-15275 was to be executed, the corporate existence of
University Publishing Company, Inc. appears to have been taken for

granted, and was not then put in issue. However, when the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued on July 22, 1961 an order of execution
against University Publishing Company, Inc., a new problem cropped
up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of the City
of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the contract with
plaintiff on behalf and as President of University Publishing Company,
Inc. They then discovered that no such entity exists. A verification
made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact.
On July 31, 1961, said Commission issued a certification "that the
records of this Commission do not show the registration of
UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or
partnership."2 This triggered a verified petition in the court below on
August 10, 1961 for the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the
Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against the
assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the
case.

All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the
University Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower
court that it had in its possession copies of its certificate of
registration, its article of incorporation, its by-laws and all other
papers material to its disputed corporate existence, University
Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. On August 11, 1961,
University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril and
Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered
plaintiff's petition for execution as against Aruego with an unsworn
manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this
case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.

Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case

Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as

representative of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the
contract sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits
resulting from it, so much so that partial payment of the
consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms, thereby
precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the

real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice, responsibility

under the judgment falls on him.

"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial. . . .' (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as this Court has said,
'Due process of law' contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person or property.'
(Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32).' (Sicat vs. Reyes, 100
Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it may not be amiss to mention
here also that the 'due process' clause of the Constitution is designed
to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue
homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now
be trite, but none the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in
Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321-322: 'A litigation is not a game
of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.
It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.
Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should he no vested rights in
technicalities.

ii.

Cardinal primary requirements of due process

1. The right to a hearing which includes the right to present

ones case and submit evidence

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial

5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the

hearing

6. The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own

independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy

7. The board or body should in all controversial questions, render

its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involves and reason for the
decision rendered

8. The officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must be

vested with competent jurisdiction

A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due

process in administrative proceedings renders any
judgment or order issued therein null and void and can
be attacked in any appropriate proceeding

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this
Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an
opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the
respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc.

Issue: What are the cardinal primary rights?

Held: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.-There are cardinal primary rights

which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The
first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider

the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The
Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose

functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than
a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended
to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).

Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256

Facts: The petitioner herein, successor in-interest in the case of the
former DECS Secretary against the public school teachers who were

illegally dismissed for staging a mass action and failure to heed to the
return-to-work order, filed a petition for the judgment of the trial court
holding that said public school teachers were denied of due process in
the proceedings. It was held that the proceedings contravened RA
4670 which required that administrative charges against a teacher
shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding
school superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who at least have the rank of a supervisor, where the
teachers belong, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and
supervisor of the Division, the last 2 to be designated by the Director
of Public Schools.

Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670 because

all the teachers who were members of the various committee are
members of either the QC Teachers Federation or the QC Elementary
teachers Federation and are deemed representatives of teachers
organization.

Issue: WON there was denial of due process

Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective organizations
does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of the
organizations. Under the law, the teachers organization possess the
right to indicate its choice of representatives. Such right cannot be
usurped by the Secretary of Education or the Director of Public
Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representatives in said
committee.

Hence the failure to comply with the requirement vested no

jurisdiction to the committee to hear the case. Respondent teachers
were denied of due process.

Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489

Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been
referred to a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL
submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of flights that included
the same Mercury night flights and this was allowed by Board
Resolution No. 139(68). The Board's action was impelled by the
authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed but were
incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule
had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred
to were not to be suspended. In short, the temporary permit was
issued to prevent the stoppage or cessation of services in the affected
areas.

The Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner,

passed Resolution No. 190 (68) approving, for a period of 30 days
starting 31 July 1968, only three or four frequencies of the seven
proposed new flights. There is no proof, not even allegation, that in all
those hearings petitioner was not notified or give opportunity to
adduce evidence in support of its opposition.

Issue: WON PAL violated the requisites of administrative due process

Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the
DTS-35 for which no previous approval has been granted by the
Board, are hereby referred to a hearing examiner for reception of
evidence on its economic justification."

It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not

exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon. 16 SCRA 921). And this
administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to
notice*, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person s legal rights; (b) reasonable

opportunity to appear and defend his rights*, introduce witnesses and

relevant evidence in his favor: (c) a tribunal so constituted* as to give
him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction. and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence* presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

iii.

the place of labor specially when conducted at the request of the

interested.

Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437

Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabubay) is a
corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business for
the last twenty-seven years. Among the government requirements for
engaging in this type of business are the export quota allocations
issued by the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board.

Necessity for notice and hearing

In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and

hearing are necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry
should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an
administrative agency or officer with certain duties and
responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely
affected.

Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions,

Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
(Maria Angela A. Pascual)

Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers

solely on the basis of an ocular inspection.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of

workers on the basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full
evidence to determine the cause or motive of such a lay off

Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo
merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in
the premises of the respondent company was incurring financial
losses. The allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of

Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for

1983 to the petitioner. These export quotas have been granted
annually to the Petitioner since 1976. They are automatically renewed
every year provided the grantee has utilized its quotas during the
previous years.

On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the Board

informing it that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked
effective February 1983. Furthermore, its major stockholders and
officers were also distinguished from engaging in business activities
involving garment and textile exports.

Issue: WON the revocation of the quota is valid

Held: "The summary revocation of the export quotas and export

authorizations issued in favor of the petitioner without hearing
violates not only the above-mentioned provisions of the Raise and
Regulations of the respondent board but also the 'due proem of law'
clause of the Constitution of the Philippines to the effect that 'no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws.'(Article TV, Sec. 1. New Constitution). According to Daniel
Webster in the Dartmouth College case. due proem is the equivalent of
the law; a law which hears before it condemns. which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that

every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.' (cited
in Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 168 by Neptali Gonzales, 1975 ed.)

"Administrative due process requires that there be an impartial

tribunal constituted to determine the right involved; that due notice
and opportunity to be heard be given; that the procedure at the
hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; and that the
proceedings be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity
for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of low and
procedure were observed.' (42 Arm Jur. p. 451, cited by Neptali
Gonzales, p. 183, Philippine Constitutional Law). "

Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in the
character of ones property.

Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447

Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of
the NAPOLCOM: The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating in
the house being occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the
apprehension of his wife and brother in two (2) successive raids
effected by law enforcement authority and his intercession for the
dismissal of the case filed in consequence thereof, are tangible proofs
that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in said
gambling operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges
and informed of the nature of such charges; that no hearing had
actually been held by the summary dismissal board: and that at any
rate he was not heard.

Issue: WON the contention of petitioner is with merit

Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of
law and that not even the fact that the charge against him is serious

and evidence of his guilt is - in the opinion of his superiors - strong

can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of
this case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be
exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those
who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who
are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.

BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; OBSERVANCE THEREOF

REQUIRED IN SUMMARY DISMISSAL.- Petitioner's case was decided
under P.D. No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1707. While Sec. 8-A of
the Decree authorizes summary dismissals "without the necessity of a
formal investigation" of members of the INP "when the charge is
serious and the evidence is strong," the Decree and the implementing
rules nonetheless give the respondent the right to be furnished a copy
of the complaint and to file an answer within three (3) days. The filing
of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to respondent
to answer the charges constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. In summary dismissal proceedings it is mandatory that
charges be specified in writing and that the affidavits in support
thereof be attached to the complaint because these are the only ways
by which evidence against the respondent can be brought to his
knowledge. The formal investigation, which is dispensed with, refers to
the presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to
the requirement that the respondent be notified of the charges and
given the chance to defend himself.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; SUMMARY DISMISSAL

BOARD; BASIS OF DECISION, NOT PROPER.- What the summary
dismissal board appears to have done in this case was simply to
receive the report on two raids allegedly conducted on petitioner's
house in the course of which what were believed were gambling
paraphernalia were allegedly found and two witnesses allegedly
admitted they were collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito Go.
But the report is not in the record of this case which the NAPOLCOM
transmitted to the Court. Nor does the decision of the summary
dismissal board disclose on what the supposed report was based. This
is in violation of the rule that in administrative proceedings "the
decision must be rendered on the evidence contained in the record

and disclosed to the party affected." In all probability, said report was
not in writing and the supposed testimonies of the two witnesses were
not taken down. This is evident from the decision of the board which
refers to the result of an -investigation.- The facts found by the board
were not the result of any investigation conducted by it but by some
other group.

iv.

Cold neutrality of a judge

A reviewing official or body tasked to resolve an appeal must refrain

from participating in reviewing any decision rendered or concurred by
him in another official capacity. The reviewing officer must be other
than the officer whose decision is under review, otherwise there would
be no different views or there could be no real review of the case, in
violation of due process of law.

Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261

Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein
he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales
Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that
case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and
possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz,
Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, Director Gozon found that the
petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining
claims in accordance with law.

The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending.
Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, as if
he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon
exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as
Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from

his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge
and appellate judge in the same case.

We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in

reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant
anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of
administrative justice.The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137,
provides:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall
be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision:

"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be

appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within
thirty days from the date of its receipt.

Issue: WON Petitioners-appellant were deprived of due process when

Gozon reviewed his own decision

Held: Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning

fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own
decision as Director of Mines.

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might

not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other
than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could
be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it
would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that
he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

v.

Prior notice and

procedural due process

hearing,

essential

elements

of

In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and

hearing are necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry
should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an
administrative agency or officer with certain duties and
responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely
affected.

Essential elements of due process:

a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials
of a fair trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there
will be opportunity for the court to determine whether the
applicable rules of law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial
evidence

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to

include the following
a. The right to actual or constructive notice
b. A real opportunity to be heard
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence

Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34

Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City
Engineer to contrcust a funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment to
the court in his suit to enjoin the construction of the funeral parlor,
Veneracion, instead of appealing the judgment, lodged a complaint
with the HSCR on substantially the same ground litigated in the
action relative parlors distance from hospitals whether public or

private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC through

Commissioner Dizon requesting transmittal of proof of location
clearance granted by this Office. Villa sent a reply telegram reading:
Locational Clearance based on certification of City Planning and
Development Coordinator and Human Settlement Officer, copies mail.
Subsequently, Villa received from Dizon an Order to Present Proof of
Locational Clearance. Since she had already sent the required
locational clearance, Villa made no response. Then Villa received a
show cause Order, requiring her to show cause why a fine should
not be imposed on her or a cease-and desist order issued against her
for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. In spite of her
communication that she had already mailed all required documents,
she received an Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring
her to cease operations, and later, a writ of execution in
implementation of the order. A motion for reconsideration to which
she attached copies of the Commission Proper was also denied on
account of the finality of the Order. An appeal to the office of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, and so was the motion for
reconsideration.
Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the
Commision, ever made known the complaint of Veneracion to Villa
until much later, after the Commission has rendered several adverse
rulings against her; the orders of the Commission made no reference
whatever to the documents Villa had already sent by registered mail;
and the resolutions of the Presidential Assistant Lazaro likewise
omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents sent by Veneracion

Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the defense of
failure of Villa to take timely appeal will not avail.

Held: Yes. These facts present a picture of official incompetence or

gross negligence and abdication of duty, if not active bias and
partiality that is most reprehensible. The result has been to subvert
and put to naught the judgment rendered in a suit regularly tried and
decided by a court of justice, to deprive one party of rights confirmed
and secured thereby and to accord her adversary, by resorting to the
prescribed practice of forum-shopping, the relief he had sought and
had been denied in said case.

The mischief done by the commissioner Dizons baffling failure

even to acknowledge the existence of the documents furnished by
petitioner was perpetuated by the Commissioner proper and
respondent Lazaro, who threw out petitioners appeals with no
reference that would have been decisive.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out
as an administrative proceeding against Villa without informing her of
the complaint which initiated the case; for conducting that inquiry in
the most informal manner by means only of communication requiring
submission of certain documents, which left the impression that
compliance was all that was expected of her and with which directives
she promptly and religiously complied.
The court finds no merit in the proposition that relief is
foreclosed to Villa because her motion for reconsideration of Nov. 22,
1982 was filed out of time. The very informal character of the socalled administrative proceedings, an informality for which Com.
Dizon himself was responsible and which he never sought to rectify,
militates against imposing strict observance of the limiting periods
applicable to proceedings otherwise properly initiated and regularly
conducted.

RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420

Facts PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, wherein both companies agreed to
establish telephone services between the Philippines and the United
States. As it lacked the necessary equipment and facilities, PLDTCO
on the same date entered into another agreement with RCA whereby
the latter constituted itself a carrier of PLDTCO's telephone messages
to and from the United States. The term of the agreement was for five
years and "shall thereafter continue in force until terminated by either
party giving the other 24 calendar months previous notice in writing."

On January 3, 1956, PLDTCO sent RCA a notice of

termination of its arrangements with the latter, the same to be
effective not later than February 2, 1958, and three months later, filed
an application with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, through the Radio Control Board, for authority to

construct and operate a radio-telephonic station of its own at Marilao,

Bulacan, and for the assignment to It of appropriate radio frequencies.

RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First

Instance of Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and the Radio Control Board from proceeding
further on PLDTCO's pending application. The complaint alleged that
the approval by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications of
the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO without previous hearing
and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence in support of its
opposition was without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity

present case.

Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only

necessary in those cases where the statute so requires. A cursory
reading of the Radio Control Law (Act No. 3846, as amended) shows
that, unlike in other proceedings or instances specified in section 3,
paragraphs d and 1, of the said law, no, hearing is required in the
consideration by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
of any application for the installation, establishment, or operation of a
radio station (paragraph k). At any rate, even assuming that a hearing
is required, RCA must be considered to have waived its right thereto,
its counsel having addressed a letter to the Radio Control Board
saying that "little would be gained by arguing the matter both before
yourselves and before the Public Service Commission."

Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103

Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. information
was filed against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100
reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).

Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension was proper.

That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase
contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the
purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams
of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit prim of Five Hundred Fifty pesos
(P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00),
which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only FiftyFive Pews (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred
Pews (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in
the total amount of Forty-NineThousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P49,500.00) CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a
plea of "not guilty."

On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia

moved for petitioner's suspension, citing see. 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 which provides in part:

Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019
makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public
officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law,
Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed.5 The
court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused
from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The
presumption is that unIess the accused is suspended he may
frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do
both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue
a warrant fur the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the
court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade
the jurisdiction of the court.

vi.
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.-Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book 11 of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that preventive

suspension should therefore be ordered only when the legislative
purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order x x x
prevent(s) the accused from using his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the legislative
purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and
should not be decreed

Notice and hearing, when dispensed with

1.
Where there is an urgent need for immediate
action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se, the preventive suspension of public servant facing
administrative charges;
Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536

Facts: Monetary Board (MB)issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the

closure of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing
business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership, and
appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. TSB filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Central Bank and
Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer for
injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29
of R.A. 269, otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act," as amended,
insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking
institution even if it is not charged with violation of any few or
regulation, much less found guilty thereof.

The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the
application of TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings under
the receivership of the officials of the Central Bank was done without
prior hearing, that is, without first hearing the side of the bank. They
further admit that said resolution can be the subject of judicial review
and may be set aside should it be found that the same was issued
with arbitrariness and in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad

faith" and a denial of "due process.

Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action

Officer, notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset
building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting
its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up
campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along
Strong Boulevard. Since the notifications remained unheeded by
petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without

judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset building.

Held:
Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing
before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under
receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289)
provides for the filing of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver
takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that the
assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the
legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and
hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit
to annul it on the basis of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17

It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor

does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the
correctness of the. Monetary Board' s resolution to stop operation and
proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before making the resolution
effective, It is enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided.

Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595

Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to
Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to
occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to
expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the Quonset
(hut) for the storage of copra.

Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset
building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port
of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on
public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an
impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the
quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no
compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that
respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan,
transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due
process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and
was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by
the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior
to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order
being a prejudicial issue.

Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458

2.
Where there is tentativeness of administrative
action; where the respondent is not precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time
without prejudice to the person affected, such as the

summary distraint and levy of the property of a

delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a
temporary appointee;

Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497

Facts: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor
refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge of attempted
rape to the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo as
ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously
refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the
Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought
against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman and were placed
under preventive suspension. It appears that petitioner conducted a
preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only
acts of lasciviousness had been committed.

Issues:
1. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call
on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of
the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

that the act or omission was committed by a public official.

Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official
like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute.
2. No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such
suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation.

As held in Nera v. Garcia:

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before

he could file his answer to the administrative complaint,
suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but
only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation,
the charges are established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the opportunity to prove his
innocence.

2. Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it

denied them opportunity to refute the charges against them

3.
Where the twin rights have previously been
offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.

Ruling:
1. Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been
held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime
committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or
arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough

Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing as a

requirement before an agency action, which refers to
the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof, can
be done, compliance with the requirement of prior
notice and hearing depends upon the nature of the
power to be exercised or the end to be achieved.

Prior notice and hearing is not required in the exercise

of police power

Prior notice and hearing is not required in granting

provisional reliefs

minal in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no vali
d trial could proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not se
e eye to eye with this view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinio
n of the court below, thus The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or crimin
al proceedings. So, where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed
to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notif
ied, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judg
e ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give,
he having been given an opportunity to be heard

Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921

Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of
Examiners for Surveyors administrative complaint2 for unprofessional
conduct against petitioner Cleto Asprec. He requested Asprec to
undertake survey on his lot in Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur.
That no survey was conducted and that it was a mere copy of one
Damian Alham. that Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the
Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision of
October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's
certificate of registration as a private land surveyor. A complaint was
but was absent in the hearing.

Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767

vii.

Notice and hearing in rate-fixing

As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity

to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its
services by a public service commission

Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his
case.

Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend hi
mself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and s
tipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribuna
l to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voic
e in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his couns
el's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excus
e at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. Presenc
e of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of d
ue process. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this con
stitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opport
unity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More tha
n this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the
parties and their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received le
ss-than-a-fair-treatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defen
se.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-cri

Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light
Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an
electric light heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating
and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of
several Municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an

alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged
residents of Vigan, Ilocos, Sur", charging the following:
The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan
Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal and
also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers
had been installed in bad faith and they register excessive rates much
more than the actual consumption.

The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net
operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its
invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest and in
consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of
its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect
immediately.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present
meter rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the
month of June, 1962
Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul
said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not
furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of
Congressman Crisologo and others. Respondent then expressed the
view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to
petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal
conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the
reduction of its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a copy
of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based,
that such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and
that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.

Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing?

Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the
order complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function
and that, having been issued without previous notice and hearing,
said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence,
null and void.

Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service

commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or
constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make
notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and
upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the
proceedings, are on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in
character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE

PROCESS), or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or

quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES, DUE PROCESS IS REQUIRED),
affecting the rights and property of private or specific persons.

As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity

to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its
services by a public service commission.

viii.

Motion for reconsideration as a cure

The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party
cures the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude
the party from claiming denial of due process assumes that the other
requirements of due process have been complied with. However such
opportunity is nothing and he is still denied due process, where the
decision against him has nothing to support itself, one of the cardinal
requirements of due process being that the decision or ruling of an
administrative body must be supported by substantial evidence.

Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278

Facts: Petitioner Medenilla is a contractual employee of DPWH as
Public Officer II. Later on, she was detailed as Technical Assistant in
the office of the assistant secretary for the admin. and manpower
management. On Jan. 2, 1989, petitioner was appointed to the
contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development
Officer. Respondents {being the next-in-rank-employees} jointly lodged
a protest before the DPWH task force re-organization contesting the
appointment of petitioner. The task force dismissed the protest of the
respondents thereby appealing before the Civil Service Commission.
The Commission disapproved the appointment of the petitioner
reversing the ruling of task force. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration before the CSC but to no avail, hence , the petition
then was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON CSC is correct in disapproving the appointment of

petitioner and that WON the petitioner was denied of due process of
law in the absence of notice?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that CSC is incorrect in
disapproving the appointment of petitioner. The CSC is limited only to
determine whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil
service eligibility and not whether another is more qualified than the
petitioner. Petitioner was not notified of the appeal before the
Commission. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice
but the absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Any
defect may be cured by the filing of motion of reconsideration.

i.

