2

$2.00

MOVES nr. 2 published April 1972

Designers
. Notes
General Editor
Co-Editor/Executive Art Director
Art Director
Managing Editor
Research Director
Associate Editors

Some ti me this year, most probably before

June. we will be publishing games at the "rate"
of 30 a year Itwo Simulations Series games
every month plus one in S&T every two
months). Many of these games a re already in
the pipeline. A regular feature of Designer's
Notes will be to keep you posted on our
progress.

James F. Dunnigan
Redmond A. Simonsen
Manfred F. Milkuhn
Lenny Glynn
Albert A. Nofi
John M. Young, Stephen B. Patrick

1972 Simulations Publications, Inc. Printed in U.S .A. All rights

reserved. All editorial and general mail should be addressed to Simulations Publications, Inc . 44
East 23rd St .. New York 10010. One year subscriptions (six issues) are available for $7 .00. Back
issues or Single copies of the current issue are available at $2.00 per copy. Please pay by check or
money order only.

MOVES Magazine is copyright

Printing by Reflex Offset, Inc.; presswork by John Banks. Bindi ng by Apollo Binders.

In this issue...

page

Game Profile: Battle of Stalingrad

by Lenny Glynn

Why Some Games Never Materialize

by AI bert A. Nofi

11

Gustavus Adolphus' Contribution to War

by James F. Dunnigan

12

Adding Realism to Armor

by Stephen B. Patrick

13

),

Simulations and Education

by AI bert A. Nofi

14

Some Panzerblitz Optional Rules

by Steven List

16

Panzerblitz Revisited

by George G. Hopp

18

Idiocy pr Reality

by D. J. Govostes

20

Gamespeak

by Redmond A. Simonsen

22

Anschluss

by Stephen B. Patric k

26

Game Review: Leipzig

by James M. Flanagan

28

Limited Intelligence

by Lenny Glynn

FEEDBACK

Simulations Publications. Inc . 44 East 23rd Street, New York. N.Y. 10010

On the cover: A detail of a Battle of Stalingrad game in play.

30
31

Games currently in "deve lopment" are The

Moscow Campaign. Borodino, 1812, Soldiers
ITactical, 1914-15). Winter War. FrancoPrussian War and secon d editions of 1914
Revision and Tannenberg. As is our pol icy.
eac h of these games attempts to treat its
subject as a un iq ue event. This means that each
game has special d esi gn features.
The Moscow Campaign covers much of the
same ground covered in The Battle of Moscow
published in S& T 24. The treatment is. however, quite different. For one thing , the scale
and basic mechanics are similar to those foun!'!in Kursk. The Battle for France: 1940 (S&T
27) and The Battle of Stalingrad. This , of
cou rse, is a perfect exam p Ie of one game
system being quite usable fo r an entire series
of games. In this case a series of games
covering World War II division leve l battles of
no more than a few weeks d uration and not
exceed ing an Army Group (about 40 divisions)
on each side. Within this fra mework there can
be considerable variation. This vari abi lity is
needed even in situa tions containing th e same
basic elements. A change in only a few
seemingly minor aspects can change things
considerably . Let us consider, for example,
The Moscow Campaign. In both Kursk and the
Battle of Stalingrad, Russian infantry units
were represented as corps. I n the Moscow
Campaign. Russian infant ry appear in divisions. This came about because of conditions
in the following areas; time and space factors,
comma nd and control and the cohesion of
Russian units during the campaign. Corps level
units were simply not justified. Movement,
supply and combat resolution systems were
a lso modified. Airpower was non-existent as a
critical factor and was thus ignored. T he
weather WAS a critical factor and had to be
given major consideration throughout the
design of The Moscow Campaign. In addition
to t he weather there was another mai or facto r.
the exhaustion of the German units during th is
phase of t he campaign.

The basic question to be answered in the game

was. of course, whether or not the Germans
could have taken Moscow and/or smashed the
Russian armies raised for its defense. As long
as this question is considered intelligently and
resolved effectively the game can be co nsidered a success. Our ea rlier Battle of Moscow
game covered much th e same g rou nd (al though
il included the Leningrad area alsol. It did so
quite well. Whether or not th e Moscow Campaig n game does th is better may be like try ing
to compare apples to pears. They are two
diffe rent games with much to be learned from
both, be it from a p laye r's or a designer's po int
of view.

3
Borodino will be pub l ished in issu e 32 of S& T
(M ay , '72) , The game is a division level
re-creation of the French-Russian bloodbath
during the 1812 cam p aign, It was one of those
battl es wh ieh N apoleon won at a cost greate r
th an he co u Id af ford. Best of a II , we were able
to use the sa me game syste m used in our
highly popular Napoleon at Waterloo game.
Some minor modificat io ns were ms de. In
addi t ion the area and f orces covered was more
than t w ice t hat at Waterloo. T h is ma kes f or a
b it more complexit y (i n terms of quantity, not
qu alit y). Sti l l, th e game is short, easy to grasp
and 'fast moving w ith the end in doubt th ro ughout th e game ,
T he 1812 game w i II be handled in a rathe r
unique fashi o n. We ended up developi ng TWO
1812 games. One used the same gam e system
fo r Napo leon ic warfa re f o u nd in Leipzig. T he
"other " 1812 game used a new game system
which co ncentra ted on the supply difficul t ies
of t he campaign. When pu blished , t he 1812
game wi ll con sisr of two separate games , both
of d ifferent desi gn app roac h. 1812 w i II sell for
$10 (i t is, in effect, si mply t wo $5 gam es being
501 d together) , The feedb ac k we receive on
these t w o games w ill help us determ ine which
design fea t ures are most effective.

Soldiers i s a tacti ca l (company) level game of

Wor ld War I {19 14-15}. This on e had more
t han i t s sha re of prob lems, wh ich seems to be
norma l for most World War I games. The
central p roblem in this game was the inter
action' of the mach in e gun and arti l lery (whi ch
caused most of the casua lt ies) and the main
combat f orce, the inf antry (which took most

of the casualties). Wo rld War I began as a

slaugh t er and didn't change much as time went
on. We f ou nd that thsre were som e interesti ng
situat ions, battles in which the dying poten tial
of ths infant ry was less than t he k i ll ing
potential of t he machine gun!arti llery combi
nation. After putting together and t est ing
so m e 4 0-odd (some very odd) sce nario s we
came ' Up wit h ab out a dozen good ones. These
incl ud ed on e wi th the Japanese and British
age i nst t he Germans and Austro H ungar i ans i n
China (it real ly happened ). Out of it all we
produced a rather interesting game, I ncluded
a re u n i ts represent i ng British, French,
J a p anese, Be lgi an , Austro-Hu ngarian and
Ru ssian troops.
The Winter War game was designed by someone ou t side au r own staff. T h is was 0 ne of the
last ga mes we accepTed bef ore dec i ding to do
al l games "i n-hou se" (when you're pay ing
close to $100 ,000 s yea r f or people t o design
games wou ld you ha ve it any other way7). T he
Winter War cove rs t he strug gl e between Sovi et
Russia and Finland dur i ng t he winter of
1939/40. I t was actually two different wars. In
the south there was a b loody war of attrit ion
on t he Mannerheim Lin e, The R ussians eventually won by sheer weight of nu mbers. Up
no rt h th e st ill -ou tn umb ered Fin ns outmaneuve red a nd bea t t he Russia ns at every tu rn. The
war ended in a marginal Russi an victory, a
stalemate. We had to do co nsiderable work on
the game to clean up th e mechan ics.
The Franco-Prussian War game w as so met h i ng
of a design breakthrough. For th is game we
develo ped a w or kab le "hidden-movemen t "

system wh ich keeps both pl ay ers i n t he dark

abo ut the "exact" location of thei r opponent's
forces. Th is was don e t h ro ugh the use of
in verted counters, a smal l nu mber of "dum my" counters and having al l t he units on each
side m ove at t he same speed (quite reasonabl e
for a strategic ga me). This system has wo rk ed
so well th at we wi l l use it fo r an enti re series of
Civil War games. The one thing preve nting the
pub lication of realist ic , stra tegic level Civ i l War
games has been the Iack of an effect ive method
of re-c reating t he "fog" th at proved so critical
during t hese campaigns. Ou r new "hidd en
movement" system solves this prob lem thus
allowing f or a whole new li ne of games.
Final ly, we have revised Tannenberg and t he
19 14 Rflvision. T he new 1914 Revision has a
complete set of ru les, plus a set of cou nters.
The new Tan nenberg is, as before, compati b le
w ith the 1914 Revision. Min or ch ange s have
been m ad e in both games t o clean t hem up.
T he long-awa ited War In The East (a/ k/ a
Sta l ingrad II) will have to wa it a while l onger.
Lo sing no ne of its potenti al as a long last ing
pain-in-the-ass, War In The East was delayed
th is t i me by t he disappearance of a sta'ff
memb er with m ost of the game. The material
fi na lly ca me back (without t he forme r staff
member ). In t he mean time we decided tha t t he
design of the game wasn't what we wanted it
to be after al l an d t hus decided to re-des ign t he
damn game. T his may t ake a while. Anyway,
the artwo rk f or the 46 i neh by 56 inch (fou r
part ) boa rd is virtua l ly complet ed and most of
t he bas ic resea rch is don e. M aybe we'll get it
out by June. Maybe. We'll keep y ou informed.

(con tinued on pagfl 15)

Korea
The Mobile War: 1950-51
The Korean War is best k now n as a bloody,
indecisive stalemate re mi niscent ot t he F irst
World Wa r. Bu t for almost a year, at t he height
of the Co ld War, a dynamic, seesaw struggle
was waged in t hat sma ll Asian pen insul a
between Un it ed Nations and Co m muni st
f orces. Korea covers t h is earl y, mobile stage of
th e war. T he Invasio n Game (25 Ju ne to 21
September, 1950) begins with the North
Koree n Peoples' Army driving it s South
Korean counterpart reel ing t oward the vit al
port of Pusan, The I ntervention Game (26
Novem ber to 27 Janu ary 1951) shows t he
startling impact of t he Chinese counteroffensive that drove Un ited Nat ions forces
from Nort h Korea. The St alemate Game (28
January to 23 June , 195 1) shows the development o f th e situat ion that last ed till t he en d of
the war as UN forces slowly grind the co mmu nists back toward the 38th para ll el. The
Campaign Game incl udes all three. Die-cut
cou nters represent all the forces that too k part
in the original campaign. There are counters
provid i ng for naval gunfire, sea t ransport ,
amphibious landings, fort if ications and supply.
A specia l rule accounts fo r the amaz ing infi lt ration tact ics of the Ch inese armies. Ava ilable
from Simu lat ions Pu blications fo r $5.00.

Division level game of the Korean " police action"

N ava l gu nfire and amp hibious' invasions offset . .. .
. . Special inflltration tactics of Chinese armies.

GAME PROFILE:

s~iBatt~a
by Lenny Glynn and Bill Sullivan
The Banle of Stalingrad is widely regarded as
the decisive struggle of the Second World War.
The battle is so famous that Avalon Hi ll used it
for the title of one their most popular games.
Yet AH '5 Stalingrad, like Simulatiorls' Barbar
ossa covers the whole Eastern Front; in either
game the city of Stalingrad may be bypassed
or captured by a single die roll. Simulation's
latest World War Two game, The Battle of
Stalingrad concentrates Orl the battle itself.
The game fully covers the Soviet Winter
Offensive that resulted in the surrender of
Sixth Army in the ruins of Stalingrad.
Battle af Stalingrad is a two player game on

the Grarld Tactical level. One Player commands German,Rumanian, Italian, and Hungar.
iarl units (divisions): the other commands
Soviet units (corps) .
The Stalingrad situation holds a unique histori
cal flavor; it was the turning paint of the war
in the East and probably of the whole Euro
pea n co nfl ict. Because of the semi-legendary
nature of the battle , the game is particularly
informative. It shows for example, how great a
gamble the Soviets took by launching their
Winter Offensive before it was fully prepared.
Even in the historical scenario (19 November
1942) , irI wh ich German u nit placement is
literally insane, the Germans have a fair chance
of breaking loose from Stalingrad and inflict
ing a serious defeat on the Soviet Player. To
duplicate the effect of Hitler's "stand fast"
orders, a special optional rule on "German
Insanity" requires the German Player to remain in his fortified lines for one full turn
regardless of whether t he Russians are sur
round ing him or not.
The conflict mechanics of Battle of Stalingrad
are based on the highly successful systems used
in Kursk and France '40. Movement pena lties
fo r entering or leaving zones of control very
effectively recreate the difficulties of disengagirlg from the line or preparing for an attack.
Supply is critical and lack of supply has a
sharp and immediate effect on combat and
movement. Air units and a full set of rules for
all air missions are included. Air units are
particularly necessary 'to break through forti
fied lines. The Combat Results Table. like that
in Kursk, requires very high odds (9-1 with air
support) before assuring the Attacker of the
destruction of opposing units. This, plus the
supply rules tend to limit the number of
attack s and force the players to maneuver to
threaten Enemy supply lines, rather than bash
headon until one has "eliminated" enough
Enemy units to call it a victory. Armored units
and Soviet cavalry have two Movement Phases
per turn which enables them to exploit arlY
gaps in enemy Ii rles. In all sixteen scenar ios in
Battle of Stalingrad, breakthroughs are inevitable and make for exciting games. Victories are

based on the destruction of enemy units and

t he conquest of territory.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Battle

of StBlingrad is the Game Problem it presents
to the players. Basically the game involves the
formation and tearing apart of huge pockets.
The Soviet player must seek to "bag" as much
as possible of the German forces because that
cuts their supplies and reduces their Combat
strength by 50%. The German must carefully
and economically slide out of the pocket with
his armor, tum around and destroy the Soviet
armor. Th is rna kes for seesaw ga mes as the
Russians form a pocket and strive to keep it
shut while the Germans squirm inside the
Soviet straightjacket, brea k free and strike
back.
This is true for the 19 November Historical
Scenario. I n other variants of the November 19
game there is free deployment of units; i.e. the
Germans are not required to set themselves up
for disaster. These unrestricted set-ups develop
into mobile free-far-ails in which the Germans
have. as much chance as the Russians t o form a
large pocket.
I n the scenarios beginning December 16, t he
pocket at Stalingrad is already formed. In fact,
the German player is hard prlssed to prevent
the Russiarls f rom forming another pocket and
trapping his remaining forces. Here the German plays a beleagured defender who cannot
afford to make a serious mistake. Unless the
Russian blunders there is no real hope of
relieving the pocket. Besides the six November
a nd four December scenarios which last 7
Game-turns there are six 21turn Campaign
Games running the whole course of the Battle.
Scenarios vary in the freedom or fixedrless of
initia l set-up and irl the rates of re inforcement
received by opposirlg players.
I n the following section we will demonstrate
the tactics of Battle af Stalingrad based on
what we have found in months of testing to be
"optimal" moves. The scenario used will be
the November 19 one as shown on the setup
map included In the game. The tact ica l principles used are applicab le to all othe r scenarios.
A brief discussion of the December 16 Historical scerlario f ollows to illustrate strategy in an
entirely different situation ; the German holding action that enabled Army Group A to
escape from the Caucasus.
In the November 19th Historical Scenario the
RU5siari player attempts to take the offensive.
He has six armor and four cavalry units against
a force consisting of eight German and th ree
Allied armor units. He has seven 55 infantry
Corps while his opPorient has twenty 3-5's.
His whole force consists of 110 poi nts of
infantry and 55 points of motorized cavalry

and armor. The German Player has 89 infant ry

points and 45 poims of more mobile armor.
The Russian Player is in an excellent position
at the start of the game (see diagra m 1). This
position is his major advantage. If this position
is properly exploited, he can encircle the main
body of the German force in the First turn,
nul lify much of the combat strength of the
German player and force him to concentrate
Orl escaping the pocket irlstead of destroying
Russian units. If the German player reacts too
slowly the Russian has a chance to tighten the
encircle ment and even trap much of the
German armor. But if this position is not used
properly, the Russian player finds himself
being cut up in open batt le with the German.
To beat the German the Russian must encircle
him, but merely encircling t he German doesn't
mean the Russian's WOri. If the pocket doesn't
hold for the first turrl or two the German will
win. I f it does hold the Russian still has a fight
in front of him.
First Game Turn
Russian First Movement Phase.
There are moves that must be made so th at the
infantry will be in position to support the
armor after the pocket is formed. The two 3-4s
in the North are moved out of t he Fortified
line so t hat they can move into the German
Fortified line next turn. The 55 in front of
Stalingrad is moved out so that it can close in
next to Stalingrad on th e next Game Turn and
pin all the German infantry in the city. The
5-5 First turn reinforcement is moved up to
hel p pi n the Germans in Stal ingrad.
Russian Combat Phase
The attacks are given in chart form below. The
hexes attacked are lettered on diagram 1.
SOViet

Attacks

On

First Game-Turn

..,.c

~g,
E .,
0"
Hex CJli)
A
B

C
0

E
F

...

Air

Odds

17-2 yes 9-1

91
9-1
71
12-2 yes 81
122 yes 81
6-1
no 81

20-2 yes
181 yes
19-3 yes

'5

&!'"

German
losses

Ex

Ex

two 145 one 3-4

two 145 one 3-4
one 1~5
one 5-5
one 50S
one 3-5
two 145 one 3-4

Ex

two 1-45 one 3-4

Ex
Ex
Ex

Russian
losses

Sf

Explarlations:
Combat Strength - The Combat Strengths of
the units involved, given as an AttackerDefender ratio.
Air - Whether or not an air unit is used to
support that partic ular attack.
Odds - The actual odds for the attack, taking
into accoum the First Turn Surprise Rule
which benef its the Russia ns.
Result - The outcome of the Attack . (For the
Purposes of this demonstration we have
assumed the worst possible.
Russian Second Movement Phase
The armor is moved out from the hexes it
occupies after combat to surround the main
body of Germans. Although much of the
Russian armor moves ou t of supp ly and may
sao n be isolated, there is no other way to
encircle the German. To meet the German in
the open. supplied, is suicide.
(continued on page 8)

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29" with a playing surface 20" x 21". Also

included on the mapsheet are the Soviet and
Axis Order of Battle and Reinforcement charts
and the Combat Results Table.

