Marks Appeal Mecklenburg Protest 12.4.16

APPEAL OF ELECTION PROTEST TO STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
Use of this form is required by G. S. 163-182.11(a)

NOTE: This form content has been updated from the original Notice of Appeal filed with
the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections on November 29, 2106. The changes were
made for clarity and reference to supplemental information. The original Notice of Appeal
as filed with the Mecklenburg Board is at Exhibit I. (page 75)
A copy of this appeal must be given to the county board of elections within 24 hours (weekends and
holidays excluded) after the county board files its written decision at its office. This same appeal must be
filed with or mailed to the State Board of Elections by the end of the second day following the county
board decision if the protest involves a first primary. As to a protest of any other election, this appeal must
be filed or deposited in the mail by the end of the fifth day following the county board decision. See G.S.
163-182.11(a). A copy of the original election protest form with attachments must be filed with this appeal.
A copy of the county board decision must be filed with this appeal. The county board will provide the
record on appeal. As many additional sheets as are necessary to answer the questions below may be
attached, but they must be numbered. Please print or type your answers.
1. Full name, mailing address, home and business phone, fax number, and e-mail address of undersigned.
Marilyn R. Marks
7035 Marching Duck Drive E504
Charlotte, NC 28210
Marilyn@AspenOffice.com
2. Are you the person who filed the original protest, a candidate or office holder adversely affected by the
county decision, or someone else whose interest has been adversely affected by the county decision?
Yes. I filed the original protest.
3. State the date, place, kind of election, and results of the election protested (if different from the
information on the election and its results as set out in the attached original protest form).
11/8/16 General election. No change since original protest.
4. State the name, mailing address, home phone, and business phone of all candidates involved in the
protested election.
Protest concerns the impact on all candidates on the statewide ballot, and all candidates
on the ballot in Mecklenburg County. Particular impact on candidates subject to recount.
5. State the date of the county board hearing.
There was no hearing. Protest dismissed on November 28 without permitting my
comment or rebuttal. Documents referenced for Boards dismissal (Exhibit A, pages 1-4)
were not shared with me until after my protest was dismissed. Board meeting began at
5 pm on November 28, 2016.
6. State the legal and factual basis for your appeal.
Summary: The Mecklenburg Board of Elections wrongly decided that there was no
evidence of violation of election law, irregularity or misconduct, as presented in
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my protest. (Board findings--Exhibit A, page 1; ProtestExhibit B.) The county

officials acted in knowing violation of the law that requires a post-election audit
sample count using paper records. The board acted in direct violation of clear
legislative intent of this requirement.
Before the State Board or county boards can achieve sufficient confidence to rely
on electronically tabulated results to issue election certificates, the required postelection audit sample count must be conducted with successful results. If
significant discrepancies are detected, a manual count of the election is required
for canvassing.
The Board applied the wrong standard in making its determination not to utilize the
VVPAT record for the required test of the electronic records. The board concluded
that any single incident of a VVPAT paper jam causes the VVPAT records for
machine and that voting location to be unusable for an audit, regardless of
whether the VVPAT printed record was damaged in any way. The board wrongly
concluded that an alleged, undocumented paper jam is a condition warranting
the use of the vote image log, in lieu of the paper record.
162-182.10(d)(1) requires that findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the
evidence and on matters officially noticed. There is no evidence supporting the
findings of facts concerning either State Board permission to use electronic
records for audits, or a record of paper jams on Election Day at #234.
The Mecklenburg Board erred in its finding that the State Board of Elections has
authorized the precinct-wide use of the vote image log in lieu of the paper record
when a paper jam in one iVotronics machine on the site occurs. The document
referenced and purportedly relied on for this finding does not state such
authorization.
The Mecklenburg Board erred in its finding of fact, stating that evidence presented
to the Board Chair documented a paper jam occurring on Election Day at precinct
234.
Despite the Boards acknowledgement during their November 28 meeting of my
stated intent to appeal a dismissal, and having received a Notice of Appeal on this
protest on November 29, the Board improperly certified the returns before the final
resolution of my protests. The certification appears to be in error.
Supporting information: On November 28, 2016 the Mecklenburg Board of Elections
improperly dismissed my November 18 protest regarding its failure to undertake required
post-election testing of its iVotronics voting system against the paper records for the
presidential vote choices. Protest and supporting documents are attached at Exhibit B.
(Exhibit B and C may contain redundant records because of the related nature of the
protests of November18 and November 20 (Exhibit C) and Request for Reconsideration.)
163-182.5(b) provides that prior to canvassing, the board must determine, based on the
sample count, whether the electronic records are reliable as a basis for tabulation for
canvass of returns. On November 21 the board acknowledged that they had not
reviewed the audit sample returns or considered this decision as a pre-canvassing issue.
They illogically maintained that the issue of reviewing the sample count had nothing to do
with the counting or tabulation of the election, although the sample count results dictate
the type of tabulation that will be used in the canvass. They improperly concluded that
their decision on the findings of the sample audit, and my related protest, could be
deferred until after canvass. On November 20, I protested the board decision not to
review the audit sample returns as a part of the canvassing process. (Exhibit C). I also
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requested the boards reconsideration of its decision to stay the proceedings of the
November 18 protest. (Exhibits pg.5/79)
The determination of the method of tabulation for canvassing is to be based on the
results of sample counts of the paper records. No such sample counts were undertaken
or attempted. The only case in which the law permits the electronic record to be used for
such testing is when the paper record has been lost or destroyed or where there is
another reasonable basis to conclude that the hand-to-eye count is not the true count.
(163-182.1(b)(1))
Mecklenburg Elections Department effectively concluded without reviewing the VVPAT
records that such paper records were unusable for testing on the hypothetical basis
that a paper jam may have occurred at the selected voting location, thereby rendering
all paper records from the voting sites unusual for purposes of sample counting. The
Mecklenburg Board concluded that the note from the State Board (Exhibit A, page 2)
granted permission to use electronic records for all required sample counts in lieu of
paper records upon the mere report of any paper jam. The date, frequency or severity
of the malfunction, or whether the jam damaged the record to be tested is not even
considered.
The board erred in claiming that the statement from the State Board (Exhibit A, page 2)
grants permission for use of electronic records in a voting location in lieu of paper records
when a jam in one of the machines occurs. The state board response on the
referenced document regards only VVPAT (RTAL) records that officials are unable to
use because of jams.
The boards finding inaccurately states that the State Board authorized the use of the
electronic image log for sample count when there has been a paper jam on one of the
machines. The one sentence advisory note from the State Board, dated November 21,
(well after Mecklenburgs sample count), is stated under the condition that the paper
record (RTAL) is unusable. (Exhibit A, page 2) There is no finding concerning any
paper record being examined or declared unusable in Mecklenburg County.
It is exceedingly unlikely that paper jams materially undermined the reliability of any,
much less all, VVPAT records of the voters presidential choices at the selected voting
sites.
During the November 18 Mecklenburg board meeting, Director Dickerson falsely claimed
that he had obtained written permission from the State Board to use electronic records
in lieu of prescribed paper records based on the attached email memo, regarding
unrelated circumstances in Alamance County. (page 38 of attachments, Exhibit B)
Only after the discussion of my protests on November 18 and 20 did the staff attempt to
locate any evidence of paper jams. That purported evidence produced (Exhibit A, pages
3-4), shows no evidence of loss of, or destruction of, or significant damage to the paper
records of presidential choices to be tested,-- only that some sort of paper jam occurred
at the Marion Diehl voting location. That one effort was cleared by the technician. There
is no indication of significant damage to the records.
The findings inaccurately state that evidence presented to the Board Chair documented
an Election Day paper jam at precinct 234 warranting the use of electronic records. Yet
the purported documentation shows the only paper roll issue having occurred during set
up of the machine on the evening before the polls opened. (Exhibit A, page 4). There is
no basis to assume that there was any paper jam at all affecting vote records, much less
making such records unusable for the entire precinct for sample counting of presidential
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choices. The precinct audit event log (linked at Exhibit D) for the 11 machines used at
precinct 234 reflects no paper jam issues or other printer malfunctions.
The VVPAT paper records at issue (selected by the State Board to be audited) were not
examined by staff or the county board in order to assess whether the records of
presidential choices evidenced any meaningful damage or question of their quality or
fidelity. Instead, the records were declared unusable on a hypothetical, prospective
basis with no documentation that suggested that the records were unusable for audit.
Even if some paper records were damaged to the point of being unusable, (there is no
evidence of this), the substitution using the electronic record should occur only for the
specific machine producing materially inaccurate paper records for the presidential
choice on numerous ballots. All other machines should be tested using the paper
records.
The Mecklenburg Board improperly failed to test the available and legible paper records
in accordance with 163-182.1(b)(1), instead relying on the hypothetical possibility that a
record might be damaged, in order to excuse themselves from using the required
source paper record to test the electronic record for all selected machines for all
precincts. No documented evidence was presented that even one vote record was
unusable. It defies imagination that two entire voting sites paper records of the
presidential choices are unusable for every machine for the approximately 12,000
ballots cast.
One example of possible lost votes undetected by canvass and sample count
demonstrates the necessity of referencing the paper record as the source document.
The Marion Diehl number of accepted voters in the absentee voter report published on
the NCBOE website was 11,043. (Exhibit D) The iVotronics event logs show 10,935
ballots cast. (Exhibit D) The difference of 108 more accepted voters than ballots
cast must be satisfactorily explained. A test of the voter-viewed paper record would be
important source information for determining why there is an apparent discrepancy
between accepted voters and ballots cast, and verifying that all ballots were recorded.
(See page 73, Dr. Duncan Buells memo at Exhibit H.)
If hypothetical unsupported theories are permitted to declare election records unusable
for testing, the iVotronics electronic records used for tabulation are subject to many more
dangerous and pervasive theories of damage and unreliability than paper records. The
board had no basis to rely on the electronic record for testing based on the false notion
that a paper jam destroys the integrity of all paper records, without any evidence of even
a single occurrence.
The Board findings state that in prior elections Mecklenburg has used the electronic
record in lieu of the paper record for testing when a paper jam occurred. This is
consistent with Director Dickersons claims that the electronic record has not been tested
against the paper record in post-election testing for years. He also asserted that all
iVotronics counties use the electronic record, not the paper record for conducting the
audit sample count. His assertion triggered my November 20 request of the State Board
for a multi-county investigation to determine whether the use of electronic records in lieu
of paper records was the routine procedure in the November 8 election. (page 51, Exhibit
E)
It appears that there is routinely no attempt at substantial compliance with the statute or
the legislative intent of requiring such testing using the paper records. In fact, during the
public meetings, the bulk of the arguments made by staff against the use of VVPAT
records related to how long it takes to test with the paper record, and the man hours
involved. The illogical routine excuse of a possible paper jam is an effort to circumvent
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the statute, and should be viewed as a serious act of misconduct committed by

officials.
The harmful implications to the pending recounts and impairment of candidates rights
must be considered in the State Boards decision on appeal. Given that the county board
(and possibly 30 other county boards) have determined the paper record to be unusable
for hand counts, the candidates rights to manually audit sample counts using the
paper record will be impaired.
The Mecklenburg Board certified the results on November 28 although members were
aware of my intention to file this appeal. Such a certification prior to final resolution of a
protest is in violation of 163-182,15. The certification should be declared null and void.
The certification is included at page 52, Exhibit F.
7. Is there any material submitted with this appeal that was not presented to and considered by the county
board? Is so, please identify and state why it was not presented to the county board. Why do you think the
State Board of Elections should consider it?
Materials presented in this appeal (with minor stated exceptions) were forwarded as part
of the protests to the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections office, and to Michael
Dickerson, Director, or are records obtained from the county. I have no way of knowing
whether all documents were all presented to the full board or considered by the board.
There was no formal hearing by the board. (Exceptions: Exhibit D, linked schedule of
Marion Diehl voters was not available during county boards consideration, but is
excerpted from NCSBOE online records. Exhibit E, requesting a multi-county
investigation was not forwarded to the county board. Exhibit H was not available at the
time of the original protest.)
Why all materials supplied should be considered:
This matter had statewide implications.
This State Board must be informed of the reliability of the records on which it is relying for
its certification. This issue on appeal is central to how the votes should be counted in
electronic voting machine counties during canvass, and whether a hand count of the
VVPAT paper record or the electronic count should control. This determination is required
be made by each county board as a preliminary part of the canvassing of returns (163182.5(b). If county boards, such as Mecklenburg, have not undertaken and evaluated the
required test of the electronic record against the paper record, there is no basis for the
county board or this State Board to rely on that electronic record for certification. I filed a
protest with the Mecklenburg Board on November 20 (page 47, Exhibit C) on the issue of
their failure to inspect the sample count returns and determine whether the electronic
record should be relied on for canvass prior to canvassing the returns. The November 20
protest has not been formally considered and acted on by the county board.
Mecklenburgs, and possibly other counties, decisions that the paper record is
unusable for counting has major negative implications for any recounts at a state or
local level. This unsubstantiated claim of unusable records denies the recount
candidate the ability to undertake and rely on sample counts of the paper recorda right
granted to him/her in the recount statutes. The State Board of Elections should insist that
no claims of unusable records be made if not fully investigated and documented by the
county board.
8. Normally the State Board will make its decision in an appeal based upon the record from the county
board. If you desire the record in this matter to be supplemented, additional evidence to be considered, or a
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completely new hearing, please state such desire and why it should be allowed in this appeal. See G.S.
163-182.11 (b).
I request a hearing before the State Board. There was no hearing at Mecklenburg County
Board level. The issue has been discussed at board meetings on November 18 and 21,
but without sworn testimony, documentary evidence shared, rebuttal or complete fact
finding. A hearing before the State Board is appropriate considering the presumed multicounty nature of the issue and the impact on upcoming recounts.
The board the attached Dismissal and findings at the November 28 meeting (Exhibit
A). Because the board would not permit me to ask questions prior to their dismissal at the
November 28 meeting, I do not know what the Mecklenburg board has included in the
record forwarded to the state. I have attached my filings with the Mecklenburg Board,
(Exhibit B and C) which should be considered part of the record.
I also request that my November 20, 2016 request to the State Board of Elections for a
multi-county investigation (page 51, Exhibit E) be included a part of the record and acted
on by this board. It is important for the State Board, candidates, and voters to know
whether the touchscreen electronic records were tested as required in the counties using
such machines. It would be inappropriate for the State Board to proceed with certification
of the election and recounts without the required post-election tests of voting machines
statewide.
The white paper forwarded to the Mecklenburg Board by Dr. Duncan Buell (page 53,
Exhibit G) should be included in the record. The paper speaks to the vulnerability of the
electronic files in iVotronic machines and why testing using the independent paper record
is necessary. He also references his discussions with Mecklenburg County staff.
Additional evidence that should be obtained by subpoena or otherwise
I have not had access to the following documents that should be reviewed by the Board
in its consideration of this appeal:
a. All VVPAT records from precinct 234 and Early Voting site Marion Diehl. The Board
could determine whether the records are being properly generated and maintained and
are in auditable condition.
b. Electronic EL152s (audit logs), and EL 155s (cast vote records) from each machine in
the two selected sites. These records would permit an easy computerized comparison of
ballots recorded as cast versus ballots recorded. The EL152 audit logs can be referenced
for indications of printer malfunctions. (Links to the EL152 records are provided in Exhibit
D).
c. A description from iVotronics vendor, ES&S, as to the meaning of Terminal Shutdown
message which appears frequently on the event logs (EL155) of Precinct 234 and Marion
Diehl locations.
d. All correspondence from State Board personnel to Mecklenburg and other counties
staff on the topic of substituting the EL155s for the VVPAT record. All internal
correspondence within the organizations on this topic should also be obtained. The
purpose is to understand the philosophy, understanding and resulting instructions of state
and county board staff on the topic of the sample audit. (I made a public records request
of the State Board on November 28 for such correspondence, and have not received a
response.)
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e. All correspondence with machine, paper or RTAL vendors regarding the use of
electronic rather than VVPAT records.
f. All correspondence with vendors regarding the apparently wide-spread nature of the
asserted unusable nature of the VVPAT records, and the alleged frequent machine
malfunctions, and requests for vendor supported remedies.
g. History of Mecklenburgs sample count audits for the last 5 years, with documentation
of whether the VVPAT record was used for such audits, and the determination of the
unusable condition of the VVPAT when it was not utilized.
h. Documentation of efforts made by Mecklenburg or the State Board to reduce the
VVPAT damage that has caused the VVPAT records to be purportedly unusable for
audits during the last several years.
i. State Boards internal documentation of changes and expansions of statistical samples
resulting from the purported inability to audit the VVPAT records in several counties
including Mecklenburg and Alamance.
j. All incident reports from voting locations indicating that VVPAT records were being
seriously damaged.
k. The Board should request a reconciliation of ballots cast in Marion Diehl voting location
according to the EL152 (event log) and the voter count record from the Absentee Voter
Record detail. (The event log details 10,935 ballots cast. The Absentee Record details
11,043 voters accepted for voting.) (See files at page 50, Exhibit D)
9. What relief do you seek? Why?

1. Mecklenburg County should be instructed to conduct the testing of the VVPAT records,
as required by 163-182.1(b)(1). If such testing indicates a significant discrepancy in the
voters presidential choice vote record on specific VVPAT rolls because the individual
paper vote records have been damaged, lost, or for some other reason proven to be
unusable for auditing, the board should document this fact and why it must rely on the
electronic records for a sample count. The county board should document which specific
machines are affected and cannot be tested using paper versus electronic records.
VVPAT paper records of the voters presidential choice that are not damaged and
unusable should be used for testing the electronic record.
2. If Mecklenburg Countys assertions are accurate that the paper record testing was
circumvented in other iVotronics counties, the state board should order that the required
testing take place immediately, prior to the State Board certification of the results.
Any material discrepancies should be reported to the State Board. The State Board
should set the standard for determination of materiality.
In both cases 1 and 2 above, when a paper record for the presidential vote choices in the
sample group order by the State Board is damaged enough to render it unusable, the
electronic record should only be substituted for the paper record for that particular
machine, and only when the discrepancy specifically in the voters presidential choice is
significant in relation to the entire sites presidential vote count.
3. The State Board should assess the negative impact of the unusable record claim on
the statistical validity of the sample counts ordered. Appropriate remedies should be
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adopted for mitigating the unusable nature of the VVPAT record to create a statistically
valid sample. It seems likely that the sample size would require expansion.
4. The premature certification of the Mecklenburg County election before this protest has
been resolved was improper and should be reversed by this board.
The vulnerability of iVotronics electronic records was demonstrated in the 2004 Carteret
County election, and has been thoroughly and repeatedly documented by experts. The
requirement for paper record testing was passed by the legislature in 2005 in response to
Carteret County and similar problems. The need for testing of the record has been
repeatedly proven. Given the many close races and the national attention on hacking
concerns and claims, election officials should not circumvent required testing in the 2016
election.
The public cannot have confidence in the results of the election when machines with wellknown vulnerabilities are not tested in post-election audits as required by state law.
10. Have you read and reviewed G.S. 163-182.11 through G.S. 163-182.14 and the current North Carolina
State Board of Elections regulations on appeals of election protests?_Yes.
11. Besides a copy of the original protest and the county board decisions, this appeal includes 79 pages of
additional answers (Exhibits) and_-4- pages of exhibits and documents [not county records] not included
in the original protest and decision.
_______________________________
Signature of Person Appealing
12/4/16
________________
Date Appeal Signed
Date appeal received by State Board of Elections

_________________________________________
(To be entered by the State Board of Elections staff)
Send your appeal to, or it you have questions contact: North Carolina State Board of Elections, P.O. Box
27255, Raleigh, NC 27611-7255, (919) 733-7173.
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Marks Appeal Exhibit A
Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

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Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B

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Request for Reconsideration of Decision to Stay Protest Proceedings

