MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE*

ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to elucidate the concepts of society. social graup,
power, class, structure, and change. This clarification is performed essential1y with the
help of the concepts of relation (in particular equivalence relation). set (in particular
equivalence c1ass), funetion, and matrix. In addition to that analysis, a framework for
sociological hypotheses and theories is evolved, reminiscent of certain ideas in mathe~
matical ecology. Thus social structure is defined as a matrix exhibiting the distribution
of the total population of a cornmunity among the various social groups resulting from
the partitions of the society induced by so many social equivalence relations. And
social change is defined as a redistribution of the relative populations oC those social
groups. The advantages and Iimitations of this approach are discussed. Also. a number
of methodological remarks are made.
INTROOUCTlON ANO STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The social sciences are centrally concemed with social groups, structures,
and changes. It is hoped that the corresponding concepts are made precise
in the course of becoming part and parcel of sociological theories. This
hope is only partially justilied: systematization, though necessary for
elucidation, is not sufficient unless the theories in question are formulated
in a full and aceurate way. But this degree of relinement is attained only
rarely: the social scientist is usually in a hurry to account for some social
facts rather ilian to make a contribution to the foundations, methodology
or philosophy of his subject.
The elucidation of key sociological concepts may be regarded as one
of the two tasks of the foundations of sociology - ilie other being the
axiomatic reconstruction of basic sociological theories. That discipline
may indeed be construed as the set of conceptual analyses and syntheses
aiming at clarifying and interrelating (systematizing) the generic, hence
basic, ideas of social science. The emphasis here is on the generc in contrast to the specific - e.g. on social groups rather than income groups or
educational groups; on social structure in general instead of, say, kinship
or class structure; and on arbitrary social changes rather ilian, for instance, urbanization or poltica! revolution.
The foundations of sociology should supply frameworks within which

J..ellf/ellnttIK6hler (etls.). Developmel/ts in the Methodology 01 Social Science. 175-215 .4.11 Rights Rtserved
Copyright
1974 by Mario Bunge.

176

MARIO

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

BUNGE

the relation of being greater than: they are 'interna!' relations in the sense
that, if a and b are members of S and R is in R, and furthermore a holds
R to b, tben this 'makes a difference' to a or b. The environment E is
shared and transformed by all the members of j. Even if a member of S
owns no par! of E and takes no part in production, it has access to E and
in turo does its share in the modification (mainly degradation) of E. Note
finally Ihat, in Ihe simplesl case, a single organism (p = 1) transforms a
single element of E (i.e. q= 1) into anolher part of E. In this particular
case, Ihen, Ihe extension of the transformation relalion is incJuded in Ihe
carlesian product of S by E 2 Sometimes (e.g. coral reefs, beehives, industrial societies) it lakes a number p of organisms acling upon a number
q of environmental nnils lo process the laller. Whenee the exponents p
and q in clause (iv).
Since we shall be concerned with human communities, we mayas well
define this latter concept as a certain specification of the generic concept
of a community. We adopt

the generic socio10gical concepts can get cJeansed and interrelated. Such
frameworks may not only cJarify sorne ofthe existing constructs, but may
also help to build substantive hypotheses or theories. However, tbe formulation of particular sociological hypotheses and theories - e.g. on the
relation of participation to social cohesiveness - lies aboye the foundational level: it is tbe concem of substantive tbeoretical work. Our own
work, concemed as it is with tbe concept of social structure ratber tban
witb social structure, will belong to the foundations of sociology.
In this paper we wish to elucidate five basic generic sociological concepts: those of society, social group, social power, social structure, and
social change. To this end we shall avail ourselves of some extremely
simple matbematical concepts and we shall adapt some ideas of mathematical ecology.
1. SOCIETY AND PRODUCTION
1.1. Society

We regard sociology as the seienee of societies, or eommunities composed

of human beings. A society may be characterized as a system (not just a
set) of organisms sharing an environment and holding certain relationships or connections (not just relations) among them. More precisely, we
propose

DEFINITION 1.2. A sextuple f/' = (S, R, E, T, W, M) represents a human

commU/.i/y (society) iff
(i) Ihe substructure (S, R, E, T) represents a community;
(ii) S is a subset of the human species;
(iii) W c: T is a nonempty subset of the set T of transformation relations, such Ihat each element of W is a relalion from a subsel of S P x Eq
inlo a nonvoid subset A of E, represenling the transformation by sorne
members of S of cerlain things in E (e.g. f1inl slones) inlo things in A
(e.g. arrow heads).
(iv) M c: R is a nonvoid subset of tbe sel R of social relalions, such
Ihal each element of M is a relation in sm, with m;;'2, and represents
some aclion of members of Supon other members of Ihe same society.

DEFINITION 1.1. A structure j=(S, R, E, T) represents a communi/y iff

(i) S is a nonvoid set of organisms of given kinds (species);
(ii) R is a nonempty set ofrelationships (connections) in sm with m;;'2
(i.e. every member of R represents a physical or an informational relationship among m members of <ej, called the social re/a/ions in j;
(iii) E is a nonvoid set of things, disjoint from S, called tbe environment of S ;
(iv) T is a nonempty set of relations from SP x Eq to E, witb p, q;;'l,
called the transforma/ion of the environment of j by the members of j.
Reasons for saying that Ihe ordered quadruple j represen/s a community
instead of saying that j is such a thing, are given in Appendix lo
The members of a community j may be plants or animals belongingto
a single species or different species; in the latter case the community is
often called an ecosystem. The relations in R are not 'external', such as

177

According lo Ibis definilion nol every buncb of humans conslilutes a

I,

.)

society: to qualify as such, a collection of persons must share an enviran

ment, Iransform it actively (by working notjust by eating il up or pollul-

ing il), and hold social relations among themselves. Work, an ingredient
of human communities, does nol suffiee to ebaraclerize them: Ihe animal
communities that work (e.g. antbills) do not qualify as human communitieso Therefore any definilion of man as 'the ... ing animal' (e.g. Ihe 1001

178

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOC1AL STRUCTURE

making animal. or the talking animal) is inadequate: we need a separate

characterization of human kind in biological terms. FinaUy. we must
single out the other distinguished subset of tbe colleetion of social
relations: the man transforming relations M. such as edueating and
managtng.
Let us now come somewhat closer to characterizing the distinctively
human relations W and M. First the former:

cows. being a product of artificial selection. are artifacts in our sense of

the word.
And now to the man transforrning relations M:

Let [1'= (S, R, E. T. W. M) represent a society. Then

(i) the element W, of W c T is called the ith kiud of primary work
done by members of S;
(ii) tbe range A, of the relation W, from SP x E' to A, is called tbe
product of the ith kind of work. and each member of the set A, is called
DEF1NITION 1.3.

an artifact;

Let [1'= (S. R. E. T. W. M) represent a society. Then

(i) the element M k of M c R is called the k lh kind of secondary work
done by members of S;
(ii) the subset QkCS. for k= 1.2... s. occurring in the domain ofthe
secondary work relation MkEM. is called the k lh set !lf secondary producers of S;
(iii) the union Q = UkQk is called the secondary manpower (or tertiary
sector) of S.
DEFIN\TION lA.

Finally, by combining bits of the last two definitions we obtain

(iii) the totality of products A, of S. for i= 1.2... r. i.e. U,A,=A. is

caIled the production. or artificial environment. of S;
(iv) the complement N=E-A of A to E is called the natural environmenl of S;
(v) the subset P,CS occurring in the domain of the prirnary work
relation W , is called the set of primary producers of A,;
(vi) tbe union P= U,P,cS is called tbe primary manpower of S.
Here again it has been assumed that every society does sorne work or
other. A single kind of primary work. such as felling trees. would suffice.
(But then it is doubtful whether a society where work of only one kind is
done. is possible. Each kind of work 'Ieads to' sorne other kinds.) But it
must be material Dr primary work: it must transform raw material into

sometbing not found in a state of nature. Solitary meditation in a monastery does not qualify. Of course it may happen that a community subsists for sorne time

179

00

the remains of a shipwreck or sorne other spoils.