November 19th historical scenario and explaining the games sixteen scenarios and Order of
Battle options.
The mapsheet for Battle of Stalingrad is 22" x

Rules for Battle of Sta/ingrad are printed on

both sides of an 11" x 28" accordion-fold
sheet. They are supplemented by a set-up sheet
showing the initial position of units in the

OOI-:>HoI_

0)

SOVIET MOVEMENT
-

= 1 st Movement Phase

- - - = 2nd Movement Phase

Diagram 1: Position at start of Game. lettered hexes mark Soviet attacks.

Diagram 2: Soviet armor seals the pocket .on its 2nd Movement Phase after Combat.

Diagram 3: German attempt to relieve Stalingrad.

Diagram 4: Soviet infantry moves up as armor tightens the pocket.

GERMAN MOVEMENT
= 1 st Movement Phase
..... = 2nd Movement Phase

.. - -

SOVIET MOVEMENT
== 1 st Movement ,Phase
:= 2nd Movement Phase
"-l

8
The first 96 unit moves to link up with the
7-6 units on the opposi te side of the Don River
and complete the poc ket , )'Vhile th e second 9-6
unit moves to pin the German armo r in
Stalingrad. The four 7-6 units and two 3-3
cavalry units in the north form a solid barrier
through which the German ca nnot hope to
break out.
German First Movement Phase
The German Player knows that he must break
out of the pocket a nd get back on equal
footing with the Ru ssian. He first moves
several 3-5s out of his fortified line to keep the
pocket large enough to gain him some
maneuvering room: He moves the 3-5 unit
from Stal ingrad out into the Russian Fortified
line to prevent the Russian from sealing off the
city with his two 5-5 units_ He then brings his
armor out of the city as fa r as possible to move
adjacent to t he Russian and slow him down_
The 5-8 unit is moved in such a way that in the
second Movement Phase the Germans can
surround the 9-6 unit near the Don River and
prevent its movi ng and sea Iing the pocket tight_
The three 4-8 units move out so that on t he
Second Movement Phase t hey will have more
freedom of movement and be able to move
adjacent to the Russian Armor.
German Combat Phase
No Combat.

probably won't win, but he can hope to limit

the Russians to a small v ictory.
T he German player can escape the pocket in
two ways: Forming a "tunnel" of friendly
units through the Russ ian lines to supply the
pocket, or attacking one of the cr itica l un its in
the pocket's walls, such as the 9-6 that moves
with in one hex of the Don river on the fi rst
turn.
The "tunnel" method requires all the German
armor outside the pocket a nd usually the
A llied 3-6. On the first German movement all
the armor inside the pocket is brough t West to
within one hex of the 9-6 by the Don and
within one hex of t he 3-3. The 5-8 and 48 in
Stalingrad should be brought out adjacent to
t he 9-6 pinning it there. Every second infan try
unit should be taken off the fortified line and"
moved west to keep the pocket as large as
possible without abandoning the Fort ifi ed line.
The trapped 6-8 should move adjacent t o t he
9-6 to the East so that 't he Russ ian will be
forced to move West and South to preserve the
pocket. which keeps him further from his
supply. On t he second German Turn you
shOUld use the units outside the pocket to
punch a tunnel th rough to the pocket on t he
first movement phase so the armor inside can
use its full eight Movement Po ints to escape on
t he second Movement Phase.

The German Player

The German play er has one great advantage
and that is his mobility. This advantage is lost
when his units are out of supply. He can beat
the Russian if he can get out of the pocket
with enough time left to do it. His sale
objective in the first turns shou ld be to get out
of the pocket as quickly as possible so that he
can engage the R ussian in the open while t he
Soviet units are stil l out of supply . If he can
get out of the pocket in t he first or second
Game-Turn he has a good chance. If he
remains tra pped unti l the third or fourth, he

German Second Movement Phase

The German player should seek to immobilize
the Russi ans as much as possible. He can do
th is to two of the Russian armor un its and
severely limit the mobi li ty of the others. The
th ree 4-8 units move in adjacent to the Russian
7,6 units to keep them fro m helping the
trapped 9-6 un it whose fate is sealed by the
movement of the German 3-8 unit in to
surround and isol at e it. The 9-8 unit from
Eli,ta is moved to prevent the Russia n from
using his 3-3 unit to seal the break in the
pocket that will be made next turn by t he 2-6
and 3-6 units. Th is guarantees that on the next

The 184 counters include Hungarian, Italian

and Rumanian infantry (1-4's) Axis cavalry,
(1-5'sJ German infantry (3-5), a wide variety
of German armored units and their Kamphgruppen substitutes plus six air units. Soviet

counters are infantry corps (3-4) and guard

infantry (5-5) cavalry carps (3-3) armored
carps (7-6) six air armies and tWD mechanized
corps (9-6), the cream of the Red Army.

9
turn the German player will be ab le to force
open a su pp ly route to the pocket .
The next two turns are crucial; if t he Russian
is able to reseal the pocket he may win.
Dia gram 4 shows one possible Russian respo nse to the German attempt to open the
pocket. In this move t he Russian has cut t he
supp ly of the 3-8 which came to the rescue
and moved his 96 corps in the seco nd
movement phase to a posit ion in which it
truly seals Stalingrad. Th is d iagram is based o n
a n unplanned response by one of Simulation's
pleytesters. Eve n so, t he Germa n 3-6 and 2-6
will be ab le to open supply t o the pocket on
the next tur n an d enable some of the German
armor to escape. From this point on t he game
becomes com pletely unpredictab le. It becomes
a t ime and mot io n contest between the Soviet
supply and infantry units coming up to rein
force the Russian armor and the escaped
German armor tryi ng t o tea r open the pocket
and re iieve t he trapped units. One tactical
hi nt: since t he Soviet player is making no
attacks he shou ld at the end of h is movement
phase decide which unit on the pocket walls
th e Ge rman is like ly to attack and fly Combat
Air Patrol over that hex with five air units.
This prevents the Ger man fro m using t he
Luftwaffe t o support an attack on t hat unit.
I n t he December 16 Historical Scenario German set-up is greatly restr icted but not d ic
tated to the letter, The German pla yer must
place a certain number of units in the sea led
o'ff Sta Iingrad po cket and most others on the
1 Dec. 16 Start Line. Thus t he German is on
t he defensive. There is no "perfect" plan for
ei ther side; all we can offer are a few tact ica l
suggestions. 1) The German must not concentrate his ar mored units. The Russian force is
very powerfu l and if the German armor is
concen trated t he Russian wi ll break through
the infa nt ry on its fl an ks an d form a second
disastrous poc ket , 2) The German has only
two mobile reserve units, th e 98 and 3-8.
They s hould be placed behind the line ou t of
reach of a ny Russian breakthroughs. Otherwi se
t he Russian will surround them and they won't
be available to form a new li ne. 3) Germa n air
units should be deployed in an a rc around
Ro stov to kee p t hem out of range of Soviet air
superiority strikes. They can reach any part of
the front to support German units fro m
Rostov. Besides, th e front is going to be
headed toward them unless the Russia n is a n
idiot. 4) At key points w here the German
wishes to avo id a breakthrough he shoul d place
armored units. These turn into Ka mpltgruppen
when the parent uni't is "eli minat ed" and do
not retreat . 5) The Soviet player has over
whelming fo rce but he must be ca reful. He
shou Id try to capita Iize on any Germa n errors;
breakthrough, surro und and st ra ngle pockets.
He should keep enough 3-4 infantry units
around Stalingrad to keep t he German units
from squirmi ng fr ee or being re lieved . 6) For a
daring German player a strategy o f placing
powerful armored un its on t he flanks and
allOwing a Russian breakthrough in t he center
has resu lted several rimes (d ur in g playte st ing )
in incred ib le German victories. Historical ly,
this is what t he Germans did ma ny times.
Scenarios with com pletely free set-ups cannot
be programmed. Th ey are much more even
battles a lthoug h the superior qual ity of the
Ax is armored u nits makes itse lf felt, It is more
diffi cu lt to trap pocket s in these scenarios and
t he com bat resem bles more conventional
games wit h lines of units, adequate reserves t o
seal ho les. an d a great dea l of attrit ion. There
are more at tack s in these scenar ias if on Iy

because units are in supply and ab le to have

com bat while in scenarios Soviet unit s plunge
out of supply to form pockets a nd cut Germa n
supply.

I n su m, Battle of Stalingrad is a varied series of

games which includes scenarios of even combat, po cket-forming and pocketbust ing , and
figh t ing withdrawals. It present s chal le nging
problems to th e advanced gamer (such as
playing the German side in Dec. 16 scenarios)
but re mains "clean" enough to be easily
grasped by anyone who's gone past Napoleon
at Waterloo. The basic ga me system for World
War Two d ivisional leve l combat has been
refi ned and honed to a sharp edge and t he
historical appeal of the Stalingrad situation is
powerf ul. Highly Recommended.

Bat tle of Stalingrad is of standard Si mu lati ons

Publications qualit y. The ma psheet is 22"x28"
light b rown cardstock pr inted in black and
t ints of black. The d iecut cou nters are light
blue, fiel d grey. and khaki. T he ga me is
shipped in a manila envelo pe th at serves to
store it,
Credits:
Game Design : James F. Dunnigan
Physical Design Redmond A. Simonsen
Ru les; John Young, Stephen C. Bettum, and
Redmond A. Simonsen
Graphic Production: George Bouse.

for the obvious errors. The Combat Results

Table printed on the maps heet fai led t o
expl a in DR (Defender Retreats). "DR -al l defending units are moved one hex from their
present position by the attacker; units which
must exceed stack i ng lim itati ons 0 r retreat
through enemy zones of control are eliminated, Units may retreat int o hexes occupied
by friendly units even if those hexes are
adjacent t o enemy occupied hexes. The attacki ng units may occupy the vacated hex of a
retreated unit up to the stacking limit. There
fore Case H under Combat sho uld read "If as a
resu lt of an attack a hex is com pletel y cleared
of defending units (due to "De," "Ex ,"
"Yo Ex," or "Dr" result) then the attacking
units responsi ble may advance into th at hex
during the Combat Phase" Case Q under
Combat should read "i.e, units retreated onto
fr iend ly un its that are being attacked in the
same combat phase are ignored for purposes of
defense but suffer the same Co mbat Res u Its as
the "host" units." The rules writer adds Case
T) under Combat "I n case of dispute the
fr iendly pl ayer decides which units wil l be lost
in exc hanges or due t o overstacking." Finally,
on e of th e five German a ir units was omitted
from the set-up map, It should be placed on
the rai line five hexes due north of Rostov.

Game Errata:
At t hi s point feedback on Battle of Stalingrad
is min imal bu t we can offer a few corrections

PanzerBlitz

Origins

Armored

Warfare
in Russia

1941-45
Panzerblitz was developed for Avalon Hill
from Simulations Publication 's Tacti ca l
Game 3. It combines the standard AH
physical quality and S& T's design quality.
The three sectio n 22" x 24" boa rd can be
assemb led in numerous ways allowi ng for
long pursuits as well as set-piece me eti ng
engagements. The playing pieces represent
every majo r Eastfront figh t ing vehicle and
their organic infantry units. Some of the
famous ta nks included are the T34, the
Joseph Stalin 1, and t he Panther, best tank
of the war. A uniqu e movement-fire
system simulates t he dynamics of armo red
tact ics. Situation Cards provide scenarios
illustrating the rang e of armored act ions
from the confid ent spearheads of the Nazi
invasio n to the desperate rear guard actions on the road to Berlin. Panzerblitz is a
bookcase game , Ava lon Hill's "best seller."
Since it was designed by Jim Dunnigan.
Redmond Simonsen, and the S& T staff.
Panzerblitz is availa ble from Simu lat ions
Pu blications for $8.00, a savings of $1 .00
under store prices.

Realpolitik and Appeasement

This is a 'political" game o n the late
1930's when the d iplomatic "warfa re" in
Europe escalated t owards the holocaust of
Wo rld War II. The diplomatic conflict
system used in Origins wi ll be fa mi liar to
Avalon Hill gamers and t hose who play
Diplomacv.Origins has two, three, and fo ur
player versio ns, bu t it is best with five
playe rs , each controll ing one of the major
natio ns (Britain, France, Germany, the
USA and the Soviet Unio n) . Using
co unters th at represent political strength
each player seeks t o achieve his "National
Objectives" by obta ining "Control" or
"Understandings" in other countries. AI
t hough many games become attempts to
"stop Germsny," the fact t hat only one
play er can w in tends t o divide any antiNazi coalition. Orig ins is ava ilab le from
Simulations Pub lications for $8.00. a
savings o'f $1 .00 over store prices,

10

Normandy

o Regimental combat Dday to D plus 6.

o Six German Orders of Battle include Rommel's plan,
o Provisions for Naval Gunfire, and Commandos.

6 June 1944
"We must stop them on the beaches;" Field
Marshall Erwin Rommel's strategy for smashing Operation Overlord, the Anglo-American
cross-channel irwasion. But when the Allied
invasion fleet reached t he coast of .. Fortress
Europe." Rommel was at home for his wife's
birthday. Hitler was asleep, his underlings
afraid to wake him. And the German generals
defending the No rmandy beaches were inland
at a Kriegspie l, playing a wargame o'f an Allied
attack on their sector. German response was
slow; the Al lies secured the beac hhead and
began the drive that ended with the
destruction of Nazi Germany. But it might
have been different. Normandy shows you
how. Normandy is a tactical (regimentl
battal ion) game covering the crucial first week
of the Allied invasion. The Alli ed player must
plan his invasion before seeing the German
defenses. Six different German Orders of
Battl e reflect the various possible strategies
from the weak "Historical Deployment" to the
powerful "Rommel Plan." Special rules provide for Naval Gunfire, Paratroops, Commandos, and th e difficulty of Allied supply.
The mapsheet covers the immediate beach area
on a scale of 2 kilometres to a hex. Available
from Simulations Publications for $5.00.

Leipzig
The Battle of the Nations: 1813
Napoleon vs. Europe
The disastrous Russian campaign of 1812
shattered Napoleon's dreams of world empire.
When the victorious Russian Army pursued
Napo le o n into Prussia in the Spring of 18 13,
French hegemony in Europe hung in the
balance. The campaign th at followed (known
as the Leipz ig campaign after its final battle)
was a milita ry classic. Nepoleon had better
generals and the "central position" (i.e. he was
su rrounded by Prussians, Russian s, and
Austrians), But the larger , better equipped
Allied armies were divided and Napoleon
hoped to destroy them piecemeal. Leipzig uses
a revolutionary ga me system to recreate t he
feel of Napoleonic strategy. The key problems
of strategic approach, attrition on the march,
concentration for battle, and supplies are
accounted for by unique rules. Eight scenarios
(four Spring, three Summer and one co mplete
Campaign Gamel allow players to simulate the
politica l and diplomatic aspects of t he campaign such as Austrian Intervention or Neutrality, the defection of Napoleon's German
allies and the anti -French rebellion that swept
Germany. The tactical skill of commanders is
represented by counters that affect the abi Iity
of the units they accompany to attack or
defend. Leipzig is available from Simulations
Publications for $5.00.

.'

o Revolutionary new game system ..

. .. Captures the "feel" of Napoleonic strategy .
Leader counters have decisive importance.

11

Why Some Games

Never Materialize
by Albert A. Nofi
Whi le readi ng the mail here at Simula t ions we
invariab ly run ac ro ss at least one letter in e~ery
bat ch that starts, "Why don't you deSign a
gam e about . . . " The letter goes on to ex plain
t he reaso ns for selecti ng th is topic : the importa nce, or the glamor, or just the sheer interest
of th e whole thing. Usu ally the operat ion in
questio n and the reaso ns giv en ane all go od
o nes, but we don't fo llow up on it. Why not?
One very good reason for not d esign ing a game
about a seem ingl y perfect topic is that some
situations do n't lend themselves well to being
made into games. For examp le take Custe r's
disastrous encounter with the Sioux and Cheyennes.
Someone sent us a game on t his topi c recently.
It was a good game. The rul es wene c lea r the
mec hanics simple and u nderst a ndab le, th~ action fast and furious. What was wrong? Well,
Custer didn't stand a chance. It wasn't t he
gam e but th e situation th at was at fault. How
can yo u make a balanced tactical game out of
a battle that we s the resu It of a colossal
t actical snafu? Th e Ind ia ns had had enough
and Custer was stupid enough to blunder into a
b unch of t hem w ho were loo kin g for a fig ht.
After dividing his already small force, he went
after several t housand Indians with less than
300 men. Some game !
A good strategic game migh t be made out of
an Indian war, bu t tactically t he Indians
usual ly didn't have a chance, except in th ose
few, very few, situations where they greatly
outnumbered their enemy and benefited fro m
serious tactical erro rs: lik e a Little Big Horn.
Not only are t ac t ical level games ofte n u nmanageab le game tOPics, bu t so metimes higher
level operations are d ifficult to game. Consider
the possibilities of doing a game w hic h we will
call MAL TA. The to pic is excell ent: beleagured Malta aw ai t ing the inevitable Axis ai rborne/
amphibiou s invasion, but co nSider the facts.

Even these Figures are not the whole story.

Roughly spea ki ng only four British brigades.
totalling 16 bat talio ns of Infantry, were ava il ab le for combat operations. Most of th e rest of
t he garri son was RA F o r RN perso nnel. Against this Force the Axis would la nd with one
German division-sized parach ute task force
one German-trained Italian parachu te divisi o n'
one Italian glider-born e d ivision , th ree regula;
Italian infantry d ivisi ons, and an Italian Marine
regi ment.
The actu a I batt le a rea was really no smaller
than on Crete, where only the tiny portion of
the island a round the main airfields was fought
over. But the Axis enjoyed total air superiority, and total sea superio rity. ove r a nd around
Malta, while at Crete the Royal Navy he ld
contro l of the sea.
The British troops on Malta were much better
prepared than th ose on Crete had been b ut
Axis power was overwhelming and a pla~able
game could only be devised by ti n kering wi th
the victory conditio ns, like requiring vict ory in
a very short time, or at a set ratio of casualties.
Bu t the n the true interest of t he situation
wou ld be lost. MALTA wou ld be a good
hi storica l study but a very one-sided, boring
gam e,
Someday , when we get arou nd to d oi ng a
theater level game of the war in the Mediterranea n - our Afrika Korps, so to speak t here will be the possibility of tack ling Malta,
but that wi ll be a different game.

Next President

T he C re te and Malta
Op.erations Compared
Crete

Malta

3,200 sq.

122 sq.