Mecklenburg County Board of Elections
Marks Protest of November 18, 2016 original protest begins p.6 of 36
This request for reconsideration is being simultaneously submitted in the form of an
election protest of an irregularity in the election process. Given the unusual nature of the
complaint, the proper procedure for timely submission is unclear. Therefore, parallel
tracks are being taken in a good faith attempt to meet the statutory requirements of an
effective complaint, and preserve rights of appeal if necessary.
I hereby request this matter be considered upon reconvening the Mecklenburg County
Board of Elections prior to the canvassing of returns. As explained below, it is improper
to canvass the returns and authenticate the results until the my 11/18/16 protest has
been resolved.
Decision at issue
The matter subject to request for reconsideration is the unanimous improper decision by
the board to stay the protest proceedings and move forward with canvassing operations
beginning Monday, November 21, prior to resolving the Marks November 18 protest
filed with the board. (Exhibit A) For the reasons discussed below, the resolution of the
procedural questions raised by the protest must be concluded before a legally compliant
canvass can be completed and results authenticated. 162-182.10 (a)(2) controls the
boards obligations to hear and resolve the protest.
Status of the protest
I filed the attached protest (Exhibit A) on Friday, November 18 during the Board of
Elections meeting, and prior to the announced time of the meeting. The central issue
presented in the protest is the boards failure to use the independent paper record
during the post-election hand-to-eye sample count (audit). A nearly meaningless
exercise was substituted and performed by election workers, circumventing the purpose
of the audit and the legislative intent of the audit requirement.
The protest was discussed during the last part of the November 18 board meeting.
Members voted unanimously to postpone a decision on the protest until after
canvassing, based on the irrelevant fact that the protest contains no direct evidence of
a tabulation issue. As explained below, the board erred in its decision to postpone
further consideration of the facts and law until after canvass. Allowing no objection to
that decision, the Chair immediately gaveled the meeting into recess.
During the preliminary protest proceedings, the board requested that Director Dickerson
obtain a statement from the State Board of Elections granting retroactive permission for
the use of ballot image records (EL155) rather than the required independent VVPAT
paper record to conduct the sample count (audit), although there was no evidence of
Marks Request for Reconsideration 11.20.16

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Req. for Reconsideration
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material failure of the VVPAT record that could possibly justify an exception to using the
paper VVPAT record on an overall basis. It is unclear whether such permission will be
granted or when a response will be received.
It is concerning that Chairwoman Potter Summa instructed Director Dickerson to
attempt to obtain retroactive state board permission for a purposeful violation of
important required procedures, rather than insisting that the staff comply with clear
statutory audit procedures using an independent paper record. The board seems to
misapprehend the purpose of the post-election audit and the need for an independent
record to be used in the audit.
Chairwoman Potter Summa stated that a response from the state board would likely not
be received until after canvass. She further stated inaccurately that the protest does
not in any way impact canvass. The board seems to misapprehend the requirement
that they review the audit results to determine whether the electronic count can be relied
on or whether a manual count is required as the basis for canvassing. Instead, in a cartbefore-the-horse decision, they illogically concluded that they will canvass and certify
the results first, and later review the legitimacy of the audit results.
The Board recessed until 5 pm, Monday, November 21, with the stated intent of
resuming canvass operations at that time.
Protest must be resolved before canvass
The board made its erroneous decision based on the irrelevant fact that the protest
does not present evidence of a tabulation issue. A protest must be resolved before
canvass of returns if the protest concerns counting and tabulation of votes, which is
the central issue of the protest.
The canvass of the election requires that either an electronic count or hand count of
votes be used as the basis of certification of results. The Board must use the results of
the audit to determine whether the electronic records should be relied on for canvass.
163-182.1(b)(1) providesIf the discrepancy between the hand-toeye count and the mechanical or electronic count is significant, a complete hand-toeye count shall be conducted.
The board has not and cannot determine whether such a significant discrepancy exists
until a sample audit of the records is performed. A legally compliant audit has not
been completed. Therefore, the board cannot make a determination before a
proper audit has been completed that the electronic records will be used as the
basis for canvass authentication.
The protest concerns the method of tabulating votes for purposes of the official canvass.

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162-182.10 (a)(2) provides, If a protest was filed before the canvass and concerns
the counting and tabulating of votes, the county board shall resolve the protest
before the canvass is completed.
Errors in Boards conclusions and findings
The board used improper criteria for its decision that the protest need not be resolved
prior to the completion of canvass. Board Chair Potter Summa asked whether my protest
presented evidence of tabulation issues, and made the motion to stay protest
proceedings based on my response that the protest does not present such evidence.
Even if such evidence exists, I would have no access to it.
The relevant issue is that this protest concerns counting and tabulation, not whether the
protest presents evidence of tabulation issues. The statute is clear that protests must be
resolved on counting and tabulation concerns prior to completion of canvassing the
returns. This is only logical because the method of tabulation (electronic or manual handto-eye) must be first determined by the board, based on audit results.
Immediately after the meeting was quickly gaveled to recess following the board decision
at issue, I approached Chairman Potter Summa asking her if she was certain that the
board can canvass and certify the returns prior to determining the legitimacy of the postelection audit. She stated that she was certain that they can canvass prior to the audit
evaluation. While this was an informal conversation during recess, it is that flawed
conclusion that I challenge here, requesting reconsideration.
Supplemental information obtained after protest was filed
During the preliminary discussion of this matter by the Board, Mr. Dickerson and myself, it
was disclosed that Mr. Dickerson had obtained the attached email (Exhibit B) on
November 10 from Don Wright, SBOE general counsel. Mr. Dickerson claimed that this
email was his authority to use the ballot image records (EL155) rather than VVPATs to
conduct the audit. The email was addressed to Alamance County from the state board
granting this permission specifically only to Alamance County because of that countys
apparent significant specific problems with new VVPAT machines. (Exhibit B)
The memo does not grant Mecklenburg such variances from the statutory requirement to
use independent paper records for the audit. The email indicates that the state board
must approve any request to vary from the state requirements of an audit. There was no
documentation provided to suggest that Mr. Dickerson presented a documented
widespread problem to the state board relating to the quality of the Mecklenburg source
paper records, nor did he ask for a variance from the standard audit procedure. Instead,
officials circumvented the purpose of the audit requiring comparison of independent
records.
Further, during the meeting, Mr. Dickerson presented no evidence that significant
problems had been encountered with the VVPAT records in precinct 234 or Marion Diehl

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early voting site selected for audit. Mr. Dickerson claimed that paper jams and paper
tears are always encountered and justified his decision to forego using the paper record
as the independent source document for auditing. I pointed out that even minor problems
with the VVPAT would have been captured in the EL152 event logs for each iVotronics
machine. Material problems could have been detected, isolated and dealt with on an
exception basis, with specific permission from the state board, without undermining the
effectiveness of the entire audit.
Mr. Dickerson stated that using the ballot image file had been the countys practice for
several years, as best practice. This is not at all a best practice and should be a last
resort, substituting for independent paper records only in unusual, specific and limited
circumstances where the paper record is materially unreliable.
Ms. Mavromatis stated that all iVotronics counties in the state used the ballot image
(EL155) rather than the required VVPAT paper record for audits. If this is accurate, it
could present major canvassing issue at the state level, given that there are over 30
counties with iVotronics equipment.
Ms. Mavromatis inaccurately claimed that files generating the VVPAT are identical to
the files generating the EL155, and cannot be maliciously altered. Her implication was
that the VVPAT records are not independent records. This is incorrect, and the board
should not rely on that claim in its decision. Different software is used to print the VVPAT
than the software used to create the EL155. If Ms. Mavormatis statements were true,
the legislature would not require the VVPAT to be used as the independent audit source
document, and would call for a far less time-consuming automated arithmetic test of the
EL155 tabulation.
Ms. Mavromatis and Chairwoman Potter Summa inaccurately stated that the EL155
records could not be hacked because they are not connected to the Internet. There
are dozens of respected published academic reports and official studies by Ohio and
California election officials documenting the vulnerability of the iVotronics data and
software to malicious attacks. The machines and memory cards can be easily hacked
by physical introduction of malware onto the memory cards, irrespective of Internet
connection. It has been demonstrated that malware can be written to be introduced on
one card and infect an entire county system. The iVotronics machines across the state
use thousands of such memory cards and absolute security cannot be assured.
Indeed, the security threat is one reason for requiring the comparison of the paper
record seen by the voter to the results of the electronic tabulation.
Given the widespread public concerns about election security and hacking threats,
Mecklenburg County election officials should not be dismissive of the very real threats
to electronic security of the election.
Discrepancy appears to exist
Dr. Jill Stein was a write-in candidate for president. Unofficial vote totals on the count

Page 8 of 79
4
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state boards website report -0- votes for Stein in Mecklenburg County. The electronic
voting location results being tested for precinct #234 and Marion Diehl voting site
presumably report -0- votes for Stein, but the manual tallies of the EL155 likely show
votes recorded for Dr. Stein. If the election report records to be canvassed have not
been manually adjusted to record Steins votes, the difference must be determined a
discrepancy in the presidential race audit ordered by the state board.
It should be clear that I have not had access to any of the completed audit
documentation, and therefore can make no conclusions or allegations on whether
significant discrepancies were exposed in the hand-to-eye count records.
Evaluation of tabulation source by the board
Prior to finalizing the canvassing of the returns, the board must evaluate whether the
election audit reveals any significant discrepancies that would require a manual (handto-eye) count of the paper records. The sample count audit as performed cannot
provide the board with reasonable assurance, given the unauthorized tally of the EL155
records in lieu of the required paper records.
The board should gain a complete understanding of the significant difference between
the nature of the VVPAT paper record (the intended audit record document), and the
EL155 (ballot image log) that was improperly used as a substitute. The board should
consider that in an audit of paper ballots, the voter-marked paper ballots themselves
are required as the independent record to be tabulated and compared to the machine
totals. The goal of using paper records is to have a relatively tamper-proof voterreviewed independent record tested against the machine tabulation of those records.
Mecklenburg County election officials seem to have lost sight of the goal of this limited
audit.
I respectfully request that the board reconsider their decision prior to the conduct and
completion of the canvass.
As a matter of information to the board, I may choose to also file this protest with the
State Board asking them to possibly take jurisdiction of this protest and the underlying
11/18/16 protest because of Mecklenburgs staff claims that all (30+) iVotronics
counties failed to use the required paper record in their audit. I will copy this board if I
make that request.
Respectfully submitted,
_____________________
Marilyn Marks
Charlotte, NC 28210
cc: North Carolina State Board of Elections

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5
Page 5 of 36
Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

6/42
Page 1 of 28
ELECTION PROTEST
Use of this form is required by G.S. 163-182.9(c)
This form must be filed with the county board of elections within the timeframes set out in G.S. 163-182.9
(b)(4). Please print or type your answers. Feel free to use and attach additional sheets if needed to fully
answer the questions below. You may also attach relevant exhibits and documents. Please number the pages
of such additional sheets and attachments.
1. Full name and mailing address of person filing the protest.
Marilyn R. Marks, 7035 Marching Duck Drive E504, Charlotte, NC 28210
_________________________________________________________________________________________
___
2. Home and business phone number, fax number, and e-mail address.
Marilyn R. Marks
call for fax. Marilyn@AspenOffice.com
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
3.
Are you either a candidate or registered voter eligible to vote in the protested election?
If a candidate, for what office?
Yes. Registered Voter, Mecklenburg County.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
__
4. List the date, location, and exact nature of the election protested. Name all candidates in the election and
the number of votes each received. Note the winning candidate(s) elected or nominated.
11/8/16 General Election, Mecklenburg County
All candidates and ballot measures on the Mecklenburg County ballot. See Mecklenburg
County Board of Elections certified ballot content.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
5. Does this protest involve an alleged error in vote count or tabulation? If so, please explain in detail. No.
Issue involves potentially undetected errors in counts and tabulations.
________________________________________________________________________________
____
6. Does this protest involve an irregularity or misconduct not described in number 5 above? If so, please give
a detailed description of such misconduct or irregularity and name those who committed such action. Yes.
Violation of requirements of hand-to-eye sample count requirements as provided in statute.
See Exhibit 1.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
7. Please set out all election laws or regulations that you allege were violated in your responses to 5 or 6
above. State how each violation occurred. Please provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of those
who you allege committed such violations.
Hand-to-eye sample counts as provided for by 163-182.1(b)(1) (currently effective) require
paper records to be compared to electronically generated totals. The clear meaning of
paper records as used in this and related statutes is the VVPAT record which the voter
sees and may verify. During the Mecklenburg sample count on Tuesday, November 15,
election officials ignored the VVPAT records and created paper printouts (EL155) from
electronic records that were not available for verification by the voter. The created paper

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Page 2 of 28
printouts were hand-tallied and compared to the electronic tally of the electronic version of
the paper printouts. Such an exercise is almost meaningless and circumvents the language
and the intent of the statute requiring sample counts.
Board of Elections management, including Michael Dickerson and Kristin Mavromatis,
instructed several staff members and at least 16 bi-partisan election judges who performed
the work at the Freedom Drive location on November 15. I do not have names or telephone
numbers of the election judges undertaking the work. (contact information --741 Kenilworth Ave.
Ste 202, Charlotte, NC 28204, 704-336-2133, Mecklenburg.boe@ncsbe.gov.
The voters of Mecklenburg County cannot have confidence in the results of the
election, given the failure of the board to properly conduct a sample audit of the election.
See Exhibit 1 for additional details.
______________________________________________________________________________________
8. Please provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of any witnesses to any misconduct alleged by
you in this protest, and specify what each witness listed saw or knows. I witnessed this violation of
statute in the officials use of the EL155 printouts rather than the VVPAT records for the
sample hand-to-eye audits. A BoE employee Michael (last name unknown) supervising bipartisan teams at the Freedom Drive location was present and explained the process to me.
Another non-employee witness present was Alesha Brown, Southern Coalition for Social
Justice, 1415 W NC Hwy 54, #101 Durham, NC 27707 (919-323-3380). Kristin Mavromatis has
the names of the election workers supervising, and the bi-partisan team members conducting
the tallies.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
9. What action do you desire the county board of elections to take in this matter?
Board should immediately undertake compliant audit sampling using the VVPAT as the
paper records to compare to the precinct and early voting location totals generated by the
Unity server. The County BoE should confer with the NCSBOE to determine whether the
previously selected precincts should be tested, or whether the state board chooses to
randomly select other precincts and early voting locations to test. The State Board should
consider factors such as the security and condition of the records, as well as the statistical
level of assurance in making this determination.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
10. Do you contend the allegations set out by you are sufficient to have affected or cast doubt upon the results
of the protested election? If your answer is yes, please state the factual basis for your opinion. Yes, the
failure to properly test the electronic tallies of the DREs can certainly cast doubt upon the
election. There are credible reports of vote flipping in early voting in Mecklenburg
County. The method of sampling used would not detect the impact of vote flipping. See
Exhibit 1. Additionally, there were reported failures of the DRE PEB memory cards in
precincts 5, 85, and 145 where EL155 data was reported used and the source record and has
not been tested against the VVPAT record.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
11. Have you read and reviewed the North Carolina law pertaining to election protests as set out in G.S. 163182.9 through G.S. 163-182.14 and current North Carolina State Board of Elections regulations pertaining to
election protests? Yes.

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Page 3 of 28
_________________________________________________________________________________________
____
12. How many pages of additional answer are attached to this protest? (10 total pages) update 28 total pages
How many pages of attachments are attached? (10 total pages) update 28 pages
___________________________
_
Signature of Protestor
Date/Time Filed with County Board
______________________________________
(to be filled out by the county board)
NOTE: The county board must provide the State Board with a complete copy of a filed protest within one
business day after it is filed. In addition, the county board shall provide a copy of the election audit with this
copy of the protest.
Please direct any questions to your county board of elections or the North Carolina State Board of Elections,
PO Box 27255, Raleigh, NC 27611-7255, (919) 733-7173.

Page 12 of 79

Page 8 of 36

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Page 4 of 28
Marks Election Protest

Mecklenburg County
11/8/16 General Election
Exhibit 1
Summary of alleged violation of statutory provisions and intent of sample handto-eye count
The purpose of the statutorily mandated hand-to-eye sample counts is to gain
confidence in the accuracy of the presidential race tabulation in one randomly-selected
Election Day precinct and one Early Voting location as a proxy for the accuracy countys
election results. The process undertaken by the Mecklenburg BoE purposely
circumvented the clear intent of the law by avoiding the use of the VVPAT (Voter
Verified Paper Audit Trail) (Exhibit 2) document as the required paper record reference
document for verification.
The remedy for the violation and failure to use the VVPAT paper record as the record
of reference in the sample is the for the Board to order the staff and election judges to
perform the sample count using the VVPAT record as required by statute.
163-182 (1)(b)(1) requires a sample hand-to-eye count of the paper ballots or paper
records. It is clear from numerous references in the Election Code that paper
records references the VVPAT records seen by the voter as he marks and cast his
ballot. In fact, the relevant section effective beginning in 2018, after the discontinuance
of DREs, removes the term paper records because DREs and VVPATs will no longer
be in use. (Emphasis added in citations below.)
163-165.7(a) stating requirements of current voting systems provides, The State
Board may certify additional voting systems only if they meet the requirements of the
request for proposal process set forth in this section and only if they generate either a
paper ballot or a paper record by which voters may verify their votes before casting
them and which provides a backup means of counting the vote that the voter casts.
Subsections (4) and (5) further reinforce the statutory meaning of the paper record in a
DRE, requiring that the paper record be viewable by the voter:
4.With respect to electronic voting systems, that the voting system generate a
paper record of each individual vote cast, which paper record shall be maintained
in a secure fashion and shall serve as a backup record for purposes of any
hand-to-eye count, hand-to-eye recount, or other audit. Electronic systems that
employ optical scan technology to count paper ballots shall be deemed to satisfy
this requirement.
5. With respect to DRE voting systems, that the paper record generated by the
system be viewable by the voter before the vote is cast electronically, and that
Marilyn Marks
Page 13 of 79
704 552 1618
Page 9 of 36

10/42
Page 5 of 28
the system permit the voter to correct any discrepancy between the electronic
vote and the paper record before the vote is cast.
The process undertaken in Mecklenburg County (and possibly in other counties)
violates the required use of the paper record. Instead, the non-compliant process
converts the electronic ballot images to a paper printout of those images (EL155, Exhibit
3). The voters do not see nor verify such data at the time of voting. The EL155 printout
is hand-tallied in a wasteful exercise (mistakenly called a hand-to-eye count) that
merely proves that the electronic EL155 compilation is mathematically correct in the
results printout (EL30A, Exhibit 4).
The Mecklenburg tally method is a laborious and wasteful process of little value that
could have been accomplished in minutes by exporting the EL155 detail data into a
worksheet and tabulating it. But even with such an automated exercise, one would have
only proved that in one contest only, (the presidential race), the arithmetic addition for
the flash memory card data was accurate. The statutory intent is to compare the
tabulation of the voter verified ballot record to the electronic tabulation of the data in the
electronic record. Comparing a post-election created paper record against the
electronic tabulation of the electronic version misses the point, and fails to comply with
the law.
When I asked Kristin Mavromatis about the process of not auditing the electronic record
against the VVPAT, she stated that either paper record (VVPAT or EL155) can be
used at the officials option. She stated that reference to the VVPAT is too time
consuming. The statutory language does not support this contention and method of
hand-to-eye count.
There can be little confidence in the tabulations based on the circumvention of the key
required process of testing the voter verified record against the electronic record. There
can be no assurance that the VVPAT agrees with the EL155s or the summarized
EL155 electronic ballot images tallies without comparison back to the voter verified
record (VVPAT).
The practical need for the proper conduct of the hand-to-eye sample count is further
evidenced by reports of DRE vote-flipping. Reviewing the VVPAT records should
reveal anomalies in voter made corrections, or potential flipped votes where verified
tape differs from the EL155 electronic record.
(http://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499450796/some-machines-are-flipping-votes-but-thatdoesnt-mean-theyre-rigged; http://time.com/4547594/vote-flipping-election-rigged/; )
The Board should immediately undertake the required sample hand-to-eye sample
count of the VVPAT against the printout of the machine totals as rolled up to the
precinct report. (EL30A Exhibit 3) The results of this test should be determined before
the canvass can be finalized.
Marilyn Marks
Page 14 of 79
704 552 1618
Page 10 of 36
Exhibit 2
11/42
Page 6 of 28

Page 15 of 79

Page 11 of 36
Exhibit 3--Marks

12/42
Page 7 of 28
EXAMPLE EL155 printout from 11/7/14 SC election.