But even so it wiII have to engage in sorne \York or other and, in any case,
it won't be self supporting. hence lasting. In other words. it is an unspoken axiom that the primary manpower of every society. referred to in
clause (vi). be nonempty. Note fnrther that our concept of primary work
does not coincide with the standard concept of prirnary industry: the
primary producers referred to above may be workingmen or farmers.
Nor does our notion of an artifact coincide with the usual one. Thus

DEFlNITlON 1.5. Let [1'= (S. R. E. T. W. M) represent a society with

primary manpower P and secondary manpower Q. Then
(i) tbe active population of S is tbe union of its manpowers:
~=PvQ;

() the inactive populatioll 01 S is the complement to S of ~:

In other words. the active part of a society is formed by all those persons
- farmers, industrial workers, and housewives - who transform raw material into artifacts. and tbose whose job it is to act upon other people.

. It is not implied that prirnary work be manual: it may consist in controlling automated machinery. Nor is it necessary !hat secondary work
consist in the direct control of other men: the invisible decision maker
in a buge industrial concero does a secondary job and so does the civil
servant. Finally it is not necessary that the memberships of the two manpowers be disjoint: in the family business P and Q may overlap or even
coincide.

The preceding conceptual framework is not self contained: it does not

provide a full and independent characterization of every one of the defining concepts. namely the coordinates of tbe sextuple [1'. Such a com-

181

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

plete characterizalion can only be gotten by filling that framework with

substantive hypotheses involving the defining or the defined coneepts. In
the above we have tacitly made only two such assumptions, and theyare
so trite as lo hardly deserve mention. One is that, for every soeiety, its
primary manpower P is nonempty. The second platitude is that the secondary manpower Q is nonempty if and only if the primary manpower P
is nonvoid. (Corollary: For every society, Q is nonempty.) However, it
is not our task in this paper to formnlate snbstantive assumplions, not
even trite ones. We mnst move on.

hand and secondary workers on the other, and relations among secondary
workers. Figure 1 illustrates tbis triehotomy. To simplify the formal
definitions we shall restrict ourselves to ternary and quaternary work
relalions. We propose

180

Manager

N
Foreman

1.2. Production

The preceding definitions will aIlow us to clarify three notions that are
central to Marxian economie and soeial thought but seem to have remained heretofore at an intuitive stage: namely those of material foree
of produetion, social relation ofproduetion, and superstrueture. We take
the former to eonsist of the environment together with the primary work
in a community, and its produetion. Sinee doing productive work of any
kind involves knowing how to do it (wilh greater or lesser awareness and
e/lidency), speeifying the set W of work relalions involves describing lhe
technology available to the soeiety of interest. Thus we have

:-~

Fig. 1.

Graph oC social relations oC production.

Let f/' = (S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a soeiety with primary manpower P and secondary manpower Q. Then
(i) for any X and y in P : x and y hold a primary (or coproduction)
relationship between each olher if there is at least one member K of R
such that, for some members W, W k and W m of W,
Kxy iff ((Wxea and WkYe'a') or W".xyea for somee, e'EEandsome
DEFINITION 1.7.

Let f/' = (S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a soeiety. Then

(i) The subsystem F = (E, W, A), where A is the i Oh product ofthe
i Oh kind of primary work W, is called the i lb material resource (or material
force of production) of f/';
(ii) the set F = {F 11", i '" r}, where r is the number of kinds of work
done in f/', is called the material resources (or material forces of produetion) of f/';
(iii) lhe resources of f/' are its human resourees d=PuQ together
with its material resources F, Le. RS= (d, F).
DEFINIT/ON 1.6.

Now to the second notion menlioned above: that of a social relation

'based' on work, such as lhe relation between a blue collar worker and a
member of the management of bis enterprise. The social relations of production are those social relalions people engage in by virtue of ther
work. There are three different kinds of social relations of produclion:
relations among primary workers, among primary workers on the one

Workingmen

a' EAc::A);
(ii) for any x in Q and any y in P: x andyhold amixedsocialrelation
oJ production if there is at least one member L of M such that, for sorne

Q,

"

W,in W,
Lxy and W,yea for some eEE and sorne oEA, cA;
(iii) for any x and y in Q : x and y hold a secondary relation oJ
produclion iff lhere is al least one relalion N in M such that, for sorne W.
in W,
Nxy and there is a z in P such that (Lxz or Lyz) and W.zea for sorne
eEE and some aEA.cA.
That is, for a social relation of production to hold between two persons,
it is necessary and suffieient that either of lhe following situations obtain:

182

MARIO BUNCE

(a) bolh individuals take parl in Ihe produetion of lhe soeiely as primary
produeers; (b) one of Ihe individuals produces while !he olher manages
the former; (e) the two iodividuals eomaoage at leasl ooe primary produeer. Thus while all lhe social relations of produetion are 'based 00'
work, as !he metaphor has it, not every kiod of work gives rise lo a social
relatioo ofproduetion. Forexample, makiog a toy for one's own ehild does
not establish a social relatioo of produetion.
Finally we come lo the Ihird notion we intended to elarify in this subseetion: that of superstructure. In Platonic terms, the latter is the set of
beliefs and rules as well as the fund of knowhow and knowledge of a
society. Since in our ootology ideas do not fiy around but are thought
out by people, we pro pose

"

.1

2.1. Let [/'=(S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a soeiety aod let

RI be a fixed relatioo io R. Theo lhe social group SI generated io S by R,
is !he sel of relata of R, (i.e. the set of R,-relatives of elemeots of S). For
a binary relation Rh
DEFlNlTlON

Si = RI [S] = {YES for some x io S, R,xy orR,yx}.

1.8. Let [/' = (S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a soeiely. Then

the superstructure ST of S is constituted by the secondary manpower of
S together with the set M of managing relations in S, i.e. ST= (Q, M).
So much for the concept of a soeiety. Heoceforth we shall part with conereteness to foeus on individual members of lhe set R of social relations.
This wiII give rise to the nolion of a social group. A social group wil! in
faet be deflned as a certain subsel of a soeiety, namely the colleetioo of
iodividuals amoog whom some relatiooship io R holds. A1though the
persoos eooeeroed are eooerete and their relations are oot imaginary,
sueh a singling oul or 'abstraeting' of a subset of R is artificial insofar as
it is the whole set R of social relations in S that makes S into a whole.
Hence the Dotion of a social group constitutes an 'abstraction' or idealization. However, just as the idealizatioo of the purely thermal effect, so
lhat of a social group does correspond to an aspect ofreality and is lherefore not idle. In the end we shall restore concreteness by consideriog
simultaneously all the social groups into which a society can be partitioned. But this synthesis wiII not come until Section 3.
2. SOCIAL GROUP AND POWER

A social group is a subset of a society characterized by a subset ofthe set

of social relations. For example, the group eogaged io school teaching
may be regarded as !he set of donors aod receptors of a eertain kind of

183

ioslruetion. (To speak of the institution of learning as beiog anything

apart from, and possibly abo ve, the people engaged in learning or tea ehing, is to indulge in Platonism or Hegeliaoism.) In general, we have

DEFINITION

2.1. Social Group

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

"

A possible alternative is Ibis: The social group generated in S by R, is the

graph of R I, i.e. !he set of ordered pairs of x, yES sueh that R,xy. Ei!her
definition can be used, as eaeh has its advantages. lo particular, if R, is
oot symmetric (as is the case with a social dominatioo relation), the
seeond definition will display lhe laek of symmetry. But on the olher hand
il wil! not allow us to say that a giveo social group of S is part of S - bul
rather that it is a subset of S2 - which is awkward. However, this definitiooal ambiguity wil! not bother us because we shall be concemed
with equivalence classes, i.e. with groups geoerated by equivalence relations,
A social group may, but need not, be a concrete unit or whole. Thal is,
a group may nol be detachable from its commuoity except conceptually.
For one !hiog, a social group need 001 be self supportiog: thiok of the
membership of a ehess elub or of a streel gaog. Nor need a social group
be a social elass, i.e. a colleetioo eharaeterized by eertaio eeooomie relaliaos. Ooly lhe eooverses hold: every society is a social group aod so is
a social class. In other words, whereas a society is a concrete thing, just
like a mouolaio, a social group may be jusI an aspeet of Ihat thiog - jusI
like a slope of a mounlain. This does nol eolail that social groups are
fietitious: lhey are as real as aoy other aspeet of a real lbiog. Only, they
have no separate or autonomous reality.
While either ofthe last two defioitions allows us to defioe social groups
00 the basis of the eorrespooding social relations, they leave oul sorne of
lhe most ioterestiog social groups, namely !hose deriving from work. For
example, the key eoneepl of ao oeeupational group may be defioed as the
set of people engaged in doiog work of a ceftain kind, sueh as farming
peanuts or keeping the aeeouots of an eoterprise. That is, we need

MARIO BUNGE

184

DEFlNmON 2.1. Let .'7'= <S, R, E, T, W, M ) represent a society and let

W, be a fixed work relation in W, aud M, a fixed management relation
in M. Theu
(i) the 'h primary occupationa/ group in S is the subset S, of PeS
defined as follows:
S, = {XEP I for sorne eEE and sorne aEA, W,xea} ;
(ii) the k" secondary occupational group in S is the subset S. of QeS
defined as follows:

S, = {XEQ for sorne y in S, Mxy}.