0.4

miles

miles

Forces:

c.4O,000

c.30,000

Aircraft:

na

na

AFV:

na

na

Axis
Forces:

c .20 ,OOO

c . 50,000

250 .0

Aircraft:

1,300

1,300

100.0

AFV:

none

150

Size:
British

75.0

Note: AFV - Armored Fighting Vehicles; %Malta as a percent of Crete forces. nainformation not availabl e. c . - about.

The Next President, designed by S& T's

Jim Dunnigan , t reats the upcoming electio n as a conflict in which the Republican
and Democrati c Parties pit money,
charisma, (such as th ey have) and orga ni zat iona l musc le in a strugg le for powe r. On
each of six week ly campaign turns the
o pposing pla yers s imu Itaneously de ploy
t hei r resources. The c limax is the election,
often a c liffhange r, as states and whole
reg ions considered secure, sli pinto your
opponent 's camp. There is also a realistic,
Four-p layer Nomination Game in which
players vie , fo r the votes of stat e delegations in Primary elections or in t he
"smoke -fill ed rooms" of party conventions where cabinet appointments, federal
judgeships, and other political sinecures
ore traded (like sto le n goods in a pawn
shop) for nominating ba llots. The Next
President is publ ished in h igh quality
format and is availab le from Simu lations
Publications for $9.00, a savings of $1.00
under store prices.

THE ADVANTAGES OF
MODULARIZ ING YOUR
CORRESPONDENCE . ..
There is a very great benefit for the both
of us (and especially for you) if you
"modularize" your correspondence i.e.,
break it out into separate letters by
category. Basi cally, we get six different
tv pes of corresponde nee from you :
1. Praise, Criticism and Suggestions and/
or requests for information
2. Orders for Merchandise and Subscriptions
3. Complaints concerning Subscriptions.
4. Complaints concerning merchandise
(game, book, and/or equipment orde rs
d elayed, damaged or unfulfilled).
5. Change of Address Notification
6. Game Rules Questions.

You can greatly expedite the handling of

your correspondence if you do not mix
the six categories listed above in a given
letter. The best thing to do is to send all
correspondence under separate cover accordi ng to category . If you fi nd that to be
too much trouble, then do the next best
thing: put each category of correspondence on a separate sheet of paper (with
your name and address on each sheet) and
title each sheet with one of the six
categories. The very least we would like
you to do is to keep your orde~ separate
from all other corr espondence. This will
reduce the possibility of error and increase
the speed of order fulfillment.
Game Questions
Questions conce rning the ru les of play and
game proced ure wil l be answered if submi tted
in the fo llowing manner:
All qu est io ns mus t be asked in a "yes-o r- no "
format. or in a " multip le choice" format or in
suc h a way that they req uire a simple one or
two word answer. Questions requir ing an
"essay" answe r will not be considered. We
simply do not have the staH ti me ava ilable to
answer lengthy , essay-type questions . . . nor do
we have the time to d irec tly answer questions
pertaining to "game design" or histo rica l
ra tio nale. We're sorry that we can' t s pend time
witt, conversationa l le tters concerning the
games. but we fe el that you'd ra the r have us
devote the t ime saved to the design of new
ga mes and pr oducts.
IMPORTANT : All gil m-ques t ioil letters must
be accompanied by a stamped. self-a ddressed
envelope_ Please write you r name a nd address
at the top of your le tter_ Pl ease do not mi x
game q uest ion lette rs with any o th e r type of
cor respon de nce li.e. orders. complaints. lovel ette~ etc.l. Please head your letter with the
name o f the ga me t hat you are. inq uir ing
ab o ut. If mo re t han one game is bei ng asked
about . categori ze and labe l you r questions by
ga me-title. Remember . mos t questi ons can be
answered simpl y by re-read ing the ru les land
you elm thereby save us an d your se lf a lot of
rigamoro lel. All ga me qu estions and s uggestions automatica lly become t he property of
Simula ti o ns Publicat ions Inc. Address yo ur
letters to: Game-Questions Editor
Simulations Publications, Inc.
44 East 23 Street
New York. N.Y . 10010

12

Qustavusc:Adolphus'
Contribution toCWar
By James F. Dunnigan
In every field there are t hose who innovate,
and those who merely dupl icate, It is by far
t he safer course not to attempt innovation; the
higher one's pos itio n is, the less one is tempted
t o try anyth ing new, T he same app lies for
those who are satisfied to dup licate the innovatio ns of ot hers,
Gustavus Ado lp hus, the King of Sweden during the ea rly Seventeenth Century, not on ly
dared to in novate, b ut extended his innovations to his a rmed forces - a precarious move
in any time o r place. During the period w he n
Gustavus ru led , the soldier had reached a rare
pinnacle of disrepute and unre liabIl ity. Mercenary groups were becomi ng more a nd more
unreliable and di fficu lt to control. The religious dissen sion had, for the most part, rent
society without offering much of anyth ing
new to rebuild it with. Fro m this seeming confusion Gustavus drew th e cata lyst that wou Id
revoluti onize warfare , not so much mec han ic..
al ly as spiritually.
What Gust avus did was to combine t he fanatic ism of re ligion with the organizatio nal
stre ngth of the modern state. The combi nati on
produced a mil itary force thai: was at once
both du rab le and incredibly strong. By fusing
ideal i5tic fervor with systemat ic planni ng, Gu~
tavus overcame Sweden's problems of small resources and paucity of nu mbers,
The idea lism of Gustavus' "New Mode l" came
f ro m the pragmatism and piety of the reformed Christianity th at was sweeping Europe , This
in itself was not enoug h to ho ld such s successfu l army 'toget her. Bu t it provided an ideology
wit h which Gustavus kept his new a rmy together whenever the mo re consistently efficient
orga nizat iona l procedures fa ltered under an
un familiar strain. T hese strains were understandab Ie whe n it is rea lized th at such po Iic ies
had not been seen or used 5i nce the day of the
Roman Leg ion and some 01 them not even
trlen,

St ructu ra llY , Gustavus ' army was a mpdern,

sta nd ing one. It was supported by the State in
peacetime and ex panded in ti me of war by an
organi zed reserve. Wh il e it is true that th e pre"
decessors of G ustavu shad actually set up th is
standing army, there is li ttle dou bt that it
could not have been lIsed 50 successfu lly if '
Gust avus had not instituted p rocedura l reforms which radically c han ged th e arrriy's character. The most im portant of these refo rms
was t he codif ication of near ly every action the
army might take - be it in peace or wa r. T hese
regu lat io ns we re the forerunne rs of the modern versions which so tight ly hold together
mass ive contemporary armies. Not only were
these regulat ions lai d down, they we re also Emforced wit h a devot ion uncharacte ri st ic of so
chao tic a period, Wea po ns, training, organization and equ ipm en t were al l covered in detai l.
I n each of these categories further refo rm s
we t-e instituted routinely in t he continui ng
sea rch for mo re practical ways of doing things.
I n weapons Gust avus foresaw the eve r- in crea~
ing importance of f irepower, He increased the
propo rtio n of musketee rs in his anmy to one
sli gh t ly favori ng the still cu m bersome gu npow
de r weapons. T he musket itsel f was improved,
cont inuing a trend in we aponry which has sti ll
not spent itself, Arti llery was stan dard iz ed in
ca lib re and lightened _ Pieces light enough to be
manhandled on t he field were introduced. be-ginni ng t he dEl.\lelopment of the in fant ry's
"heavy weapons" which t he n, as now, cause
such s laugh ter on the battlefiel d. The cava lry
was armed Wit h the sabre, as wefl as the traditiona l pistol, T he pike was st ill retained, if
o nly because t he bayonet had not yet been
int rod uced.

Who Are YOU?

How abou t that .. . second tir[1e in twe lve

months . We've moved Our ma in offices to
large r and infinite ly more wonderful
quarters right up the black from our o ld
sddress. Direct a ll ma i I to:

The customer is n't always right ... especisl ly when he forgets to include his name
and ad dress with h is order I We've come
across this p roblem a distressing number
of times Iparticularly wit h Business Rep ly
envelopes - peop le simp ly neglect to fill
aut the address b lock). Now we appreciate
getting your mo ney and eve ryt hi ng, but
we rea lly do want to f ulfi ll your order, so
p lease incl ude your name, add re ss and Zi p.
It's good pract ice to put full add ress
information on every sheet o f paper you
send us Iwe 're not so perfect either). Do
not re ly upon the retur n address on the
outside of yo ur envelope ... envelopes
may get torn or schmeared whe n handled
. . . "fail-safe" you r order by putting your
address an each sheet. Thsnks!

New York, N. Y. 10010

Not so different from the old address, is
it? In fa ct it's fs irly easy to confuse with
the old ad dress .. . the only difference is
that now it's Forty-four (44) instead of
T hirty-fou r (34) East 23rd Street. Don't
worry about any ,mail you've recently sent
to our o ld address - the Postal Service will
forwsrd it to us .

The medium through which the devot ion was

ex t racted was th e new, refo rmed Cil rist i an ity
of t he ti me. Rebelling against the anarchy and
decadence of th e period, even non"Swedes
floc ked to the stern ban ne r of Gustavus. Naturally enough, this religious fervor soon be-.
came mixed with a Nationa listic one and. event ua lly , it became impossible "to tell t he two
apart. Yet , his armies very soon became less
than one-ha lf Swedish. By the battle of Lut"
zen, it was proba bly even less,
OrganizaTion followed t he cha nges in weaponry and train ing. Gustavus stressed lightness and
mobi lity . Fou r 150 rnan comp anies lof pi ke
and musket) made a battalion. T wo battalions
formed a reg im ent and three regiments a brigade. The men sti ll foug ht in six li nes but t he
stress was now on the musket an d cannon, not
the pike. Each unit had only so much equipment , as laid down in the meticu lo us regu letions. Cavalry was organized into heavy sabremen and mounted infant ry. Artillery was as-si gned to the reg im ent s, independent support
un its and spec ia l siege un i ts, A staff of sorts
assembled abou t the King and p rovided a
ready means of commu nicat ing orders "to the
troops.
Equipment was , in genera l: .. c onSiderably
lightened, T he Kin g's main t act ical principle
was mobility and all he d id ref lected his attempts to ex tract more of th is rare element
from th e previously c lumsy armies. Supply was
provided by prB - posi t ioned magali nes, th us
freeing the ar my from the burden o f ca rrying
its own or scouring t he countryside for it,
Gustavus saw That professional troops, fed
from maga ~ in es, controlled by a sense of mutual support, and an imated by rei igious and
na'tiona list ic fervo r cou Id not long be resisted,
By mak ing a com mi ssi on a post of ho no r and a
place in the ranks desirab le for respectable
peasants, Gust avus insured t he continued exi stance of an army type that has changed litt le in
essence to this day.

T raining wa s something new. Not on ly was it

vigoroLisly introduced, but it was const ant ly
fo llowed up by Gustavus h imself, Discip li ne
was enfo rced and t he so ld iers we re expected to
act respectfully toward noncombatants. T his,

We've Changed Our Address

Simulations Publications, Inc.

44 East 23rd Street

in itse lf, was a sta rt]i ng innovation. T he rigorous trai n ing an d disc ip line could only be enforced among men who fe lt more t han a monetary attachment to t heir leader.

A Brief, Physical Description

of Simulation Series Games
The physical qua lity of Simulation Series
G ames is very si mi Iar to that of th e games
incl uded in issues of Strategy & Tactics_
The primary differences are (1.) the map is
produced on heavy cards tack as opposed
to the ligh twei ght stock used in magazine
games, 12.) a die is inclu ded and 13,) the
map is only fo ld ed twice (down to approx imately 11" x 14") and the , game is
shipped in a pla in envelop e with a corru gated stiffener (unboxedl_ Us ual ly ,
Simu lati on Series games have a greater
amount of suxillsry tab les snd game
ch arts incl uded with them.

13

ADDINe REALISM TO ARMOR STEVE PATRICK

It 's a necessary evil of war gam es th at in
reducing combat to a manageable game,
realism must be sacrificed for p layability.
Leading t h is ro ut f rom realism is armo r. T his is
largely unnecessa ry. A discussio n of what can
be done to put mo re realism into armor is in
ordc: r.
In board games, an armored unit is always
somewhat stronger than infantry and has a
greater Movement Allowance, but there are usually restrict io ns on movement over certain
types of terrain. That's w hat passes for armor.
Bu t armo r isn' t simply beefed-up infantry and
warga m i ng should recognize th at real it;!.
Mou ntai ns, forests, and swamps a re treated as
impenetra ble barriers to armor (i.e. tanks, because t hat 's what armor's a ll about.! . The effect o'f the se barriers is grossly overrated as t he
Germans showed in World War Tw o and we are
fin d ing ou t in Viet Na m.
Fo rests are the most common barrier to arm or
in war games. Usually the exclusion is absolute, w hile infantry suffers a one-hex-per-turn
penalty to cross the forests. Bu t in real ity, between t he brute force of ta nks and caniste r
ro unds, few fo rests or jung les present a physical obstac le to armor. T he threa't is the enemy
lying in ambush with remote control mines
and bazookas. That's where the infant ry comes
in; t hey clear th e forests so the tanks can pass.
Apply ing th is to warg ames is easy; add infa ntry to armor whe n moving throug h wo ods. In
fact , while a rmor is reduced in ma neuverabil ity
dependi ng on t he dens ity of t he forest , the
machine gun s on tan ks give t hem as much
punch as t heir sup po rt ing infantry though
tanks sti ll rem ain vu Inerable to cl osein attack.
Denying arm or passage 'through woods is t he
Mag inot menta l ity. The Germ ans managed to
teach t he Fre nc h a lesson about armor and forests and repeated it for our benefit in the Batt le of t he Bulge. T he reduction in movement
rate through fo rests is realist ic but impenatrab iI ity is nonsense.
Moun ta in s are another matter. But if you can
move a n infantry divi sion, inc lu d i ng the supp ly
trains and other vehic les, through those mo untai ns, why not tan ks? A ta nk can handl e a
steeper grade than a two a nd a half ton truck
a nd requi res only a slightly wider roadbed.
Some mountai ns may be open on ly to men on
f oot (that 's why there a re mounta in d ivisions),
but if the infa ntry can get its trucks ove r the
mountains, armor can go too.
Swamps and marshes can be a genuine barrier
to tanks. But there are swamps and there are
swamps. There are places w here a t ank can be
mired to t he tu rret;'there are oth ers whe re t he
mire ho lds wheels and greatly impedes the foot
soldier while tracked veh icl es can go right
th rough. Passabil ity is a factor of weather. If
rainy impassable; if dry-passable. While ta nks
can't move th ro ugh swamps as fast as they can
over open road s, a rea so nab Ie rate of speed can
still b e obtai ned. T he solution fo r gaming is
probab Iy a reduced rate of speed t h rou gh
swamps in dry weather, no e ntry in wet.
Odd ly one of the worst barriers to armor is
often ignored by warga mers, th e c ity. Usually
the practice has been , t ake a city one turn. z ip
on through the next, making use of th at good
road netw ork. I n war, cities a re bombed and
shelfed, and if actually fo ug ht over, can be reo
duced to instant pill box and tan k trap. Th e

streets are strewn with rubble and im passab le

to both tanks and trucks. Snipers may also be
left behind aft er the e nemy 's main boay
flees. No city with its streets tur ned into cra
ters wil l be a thoroughfare the day aft!lr capture. For wargaming the solution is si mple, for
a city which is captured after a f ig ht, if turns
equa l say, two days, no pa ssage for two turns,
th e n only at normal movement rate for two
more turns. After the equ iva len t of about a
week t he city wo uld be returned to full carrying capacity with its roads cleared. The len gth
of restric tion on movemen t wo uld obviously
vary according to the length of the gam e tu rns
in different games but the prinCiple would be
the same.
Rivers are another oft-used bar rier. Most often
th e ru le is t hat the side seeking to cross the
river must stop at one sid e and cannot cross
unt il t he next t u rn. T his implies a n inabi lity t o
p la n ah!lad. IIi wa r, a commander who to ok
more than a f ew hours t o make an unopposed
crossing would be looki ng for a job. War games
reverse th e true situat ion becau se it is faster
crossing a river in an at tack th an unopposed.
You ca n move your full Movement Al lowa nce
to a river line, atta ck, and if successfUl cross
th e river to take t he enemy hex-all in on e
t urn. For unopposed crossings, a more realist ic
rule is simply some redu ction in movement
points represen ti ng t he delay caused by having
to bridge the rive r. The U.S. Army regularly
holds a con test between engin eer un its to
bridge the Rh ine and the time needed is a matter of hours. Besides, tanks do have (and have
had) fo rding eq uipment. FO r major crossings, a
good commande r will have this equipment up
f ront, ready to go, when th e river is reached.
Numero us smal ler rivers can be c rossed by
ta nk s without any spec ial equ ipm ent.
Besides these maneuver prob lems there is a
need to embody the shock effect of a rmor in a
war game. Shock action is one of the means by
wh ich armor accomplishes its mission. It is
very upsetting to t he mora le of the average
grunt to see f ifty-odd to'ns of stee l co ming for
his fox ho le. It is even more distu rbing if t hat
grunt no lo nger has a fox h ole. Maybe he'll
stand and f igh t, but it's more likely that he'l l
thin k seriously about find ing a mo re suitable
position, somewhere to t he rear. Fo r gaming,
the solu t ion is to boost the odds when armor
attac ks infantry. But arm or would get no bonus when being attacked by infa ntry since
shock effect comes from the momen tum of
attack .
Co mbining the th ree elements of armor - firepow!lr, shock effect, and maneuver, wil l,if properly done , allow the ulti mate goal of armored
attac k - breakout. Yet, first generation wargames, particula rly Ava lon Hi ll games, seem
designed t o ma ke th is impossib le. The c ombat
results tables always read someth ing like "defender back ' f our; attacker advance t h ree."
Never th e reverse. It is pure fantasy to al low an
infantry unit th at h as been overru n by arm or
to outru n ta nks. The key armor tactic is t o
puncll a hole in the line and roll back t he
flanks, but how can this be do ne when the
"defeated" e nemy still out runs t he victor.
Again, th e answer is simple. A spec ial Combat
Resu lts T ab le for armor is one way . Another is
to allow an a rmo red un it which wins a n attac k
to use as much of its basic Movement Allowance as it has left to expl oit whateve r hole it

has made. Allowing armor to outrun infantry

will give armored units somet h ing in fa nt ry
d oesn 't have and cha nge armor f rom what it
has been in most war games ~ strong , mobile,
infa ntry .
Finally , there is the matter of reserves. Reserves in war games now are little more th an fire
brigades used to plug gaps or for extra strength
to lea n more on the unit yo u are an acking .
jacking t he odds and grindi ng your opponent
back a few hexes. That's not the purpose of
reserves in war. Sbmetimes rese rves are not
comm itted un t il a battl e is al ready over. Tnen
they are sent in to mop up and explo it the
resu Its. Th is t actic h as been co mb ined with a rmo r since the F irst World War, bu t there is no
way to do it in most war ga mes. To create th is
effect players should be al lowed to des ignat e a
certai n number of c ombat un its as reserves.
These reserves would have to be located within
a certa in distance of where the combat is tak ing pi ace. If the enemy is dislodged, the reserves could th en move into t he ho le . The exact
distance a ll owed would be eit he r a stated numbe r of hexes on the Combat Results T able or a
portion of the reserve units ' Movement Allowances.
Using these rule revisions should change the
dynamics of wargames a great dea l by allowing
breakthroughs and envelopment. Atmor restored mobility to t he battlefield. It's about t ime
someone restored mobility to the t anks in wargame s.