(ballot image files representing data stored on flash memory card from each DRE ballot input)
E&l2a0o7c067F(s0p16.66h3b6T&a00L
RUN DATE:11/07/14 01:14 PM
ELECTION ID: 01110414
VOTR.
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
B/I
2*
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
5*
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
7*
7
7
7
7
PRECINCT
1 - Abbeville No. 1
CANDIDATES RECEIVING A VOTE

12 Nikki R Haley
16 Henry McMaster
20 Mark Hammond
23 Curtis Loftis
27 Alan Wilson
31 Richard Eckstrom
35 Molly Mitchell Spearman
39 Bob Livingston
43 Hugh E Weathers
51 Lindsey Graham
55 Tim Scott
60 Jeff Duncan
64 Craig A Gagnon
67 Mark Sumner
70 Sue Simpson
73 Betty A Cowan
88 Barney Gambrell
106 Yes
110 No
5 Republican
12 Nikki R Haley
16 Henry McMaster
20 Mark Hammond
23 Curtis Loftis
27 Alan Wilson
31 Richard Eckstrom
35 Molly Mitchell Spearman
39 Bob Livingston
43 Hugh E Weathers
50 Brad Hutto
56 Jill Bossi
60 Jeff Duncan
64 Craig A Gagnon
88 Barney Gambrell
107 No
109 Yes
2 Democratic
10 Vincent Sheheen
15 Bakari Sellers
19 Ginny Deerin
26 Parnell Diggs

Page 16 of 79
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Secretary of State
State Treasurer
Attorney General
Comptroller General
State Superintendent of Education
Adjutant General
Commissioner of Agriculture
U S Senate
U.S. Senate (Unexpire Term)
CNG0003 U S House of Representatives Dis
HOUS011 State House of Representatives D
Probate Judge
Auditor
County Treasurer
Soil and Water District Commission
Amendment 1
Amendment 2
STRAIGHT PARTY
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Secretary of State
State Treasurer
Attorney General
Comptroller General
Adjutant General
U S Senate
Amendment 1
Amendment 2
STRAIGHT PARTY
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Secretary of State
Attorney General
Page 12 of 36

13/42
Page 8 of 28
5101642 7 30 Kyle Herbert

5101642 7 34 Tom Thompson
5101642 7 49 Brad Hutto
5101642 7 54 Joyce Dickerson
5101642 7 59 Barbara Jo Mullis
5101642 7 63 Tombo Hite
5101642 7 67 Mark Sumner
5101642 7 70 Sue Simpson
5101642 7 73 Betty A Cowan
5101642 7 80 James B Tisdale Jr
5101642 7 89 Jim Irwin
5101642 7 98 Bertha D Crawford
5101642 7 106 Yes
5101642 7 109 Yes
5101642 4 * 12 Nikki R Haley
5101642 4 16 Henry McMaster
5101642 4 20 Mark Hammond
5101642 4 23 Curtis Loftis
5101642 4 27 Alan Wilson
5101642 4 31 Richard Eckstrom
5101642 4 35 Molly Mitchell Spearman
5101642 4 39 Bob Livingston
RUN DATE:11/07/14 01:14 PM
ELECTION ID: 01110414
VOTR.
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
5101642
B/I
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Comptroller General
U S Senate
Probate Judge
Auditor
County Treasurer
SCH0003 School Board District 3
CTY0004 City Council District 4
Amendment 1
Amendment 2
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Secretary of State
State Treasurer
Attorney General
Comptroller General
Adjutant General
PRECINCT 1 - Abbeville No. 1
CANDIDATES RECEIVING A VOTE

43 Hugh E Weathers
51 Lindsey Graham
55 Tim Scott
60 Jeff Duncan
63 Tombo Hite
67 Mark Sumner
70 Sue Simpson
73 Betty A Cowan
84 C Brad Evans
88 Barney Gambrell
89 Jim Irwin
106 Yes
109 Yes

Page 17 of 79
U S Senate
Probate Judge
Auditor
County Treasurer
SCH0006 School Board District 6
Amendment 1
Amendment 2

Page 13 of 36
Marks Aprotest
11.18.16
Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit
Exhibit 4B Exhibit
to Marks
Req. Reconsideration
14/42
Page 9 of 28

Page 18 of 79

Page 14 of 36

15/42
Page 10 of 28

Page 19 of 79

Page 15 of 36
5 Req. Reconsideration
Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit AExhibit
to Marks
16/42
Page 11 of 28
Friday, November 18, 2016 at 12:03:52 PM Eastern Standard Time
Subject: Fwd: Ques*ons on North Carolina recount and audit statutes

Date: Friday, November 18, 2016 at 10:10:35 AM Eastern Standard Time
From: Dan Pederson
To:
Marilyn Marks
Marilyn,
See the email exchange copied below. Note item #1. The highlighting is Don Wright's, and it is his response to a list of questions I sent
to him. I will forward that list in the next email.
See also his answer (in blue text) to question #2 in the email dated 3/20 below.
---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Wright, Don <don.wright@ncsbe.gov>

Date: Wed, Jun 4, 2014 at 12:53 PM
Subject: RE: Questions on North Carolina recount and audit statutes
To: Dan Pederson <dan@ceimn.org>
(1) NC is moving to a paper ballot optical scan system by 2018 and will therefore no longer be using paper
records (or "VVPATs"), DRE touch screen voting systems will no longer be certified for use in NC after 1/1/2018.
or,
(2) despite the fact that the term VVPATs or the term paper records is not explicitly included in either the
definition of ballot or 'paper ballot, NC would still construe those definitions to include VVPATs or paper records?,
VVPATS result tapes are not considered ballots and are public record. But the actual iVo RTAL tapes produced by
the action of the voter are considered ballots are not public record. .and

(3) because the term paper records has been removed from the audit law, but has not been explicitly been added
to the definition of ballot or paper ballot, if DREs with VVPATS are still being used in 2018, will the VVPATs
continue to be counted in audits in 2018 and thereafter? There will be no WPATS after 1/1/2018.
In addition, you did confirm that NC currently does not count VVPATs in recounts, but counts them in audits, but can
you advise re: why? We do note the language in in the regulatory code that states that "A manual recount, by hand
and eye, of ballots is not possible whenever a lever machine or direct record electronic voting machine error occurs"
(08 NCAC 09.0108(c)). However, NC does (currently) count VVPATs in audits, and therefore it is clearly possible to
count them (in recounts). Is that regulatory language left over from when NCs DREs were paperless? If so, are
there any plans to remove it and require VVPATs or paper records, to the extent still used after 2018, to be counted
in recounts (as well as in audits)? Sample audit counts are separate from recounts and are used to confirm the
accuracy of the totals. Recounts are controlling as to the actual winner of a race. There will be no VVAPTS after
1/1/2018.

Don Wright
General Counsel
Page 20 of 79
Req. for ReconsiderationPage 1 of 6

Page 16 of 36

17/42
Page 12 of 28
NC State Board of Elec*ons

PO Box 27255
Raleigh, N.C. 27611-7255
(919) 715-5333
don.wright@ncsbe.gov

From: Dan Pederson [mailto:dan@ceimn.org]
Sent: Wednesday, June 04, 2014 12:10 PM
To: Wright, Don
Subject: Fwd: Questions on North Carolina recount and audit statutes
Mr. Wright,
Regarding my email of May 1st, I am hoping you can answer the follow-up questions I attached.
Please let me know if you will not be able to address these questions.
Thank you again for your assistance.
Dan Pederson
---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Dan Pederson <dan@ceimn.org>

Date: Thu, May 1, 2014 at 11:28 AM
Subject: Re: Questions on North Carolina recount and audit statutes
To: "Wright, Don" <don.wright@ncsbe.gov>
Mr. Wright,
Thank you again for you response to my questions. I have some follow-up questions on question #2-regarding the removal references to "paper records" from the statutes. Please see the attached document.

Page 21 of 79

Page 17 of 36

18/42
Page 13 of 28
Best regards,
Dan Pederson
On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 12:37 PM, Wright, Don <don.wright@ncsbe.gov> wrote:
Dear Mr. Pederson,

See below.

Don Wright
General Counsel
NC State Board of Elec*ons
PO Box 27255
Raleigh, N.C. 27611-7255
(919) 715-5333
don.wright@ncsbe.gov

From: Dan Pederson [mailto:dan@ceimn.org]
Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 11:04 AM
To: Wright, Don
Subject: Fwd: Questions on North Carolina recount and audit statutes
Mr. Wright,
Here are the questions. Thank you for your assistance.
Dan Pederson
---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Dan Pederson <dan@ceimn.org>

Date: Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 9:46 PM
Subject: Questions on North Carolina recount and audit statutes
To: don.wright@ncsbe.gov
Mr. Wright:

Page 22 of 79

Page 18 of 36

19/42
Page 14 of 28
I am hoping you can answer some specific questions about the North Carolina elections statutes.
Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota maintains searchable databases of state recount and audit laws.
We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that creates these databases and makes them freely available
to candidates, election officials and the public. I am in the process of updating our database entries for
North Carolina and want to be sure they contain the correct information. Please see my questions below.
1) Section 163.182.1(b)(1) requires that the "random selection of precincts..shall be done publicly" for the
sample hand-to-eye count (audit) of the paper ballots. Randon selection is made by two SBE staff using a
list of all precincts in a county and using a web-based random selection service that allows a range of
numbers to be entered and then selects one number. The precincts are numbered on the list and thus are
selected based upon the numbers generated by the web-based selector. The public can view this task if
they desire.
Is there a rule or a statute that specifies that the public is also allowed to observe when the audit is
conducted? The public is allowed. There is no rule or statute on this issue because the public always has
access to election tasks unless restricted by statute or rule. The assumption is that an election task is open
to the public.
2) In 2013 North Carolina amended its statutes (163.182.1 and 163.182.2(b)(1a)) to remove references to
"paper records."
In regard to how this amendment applies to Direct Recoding Electronic (DRE) voting equipment with voter
verifiable paper trails (VVPATs), would VVPATs be hand counted in the audit (sample hand-to-eye count)
referenced in 163.182.1(b)(1)? Yes.
NCAC 09.0108(c) indicates that a manual recount by hand and eye is not possible for DRE voting machine
errors. Would DREs with VVPATS ever be subject to a hand-to-eye count under the terms of the recount
statutes or rules? VVPATS have not been used in a DRE recount that is not a sample audit count.
3) Sections 163.181.1(b)(1) and 163.182.2(b)(1a) both seem to be requiring a hand counting of a sample of
ballots. ls there a reason they both exist and do they work together in some way? Good question. I have
also wondered why our General Assembly included the sample audit count mandate in both statutes. They
mandate the same action which we follow.
You can view our current database entries for North Carolina at the following links:
Recount Database--North Carolina: http://www.ceimn.org/ceimn-state-recount-laws-searchable-dat
abase/states/North%20Carolina
Audit Database--North Carolina: http://www.ceimn.org/state-audit-laws-searchable-database/
states/north%20carolina
Thank you for your assistance.
Best regards,
Dan Pederson
-Daniel Pederson
Program Coordinator
Citizens for Election Integrity - Minnesota
2323 East Franklin Ave.
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Minneapolis, MN 55406
612-724-1736
dan@ceimn.org
www.ceimn.org
-Daniel Pederson
Program Coordinator
612-724-1736
dan@ceimn.org
www.ceimn.org
-Daniel Pederson
Program Coordinator
612-724-1736
dan@ceimn.org
www.ceimn.org
-Daniel Pederson
Program Coordinator
612-724-1736
dan@ceimn.org
www.ceimn.org
-Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

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Daniel Pederson
Program Coordinator
612-724-1736
dan@ceimn.org
www.ceimn.org

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Exhibit 6 Marks Protest
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA

SESSION 2005
SESSION LAW 2005-323
SENATE BILL 223
AN ACT TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS BY
REQUIRING THAT THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, THROUGH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, ENSURE THAT ALL
VOTING SYSTEMS GENERATE EITHER A PAPER BALLOT OR A PAPER
RECORD BY WHICH VOTERS MAY VERIFY THEIR VOTES BEFORE
CASTING THEM AND WHICH PROVIDES A BACKUP MEANS OF
COUNTING THE VOTE THAT THE VOTER CASTS; BY PROVIDING
STATUTORY GUIDANCE AS TO COUNTING; BY STANDARDIZING
PURCHASING OF VOTING SYSTEMS IN NORTH CAROLINA, INCLUDING
A REVIEW OF SOURCE CODE FOR SOFTWARE RELATED TO THOSE
VOTING SYSTEMS AND AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH THE ROLE OF
THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS RELATED TO TRAINING AND SUPPORT OF VOTING
SYSTEMS; BY REQUIRING POSTELECTION TESTING OF VOTING
SYSTEMS, INCLUDING A PAPER SAMPLE-COUNT; BY EXPANDING THE
RIGHT TO A HAND-TO-EYE RECOUNT OF PAPER BALLOTS; AND BY
PERMITTING A PILOT PROGRAM TO EXPERIMENT WITH NONPAPER
MEANS OF VOTER VERIFICATION AND BALLOT BACKUP.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
SECTION 1.(a) Effective August 1, 2005, and applicable to any voting
systems upgraded or acquired on or after that date and to all voting systems used in the
State during any election during or after 2006, G.S. 163-165.7 reads as rewritten:
" 163-165.7. Voting systems: powers and duties of State Board of Elections.
(a)
The State Board of Elections shall have authority to approve types, makes,
and models of voting systems for use in elections and referenda held in this State. Only
voting systems that have been approved by the State Board shall be used to conduct
elections under this Chapter, and the approved systems shall be valid in any election or
referendum held in any county or municipality. The State Board may, upon request of a
local board of elections, authorize the use of a voting system not approved for general
use. Only voting systems that have been certified by the State Board of Elections in
accordance with the procedures and subject to the standards set forth in this section and
that have not been subsequently decertified shall be permitted for use in elections in this
State. Those certified voting systems shall be valid in any election held in the State or in
any county, municipality, or other electoral district in the State. Subject to all other
applicable rules adopted by the State Board of Elections and, with respect to federal
elections, subject to all applicable federal regulations governing voting systems, paper
ballots marked by the voter and counted by hand shall be deemed a certified voting
system. The State Board of Elections shall certify optical scan voting systems, optical
scan with ballot markers voting systems, and direct record electronic voting systems if
any of those systems meet all applicable requirements of federal and State law. The
State Board may certify additional voting systems only if they meet the requirements of
the request for proposal process set forth in this section and only if they generate either
a paper ballot or a paper record by which voters may verify their votes before casting
them and which provides a backup means of counting the vote that the voter casts.
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Those voting systems may include optical scan and direct record electronic (DRE)
voting systems. In consultation with the Office of Information Technology Services, the
State Board shall develop the requests for proposal subject to the provisions of this
Chapter and other applicable State laws. Among other requirements, the request for
proposal shall require at least all of the following elements:
(1)
That the vendor post a bond or letter of credit to cover damages
resulting from defects in the voting system. Damages shall include,
among other items, any costs of conducting a new election attributable
to those defects.
(2)
That the voting system comply with all federal requirements for voting
systems.
(3)
That the voting system must have the capacity to include in precinct
returns the votes cast by voters outside of the voter's precinct as
required by G.S. 163-132.5G.
(4)
With respect to electronic voting systems, that the voting system
generate a paper record of each individual vote cast, which paper
record shall be maintained in a secure fashion and shall serve as a
backup record for purposes of any hand-to-eye count, hand-to-eye
recount, or other audit. Electronic systems that employ optical scan
technology to count paper ballots shall be deemed to satisfy this
requirement.
(5)
With respect to DRE voting systems, that the paper record generated
by the system be viewable by the voter before the vote is cast
electronically, and that the system permit the voter to correct any
discrepancy between the electronic vote and the paper record before
the vote is cast.
(6)
With respect to all voting systems using electronic means, that the
vendor provide access to all of any information required to be placed
in escrow by a vendor pursuant to G.S. 163-165.9A for review and
examination by the State Board of Elections; the Office of Information
Technology Services; the State chairs of each political party
recognized under G.S. 163-96; the purchasing county; and designees
as provided in subdivision (9) of subsection (d) of this section.
(7)
That the vendor must quote a statewide uniform price for each unit of
the equipment.
(8)
That the vendor must separately agree with the purchasing county that
if it is granted a contract to provide software for an electronic voting
system but fails to debug, modify, repair, or update the software as
agreed or in the event of the vendor having bankruptcy filed for or
against it, the source code described in G.S. 163-165.9A(a) shall be
turned over to the purchasing county by the escrow agent chosen under
G.S. 163-165.9A(a)(1) for the purposes of continuing use of the
software for the period of the contract and for permitting access to the
persons described in subdivision (6) of this subsection for the purpose
of reviewing the source code.
In its request for proposal, the State Board of Elections shall address the mandatory
terms of the contract for the purchase of the voting system and the maintenance and
training related to that voting system.
No voting system acquired or upgraded by a county before August 1, 2005, shall be
used in an election during or after 2006 unless the county can demonstrate to the State
Board of Elections compliance with the requirements in subdivisions (1) through (8) of
this subsection, where those requirements are applicable to the type of voting system
involved.
(b)
The State Board may also, upon notice and hearing, disapprove decertify
types, makes, and models of voting systems. Upon disapproving decertifying a type,
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make, or model of voting system, the State Board shall determine the process by which
the disapproved decertified system is discontinued in any county. If a county makes a
showing that discontinuance would impose a financial hardship upon it, the county shall
be given up to four years from the time of State Board disapproval to replace the
system. A county may appeal a decision by the State Board concerning discontinuance
of a voting system the process by which the decertified system is discontinued in that
county to the superior court in that county or to the Superior Court of Wake County.
The county has 30 days from the time it receives notice of the State Board's decision on
discontinuancethe process by which the decertified system is discontinued in that
county to make that appeal.
(c)
Prior to certifying a voting system, the State Board of Elections shall review,
or designate an independent expert to review, all source code made available by the
vendor pursuant to this section and certify only those voting systems compliant with
State and federal law. At a minimum, the State Board's review shall include a review of
security, application vulnerability, application code, wireless security, security policy
and processes, security/privacy program management, technology infrastructure and
security controls, security organization and governance, and operational effectiveness,
as applicable to that voting system. Any portion of the report containing specific
information related to any trade secret as designated pursuant to G.S. 132-1.2 shall be
confidential and shall be accessed only under the rules adopted pursuant to subdivision
(9) of subsection (d) of this section. The State Board may hear and discuss the report of
any such review under G.S. 143-318.11(a)(1).
(d)
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, the State Board of Elections shall
prescribe rules for the adoption, handling, operation, and honest use of certified voting
systems, including, but not limited to,including all of the following:
(1)
Procedures for county boards of elections to utilize when
recommending the purchase of a Types, makes, and models of
certified voting systems approved system for use in this Statethat
county.
(2)
Form of official ballot labels to be used on voting systems.
(3)
Operation and manner of voting on voting systems.
(4)
Instruction of precinct officials in the use of voting systems.
(5)
Instruction of voters in the use of voting systems.
(6)
Assistance to voters using voting systems.
(7)
Duties of custodians of voting systems.
(8)
Examination and testing of voting systems in a public forum in the
county before and after use in an election.
(9)
Notwithstanding G.S. 132-1.2, procedures for the review and
examination of any information placed in escrow by a vendor pursuant
to G.S. 163-165.9A by only the following persons:
a.
State Board of Elections.
b.
Office of Information Technology Services.
c.
The State chairs of each political party recognized under
G.S. 163-96.
d.
The purchasing county.
Each person listed in sub-subdivisions a. through d. of this subdivision
may designate up to three persons as that person's agents to review and
examine the information. No person shall designate under this
subdivision a business competitor of the vendor whose proprietary
information is being reviewed and examined. For purposes of this
review and examination, any designees under this subdivision and the
State party chairs shall be treated as public officials under G.S. 132-2.
(10) With respect to electronic voting systems, procedures to maintain the
integrity of both the electronic vote count and the paper record. Those
procedures shall at a minimum include procedures to protect against
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the alteration of the paper record after a machine vote has been
recorded and procedures to prevent removal by the voter from the
voting enclosure of any paper record or copy of an individually voted
ballot or of any other device or item whose removal from the voting
enclosure could permit compromise of the integrity of either the
machine count or the paper record.
Any rules adopted under this subsection shall be in conjunction with procedures and
standards adopted under G.S. 163-182.1, are exempt from Chapter 150B of the General
Statutes, and are subject to the same procedures for notice and publication set forth in
G.S. 163-182.1.
(e)
The State Board of Elections shall facilitate training and support of the voting
systems utilized by the counties."
SECTION 1.(a1) G.S. 163-166.7(c) reads as rewritten:
"(c) The State Board of Elections shall promulgate rules for the process of voting.
Those rules shall emphasize the appearance as well as the reality of dignity, good order,
impartiality, and the convenience and privacy of the voter. Those rules, at a minimum,
shall include procedures to ensure that all the following occur:
(1)
The voting system remains secure throughout the period voting is
being conducted.
(2)
Only properly voted official ballots or paper records of individual
voted ballots are introduced into the voting system.
(3)
Except as provided by G.S. 163-166.9, no official ballots leave the
voting enclosure during the time voting is being conducted there. The
rules shall also provide that during that time no one shall remove from
the voting enclosure any paper record or copy of an individually voted
ballot or of any other device or item whose removal from the voting
enclosure could permit compromise of the integrity of either the
machine count or the paper record.
(4)
All improperly voted official ballots or paper records of individual
voted ballots are returned to the precinct officials and marked as
spoiled.
(5)
Voters leave the voting place promptly after voting.
(6)
Voters not clearly eligible to vote in the precinct but who seek to vote
there are given proper assistance in voting a provisional official ballot
or guidance to another voting place where they are eligible to vote.
(7)
Information gleaned through the voting process that would be helpful
to the accurate maintenance of the voter registration records is
recorded and delivered to the county board of elections.
(8)
The registration records are kept secure.
(9)
Party observers are given access as provided by G.S. 163-45 to current
information about which voters have voted.
(10) The voter, before voting, shall sign that voter's name on the pollbook,
other voting record, or voter authorization document. If the voter is
unable to sign, a precinct official shall enter the person's name on the
same document before the voter votes."
SECTION 1.(b) Section 11 of S.L. 2003-226, which would have made
amendment to G.S. 163-165.7 effective January 1, 2006, is repealed.
SECTION 1.(c) In order to carry forward the first of two amendments that
would have been made by Section 11 of S.L. 2003-226 to the old version of
G.S. 163-165.7, effective January 1, 2006, G.S. 163-165.7, as rewritten by subsection
(a) of this section, is amended by adding the following new subsection:
"(a1) Federal Assistance. The State Board may use guidelines, information,
testing reports, certification, decertification, recertification, and any relevant data
produced by the Election Assistance Commission, its Standards Board, its Board of
Advisors, or the Technical Guidelines Development Committee as established in Title II
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of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 with regard to any action or investigation the
State Board may take concerning a voting system. The State Board may use, for the
purposes of voting system certification, laboratories accredited by the Election
Assistance Commission under the provisions of section 231(2) of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002."
SECTION 1.(d) In order to carry forward the second of two amendments
that would have been made by Section 11 of S.L. 2003-226 to the old version of
G.S. 163-165.7, effective January 1, 2006, G.S. 163-165.7(d), as rewritten by subsection
(a) of this section, is amended by adding the following new subdivision:
"(11) Compliance with section 301 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002."
SECTION 1.(e) G.S. 163-132.5G reads as rewritten:
" 163-132.5G. Voting data maintained by precinct.
To the extent that it can do so without compromising the secrecy of an individual's
ballot, each county board of elections shall maintain voting data by precinct so that
precinct returns for each item on the ballot shall include the votes cast by residents of
the precinct who voted by provisional ballot and by absentee ballot, both mail and
one-stop. The county board shall not be required to report provisional and absentee
voting data by precinct until 60 days after the election. The State Board of Elections
shall adopt rules for the enforcement of this section with the goal that all voting data
shall be reported by precinct by the 2006 election. Those rules shall provide for
exemptions where the expense of compliance would place a financial hardship on a
county. Those rules shall provide for compliance by 2004 for counties the State Board
determines are capable of complying by that year."
SECTION 1.(f) G.S. 163-165.1(e) reads as rewritten:
"(e) Voted ballots and paper records of individual voted ballots shall be treated as
confidential, and no person other than elections officials performing their duties may
have access to voted ballots or paper records of individual voted ballots except by court
order or order of the appropriate board of elections as part of the resolution of an
election protest or investigation of an alleged election irregularity or violation. Voted
ballots and paper records of individual voted ballots shall not be disclosed to members
of the public in such a way as to disclose how a particular voter voted, unless a court
orders otherwise."
SECTION 2.(a) Part 2 of Article 14A of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes
is amended by adding a new section to read:
" 163-165.9A. Voting systems: requirements for voting systems vendors; penalties.
(a)
Duties of Vendor. Every vendor that has a contract to provide a voting
system in North Carolina shall do all of the following:
(1)
The vendor shall place in escrow with an independent escrow agent
approved by the State Board of Elections all software that is relevant
to functionality, setup, configuration, and operation of the voting
system, including, but not limited to, a complete copy of the source
and executable code, build scripts, object libraries, application
program interfaces, and complete documentation of all aspects of the
system including, but not limited to, compiling instructions, design
documentation, technical documentation, user documentation,
hardware and software specifications, drawings, records, and data. The
State Board of Elections may require in its request for proposal that
additional items be escrowed, and if any vendor that agrees in a
contract to escrow additional items, those items shall be subject to the
provisions of this section. The documentation shall include a list of
programmers responsible for creating the software and a sworn
affidavit that the source code includes all relevant program statements
in low-level and high-level languages.
(2)
The vendor shall notify the State Board of Elections of any change in
any item required to be escrowed by subdivision (1) of this subsection.
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(3)
The chief executive officer of the vendor shall sign a sworn affidavit
that the source code and other material in escrow is the same being
used in its voting systems in this State. The chief executive officer
shall ensure that the statement is true on a continuing basis.
(4)
The vendor shall promptly notify the State Board of Elections and the
county board of elections of any county using its voting system of any
decertification of the same system in any state, of any defect in the
same system known to have occurred anywhere, and of any relevant
defect known to have occurred in similar systems.
(5)
The vendor shall maintain an office in North Carolina with staff to
service the contract.
(b)
Penalties. Willful violation of any of the duties in subsection (a) of this
section is a Class G felony. Substitution of source code into an operating voting system
without notification as provided by subdivision (a)(2) of this section is a Class I felony.
In addition to any other applicable penalties, violations of this section are subject to a
civil penalty to be assessed by the State Board of Elections in its discretion in an amount
of up to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per violation. A civil penalty assessed
under this section shall be subject to the provisions of G.S. 163-278.34(e)."
SECTION 2.(b) This section applies with respect to purchase or upgrade of
any voting system on or after August 1, 2005.
SECTION 3. Effective August 1, 2005, G.S. 163-165.8 reads as rewritten: "
163-165.8.
Voting systems: powers and duties of board of county
commissioners.
The board of county commissioners, with the approval of the county board of
elections, may adopt and purchase or lease acquire only a voting system of a type,
make, and model approved certified by the State Board of Elections for use in some or
all voting places in the county at some or all elections.
The board of county commissioners may decline to adopt and purchase or lease
acquire any voting system recommended by the county board of elections but may not
adopt and purchase or lease acquire any voting system that has not been approved by
the county board of elections. Article 8 of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes does not
apply to the purchase of a voting system certified by the State Board of Elections."
SECTION 4. Effective August 1, 2005, G.S. 163-165.9 reads as rewritten:
" 163-165.9. Voting systems: powers and duties of county board of elections.
(a)
Before approving the adoption and purchase or lease acquisition of any
voting system by the board of county commissioners, the county board of elections shall
do all of the following:
(1)
Obtain a current financial statement from the proposed vendor or
lessor of the voting system and send copies of the statement to the
county attorney and the chief county financial officer.Recommend to
the board of county commissioners which type of voting system
should be acquired by the county.
(2)
Witness a demonstration, in that county or at a site designated by the
State Board of Elections, of the type of voting system to be
recommended by the proposed vendor or lessor and also witness a
demonstration of at least one other type of voting system approved
certified by the State Board of Elections.
(3)
Test, during an election, the proposed voting system in at least one
precinct in the county where the voting system would be used if
adopted.
(b)
After the acquisition of any voting system, the county board of elections shall
comply with any requirements of the State Board of Elections regarding training and
support of the voting system."
SECTION 5.(a) G.S. 163-182.1(b) reads as rewritten:
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"(b) Procedures and Standards. The State Board of Elections shall adopt uniform
and nondiscriminatory procedures and standards for voting systems. The standards shall
define what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of
voting system used in the State. The State Board shall adopt those procedures and
standards at a meeting occurring not earlier than 15 days after the State Board gives
notice of the meeting. The procedures and standards adopted shall apply to all elections
occurring in the State and shall be subject to amendment or repeal by the State Board
acting at any meeting where notice that the action has been proposed has been given at
least 15 days before the meeting. These procedures and standards shall not be
considered to be rules subject to Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.
However, the State Board shall publish in the North Carolina Register the procedures
and standards and any changes to them after adoption, with that publication noted as
information helpful to the public under G.S. 150B-21.17(a)(6). Copies of those
procedures and standards shall be made available to the public upon request or
otherwise by the State Board. For optical scan and direct record electronic voting
systems, and for any other voting systems in which ballots are counted other than on
paper by hand and eye, those procedures and standards shall do both of the following:
(1)
Provide for a sample hand-to-eye count of the paper ballots or paper
records of a statewide ballot item in every county. The presidential
ballot item shall be the subject of the sampling in a presidential
election. If there is no statewide ballot item, the State Board shall
provide a process for selecting district or local ballot items to
adequately sample the electorate. The sample chosen by the State
Board shall be of full precincts, full counts of absentee ballots, and full
counts of one-stop early voting sites. The size of the sample of each
category shall be chosen to produce a statistically significant result and
shall be chosen after consultation with a statistician. The actual units
shall be chosen at random. In the event of a material discrepancy
between the electronic or mechanical count and a hand-to-eye count,
the hand-to-eye count shall control, except where paper ballots or
records have been lost or destroyed or where there is another
reasonable basis to conclude that the hand-to-eye count is not the true
count. If the discrepancy between the hand-to-eye count and the
mechanical or electronic count is significant, a complete hand-to-eye
count shall be conducted.
(2)
provide Provide that if the voter selects votes for more than the
number of candidates to be elected or proposals to be approved in a
ballot item, the voting system shall do all the following:
(1)a. Notify the voter that the voter has selected more than the correct
number of candidates or proposals in the ballot item.
(2)b. Notify the voter before the vote is accepted and counted of the
effect of casting overvotes in the ballot item.
(3)c. Provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the official
ballot before it is accepted and counted."
SECTION 5.(b) G.S. 163-182.2 reads as rewritten:
" 163-182.2. Initial counting of official ballots.
(a)
The initial counting of official ballots shall be conducted according to the
following principles:
(1)
Vote counting at the precinct shall occur immediately after the polls
close and shall be continuous until completed.
(2)
Vote counting at the precinct shall be conducted with the participation
of precinct officials of all political parties then present. Vote counting
at the county board of elections shall be conducted in the presence or
under the supervision of board members of all political parties then
present.
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(3)
Any member of the public wishing to witness the vote count at any
level shall be allowed to do so. No witness shall interfere with the
orderly counting of the official ballots. Witnesses shall not participate
in the official counting of official ballots.
(4)
Provisional official ballots shall be counted by the county board of
elections before the canvass. If the county board finds that an
individual voting a provisional official ballot is not eligible to vote in
one or more ballot items on the official ballot, the board shall not
count the official ballot in those ballot items, but shall count the
official ballot in any ballot items for which the individual is eligible to
vote.
(5)
Precinct officials shall provide a preliminary report of the vote
counting to the county board of elections as quickly as possible. The
preliminary report shall be unofficial and has no binding effect upon
the official county canvass to follow.
(6)
In counties that use any certified mechanical or electronic voting
system, subject to the sample counts under G.S. 163-182.1 and
subdivision (1a) of subsection (b) of this section, and of a hand-to-eye
recount under G.S. 163-182.7 and G.S. 163-182.7A, a board of
elections shall rely in its canvass on the mechanical or electronic count
of the vote rather than the full hand-to-eye count of the paper ballots or
records. In the event of a material discrepancy between the electronic
or mechanical count and a hand-to-eye count or recount, the
hand-to-eye count or recount shall control, except where paper ballots
or records have been lost or destroyed or where there is another
reasonable basis to conclude that the hand-to-eye count is not the true
count.
(b)
The State Board of Elections shall promulgate rules for the initial counting of
official ballots. All election officials shall be governed by those rules. In promulgating
those rules, the State Board shall adhere to the following guidelines:
(1)
For each voting system used, the rules shall specify the role of precinct
officials and of the county board of elections in the initial counting of
official ballots.
(1a) For optical scan and direct record electronic voting systems, and for
any other voting systems in which ballots are counted other than on
paper by hand and eye, those rules shall provide for a sample handto-eye count of the paper ballots or paper records of a sampling of a
statewide ballot item in every county. The presidential ballot item
shall be the subject of the sampling in a presidential election. If there is
no statewide ballot item, the State Board shall provide a process for
selecting district or local ballot items to adequately sample the
electorate. The sample chosen by the State Board shall be of full
precincts, full counts of absentee ballots, and full counts of one-stop
early voting sites. The size of the sample of each category shall be
chosen to produce a statistically significant result and shall be chosen
after consultation with a statistician. The actual units shall be chosen at
random. In the event of a material discrepancy between the electronic
or mechanical count and a hand-to-eye count, the hand-to-eye count
shall control, except where paper ballots or records have been lost or
destroyed or where there is another reasonable basis to conclude that
the hand-to-eye count is not the true count. If the discrepancy between
the hand-to-eye count and the mechanical or electronic count is
significant, a complete hand-to-eye count shall be conducted.
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(2)
The rules shall provide for accurate unofficial reporting of the results
from the precinct to the county board of elections with reasonable
speed on the night of the election.
(3)
The rules shall provide for the prompt and secure transmission of
official ballots from the voting place to the county board of elections.
The State Board shall direct the county boards of elections in the application of the
principles and rules in individual circumstances."
SECTION 5.(c) G.S. 163-182.5 reads as rewritten:
" 163-182.5. Canvassing votes.
(a)
The Canvass. As used in this Article, the term "canvass" means the entire
process of determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly,
culminating in the authentication of the official election results. The board of elections
conducting a canvass has authority to send for papers and persons and to examine them
and pass upon the legality of disputed ballots.
(b)
Canvassing by County Board of Elections. The county board of elections
shall meet at 11:00 A.M. on the seventh day after every election to complete the canvass
of votes cast and to authenticate the count in every ballot item in the county by
determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly. If, despite due
diligence by election officials, the initial counting of all the votes has not been
completed by that time, the county board may hold the canvass meeting a reasonable
time thereafter. The canvass meeting shall be at the county board of elections office,
unless the county board, by unanimous vote of all its members, designates another site
within the county. The county board shall examine the returns from precincts, from
absentee official ballots, from the sample hand-to-eye paper ballot counts, and from
provisional official ballots and shall conduct the canvass.
(c)
Canvassing by State Board of Elections. After each general election, the
State Board of Elections shall meet at 11:00 A.M. on the Tuesday three weeks after
election day to complete the canvass of votes cast in all ballot items within the
jurisdiction of the State Board of Elections and to authenticate the count in every ballot
item in the county by determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated
correctly. After each primary, the State Board shall fix the date of its canvass meeting.
If, by the time of its scheduled canvass meeting, the State Board has not received the
county canvasses, the State Board may adjourn for not more than 10 days to secure the
missing abstracts. In obtaining them, the State Board is authorized to secure the
originals or copies from the appropriate clerks of superior court or county boards of
elections, at the expense of the counties."
SECTION 5.(d) This section becomes effective January 1, 2006.
SECTION 6.(a) G.S. 163-182.7 reads as rewritten:
" 163-182.7. Ordering recounts.
(a)
Discretionary Recounts. The county board of elections or the State Board of
Elections may order a recount when necessary to complete the canvass in an election.
The county board may not order a recount where the State Board of Elections has
already denied a recount to the petitioner.
(b)
Mandatory Recounts for Ballot Items Within the Jurisdiction of the County
Board of Elections. In a ballot item within the jurisdiction of the county board of
elections, a candidate shall have the right to demand a recount of the votes if the
difference between the votes for that candidate and the votes for a prevailing candidate
is not more than one percent (1%) of the total votes cast in the ballot item, or in the case
of a multiseat ballot item not more than one percent (1%) of the votes cast for those two
candidates. The demand for a recount must be made in writing and must be received by
the county board of elections by 5:00 P.M. on the first day after the canvass. The
recount shall be conducted under the supervision of the county board of elections.
(c)
Mandatory Recounts for Ballot Items Within the Jurisdiction of the State
Board of Elections. In a ballot item within the jurisdiction of the State Board of
Elections, a candidate shall have the right to demand a recount of the votes if the
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difference between the votes for that candidate and the votes for a prevailing candidate
are not more than the following:
(1)
For a nonstatewide ballot item, one percent (1%) of the total votes cast
in the ballot item, or in the case of a multiseat ballot item, one percent
(1%) of the votes cast for those two candidates.
(2)
For a statewide ballot item, one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the votes
cast in the ballot item, or in the case of a multiseat ballot item, one-half
of one percent (0.5%) of the votes cast for those two candidates, or
10,000 votes, whichever is less.
The demand for a recount must be in writing and must be received by the State Board of
Elections by noon on the second Thursday after the election. If on that Thursday the
available returns show a candidate not entitled to a mandatory recount, but the
Executive Director determines subsequently that the margin is within the threshold set
out in this subsection, the Executive Director shall notify the eligible candidate
immediately and that candidate shall be entitled to a recount if that candidate so
demands within 48 hours of notice. The recount shall be conducted under the
supervision of the State Board of Elections.
(d)
Rules for Conducting Recounts. The State Board of Elections shall
promulgate rules for conducting recounts. Those rules shall be subject to the following
guidelines:
(1)
The rules shall specify, with respect to each type of voting system,
when and to what extent the recount shall consist of machine recounts
and hand-to-eye recounts. Hand-to-eye recounts shall also be ordered
as provided by G.S. 163-182.7A.
(2)
The rules shall provide guidance in interpretation of the voter's choice.
(3)
The rules shall specify how the goals of multipartisan participation,
opportunity for public observation, and good order shall be balanced."
SECTION 6.(b) Article 15A of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes is
amended by adding a new section to read:
" 163-182.7A. Additional provisions for hand-to-eye recounts.
(a)
The rules promulgated by the State Board of Elections for recounts shall
provide that if the initial recount is not hand-to-eye, and if the recount does not reverse
the results, the candidate who had originally been entitled to a recount may, within 24
hours of the completion of the first recount, demand a second recount on a hand-to-eye
basis in a sample of precincts. If the initial recount was not hand-to-eye and it reversed
the results, the candidate who had initially been the winner shall have the same right to
ask for a hand-to-eye recount in a sample of precincts.
That sample shall be all the ballots in three percent (3%) of the precincts casting
ballots in each county in the jurisdiction of the office, rounded up to the next whole
number of precincts. For the purpose of that calculation, each one-stop (early) voting
site shall be considered to be a precinct. The precincts to be recounted by a hand-to-eye
count shall be chosen at random within each county. If the results of the hand-to-eye
recount differ from the previous results within those precincts to the extent that
extrapolating the amount of the change to the entire jurisdiction (based on the
proportion of ballots recounted to the total votes cast for that office) would result in the
reversing of the results, then the State Board of Elections shall order a hand-to-eye
recount of the entire jurisdiction in which the election is held. There shall be no cost to
the candidate for that recount in the entire jurisdiction.
(b)
Recounts under this section shall be governed by rules adopted under
G.S. 163-182.7(d).
(c)
No complete hand-to-eye recount shall be conducted under this section if one
has already been done under another provision of law."
SECTION 6.(c) This section becomes effective January 1, 2006.
SECTION 7. G.S. 163-82.28 reads as rewritten:
" 163-82.28. The HAVA Election Fund.
Page 10
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Page 27 of 28
There is established a special fund to be known as the Election Fund. All funds
received for implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Public Law 107252, shall be deposited in that fund. The State Board of Elections shall use funds in the
Election Fund only to implement HAVA. HAVA and for purposes permitted by
HAVA to comply with State law."
SECTION 7.1. Each county shall receive a grant of up to twelve thousand
dollars ($12,000) per polling place and one-stop site from the Election Fund created
under G.S. 163-82.28 for voting equipment that complies with the requirements of
HAVA and this act. The grant shall also include two backup units per county. Each
county shall also receive a grant equal to one dollar ($1.00) per voter in the 2004
presidential election, but no less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more than one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), for central administrative software for tabulation.
SECTION 8. The State Board of Elections shall recommend a model code
of ethics for members and employees of county boards of elections and of the State
Board of Elections. The code shall address the appropriate relations between those
members and staff and vendors who do business or seek to do business with boards of
elections in North Carolina. It shall address how to avoid both the reality and the
appearance of conflicts of interest and impropriety. The State Board shall report its
recommended code to the Joint Select Committee on Electronic Voting Systems and to
the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations no later than 60 days
after this act becomes law.
SECTION 9. The State Board of Elections may conduct, for primaries and
elections in 2006 only, experiments with voting systems that use a means in addition to
paper to fulfill the backup record and voter verification requirements of
G.S. 163-165.7(a)(4) and G.S. 163-165.7(a)(5), as enacted by this act. The pilot
program may be conducted in no more than nine counties. The county boards of
elections shall cooperate in conducting the pilot program. The pilot program shall be
conducted according to the following requirements:
(1)
The experiment may be conducted in no more than two voting sites per
county. The voting sites may include election-day voting places or
one-stop sites.
(2)
At each voting site in which the experiment is conducted, voters must
have a choice of voting on the experimental voting system or on a
voting system that is not part of the experiment.
(3)
Each experimental voting system shall include an additional means for
the voter to verify the choices that the voter makes in the electronically
cast ballot, which means shall also provide for an additional count.
That additional means may utilize audio technology, digital scanners,
or some other material or technology that shall record the voters'
choices but shall not record any image of any part of the voter.
(4)
On each voting machine or unit used in the experiment, the voting
system shall comply with all the applicable requirements of
G.S. 163-165.7, including the requirement in G.S. 163-165.7(a)(4) that
a DRE system must generate a paper backup record of each individual
vote cast electronically and the requirement in G.S. 163-165.7(a)(5)
that the paper record generated by the DRE system must be viewable
by the voter before the vote is cast electronically and that the system
allow the voter to correct any discrepancy between the electronic vote
and the paper record before the vote is cast. On every machine or unit,
the experimental means to fulfill those functions shall be used in
addition to, rather than instead of, the required paper means.
(5)
For all votes cast on an experimental voting system under the pilot,
there shall be, in addition to an electronic count, a full hand-to-eye
paper count and a full comparison count of the experimental
verification technology.
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Page 28 of 28
The State Board of Elections shall report the results of the pilot program, together with
its recommendations, to the 2007 General Assembly and to the Joint Legislative
Commission on Governmental Operations by February 1, 2007.
SECTION 10. The requirement for testing a voting system in an election
provided in G.S. 163-165.9(a)(3), as enacted in Section 4 of this act, does not apply to
any voting system acquired before January 1, 2008, as long as the voting system is
demonstrated in a public forum in the county. Notwithstanding G.S. 163-132.5G, as
amended by this act, voting data by precinct shall be reported for the general elections
of 2006 by March 1, 2007, and for the primary elections of 2006 by May 1, 2007.
Except as otherwise provided in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it
becomes law.
In the General Assembly read three times and ratified this the 16th day of
August, 2005.
s/ Marc Basnight
President Pro Tempore of the Senate
s/ James B. Black
Speaker of the House of Representatives
s/ Michael F. Easley
Governor
Approved 11:00 a.m. this 26th day of August, 2005
Page 12
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Dickerson, Michael
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Exhibit B --Request for