One and the same person may belong to several occupational groups - he
may even be ajack of all trades. And, in keepingwith Section 1, house wives
form a distinct occupational group. Finally, the union of all the occupational groups in S equals the active population of S (recall Definition 1.5).
Two individuals may be said to be equivalent as regards occupation
just in case there is an occupational group S, in Sto which bolh belong.
Similarly with other social classifications. We shall say that tbe belonging
to the same social group is holding a social equivalence relation. More
precisely, if S is split up into disjoint social groups S, covering S, Ihen E,
is a social equivalence re/ation on S equals, by definition:
There is an S, e S such that E,xy iff XES, and YES,.
Social equivalence relations are the proper tool for discussing the division of society into social groups - social equivalenee relations such as
those of same occupation, same income bracket, same educationallevel,

or same politieal power. By seizing on any such equivalence relation we

shall be able to study society in the corresponding respec!. And by changing equivalence relations we shall get different partitions of Ihe same
community. Since one and the same person may, and usually does, belong
to several social groups, we should take all sucb partitions into accoun!.
This will permit us to cbaracterize Ihe social structure of a community as
well as the changes in that structure. But before embarking on that study
we shall do well to make a detailed study of a special kind of social group,
namely that of social elass. And, sinee we shall regard social classes as
generated by economic power, we must start by analyzing the notion of
power.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

185

2.2. Social Power

We assume that there are societies in which sorne individuals exert power
of a eertain kind over other individuals, and Ihat this relationship seIs the
relata apart in different social elasses, such as Ihe landed aristocracy and
the serfs. Moreover we shall single out for analysis one particular kind of
power, namely economic power, and make Ihe methodological assumption that the strength or intensity of power is a numerical function. But
before introducing this notion it will be convenient to clarify the qualitative notion of influenee. To lhis end we shall take it for granted
Ihat the notions of human activity and communication have been
elucidated elsewhere. We need Ihe following combination of these two
coneepts:
DEFINmON 2.2. Let x and y be members of a society represented by
.'7' = <S, R, E, T, W, M). Then x influences y iff the activity of y while
communicating with x differs from whal y performs when no such communication flow exists.
Obviously, two persons may influence one another with unequal in

tensity. We need therefore a comparative and, better, a quantitative coneept of influenee. We offer the following:
DEFlNITION 2.3. Let x and y be members of a society represented by
.'7'= <S, R, E, T, W, M) and call N(y) the number ofactions y performs,
and N(y I x) tbe number of actions y performs nnder the inflnence of x.
Then the strength oi rhe influence x exerts over y is the function
1:S x S -> Q+ such that 1(x, y)

IN(y x) - N(y)1
Max{N(y), N(y Ix)}'

where Q+ is the set of nonnegative fractions.

In other words, to compute the intensity of an influence we first analyze

Ihe total activity of the subject as a set of unit actions -and then take the
par! of tbe activity performed under the influenee of the other individual
concerned.1t turns out tbat the influence is the same whelherit steps up the
activity by a factor n or slows it down by a factor I/n.
Control or power may be said to exist when the inlluence in one direction is far greater than tbe reciprocal influenee. That is, we propose

187

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

DEFINITION 2.4. Let x and y be two members of a society represented by

[1'= (S, R, E, T, W, M). Then x controls y (or x exerts power over y) iff
I(x, y)~I(y, x).

managed by the powerful party; afortiori it is immaterial whether property is private or pub lic. (These finer distinctions, though important, are
irrelevant to the question of effective economic control: the management
of a state enterprise may exert a s!ronger economic power than the owner
of a private concern.) Finally, the fourth clause is necessary as well: the
first three conditions alone are also satisfied by the pair consisting of a
manager and his docile wife.
Having secured a qualitative ootion of economc power, we can now
proceed to building a quantitative concept. We shall assume that economic power can be measured by the number of persons under control. More
precisely, we lay down

186

Not only people but also things can be subjected to control. We take it
that controlling a thing is working on or with it, or having somebody else
do the work for ns. More formally, we propose
DEFlNlTlON 2.5. Let x be a member of a society represented by [1' =
=<S,R,E,T, W,M) and call F={<E, W"A,) 1 <;;<;;r} me material
resources of S (Definition 1.6). Then
(i) the person x has direct control of the ming yEEu A iff there is a
W, in W such that Wxya for some aEA or Wxey for some eEE;
(ii) the person exer!s indirect control over the tlllng yEEu A iff mere
is at least one other person ZE S such that x controls z and in turn Z has
direct control of y;
(iii) the person x mobilizes (owns or manages) part of the material
resources F of S iff x has direct or indirect control of sorne of the things
that make up F.
Now, control can be ofvarious kinds: physical, psychological, or social.
We are interested in economic control, a kind of social control. We define
it as follows:

DEFINITION 2.6. Let x and y be two members of a society represented by

[1'= <S, R, E, T, W, M). Then x has the economic control ofy (or exerts
economic power over y) iff
(i) x belongs to Q;
(ii) x controls y (Definition 2.4);
(iii) x mobilizes (owns or manages) part ofthe material forces ofproduction of S (Definition 2.5);
(iv) x and y are in a social relation of production (Definition 1.7).
The first clause, though necessary, is insufficient: clerks too belong to Q
and yet they wield no economic power. The second clause alone does not
guarantee economc control, since the control1ed individuals may revolt
and climb on top at least temporarily, e.g. by occupying the production
planto According to the third clause it 18 immaterial, [oi effective control,
whetber the resources or material forces of production are owned or just

DEFlNITION 2.7. Let x be a member of a society represented by [1'=

= <S, R, E, T, W, M). If the cardinality (population) of S is N> 1, and
x controls N(x)<N members of S (other than himself or herself), then
the power tbat x wields in S is

P(x)

N(x) .
N-l

Clearly, the values ofthe functionP: S ... Q+ are comprised between Oand
1. Any specific quantitative concept ofpower, such as that of economic or
political power, is obtained by suitably qualifying the words 'control'
and 'power' in the preceding definition.
The following derivative concepts suggest themselves:
DEFlNITION 2.8. Let x and y be members of a society represented by
[I'=<S, R, E, T, W, M) and call P(x) and P(y) respectively the powers
they wield. Then
(i) x is powerless in S iff P (x)", O;
(ji) x is more powerful than y in S iff P(xP(y);
(iii) x is the most powerful member of S iff, for an y in S,

P(x) > P(y);

(iv) x is al! powerful in S iff p(x)", 1.
We shall focus henceforth on economic power and will try to construct
a measure of the economc distance among individuals. We stipulate

188

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

MARIO BUNGE

DEFINITION 2.9. Let .'1' = (S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a society. Then

the function
d: S x S .... R+ such that, for any

x, yeS, d(x, y)

IP(x) - P(y)l,

were P is the economic power functioD, represents the ecollomic distan ce

belween any t\Vo members of S.

The main mathematical property of lhe economic distance function is
given by
THEOREM 2.1. Let d be lhe function introduced by Definition 2.8. Then
lhe structure f=(S, d) is a quasimetric space.
Proo! It is immediate lhat d(x, x)=O and d(x, y)=d(y, x). And it is
easy to see that d(x, y)+d(y, z);;'d(x, z) for all x, y, zeS.
Note that d is not a metric, for it may not be lhe case that x and y are
at no distance apart except when they are one and the same individual.
Precisely lhis circumstance wil! allow us to define (roughly) a social elass
as a group whose members hold no economic distance amongst themselves. We shall make use of the following convention:
DEFINITION 2.1.0 Let .'1'= (S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a society, and
let d be the economic distance function introduced by Definition 2.8.
Then the quasimetric space f=(S, d) is called an economic space.
COROLLARY 2.1. Let G"=(S, d) be an economic space. Then the econo",ic
distance between two individuals x, y in the economic space f is
d( x,y )

IN (x) - N (y)1
N-1

where N(x) and N(y) are the numbers ofindividuals conlrolled economically by x and y respectively, and N is the population (cardinality) of S.
We can now exactify two further notions of interest:
DEFINITION 2.11. Let G"=(S, d) be an economic space. Then
(i) S is a class society iff, for sorne x, yeS, d(x, y);"O;

189

(ii) S is a e/assless society iff S is not a elass society (i.e. if, for all x,

yeS, d(x, y)=O).