Battle of Britain

Battle of Brita in was designed by Lo u

Zocchi , long time fri e nd and a,sociate of
S& T. It waS the first commercia lly published air warfare game . Battle of Britain
was publ ished by Game-science under the
d irection of Phi l Orbanes who has since
joined S&T. It was the last and probabl y
th!l best of the four Gamescience titles. It
is a highly complex simulat ion of the
struggle for co ntrol of the sk ies over
Britain in 1940. Every (that's rig ht
EVERY) pla ne that took part in the
o rigin al campaign is accounted for; more
than 1900 German a ircraft take part in the
confl ict. There are different com bat resu lts tabl es t o acco unt fo r t he dif fe rent
effects of various aircraft against each
other and in diffe rent formations. Detai led
rules on fuel replicate the effect of shortages on aircraft ranges. Battle of Britain is
available from Simulations PlJblications
for $7.00.

14

SIMULATIONS AND EDUCATION:

SOME NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS
For a number of years I taught high school
Social Studies in East Harlem in New York
City. At the time I was an occasional contributor to Simulations Publications. Because I
was teach ing and involved in game development at the same time, I had a unique opportunity to test materi als in classroom situations.
I used a number of Sim ulations, in fact , the
game Origins of World War II was extensively
tested in class for almost three years before it
was finished a nd published.
I n class, this game, and others still unpublished , proved valuable and interesting tools. Students of all grades, from fresh men to seniors,
and at all levels of academic ability, found the
gam es interest ing, fun and informat ive. I n fact,
post game t esting showed the students had
learned as much about "the origins of World
War Two" as they could have using the more
traditi onal "party line" - developmental lesson,
Game simulations are not the solution to all
p roblems involved in teaching the social sciences. There are many situations in history
that don't readily lend themselves to simu lation. To be effective, a simulation, whether
played for pleasu re or for educational pu rposes, must be simple. Unfortunately, too
many of the things touted as "educational
games" are clu msy monstros ities as a recent
demonstration at t he A.T.S.S. [Association of
Social St udies Teachers] Convention clearly
poi nts out, This "game" was so complex that
it took mo re .than an hou r for one of the deSigne rs to explai n it to a group of teach ers, who
became less interested as things progressed . In the .end so many people had been bored
to tEars by the "game" that it didn't actua lly
get into play.

S&T 19, featuring the

Blitzkrieg Module System game
The ult imate variant fo r AH's Blitzkrieg
game. I ncludes new set of counters (a ll
unmounted) for bot h major powers as well
as minor co unnies. New set o f "modularized" rules covering such subjects as ra il roads, diffe re nt movement systems, sequencing, different OB's, production, supply,
nava l fo rces, flak, ' air forces, weather,
guerillas, artillery, and variable scenarios.
Nume rous charts, tables and ot her play-a ids
are included, Our surveys have shown this
variant to be much more popu lar than the
original game. Also in issue 19 is th e first
insta llment of our articles on North Africa ,
this one o n the Ita lian Army. Also-an article
on Hannibal plus our- regular features. These
include d an article on min iatures, plus letters, 0 ipl omacy and others.
$3.00, from Simulations PUblications

A good game simulation requires two elements, realism and playability. Realism is how
close thE game comes to actua lly Simulating
reality; playability is simply ease and pleasu re
of play. A game can be realistic but unplayable, or be playable but unreal, idea lly it
shou ld be accurate and playable. Ohly the latter can stand the test of the classroom.
A realistic but overly complex simulation is
The Internation Simulation. In this reproduction of internatio nal relations and national policy making, five co untries a nd an international
agency are represented. Each country requires
five or six players as does the international or
ganization, hi additio n several players are r&quired to act as umpires. All in all about 35
people are involved. But that 's only the beginning. I n addition t o the. large number of players there is an enormous amount of paper
work - called by game designers, "bookkeeping", Players must outline economic development, national fiscal policies, national foreign
policies, military plans, and so on ad infinitum,
ad nauseam. Need less to say, t he game is who lly inadequate for classroom pu rposes in spite
of its rea listic simulation of domestic and international affairs . .
An unrealistic but playable game is Consensus'. This game purports to represen t the nominating procedure for President. Th e mechanics
are excellent and the bookkeeping minimal.
Things move a long nicely and it is sometimes
easy to ig nore the inconsistencies : a person can
win in the segregationist states and in the liberal urban centers simultaneously! This is not
impossible in the framework of American politics, but it's highly unlikely in the present politica l climate.

by Albert A. Nofi

F inallY there are games that are both highly

playable and high ly realistic, For example Ori
gins of World War II and The Next President.
Both can be played with relatively small
groups of people either singly or in teams, Origins has no bookkeeping, The Next President
very little. Neither takes more than an hour to
play, Each game imparts enough essenti al in'formation to make the situation understandable without overwhelming the students. Origins concerns itself with the political maneuvers on an international scale from 1934
through 1940, instead of the far less important
Questions of Hitler's private motivations. CUriously, a recent criticism of the game - albeit
by a non-historian, non-teacher - was that it
did not take Hitler int o account. But what we
are trying to teach our students is that decisive, concerted international action might have
avoided the outbreak of the war, and 30 million d eaths whether Hitler wanted it or not,
The Next President is similar. In the nomination phase of the game, 'the players vie for convention votes by pledges of judicia l posts and
other forms of political patronage, B6th games
concern themselves primarily witll essentials,
not with issues likely to concern on ly the professional historians.
Most socalled educational games were designed by ed ucators hav ing Iittle or no famil iarity
with game design or by game designers having
little or no familiarity with education. One
problem in developing a usefu l game for educational purposes is the Questi on of testing,
Some presently available materials seem to
have had little, if any, pl ay testing before marketing. At Simulations as much as 500 hours
of testing may go Into a simulation. Testing

"

15
takes pla ce under regu lar play ing cond itio ns
using volu nteers. The testers are given written
rules and asked to follow them as best they
can, avoiding situatio ns where ambiguous rules
are explained by the designer and the wording
is never altered. Each playtest team is asked to
write its comments and the' whole set of ru les
is reviewed regularly . !f'something seems fundamentally wrong the existing rules may be
eliminated in favor of an entirely new concept.
In t his way clarity of concept, ru les, mechanics, and purpose is maintained,
Another serious fault of many simulations intended for educational pu rposes is their lack of
variations. To be a true simulation, a game
must give the players enough flexibilitv to alter the course of the events portrayed. That is,
if certain decisions are made exactly as t hey
were in the real situation the simulation will
result in the same outcome, but by changing
the policy, goal a nd the timing of actions the
outcome will be altered thus demonstrating
the possibilities inherent in an historica l situa
tion. Many games used In schools don't allow
this sort of "what if". They are, in effect, mechanical replicas of human events. Set them
up, do exactly what the actual decisionmakers
did and you end up with the same results. Consider an "educational" travesty. called Triangle Trade. This "game" shows the need for
iabor in the colonies, the need for certain raw
mat erials (cotton, tobacco) in England and the
West I ndies, and the surplus of labor in Africa.
It mechanically illustrates how t he slave t rade
worked. How much more valuable fo r learning
if the designer had considered what options
were open to the people of th e times. Might it
Il ave been possible to recru it labor from other
parts of the world? Might it have been possible
to recruit free labor in Africa instead of slave
labor? etc, If a game offers th is tv pe of OPtion
students respond with far more interest, be
cause it puts him in a position to alter the
course of history. Another game currently in
use in the schools is 1787, which simulates the
Constitutional Convention and permits the

S&T20, featuring
Bastogne and Anzio Beachhead
Bastogne comes comp lete with 22x2S"
mapsheet , counters (unmounted) and other
play-aids. I[ is a comp letely new game on
the Battle of the Bulge using new and
original movemen t , supply, combat and
unit-breakdown systems. A very rea listic,
yet not overly com plicated, ga me. Also
contains variable Orders of Battle, thus
making the game "selfbalancing." A lso in
issue 20 is the Anzio Beachhead game,
compl ete with 11 x 17" map cou nters (u nmounted ) a nd other player aids. This game
also contains numerous design in novations.
In issue 20 are articles on the Luftwaffe
Land Army (e complete survey with numero us charts. diagrams, etc.). Other features
include letters, If Looks Could Kill (by
Redmond Simonsen, on how to design,
mount and cut your own cou nters), Dip lomacy, Games a nd mi niatures.
$3.00, from Simulations Publications

participants to draft a Constitution considerably different fro m the actual one, yet bound
by the same essential parameters as the actual
authors. The students can opt for a unicameral
legislature, a parliamentary system not unlike
that of Britain, or possibly the total abOlition
of slavery. This dynamic model of a historical
event is more productive th an simple narrative
coverage of the same event Whether in a text
or in a static, mechanical game like Triangle
Trade.
One very important observation before concluding this rambling discussion of education
and simulations. Iii effect, the teaching profession is guilty of fraud In this field. Teachers are
on record as favoring the use of simulations
techniques and materials in t he classroom but
few make any serious efforts to do this. For
seven years in various schools J often used simulation materials, both finished products and experimental ones. I generally invited my colleagues and supervisors to drop in and watch,
Rarely did more than half a dozen of perhaps
250 teach ers attend: n at even 'th e people responsible for developing new materials bothered to show up to see game simulations in action.
Besides teacher apathy, game simu lations conf lict with the antiquated 40 to 50 minutes
classroom "period" which school systems cling
to as a divinely decreed prerequ isite for learning. As long as the "period" fractures educatjon we will be unable to use the many excellent materials now available or the better
games which will be available in the future as
design t echniques Improve.

Where to Find the Simulations Mentioned in

this Article
Triangle Trade. Teaching Research, Oregon
State System of Higher Education Monmouth,
OR, 97361. $15.00

1787. Olcott Forward, 234 North Central

Ave .. Kartsdale, N.Y., 10530 $20.50.
Inter-Nation Simulation, SRA, 259 East Erie
St., Chicago, III. 60611 $45.00
Origins of World War II and The Next Presi
dent are both avail able through Simulations
Publications, 44 East 23rd st., N.Y. : N.Y.,
10010. Or igins sells for $8.00. The Next President for $9.00;
Consensus. I have been unable to locate the
publishers of this ga me and it is possible that it
has been withdrawn as I have not seen it in
some time.

DESIGNER'S NOTES
(continued from page 3)

The Feedback results for MOVES #1 will

appear in MO VES #3.
Also in MOVES #3 there will appear our
"Guide" sections for Games I n Print and
GameSimulation Periodicals In Print. These
regular features wi ll replace the S&T Guide
covering the same subjec.ts. The material will
rece ive better and more time ly treatment in
MO VES. FinallY, we are doing considerable
work on upgrading the editorial qua li ty of
MOVES. Examp les, such as the Game Profile
(Battle of Stalingrad I anic le in this issue, are
typical of what we are trying to do. Keep
com menting on what we put into MOVES;
we' ll keep changing .

16

SOME PANZERBUTZ
OPTIONAL
by Steven List
These ru les are prima rily intended for t he hard
core fanatic who doesn't mi nd some more dirt
ina ga me if (h e t h inks) it leads to a bette r simulation or enables him to outwit his opponent
by using addit ional ru les. I think their Judicious use will add to t he scope of the game
without seriously clutteri ng up the mechanics
of p lay .
I Weather Conditions: T he sta nd ard game reflect s the " good campaigning weather" of Tact ics II, but as the Germans learned, Russian
weather was a considerable foe in itself. The
standard game ma kes no distinct ion betwee n
the variou s scenarios, yet given the range of
"adverse weather can be t o some extent approximated by use of one or m ore of th ese modules:
(A) Heavy Ra in/Heavy Snowfall : Th is affects
visibility rathe r t han mobility. Reduced visibility cuts the LOS of all units to 10 hexes, with
a co rresp ond ing half-range of 5 hexes. Units
w hose range is norm a lly less t ha n 11 are not
affected. M and H units using ind irect fire can
use their fu II range, but the CP or other spott ing unit mu st be within 10 hexes of the target. (If using the Defilade/Enf ilad e rules, use
the printed range of H units rathe r than the 10
hex range to determine the DIE effects.)
(B) Mud : road movement not affected. Off-

road penalt ies a re doubled for all units except

full-track ed Russian vehiCles, Pa nth ers, and
JgdPz V. These uni ts move on clear terrain at
t he normal rate but pay t he doub led penalties
on other terrain.
(e) Dee p Snow : Cavalry and wagons have t heir
MFs cut to 1, trucks are cut to 6, and all other
units to 2/3 of no rmal va lues (fractions round
to nee rest intege r). Slope and gu Ily pe nal t ies
are inc reased by 1.

ID) Hard Frost: Slope a nd gully penal ties increase by one. Pond and swam p hexes are
'rea ted as clear terrain even if th ey contain
streams. If a unit is on the pond hex and is
anacked by H o r M units, roll the d ie once for
each 15 AF employed. If a six is rolled, t he ice
is broken- all units on t he hex are lost and the
pond is imp assible for the rest of the game.

Modu le B can only be combined with modul e

A. If modules C and D are combined, sl ope
and gull y penalties are inc reased o nly by one.
II Entry of Un its : Many of the game situations
cell for all units to enter on turn 1, but provide

no indication of how it should be done. It is

patent ly unreal to successive ly place each u nit
on the sa me board edge hex and then move it
up to its fu ll MF , but nothing prohibits thi s
kind of weaseli ng. Therefore these op"tions.
(A): All units or stacks to be brought on
throug h the same hex are lined up off the
board. The f irst stac k expends one MF to enter
the boa rd , the second expen ds two, etc. If the
units are entering using road m ovement, they
must e nter (and be lined up) singly,

(B): In some situ atio ns it would make more

sense to defi ne a "Start Li ne " or "Line of De.
parture" fo r the attacking player, especial ly
for t hose sit uations where an att acking infa ntry force is employed.

II I T hese modules are in tended to add a bit to

t he scope and fl ex ibility of the game, at an

admitted cost in complex ity, I feal that this is
no serious object io n as the areas affected were
somewhat oversimp lifi ed to begin with,

tAl: Overstacking - Players may have up to

twice as many units in a hex as t he norm al
stac kin g limi t su bject to the restriction that all
of the excess units must be t ransport units,
and that al/ units in an overstacked hex have
t heir defence factors halved if attacked while
overstacked.
(B) : Unobserved fire - Us ing this rule, u nits
may fire into town or forest hex es wi th out a
spotting u nit . Basically, the firing unit su ffers
penalties before TEC and WEC penalties are
imposed. If the t arget hex has 1 or 2 green
and/or gray hex sides, the attacker 's attack
strength is halved; 3 or more and the attack
strengt h is reduced to ]4 normal. S PA units
firing at greater tha n Y, rang e , and M type units
may f ire t hrough gray or green hex sides as
well, When USing unobserved fire, combinat ion
attacks must be made on ali units in forest
hexes.

Ie) : Semi-hidden Units - Rather t han removing units f rom the board as in the experimental
Hid den Deployment rule, mere ly cover the
hidden uni ts wit h coins, poker chips or unit
counters fro m another game. The identity of a
unit is revea led when it fires its weapOns, is
adj acent to an enemy unit, or inIon a clear or
clear/hilltop hex t o wh ich an enemy unit h ~ s a
clear LOS (players may also dec id e that units
o n slopes or in gull ies must reve al their ident i"ty when in t he clear LOS of an enemy.)
When a player fires at a covered unit, he tells

the enemy player w hat types of weapons and

attack factors he is using. The enemy player
determines the odds, bu t tells the attacker
o nly the results of hi s die roll. Players may
even choose to leave th is secre t from t he attacker si nce in genera I on Iy unobserved fi re
could be used against the hidden units. But
even in thi s case, a wreck counter must be
placed where an AFV unit is destroyed.

p.

(D): Hidden Minefields and Reconnaisance-by-

Fire - Minefi e lds are not physically pl aced on

board until discovered; Thei r locatio ns must be
secretly recorded on t he side. The fields are
discovered in three ways - a unit moves onto
the field, th e he x is searched, or th e hex is
reconned by fire. (Note: Mi nefie lds on road
hexes must be revealed when any enemy unit
fall owi ng the road moves adjacent to it ; Th is is
because mining a road leaves visible traces.
However, a seco nd m inefield may be placed
off the road in the same hex.) Recon-by-fire
may be co nd ucted by a ny unit wit h an attack
factor against any hex wi th in its ra nge or 4
hexes, whichever is less. The unit simply fires
into the hex to ex plode any mines there. Units
may not move or attack in the same turn they
cond uct a search or recon by fire,
An additional factor that can be introduced is
t he dummy minefield . These are represent ed
on the board by regular minefield counters and
are revealed as dummies only if a un it moves
onto t he hex o r an engineer uni t moves next to
it and rolls th e die for removal. Recon-by-Fire
cannot be used t o detect a du mmy. When usin g dummies, players should leave at least a
part of their real f ields unhidden.
Mi nes on road hexes can be either on the road
or off the road, or two separate f ields may be
laid o n th at hex to cover both. They must be
removed sepa rate ly.
(D) : Cavalry Charges - Russian cava lry some.
tim es engaged in old fas hion ed charges, w ith
nonuniform results. I n a charge, the un it s can
move 4 hexes and 'the charge is treated I ike an
overrun attac k except j) the hex from which
they enter the target hex must be clear, iii
there can be no AFV units in the target hex ,
and ii i) the units being charged get to fire at
th e cava lry units before they e nt er the target
hex and if the cav is dispersed, it stops right
there. The odds fo r this counter-fire is basic
attack strength vs. defense strength. Counterf iring units cannot move or f ire in th eir ensuing t urn, and the cavalry uni "[s stay d ispersed
unti l the e nd of the Russian p layer's following
turn.

lEI : Employment of Towed Artillery Unit s The usu al rules gover ning towed weapons
should not apply t o th e to wed artillery units
supplied in the designer's notes booklet, These
weapons are ge nera ll y heavier than those used
in the game and/or t heir set up included indirect fi re co ntrol facilities. To reflect t his, the
7.5,10.5 a nd 15 em arti llery units should not

1-

17
be allowed t o fire in the turns before and after
load ing or unloadin g. (Actually these restrict ions could apply to the 8.8 cm AT and 122
mm infantry guns as well; they were damned
heavy pieces,) The 17 cm units require 5 turns
after unloading to prepare for fi ring and 3
tu rns to loa d before m ovi ng.
IV Additional units: Th is section includes
some comments on the additional units given
in t he designer's notes, as well as some units of
other o rig ins and indications of their employment.
(A): Artillery - The additional artillery un its
given in the design notes are based on 6 weapons per battery. This scheme was followed in
t he WESPE and HUMMEL units as wel l in the
Volksgrenadier divisions, but t he other divisional artillery battalions followed the standard 3 batteries of 4 weapons sch eme. So , fa r
the nit-pic kers , reduce the attack factors of the
17,15, and 10.5 cm units to 32, 40 and 28
while increasing their num ber from 2 to 3 (or
6 to 91. Also, t he Panze r. SS Panzer and Pan
zergrenadier artillery reg iments had 32 em f lak
units which are not shown.