Right to counsel, not a due process requirement

There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a

non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings

Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125

Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region
(DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993.
In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this
petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR

Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio
with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint
dated November 16, 1989,1 charged Lumiqued with malversation
through falsification of official documents. From May to September
1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification
by padding gasoline receipts.

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee

rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, finding Lumiqued liable for all
the charges against him.

The investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or

removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges against him.

This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the
reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Committee, the October 22, 1992,
Memorandum of then Justice
Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the
orders of Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the "payment of retirement
benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by
law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was
dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.

ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be

assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body

may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that
under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself and no
duty rests in such a body to furnish the person being investigated
with counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding such as the one
that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the
option of engaging the services of counsel or not.

Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of hearings

attended by Lumigued clearly show that he was confident of his
capacity and so opted he represent himself.

The hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part

of a criminal prosecution. This
was
even
made
more
pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it
hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of
public
documents in its report
and
recommendation.
d. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

i.

Definition and objective

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should

first seek relief in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a
remedy in court, even though the matter is properly presented to the
court, which is within its jurisdiction. The court will not determine a
controversy:
1. Where the question demands administrative determination
requiring special knowledge, experience, and services of
the administrative tribunal
2. Where the question requires determination of technical and
intricate issues of fact
3. Where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission,
Commissioner
Joseph
A.
Santiago,
Deputy
Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C.
Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that
the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the

Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the

Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in
the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum

Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such,
petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional
Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies

The Director of Lands issued an 'Order of Award in favor of Nasipit

Lumber Company, Inc.

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency; judicial intervention is withheld until the
administrative process has run its course.

Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales

Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not
paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION applies where a claim is originally

cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement
of claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views

The Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of

P5,000.00 in the Deed xxx and the consideration in the Agreement to
Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflor's protest
and gave due course to the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber.

ii.

Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220

iii.

RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of

of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals

Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327

FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of

the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by the
trial court of Petitioner Vicente Villaflor complaint against Private
Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc.

Villaflor in a Lease Agreement leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a

parcel of land. Villaflor claimed having discovered that after the
execution of the lease agreement, that Nasipit Lumber 'in bad faith
surreptitiously grabbed and occupied a big portion of plaintiff's
property.

Villaflor executed a document, denominated as

Relinquishment of Rights, in favor of Nasipit Lumber.

ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the
case?

'Deed

of

Lands and Finality

Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine
of primary Jurisdiction; courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the Jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds

application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land
in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as an
awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the
Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to
determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial
determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the
primary Jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176

Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals
and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City
against petitioners Lope Machete and 11 others. The complaint alleged
that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to
Villanons landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under
which Machete et al. were to pay private respondent a certain amount
or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands
and with no valid reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their respective
rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to
pay him back rentals and damages.

Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended
that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations,
hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under the Revised Rules of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied the
motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the petitioners maintain that
the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an
agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to
consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold
contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing
its execution and the rights and obligations of the parries thereto are
necessarily R.A. 3844, R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian laws.
Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the
DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA
found the petition to be impressed with merit. E.O. 2298 vested the
DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those
failing under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law, hence, this case.

Issue: WON the CAs decision is correct.

Ruling: There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is

exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay
back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private
respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of
the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Thus, respondent appellate
court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this
case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the
part of private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic
in Quismundo v. Court o Appeals,the resolution by the DAR is to the
best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve
agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the
proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not
bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end
that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in
a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28
September 1989 are REINSTATED.

Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a
Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows
gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of
matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified
persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the

Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of

incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood
and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International
Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from
Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers
of matches from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural
Resources and
Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available
softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila
a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and
AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "woodderivative" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and
releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case
asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of
the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence

with the Bureau of Customs
contesting the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would
preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute

administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining

Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized

administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial
review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate

relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and
forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to
seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the
same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude
recourse to the courts by way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs should
gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the
court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such
act which is with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its
authority it claerly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at
bench, we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139

Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum,
Davao, which are covered by Transfer Certificates. The lands were
taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to
landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made
by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a
petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum,
Davao, which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB. Since this case was filed only on January 26,

1994, the fifteen-day period provided for under Section 51 of Republic

Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law within
which to appeal, already lapsed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the decision was affirmed. It was held that: Jurisdiction over land
valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review.

Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to

determine the just compensation for the taking of lands under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such jurisdiction
is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just compensation
can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from the
decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand, respondents argue
that actions for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the
appropriate courts within 15 days from receipt of the decision of the
DAR adjudicator, otherwise such decision becomes final and
executory, pursuant to 51 of R.A. No. 6657.

Issue: Which contention is meritorious?

Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides:

The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special Agrarian Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court
shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts,
unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under
their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of
the case for decision.

iv.

When doctrine does not apply

Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine

does not apply. It does not apply in any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260

Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for
damages which was instituted by the petitioners against the private
respondents for closing a logging road without authority.

From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel.

Private respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a
national highway, through their security force, to prevent passage of
the trucks hauling the logs for the Japanese vessel. Private
respondent claim that they were the only authorized timber licensee
to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court, which
was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding that the
issue is within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have
heard the case before filing t case in court.
Issue : WON the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry applies.

Held : The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages,
the regular courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them,
the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of
Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a
logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does
not vast any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine
whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to
make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages
may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the
petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of
the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter
to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be
disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and
authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the
unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the
payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a
forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development.

available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted

to before resort can be made to (the) court."

Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process,

obviously to show that their case falls within one of the exceptions to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they

were made to avail in the same administrative agency, the opportunity
or right to oppose, which in fact they did, when they filed a motion for
reconsideration and later when the motion was denied, they appealed
to the Secretary of Education and Culture.

Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in

character on the issue of alleged denial of due process.
e. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
i.

Definition and purpose

As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until

all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.

Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344

Ruling : Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
recourse through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until
all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.