Note that we have defined lhe concept of a elass society without having
introduced the notion of a class. Notice also that there are alternative
measures of po\Ver. One that has been employed in politology is the
probability of influencing other people's decisions or actions. We have
not employed this measure, despite its obvious mathematical advantage,
because it quantifies potential, not actual power (unless of course probability values are confused with actual frequencies). Another candidate of
sorne promise is the fraction of time of the !ives of olher individuals, that
an individual controls. More precisely, consider a (relatively extended)
time interval T(y) in the !ife of an individual y, and that part of it during
which y is at the disposal (or under the control) of another individual (or
group) x. Call T(x y) Ihe lalter portion. Then we might define the power
lha t x exerts on y as
T(x y)
Power 01 x over y = P(x y) = T(y)

ClearIy, the values of Pare comprised in the [0,1] interval. Examples:

P(captor prisoner)= 1, P(slave holder slave)=2/3, P(manager workingman)= 1/3, P(professional professional)=O.
The total power that a unit (person or family) x wields in a community
S is the sum of the periods of time controlled by x:

P(x) =

I P(x I y) = eS
I
eS

I y)
T()
Y

T (x

Example: A slave holder who owns lOO slaves exerts a total power of
200/3, twice the power exerted by the manager who employs the same
number of workers.
The preceding interpersonal power measure suggests defining a social
separalitm function:

u:S x S .... R+ such that u (x, y) = IP(x y ) - P(y x)1

Two individuals are socially separated just in case either overpowers the
other. But this is clearIy inadequate, because two iudividuals may hold a
dependence relationship and yet be socially distant, like a given landlord

190

MARIO

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

BUNGE

and the serfs of another landlord. Besides, the above social separation
function u is not even a qnasimetric, which is mathematically annoying.
2.3. Social Class

In the last subsection we defined !he notion of a class society but not that
of class. We could try and use !he notion of economic distance to define
at least the concept of same elass, namely as follows;
Let C=(S, d) be an economic space. Then, for any persons x andy in C,
(i) x is classwi,. equivalent to y, i.e. x~,y, ilf x and y wield!he same
power, i.e. if they are not economically distant ;

,y ilf d (x, y) = O;

(ii) the economic class of x is the

[x]

~,relation

elass of x in S;

= {y eS IY ~~}.

It is immediate that ~ , is an equivalence rela.tion and thus induces a

partition of S into disjoint homogeneous groups. However, this partition
is too fi ne to be regarded as mirroring the e1ass division of a society. Indeed, according to the previous definition, businesman J ones, employing
101 workers, would rank socially higher than businesman Smith, with
100 workers. We need a coarser partition.
We might try the relation defined by

x ~,y ilfO '" d(x, y) '" e witb eeR+ and e < l.

But this relation faUs to be transitive, hence it is not an equivalence relation capable of elfecting a partition of S. We do get what we want if, instead of seizing on the economic distance d, we focus on the economic
power P. As noted before we cannot define a social e1ass as the set of all
those who are equalIy powerful, for this would give too fine a partition.
But we can divide the range of P, i.e. the unit interval, into subintervals
rellecting the class division of a society. We shall do this, but before we
proceed we must recall that economic power is exerted only on sorne
members of a family. The inactive members of the famUy get their social
status vicariously. by their association wi th the active members. Hence
we must start by partitioning society into families; it is the set of families
in S , rather than S itself, that is divided into social elasses.

191

Now, there are two concepts of family; the anthropological and the
sociological ones, the former based on kinship relations only, the latter
adding a social componen!. In sociology a famUy is a kinship group of
people living together and sharing their possessions or at least sorne of
them. Call ~ I !he social equivalence relation of belonging lo Ihe sarne
family in !he sociological sense. The quotient of S by ~ I is then the
family ofF of all !he families in S. It is this set ofF that will be categorized
into social classes. A social class will be dellned as the collection of famiIies containing individuals who wield an economic power comprised between given bounds. More formally, we make
DEFINITION 2.12. Let .9'= (S, R, E, T, W, M) represent a society with
the family partition ofF = SI ~ l ' and let P be the economic power function
introduced by Definition 2.6. Then if a and b are preassigned reals, an
economic class in S is defined as the interval

C = {FeofF For sorne x in F, a '" MaxP(x) '" b},

where MaxP (x) is the maximum power a person in a famUy wields.
We are not stating that any bounds a and b will do, but !hat there are
suitable values refiecting the variety or spread within a given class as well
as its separateness from tbe other classes. The actual determination of
!hose bounds is a task for the social theorist r~ther than for the foundational worker, as it calls for specific theories of elass structure rather than
just a framework for such theories.
An imaginary example will show how the last definition can be put to
work. Let ofF = SI ~ I consist of 13 families categorized as follows;

I
tm
2 middle fams.; {GeofF I (3y)(yeG & -h '" P(y) '" rt)}
10 lower fams.; {He ofF I (3z) (zeH &P(z) = O)}
I top family;

{FeofF (3x) (xeF & P(x) =

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

We have built a concept of social cIass coinciding with that of an econoroic cIass bu! to be kept distinet froro Ibat of an occupational group.
The notion of equal social cIass follows irnmediately:

It is onIy in hierarchical socie!ies !ha! the more powerful classes dominate

the less powerfu\. (For this reason we do not use the standard expression
'stratified society', that suggests the simple ordering of social strata resulting in what we call a hierarchy.) The notion of social dominance is
elucidated by

192

DEFINITION 2.13. Let e" be a social class in a society S, or ralber in tbe

family partition ff of S. Then, for any X and y in ff,
(i) x is class equivalent to y iff x and y belong to e,,:

(ii) the social class of x is the ~ o relation cIass of x in S:

[x] = {YEff 1 y ~A
It is easily seen that ~ o is an equivalence relation. Consequently the
quotient set of ff by ~ o' i.e. ff1~ o = (SI ~ f)1 ~ o, wiII be Ibe class partition of the family partition of S. To emphasize we make

DEFINITION 2.14. Let ~ f be tbe family equivalence relation, and let ~,

be the social class equivalence relation in a society S. Then Ibe class
partilion (or class strueture) of the family partition of S is 9,=ffl ~ ,=
(S/ ~f)/~,

We can now introduce the notion of relative (or comparative) power of

social classes:
DEFINITION 2.15. Let 9, be the cIass partition of a collection ff of families of a society S. Then if Si and SJ are in 9, (i.e. are social cIasses), Si
is more powerful than S} iff every family in S, wields a greater econoroic
power than any member of SJ:
S ,>- Si iff, for every family x in Si and every family y in Si' there exist
a person u in x and a per.on v in y such that

P(u) > P(v)

Note that a social class may be more powerful than another without
dominating the Jatter. The land owners and industrialists may vie for
economic, political and cultural control without eilber of them being
under the sway ofthe other: metaphorically speaking they can be paralle\.

193

DEFINITION 2.16. Let 9, be the class structure of a society. Then, if Si

and SJ are social classes (are in 9,), S, dominates Si iff every member of
Si is in economic control of sorne members of Sj:
S,>- >-SJ iff, for any family x in S" there is a family y in S} snch that
sorne member u of x overpowers economically sorne member v of y:

P(uP(v).
This dominance relation helps to define a hierarchical society:
DEFINITION 2.17. Let S be a society. Then S is a hierarehical society iff
(9" >- >- >is a simple order (i.e. if, for any Si' SjE9" eilber Si>- >-S} or
SJ>- >-S,).

The notion of economic distance, defined previously for individuals (Definition 2.8), carries over to classes. In fact we can
, stipulate that Ibe distance between two classes equals the smallest distance be!ween elements
of those cIasses. That is, we propase
DEFINITION 2.18. Let S be a society with family partition ff and cIass
structure 9" and let S, and SJ be members of 9,. The function
a:9o x9,-+R+ such that a(Si' SJ)=Min{d(u, v)[ for all
UEXES,

and all VEYES j }

is called the social distance between the classes S, and SJ.