In summary, I suggest the addition of these

units, beyond those suggested in t he deSign
notes. The fact that they are all German is due
to lack of data on Russian weapons and the
belief t hat most of the weapons used by the
Russians are al ready inc luded.
Use of these units: Heavy traCTOrs shou ld be
used for the artillery, Nebelwerfe r, .88mm AT
guns and the bridges. Light 't ractors should
generally replace trucks and half tracks as
prime movers for Flak , AT and in fantry guns
and 120rnm mortars. A 3.7 F lak SP should be
added to each ta nk regiment, and one should
re p lace the 2 20mm 141 in th e VG AT Bn. The
t owed 2cm Flak in t he Inf. Div. AT bn. shbuld
be replaced by SP units. Brumbar uni ts can be
used in place of th e GW38(M). Elefant AT
guns (also called Ferdinands and Porsch e Tigers) were Bmployed in one battalion (3 co of
3 platoons). SP 75mm IGs-there were 2 guns
in each of the rifle companies of tl16 armored
infantry bn, and 6 more in its heavy weapons
co; So rep lace the 2 StG III units by 6 of thBsB .
81 mm mo rta r sections-each engineer, security
and VG Fusilier co has one; use 3 to replace
the regular mortar units in the armored and
motor ized infantry bns; the recon bn sho uld
have 2 SP sections and a full SP platoon; the
sections in the arm inf bn shou ld be SP, and
one of the three sections added to the Mobile

HOW TO ORDER
GAMES, SUBSCRIPTIONS,
BACK ISSUES
AND OTHER PRODUCTS
Send all orders to:

Simulations Publications, Inc.

44 East 23rd Street
New York, New York 10010
Please enclose payment with your order;
make cheCk or money order pay .. ble to
Simu lations Publications, Inc. If possible,
do not send payment in cash. All payment
shou ld be in U.S. f unds. Write out your
order in exact form, being very specific as
to the description and quanti ty of each
separate ite m desired .

Division Engineer Bn should be SP.

General Organization notes: The VG Fusi lier
co should also have an IG (75mm) platoon.
The re should be 3.2 cm Flak in an arm. inf.b n.
1 in the mot.inf.bn; this means 4 in the arm.inf .reg. of t he Panzer div" but only 2 in its
Mot.inf.reg. Neither shOUld have a 20mm(2l
unit. The inf.reg.'s of the pzr.div. shou ld each

have an engr.co. as well (with hots in the arm

inf reg).
Stacking wit h t he mortar, SP CP and SP 751 G
sections - let one be added t o any stack , whi le
2 o r 3 are treated as another whole unit. The
non-mot 81 mort ar section can be carried in
transport unit in addition t o any other unit
being carried .

SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL GERMAN UNITS FOR PANZERBLITZ

DESCRIPTION

UNIT

28H 32
40H36

21:t~
4 H 10

fo,sPAA 10

Illtm0

I: t0

12 ElfNT 6

2 H 12

M12
81Jmrn

.-

a 1'IlUM 6

1 M12

281-sPM10

...
...

1s.J.~111110

4 heavy field guns, ammo vehicles,

about 200 men

2 cm Flak (SPI

6 unarmored halftracks with mounted

flak, plus ammo vehicles, about 40 men

r- 3.7 cm Flak (SP)

4 88mm AT guns(SP), with ammo vehicles

about 50 men

Brumbar platoon

2 15 em assault guns, ammo vehicles,

about 30 man

Ie IG section (SPI

2 75mm infantry guns mounted on

half tracks about 10 men

m GrW section (SP)

2 B1mm mortars mounted on half tracks

about 10 men

m GrW section

2 B1 mm mortars, about 15 men and 2

horse drawn vehicles

Armored CP

2 radio equipped halftracks, about

10 men

light tractor

5 unarmored half track prime-movers,

about 10 men Class C unit

1 I 1

2 HT-C p 10

o C

1saKI/i 10

8.9 weapons on a pz IV chassis, ammo

vehicles and about 50 men

Elefant platoon

10 H 12

1 I t

17 cm arty bty

8 H 12

t:IJ.

2 7,.sPG 10

4 med ium field howitzers, ammo

vehicles, about 180 men

s3l-SPAA a

4 light field howitzers, ammo

vehicles, about 130 man

15 cm arty bty

32H 80

... ..
...
12 A 12

r- 10.5 cm arty bty

r- Heavy tractor

Be sure to write you r full name and

address (includ ing Zip code) on each sheet
of you r a rder. PI ease do not encl ose oth ar
corresponden ce wi th your orde r since th is
causes de lays in the processing and fulf ill
ment of your order.
New York State Residents: Please add 4%
sales tax on all orders lexcept for orders
for magazi nes).
New York City Residents: Please add 7%
sales ta x on a ll orders (except orders for
magazines) .
All prices apply to orders f rom the U.S.A. ,
APO/FPO, and Canada. Allow two to
three weeks for delivery on orders within
the Continental U.S. Simu lation Series
Games are shipped by First Class mai l;
Other games are shipped parcel post.

5 unarmored halftraek heavy tractors,

about 5 men Class C unit

Overseas Orders : On all orders originating

outside of U.S. I Canada I APO- FPO,
customers must add one dol lar per year
per subscription and one dollar per game.
Add $0.25 for each individual back issue
or book. This additional payment is purely
for postage (overseas orde rs on all prod
ucts are shipped surface mail ; allow six to
eight weeks for delivery). All payment on
all orders must be in U.S. funds Ithis
inc ludes Canadia n customers). All import
duties must be assumed by the customer.
Overseas customers may, by advance
arrangement land payment). have their
orders shipped by Air Mail. T he rates,
howeve r, are tru ly outrageous (often
exceeding the price of the merchandise
itself).

18

Panzerblitz Revisited
You are cont rolling 23rd Panzer Division in
Situat ion 2. Goi ng into the Soviet half of the
last turn you have, through mag nificent defensive tactics, kept t he Russia ns to within 8 hexes of t he north ern ed ge - suddenly, out of the
underbrush, under the muzzles of all your
tanks, guns, a nd miscellaneous death dealing
weapo nry, a tr uck scurries into hex 18 and
Decisive Vict ory. What a f ru strat ing a nd absu rd disast er.
Well, this prob lem certai nly bot hered me, especially as several attempt to overcome it, su ch
as use of the ' Phase Movemen t & Retu rn
Fire' Ru le and offshoots from it, all fell sh ort
of the desired realism. MV latest, and hopefully
fina l, solution Is su mmed up in Fig. 1. Note
that t h is form can be used to keep tra c k of
turns, and impu lses within turns.
The prime change t o published game procedures is the addition of defensive fire DU RI NG
the attacker's movemen t. This defensive fire
can be carried out in a nyone of the fa llowing
si tuatio ns:
A. Situation 1 - If the movi ng unit moves
more tha n two successivB hexes in clea r sight
of one or mo re enemy units.
Defensive fire takes plac e during the attacker's
movement. T he target must be visible for more
than two successive hexes to allow time for the
defensive weapons to be targeted and ranged.
T he defendi ng weapon ca n fire at any poin t
du ring the movement of the ta rget u nit, after
the target has passed into the th ird successive
hex of movement visible to the weapon.
A target which has been visible to one weapon
for three hexes a nd t o a nother for two or fewer hexes, can on ly be fired at, in that hex, by
the first weapon. If a unit is visible to t wo or
more weapons for the required nu mbe r of hexes, it can be fired on by all th ose weapons
either concu rrentl y or successively. A unit
travelIing th rough successive f ield s of fire can,
therefo re, be fired at several ti mes during its
movement (Note : Defensive fire is the only situation in which a unit can be 'fired at more
tha n once during a single imp u lse).

terrain road hexe s without drawing fire during

movement. Firing is delay ed unti l movement is
complete because it takes t ime to organiz,e effective fire against a ta rget in lim ited vision
terrain,

Defensive fire ta kes place afte r the attacke r's

movement ceases, This enables defending units
to fi re upon a unit w hich has either not
moved , or has fini shed its move within ra nge
of, and visible to, these units.

5 . The Phase Chart (Fig. 1) includes an optional ru le which would prevent any un it
which fires defensivelY from carrying out any
o'ffen sive action. I am personally not in favour
of its use as it would fu rther slow the offensive
which, in most Panzerblitz situ ations, already
has enoug h problems.

2. For simp licity sake, all LOS determ in ations

are made from the centre of t he firing hex to
t he centre of the target hex (Real-Space Un e
of Sight Determination).

6, As most situations contain a distinct bias

towards one side or the other, I would recommend that Panzerblitz victories be measured
after combatants have played both sides of a
given situation .

3. When a weapon is fired (whether offensively

or defensively) , it is left upright (to ensure that

Figure 1

SIDE A PHASES

SIDE B PHASES

Execute minefield attacks.

Execute minefield attacks.

Fire.

Fire.

Move non-firing units! execute overruns, "

Make Close Assaultsl f lip all units (except those dispersed in Impulse 7) right
side up. Also flip un its dispersed in Impulse 3.

non-firing units! execute over3 Move

runs. "

Make Close AssaUlts! flip all units (except those dispersed in Impulse 3) right
side up. Also flip units dispersed in Impulse 7,

"Defensive Fire. Rolled DURI NG the moving player's phase .

using only direct fire, unde r the fo ll owing conditions:

jacent to the defender (regard less of te rrain).

WHEN DEFENSIVE FIRE

ROLLED

SITUATION

Defensive fi re ca n ta ke place durin g u nit move.

ment (Category 1), or afte r it has been completed (Category 2).

Unit moves MORE th an two successive hexes in clea r si ght of 0 ne or more

defendi ng un its.

Category 2 - If the adjacent hex that the moving un it enters is ot her than clear terrain or
clear te rrain road, that un it cannot be fired at
unt il attacker movement is comp lete. Thus a
transport can unload and th en pass through
'fu rther adjacent non-clear terrain or non-clear

. 4. A unit dispersed during a defensive f ire tu rn

is flipped up at the end of the OPPOSing player's offensive tu rn. This keeps the number of
d ispersed ' phases due to offensive and to d ~
fensive fire ro ughly equa l. T b differentiate between a unit dispersed by defe nsive fire from
one dispersed by offensive fire, place a marker
on t he un it overturned by defensive fi re.

GENERAL
1. A defensive weapon can be 'fired only once
du ring this phase, regardless of how many
situations it is capable of firing in.

B. Situation 2 - If the moving unit moves ad-

Category 1 - If the adjacent hex that the moving unit enters is clear terrain or clear t e rrain
road , then it can be fired on immediat ely re.
gardless.of how many or few clear terrain hexes it has previous crossed: thus a loaded vehicle
co uld be f ired o n before it cou ld unload its
cargo. This is to reflect the fac t that defensive
weapons would be fir ing at point blank range
aga inst a target in open country.

it is not mistaken for a d ispersed unit), but has

a ma rker penny, etc. placed on it. Th e marker
is removed from ALL weapons fi red during the
impulses of a given side a't the end of th at
side's Close Assault Phase. I.e. I n Side A
phases, markers a re removed from guns fired
offensively in Phase 2, and t hose fired defensively in Phase 3, at the end of Phase 4.

Note that the adjacent defending unit can act

as a spotter fo r other direct fire,
C. Situation 3 - if the moving unit is either
adjacent t o a defending un it, or in open terrain
(within range and spotted) at the end of its
movement phase .

by George G. Hopp

Unit moves adjacent to defendera. Adjacent hex is clear terrain o r clear

t errain road.
b, Adjacent hex is other tha n above,
Unit is either ad jacent, o r in open terrain (Within range and spotted) at t he
end of its movement.

Duri ng unit movement

As unit enters adjacen t hex

After unit movement has ended

After un it movement has ended

Op tional Rule. If a weapon is fired during

this impulse, it can be ne ither fi red nor
moved during its own offensive impulses.

19

Figure 2
Situation 1 :
2 spots 1 in hex A, and can fire starting in

hex c.
3 spots 1 in hex B. and can fire starting in
hex D.
?ll:uation 2 (Category 1):
2 can fire at 1 when it enters hex D.
Situation 3:
If 1 ends its movement in hex E, both 2&3
can be fired at it (If they haven't fired
previously).

Figure 3
Situ ation 1: Does not apply.
Situation 2 (Category 1):
3 can fire at 1 as it enters hex A.
4 can fire at 5 as it enters the hex its
shown in.
Situation 2 (CatSf)Ory 2):
3 can fire at 2 after all movement has
been completed.
4 can fi re at 2, spotted for by 3, after all
movement has ceased.
Situation 3:
3 can fire at 1 or 2.
4 can fire at 2, spotted for by 3, or at 5.
(Note: As firing is carried out, in t his
situa t ion, after a ll movement has ceased , the t ruck could unload its troops
before being fired on).

S&T 21, featuring

The Flight of the Goeben game
The re a re actually fou r ga mes in this issue
(a ll with unmounted counters). The F light
of t he Goeben (Strateg ic] contains two
11 x 1T' maps, counters and other playa ids. It in volves the Allied search fo r the
German battle-cr uiser Goe ben in the Mediterranean during August 1914. A unique
"search" sys't em, includ ing "secret d ie rolls"
for such things as objectives and victory
cond itions,as wel l as a rea listi c coa ling rule
make this a unique game. Also in issue 21 is
a " mi natures" ga me, Flight of 'the Goeben
(Tactical). The Chicago-Chicago I game recreates t he situat ion in Chicago dur ing the
August 1968 riots. Complete with 22x28"
playing map, rules and play-a ids. A fourth
game, Invasion, is ill t he Games column.
A lso articles on the Brit ish army in North
Af rica. a rev iew of the T est Series Games
pl us regular features.
$3.00, from Simulations Publications

20

'
I

.".

>'i;

In Designers Notes (Game Design #5)' Jim

Dunnigan dealt with the " id iocy fact or" in
game design. Anot her name for t his factor has
been t he "rationa lity concept" of game design.
Th is is a critical concept because game t heory
has been criticized primarily on the grounds
that it forces players to maximize some value
(Le., behave rationally) ; does not account for
deviant behavior !idiocy or ir rationality); and
generally, presents a sterilized version of reality. These attacks present a severe threat to
ga me theory and are one of t he major facto rs
in the relative unpopularity of simulations and
games among the academic community. T his
article is concerned with three important
aspects of the quest ion of "idiocy" and t he
ho pe of "complet ing" game theory to make it
a less sterile mode of understanding situationsolving.
Mr. Dunni gan sets forth t wo planes of id iocy.
The first is the plane prior to the hist orical
sit uation. This can be incorporated in the rules
of t he game/simulation le.g. KURSK). The
oth er is t he idiocy manifested during the
historical situation. This cannot readily be
built into the game/simu lation because of
unfeasibleness, complications, etc. (FRANCE,
1940). This plane of decision, Mr. Dunnigan
asserts, has been left to playe r control. Because
of this, he fu rt her asserts (also correctly) that
we t hink our present frame of reference, thu s
making histo rical re-creation unlikely. We te nd
to seek ways around rules designed to build in
such idiocy lescaping consequences of "Feudal

S&T 22, featuring the Tac 14

(Renaissance of Infantry) game
Tactical Game 14 co ntai ns a 22x28" map,
unmounted counters and other pla y-aids.
The game is tactical leach un it represents
some 500 men, each Ilex some 100 meters).
11 covers the period 1250-1550AD when
infant ry replaced the mou nted "man-atarms" I"knight") as the decisive weapon.
Each unit represents a different type of
soldier Ipikemen, light and heavy cavalry.
long- and cross bowmen, artillery, arq uebusiers, etc.) These are combined to prod uce 20 different battles of the period
{f ro m Adrianople . 378AD to Pavia,
1525ADl. Spec ial rules have been deve loped to recreate the unique conditions of
tactic,11 level warfare. Also in issue 22 is an
article on the Renaissa nce of I nfantry, as
well as a "Profi Ie" article on the deve lo pment and use of t he Germs n Me-l09 fighter.
Introduction of GAGE game reviews plus
regular features.
$3.00, from Simulations Publications

by John Govostes
Rule")' I feel we must tackle this factor to
mak e game theory a viable situation-solving
tool. We must make the idiocy fa ctor work t o
make simu lation games more than ster ile tests
of wits under controlled conditions. We must
use idiocy factors t o increase realism' and
abandon t he concept of rationa l behavior in
game theory.
I perceive three levels of idiocy in any historie
al situation being analyzed. T he first is the
personal level. Th is is the simplest level and
dates back to PHALANX and DARK AGES.
Th is represe nts the personality of the commander (or commanders) of the various armies
present. Psychoanalysis offers us t he tools of
Classificat ion of behavior traits and patterns
that could enab le us to construct biographies
and probability tab les of likely actio ns (and
successes) for these men.