When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive

Department of the government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or
refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to
interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on
convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants
and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is

Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657

Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was
appointed Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the
municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later
converted into a Regional Vocational High School under the name of
Iloilo Vocational High School. Gonzales then received a letter from the
Secretary of Education appointing him as Head of the Related
Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He also received
a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools addressed to
respondent Alfredo Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar Trade
School, appointing him as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School.
When Pineda came to assume the office of Principal of the latter
school, Gonzales refused to yield the same to him, and sent a written
protest against Pineda's appointment as well as against his own
appointment as Head of the Related Subjects Department, addressed
to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades, who
forwarded it without undue delay to the Director of Public Schools by
a second indorsement. Without waiting for any action on his protest-in
fact even before said protest could be forwarded and submitted to the
Director of Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for

prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance

of Iloilo to restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of
Public Schools from giving effect to the appointment of Alfredo Pineda
as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School, and to recover damages.
After due trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment.
Appellants claimed that the lower court erred in not holding that the
present action was instituted prematurely.

dismiss the case but RTC denied the petitioner. Petitioner questioned
the courts jurisdiction to try the case without first resorting to
exhaustion of administrative remedy to the Civil Service Commission.

Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative

proceeding.

Ruling: Private respondent did not exhaust the administrative

remedies available to him. Respondent Pontejos is subject to civil
service laws and regulations pursuant to the Constitution as Labor
Arbitration Associate.

Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated

appropriate administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders
that he considered prejudicial to his rights by means of his first,
addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and
Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter to the Director of
Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted the
present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior
officers any opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before
seeking judicial intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate
remedies before resorting to the courts to seek relief appears to be of
stronger application to the present case where, according to the
record, appellant Pineda and the superior officers of appellee did not
appear to have exerted any undue pressure upon him to compel him
to yield and give up the position in question. The decision appealed
from is reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.

Issue: WON private respondent failed to exhaust administrative

remedies available to him?

Respondents grievances must be first raised before the Civil Service

Commission before resorting to judicial intervention. Therefore the
instant case is premature and that respondent should exhaust all the
available remedies to his grievances before resorting to courts.

The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was
ordered to dismiss the case filed by Pontejos.

The exceptions under the Doctrine of Exahaustion of Administrative

Remedies mentioned in this case are the following;
1) where the question is purely legal,

Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132

Facts: Private respondent Pontejos was issued a permanent
appointment as Labor Arbitration Associate by herein petitioner
Carale who is the NLRC Chairman. Carale, pursuant to his exercise of
admin. authority and supervision over all NLRC officials , issued an
admin. Order detailing and re-assigning private respondent to NLRC
4th division in Cebu. In this regard, private respondent filed a case
before the RTC of Cebu against petitioner for Illegal Transfer
tantamount to removal without cause in violation of the security of
tenure under the Constitution. Petitioner moved for a motion to

(2) where judicial intervention is urgent,

(3) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
(5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to
act on the matter, and
(6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot.

De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224

pursuant to a resolution approved by the City Council, which

proceeding is now pending in the Court of First Instance of Basilan.
Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him. Petitioner should have first brought the
matter to the Director of Public Works who, under the law, exercise
supervision and control over city engineers of chartered cities (see
Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not satisfied with the
Director's decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.

Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Basilan City dismissing a petition for mandamus to compel Limbaga,
the engineer of that city, to authorize de los Santos to construct a
residential house on the land described in the petition. It is alleged
the respondent without any lawful cause refused to grant said permit;
and that in view of this refusal, petitioner suffered damages.

The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision of

an administrative official should. before coming to court, apply for
review of such decision by higher administrative authority. This
principle rests on the presumption that the administrative agency if
afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter.

ii.

Effect of failure to exhaust remedies

It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of noncompliance with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a
cause of action, which is ground for a motion to dismiss. Nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is a ground for motion to
dismiss or is a defense which may be raised in the answer.

In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of

Basilan, denied the allegations of the petition and interposed the
following affirmative defenses: that after a fire which occurred in
Lamitan that raged down a major portion of the market site therein,
the city government approved the purchase of an additional area to
enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the lot claimed by the
petitioner was included in the area; that by virtue thereof,
expropriation proceedings had been instituted thereon, hence, the
denial of the permit applied for by petitioner. The city fiscal moved to
dismiss the petition on the following grounds: that mandamus will not
lie since the issuance of the permit applied for was a discretionary
and not a ministerial duty on the part of the city engineer to which
the trial court agreed.

Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance with
the DEAR.

Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason
that, as the record shows, the land in question is already the subject
matter of expropriation proceeding instituted by Basilan City

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438

Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530

iii.

When applied

The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only

where the agency exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It does
not apply in the exercise of its rule-making power or legislative power.

Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952

Facts: The petitioner, a duly registered partnership of Manila, alleges
in substance (1) that it had placed orders for textiles amounting to
about P340,000 with foreign suppliers which orders were accepted
before July 31, 1949; (2) that in November 1950 it requested the
respondent to allow importation of the textiles against its quota for
1949 pursuant to circular No. 12 and (3) but that respondent with
grave abuse of authority and discretion has denied the request and
instead ordered that said orders of Ang Tuan Kai & Co., be charged

against the firm's 1951 quota and exchange allocations in pursuant to

the order issued previously by the same board. Hence this case.

Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case
before the court.

Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the

Import Control Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and
adequate remedy by an appeal to the President. Certiorari or
mandamus against administrative officers should not be entertained if
superior administrative officers can grant relief. Thus, the petition is
denied.
iv.

Exceptions to the doctrine

When there is a violation of due process

When the issue involved is purely a legal question

When the administrative agency is patently illegal

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

When there is estoppels on the part of the administrative

agency concerned

When there is irreparable inquiry

When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts

as an alter ego of the President hears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter

When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies

would be unreasonable

When it would amount to a nullification of a claim

When the subject matter is private land in land cases

proceedings

When the rule does not provide a plain speedy and

adequate remedy

There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention (Paat vs. CA)

Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482

Facts: The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA),
authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession
area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for
a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the
cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious violations of its
conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the
petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional
Trial Court of Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1)

the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had
not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction
sought was expressly prohibited by Section I of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11,

1987,1 and the motion for reconsideration on February 15,1988.2 The
petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of
Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4,
1988,3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the
motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of the
reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of
noninterference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that
the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve
questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by
their superiors if given a chance to do so. The argument that the
questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable.
The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case
before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court
of Pagethan City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and
conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations.21 The charge involves factual issues calling for the
presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated
first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized
knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before
the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review. here is no
question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint
was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging
activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine
whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had
indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this
question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management
Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the
administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a
condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of
the same question by a court of justice.

Petitioner is the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters

Association engaged in the production of rice and corn, filed the
petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said
importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are,
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act
No. 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the
Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency; that
petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and that a prelinainary injunction is
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the
pendency of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from
becoming ineffectual. Respondent, among others, countered that the
petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies available to him
before coming to court.

Issue : WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

applicable in this case.