There are alternative measures of the distance between social cIasses,
which we shall not investigate. Instead we shall move on !o the notion of
diversity or heterogeneity of a society.
2.4. Class Diversity

There are several ways of exactifying the notion of social diversity or

195

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

heterogeneity and, in particular, of elass heterogeneity. The simplest measure of the c1ass diversity of a society is, of coursc, just tbe number of
social elasses of the society, i.e. the number of members of the elass partition !!Y',. However, this simple index is clumsy because it does not indicate
how the total population is distributed among the classes. These two
independent variables, the number of elasses and their relative abundance,

This definition, together with Corollary 2.1., entails the formula we

shall use to compute elass diversity indiees:

194

COROLLARY 2.2. The elass diversity (heterogeneity) of a eommunity S is

given by

D(S)=(N-1)-Z

This is what many of the indices of ecological diversity do. Unforturtately

we cannot borrow any of tbem because the best of fuem (e.g. Simpson's)
presuppose fuat maximal diversity is a desideratum. This is true in matters
ecological, where equilibrium is desirable and coincides wifu the maximum
value of certain indices of ecological variety. But this, whieh holds for fue
'balance of nature', may not hold for the 'balance of society': it could be
argued fuat social equilibrium may be attained either by increasing social
diversity or by reducing it to zero. We need fuen an ideologieally neutral

D (S) oc

d (i, j).

, j e S

This diversity index is zero for a elassless soeiety and it increases with
both the social distanees and the abundance or population of eaeh elass.
The maximum value oceurs for d(i,j)=8lj' where is fue Kronecker
delta. In this case, hardly a realistie one exeept for a two tier society,

d(i,j)=tN(N-l).

,jES

To form an exaet definition we must take into aeeount that fue individual of interest is now a whole soeiety. Hence we must take the colleetion .11 of human socieles and define D on this set. We adopt

IN(i)-N(j)I,

where N(k) is the number of persons eontrolled eeonornically by k.

Let us work out a eouple of examples. Firstly we have
THEOREM 2.2. The elass diversity of a two elass eommunity equals the
distance between the two elasses (Definition 2.17). More preeisely, let a
soeiety S be partitioned into two elasses, upper and lower, in the 1: In
ratio, where m is a natural number. Then

index of cIass heterogeneity, and moreover ane in tune with our prcvious

work.
The coneept of eeonomic distance (Definition 2.7) allows us to build
a measure of the overall elass diversity of a community S, namely

L
,l eS

can be combined in several ways to yield measures of class heterogeneity.

D(S) = 8 (upper, lower) = ml(N -1).

Proof The total population N of S is divided into n subgroups of
m + I individuals each, in sueh a way that N = n (m + 1). (In Figure 2,

n=3 and m=5.) Since d(i, j)=ml(N-I) if i is upper elass andj lower
elass but zero otherwise, fue value ml(N -1) occurs n times in the summation. But nm=N-I, whenee the sum equals m, and we have
D (S)

m
= -N-l
- = 8 (upper, lower).

Example. Greek elassical period : m= 1, D(S)= l /N. Late Roman Empire: m= 100, D(S)=mIN= 1001N, i.e. 100 times fue economic heterogeneity of fue previous case.

DEFINlTION 2.19. Let .11 be fue set of human eommunities. Tbe c/ass
diversity (heterogeneity) measure is fue funetion D:.II -+ Q+ sueh that

foranySE.II,D(S)=(N-1)-'

L
l.j eS

where N> I is the population of S.

d(i,j),
Fig. 2.

A society compased of social groups consisting of ene upper class individual

and five lower c1ass persoos each.

196

MARIO BUNGE

TH E CO N CEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

TREOREM 2.3. Let S be a society consisting of n pyramids, each of which

is forrned by one upper class unit dominating m middle class units that
in turn dominate Ilower class units each. Then

~., witb k between 1 and n, and the corresponding partitions fili'k=S/ ~k'
That is, we must consider the whole

D(S)

nm(l + 2)
(N -1)'

Proof. Each pyramid is constituted by 1 upper class, m middle class,

and mllower class units (see Figure 3). Hence the total population N adds
up to N =n (I + m + mi). The economic powers the individuals wield are
.

Upper class (on mlddle and lower) =

Middle class (on lower)

197

A handy way of dealing with the resulting social groups (whether we

ean enumerate them all or not) is tbe following. Take a fixed k, Le. a given
social equivalence relation ~ ,. Then the k" aspect of the society can be
represented by the column vector

m +ml

~-,...

N-l

N-l

In the summation there are n terms worth (m +ml)/(N-I)' each and

nm terms worth I/(N - 1)' each. This explains the resul!.

And tbe totality of aspects (social partitions) of S may be regarded as the

row matrix composed of all the previous column matrices, Le. as the
m x n rectangular matrix (where mis the maximum number of rows of al!
:E,) :

mI
Fig. 3.

A three tier social pyramid.

3. SO C IALSTRUCTUR E

3.1. CeU and Comb

The family and class partitions of society are just two among many possible. (They may not even be universal, as anthropology and prehistory
tel! us.) A social equivalence relation other tban those of being in the
same family and being in the same cIass wil! generate a difrerent partition
of the same society. Hence one and the same society S can be partitioned
in n different ways, where n, a finite natural number, is the nunlber of
equivalence relations defined in S. If we wish to attain a satisfactory
picture of a society we must take into account all n equivalence relations

Every element S" of this matrix is a set eitber empty or nonvoid and it
represents tbe " social group resulting from the k" partition (or aspect)
of S. We compress tbe foregoing in the following
3.1. Let S be a society and fiIi's the col!ection of al! n partitions
of S, each induced on S by a social equivalence relation. Then
(i) every element S" of fiIi', EfiIi's is called a social eeU of S and
() the entire matrix :E= 11 S" 11 is called tbe social eomb of S.
DEFINmON

For the unusual but rigorous extension of tbe concept of a matrix

to one whose elements are sets rather than numbers Dr function s, see
Appendix U.
Since every element of fiIi's is an equivalence cIass, we have the following
trivial but important

MARIO BUNGE

198

THEOREM 3.1. Let 1:= 11 S" 11 be the social comb of a society S. Then for
each fixed (aspect) k between l and n,
m

(a)

U Sik = S

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURB

199

funclion. Its values look like tbis:

N u (1) N 12 (1) oo.

N (1) N 22 (1) oo.
D(S, 1) = I/N(I). 21

N,. (1)
N 2.(I)

= 1

and
m

(b)

n S,,=0 .

i= 1

In other words, each relation of social equivalenee effeets the partition of a soeiety into social eeUs that are pairwise disjoint and'
jointIy exhaustive, Sinee these various partitions are mutuaUy compatible, one and the same individual may belong to different social eeUs
Slk and Sm. provided k"" n (Le. as long as different aspeets of soeiety are
studied),
The concept of social ce11 exactifies that of social group, and the coneept
of social comb elucida tes that of soCial slruclure, The two are exaet coneepts witbout being quantitative, If we wish to obtain an equaUy aeeurate
but far more detailed pieture of soeiety we must take a further step and
measure at least the size of each social ceU in a community. And as a
second step we should inquire into tbe variation of such partial abundances in tbe eourse of time. That is, we should study tbe distribution of
the total population of a society among the various ceUs of its social
comb, as weU as the ehange in sueh a distribution. This we proceed to
do next.
3.2. Densilies o[ Social eells

Let S be a human community with social comb 1:= II S"II. CaU N(I) the
total population of S at time 1, This population is distributed among the
various cells Si.' Can N" (1) the population of ceU Si. at time l. These
m x n numbers are subject to the sale condition tbat, for every fixed partition [1Jke[1JS, they add up to N. Dividing now each Nik(l) by the total
population N(I) al the same time, we obtain the population density of
the i lb social cell in the le lh social comb (respect). Call D the function that
carries Sik in lO N,,(I)/N(I) al time 1, This funclion D associates aU Ihe
possible parlitions of a society to the relative abundance of every one of
the resulting ceUs. Hence it deserves being caUed Ihe social struelure

We compress Ihe foregoing into

DEFINITION 3.2. Let JI be the collection of societies and TeR (where R
is tbe set of reals) a time interval. Furthermore eall1:= IISikll the social
eomb of Se ../t, N(t) the population of S al lime leT, and N,,(t) the
population of cell S" at the same time, subjecl to the condition
1: iN ik

= N for every

S;

S;

n.