BAROSSA, STRATEGY I, US N, etc. This

rep resents the perceived use o'f the military by
the govern ment and the goals sought beyond
single battles and campaigns. Th e information
is also availab le, but it is more difficult to
assimilate and reduce t o probability tables. A
good start has been made towa rd th is by the
National Objectives tables in Origins of World
War Two.
I am opting for a system first pu t forwa rd by
Nathan Leites (A Study of Bolshevism, 1953)
- Qperational codes. T h is is a means of
understanding behavior patterns and responses
through an understanding of doctrine. We have
done this type of analysis in S&T. To a certain
extent, one could argue doctrine is incorporated into a game. A unit's movement, firepower,
and organization are partly fu nctions of doctrine. But S&T began a construction of units
ICO's) which igno red doctrinal aspects and left
these fact ors to the ru les. I would include
these facto rs under doctrine or more properly
exp ressed - operational codes.

The second level is military. This is the

operat ional doct rin e of the ' military establishment in question. From such a doctr ine,
probabilitv tables regard ing types of formations, actions, and resu lts cou ld be constructed which would limit the player's actions in
situations being simulated. Several articles have
bee n done on t he different military establishments and their doctrines. The information
seems neadily available fo r this operational
step.

Up to this point, we have three levels of idiocy

that take place in a ca mpaign (any or all of
which may be inc luded in a single si mulation
situation). We have means of operationalizing
these concepts outside t he rules. That leaves
the third critical aspect of game the ory decision.

The third and most complex level is the

political. This is crucial in games like BAR-

It is well to rem ember that deCision theory

preceded game theory; in fact , game theory is

21
an offshoot of decision theory. But the criticisms of decision theory (decision concern,
individuals ignored, consequences of decisions
ignored, zero-sum aspects, false picture of
inpu ts, gap between "rea I" decisions and
acade mic ones etc.) limit its value to those
concerned with conflict resolution. The problem hinges on how people reach decisions behavior patterns. Probability tables must be
constructed based on methods of decisionmaking , i.e., we need to 'find a common
deno minator of decision-making. Let us posit
three levels of decision, each reflecting not
only more sophistication on the part of the
decision makers, but also an increasing order
of complexity and reality,
The first leve l of decision is that of maximizing
behavior, This is the same as the economic
principle - action to max imize profit while
reducing cost. Most early two-player games
used this principle, This decision level illustrates another important principle in decision
theory - the zerosum concept, This simply
means what one pl aye r gains, another must
lose - the sum of gain and loss is zero. This is
also prevalent In early games; there could only
be one winner, There is a telling criticism of
this pattern of behav ior - players do not
always seek to maximize. In economics t his
has given rise to a new field - econometrics.
Giant corporations with near monopo lies may
actively seek shortrun losses for long-run
gains. I n the military arena, the actions we
have taken in Vietnam are not indicative of
maximizing military effects but a solution is
sought polit ically (with gain in mind).
The second level of decision is tha t of sat isficing behavior. If alternatives in strategy are at
or above p layer resources, the player w ill
c hoose the best cou rse avai lable. When no
cou rses of strategy ca n satisfy player aspirations, the concept of satisfiCing behavior
means that th e player will take short-run
-action of searching for alternat ives and revise

S&T 23, featuring the T-34 game

T"34 is a "miniatures" game that uses paper

cut-out co unters rep resent ing platoon and

compa ny s ize units. No ma p is used. The
subject is Russia, 1944. It's a somewhat
different sort of game. If you want to find
out what miniatures are lik e, try this game.
Also in issue 23 is the f irst of our articles on
the war in Russia (1941-45). This first
article , on t he Organization of t he Soviet
ground forces, presents data avai lable in no
other publi cat ion. A sepa rate 22x28" sheet
gives organization and equipment -charts of
al l Soviet un its employed during t he war.
The article itself goes into the "whys" of
Soviet doctrine,as well as giving such Order
of Battle data as is available. Also in issue 23
is another North Africa a rt icle, t his one on
the German Afrika Korps. Plus our regula r
features,
$3.00, from Simulations Publications

his goals. Th is means when a player seeking

total victory while he has only the capabil ity
of achieving marginal victory , he is lik ely to
become emotional, be have irrationally in his
moves, etc., unless he revises his goals down to
rea l ity. The means of handl ing this pattern of
decision have been bu ilt into simu lation games
by using the victory point system and th ree
tYpes of victory. Still the system is inadequate
as the first instinct is to max im ize - seek tota l
victory. Also, it doesn't work wit h more than
two person games. The th ird leve l is (hat of
"compensating strategies" (a Ie S. Liebersonl.
Th is theory of decision means that severa l
players can pursue goals (without conspiracy
or collusion) provided the ind ividual loss t o
any of the other players is smal l and it can be
shown that there is no net loss. The theory
ta Kes actions of others into account before a
decision is reached. Decisions are based on
anticipated reaction s and consequences of decisions. The zero-sum co ncept is reduced to its
proper high plane of nat ion al concern . Players
act as indiv iduals LJntil t heir very existence is
threatened.
If we view the last two types of decision as the
mo re realistic and preferred, we a're forced to
beg in revision of victory cond itions in t he
games. T hi s has begun t o be d one unconsciously by t he scenario concept (it limits actions of
players in to seeking perhaps on ly margina l
victory, best examples are LOST BATTLES,
PAN ZERBLlTZ, and GRUNT). Bu t if we use
the operational code concept, we can begin to
construct decis ion probabiJ it y tables based
upon the apparent decision behavior exhibited
by the rea l pe rsons,
What we are after is a system which not on ly
has a realistic and playable set of rules fo r the
simulation/game, but a means of incorporating
the h istorica l huma n facto r. We are trying to
control player resp onse within pa tter ns of
behavior preva lent dLJring the historica l situat ion. TI nce we can do that we are-involved in

t he ul t imate experiment, gO ing beyond CHESS

or any other game int o the real m of e motion,
dr ive, ambition, and understanding. That is
what game theory mLJst seek . Each successive
step b rings us closer to dup licating rea lity.
Once we have ac hieved that, we are only steps
away fr om simulat ing (with predictive capabi l
ity) the future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. The re are many articles that
can be referred to, I will lim it myself to just a
few. Herbert Simon's article in the BobbsMerrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences,
Vol. XLIX, (Ju ne , 1959), PP. 264-266; Nathan
Leites' A Study of BOlsheVism (1953) ; Thomas
Schel ling's The Strategy of Conflict (London,
'1960): Rosenau, Schell ing and ShLJbik's artie
les in Contemporary Political Analysis(London, 1960 ); S. Liebe rson's article in American Journal of Sociology (January, 1971) and
E_ Gross's article in American Journal of
Sociology (July. 197 1).

A Brief, Physical Description

of Simulation Series Games
The physical qualily of Simulation Series
Games is very similar to thai of the games
included in issues of Strategy & Tactics.
The primary differences are (1 . ) the, map is
produced on heavy cardstock as opposed
to the lightweight stock used in magazine
games, (2.) a die is inclLJded and (3.) the
map is only folded twice (down to approximately 11" x 14" I and the game is
shipped in a plain envelope with a corru
ga ted s I i ffener (unboxed). Usually,
Simulation Series' games have a greater
amount of auxiliary tables and game
charts included with them.

22
destroy t hem or dislodge them from their
pOsitio n. (see com bat action).

DOUlll-PlUS GOD!
by Redmond A. Simonsen
Over the past f ifteen years or so , dur ing which
wargames have been genera l ly avai lab le, a large
body o f jargon has grown up aro und t he
games. Due to the sp l i ntered, erractic growth
of the field , much o f th is special langua ge
came into use w ithou t much t hought to logic
or cla r ity or any rea l sense of uti li ty. Many of
the game designers had little fee l for language,
nor d id they rea li ze how important t he right
c ho ice of wo rd s is to proper rules-writ ing.
Even i n simple t hings some trul y as ini ne wo rd
choices were made and unfortuna tely st uck! I
wonder w hat su per semanticist deci ded tha t
" hex agons wi ll henceforth be referred to as
squares". Lovely. Perhaps the saine friend of
Webster decid ed that uni t s should have " factors" and bequeathed to us all the ambiguities
of rules-ph rasing tha t resu lted f rom that co mplet ely inappropriate use o f t he w ord.
Since I'm the on ly person who seems to
actua l ly enjoy writing ru les in t his game-mil l I
work in (h ow tha t squares with being an Art
Director, I'll leave to you psychoana lysts), it
fel l to me to develop and refi ne the standard
phrases to be used in gam e rules. This I did
part ly out of self-defen se: you should see t he
pain fl ash across my f ace whe n I 'm preparing
somebody else's ru les manuscript for typesetti ng and come across some gem of obf uscation.
A nothe r, m ore importa nt, reason fo r d a i ng it
is communication. This hobby(?) is growing
larger by the min ut e and it would be pleasant
i f we all spoke the same language and meant
the same t hi ng by it.
Over the past severa l months, in the course of
writin g or rewr iting or touching-up the rules to
most of the games that have come out of this
company, I began to replace t he old ly r ics in
some of the standa rd "songs" one f inds in all
rules. The reasons for compi ling them and
presenting t hem to you in a single glossary are
(1 ) to gi ve yo u (and espec iall y the newer
players am on gst youl an overv iew of the
language, (2/ to give currency to t he term s and
to estab l ish t hem i n the coli ec t ive mind, and
(3/ to get your reactio ns and opin ions on this
" newspeak" I'm try ing to induce you to use.
After al l , you should have some say i n what's
going t o be coming ou t of your mouths.
The gu iding pr inciples i n the development of
t his glossary h ave been:

3. Avo id the " Pentagonese" syndrome, i. e., t he

use of complicated jargon in p lace of plain
language.
The glossa ry is of course in a dynamic stat e:
sbme of the jargo n w il l wi th er and be replaced;
I expect to rece ive feed back f rom a II of you
w hich wi ll d i rec t the addition, subtraction o r
modif icat ion of t he t erms we will all be usi ng.
Note: in some cases t he "oldspeak" term
w hich is being replaced by the new language
w ill be found at the end of t he defi nition
p receded by "abs" (obsole t e). Note also, that
the definitions given are somewh at generalized;
the specific rules surrounding a term in a given
game wil l in many cases f urther define the
term .
I nc lud ed i n t he glossary are some common
mi lita ry t erms wh ich are in general use in
games. A lso included are those "oldspeak"
terms w hich w ill remain in use. Some o f the
terms i ncluded may seem absu rd ly simp le and
not really in need of definition. Such terms
have been i ncluded simp ly to delineate the ir
spec ial app l ication to game-ru le.s or t o merely
indicat e t heir standard abbrev iations or caPitalizat ion . Note that some of the words in the
glossary are capi talized w hen in ordinary Engli sh t hey would no t be. This is deliberately
done in o rd er t o set them off and to ca ll
attention to their having specia l meaning when
writ ing game ru les.
Aircraft Element - The one counter of a
two-cou nter A ir unit which rep resents the
fl y i ng portion of that Air unit. (see G rou nd
Support Element) .
Air Defense Strength {ADS)-t he numerical
rating of t he abi lity of a u nit or a hex to
defend against ai r attack_
airlift-to t ra nsport by ai r.
Air-Strike Strength Poi nts- a n allowance of
Combat Strength Points w hi ch represent t he
ai r attack capability of a Player's airfo rce.
Usually used in games in w hich the ai r arm is
not represented by actual counters but rather
by such Individual ly allocat able Combat
Strength Points_

1. Each aspect or facet o f a game sho uld have

unambiguous phrases or labels which are consistent ly and logical ly used.

area-map game-a game in which th e pieces are

moved by area rathe r than by a grid system.
see t he games Chicago-Chicago!, Diplomacv,
and Origins.

2. Special words or phrases shOUld be si mple,

and as se lf-descriprive as poss ibl e.

attack (atk/-a specif ic combat act ion agai nst a

particular En emy unit or u nits, i n o rder to

Attacker (Atkr or A)-The Player whose Combat Phase is in progress; the Pl ayer who is
initiating combat agai nst opposing units. This
term shou ld only be used in reference to th e
Player, and not that Player's un its
.Attack Strength (AS)- The bas ic offensive
power of a given unit ex pressed as a number.
(see Combat Strength and Defen se Strength).
obs: Attack Factor
Attack Transport - a naval transpo rt unit capable of delivering assault units t o hostile
beaches.
Bombardment Results Table (BRT)- a specialized Combat Resu lts Table used to resolve t he
effects of air, land , and/or naval bombardment.
break-down-the act of substit uti ng tWO or
more smaller u nits for a Single larger u nit.
cascade attacking-a caref u lly sequenced series
of related at tacks wh ich have as their object
the surrounding and. eliminat ion of a key unit.
case-a numbered or lettered paragraph which
mod if ies or fu rther exp l ains t he prov isions of a
General Rule.
Class-a grouping of si m i lar unit -types according to funct ion; e_g . .. ... all Air un its are Class
T wo .. . "
clean game-a game w hich is simple and
uncl uttered in t he same way that chess is
simple. A we ll deSigned , playable game that
does not rely upo n a patchwork of complex
rules in order to achieve authen t icity.
Close Assault Tactics (CAT}-in tact ical games,
the spec ial attacks made by infant ry or infantry/engineer combinat ions which are made
against adjacent or same-hex enemy unit s and
wh ich are resolved using some sort of bonus
system to reflect t he effectiveness of such
attacks (e.g. , doubli ng t he A t tack St rength).
combat-action- a specific attack made by a
given u nit or group of units agai nst a given
defend ing unit or uni t s; an attack which is
resolved by a sing le consu ltation o f the Combat Resul t s Tabl e or a closely related series of
consult ations of th e Com bat Results Table.
combat allocation-the act of indicating, befo re execu t ion, t he exact units which will
participate in spec ific combat actions in a
given Combat Phase .
Combat Phase-the port ion o f a Player-Turn
during which combat takes place.
Combat Results or Combat Outcomes-descriptive phrases used to labe l t he ef fect s of combat
u pon units. Such phr ases are routinely ab brevi ated whe n used in Combat ReSU lts Tables.
The fo ll owing l ist gives the most Combat
Outcomes, their sta ndard abbreviations and
the i r general mea n i ng:

Attacking Units Eliminated rAe): all attacking

units involved in that attack are destroyed .

Attacking Units Retreat fAr): all involved

attacking units must retreat.

23
Attacking Units Disrupted (Ad): all involved

attacking un its are "disrupted" (which usually

means that they rem ain in place and suffer
some sort of impairme nt of th eir co mbat
a nd/or moveme nt ability)
Exchange (Ex): t he side wit h the wea ker force
is completely destroyed a nd the st ronger force
loses a number of Combat St rength Points at
least eq ual to t ha t of the weaker force.
Defending un i ts Eliminated (De); Defending
Units Retreat (Dr); Defending Units Disrupted
(Dd): the three precedi ng ph rases have the

same general meaning as applied to the defending units as do their counterpart phrases Wh ic h
apply to the attacking units.
Comba t Resu lts Tab le {CRT)-a t able of combat outco mes usually used in con junctio n with
a die or some other means of generat ing a
rando m nu mber in o rder to determine the
effects of attacks made du rin g the course of a
game_
Combat Results Deck {CRDl-a dec k of cards
used to determine the outcome of combat-actions instead of using a die-table system_
Combat Strength-the basic o'ffensive a nd defensive p ower of a given unit expressed as a
numbe r_ obs: Combat Factor
Com bat Supply-that f or m of supply required
by un its which are a bout to engage in combat;
Combat Supply usually takes the form of
special sup ply un its which are expended as
t hey are used for supp ly purposes,
conso lidate-to form a single large unit from
two or more smal ler u nits (see breakdown)
contiguous line-an uninterrupted line of
Friendly u nits and/or Friendly con trOlled hexes_
controlled hex - a hexago n upon which units of
one Player's army are exerting a Zo ne of
Control without actually occupying the hex ._
corps-equivalent-a given number of sma ller
units which whe n taken t'ogether a re co nsidered t he eq ual of a fu II corps for game pu rposes.
Counter-attack (Ca)-a same-p hase attack by
the no n-phasing Player's units as mandated by
the Combat Resu lts T able. See the games Crete
and France 1940.
covering terrai n- in tactical games, terrain
wh ich provides concea lment and t hereby prevents a Line of S ight/Li ne of Fire from being
established to un its withi n such te rrain.
Defender (Def or D)- t he Playe r whose u ni ts
are t he objects of the attac ks in progress.
Defense Strength {DSI - the basic defensive
power of a given un it expressed as a number.

basis representing the use of c rew-s ighted

weapons; e.g., tank and anti-t ank guns, machineguns etc.
"dirt"- those as pects of a game which increase
complexity at the expense of playabi lity;
un necessary detail added to a game in an
attempt to produce so-call ed " rea lism".
diversionary attack-an attack performed at
poo r odds in a n effort t o all ow o t her attack ing
u nits to concent rate (and obtai n better odds)
against another, adj acent defending un it. obs:
soak-off.
dummy unit-a cou nter which resembles an
actual unit but whose only function is to
deceive t he Ene my PIayer; a cou nter used to
si mu late t he effects of li mited inte lli ge nce.
Enemy Player-the opposing Player. Term is
used in ru les writing to refe r to the other
Pl ayer from the point of view of th e reader.

ma inte nance a nd ad min istrative personnel and

facil it y_
hex-hexagonal grid-module used 'to det e rmin e
the pos it ioning and movement of u nits on a
Game-map . obs: square.
hex-grain-the direction of a hex-pattern which
is described by d rawi ng an imaginary line,
perpendicular to two of the sides of a hex and
pa ra Il e l t o one of t he si des of the map-sheet.
When the Iine para lle ls the width of 'the
map-sheet , the pattern is called "grain short";
when it parallels t he length, it Is cal led "grain
long".
hex-side-one of t he six sides of a hex agonal
grid modu le_
Indirect Fire-in tact ical gam es, high trajectory
f ire guided by an o bserver. Fire whic h is not
limited to the Line o f Sight.

entry cost-the expend iture of Move ment

Poi nts required to en ter a given hex .

interdict-to affect (usu al ly by the use of

airpowe r or art illery) the lines of commun icat ion or supp ly of a n enemy force.

environment- t he physica l sphere in which t he

action of a game takes place: Air, Sea, or
Land.