Ruling : The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of

administrative remedies is not applicable "where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, or where the controverted act is
"patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary,
whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or
where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore,
untenable.

Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802

Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167

Facts : Respondent executive secretary authorized the importation of

several tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and
created a rice procurement committee composed of the other
respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed
importation.

Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989
when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its
way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could

not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof fifteen, (15) days within which to submit
an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On
June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of
DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No.of temporary restraining order of petitioners
was granted by this court. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the buck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other
hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting
that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon
the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were
not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture
was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck
as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the
crime.

Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case
is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy

entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of

controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for
reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we
are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an
ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called
upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while the administration
grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies."
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the
instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases
heretofore stated.

Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962

Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special
Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, he
was charged in an administrative case, for alleged dishonesty,
incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression,
misconduct, etc., preferred against him by employees of the Bank,
resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and
the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The committee
was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service
and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer
of the respondent therein, the committee heard the case, receiving
testimonies of witnesses on both sides. On May 5, 1959, the
committee submitted its Final Report, the pertinent conclusion and
recommendation therein reading as follows: "(1) In view of the
foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to
recommend disciplinary action against respondent and therefore

respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated." Unable

to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted
Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered "the
respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension." The pertinent portion of the resolution reads thus:
"After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the
aforesaid fact finding committee, in conjunction with the entire
records of the case and representations of both complainants and
respondent, through their respective counsel; and, further, after a
thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly
the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board
Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves fitness,
discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover, upon formal statement of
the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special
Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department
(such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in
nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the
respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to
be best interests of the Central Bank, and, therefore, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the
respondent, Mr. R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the .date of his
suspension."

Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995,
dated July 23, 1959, approving the appointment of herein respondent
Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino
Corpus. The lower court was of the opinion that petitionerappellant
should have exhausted all administrative remedies available to him,
such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, under
Republic Act 2260, or the President of the Philippines who under the
Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments
of the government including its agencies and instrumentalities. This is
the main issue disputed in this appeal.

Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by
the President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it is our
opinion that a resort to these administrative appeals is voluntary or
permissive, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case. (1)

There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the

one at bar. The fact that the President had, in two instances cited in
the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from decisions of the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as
precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of condescension on
the part of the Chief Executive. (2) While there are provisions in the
Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil
Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the
petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his status and
the Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo vs,. Bayona, et al., 106
Phil., 1121, We said that Section 14, Republic Act 265, creating the
Central Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof, "is
sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the power of
investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor thereof.
In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for
the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees,
whereas Section 14 is a special provision of law which must govern
the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central
Bank-, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and
Regulations in other respects."

In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner

resigned from the office to which he has been legally appointed as of
the date of his suspension, after he has been duly indicted and tried
before a committee created by the Board for the purpose. An appeal to
the Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act of
supererogation, requiring the presentation of practically the same
witnesses and documents produced in the investigation conducted at
the instance of the Monetary Board. Moreover, Section 16(i) of the
Civil Service Law provides that "except as otherwise provided by law,"
the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have "final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent
officials and employees in the competetive or classified service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officials and employees; * * *." Considering again the fact that
the Charter of the Central Bank provides for its own power, through
the Monetary Board, relative to the investigation, suspension or
removal of its own employees except the Governor, coupled with the
fact that Petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the non-

competetive or unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by

petitioner to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at
most is permissive and voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it may
be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one
is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are
prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings it
follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts,
should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period.
As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 621, and Tumulak vs.
Egay, 82 Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public interest requires that
the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as
practicable."

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August

2003
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission,
Commissioner
Joseph
A.
Santiago,
Deputy
Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C.
Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that
the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods
such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in
the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum

Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such,
petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional
Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts.25 This is within the scope of
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works

8 SCRA 179
Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the petitioner
was denounced before the Port and Harbor Board, Manila for making
certain constructions near the mouth of Calat-an Creek in Sipalay,
Negros Occidental; that on September 11, 1958, petitioner was served
with copy of the charges filed against it by two investigators of
respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communications who
conducted an investigation of said charges; that on the basis of this
investigation, respondent Secretary rendered a decision dated
January 16, 1959 ordering the petitioner herein to remove the
causeway illegally constructed at the mouth of the Calat-an River and
restore the bed of said river to its original condition within thirty days
from receipt of copy of the decision, otherwise, the removal shall be

effected by the government at the expense of herein petitioner.

Without appealing the decision of the respondent Secretary to the
President, herein petitioner has filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari seeking that the decision of respondent be
annulled."

Ruling: Nowhere in the foregoing provisions, or in any other part of

Republic Act No. 2056, is it required that appeal to the President
should precede recourse to the courts. The silence of the statute, to be
sure, does not mean that the President may not review the action of
the Secretary. His power to do so is implicit in his constitutional power
of control of all the executive departments (Section 10, Works and
Communications par. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). This, however,
does not resolve the issue, which is not whether petitioner could have
appealed to the President but whether he should have done so before
seeking judicial relief. The answer depends, in turn, upon whether an
appeal to the President would have been sufficiently effective,
adequate and expeditious, a negative finding in this respect being the
basis on which the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as prayed for by
petitioner, may be issued. The absence of an express provision in
Republic Act No. 2056 for an appeal to the President from the decision
of the Secretary, considered together with the peremptory character of
the periods therein prescribed, shows that such an appeal-assuming
that it may be taken in view of the President's constitutional power of
executive control-would not affect the inexorable requirement that
those periods be observe& the only exception being in favor of Works
and Communications the Secretary, if there is justifiable or valid
reason for his failure or delay to terminate and decide a case or effect
the removal of the illegal construction such as, for Instance, an
injunction issued by a court. We are of the opinion that an appeal to
the President from the order of respondent Secretary would not have
been expeditious enough for petitioner's purposes and hence the latter
did not have to resort to it before seeking judicial relief. In any event,
we believe the facts of this case place it within the rule enunciated in
Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil., 237, as follows: "Such failure
(to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President) cannot preclude the plaintiffs
from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a
Department is merely an alter-ego of the President; the assumption is

that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the
President, unless the same is disapproved by the latter."

Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794

Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special Civil
Case No. 48 with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against
Valeriano, C. Bueno and one Juanito Merin, for injunction and
damages. In his amended petition, Patanao alleged that on March 10,
1958 the respondents therein disturbed him in his, possession of his
timber concession by illegally entering the same and cutting and
hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop said
respondents and their laborers, truckers and loggers from cutting and
hauling logs "he was met with riot guns, pistols and other firearms";
and that defendants were able to cut no less than one million board
feet of exportable logs worth not less than $64,000.00 and would be
able to cut and haul even a bigger amount in the space of one month
as they had allegedly concentrated all their logging machineries and
equipment with the apparent intention of illegally denuding the forest
area covered by his license. Patanao thus urged the court below to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction so as to enjoin the respondents,
their agents, laborers and lawyers, from entering the area and cutting
and hauling logs therein pending trial and, after trial, to make the
injunction final and permanent, and to condemn said respondents
liable in an amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as actual and moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs.