Reconsideration Marks
Don Wright <ncelectionattorney@gmail.com>

Thursday, November 10, 2016 3:28 PM
Dickerson, Michael
Fwd: Sample Audit
Michael,
Sorry that you had some malfunctioning paper rolls. That is interesting. Alamance had the same issue ... see
below.
Don Wright
----------Forwarded message---------From: Neesby, Brian <Brian.Neesby@ncsbe.gov>
Date: Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 3:21 PM
Subject: RE: Sample Audit
To: Kathy Holland <kathy.holland@alamance-nc.com>
Cc: "ncelectionattomey@gmail.com" <ncelectionattomey@gmail.com>, "Strach, Kim"
<kim.strach@ncsbe.gov>, "Lawson, Joshua" <joshua.lawson@ncsbe.gov>, ''Love, Katelyn"
<Katelyn.Love@ncsbe.gov>
Hi Kathy,
(Per our phone conversation, because the RTAL paper rolls malfunctioned, you are permitted to use the vote
~mage logs to conduct your sample audit count. Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks!
Brian Neesby
Business Systems Analyst
T: (919) 715-9199
E: brian.neesby@ncsbe.gov
E-mail correspondence to and from this address may be subject to North Carolina public records laws and may
be disclosed to third parties by an authorized official.
-----Original Message----From: Strach, Kim

Sent: Thursday, November 10, 2016 3:13 PM
To: Neesby, Brian <Brian.Neesby@ncsbe.gov>
Subject: FW: Sample Audit

Page 38 of 79

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-----Original Message----From: Kathy Holland [mailto:Kathy.Holland@alamance-nc.com]

Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2016 8:58 PM
To: Don Wright <ncelectionattomey@gmail.com>
Cc: Strach, Kim <kim.strach@ncsbe.gov>; SVC_SBOE.Legal.SBOE <legal.sboe@ncsbe.gov>; Lawson,
Joshua <joshua.lawson@ncsbe.gov>; Degraffenreid, Veronica <Veronica.Degraffenreid@ncsbe.gov>; Barcliff,
Eric <Eric.Barcliff@ncsbe.gov>; Baddour, Neil <neil.baddour@ncsbe.gov>
Subject: Re: Sample Audit
Also, what is the criteria for requesting an extension on Canvass Day. With the inclusion of the sample count
for one stop site, if we are not approved to use the audit log, due to the labor intensiveness of processing the
count on RTAL rolls, approximately 200 rolls, it will take longer than the 10 days to Canvass. Our approximate
cost for this will be ten thousand dollars.
Sent from my iPad
On Nov 9, 2016, at 7:43 PM, Don Wright
<ncelectionattomey@gmail.com<mailto :ncelectionattomey@gmail.com>> wrote:
Kathy you do not have to post the sample audit count as a meeting.
You are correct in that it is standard operating procedure to get SBE guidance on anything that is out of the
ordinary as to a sample audit count. That is exclusively the SBE's call. But generally the most accurate method
of count will be approved by the SBE.
Another factor is that the RTAL paper you were provided by PrintElect had problems as you described. So if
the SBE is not already aware of this issue ... they need to know about it.
The SBE will recognize the importance of giving you guidance on this issue ASAP. I will ask that they copy
both of us on the response.
Don
Don Wright
On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 6:57 PM, Kathy Holland <Kathy.Holland@alamancenc.com<mailto:Kathy.Holland@alamance-nc.com>> wrote:
Don,
Alamance County was assigned the Holly Hill Mall One Stop site as one of our sample audits. I would like to
obtain clarification regarding what is acceptable to use in the sample count. We are an iVotronic County. The
"new" RTAL paper rolls sold by the approved vendor, Print Elect and ES&S were so thick that the sensor on
the RTAL printer wasn't picking up when the roll was ending. Resulting, the printer was running out of paper
and we would cancel there is no way our sample count from the R TAL rolls is going to be correct.
My first question, is it permissible to pull the Vote image log audit log from the flash cards and tally each vote
that way? Either way it is going to be difficult because when the paper ran out, if it ran out at the end of a
voter's selection, the ballot was cast, no problem. However, ifthe paper ran out in the middle, we canceled the
ballot on that iVo (#1) and moved the voter to another iVo (#2) and started them over in the process. So, the
partial part of the uncast ballot (cancelled ballot) is on the tape and will be tallied but wasn't cast.
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Second question, since this isn't a Board Meeting and the members will not be assisting, am I required to post a
"meeting" for the sample count in advance of beginning the count, under the open meetings law? With all we
have to do, narrowing a specific time and place is going to be difficult. I am going to have to rent a facility and
hire enough people to conduct this massive count before a determination can be made about a time/day, so
posting 48 hours in advance is going to further limit my time.
Would you please get guidance from the SBOE regarding ifl can use the vote image log for our sample count?
Thank you,
Kathy Holland, CERA, CNCEA

Director
Alamance County Board of Elections
115 S. Maple Street
Graham, NC 27253
336-570-6755<tel:336-570-6755>
336-570-6757<tel:336-570-6757> (fax)
Kathy.holland@alamance-nc.com<mailto:Kathy.holland@alamance-nc.com>
www.alamance-nc.com<http://www.alamance-nc.com/>
In all things preserve integrity; and the consciousness of thine own uprightness will alleviate the toil of
business, soften the hardness of ill-success and disappointments, and give thee an humble confidence before
God, when the ingratitude of man, or the iniquity of the times may rob thee of other rewards. Barbara Paley

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Supplemental Information for Markss Protests of Canvass Process
correction: 11/20
is date of second
protest.
Supplemental information related to events occurring during and after the

November 21 Board of Elections meeting is hereby provided to the board
for its consideration in the matter of the two Marks protests (November 18
and 21, 2016) related to the required sample count of electronic election
records.
The board decided to defer the consideration of the protest on the issue of
non-compliant post-election sample count testing until after canvass, based
on the erroneous theory that the issue does not concern the counting and
tabulating of votes. Yet, it is the very method of counting and tabulation
of votes that is at issue in the protest.
In canvassing the election, the board is charged with deciding whether to
rely on the electronic record for canvassing, or to require a manual count.
The is the most fundamental decision regarding counting and
tabulation that the board must make prior to canvassing such returns. The
decision is to be based on the results of the sample count. The board has
erroneously avoided making that decision and has prematurely and outside
of a public meeting, chosen to rely on the untested electronic count.
Subsequent events
1. Governor McCrory and State Auditor candidate Stuber have formally
requested recounts. (https://wccbcharlotte.com/2016/11/22/governormccrory-files-recount-nc-gubernatorial-election/)
Recount candidates have statutory rights to hand counts of paper records
at issue in Markss protest. If the board proceeds with their indicated
decision of denying Marks protest, the decisions will impair these
candidates recount rights.
2. Jill Stein, Green Party candidate for US President, filed for a recount in
Wisconsin, supplemented her petition with an affidavit from a renowned
computer scientist explaining the necessity of using the paper record as the
source document in testing a voting system. The same facts and
arguments apply to the issues in Markss protests.

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3. The board acknowledged at the November 21 meeting that it had not

reviewed or accepted the returns of the required sample counts as part of
the canvass procedures, yet is prepared to move forward with certification
of results based on sampling substitute electronic records it has not
reviewed.
Implications of certification prior to required sample count
The Board has signaled its intent to certify the returns on November 28
without resolving Markss protests concerning the non-compliant sample
count required as a basis for proceeding with canvass. The Board fails to
recognize that by certifying the returns based on improperly tested
electronic records, and accepting the sample count findings without
reviewing such findings during canvassing, it is effectively concluding that
the VVPAT records should not be relied on and that electronic records are
the appropriate source documents, without the required testing. The board
is also knowingly circumventing a required testing step in the canvassing of
the election.
There is no practical way to reverse this decision after certification. If the
results of the sample count audit are reviewed after certification and found
to be non-compliant or unacceptable, there is not an efficient or practical
method to decertify the returns.
Impairment of candidates rights in McCrory and Stuber recounts
At the November 18 meeting, Chairwoman Summa Potter instructed
Director Dickerson to obtain permission from the State Board to use the
electronic ballot image reports (EL155s) in lieu of the VVPAT records for
testing the electronic records, because of claimed (but unsubstantiated)
unreliability of the paper record.
The board is poised to effectively declare the VVPAT records unusable for
purposes of the pre-election audit, based on an unsubstantiated theory that
the damage to the VVPATs is so extensive that VVPAT records are
unreliable. Without examining the paper records, the board appears to be
relying on the following provision of 162-182.1(b)(1):
In the event of a material discrepancy between the electronic or mechanical
count and a hand-to-eye count, the hand-to-eye count shall control, except

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where paper ballots or records have been lost or destroyed or where there is
another reasonable basis to conclude that the hand-to-eye count is not the
true count.
If the board moves forward with its decision that the paper record is not the
true count for purposes of post-election testing, this will impact the
candidates ability to rely on the paper record in the recount process. This
will impair the rights of candidates to rely on an independent record for an
accurate count. The candidates will be left with only the re-tabulation of the
electronic record for their recount. That is a virtually meaningless test. The
other problematic alternative would be for the candidates to challenge this
finding of fact by the board.
The VVPAT records cannot be simultaneously unreliable for precanvassing sample counts, and reliable for post-election recounts.
Extreme caution by the board is urged before the board advantages
the unofficial winners of the recount races in this manner, by
effectively deeming the paper records unreliable, and putting a test
of the paper records off limits to the losing candidate.
Recommendations:
a. The Board should investigate and document the claim that the
VVPAT records will produce material discrepancies in test counts
because of mechanical failures, before reaching the significant
conclusion that the record is unreliable. The board can be presented
with all VVPATs in the state-selected test locations (Marion Diehl
early voting, and #234 for Election Day voting), and select a
statistically valid random sample to examine. A determination can be
made with documented evidence as to the condition of the paper
record.
b. The Board should require a printout of audit event log reports
(EL152s) from each voting machine in the sample precincts chosen
by the state board. The event logs should be reviewed for the
frequency and seriousness of paper jams or other mechanical
problems occurring at these selected locations. The impact of such
events can then be inspected on the related VVPAT to determine the
seriousness of the failure, and the reliability of the VVPAT record. A

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documentation of the frequency of such events should be included in

the boards deliberations on the reliability of the VVPAT records.
c. Given the potential harm to the recount candidates, affected
campaigns should be given notice of the pending determination and
potential testing of the quality of the VVPAT record. They should be
provided with an opportunity to observe the testing and advocate for
their interests.
Experts affidavit on facts in dispute
The disputed facts in Markss protests are similar to certain relevant facts in
the recently filed Jill Stein Wisconsin recount. Chairwoman Summa Potter
and elections department manager Kristin Mavromatis stated in the record
that the Mecklenburg iVotronics machines and Unity system cannot be
hacked because they are not connected to the Internet. Despite arguments
to the contrary, the boards misunderstanding of the electronic security risk
was part of their rationale in improperly concluding that the electronic
record is a satisfactory substitute for the paper record (VVPAT) in sample
counting and testing the electronically generated results.
The affidavit of Dr. Alex Halderman is attached at Exhibit 1 of the attached
Stein recount petition. (Exhibit A) Please refer to paragraphs 8-14, with
particular attention to paragraphs 8-10. Note Dr. Haldermans explanation
in paragraph 10 that systems can be hacked without connection to the
Internet. Also, please note paragraph 12 concerning the rationale for using
paper records as the source document. Linked at Exhibit D, page 50 Marks Appeal.
Dr. Haldermans affidavit references a video which may be helpful in the
boards deliberations on this issue.
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZws98jw67g&feature=youtu.be)
While the machine in the video is manufactured by a different voting
machine manufacturer, the same principles apply to the iVotronics
machine. Computer scientists have documented the same vulnerabilities in
the iVotronics machines.
In light of the facts presented in Dr. Haldermans affidavit, reconsideration
of the findings of the board is requested. The electronic record cannot be

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properly substituted for the VVPAT paper record called for by statute in
hand-to-eye counts.
Board failure to examine sample count returns
During the latter part of the November 21 meeting the board acknowledged
that it had not reviewed the results of the required sample count of the
presidential race. However, 163-182.5 (b) provides:
The county board shall examine the returns from precincts, from absentee
official ballots, from the sample hand-to-eye paper ballot counts, and from
provisional official ballots and shall conduct the canvass. (emphasis added)
It is clear that such a review is required prior to completion of canvass. If
the board fails to examine the sample count returns for compliance, it is
effectively accepting the flawed sample count method and the underlying
assumption that the VVPAT record is unreliable.
Summary
In light of this supplemental information, the board should reconsider its
following preliminary decisions:
a. to complete the canvass and certify the returns prior to reviewing the
sample count results in violation of 163-182.5(b)
b. to proceed with canvass without resolving whether the electronically
generated results can be relied on for certifying the returns, or whether a
hand-to-eye full count is required.
c. to accept the electronic record (EL155) in lieu of the VVPAT record for
use in the sample count, on the basis of the VVPATs purported
unreliability, which has not been documented.
d. to accept staffs mistaken assertions that the election software cannot be
compromised through security breaches, and therefore electronic records
and paper records are identical.

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e. to accept Director Dickersons assertions that the VVPAT records are

unreliable for hand-to-eye sample counts, without verifying and
documenting the alleged problem.
f. to conclude that the VVPAT records are unreliable without giving proper
notice to candidates whose recounts rights will be impaired by such a
decision.
Respectfully submitted,
__________________
November 27, 2016
Marilyn Marks
Charlotte, NC 28210

Page 46 of 79
Marks Appeal 12.4.16 Exhibit C

November 20 Protest
1/3
ELECTION PROTEST #2
Use of this form is required by G.S. 163-182.9(c)
This form must be filed with the county board of elections within the timeframes set out in G.S. 163182.9 (b)(4). Please print or type your answers. Feel free to use and attach additional sheets if needed to
fully answer the questions below. You may also attach relevant exhibits and documents. Please number
the pages of such additional sheets and attachments.
1. Full name and mailing address of person filing the protest.
Marilyn R. Marks, 7035 Marching Duck Drive E504, Charlotte, NC 28210
(This is second and separate protest under my name.)