Then tbe function

D fromJl x Tinto tbe ring ofmatrices such that

(S,I)>->(I/N(I) II N,,(t)1I
is called the social Slrueture funclion, and tbe value of D at (S, 1) the
social slruelure o[ S al time t.
Imaginary example. Let S be formed right now (1=0) by 100 persons,
10 of whom are upper elass, none middle elass, and 90 lower elass. Besides, there are in S 70 illiterates and 30 literates. Finally, 50 members of
S vote white, 25 red, and 25 black. Make the pretence that these three
aspeets are all those that are relevant to the social strueture of S. Then the
social structure of S at the present time is given by the density matrix

0.10 0.70 0.50

D (S, O) = 0.00 0.30 0.25
0.90 0.00 0.25
Note tha! the relative positions of tbe social eells in each column (aspeet)
are arbilrary. But they musl be adopted once and for all if intersocietal
comparisons (Le. tbe comparisons of the social structures of different
communities) are to make sense. Note also that, by setting the densily of
the middle elass equa! to zero, rather than leaving a blank in the matrix,
we get a mathematically meaningful thing and also leave the door open

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

for an eventual change in that entry. Change is, precisely, what will occupy our altention for the remainder of this papero

with, since changes in one column are bound to be correlated with changes
in other columns. Thus we are led to propose

4. SOCIAL CHANGE

DEFINITION 4.1. Let S be a society wilh social comb II S"II and the corresponding social structure D = IID'kll, where D is the m x n density matrix.
Then the nef sfrucfural change of S between the times f 1 and f 2 is them x n
matrix

200

4.1. Net Structural Change

Since the social structure of a society is given by lhe relative populations

of ilS cells (Definition 3.2), any change in thal structure must be given by
changes in sorne of those population densities, irrespective of the variation in the total population, provided the lalter does not dwindle to zero.
Example. Let S be a community initially divided into slave holders and
slaves in lhe 1: lO ratio. Assume lhat, after a successful revolution, only
free men remain. The social classes to be considered are lhen three and,
even if sorne of them are not inhabited eilher in the beginning or in the
end, we shall consider the class comb as fixed . The population densities
of the three classes concemed, in the beginning (f=O) and after the time
T lhe revolution took lO be completed, are
N 1 (O) = 111
N 2 (O) = 1011 N , (O) = O
N(O)
, N (O)
, N(O)
,
N 1 (T) = N 2 (T) =0 N 3 (T) = 1.
N(T)
N(T)
, N(T)

Therefore the iDitial and final class structures of S are

O
111
D(S,O)= 1011 , D(S,T)= O

Lf (S; f 2 , f 1 ) = D (S, f 2 )

- 111
Lf (S; T, O) = - 1O11

+1
In tbis example a single aspect (column) of lhe social structure was
taken into account. But the whole social comb IIS'kl1should be reckoned

D (S" f 1 )

This measure of social change may Dot be as perspicuous as this other ane:

'. (S'
a,k

'2'

() _
1

N" (f 2) - N" (t1)

N" (f 2) + N ik ( f 1 )'

On lhe other hand the computation of the extent of social change is easier
with Definition 4.1. This is an nstance of the general maxim lhat simplicity cannot be achieved in every respect al the same time.
That which effects the change from D (S, f 1 ) to D (S, f 2 ) is a certan
matrix E(S; f" (2) characteristic of both the society S and the time interval [t" f 2 ]. In the prevous example, a possible operator ofths knd is
E(S; O, T) =

1
1

- 110 O
- 1 1O O

It is easi1y seen that several other operators do the same trick, .e. that the

evoluton of a society between two given structures is not given by these

alone. For example, the matrix

The net structural change Lf (S; O, T) between the instants Oand Tmay be
regarded to be D(S, T)-D(S, O), i.e.

201

E(S; O, T) =

O O 1
O O 1
1 1 O

effects the same change. This is just as well both mathematically and
sociologically. The first because the problem we are dealing with, namely
that of tracing lhe evolution of a society between two given social structures, is an inverse problem, and it is typical of inverse problems not to
have unique solutons. (The corresponding direct problem is, of course:
Given a social structure and an evoluton operator, find the resulting

203

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

new structure.) It is also sociologically reasonable, for there are alternative ways of producing a given structural change in a society.
The preceding considerations are sununed up in the fo11owing convention and consequences of it.

century, according to fue speed of social change and the fineness of our
analysis.) The two matrices are related, according to Definition 4.2, by
the evolution matrix E(S; 1,1+ 1) in the following way:

DEFINlTlON 4.2. Let D(S, 1, ) and D(S, (2 ) represent the social structures
of a society S at times 1, and 12 respectively. Then any matrix E(S; 1" 12 )
such that
D (S, 12 ) = E(S; 1 12) D (S, 1, )

If E itself does not change in the course of time, then the social structure
acquired by the society p time units later is obtained by iterating E p
times, where p is a number such that p = T, T being the total time lapse
considered. The condition of invariance of E is satisfied when the society
changes with a constant mode of change, such as gradual industrialization, or literacy. In general terms we have

202

"

is called a social evolulion operalor (matrix).

COROLLARY 4.1. The net structural change in a society S between times
t 1 and 12 is
j

(S; 12 , 1, ) = [E(S; 1" ( 2 )

I] D (S, 1, )

where lis the unit matrix ofrank Max{m, n}.

Proof. By Definitions 4.1 and 4.2.
THEOREM 4.1. Any given structural change in a society can be brought
about in alternative ways, each represented by a different social evolution
matrix.
ProoJ. Consider the simplest case, that of a single column of the social
comb, and moreover one consisting of just two ce11s. Given are then the
density matrices

I ~J I ~ill
and sought the coefficients

eik

of the social evolution matrix such that

1::: :::II 'II~:II I ~ill

D(S, t

+ 1) =

E(S; 1, I + 1) D(S, 1)

THEOREM 4.2. Let S be a society with social structure D (S, 1) at time l.

Then if S evolves wifu a constant mode of change, its structure p time
units later is given by

+ p) =
Set 12 =1, + 1 in
D(S, I

E' D(S, 1).

Definition 4.1 and use induction on p, on the

ProoJ.
assumption that E(S ; 1, l+n)=E(S, 1) for any natural number n.
COROLLARY 4.2. The net social change produced in a society S that evolves
with a constant mode of change, at the end of p time units, is
j

(S; 1, I + p) = (E' - I) D (S, 1) with E '" E(S; 1, 1+ 1).

ProoJ. By Definition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2.

For sorne methodological remarks on the preceding framework, see
Appendix III. And now to sorne examples of types of change.
4.3. Main Types of Slruclural Change

The preceding framework will enable us to characterize with sorne precision sorne of fue main types of structural change studied by historians.

The resulting system of equations is indeterminate.

4.2. Discrele Time

Call D (S, 1) the social structure of S at time I and D (S, 1+ 1) the value
of Done time unit later. (This unit is conventional: it can be a week or a

DEFlNITION 4.3. A society remains slalionary (or slagnanl, or in a state

of slalic equilibrium) in the respect k(1 :<{.k:<{.n) over the period [O, T] iff

Ni' (1) '" cons!. for alll

:<{. i:<{.

m and all IE[O, T],

where Ni' is the population of the S" cell.

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

DEFINITlON 4.4. A society is slable (or in a state of dynamic equilibrium)

in the respect k (1 kn) over lhe period [O, T] iff aU lhe ceUs of the
society expand or shrink at the same rate:

DEFlNlTlON 4.5. A social ehange eharaeterized by a eonstant mode of

evolulion E, for which lhere is a natural number p sueh lhat EP=J, is
caUed a cyclic change.

204

N,,(T)

aN,,(O) with aeR+ and a"" 1

for aU 1,,; i ,,; m.

By virtue of Definition 3.2, the preceding condition is equivalent to the

following condilion on the densities of the social ceUs in the k th aspect:

Dk(T) = bDk(O) with b = aN(O)/N(T).

Since, by Definition 4.2, the law schema of social change in tbis case is
D(T) = ED(O), we finaUy have
COROLLARY 4.2. The stable state of a society that develops with a constant mode of change over a period [O, T], consisting in the uniform change
in the size of aU the ceUs during that period, is given by the eigenvalue
equation
EDk(O) = bDk(O).
As is weU known, the eigenvalues b corresponding to the stable state are
in turn the solutions of lhe characteristic equation

IE- bIl = O.
RecaU now Corollary 4.1 and note Ihat, even if there is a net structural
change over every single time unt (i.e. if E""I), there may be some p for
which E' =1. In tbis case, after p untary changes the society resumes its
initial social structure. The whole process constitutes a cycle with period
p. Example :
O 0 ... 0

E= O 0 ... 1 O
1 O... O O

represents a eertain exehange of populalions of social eeUs. Indeed, in

this case E 2 =I, so that D(I+2)=D(t). This is the case with politieal
restorations as weU as with lhose eommunties whose adult male populations migrate every year to obtain seasonal employment and return afler
six months. In general we have

205

DEFINlTlON 4.5. A social change is irreversible iff it is not cyelie.