Ruling: At first glance, petitioner's argument appears to be tenable.

True, the common boundary of the parties was verified by the Bureau
of Forestry way back in March 1955. It seems, however, that while
petitioner Bueno had endeavored to respect the verification report,
respondent Patanao had refused to conform thereto, so much so that
the conflict was brought anew to the attention of the Director of
Forestry who has formally taken a hand therein. On or about April 8,
1958, before Patanao instituted Civil Case No. 48 with the respondent
court, he was officially requested to designate a representative to
accompany Forestry officials in the verification of the common
boundary line between him and petitioner (Exhibit 8, letter addressed
to Patanao by Anastacio G. Sison, officer-incharge, Esperanza Forest

Station, Agusan, p. 5; Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of

Preliminary Injunction, dated, July 23, 1958.) That said boundary
dispute is still pending in the Bureau of Forestry at the filing of this
petition is shown by the letter of the District Forester of Agusan, now
in the record as Annex A-Opposition. The record also discloses that
Patanao's application for renewal and consolidation of his timber
licenses for 1957-58 had not yet been approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its renewal depends upon the
consideration of the Director of Forestry. The granting of timber
licenses, their renewal or cancellation, and the determination of
conflicting claims or boundary lines involving forest zones, such as
those presently occupied by the parties hereto, are all vested by law
primarily upon the Director of Forestry and ultimately upon his
Department head.

Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151

Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent
Rodito Nasayao claimed that sometime in May 1974, he was appointed
plant manager of the petitioner corporation, with an alleged
compensation of P3,000.00, a month, or 25% of the monthly net
income of the company, whichever is greater, and when the company
failed to pay his salary for the months of May, June, and July 1974,
Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission, Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The
case was docketed therein as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the
herein petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was employed in the
company as plant manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00.
They claimed that the undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a
joint venture, a sort of partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to
keep the machinery in good working condition and, in return, he
would get the contracts from end-users for the installation of marble
products, in which the company would not interfere. In addition,
private respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount equivalent to
25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would realize,
should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no
profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled to any
amount. The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the
parties selected the herein respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary

arbitrator. In the course of the proceedings, however, the herein

petitioners challenged the arbitrator's capacity to try and decide the
case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from farther
hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In due time,
or on 29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the
complainant, ordering the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao
the amount of P9,000.00, within 10 days from notice. Upon receipt of
the decision, the herein petitioners appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely
abused his discretion in persisting to hear and decide the case
notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and
that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. On 18 March
1976, Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final,
appealable, and immediately executory;3 and, on 23 March 1976, he
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Acting on the
motions, the respondent Commission, in a resolution dated 7 May
1976, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision appealed
from is final, unappealable and immediately executory, and ordered
the herein petitioners to comply with the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed
for, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein
respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned
decision and resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that

the petitioner failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin
remedies is tenable.

Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case, as contended.
In the recent case of John Clement Consultants, Inc. versus National
Labor Relations Commission, the Court said: "As is well known, no
law provides for an appeal from decisions of the National Labor
Relations Commission; hence, there can be no review and reversal on
appeal by higher authority of its factual or legal conclusions. When,
however, it decides a case without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion, the party thereby adversely affected

may obtain a review and nullification of that decision by this Court
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Since, in this case, it
appears that the Commission has indeed acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a belated
appeal sought to be taken from a decision of Labor Arbiter and
thereafter reversing it, the writ of certiorari will issue to undo those
acts, and do justice to the aggrieved party."

Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92

Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of
Muntinlupa (hereinafter, Municipality), Metro Manila, thru its then
Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MCA MAGTITINDA SA
BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM)
represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's
management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The
contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2
September 1985, renewable for a like period, unless sooner
terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, at a
monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be
paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month
which shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year
during the first five (5) years only. Following his assumption into office
as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio
Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year
term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently
inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract.3 He
sought opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the in strument. In
separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be
taken towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the
MMC even granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary
legal steps for the cancellation. rescission of the above cited contract
and make representations with KBMBPM for the immediate
transfer/takeover of the possession, management and operation of the
New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa."

Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye

with the
Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution
No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution, Bunye,
together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital Command
of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the
public market and announced to the general public and the
stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the
management and operation of the facility, and that the stallholders
should thenceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality, thru the
Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow
the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies.

Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is

well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of
the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him.69 This doctrine of qualified political agency
ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no
need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President;
recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in
the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal,
arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as
hereinafter shown, is correct.

Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796

Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for
retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation
Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR), Regional Office in Tobaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty.
Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report
dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's
tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the

necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application sometime in

1979-1985 alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to
deliver her landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the Ming of
the said application and, that the latter had distributed his
landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was conducted this time
by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31, 1985 filed his report
recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT. Said
report was elevated to the MAR. In an endorsement dated November
25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence
with the report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of the
petitioner consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 27167, 27168 and 27344 and hence not
covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program. Juanito L. Lorena,
the Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred therewith. However,
in the order dated February 13, 1986, then Minister Conrado Estrella
denied petitioner's application for retention. On April 17, 1986,
petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
The case was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as ACG.R. SP No. 08550. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal. However, it was denied in an order dated May 28, 1986. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. After the
parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision dated June 29, 19871 dismissing the appeal on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a
landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land holdings,
if administratively decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, are
appealable and could be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980.2 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied in a resolution dated October 22, 1987.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the CA is tenable.

Ruling: A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that questions

as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain
his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now
Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the

Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations.

These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR,
now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of
the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the
courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari brought
before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly
made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a
matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The
Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the
Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to appeal to the
Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian
Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.

Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553

Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the
Conservatory Music in UP as recommended by the President of the
University of the Philippines after compliance of the required
qualifications under the Charter of the same. Consequently, the Board
of Regents of the said University issued a resolution fixing the terms of
the office of the Dean and Directors thereof allegedly in pursuant to
same charter. Thereafter, the University President issued a
memorandum reminding the Deans and Directors whose terms are
about to expire that unless they are recommended by the same for
reappointment, their assumption to their respective office is deemed
terminated. Tapales was injured by the said resolution and
memorandum as such filed before the court a question on the validity
of the said resolution and memorandum. The respondent on the other
hand alleged that the petitioner failed to exhaust the required
administrative remedies available.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: It is contended in this connection, that the appellee failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies by not asking the Board of
Regents to reconsider the challenged resolution before bringing the
matter to court. An administrative review is not a condition precedent
to judicial relief against a statute or ordinance which is claimed to be
unconstitutional and void (73 C.J.S. 357), or where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature
is to be or can be done (73 C.J.S. 354). Here, appellee impugned the
constitutionality and validity of the Resolution of October 2, 1959, and
appellee's objection thereto is a purely legal one.

Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210

Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was duly
and officially registered with NSF and for which he is issued a
certificate of registration, thereby entitling it to participate in horse
races and sweepstakes draws in legally authorized racing clubs or
tracks. In line with the SOP and usual racing practices for horse
owners, Quintos applied for inclusion of his horse in a particular race
3 days before the date of the race which application was duly
approved by Phil Racing Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos
race-horse was scheduled to participate in race no. 15, the PRC
announced thru the PA system before the start of race no. 13 that his
horse was being excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It was then
alleged that the cancellation of the certificate of registration of his
horse was arbitrary and oppressive, due process being denied him in
the absence of a formal investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The trial
court dismissed the complaint primarily on the ground of lack of EAR
that the admin remedy of Quintos was to ask the Board of Trustees
of NSF to reconsider its resolution cancelling the certificate of
registration, and in case of denial of appeal to the Games and
Amusement Board or to the Office of the President. The CA certified
the case to the SC since it found that a purely legal question was
involved, to wit: WON the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: Does Quintos have a valid cause for complaint?

Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages. The

reason for this short-circuiting of administrative processes is not
explained by Quintos. His gives no reason for his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Indeed, there is none. The order of dismissal,
therefore, certainly cannot be considered as being in derogation of the
due process guarantee. The judicial forum sought by Quintos was in
effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept of primary
jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative law, the
stage of ripeness for judicial review had not been reached. Quintos
ignored factors not predetermined by formula but by seasoned
balancing for and against the assumption of jurisdiction. All that had
been said so far would seem to indicate that under such a test, the
lower courts insistence of the fundamental requirement of exhausting
administrative remedies is more than justified.

Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116

Facts: This is MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD.
FRANCISCA SOTO. Specifically, the change sought is in the civil
status of the registered owner, whom the petitioner wants to be
described in the certificate of title as married to her rather than as a
widower.
The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in
January 1933 to the petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a
homestead patent, describing himself as "married to Francisca Soto,"
but in 1953, when the original certificate over the homestead was
issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower." Serfino died in
1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner filed a motion with the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental praying that his description as a
"widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of
the couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents
were married in 1933, the oppositors nonetheless pointed out that
their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man.
Later, they said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man
by whom she begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it
was their father himself who had described himself as a widower in
1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942.

Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being

considered conjugal and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change
prayed for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without
jurisdiction to act on the matter. Its reason was that there was no
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment of

a certificate of title without previous exhaustion of administrative
remedies?

Held: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have
repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of
non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant
of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.

A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the

respondents' office premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm
based in California, U.S.A., through its Chairman, Dulay filed a thirdparty claim in the NLRC case on the ground that it is the real owner of
the computers levied upon and scheduled for auction. This third-party
claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for
relief from judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. The NLRC then issued the questioned resolutions incidental to
Injunction Case. The petitioners filed before the NLRC a motion to
dismiss and/or answer to the petition on the ground that a petition
for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor Code and NLRC
Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to dismiss,
the petitioners filed the present petition. This petition seeks to annul
the three NLRC resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC from taking further
proceedings in Injunction Case and to direct the NLRC to dismiss said
injunction case and to order the full execution of the decision.

Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not

applicable to private lands, as also settled in a number of decisions
rendered by this Court. Once registered, the homestead granted to
Sergio Serfino ceased to have the character of public land and so was
removed from the operation of the said doctrine. But notwithstanding
the above principles, the petition will still have to be dismissed
because the change sought is not authorized under Section 112 of Act
496, as interpreted by this Court.

The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed for

being premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. He further stressed the jurisdiction of the NLRC and its
exercise of sound discretion.

Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338

Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding, among
others, that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general
rule. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
inflexible rule. In fact, it yields to many accepted exceptions. As we
have noted in a number of cases, exhaustion is not necessary where
inter alia there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; where there is unreasonable delay
or official action that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant:
where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule

Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD
Computer Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
certain benefits. The labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining the
petitioners' position. The labor arbiter, then, upon motion of the
petitioners, issued a writ of execution to enforce said decision. The
following day, the sheriff served a notice of garnishment to the
Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount of
P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned over
to the petitioners.

Issue: WON the Soc Gens position is tenable.

impractical and oppressive; where the question involved is purely legal

and will ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts of justice.

financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the

highest court of the land.

At least two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on

exhaustion of administrative remedies. There had been no action on
the challenge to the petition for relief from judgment for almost a year.
This is considerably long considering that the labor arbiter's decision
had already become final and in fact has been partially executed. The
main case had been filed as early as June 20, 1986.

Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President

of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and
political rights. With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner
applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be
reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not
to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.

Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the

suspension of an execution would only be further delayed if we
remand it to the NLRC, only to have any decision raised again before
this Court.

Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his position.

Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623

Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of
Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High
School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was
in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students could hardly
pay for their monthly tuition few. Since at that time also, the President
of the Philippines who was earnestly campaigning was giving aid in
the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through
proper resolutions alloted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the
salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest thought in mind
that the barrio high school was a barrio project and as such therefore,
was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. The only part
that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by the said
barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was
subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of
the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of
the herein petitioner as it involves the very intricacies in the
disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities. Thus, the
herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were charged of the
violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a
sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The
herein petitioner appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, Manila.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision by eliminating the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of onehalf of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, being

Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be

reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the
appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the
petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his, the
discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the
petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports cannot be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be
sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore
technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this
government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer,
who claims that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, the Court
set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.
The petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized
representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to the position
of Elementary School Principal I or its equivalent

Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of duty
(Dredge No. 6 under him bad sunk because of water in the bilge,

which he did not pump out while under his care). the Commissioner
of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a
committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the
decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not
pumping, the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered
resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to
reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a
motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all
his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 598, which provides: The Civil Service Board
of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and decide all
administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in
such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the President
of the Philippines.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of Commonwealth

Act No. 598 in the instant case.

Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision

has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to
the President, and that the tendency of courts has been not to subject
the decision of the President to judicial review. It is further argued
that if decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts,
those of the Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be acted upon by
the President also, before recourse may be had to the courts. It is also
argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be
final and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action
would be derogatory to the high office of the President. The judgment
appealed from is thus affirmed.