_____________________________________________________________________________________
2. Home and business phone number, fax number, and e-mail address.
Marilyn R. Marks
call for fax. Marilyn@AspenOffice.com
_____________________________________________________________________________________
3. Are you either a candidate or registered voter eligible to vote in the protested election?
If a candidate, for what office?
Yes. Registered Voter, Mecklenburg County.
4. List the date, location, and exact nature of the election protested. Name all candidates in the election
and the number of votes each received. Note the winning candidate(s) elected or nominated.
11/8/16 General Election, Mecklenburg County (possibly all iVotronics counties involved.)
All candidates and ballot measures on the general election ballots.
5. Does this protest involve an alleged error in vote count or tabulation? If so, please explain in detail.
No. This issue involves a decision made by the Mecklenburg BoE concerning the method
of tabulation and counting for canvassing activities.
This protest is being filed as both a new protest and a request for reconsideration of the
11/18/16 protest decision. I am unable to appeal the decision to stay proceedings
because there is no written record of findings. This is an urgent matter and should not be
delayed because formal procedures do not address this unusual factual circumstance.
____________________________________________________________________________
6. Does this protest involve an irregularity or misconduct not described in number 5 above? If so, please
give a detailed description of such misconduct or irregularity and name those who committed such action.
Yes. Mecklenburg Board erred in staying the protest proceedings of my 11/18/16 protest.
(Exhibit 1 copy of 11/18/16 protest.) The protest regarding audit irregularities must be
decided prior to completion of canvass. Board decided to move forward with canvassing
and authentication of the electronic results without the benefit of the findings from a
valid and required hand-to-eye sample count.
____________________________________________________________________________________
7. Please set out all election laws or regulations that you allege were violated in your responses to 5 or 6
above. State how each violation occurred. Please provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of
those who you allege committed such violations.
A protest concerning the counting and tabulating of votes must be resolved before
canvass is completed (163-182.10 (a)(2)). (Detailed description at Exhibit 2) My 11/18/16
protest concerned the tabulation method that must be chosen by the board to be used in

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November 20 Protest
2/3
the canvassing of the votes. The board has stayed proceedings and deferred the
decision on this gating issue. Until a legally compliant audit is completed, the board
cannot determine whether the electronic vote can be relied on for canvass or whether a
manual count is required and therefore cannot legally complete the canvassing activities.
(See Exhibit 1 for underlying 11/18/16 protest.)
Board of Elections members Ms. Potter Summa, Ms. McDowell, and Ms. Williams erred in
their decision to stay the protest proceedings. Board of Elections management, Michael
Dickerson and Kristin Mavromatis, misinformed the board on the audit, falsely claiming
that permission had been granted by the state board to use the electronic record (EL155)
as the audit record rather than the paper record (VVPAT). Numerous sections of the
Election Code prohibit officials from make false claims and knowingly presenting
inaccurate information.
All may be contacted at 741 Kenilworth Ave. Ste 202, Charlotte, NC 28204, 704-336-2133,
Mecklenburg.boe@ncsbe.gov.
____________________________________________________________________________________
8. Please provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of any witnesses to any misconduct alleged
by you in this protest, and specify what each witness listed saw or knows.
Members of the board and management listed in #7 above. Members of the public
attending the Board meeting 11/18/16 between 5:20 and 6pm.
I was also present at the meeting where the violations occurred.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
9. What action do you desire the county board of elections to take in this matter?
Board should reconsider and reverse their decision to stay the protest proceedings. The
board should determine prior to canvassing activities that the paper record should be
used for the audit source document as stated in the 11/18/16 protest.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
10. Do you contend the allegations set out by you are sufficient to have affected or cast doubt upon the
results of the protested election? If your answer is yes, please state the factual basis for your opinion.
Yes, the failure to conduct the required post-election audit and properly test the
electronic tallies of the DREs can certainly cast doubt upon the election. The election
cannot be canvassed with confidence without required tests properly performed. The
false statements made by management concerning having permission from the state
board to use electronic records rather than independent paper records cast doubt on the
credibility of the election processing and results.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
11. Have you read and reviewed the North Carolina law pertaining to election protests as set out in G.S.
163-182.9 through G.S. 163-182.14 and current North Carolina State Board of Elections regulations
pertaining to election protests? Yes.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
12. How many pages of additional answer are attached to this protest? (Please note Exhibit 2)
How many pages of attachments are attached?

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November 20 Protest
3/3
__________________________
__
Signature of Protestor
Date/Time Filed with County Board
______________________________________
(to be filled out by the county board)
NOTE: The county board must provide the State Board with a complete copy of a filed protest within
one business day after it is filed. In addition, the county board shall provide a copy of the election audit
with this copy of the protest.
Please direct any questions to your county board of elections or the North Carolina State Board of
Elections, PO Box 27255, Raleigh, NC 27611-7255, (919) 733-7173.

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Marks Appeal 12.4.16 Exhibit D

1/1
Exhibit D
Exhibit of linked information from large electronic files.
Marion Diehl Early voting machine event logs (EL152)
https://www.scribd.com/document/333223232/Marion-Diehl-EL152-Event-log
Marion Diehl early voting voter list
https://www.scribd.com/document/333225539/Marion-Diehl-Voters-Early-voting
Precinct 234 Election Day voting machine event logs (EL152)
https://www.scribd.com/document/333223703/Pct-234-EL152-Event-Log
Affidavit of Dr. Alex Halderman related to security risks of touchscreen voting machines.
(in Jill Stein Wisconsin recount case) referenced in Supplemental information to
Mecklenburg Board for November 20 protest
http://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/wisconsin_recount_petition_of_jill_stein_0
0268242_12391.pdf
Dr. Haldermans video regarding ease of hacking touchscreen machines.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZws98jw67g&feature=youtu.be

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Exhibit E-- Req. Multi-County Investigation

1/1
Marilyn R. Marks
Charlotte, NC 28210
Re: Request for SBOE investigationpotential sample audit failures
North Carolina State Board of Elections
(via elections.sboe@ncsbe.gov)
Honorable Board Members:
I am writing to request that the Board initiate an investigation into the conduct of the
hand-to-eye sample count (sample audit) of counties using iVotronics machines in the
November 8, 2016 election.
In the course of my observation of the Mecklenburg County election processing for the
November 8, 2016 general election, I learned that the required sample audit was not
conducted using independent VVPAT paper records as required by statute. I filed the
attached protest regarding that violation on Friday, November 18, 2016. I emailed a
copy to the state board upon filing. During the preliminary discussion of the protest,
Director of Elections, Michael Dickerson and Kristin Mavromatis, reported to the county
board that all iVotronics counties used the EL155 records (ballot image records) rather
than the required independent VVPAT paper records to conduct their audit.
I seek the boards investigation into the audit methods for the counties using iVotronics,
to determine compliance with the sample audit law, and the impact of any
noncompliance on canvass, given the inability to rely on the electronic records if they
have not been tested.
If I were to personally attempt the inquiry beyond Mecklenburg County, public record
request responses would not arrive in time to act on the responses, nor do I have
standing to bring protests in counties other than Mecklenburg where I am a registered
voter.
The relevant documents supporting my allegations related to Mecklenburg County are
incorporated into the second protest and request for reconsideration filed with
Mecklenburg County tonight. I also copied the State Board on these matters.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter. Please contact me if you have
questions, or can provide me with an opportunity for public comment or a hearing on
this matter.
Marilyn Marks

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Marks Appeal 12.4.16 Exhibit F

1/1
abstract not attached in

this Appeals filing.

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Marks Appeal 12.4 16 Exhibit G

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White Paper
Attack Vectors for ES&S iVotronics
And Data Analysis of Election Results
For the Mecklenberg County Board of Elections
Duncan A. Buell, 27 November 2016
I write this to expand on my earlier letter to the Board of Elections. I have had programs since
2010 that analyzed the data produced by ES&S iVotronic voting machines and the Unity
software that runs on computers at county election headquarters. My analysis has been done
largely through the League of Women Voters of South Carolina, for whom I serve also as a
technical consultant on electronic voting systems.
My programs normally run using the EL152 event log and the EL155 cast vote record produced
by each iVotronic machine, together with the EL68A system log of the Unity software and the
EL30A file that is a results file. My code cannot determine if there has been an internal hack of
the iVotronics (such as will be mentioned later). The ES&S system is, however, rather
complicated to use and lacks some of the fail-safe and internal checks that one ought to be able
to expect, and my code can identify most of the procedural errors that would come from inexpert
poll managers not following directions, poll workers having problems at the end of a very long
election day, or problems that arise from known bugs in the software or a lack of internal checks
in the software.
There are two reports on the ES&S iVotronics that are the operative documents describing
shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the ES&S system. One of these is the EVEREST report,
produced for the Secretary of State of Ohio and published on 7 December 2007. The EVEREST
report looked at all three direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in use at that time in
Ohio. The analysis of the iVotronics was done by two university research groups, one at the
University of Pennsylvania under the direction of Dr. Matt Blaze, and the other at a computer
security firm in Santa Barbara CA under the direction of Dr. Giovanni Vigna.
The second relevant report was done following the 2006 election in Sarasota FL, with a team led
by Dr. Alec Yasinsac. Although the Florida study was very narrow, the appendix describing the
absurdly poor password structure in the iVotronic system is of great value in understanding the
quality of the software in the ES&S system.
I believe that perhaps the first issue that needs to be addressed is the difficulty (or ease) of
hacking an iVotronic so as to insert malware that would corrupt the election. The ease of
corrupting a PEB and an iVotronic is mentioned on page 50 of the EVEREST report.
Undocumented features provide backdoor entry into an iVotronic and a corruption of the
records. An attacker with an altered PEB can access an iVotronic and insert malware into the
system that can propagate all the way to county headquarters (EVEREST, p. 51).
Three mistaken opinions regarding the attacks mentioned above seem to be prevalent among
election officials. First, it is assumed that one would need physical access to the countys voting
hardware. This is not the case. I bought two iVotronics, complete with PEBs, from eBay two
years ago. The notion that the hardware is secure because no one except trusted people have

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access to it is called security through obscurity in the computer security jargon, and security
through obscurity is generally considered to be somewhere between totally ineffective and totally
worthless. If a university professor in South Carolina can get two working iVotronics delivered
to his office by UPS, then surely hostile actors would be able to find a way to lay hands on
examples of the physical hardware. The fact that the hardware and software have not been
updated for many years (probably because that would require another costly trip through the
testing lab to maintain certification) means that the iVotronic is not a moving target; hardware
acquired today is probably almost identical to hardware used around the country.
We must therefore assume that an attacker with a motive and with only modest means can
acquire the hardware with which to conduct an attack.
The second mistaken opinion is that physical access to the ability to corrupt an iVotronic would
be difficult. I certainly do not believe this to be the case. I can easily imagine an attacker walking
up to an iVotronic, with a rogue PEB hidden under a legal-size paper purporting to be the voters
ballot choices, and slouching against the left side of the machine so as to minimize the chance of
being detected. I was a poll observer in the 2016 election, and I noticed a number of voters who
would not have been detected had they been employing this mode of attack. Poll workers can
and should be diligent, but I believe the inherent goal of privacy of the vote makes it much
harder to detect this kind of attack.
The third huge mistake that election officials seem compelled to make is to assume that just
because the voting machine itself is never connected to the internet, then the voting machine is
protected against attack. This would only be true if NONE of the computers involved were ever
connected to the net, and if no electronic data came in to the iVotronics from any computer that
had ever been connected to the network.
In my earlier letter I mentioned Stuxnet, which was apparently used to infect and destroy Iranian
nuclear centrifuges that were in fact never connected to the network. Flash memory drives are an
absolutely standard vector for malware, just as with Stuxnet. If the main computer at county
headquarters, running Unity, is connected to the network, then we must assume that it is
vulnerable. If that computer is used to configure PEBs and to erase and format memory cards for
the iVotronics, then we must assume that the PEBs and the memory cards are infected. And since
both of those are plugged into the iVotronics, we must assume that the iVotronics are all
infected.
The only way in which one can assume that in fact nothing is connected to the internet is if ALL
the computers, the one running Unity included, are disconnected at all times from the net. This
would also mean that any operating system updates would have to be done using a trusted
medium (like a CD) obtained from a trusted source (like ES&S itself). Unless that is the standard
protocol, then it is completely fatuous to argue that the voting machines are not connected to the
internet.
It is worth pointing out at this point that during the time I was chair of the Department of
Computer Science and Engineering, the dean and department chairs were briefed by a contingent
from the FBI. The specific advice from the FBI to the chairs, to be passed on to the faculty, was

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that when faculty travel, they should be very careful not to allow anyone to plug in a flash
memory drive into their laptops. Even if ones acquaintance at a conference is merely asking
for a copy of a paper or of powerpoint slides, the FBI advice was not to allow unknown flash
drives to be inserted, because malware could easily be introduced in this way.
I will close by reiterating that the reliance on passwords results in ineffective security. As is
described in the Yasinsac report, most of the passwords are clearly trivial. Further, the handling
of passwords in the software (described also in the EVEREST report) is done in a manner best
described as juvenile. Even without the confidential annex to the EVEREST report, it is clear
that relying on the passwords in the iVotronics is a serious mistake.
I am happy to provide further information if your board deems it helpful. My goal in this work is
to improve the quality and trustworthiness of the election process and thus give more voters
reason to trust the outcomes. There are huge security issues with the iVotronics. There are just as
many issues of improper use of a system with a complicated protocol. My goal has always been
to try to identify situations that will arise that will compromise the integrity of elections and to
find ways to mitigate the vulnerabilities.

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Duncan A. Buell
Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering
NCR Chair of Computer Science and Engineering
University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina 29208
buell@acm.org, 803-777-7848, www.cse.sc.edu/duncanbuell
Personal: 66 years old, U. S. citizen.
Experience:
July 2009present: Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208.
October 20002009: Professor and Chair, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of South Carolina. Duties also
included management of the college IT network, computer center,
and staff comprising nine instructional labs (250 desktops), cluster
computers, file and mail servers, and network infrastructure.
August 2005July 2006: Interim Dean, College of Engineering and Information Technology, University of South Carolina.
January 1986September 2000: Center for Computing Sciences, Institute
for Defense Analyses, 17100 Science Drive, Bowie, Maryland 20715.
(The Center for Computing Sciences was named the Supercomputing Research Center from 1985 through May 1995.)
1979December 1985: Department of Computer Science, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803. (Assistant Professor,
19791982; Associate Professor with tenure, 19821985)
19771979: Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science, Bowling
Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43402.
19761977: Research Associate, Department of Mathematics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S 5B6.
Education:
Ph. D. in mathematics (number theory), 1976, University of IllinoisChicago.
M. A. in mathematics, 1972, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
B. S. in mathematics, 1971, University of Arizona, Tucson.
Computing Interests:
Digital humanities
Electronic voting systems and computer security
Computational number theory
Information retrieval

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November 24, 2016
Duncan A. Buell
Page 2
Grants Held:
First-Year Composition as Big Data, Conference on College Composition and Communication/National Council of Teachers of English,
$9,663, 2/2016-2/2017. (co-PI with PI Chris Holcomb)
AP Summer Institute in Computer Science, South Carolina State Department of Education, $16,475, summer 2014. (PI)
Expanding Computing Education Pathways Alliance, National Science
Foundation, Mark Guzdial (Georgia Tech) and Rick Adrion (U.
of Massachusetts Amherst), PIs, $6.4M, 10/2012-9/2017. (subcontractor as partner state, $394,986 to USC)
AP Summer Institute in Computer Science, South Carolina State Department of Education, $17,475, summer 2012. (PI)
Ghosts of South Carolina CollegeA Critical Interactive for Engaging Students and Visitors in the History of USCs Horseshoe, USC VicePresident for Research ASPIRE-II grant, $65,185, 5/2012-8/2013.
(PI with co-PIs Heidi Rae Cooley and Bob Weyeneth)
Mobile Geospatial Situational Awareness for Field and Command Staff During the Emergency Response Phase, Department of Homeland Security $99,257, 9/2011-5/2012. (co-PI with PI Michael Hodgson)
History Simulation for Teaching Early Modern British History, National
Endowment for the Humanities, $49,967, 5/2011-5/2012. (PI with
co-PI Heidi Rae Cooley)
Humanities Gaming: Building Serious Games for Research and Pedagogy,
National Endowment for the Humanities, $232,096, 5/2010-5/2011.
(PI with co-PIs Randall Cream, Simon Tarr, and Heidi Rae Cooley)
SC STEPS to STEM, NSF, $2,035,667, 2007-2012. (co-PI with PI Tim
Mousseau and co-PIs Ann Johnson, Loren Knapp, and Jed Lyons)
New metrics for characterizing and predicting network behavior, Subcontract of DARPA funding from Department of Physics and Astronomy, USC, approximately $400,000, 2003-2006. (co-PI with PI Joe
Johnson and co-PI Chin-Tser Huang)
Library development and experiments using prototype reconfigurable computing machines, NSA subcontract from George Washington University, $399,993, 5/01/04-8/31/06. (PI with co-PIs J. Davis and
G. Quan)
Gene expression profiles of HPV-transformed cells in vitro and in vivo,
USC Medicine and Engineering Research Fund, $35,000, 3/15/033/14/04. (co-PI with L. Pirisi-Creek and PI J. Rose)

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November 24, 2016
Duncan A. Buell
Page 3
Utilization of aggregate network load modules for high-performance computing applications, Ixia Corporation industrial research contract,
$51,204 and major equipment donation, 1/1/03-8/15/03. (co-PI
with PI K. Cameron)
Library development and experiments using prototype reconfigurable computing machines, NSA Lucite subcontract, $426,574, 4/08/024/30/04. (PI with co-PIs J. Davis and G. Quan)
Information Systems Security Education at the University of South Carolina, NSF, $199,846, 9/01/01-8/31/03. (co-PI with PI C. Farkas
and co-PIs C. Eastman, S. Fenner, and J. Johnson)
Accelerating computations in statistical genomics through the use of novel
hardware and parallelized software, USC Vice President for Research Opportunity Fund, $50,000, 2001-2002. (PI with co-PIs
Laszlo Szekely and Peter Waddell)
A high performance computer for factoring large numbers, National Security Agency MDA904-85-H-0006, $198,296, 1 February 1985-31
January 1987. (co-PI with Walter G. Rudd)
An investigation of the CPS factoring method, National Science FoundationNational Security Agency DCR-8311580, $58,125, 15 April 1984-30
September 1985.
Modelling of generalizations of Boolean query processing in information
retrieval systems, NSF IST-8115146, $34,722, 1 September 198128 February 1983. (co-PI with Donald H. Kraft)
Database/data access needs for computerization of well data, LSU Mining and Mineral Resources Research Institute, Summer Faculty Research Award, 1981.
Elliptic curves and class groups of quadratic fields, NSF MCS78-01943,
$6,700, 15 July 1978-31 December 1979.
Professional Associations:
American Association for the Advancement of Science (Elected a Fellow 2013)
Advisory Board Member, Overseas Vote Foundation
Association for Computing Machinery (Senior Member)
American Mathematical Society
Foundation Fellow, The Institute of Combinatorics and its Applications
IEEE (Senior Member), IEEE Computer Society

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November 24, 2016
Duncan A. Buell
Page 4
Other Scholarly and Professional Activities (selected):

Committee Member, Computing Sciences Scholarships and Fellowships Committee, National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada,
2013-2017. (This committee is the Canadian analogue to the NSF
panels that evaluate Graduate Research Fellowship proposals, but
it also has funding for postdoctoral positions.)
Member, Board of Reviewers Journal of Writing Analytics 2016present.
Appointed by The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Governor of Arkansas, to
the Southern Regional Education Board Commission on Computer
Science, Information Technology, and Related Career Fields, 2015.
General co-chair, Election Verification Network annual conference, 2016.
Elected to the Coordinating Committee, Election Verification Network, 2015.
General chair, Election Verification Network annual conference, 2015.
Member of the search committee for the Executive Director of the Computer
Science Teachers Association, 2015.
Organizing Committee, Election Verification Network annual conference, 2014.
Consultant on electronic voting technology, League of Women Voters of South
Carolina, 2004present.
Program Chair, Computer Science Teachers Association annual conference,
20112015.
National University Representative to the Computer Science Teachers Association, 2008-2010, re-elected for 2010-2012.
Co-Editor in Chief, ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and
Systems 2007-2010. (Founded this journal with Wayne Luk, the
other co-EIC.)
IEEE Workshop/Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing
Machines: Co-chair, 1993, 1994, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; Program
Committee, 19952013.
Program Committee, ACM FPGA94, FPGA95, FPGA 2005, Monterey, California.
Program Committee Chair, ANTS VI (Algorithmic Number Theory Symposium), Burlington, Vermont, June 2004.
Advisory board member, IEEE International Conference on Field-Programmable
Technology, 2003, 2004.
Guest editor of various special issues of journals.
Associate Editor, Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 1986-1992.
ACM National Lecturer, 1982-83.
Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Kappa Phi.