Interphase-a Phase occuring between the Player-Turns in which both Players perform some
action {such as unit prod uction, fo r exam ple!.

e)(it-cost-the expenditure of Moveme nt Points

requ i red to enter a given hex.
facing-the direction in whic h a unit is pointed; applicable on ly in games in which units
have a "front" and a "flank".

involved unit-a unit wh ich is t he SUbject, or

the object, of a given game-ac t ion (usually an
attack); a unit which is act ive ly concerned as
d ist ingu ished fro m other units which may be
present in the same position but Wh ich a re not
partic ip ants in the act ion,

Field of Fi re-t he a rc of space through which a

given un it 's weapons have effect.

isolated-the stat e of be ing totally out-ofsu pp ly.

Friendly Player-the Player from whose po int

of view a given ru le is written.

Level of Victory-one of t he various degrees of

victory possibl e in a given game. In games in
which degrees of victory are possible the most
common fo r mat is th at of three possible leve ls:

Fire Protect ion Strength-the defensive abi lit y

of a given uni t or terrain with respect to a Fire
attack. (see Protection Strength I
Fire Strength-t h e speci ali zed Combat
St re ngth of a missile-firing uni t, e. g. , an artillery unit.
Fortification hex - a hex which con tains p repa red defensive posit ions.
game-map-the p laying surface. obs: mapboard
or bo ard
Game-Turn - a complete t urn of play in a
game, usu al ly co nsisting of two Player-Turns.
(see Sequence of Play)
General Rule-a major game rule expressed in a
brie f , genera l parag ra ph . (see cases)
General Supply-t hat as pect of su pply wh ic h
contributes to the day-to-day "housekeeping"
and maintena nce of a un it in the f ie ld (as
d istinguished from Combat Supply)

Demoral ization-th e pOint at which t he overall

performance of a n army or a unit is grossly
affected by the psychological impact of he~vy
losses.

grid-the pattern (u su a ll y hexagonal) superimposed upon t he ma p-sheet in order to regu larize movement and position, Isee hex).

detrain - t he off-l oad ing of units wh ich have

been travell ing by ra il; simi larly : deplane,
debark. Antonyms: entrain, emplane, embark.

grid-map game-a general term for simu lation

games which ut il ize grid pattern maps, quant ified units, pro babil ity tab les etc.

Direct- Fire- i n t actica l games, the app l icat ion

of a unit's Attack Strength on a Line-o f-Sig ht

Ground Support Element-the one coun ter of

a two counter Air Unit wh ich re presents the

Marginal Victory-a bare vict ory; e.g., in terms

of game victory points, a vic'tOry in wh ich the
w inn e r has more than half of the total victory
points achieved by bot h sides, but less t ha n
two-thirds, and has not suffered losses greater
than 45% of his enti re army,
Substantive Victory-a creditable, but average

victory; e.g_, in terms of game victory points, a

victo ry in which the winner has two-thirds or
more of the tot al victory poi nts achieved by
bot h sides bu t less than th ree-quarters, and has
not suffered lo sses greater th a n 35% O'f his
tota l strength_
Decisive Victory - an unqualif ied success : e.g"
in t erms of game victory points a victory in
which the winner has at least three-quarters of
the total victory points acheived by bot h sides,
and has not suffered losses greater t han 25% o f
his total st ren gt h.
Possible fourth Level of Victory:

Overwhelming victory - a rout of t he e ne my: in

te rms of game victory points, a victory in
which the winner has four-f ifths or more of
the total victory points achieved by both sides
an d has suffered losses not greate r than 15% of
his total strength.
Note t hat the specific terms of victory may
change from game 10 9<J me-what constitutes a
Decisive Victory in one gam e may be on ly a
Margi nal Victory in another-the rat ios given
1Il the above definit ions are for the purpose of
illustrat io n on ly and should no r be construed
as abSOlute st and a rds.

24
Line of Fi re (LOF)-t he path of fi re Ifrom
direct-fire weapo ns) between two units; the
'imaginary straight line wh ich describes such a
path drawn from t he ce nter of the one hex to
the center of the other. The Line of Sigh t and
the Line of Fire are usu ally equivalent.
line of Sight (LOS)- t he path of VISion
between two units; the imagi nary straight line
which describes such a path drawn fro m the
center of one hex to the center of t he other.
Melee Combat-in tactical games, hand-to-hand
fight ing usua ll y involving edged weapons. In
such ga mes. units are usually represented as
having a Melee Combat Strength distinct fro m
any Fire Combat Strength .
Motorized Movement Phase - in modern-era
games, th e second Movement Phase, of a
PlayerTurn, in which the motorized units may
be moved (again).
Movement Allowance-the basic movement
capability of a unit, expressed as a number
whic h represents the basic number of hexagons
which th e unit may move in a single Moveme nt
Phase.

Play-by-Mail IPBM) -any one of severa l sys

tems desig ned t o all ow Players to cond uct
games by ma il .

Road Movement Rate-the number of Moveme nt Po int s-per- hex req uird to be expended
by a unit moving on a road .

Player-one of t he active participant s in a

ga me.

saddle poi nt-the po int in a game in whic h t he

outcome is usua ll y dec id ed.

Player-Turn-a SUbdiv ision of a Game-T urn in

which the actio ns of a spec ific Player ta ke
place. (see Se'1 uence of Pl ay).

Scenario-a game-si tuation consisting of d ist inct Orders of Battle, deployment, and Vic
tory Conditions. Usua ll y a game will present
several Scenarios all of wh ich can be created
using the same basic equipment available in the
game.

Player Victory-a system of victory determinat ion which relies upon a hand icapp ing rule
which ba la nces the chance of winning for
either Player so that even in historical situations which are grossly imbalanced, each Player has a roughly even chance of w inn ing
measured in terms of how well they perfo rmed
with the fo rces avai lable to them.
Point-the unit-of-measure used in describing
the constituent parts of a Movement Allowance, a Combat Stre ngth , or a Range Allowance. Also: th e unit-of-m easure of victo ry in
games wi t h q uantified Victory Cond iti ons. T he
word Point shou ld always be used with a
modifier to avoid am bi guity.
Production Center-a cou nter wh ich represe nts

a given amount of uni t-prod ucing capability.

Isee J:he ga me Strategy I) .

Movement Phase-the portion of a Pl ayer Turn

in which movement of t hat Player's un its ta kes
place.
Movement Point-the unitof. measu re of which
a Movement Al lowance is co m po sed ; usually
one Movement Point represents t he capability
of moving one hex.
Mil itary Sea Transport (MST)-naval units
which are capable of transporting units from
fri end ly port to friend ly port, but wh ic h are
not capab le of delivering invasion fo rces.
Order of Battle (OB)-the make-up of a Player's forces in terms of un it quantities. types
and strengths; the forces ava ilable in a given
scenario.
Overrun-an overwhelming attack which is
USUally executed during t he Movement Phase
and which usually requi res no use of t he
Combat ReSOlution table; i.e., t he o utc ome is
automatic.
bwning Player-the Pla yer to whom a particular un it or geographic feature belongs.

Passenger-a unit wh ich is bei n9 t ransported by

another un it . Isee Transport)

Phase-a subdivision of a Player Turn in wh ich

spec ific actions are to be executed ; e.g., a
Combat Ph ase.

Phase-Class Sequencing (PCS)-a system of

movement in which un its are moved in a
specific sequence, by class.

Phase-SegmenT-see Segment.
phasing Player-the Player whose Phase it is at
that particular moment in the game.

Program Ide ntity Code (PIC)- a number w hi c h

ide nt ifies the genera l category. specific t ype,
and specific unit in a given game. System was
designed t o be used in tactical games in wh ich
a large number of different types a re presen t .
(see t he game PanzerBlitzl.
Protection Strength-the defensive value of a
given type of terrain ; used in ga mes in w hic h
defense is exclusively a ch aracteristic of the
terrain, not the units themselves. see Fire
Protection Streng t h.
Rail Capacity Points-e xpe ndable points whic h
represent a Player's ' abi lity t o move given
quantities of his units by rail in a given
Movement Phase.
Rail Movement-specia l movement of uni ts by
rail ; usua ll y found in games of Operational or
Strategic level.
Rimdomizer-a system for generat ing random
numbers for use in game~. c on sist ing si mp ly of
sets of chits (counters) numbered one through
ten which are drawn from a cup. one at a t ime,
to determine the outcome of co mbat actions.
See t he game Stra tegy I.
Range Allowance-t he radius of action or
effect, in terms of hexagons, of an air unit,
artillery unit, or othe r missile-f ire unit.
rea l-space game-a game which is played with
min iatures or miniatu refacsimiles without the
use of a map or grid.
Reinforcement Chart-a c hart which li sts, by
GameTurn, the new units which are to be
brought into t he game.
Retreat Pri ority- a rule provision which d ictates the preferred hexes in to which retreating
units must move.
Road March Space ( RMS)-t he number of
hexagons which a sing le unit is said to "occupy" as it moves in a roadqrayel conf iguration.
Used ma inly in tilctical/operat ional level
ga mes. (see t he game Lost B<Jttles. )

Segme nt-a subdivision of a Phase in which

specif ic actio ns are to be executed e.g .. an Air
Movement Segment.
Sequence of Play - the strict ly defined o rder in
whi ch specific Players are t o tak e specific
actions in a standard GameTurn. The following is an example of a typical Sequence of
Pl ay:

First Player Tum:

A. Movement Phase-F irst Player moves h is
units.
B. Combat Phase-First Player exec utes attacks
aga inst Second Playe r's u nits.
C. Second Movement Ph ase,- F irst Player
moves his units.

Second Player Turn:

D. Movement Phase-Second Player moves his
units.
E. Combat Phase- Second Pl ayer executes attacks against First Player's units.
F. Seco nd Movemen t Phase - Second Pl ayer
moves his units.
Players repeat t he above sequence. recording
t he passage of one Game-T urn for every
compl ete repetiti on of th e cycl e.
Stacking Points- the "stacking va lue" of a u nit
exp ressed as a number. No more than a certain
number of Stacking Po ints are per m itted in the
same hex at the same time. The Stacking Point
system is an a lternat ive to a system based upon
numbe rs of ' units per hex or nu mbers of
Strength Poi nts per hex.
Standard Game-the body of ru les which
cons'titute t he basic game, w ithout any optional rules or modification.
Step Reduction System- a system of combat
reso lution in which un its are partially eli m inated in a se ries of steps (a new, weaker strength
u ni t bei ng substituted each time losses are
suffered) .
target acquisition-the fu lfil lment of sighting
and other requirements necessary to be able to
fire upon a give n unit o r hex.
Target hex-the hex occup ied by a unit. or
units, which is the ob ject of an attack. Phrase
is us ually fou nd in tact ical games where
fire-through distance is possib le.
Terrain Effects Chart (TECI-a chart whic h
lists the effects of various tYpes of terrain
up on movement and combat.
Transport o r Transporter-a uni t wh ic h is
capable o f ca rrying other units. (see Passe nger).
uni t-a playing piece wh ich represents a mi lita ry o rgani Zat ion such as a division o r a squad.

25
Victory Conditions- th e goals which must be
achieved by one Player or the oTher in order to
be considered the winner of a game. (see
Levels of Victory).

Enemy units entering the controlled hexes, but

does not absolutely prohbi t i movement
t hrough.

Open Zones of Control: have no effect upon

Victory Points-the unit-of-measure of victory
in a ga me based upon a point-sco ring system.
Weather Environments-the three main spheres
of action which are affected by weather:
Visibility (air), Ground (land) , Sea. These
t hree environments may be rated nLJmerically
as to their current cond ition, and the rati ngs
indicate certain effects upon the movement
and combat ab Tii ties of units operating in those
enviro nments.
Zone of Control (ZOCI-an area of effect
surrounding a unit; usually defined as t he six
immediately adjacent hexagons.
The various types of Zones of Control may be
characterized by the use a nd comb! nation of
two groups of three ad jectives. The first group
characterizes the ef fect on movement; the
second the effect on combat. They are as
follows:

Rigid Zones of Control: prohibit t he samephase movement of Enemy units throu gh the
controlled hex es.
Elastic Zon es of CD ntrol: requ ire the expend-

Enemy movement.
ThB second group modifies t he Bffect on Combat:

Active Zones of Control reqLJire t hat every

Enemy unit within a FriBn dly unit's Zone be
attacked during the Combat Phase.

Semi-Active Zones of Contro l require that

some, bu 't not all, of the Enemy LJ nits within
the Zone of a Friendly unit be attacked during
the Combat Phase.
Inactive Zones of Control do not require
attacks upon Enemy LJ nits within the Zone of
a Friendly un it.
Using the various modifying phrases in combination it is possible to describe nine bas ic
ty pes of Zo nes of Control.

iture of Movement Points o n the part of

16mm short grai n, 1 0/1 6 inch hexes. ITh i s

is the standard sheet used in most ga mes,
the rows of hexes run across t he sh ort
dimension of t he 23x29 inch sheet.1
16mm l ong grai n, 10116 inch hexes. (The
rows of hexes r LJn across the long
dimension of the 23x29 inch sheet.)

ill

ill
25m m

19mm short grain, 12/16 inch hexes.

19mm long grain, 12/16 inch hexes .
25mm short grai n, 15/16 inch hexes.
25mm long grain, 15/16 inch hexes.

We don't usua lly se ll other peoples' games,

but Diplomacy is a hard-to-find game that
is constantly increasing in popularity. It is
a strategic game of d iplomatic-military
conflict in Europe before World War I.
While there is a certain lack of realism
(Tu rkey can conquer Russia) Diplomacy
offers a fascinating game system which
leaves no roo m for luck (the die). Players
write orders for th e construct ion and
movement of f leets and navies, form alliances and stab their allies in the back.
Conflicts are automatically reso lved by a
remar'kably simple (though unrealistic)
system. T he winner is generally the player
with the greatest capacity for deceit and
treachery. I n this respect, Diplomacy
serves as an eXOB llen t introduction to
international relations. Besides the 1913
game there is a 1900 variant. Diplomacy
fans are highly organized and playby-mail
opponents are readily available. Available
fro m Simulations Publications for $8,00.

BLAN K DI E-CUT
COUNTER SHEETS ("Y2")

BLANK HEX SHEETS

These blank hex sheBts are the ,f inest
available. The master copies were p repared
by a compLJter plotter and are geometrically perfect. They are pri nted on specia I
high quality. hea vy paper stock. This
paper is especially suit ed fo r drawing ,
either with pen and in k or dry marker.
These hex sheets were made exclusively
fo r our own LJse i n prepari ng all au r new
games. Hex sheets of th is quality are
available nowhere else. We will mail the
hex sheets to you F irst Class, in a p ro tective mailing tube . T he price is $8.00 a
dozen. You may order a dozen of one
type or 2 dozen composed of any combinati on of the six fo llowing types:

Diplomacy

Each hex sheet is 23x29 inches wit h no

part ial hexes. The hex field is 22x28
inches. Please be extremel y specific when
ordering as to the hex ty pe and q uantity
you want.

These inexpen sive components solve one

of the naggi ng problems of the amateu r
game designer- making nBat, playable
COLJnters. Each die-cut, cardboard counter
sheet contai ns 255 half-i nch counters
(exsctl y li ke those in S&n T he sheets
come in two basic typBS:

Type A: 225 counters imprinted with a

mix of military unit symbo ls plLJS thirty
completely blank cou nters.
Type B: 135 cou nters imprinted with a
blan k symbol box , plus 120 completely
blank CO LJn ters.
Each shet type is ava i lable in any of four
co lors: White, Gray, Tan, or Olive, COLJnter sheets may be ordered in sets of Si x
($ 4.00 fo r 1530 half inch counters) or sets
of T we lve ($7.00 fo r 3060 half-inch
cOLJnters). Sets may be any comb inat ion
of co lors andlor type . Please be specific on
orders, for example "One mixed set of
six - 2 White type A, 2 Tan type B, 1 01 ive
type A, 1 White ty pe B."

26

by Stephen 8. Patrick
The h istorica l wargame ca rries the underlying
premise 01 "what if . . 7" But for every great
batt le which was fough t and which produced
volumes explaining why it came out as it did,
and about which we might speculate many potentially great battles and campaigns were never fought. The list begins as long ago as Caesar 's Parthian Campaign and goes up to Operat ion Olympic - the assault on the Japanese
Home Islands . a nd MacArth ur's invasion 01
mainland China during the Korean war. These
wars were never fought, the plans for them
were pigeonholed. Few historians care to speculate about what might have been' when t hey
have so much trouble explaining what did h appen. The Anschluss of Austria to the Third
Reich in 1938 was such a "might have been"
war and, as usual, data is scarce,
The Anschluss is viewed today , as a po lit ical
event , rather than a military one. I n Feb ru ary,
1938, H it ler began to bu lIy the Au stri an Cha ncell or, Kurt von Schuschnigg, demanding that
he agree to union with th e Reich. Schuschnigg
played what he thought to be his trump card
on March 9, 1938 : he called for a plebiScite, to
be held M~rch 13 , on whether Austria shou Id
unite with Germany. He had good reason to
bel ieve that the Austrians, fea rfu I of the Nazi
regime, would vote for continued independence. But Schuschn igg was playing his hand
alone. Anthony -Eden, a strong opponent of
a ppeasement, had resigned from the British
cabinet in February, leaving England illd isposed to oppose Hitler. At the critical moment
when Schuschnigg made his move, the F rench
gove rn ment re signed in one of their regular crises and F ranc e was, in effect, ou t of the pictu re. Hi tler had alreadY 'sounded ourMussolini,
who had prevented Ansch luss in 1934 when
Do IIfuss was killed. This time Hitler made clear
that Austria's frontier would be the Brenne r
Pass, thereby renouncing claims to the South
Tirol (Alto Ad igel. which Italy ga ined after
World War I. Mussolini agreed to ignore Hitler's move. Austria's last possible support was
Czechoslovakia. Goring button-holed the
Czech ambassador to Germany at a party, on
the eve of the German move, assured him "that
Germany h ad no deSigns on Czechoslovakia
and would leave her alone il Germany were
not opposed_ Czechslovakia, In effect, took the
sam'e position that Britain an d France we re to
take that Fall at Mu niCh, when the Czechs
were on the chopp ing block. Austria was isolated. Hit le r then issued an ultimatum and, on
March 11 , Schuschnigg cap itulated, resigni ng
in favo r of Seyss-I nquart, an Austrian Nati.
The next day the Germans crossed the border
to complete the Anschluss.