Of aU the irreversible ehanges the deepest are the revolutionary ehanges.
We distinguish various degrees of extent of revolutionary changes.
4.6. A socety S experiences a revolution in certain respects

DEFINITION

iff S ehanges irreversibly in lhose respeets and if the net social ehange in
those respecls is very large, i.e. if some eells D'k ehange appreciably.
DEFlNITlON 4.7. A soeiety S experiences a total revolution iff S ehanges
irreversibly in every respeet and to a large extent, i.e. if every eeU D 'k
changes appreciably.
At tirst blush the irreversibility condition we have plaeed on revolutionary
ehanges to qualify as such is ineonsistent with the faet that there are
drastic eyelie changes (Definition 4.5). There is no sueh ineonsistency: a
genuine social revolution, in contrast to a strictly politieal revolution or
sorne other partial upheaval, affeets irreversibly a number of eolumns in
the social combo Thus the English and Freneh restorations of the monarchy in the 17th and 19lh centuries respeetively did not undo the profound social and cultural changes brought about by the eorresponding
revolutions.

The difference between a peaceful and a violent revolution may be

represented as foUows in our formalismo Suppose a soeiety eonsists initiaUy of 10 upper elass and 90 lower class units (e.g. families). If we take
only this particular partition into aeeount, the total population matrix
degenerates into lhe column vector:

N(O)'D(O)

II!~II

At time T a lotal revolution oecurs that dispossesses aU the upper class

units. If their lives are spared then the new population matrix is

N(T)'D(T)

1 1~011

(Peaceful)

206

207

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

But if the upper class is physicaIly liquidated and the lower class deci-

altogether others are only greatly reduced and others greatly increased.
Example:
N,

mated in the revolutionary process,

I ~III

N(T)'D(T) =

N(O) D(O)

(Violenl)

I ~II

moderates are mainly interested in the total population matrix, extremists

are only interested in the density matrix.) Each type of change can be
represented by an evolution matrix of a peculiar formo In the example
aboye we may set

I ~ ~II

since

I ~ 9/~01 1

N(T)'D(T) =

I ~ ~II ' I !~II = 1 1~011

since

a peacefullevelling revolution by E=
p

O 0 ...
O 0 ... 0

1 1...1
and
a violent levelling revolution by

E=
,

But, if Ihe revolution is peaceful, aN2 +bN3 =N(O), while if it is violent

aN2 +bN3 <N(O). The intensity of revolutionary violence is given by
V = 1-

aN 2 + bN 3
N (O)
.

In aIl the cases of drastic revolution, where whole columns or rows of

the evolution matrix are composed of zeros, the matrix is singular. There-

4.4. Social History

I ~ 9/~011'11!~11=I180111

In general, we may represent

O O O
O a O
O O b

fore knowledge of the final social structure is insufficient to retrieve (retrodict) the initial structure.

and
E, =

Whether the revolution is peaceful or violent, the evolution matrix is

E=

If we wish to distinguish between peaceful and violent revolutions on

the basis of a populational analysis alone, we must study Ihe evolution of
the total population matrices. (Simplifying we may say that, whereas

Ep

N2

N3

The resulting social structure is the same Ihrough either method. Indeed,
in both cases the final density matrix is

D(T) =

O 0 ... 0
O 0 ... 0

.. .....
O O. .J

where f is the surviving fraction of Ihe victorious group.

The aboye cases are so extreme as to be unfrequent, perhaps nnreal in
modero times. In the typical case, while some groups may disappear

The en tries of the social structure matrix D= IIDik ll at time tare the instantaneous relative populations of the social ceIls Sik of a society S. If
we collect the whole lot of values of the density NiklN of every such ceIl
over a period T, we obtain the history of that ceIl during that periodo And
if we do the same for every cel! in the comb of S we obtain the social
history of S. More explicitIy, we have
DEFINITION 4.8. Let S be a human society with instantaneous social structure D (S, t). Then
(i) Ihehistoryofthecell Sik throughout the period [O, T] is the sequence

Hik(S; O, T) = <Dik(S, t) tE[O, T]);

(ii) the social history of S throughout the period [O, T] is the set matrix
H =

IIHikll

209

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The goal of social history, in contrast to other, narrower branches of

history, is to determine the form and values oflhe whole social s!ructure
function D for every society (or cluster of societies) of interest over the
entire period of inlerest.
Two partieularly simple examples are lhe objeet of the following the-

lhe introduction of certain ideas that might help formulate specific sociological theories - e.g. by specifying the population dcnsity matrix D and
lhe social evolution operator E. A framework has thus been produced
that might aceommodate a number of eompeting sociological theories. For
a charaeterization of the framework concept see Appendix V.
Because of its eminentJy analytic rather than substantive charaeter,
this paper contains more definitions lhan postula tes and theorems. Neverlheless we have tried to make adequate rather than arbitrary definitions
and, in the process, we have been forced to make some assumptions - for
example, that the population density matrix D is an adequate representative of the social structure. We have also made a few assumptions of a
simplifying character. One of lhem is lhat social structure and social
change are independent of lhe total population. (An exception was the
trealment ofrevolutions in Section 4.3.) This is only approximately true :
we know that below a eertain population threshold some social partitions
(e.g. division of labor) do not come into existence, and that there are
critical masses as weU, beyond which certain functions (e.g. participation
in management and politics) become impossible.
Another pretence, of a different kind, is that the social comb does not
change: only the occupation numbers N ik of the corresponding ceUs Sik
may change, in particular from zero or into nought. In other words, we
have regarded the social comb as a permanent set of cubes, sorne of them
empty, through which people pass. To iIIustrate:

208

orems.

THEOREM 4.3 . A society with a rigid social structure has no history.

Proo! If Dik (S, I) =eonstant, then lhe history of the cell S'k is lhe
singleton H'k= (D'k (S, 1. But this is no history proper: nothing happens
at the sociallevel, neither in any cell nor, a fortiori, in the whole combo
Moral for politieians: If you want your society to have a history, do not
allow its social structure to crystallize.
THEOREM 4.4. The growth of any cell in a column of the social comb
occurs at the expense ofthe decay ofsome other ceU(s) in the same column.
Proo! By Definition 3.2, the populations along any given column must
add up to the total population.
Example. Take a respect (partition) k with just two ceUs, S1k and S'k'
and assume lhat the fust of them grows exponentially, i.e. N,k(I)=
=N(O) [l - exp (- al)] with a a positive real. Then lhe other ceU must
decay according to N'k(t)=N(O)exp(-at), for only thus N .. (t)+
+N'k(t)=N(t).
Moral for politicians: Do not promise growth of every social group in
a given partition - let alone growth of every ceU in the comh.
This must suffice: our purpose was not to propase historicallaws but
to explore a framework within which such laws might be formulated. For
sorne possible types of social and historicallaws, see Appendix IV.
5. CONCLUDING METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Because this paper has proposed no sociologicallaws, it does not contain
a sociological lheory. It does not even offer a deseription of any particular
social structure ar change. What it does instead, in accordance with our
declared intention, is to analyze certain sociological concepts. These can-

cepts are so basie lhat they are usuaUy taken for granted and therefore
are not always as elear as they should. A byproduct of our effort has been

..

That is, our study has not dealt with the fascinating question ofthe very
origin and extinction of the cells of a social eomb. The reason is plain:
such an alternative study involves conjecturing specific dynamieal laws
about the mechanisms or 'forces' (biological, psyehologieal, eeonomical,
political, or cultural) lhat bring abont or dissolve the various social partitions (aspeets) of society. Sueh a study of the emergence and extinetion of
the various social categories belongs to social science proper rather than

210

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

MAl<.lO BUNGE

to its foundations and is therefore way beyond the scope of this papero
However, we can be sure that any such study of origins and decays can
use sorne of the concepts analyzed in this papero
Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unil
McGill Universi/y

NOTE

211

contribute to sketching the meaning of the formulas. For example, suppose we tried to represent the phenomenon of social parasitism by means
of the Lotka-Volterra equations
dH
- = (all
dt

+ a12P) H,

dP
-

dt

(a21

+ a22H ) P .