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Duncan A. Buell
Page 5
Publications:
Books:
D. A. Buell, Data Structures Using Java, Jones and Bartlett, 2013, 400 pages,
ISBN-13: 978-1-4496-2807-9.
D. A. Buell, J. M. Arnold, and W. J. Kleinfelder, eds., Splash 2: FPGAs in a
Custom Computing Machine, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1996,
320 pages, ISBN 0-8186-7413-X.
D. A. Buell, Binary Quadratic Forms: Classical Theory and Modern Computations, Springer-Verlag, 1989, 247 pages, ISBN 0-387-97037-1.
Proceedings editor:
D. A. Buell and K. Pocek, eds., Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on FieldProgrammable Custom Computing Machines, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2009, 309 pages, ISBN 978-0-7695-3716-0.
D. A. Buell and K. Pocek, eds., Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on FieldProgrammable Custom Computing Machines, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2008, 324 pages, ISBN 978-0-7695-3307-0.
D. A. Buell and K. Pocek, eds., Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on FieldProgrammable Custom Computing Machines, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2007, 358 pages, ISBN 0-7685-2940-2.
D. A. Buell and K. Pocek, eds., Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on FieldProgrammable Custom Computing Machines, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2006, 355 pages, ISBN 0-7695-2661-6.
D. Buell, ed., Algorithmic Number Theory, Proceedings of the sixth international symposium (ANTS VI), Lecture Notes in Computer Science
3076, Springer-Verlag, 2004, 451 pages, ISBN 3-540-22156-5.
D. A. Buell and J. T. Teitelbaum, eds., Computational Perspectives in Number Theory: Proceedings of a conference in honor of A. O. L. Atkin,
American Mathematical Society, 1997, 232 pages, ISBN 0-82180880-X.
D. A. Buell and K. Pocek, eds., Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on FPGAs
for Custom Computing Machines, IEEE Computer Society Press,
1994, 199 pages, ISBN 0-8186-5490-2.
D. A. Buell and K. Pocek, eds., Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on FPGAs
for Custom Computing Machines, IEEE Computer Society Press,
1993, 224 pages, ISBN 0-8186-3890-7.

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Duncan A. Buell
Page 6
Journal Articles and Book Chapters:

D. A. Buell and G. S. Call, Class pairings and isogenies on elliptic curves,
Journal of Number Theory, v. 167, 2016, pp. 31-73.
H. R. Cooley and D. A. Buell, Building Humanities Software that Matters:
The case of Ward One Mobile App, Debates in the Digital Humanities, volume on Making Humanities Matter, Jentery Sayers,
ed., University of Minnesota Press, to appear.
H. R. Cooley and D. A. Buell, Ghosts of the Horseshoe, a Mobile Application: Fostering a New Habit of Thinking about the History of
University of South Carolinas Historic Horseshoe, Annual Review
of Cultural Heritage Informatics, v. 1, 2014, pp. 193-212.
D. A. Buell, An Analysis of Long Lines in Richland County, South Carolina, USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems, v. 1,
issue 1, August 2013, pp. 106-118.
D. A. Buell and H. R. Cooley, Critical Interactives: Improving public understanding of public policy, Bulletin of Science, Technology, and
Society, v. 32, issue 6, December 2012, pp. 486-493,
DOI:10.1177/0270467612469073.
D. A. Buell, Ideal composition in quadratic fields: From Bhargava to Gauss,
The Ramanujan Journal, v. 29, 2012, pp. 31-49. (DOI 10.1007/s11139012-9400-z)
Y. Kopylova, D. A. Buell, C.-T. Huang, and J. Janies, Mutual information
applied to anomaly detection, Journal of Communications and
Networks, v. 10, 2008, pp. 89-97.
P. Saha, E. El-Araby, M. Huang, M. Taher, S. Lopez-Buedo, T. El-Ghazawi,
C. Shu, K. Gaj, A. Michalski, and D. Buell, Portable library development for reconfigurable computing systems: A case study,
Parallel Computing, v. 34, 2008, pp. 245-260.
T. El-Ghazawi, E. El-Araby, M. Huang, K. Gaj, V. Kindratenko, D. Buell,
The promise of high-performance reconfigurable computing, IEEE
Computer, February 2008, pp. 69-76.
D. A. Buell, Number theory, The Handbook of Information Security, Volume 2, John Wiley, 2006, pp. 532-547.
D. A. Buell, The Advanced Encryption Standard, The Handbook of Information Security, Volume 2, John Wiley, 2006, pp. 498-509.
D. A. Buell and R. Sandhu, Identity management, IEEE Internet Computing, v. 7, no. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 26-28. (guest
editors introduction).

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Duncan A. Buell
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X. Feng, D. A. Buell J. R. Rose, and P. J. Waddell, Parallel algorithms

for Bayesian phylogenetic inference, Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, v. 63, 2003, pp. 707-718.
M. N. Huhns and D. A. Buell, Trusted autonomy, IEEE Internet Computing, v. 6, no. 3, May/June 2002, pp. 92-95.
D. A. Buell and Kenneth L. Pocek, Custom computing machines: An introduction, The Journal of Supercomputing, v. 9, 1995, pp. 219-230
(guest editors introduction to a special issue).
D. A. Buell and Veikko Ennola, On a parameterized family of quadratic and
cubic fields, Journal of Number Theory, v. 54, 1995, pp. 134-148.
A. Bremner and D. A. Buell, Three points of great height on elliptic curves,
Mathematics of Computation, v. 61, 1993, pp. 111-116.
D. A. Buell and R. L. Ward, A multiprecise integer arithmetic package,
The Journal of Supercomputing, v. 3, 1989, pp. 89-107.
J. Young and D. A. Buell, The twentieth Fermat number is composite,
Mathematics of Computation, v. 50, 1988, pp. 261-263.
D. A. Buell, Integer squares with constant second difference, Mathematics
of Computation, v. 49, 1987, pp. 635-644.
D. A. Buell, Factoring: Algorithms, computers, and computations, The
Journal of Supercomputing, v. 1, 1987, pp. 191-216.
D. A. Buell, Class groups of quadratic fields II, Mathematics of Computation, v. 48, 1987, pp. 85-93.
D. A. Buell and R. H. Hudson, Sequences in power residue classes, International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, v. 9,
1986, pp. 261-266.
D. M. Chiarulli and D. A. Buell, Parallel microprogramming tools for a
horizontally reconfigurable architecture, International Journal of
Parallel Programming, v. 15, 1986, pp. 151-162.
D. A. Buell, A problem in information retrieval with fuzzy sets, Journal
of the American Society for Information Science, v. 36, 1985, pp.
398-401.
D. A. Buell, A retrieval system for well information data, Computers and
Geosciences, v. 10, 1984, pp. 205-209.
D. A. Buell, The expectation of success using a Monte Carlo factoring
methodsome statistics on quadratic class numbers, Mathematics
of Computation, v. 43, 1984, pp. 313-327.
D. A. Buell and R. H. Hudson, On runs of consecutive quadratic residues
and quadratic nonresidues, BIT, v. 24, 1984, pp. 243-247.

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Page 8
D. A. Buell and R. H. Hudson, Solutions of certain quaternary quadratic

forms, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, v. 114, 1984, pp. 23-45.
D. A. Buell, R. H. Hudson, and K. S. Williams, Extension of a theorem of
Cauchy and Jacobi, Journal of Number Theory, v. 19, 1984, pp.
309-340.
D. H. Kraft and D. A. Buell, Fuzzy sets and generalized Boolean retrieval
systems, International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, v. 19,
1983, pp. 45-56. (Reprinted in Readings in Fuzzy Sets for Intelligent Systems, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, and Ronald Yager, eds.,
San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, 1993.)
D. A. Buell, An analysis of some fuzzy subset applications to information
retrieval systems, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, v. 7, 1982, pp. 35-42.
D. A. Buell, A general model of query processing in information retrieval
systems, Information Processing and Management, v. 17, 1981,
pp. 249-262.
D. A. Buell and D. H. Kraft, Threshold values and Boolean retrieval systems, Information Processing and Management, v. 17, 1981, pp.
127-136.
D. A. Buell and D. H. Kraft, A model for a weighted retrieval system,
Journal of the American Society for Information Science, v. 32,
1981, pp. 211-216.
D. A. Buell, P. A. Leonard, and K. S. Williams, Note on the quadratic
character of a quadratic unit, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, v.
92, 1981, pp. 35-38.
D. A. Buell and K. S. Williams, An octic reciprocity law of Scholz type,
Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, v. 77, 1979, pp.
315-318.
D. A. Buell and K. S. Williams, Maximal residue difference sets modulo p,
Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, v. 69, 1978, pp.
205-209.
D. A. Buell, Elliptic curves and class groups of quadratic fields, Journal of
the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, v. 15, 1977, pp. 19-25.
D. A. Buell, Small class numbers and extreme values of L-functions of
quadratic fields, Mathematics of Computation, v. 31, 1977, pp.
786-796.
D. A. Buell, H. C. Williams, and K. S. Williams, On the imaginary bicyclic
biquadratic fields of class-number 2, Mathematics of Computation,
v. 31, 1977, pp. 1034-1042.

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D. A. Buell, Class groups of quadratic fields, Mathematics of Computation,

v. 30, 1976, pp. 610-623.
Refereed Conference Proceedings:
H. R. Cooley and D. A. Buell, Ghosts of the Horseshoe: A Mobile Critical Interactive for Social Engagement, Interactive Narratives, New
Media and Social Engagement International Conference, Toronto,
Ontario, October 2014.
D. A. Buell and H. R. Cooley, Ghosts of the Horseshoe: A Critical Interactive, Software demo presented at HASTAC 2013, Toronto,
Ontario, April 2013.
D. A. Buell and H. R. Cooley, Desperate Fishwives: On the Origins of
Critical Interactives, Proceedings, Games, Learning, and Society,
Madison, Wisconsin, June 2012, pp. 391-396.
D. A. Buell, E. Hare, F. Heindel, C. Moore, B. Zia, Auditing a DRE-based
election in South Carolina, Proceedings, USENIX Workshop on
Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
2011, San Francisco, California, August 2011.
S. Shida, Y. Shibata, K. Oguri, and D. A. Buell, An optimization method
of DMA transfer for a general purpose reconfigurable machine,
Proceedings, International Conference on Field Programmable Logic
and Applications, 2008, pp. 647-650.
X. Feng, D. A. Buell, K. W. Cameron, PBPI: A high performance implementation of Bayesian phylogenetic inference, Proceedings, Supercomputing 2006, Tampa, Florida, November 2006.
E. A. Michalski and D. A. Buell, A scalable architecture for RSA cryptography on large FPGAs, Proceedings, FPL 06, Madrid, Spain, 28-30
August 2006.
C. L. Cathey, J. D. Bakos, and D. A. Buell, A reconfigurable distributed
computing fabric exploiting multilevel parallelism, Proceedings,
IEEE Symposium on Field Programmable Custom Computing Machines, Napa, California, April 2006.
A. Michalski, D. Buell, and K. Gaj, High-throughput reconfigurable computing: Design and implementation of an IDEA encryption cryptosystem on the SRC-6e reconfigurable computer, Proceedings, International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, 2005, pp. 681-686.
G. Quan, J. Davis, S. Devarkal, and D. A. Buell, High-level synthesis for

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large bit-width multipliers on FPGAs: A case study, Proceedings, Third IEEE/ACM/IFIP International Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+ISSS),
Jersey City, New Jersey, September 2005, pp. 213-218.
D. A. Buell, Calibrating entropy functions applied to computer networks,
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network
Security, St. Petersburg, Russia, September 2005, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science #3685, V. Gorodetsky, I. Kotenko, and V.
Skormin, eds., Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 76-87.
L. Cordova and D. Buell, A novel high-level dynamic hardware-software
remapping technique for mission critical reconfigurable computers,
Proceedings of the Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) conference, Washington, DC, 7-9 September 2005.
S. Akella, D. A. Buell, and L. Cordova, The DARPA data transposition
benchmark on the SRC-6, Proceedings of the Military and Aerospace
Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) conference, Washington,
DC, 7-9 September 2005.
D. Buell, S. Akella, G. Quan, J. Davis, and L. Cordova, Programming
FPGAs from C: Experiences with the SRC-6, Proceedings of the
Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD)
conference, Washington, DC, 7-9 September 2005.
L. Cordova, D. A. Buell, and S. Akella, The DARPA dynamic programming benchmark on a reconfigurable computer, Proceedings, IEEE
Symposium on Field Programmable Custom Computing Machines,
Napa, California, April 2005, pp. 327-328.
D. A. Buell, D. Caliga, J. P. Davis, G. Quan, The DARPA boolean equation benchmark on a reconfigurable computer, Proceedings of the
Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD)
conference, Washington, DC, 8-10 September 2004.
Quan, G., A. Michalski, D. Buell, and J. Davis, The DARPA sorting
benchmark on the SRC platform, Proceedings of the Military and
Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) conference, Washington, DC, 8-10 September 2004.
D. A. Buell, J. P. Davis, G. Quan, S. Akella, S. Devarkal, P. Kancharla, E.
A. Michalski, H. A. Wake, Experiences with a reconfigurable computer, Proceedings, Engineering of Reconfigurable Systems and Algorithms, Las Vegas, NV, 21-24 June 2004.

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S. Akella, D. A. Buell, J. P. Davis, and Heather A. Wake, Porting EDIF

netlists to the Viva environment, Proceedings, Military and Aerospace
Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) conference, Washington,
DC, 9-11 September 2003.
P. Kancharla and D. A. Buell, The Advanced Encryption Standard on
the HC 36m reconfigurable computer, Proceedings of the Military
and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) conference,
Washington, DC, 9-11 September 2003.
S. Devarkal, D. A. Buell, J. P. Davis, and G. Quan, Elliptic curve arithmetic
addition on reconfigurable hardware, Proceedings of the Military
Washington, DC, 9-11 September 2003.
D. A. Buell, S. Devarkal, and H. A. Wake, Reconfigurable computing machines and their applications in computational number theory,
High Primes and Misdeameanours: A Conference in Honor of Hugh
Williams, Fields Institute Communications, volume 41, pp. 123148, Fields Institute, Toronto, 2004.
H. Wake and D. A. Buell, Congruential sieves on a reconfigurable computer, Proceedings, IEEE Symposium on Field Programmable Custom Computing Machines, Napa, California, April 2003, pp. 11-18.
D. A. Buell, J. P. Davis, and G. Quan, Reconfigurable computing applied to
problems in communications security, Proceedings of the Military
Laurel, Maryland, 10-12 September 2002.
D. A. Buell, C. Farkas, M. N. Huhns, J. R. Rose, and M. G. Valtorta, Information reputation in an environment of ubiquitous computing,
Phoenix Conference on Information Warfare, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, September 2001.
D. A. Buell, The last exhaustive computation of class groups of complex
quadratic number fields, CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, v.
19, 1999, pp. 35-53. (Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the
Canadian Number Theory Association.)
N. D. Bronson and D. A. Buell, Congruential sieves on FPGA computers, in Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics #48, Walter Gautschi, editor, American Mathematical Society, Providence,
1994, pp. 547-552.
J. M. Arnold and D. A. Buell, VHDL programming on Splash 2, in More
FPGAs, Will Moore and Wayne Luk, editors, Abingdon EE & CS

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Books, Oxford, England, 1994, pp. 182-191. (Proceedings, International Workshop on Field-Programmable Logic, Oxford, 1993.)
J. M. Arnold, D. A. Buell, D. Hoang, D. V. Pryor, N. Shirazi, M. R. Thistle,
Splash 2 and its applications, Proceedings, International Conference on Computer Design, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 482-486.
J. M. Arnold, D. A. Buell, and E. G. Davis, Splash 2, Proceedings, Fourth
Annual ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures, San Diego, 1992, pp. 316-322.
D. A. Buell, The interplay between algorithms and architectures: Two examples, Proceedings, Frontiers of Supercomputing II, Los Alamos,
New Mexico, 1990.
D. M. Chiarulli, W. G. Rudd, and D. A. Buell, DRAFTA dynamically
reconfigurable processor for integer arithmetic, Proceedings, 7th
International Symposium on Computer Arithmetic, Urbana, Illinois, 1985, pp. 309-317.
D. A. Buell, On a problem involving partitions, Congressus Numerantium,
v. 44, 1984, pp. 191-200.
D. H. Kraft and D. A. Buell, Advances in a Bayesian decision model of
user stopping behavior for scanning the output of an information
retrieval system, Research and Development in Information Retrieval (Proceedings of the 3rd joint BCS/ACM symposium), Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1984, pp. 421-433.
W. G. Rudd, D. A. Buell, and D. M. Chiarulli, A high performance factoring
machine, Proceedings, 11th Annual International Symposium on
Computer Architecture, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1984, pp. 297-300.
D. A. Buell and D. H. Kraft, LIARSA software environment for testing
query processing strategies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
#146, G. Salton and H.-J. Schneider, eds., Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1983, pp. 20-27.
D. A. Buell, On the computation of unitary hyperperfect numbers, Congressus Numerantium, v. 34, 1982, pp. 191-206.
D. A. Buell and D. H. Kraft, Generalizations of Boolean query processing,
Proceedings, ACM 82 Conference, Dallas, Texas, 1982.
D. A. Buell and D. H. Kraft, Evaluation of fuzzy retrieval systems, Proceedings, Annual Meeting of the American Society for Information
Science, Washington, D. C., 1981.
D. A. Buell and D. H. Kraft, Performance measurement in a fuzzy retrieval
environment, ACM SIGIR Forum, v. 16, 1981, pp. 56-62. (Pro-

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ceedings of the Fourth Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference, Oakland, California, 1981)
D. A. Buell, Computer computation of class groups of quadratic fields,
Congressus Numerantium, v. 22, 1978, pp. 3-12. (Text of invited
address at the Eighth Manitoba Conference on Numerical Mathematics and Computing, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 1978)
Patent:
U. S. Patent number 4,748,585, Processor utilizing reconfigurable process
segments to accommodate data word length, held jointly with
Donald M. Chiarulli and Walter G. Rudd.

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Technical Reports and Other Publications:

D. A. Buell, An Analysis of the 11/06/2012 Richland County General Election, Draft reports for the League of Women Voters of South Carolina and submitted to the Richland County Board of Elections
and Voter Registration, 11/23/2012, 12/02/2012, and 12/19/2012,
available at http://www.lwvsc.org/votingtechnology.html.
D. A. Buell, An Audit of the South Carolina 2012 Republican Presidential
Preference Primary of January 21, 2012 (Interim Report 2/24/2012),
available at
http://www.lwvsc.org/votingtechnology.html.
K. Dohi, Y. Shibata, T. Hamada, T. Masada, K. Oguri, and D. Buell, Implementation of a programming environment with a multithread
model for reconfigurable systems, ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, v. 38, 2011, pp. 40-45.
R. Schnabel, D. Buell, J. Goode, J. S. Moore, and C. Stephenson, An
open dialogue concerning the state of education policy in computer
science, ACM SIGCSE Bulletin, v. 40, 2008, pp. 114-115.
D. A. Buell and C. Bays, Electronic voting machines in South Carolina,
white paper prepared for the National Research Council, Computer
Science and Telecommunications Board, project on electronic voting, 2004.
J. P. Davis, D. A. Buell and S. Akella, SoC methods and architecture for
realizing fast cryptographic computing engines, (USC Technical
Report CSCE TR-2002-002).
D. A. Buell and N. Shirazi, The Splash 2 Tutorial, SRC Technical Report
TR-92-87, 1992.
D. A. Buell, Sorting on Splash 2, SRC Technical Report TR-92-78, 1992.
D. A. Buell, Broadcast and total exchange in supertoroidal networks, SRC
Technical Report TR-91-48, 1991.
D. A. Buell, Supertoroidal networks, FFT butterflies, and cube-connectedcycles. SRC Technical Report TR-91-45, 1991.
D. A. Buell and J. Young, Some large primes and the Sierpinski problem,
SRC Technical Report TR-88-004.
D. A. Buell, et al., Parallel algorithms and architectures: Report of a workshop, The Journal of Supercomputing, v. 1, 1988, 301-325.
D. A. Buell, A note on long Cunningham chains, LSU Computer Science
Technical Report 85-027.

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D. A. Buell, On determining the rank of certain elliptic curves, LSU Computer Science Technical Report 84-023.
D. A. Buell and R. H. Hudson, Sequences in power residue classes, (extended version of the paper with the same title) LSU Computer
Science Technical Report 84-003.
D. A. Buell and R. H. Hudson, On runs of consecutive quadratic residues
and quadratic nonresidues, (extended version of the paper with
the same title) LSU Computer Science Technical Report 83-017.
D. A. Buell, The new cryptography, LSU Computer Science Technical
Report 82-022.
D. A. Buell, Some factorings from the Cunningham Table, LSU Computer
Science Technical Report 82-013.
L. J. Waguespack and D. A. Buell, A language for the specification of software directly as trees, LSU Computer Science Technical Report
82-005.
K. S. Williams and D. A. Buell, Is there an octic reciprocity law of Scholz
type?, The American Mathematical Monthly, v. 85, 1978, pp. 483484.
Students Supervised, 2000-present:
Connor Bain, B.S.C.S. Honors Thesis 2015, joint supervision with H. R.
Cooley.
Richard Walker, Ph.D. 2014, joint supervision with H. R. Cooley.
Andrew Ball, B.S.C.S. Honors Thesis 2013, Augmented Reality for Ghosts
of the Horseshoe).
John Hodgson, M.S. 2012, Desperate Fishwives: History Simulation for
Teaching Early Modern British History.
Maliek McKnight, B.S.C.S. Honors Thesis 2012.
Xizhou Feng, Ph.D. 2006, High performance, Bayesian-based phylogenetic
inference framework.
Soumya Ragunathan, M.S. 2005, Snort processing on a reconfigurable computer.
Heather Wake, B.S. Honors Thesis 2004, Porting EDIF netlists for congruential sieves to the Viva environment.
Feng Yue, M.S. 2003, A parallel implementation of UPGMA algoritm.
Pradeep Kancharla, M.S. 2003, The Advanced Encryption Standard on a
reconfigurable computer.
Other Selected Presentations:

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Seminar presentations on critical interactives with Dr. H. R. Cooley: Coastal

Carolina University, September 2014; Wake Forest University, February 2013; University of North Carolina Asheville, February 2013;
University of Arizona, October 2012.
Invited panel presentation, Election Verification Network annual conference,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, March 2012.
Seminar presentations on gaming and the humanities, with Dr. H. R. Cooley,
Georgia Tech, February 2012.
Invited lecture, Discrete Mathematics and Algorithms conference, Clemson
University, October 2010.
Visiting Lectures, Department of Mathematics, University of Florida, November 2010.
Tutorial, SC2006 (Supercomputing), Tampa, Florida, November 2006.
Keynote address, Reconfigurable Systems Summer Institute, NCSA, Urbana,
Illinois, July 2006.
Tutorial, SC2005 (Supercomputing), Seattle, Washington, November 2005.
Keynote address, Reconfigurable Systems Summer Institute, NCSA, Urbana,
Illinois, July 2005.
Seminar presentation in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, United States Military Academy, West Point, New
York, 24 February 2005.
Seminar presentation in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York, 10 February 2005.
Panel presentation, Ohio Supercomputer Center, Springfield, Ohio, 5 October 2004.
Seminar presentation in the Department of Computer Science, University of
New Orleans, 30 September 2004.
Seminar presentation in the Department of Computer Science, University of
Pittsburgh, November 2004.
Tutorial, SC2004 (Supercomputing), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November
2004.
Tutorial, SC2003 (Supercomputing), Phoenix, Arizona, November 2003.
Tutorial, SC2002 (Supercomputing), Baltimore, Maryland, November 2002.
Tutorial on reconfigurable computing, MAPLD 2003, Washington, DC, September 2003.
Phoenix 2001 Conference on Information Warfare, Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 2001.

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Institute for Mathematics and its Applications Workshop on Data Mining

and Industrial Applications Minneapolis, Minnesota, November,
1996.
Invited address, Canadian Number Theory Association, Ottawa, Ontario,
August, 1996.
Invited address, Third FPGA/PLD Design Conference, Tokyo, Japan, July,
1995.
Technology 2002 (National Technology Transfer Conference), Baltimore, Maryland, December, 1992.
Fourth ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures, San
Diego, California, June, 1992.
Fall Lecturer, Oregon Council for Advanced Technology Education, Corvallis
EugenePortland, October 1990.
Invited panel presentation, Frontiers of Supercomputing II, Los Alamos, New
Mexico, August 1990.
Invited short talk at the Regional Meeting of the American Mathematical
Society, Mobile, Alabama, May 1985.
Eleventh Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, June 1984.
Fourteenth Manitoba Conference on Numerical Mathematics and Computing, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 1984.
Invited talk at the Sino-American Symposium on Fuzzy Mathematics and
Analysis with Applications to Electric Power Systems, Beijing, China,
July 1984.
Fifteenth Southeastern Conference on Combinatorics, Graph Theory, and
Computing, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, March 1984.
Invited short talk at the Annual Meeting of the American Mathematical
Society, Denver, Colorado, January 1983.
Invited short talk at the Summer Meeting of the American Mathematical
Society, Toronto, Ontario, August 1982.
Fifth Annual ACM SIGIR Conference, Berlin, Germany, May 1982.
Eleventh Manitoba Conference on Numerical Mathematics and Computing,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 1981.
Fourth Annual ACM SIGIR Conference, Oakland, California, May-June
1981.
Invited address at the Eighth Manitoba Conference on Numerical Mathematics and Computing, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 1978.

Page 72 of 79
Marks Appeal 12.4.16 Exhibit H

1/2
DUNCAN A. BUELL
PROFESSOR
NCR CHAIR IN COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING
December 4, 2016
Mecklenberg County Board of Elections

I am writing again to emphasize the importance of a detailed analysis of the iVotronic
election data to ensure that votes were cast as intended and then counted as cast.
I have specifically been looking at the Marion Diehl EL152 file and the absentee
reporting data from that polling place.
10/27/2016 1175 1169

10/28/2016 1077 1071
10/29/2016
704
692
10/30/2016
347
346
10/31/2016
822
809
11/01/2016 1041 1030
11/02/2016 1112 1103
11/03/2016 1476 1457
11/04/2016 2070 2057
11/05/2016 1220 1201
TOTALS 11044 10935
6
6
12
1
13
11
9
19
13
19
109
6
12
24
25
38
49
58
77
90
109
There are 11047 names in the absentee reporting file (from the state website). Two names
were cancelled and one not voted, leaving the 11044 in the second column of the
table above. The third column counts the vote cast events from the EL152 file. This
total of 10935 includes 10928 Vote cast by voter (code 1510) and 7 Vote cast by poll
worker events. There are in addition 13 vote cancelled events.
The fourth column lists the differences. These could indeed be fleeing voters, but my
understanding is that Marion Diehl runs for the most part with a line for checking in but
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29208

Page 73 of 79
EMAIL: BUELL@ACM.ORG
803-777-7848 FAX 803-777-3767
Marks Appeal 12.4.16 Exhibit H

2/2
then voters who have checked in are immediately taken to iVotronic machines; there is
no second queue. This would make the act of fleeing rather unusual. In my experience in
observing polls, even with a second queue for getting to the voting machine after
checking in, the number of fleeing voters is nearly an order of magnitude smaller than the
one percent observed here.
One would hope that it would be possible to reconcile these counts. Is it the case that in
all voting locations one observes the same frequency of fleeing voters? This would seem
to be an important question to answer.
Sincerely,
Duncan A. Buell
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29208

Page 74 of 79
EMAIL: BUELL@ACM.ORG
803-777-7848 FAX 803-777-3767
Marks Appeal 12.4.16

Original Notice to Mecklenburg
1/5
Exhibit I
APPEAL OF ELECTION PROTEST TO STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Use of this form is required by G. S. 163-182.11(a)
LY
A copy of this appeal must be given to the county board of elections within 24 hours (weekends and
holidays excluded) after the county board files its written decision at its office. This same appeal must be
filed with or mailed to the State Board of Elections by the end of the second day following the county
board decision if the protest involves a first primary. As to a protest of any other election, this appeal must
be filed or deposited in the mail by the end of the fifth day following the county board decision. See G.S.
163-182.11(a). A copy of the original election protest form with attachments must be filed with this appeal.
A copy of the county board decision must be filed with this appeal. The county board will provide the
record on appeal. As many additional sheets as are necessary to answer the questions below may be
attached, but they must be numbered. Please print or type your answers.
PE
AL
N
O NO
T
T
FI IC
N E
AL O
N
1. Full name, mailing address, home and business phone, fax number, and e-mail address of undersigned.
Marilyn R. Marks
7035 Marching Duck Drive E504
Charlotte, NC 28210
2. Are you the person who filed the original protest, a candidate or office holder adversely affected by the
county decision, or someone else whose interest has been adversely affected by the county decision?
Yes. As a Mecklenburg County voter, my interests are adversely affected by the knowing violation
of election law, when basic required testing of the electronic voting system on which I voted is not
performed. Candidates who I support are subject to recount, whose interests are being harmed
by this decision.
3. State the date, place, kind of election, and results of the election protested (if different from the
information on the election and its results as set out in the attached original protest form).
11/8/16 General election. See State Board of Elections website for unofficial results.
Mecklenburg County, with possible implications for numerous counties using iVotronics
machines.
AP
4. State the name, mailing address, home phone, and business phone of all candidates involved in the
protested election.
Protest concerns the impact on all candidates on the statewide ballot, and all candidates on the
ballot in Mecklenburg County.
5. State the date of the county board hearing.
There was no hearing. Protest dismissed without permitting my comment or rebuttal. Board
meeting began at 5pm on November 28, 2016.
6. State the legal and factual basis for your appeal.
The Mecklenburg Board of Elections wrongly concluded that there was no evidence of violation of
election law, irregularity or misconduct. (Board findings--Exhibit A, page 1) The county officials
acted in knowing violation of the law requiring a test of paper records, and in direct violation of
clear legislative intent of this requirement.

Page 75 of 79

2/5
Exhibit I
On November 28, 2016 the Mecklenburg Board of Elections improperly dismissed my protest
regarding its failure to undertake required post-election testing of its iVotronics voting system
against the paper records for the presidential vote choices. Protest and supporting documents
are attached at Exhibit B. (Exhibit B contains several redundant records as many identical
records were included in my related protests and request for reconsideration.)
LY
163-182.5(b) provides that prior to canvassing, the board must determine, based on the sample
count, whether the electronic records are reliable as a basis for tabulation for canvass of returns.
On November 22 the board acknowledged that they had not reviewed the audit sample returns or
considered this decision as a pre-canvassing issue. They maintained that the issue of reviewing
the sample count had nothing to do with the counting or tabulation of the election, and any
decision could be deferred until after canvass. I protested that decision as well.
PE
AL
N
O NO
T
T
FI IC
N E
AL O
N
The determination of the method of tabulation for canvassing is to be based on the results of
sample counts of the paper records. No such sample counts were undertaken or attempted. The
only case in which the law permits the electronic record to be used for such testing is when the
paper record has been lost or destroyed or where there is another reasonable basis to conclude
that the hand-to-eye count is not the true count.
(163-182.1(b)(1))
Mecklenburg Election Department concluded in advance of reviewing the VVPAT records that
such records were unusable for testing on the hypothetical basis that a paper jam may have
occurred at a precinct, thereby rendering all paper records from the voting site unusual for
purposes of sample counting. The Mecklenburg Board concluded that the attached note from the
State Board (Exhibit Apage 2) granted permission to use electronic records for all required
sample counts in lieu of paper records upon the mere occurrence of any paper jam, the
frequency or significance of the malfunction, or whether the jam damaged the record to be tested.
It is exceedingly unlikely that paper jams materially undermined the reliability of all records at the
selected voting sites.
During the November 18 Mecklenburg board meeting, Director Dickerson claimed that he had
obtained written permission from the State Board to use electronic records in lieu of prescribed
paper records based on the attached email memo, regarding unrelated circumstances in
Alamance County. (Exhibit C, page 86/108 of attachments)
AP
The board finding inaccurately states that the state board authorized the use of the electronic
image log for sample count when there has been a paper jam on one of the machines. The one
sentence advisory note from the State Board, dated November 21, (well after the sample count),
is stated under the condition that the paper record (RTAL) is unusable. There is no finding of
any paper record being examined or declared unusable in Mecklenburg County.
Only after the discussion of my protests in two meetings did the staff attempt to locate any
evidence of paper jams. That evidence produced (Exhibit Apages 3-4), shows no evidence of
loss of, or destruction of, or significant damage to the records to be tested,-- only that some sort
of paper jam occurred at the voting location. The records at issue were not even examined by
staff or the Board. Even if some paper records were damaged to the point of being unusable, the
substitution of the electronic record should only be used for the specific machine producing
materially inaccurate paper records. All other machines should be tested using the paper records.
The Mecklenburg Board improperly failed to test the available and legible paper records in
accordance with 163-182.1(b)(1), instead relying on the hypothetical possibility that a record
might be damaged, in order to excuse themselves from testing the source paper record. No
documented evidence was presented that even one record was unusable. It defies imagination
that two entire voting sites paper records are unusable for every machine for the reportedly
11,000 ballots cast.

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3/5
Exhibit I
If hypothetical theories are permitted to declare election records unusable, the electronic
records for iVotronics tabulation are subject to many more dangerous and pervasive theories of
damage and unreliability than paper records. The board had no basis to rely on the electronic
record for testing based on the false notion that a paper jam destroys the integrity of the paper
records, without any evidence of such a single occurrence.
LY
The Boards findings state that in prior elections Mecklenburg has used the electronic record in
lieu of the paper record for testing when a paper jam occurred. This is consistent with Director
Dickersons claims that the electronic record has not been tested against the paper record in
post-election testing for years. He also asserted that all iVotronics counties use the electronic
record, not the paper record.
PE
AL
N
O NO
T
T
FI IC
N E
AL O
N
It appears that there is no attempt at substantial compliance with the statute or the legislative
intent of requiring such testing. In fact, the bulk of the arguments made by staff related to how
long it takes to test the paper record, and the man hours involved. The illogical excuse of a paper
jam is nothing more than an effort to circumvent the statute, and should be viewed as a
serious act of misconduct by officials.
7. Is there any material submitted with this appeal that was not presented to and considered by the county
board? Is so, please identify and state why it was not presented to the county board. Why do you think the
State Board of Elections should consider it?
All material presented in this appeal was forwarded to the Mecklenburg County Board of
Elections office, and to Michael Dickerson, Director. I have no way of knowing whether they were
all presented to the full board or considered by the board.
The issue is central to how the votes should be counted in electronic voting machine counties-whether a hand count of the VVPAT paper record, or the electronic count should control. This
determination is required be made by each county board as a preliminary part of the canvassing
of returns (163-182.5(b). If county boards, such as Mecklenburg, have not undertaken and
evaluated the required test of the electronic record, there is no basis to rely on that electronic
record.
AP
Mecklenburgs, and possibly other counties, decisions that the paper record is unusable for
counting has major negative implications for any recounts at a state or local level. This
unsubstantiated claim of unusable records denies the recount candidate the ability to undertake
and rely on sample counts of the paper recorda right granted to him/her in the recount statutes.
The State Board of Elections should insist that no such claims of unusable records be made if
not fully investigated and documented by the county board.
8. Normally the State Board will make its decision in an appeal based upon the record from the county
board. If you desire the record in this matter to be supplemented, additional evidence to be considered, or a
completely new hearing, please state such desire and why it should be allowed in this appeal. See G.S.
163-182.11 (b).
There has been no hearing. The issue has been discussed at board meetings on November 18
and 21, but without sworn testimony, rebuttal and complete fact finding. I would like a hearing on
the record before the State Board of Elections. A hearing before the State Board is appropriate
considering the presumed multi-county nature of the issue and the impact on upcoming recounts.
The board the attached Dismissal and findings at the November 28 meeting (Exhibit A).
Because the board would not permit me to ask the question, I do not know what they have
included in the record forwarded to the state. I have attached my filings with the Mecklenburg
Board, (Exhibit B) which should all be considered as part of the record.

Page 77 of 79

4/5
Exhibit I
I also request that my November 20, 2016 request to the State Board of Elections for a multicounty investigation be included a part of the record. It is important for the State Board,
candidates, and voters to know whether the touchscreen electronic records were tested as
required in the counties using such machines. It would be inappropriate for the State Board to
proceed with certification of the election without the required tests of voting machines.
The white paper forwarded to the Mecklenburg Board by Dr. Duncan Buell (Exhibit D) should be
included in the record. The paper speaks to the vulnerability of the electronic files in iVotronic
machines and why testing is necessary. He also references his discussions with Mecklenburg
County staff.
LY
9. What relief do you seek? Why?
PE
AL
N
O NO
T
T
FI IC
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N
1. Mecklenburg County should be instructed to conduct the testing of the VVPAT records, as
required by 163-182.1(b)(1). If such testing indicates a significant discrepancy because the
individual paper vote records have been damaged, lost, or for some other reason proven to be
unusable, the board should document this fact, and why it must rely on the electronic records for
a sample count. The county board should also document which specific machines are tested
using paper versus electronic records.
2. If Mecklenburg Countys assertions are accurate that the paper record testing was
circumvented in all iVotronics counties, the state board should require that the required testing
take place immediately, prior to the State Board certification of the results. Any material
discrepancies should be reported to the State Board. The State Board should set the standard
for determination of materiality.
In both cases, when a paper record for the presidential vote choices in the sample group order by
the State Board is damaged enough to render it unusable, the electronic record should only be
substituted for the paper record for that particular machine, and only when the discrepancy is
significant in relation to the entire sites vote count.
The vulnerability of iVotronics electronic records was demonstrated in the 2004 Carteret County
election, and has been thoroughly and repeatedly documented by experts. The requirement for
paper record testing was passed by the legislature in 2005 in response to Carteret County and
similar problems. The need for testing of the record has been repeatedly proven. Given the many
close races and the national attention on hacking concerns and claims, election officials should
not circumvent required testing in the 2016 election.
AP
10. Have you read and reviewed G.S. 163-182.11 through G.S. 163-182.14 and the current North Carolina
State Board of Elections regulations on appeals of election protests?_Yes.
11. Besides a copy of the original protest and the county board decisions, this appeal includes 108 pages of
additional answers (Exhibits) and_-0- pages of exhibits and documents not included in the original protest
and decision.
_______________________________
Signature of Person Appealing
11/29/16
________________
Date Appeal Signed
Date appeal received by State Board of Elections

_________________________________________
(To be entered by the State Board of Elections staff)

Page 78 of 79
updated in
Marks Appeal
12.4.16

5/5
Exhibit I
AP
PE
AL
N
O NO
T
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AL O
N
LY
Send your appeal to, or it you have questions contact: North Carolina State Board of Elections, P.O. Box
27255, Raleigh, NC 27611-7255, (919) 733-7173.

Page 79 of 79

Marks Appeal Mecklenburg Protest 12.4.16

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Marks Appeal Mecklenburg Protest 12.4.16

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APPEAL OF ELECTION PROTEST TO STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Use of this form is required by G. S. 163-182.11(a)

my protest. (Board findings--Exhibit A, page 1; ProtestExhibit B.) The county

the statute, and should be viewed as a serious act of misconduct committed by

9. What relief do you seek? Why?

Date appeal received by State Board of Elections

Marks Appeal Exhibit A

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks Appeal Exhibit A

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks Appeal Exhibit A

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks Appeal Exhibit A

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B

Request for Reconsideration of Decision to Stay Protest Proceedings

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B

Marks Request for Reconsideration 11.20.16

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B

Marks Request for Reconsideration 11.20.16

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

Marks Election Protest

704 552 1618

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

704 552 1618

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

EXAMPLE EL155 printout from 11/7/14 SC election.

CANDIDATES RECEIVING A VOTE

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

5101642 7 30 Kyle Herbert

CANDIDATES RECEIVING A VOTE

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

Marks Appeal12.4.16 Exhibits

Req. for Reconsideration

Friday, November 18, 2016 at 12:03:52 PM Eastern Standard Time

Subject: Fwd: Ques*ons on North Carolina recount and audit statutes

---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Wright, Don <don.wright@ncsbe.gov>

Req. for ReconsiderationPage 1 of 6

Marks 12.4.16 Appeal Exhibit B Exhibit A to Marks Req. Reconsideration

NC State Board of Elec*ons

Thank you again for your assistance.