Then in addition to postulating these equations we should assume that H

and Pare fust order differentiable with respect to the real variable I and
that the diagonal eoeffieients of lIa,,1I are positive reals and the others
negative reals. Besides, we should try to render explicit the foIlowing tacit
semantic assumptions: (a) t represents an instant of time, (b) H(I) represents the population of the host social group at time 1, and (e) P(t)
represents the size of the parasitie social group at time l.

* This paper was written at the University of Aarhus while tbe author held a John
Simon Guggenheim Foundation fellowship. <O Copyright 1974 by Mario Bunge.

APPENDIXES
1. SEMANTIC ASSUMPTIONS

2.

It may be noted that, in stating certain definitions, we do not say that a

certain mathematical structure is a society, or a social group, but that the
former represenls the latter. The reason for this departure from custom is

that constructs are not things. At most, constructs constitute conceptual

representations or symbolic ~pictures' of concrete systems or sorne of
their aspects.
A statement of the form 'x represents y', where x names a construct
and y a thing, may be caHed a seman/ic assumption. It is not just a convention, Iike naming, for it may weH be the case that the construct concerned represents a thing other than the one intended, or that it does its
job in an utterly inadequate way, so that it does not deserve being regarded
as a representing construct. A semantic assumption is then a full f1edged
hypothesis. But it must be distinguished from both the purely mathematical as weH as the substantive assumptions of a scientific theory, as it concerns neither the constructs alone nor their referents by themselves: a
semantic hypothesis is about our way of representing the worId with
concepts. It foIlows that every definition involving a statement of the
form 'x represents y', far from being an arbitrary stipulation, has a status
intermediary between a nominal definition and a substantive hypothesis.
In an explicit, exact and orderIy (Le. axiomatic) formulation of a scientific theory, the semantic assumptions should be stated explicitly and
separately on a par with the other postulates of the system, sinee they

SET MATRICES

In Sections 3. l and 4.4 we introduced matrices whose elements are sets.

namely the matrices representing the social strueture and the social history of a soeiety. We shaIl now justify that use by rendering explicit the
laws for the addition and muItiplication for such matrices.
Al. The quntuple JI=(M, +, ',0,1), whereMis a set, +
and . are binary operations on M, aud O and 1 are distinguished elements
of M, is a ring ofse/ matrices iff
(i) JI is a ring (roughly, Mis cIosed under+and ' );
(ii) every member of JI is a rectangular array of m rows and n eolumns
with m, n>O;
(iii) if A and B are in JI, then

DEFINITION

.,

(iv) thenuIlmatrixO is the matrix every entry ofwhich is the empty set;
(v) theunit matrixIis the diagonal p xp matrix, with p=Max{m, n},
sueh thatl,.=o .. U, where O'k is the Kroneeker delta and Uthe largest of
the sets being eonsidered.
Because of the multiplieation law (iii) and of the eommutativity of set

212

MARIO BUNGE

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

intersection, it follows, with Ihe he1p of (V), Ihat lA =AI=A for every A in
.

JI. Thus for

A = IIA
A 2l

A 12
A 22

A1311

A 23

we set

~.

U 11 11
I= 0 U 11
11 11 U

with

U::oA I"

aud obtain, using (i),

value. Besides, set matrices in general have no in verses under multiplication. (The exception is constituted by certain matrices sorne of whose
elements are unit matrices.) There is nothing wrong with Ihe lack of an
inverse, either as a matter of principIe or as a practical malter. Singular
matrices, though disagreeable, are known to physicists and economists.

3. THE PROIECTION PROBLEM

In the particularly simple cases handled by Theorem 4.2 and Corollary

4.2 the predic/ion problem is: Given the social structure D (S, t) and the
ev?lution.operator E(S; /,.t+ 1), compute the social structure D(S, t+p)
P lime umts later by assummg Ihal Eis conslant and applying the forward
projection operalor EP lo D (S, t). The corresponding retrodiclion problem
is: Provided Ihat Ihe backward projection operalor E - P be nonsingular,
find Ihe value of Ihe social slructure D(S, t-p) p time units earlier by
applymg E-P to the given present social structure D(S, t),
In either case we must know the present social structure and assume
that the mode of social evolution (summarized by E) has remained constant throughout the period ofinterest. Ifthe projection (forward or backward) is refuted then, assuming !hat the initial data compressed into

D (S, t) are reliable, we must iofer that the mode of evolution itself did
in fact evolve - e.g. that, after a certain point, industrialization led to
neglecting agriculture, which in turo caused famine, which originated
riots, which ended up in a civil war.
Our formulas for social change in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 constitule a
framework for social projection (prediction or retrodiction), hence for
social history of a !dnd. On Ihe other hand they give hardly any insight
into social change. Indeed the evolution matrix E does not exhibit any
change mechanism: it just summarizes the operation of Ihe social mechanisms of structura! change. In olher words, we have supplied a nonexplanatory black box. But this box is ample enough to contain any
explanatory mechanism and moreover it provides a framework for any
such mechanismic hypolheses.

4.

The main difference between a set matrix and a numerical matrix is of

course, that the former has no associated determinant with a numerlcal

FORMS OF SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL LA ws

According to the pOnt of view adopted in Seclions 3 and 4, the laws of

social structure are patteros of distribution of Ihe total population among
Ihe various social cells of a society. Correspondingly, the laws of social
change (i.e. the laws of social history) are palteros of redistribution of
such populations. Every such pattero consists in turo in a definite functional relation among the populations of Ihe various cells.
We can distinguish two main groups ofsocietallaws: those concerning
a single respect or partition (column) and those relating two or more
respects or partitions (columos). And within each of these two major
groups we make a few distinctions as indicated in the following listo
1. Intrapartition (same column) laws
1.1. Static
1.1.1. Deterministic NI, =! (N,,)
1.1.2. Stochastic
Pr(N1, N'k) = PI'k
1.2. Dynamic

213

'1

1.2.1. Deterministic
1.2.2. Stochastic

d~ik =!(N", N j "

dPr(N", t)
dt

t)

()

9 (N Ik , Pr N'k)' t

214

THE CON'

MARIO BUNGE

2.1. Static
2.1.!. Deterministic N ik = (Nj ,)
2.1.2. Stochastic
Pr(Nik N m,) = P"m,

2.2. Dynamic

2.2.2. Stochastic

215

garded as a collection __
el objects, of the referents of
the discipline. For example, our DefinitlOn 1.1 of a cornmunity as the list
'6'= (S, R, E, T) is a mode! object of a community. Such a relational
system constitutes a conceptual model of a cornmunity. In order to obtain a definite theory of communities one should put forth a number of
hypotheses characterizing and inter-relatng the various coordinates of'6'.
As long as this transformation of a framework into a theory is not performed, the derived concepts wil! be defined in terms of more or less hazy
notions.

2. Interpartition (different columns) laws

... -dN"
2.2.1. D etermUllstlc
dI

~TRUCTURE

(Nik' Nmil' t )

dPr (N", t)
dt
= g (N", Pr(Nm,), t)

In the above expressions 'Pr' stands for a probability function. In the

interests of perspicuity we have written only first order rate equations and
have not listed any integral equations - the standard tools for handling
after effects (or memory effects), so typical of human history.
It is quite likely that it is impossible to isolate intraparttion (type 1),
laws. Indeed, it seems to be a metanomological statement in social science
that every column in rhe social structure matrix covaries with al least some
other column. For example, growth in literacy is often accompanied by a
redistribution of the total population among the various occupational
groups. In other words, there seems to be no one sided development, i.e.
evolution in a single respec!. But this systemic or wholistic character of
social evolution, rar from having to remain mysterious, can be accounted
for with the help of our formalismo
Note finally that our frarnework accornmodates not only Ihe single
community case but also the case of an arbitrary number of societies.
Indeed, the social comb and its corresponding social structure matrix may
be construed as referring to a whole collection of societies - particularly if
they are in strong interaction. This applies, in particular but not exclusively, to the case of two or more competing (e.g. warrying) cornrnunities.
5. THEORY ANO FRAMEWORK

A theory, in the technical acceptation of lhe word, is a set of hypotheses ,

together with its deductive consequences - i.e. a hypothetico deductive
system. N ot so a conceptual frarnework: this is just a set of concepts
which are only Ioosely sketched. A frarnework for a science may be re-