1938 the Austrian army had 8 divisions, including one mechanized outfit, and one separate
brigade [Fig. 11 with a total of 80,000 men,
The Austrians had contingency plans for attacks from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy,
Yugoslavia and Hungary , but they put the
most emphasis, by 1938, on the German one.
The Austri'a n defenses turned on a strong
system of barriers running Eastward from the
German border, induding minefields, the
blowing o'f bridges, roads and railroads and
even t he use of mustard gas. The p lan allowed
for two days to alert the troops and ten to
equip and transport th em into positi ons, The
Schnelle (mechanized) Division was to be in
Linz, wh He the 1 st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th I nfa ntry
Divisions and the separate artillery reg iment
constituted the Westarmee behind the Traun
on the Iins Ebelsberg- Lambach . Thi s was the
mai n 'fo rce blocking the Danube road. The 8th
Brigade was in Salzburg, the 2nd Bn., 8th
Ligh t Artillery held Lueg Pass and the 1 st Bn. ,
2nd I nf , the area near Saalfelden, The 7t h Inf.
Div. held the area around Lueg Pass, Radstadt
and Schwarzach, acting as the linking unit between the Westarmea and the Tirol. The 4th
was the cove ring force for t he main body while
the 6th Inf. Div, was in the Tirol and Vorarlberg.
In covering the main body, the 4th was to protect Linz by securing the line Danube - west
of Wilhering - Pasching and the town of
Traun, They were also to hold the bridges over
the Traun for the Westarmee, The Schnell Division was the last to be moved during the two
day alarm period and actually assumed the m obile reserve ro le, being in Linz and able to reinforce t he Wesl'<lrmee. For the Westarmee iTself,
the dispOSitions were: 3d In f. Div. - Ebelsberg- Enns-5t. Marien-Pucking; 1 st Inf. Div. -

Wels - Samersdorf-Neuhofen-Krems-Kresmunster; 5th Inf. Div. - Lamba~h-EchendOI.

Kirchdorl aid Krems-Laakirchen; 2nd Inf. Div,
- east of the 1st and 3d Divisions to include
N ied erneu k i rchen-Waldneukirchen-Wartberg.
Air units were under the control of the army,
with air defense units on the li ne St, Valentine-S teyr- Klaus under the control of the West.armee, as were one recon squadron and a flak
"maschinkannone" battalion. The remainder
of the air forces were under control of army
headquarters.
The day after Schuschnigg announced his plebiscite Hitler called in Genera/oberst Bock,
head of t he Genera/stab, and his Chief of Operations, von Manstein, to discuss what was available for a military move against Austria. Th e
Germany armY, at that time consisted of 35
d ivisions, three of which were panzer divisions,
and 1 1 Heeresdienststellen (quasi-divisional
units) distributed among 'fo ur Gruppenkommandos. However, Hitler was advised that only
those units stationed in Bavaria, VII and XIII
Armee Korps, plus 2nd Panzerdivision, were
actua lly available on such short notice. Hitler
directed that an operations order be issued
that day and tha t the army be ready to move
on March 12. The available units comprised
five divisions, But this was deceptive because
these divisions were strongly augmented.
Thus while the nominal strength was only 1 1
infant ry regiments for the Germans to 14 for
the Austrians; five mountain regiments, in the
gebirgsbrigade, to six for the Austrians; and
two panzer regiments to four mechan ized battalions and one tank battalion for the Austrians, the augmentations, such as three S5
Standarten and a To ten kop fverban, brought
German combat strength to a sligh t advantage.
With support troops, the Germans planned to

GERMAN PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF AUSTRIA: "SONDERFAll OTTO"

GERMANY
0

.
m

{)

~.

'!:I
e-flv

27

Austria had ant icipa ted a German invasion a nd

had a detailed plan to oppose it. Th e Germans,
for their part, had a plan Sonderfafl Otto - the
military inva sion of Austria. These plans were
t he basis fo r a war that d idn 't happen.
Austria, like Germany, suffered from the peace
treat ies of World War I. Fo r Austria it was the
treaty of St. Germain, which forbade Ansch
lu ss, and called f or military limitations sim il a r
to those w hi ch Versailles imposed on Germany. But in 1936, AUstria renounced St. Germain and, like Germany, began to rearm. By

(i

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,

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Graz

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27
field 105,000 men - about 20,000 more than
t he Austria ns,
The plan devised by Bock and v, Manstein,
Sonderfall Otto, recognized the Danube Valley
as the key to Austria. A three-pronged attack
was planned. The main attack ran from the
line Burghausen-Passau due East through Linz
to Vienna. A second thrust was from Salzburg
to Graz and a third, lesser drive, was into the
T irol to tak e Innsbruck and the Brenner Pass.
The attack was in two waves. In the fi rst wave,
striking on ,he Linz-Vlenna road, were 2nd
Panzer and 10th and 7th Inf. Div. The Gebirgsbrigade, later 1st Gebirgsdivision, was t o ad
vance on Graz. I n the second wave came HOst
10, into the T irol , and 17th and 27th Inf. Div.
to follow up on the L1nz-Vienna LIne. In planning their attack. the Germans considered that
the major resi sta nce would come fro m the gendarmerie, customs guards and whatever army
units could be mobilized in time. In additiqn,
they correc tly assumed t hat, in the event of
war, they would have problems with blown
bridges, minefields and the like. The Germans
also anticipated that the st rongest fi ghting
would occur near Salzburg and behind the Inn.
On the morning of March 1 1, the Au strian 4th
and 6th Divisions were alerted but, faced witb
the German ultimatum, Schuschnigg yielded.
On March 12 the Germans crossed the border
unopposed and, without firing a shot, roadmarched into Austria, reachi ng Vienna with
their vanguard on the evening of Marcil 13.
Before d iscu ssing whether t he de-fense of Austr ia might have succeeded, had Schuschnigg attempted it, a few observations on the actua l
move are in order. Guderian, commanding
Kdo. der Panzertruppen, later XVI A.K., took
pai ns to counter Churchill's allegations that
t he operation was a tech nica l disaster due to
mechanical failure. In so do ing, Guderian underscored some interesting points. Guderian
noted t hat the panzer divisions, as an independent elemenl, were far from ready . 1:he officers of 2nd Panzerdivision had to ru sh baCk
from Trier, where they were training, to take
part in the move. Officer's theoretical training
had. just been completed a nd company level
training had not yet begun. A div is ion-sized
maneuver had not even been p lanned when the
2nd Panzerdivision was called upon to invade
Austria. Fuel supp ly was a bootstrap operation. Guderian sa id "shortages which here became apparent were immediately put to rights."
In fact , the panzers refueled at local gas
stations on the road, a somewhat unlikely
practice in actual comb at . Guder ian furthe r indicated that, though no amm un it ion was used,
the situat ion was similar. O ne wonders whe the r they p lanned to use the local gu n' shops if
necessary. Guderian also minimized Churchill's
remarks co ncemi rg the high percentage o f mechanical failures claiming that neither whee ls
nor tracks had many breakdowns a nd that
though tanks suffered more t han other vehicles, the breakdowns among t anks were "certainly not as high as 30 per cent." The stat istics available indicate that 39 tanks, 4 half[racks, 97 motorcyc les and 665 of 22,000
horses dropped ou t . Of the tanks, t hat is ~I
most eight whole platoons among two regiments; it is a rather large number for an uno pposed road marc h. The question is what the
b reakdown rate would have been if these t anks
had been forced to move across country and
engage in p ro longed figh ting . These were
PzKpfw I and" both modelS being obsolete
by the first year of the war. But the Austrians

were no better off, having only outdated Italian tanks. One further note on preparedness:
Veiel, commanding 2d Pz. Div., used a Bae-.
deker's Guide to Austria in lieu of unavailable
military maps.
The Nazis entered Austria with flags flying,
drapped in greenery. There is a reason to believe t hat they would have been hard-pressed
to do much more. The 'German troops were
hot the motley array w hic h had entered ~he
Rhineland in 1936 f lying the same squadron of
planes overhead several ti mes to create t he appearance of a large airforce. But neither was it
the army which blitzed Poland a year and a
half later. Germany began reanmament In 1935
with a target date of 1942-43 for war. 1938
was far closer to the beginni ng than to the end.
It is possib Ie that the ease with wh ich Austria
and, later, Czechslovakia, were annexed led
Hitler t o think he was ready before he actually
was.
The Germans unquestionabl y profi ted from
t he Austrian experience. Supply prob lem s
were ironed out so that, by September, 1939,
Bliukrieg was possible. It is highlV unlikely
that the German Army could blitz Austria in
1938, regard less of t he qualitv of the Austrian
army: it simply did not have the material to do
it.
But t he organiZational superiority of the Wehrmacht was importa nt . The Austrians planned
on twelve days to mobilize (though they
though t they could do it in closer t o eight).
Th e Ge rm ans were ready to go, albeit without
much strength , in less than t wo. This meant
t hat the first wave, striking toward Vienna,
could have been met only by the 4th Div.,
stationed in Linz, and perhaps the Schnelle
Div. The 6th , in the Tirol, was al so ava ilable
for combat early in any war, but the Germans
were saving the Tirol for the second wave and
for the weakest of all their thrusts. To take the
6th from the Tirol t o bolster the 4th and
Schnelle would have left the Ti rol undefended.
Leaving it in the Tirol would have left the 4th
and Schnelle to face t he brunt of the assau lt, a
dilemma which the Germans didn't plan to
give the Austrians much t ime to sort out.
What would have been the impact of an Austro German War? Governmental problems had
diverted French and British attention a nd Ita ly
and Czechoslovakia had each, for t heir own
reasons, sanct ioned the Anschluss. It alian attack on Ethiopia in 1935 produced no more
strenuous opposition than ineffective ssnct ions. But Austria was pa rt o f the common
Eu ropean herit age and carried far more po litical weight th an the distant, litt le known, black
Ethiopia. It is impossible to guess what it
would have take n to t urn a military invasion of
Austria into World War II in 1938, but, obviously, the longer Austria could hold out, the
greater the likelihood of such a result. 1938
was not 1914 and the invasion of Austria by
Germany may not have produced the effect of
the invasion of Serbia by Austria-Hungary.
Essentially the point about the AnSChluss is,
bot h sides had the plans to make it a military
struggle, but only the Germans had t he determina tion to fo llow the military course if necessary and so, in the end, t he Nazi pOlitica) aim
prevailed. The Austrians could have resisted
t he Germans by force. The resu lt s of such resistance re ma in the subject of speculation and
falls into t he c ategory of "'might have been"'
wars.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Anschluss, Brook-Shepherd, Lippincott,
1963.
Der Deutsche Einmarsch in Osterreich 1938.
F rftz , Heeresgesch ichtliches Museu mlMil itarw issensch aftliches Institut, 1968.
The German Army and the Nazi Party
1933-39, O'Neill, Cassell & Co., 1966 PANZER LEADE R, Guderian, Dutton. 1951.

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of your order. Please do not enclose other
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causes delays in the processing and fulfillment of your order.
New York State Residents: Please add 4%
sales tax on all orders (except for orders
for magazines) .
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sales tax on all orders (except orders for
magazines).
All prices apply to orders from the U.S.A.,
APO/FPO. and Canada . Allow two to
three weeks for delivery on orders within
the Continental U.S. Simulation Series
Games are shipped by First Class mail;
Other games are shipped parcel post.
Overseas Orders: On all orders originating
outside of U.S. I Canada I APO-FPO,
customers must add one dollar per year
per subscription and one dollar per game.
Add $0.25 for each individual back issue
or book. This additional payment is purely
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orders shipped by Air Mail. The rates,
however, are t ruly outrageous (often
exceeding the price of the merchandise
itsel f ).

28
COMPONENTS

GameReview
by James M. Flanagan
PUBLICATION DATA
Title: Leipzig. Publisher: Simulations Publications, Inc. Publication Date; September 1971
(Second Edition). Price; $5.00. Sold: By mail.
Designer: J. F. Du nn igan. Physical Design and
Graphics; R.A. Simonsen and M. Frederick.
Play testing and Development; J. Young & R.
Champer. Rules Organization and Editing: J.
Young, R.A. Simonsen. Designer Credits: Mr.
Dunnigan designed most of the recent AH
games and the bUlk of those published by Sim"
ulations Publicat ions, Inc.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION
Subject: Napoleonic warfare on the strategic
level, Leipzig simulates the 1813 campaign.
Packaging; 12" x 15'1." mailing envelope.
RULES
Complexity Rating: (8) The rules reflect the
we ll lntentioned, but somewhat overdone,
drive of Simulations Publications toward complication.
Clarity Rating: (5) The great exertion evident
here to cover every contingency results in redu ndancy, wh ich on Iy serves to red uce clarity.
Comprehensiveness Rating: (7) For a strategic
game, the number of elements covered is good.
Accessibility and Organization Rating: (4) The
rules seem sl ick and very graphic but you are
often left with the impression that some "ex"
ception" is buried under the prose. The rules
are pri nted on both sides of one 14" x 22" and
one gy," x 11" sheet. Some items are segregated in boxes and charts. Other material is
organized under bold face headings. Reference
is sometimes difficult due t o repetition. Read
ing Comprehension Time: You can cover the
ground in an hour or so, but frequent refer"
ence is necessary as you play, Word Count:
4,950. Illustrated Examples of PII!Y: 1. Ex
pandability Rating: (8) This game is high on
variables. One scenario covers the actual historical situation in the Spring. Another deals
with the Summer campaign. Then you have
five "What-if?" situations based on what migh t
have occurred if th is or t hat historical factor
had developed differently. Austrian in te rvent ion or neutrality, for example, was a crucial
element. Rules Sections Headings: The Game,
G3me Equipment, General Course of Play,
Game Length , Movement, Zones of ContrOl,
Stacking and Unit Breakdow n, Supply, Co mbat, Retreat Order of Preference, Leaders, Fortres s and Siege, Reconnaissa nce, How to Use
the Scenarios, Special Game Rules, Spring
Scenarios (1 through 41. Summer Scenarios (5
through 71. The Campaign Game, Special Cam"
paign Game Rules, How to Use the Combat
Results Table, How to Win, Fo rced Marches,
Terrain Effects. Notable Game Features: AI"
though few things can be called true innova.tions anymore, since over the years wargamers
have explored almost every conceivable gimmick and angle. many games create fascinating
variations of old themes. I n LeipZig, the stack"
ing, unit breakdown and buildup, supply, leaders, retreat before combat, combat results
table and forced march ru les a re all exa mp les
of brill iant game design. Though sometimes ex"
plained in a confusing way, they are still high
grade ore.

Playing Surface: The map is 23" x 29" unmounted heavy cardstock. It is tan with vary"
Ing tints of gray and black . Type of Grid Module: Hexagon. There are 1,760 hexes in all.
Each one is .625" from side to side. The scale
is 7 km to the hex. Clarity of Symbolization
Rating: (B) The map is very well done in this
sense. Types of Terrain/Percentage of total
area (C=affects combat, M=affects movement):
Fortress hexes . . 51% (C), River hexes (sides)
16.8%(C.MI, Bridged River hexes (sides) .96%
(C), Mountain hexes 11 .3% (C,M) Mountain
Pass hexes .73% (CI. Playing Pieces: square
.625" die cut counters. 234are in the game.
They break down as follows: 10 Supply, 3 Depot, 2 1 Cavalry, 73 Infantry and 10 Leaders
for each side. The total used in each scenario
varies from Scenario no. 1 ' 1OB units (not including supply, which is a variable) to Scenario
no. &:175 units (dittol. Scenario no. 8 is the
campaign game. It begins with the Spring order
of battle (108 units!. As it continues, several
variables besides supply affect the number of
pieces in play. Bavarian Defection, German Rebellion and Aust rian Intervention can all determi ne the strength of both sides.
Quality of Playing Pieces Rating: (8) The
pieces are of the traditional sort. They are easy
to read and use. The fa ce indicates type,
strength , movement, unit size and designation
etc. Functionally Distinct Units: The infantry
has its usual role. The cavalry have greater fle x"
ibility in withdrawals and dealing with enemy
zones of control. Supply and depot pieces
greatly affect the abilities of ot her units in
movement (For forced marches) and combat.
The un iqu e Ieader units are im portant.
Numerical factors have been worked out estimating the ab ilities of the various generals in"
valved . Each leader affects the com bat
strength of the troops he leads - sometimes
decisively. Slit Up Aids: Designer Notes, Reinforcement Chart, Combat Results Table, Vic"
tory Poin t Schedule, Forced March Tables,
Terrain Effects Chart, Order of Battle Charts
(with explanation for each scenario!.

PLAY MECHANICS
Set Up Time; Th is changes with the situation
used, but if you have your playing pieces sort"
ed, about 10 minutes will be enough. If you
like to pour over initial deployments, as we do.
it takes longer. Total Number of Game-Turns;
All the scenarios last twelve turns except the
campaign game whic h lasts th irty"five t urns.
Average time for each Player's Move : Varies
from 8 to 13 minutes, depending on scenario.
The above estimates assume that both players
are quick movers who have mastered t he rules.
Decision Point: This usually comes fairly late
in the game, around tum 9 or 10. Average
Playing Time: Three hours plus. There can be
considerable variation depending on the. players and their strategies. We tend to tal k and
deliberate so Oelr games run about four hours,
Average Number of Die Rolls Per Turn: Only a
couple per side as far as combat is concerned.
Fighting is often not worth it, unless you can
destroy a sizable force. A clever enemy will
not concentrat e h is fa rces unless it su its his
purposes. Forced Marches account for a sizable
percentage of your die rolls if you are a blitz
minded player. Movement System: 1, French
player moves 2. French player allo cates supply
for intended attacks 3. Allied . player may, in
certain cases, retreat his units under attack. 4.
Allied player allocates supply to units of his

choice. 5. Combat is resolved. Then the Allied

player moves, in the same sequence. Conflict
Mechanics: The Attacker's strength is comput"
ed as a percentage of the defenders strength
(60%. 80%, 100%, 110%, etcc.) Quite different
from "rounding off" as we do with most tables. Combat results include "scattered," dispersed,""destroyed" or "partia lly exchanged:'
Automatic destruct ion is achieved when the
attacker Can launch a 500% attack against enemy infantry. Victory Conditions: Each scen..
ario has its own victory conditions. These are
based on accumulating points, which are
awarded for possessing geographical objectives,
destroying enemy units and in some scenarios
.(1 through 4) the French player receives points
for advancing units off the eastern edge of the
map. pray Balance: Varies with each scenario
but generally Napoleon is on the short end of
the stick. Iri addition he has to contend with
enemies in a superior supply and reinforcement situation. The better quality of the
French leaderShip is his ace in the hole. Realism: The game has a relatively high order of
realism. 11' certainly is well above any other
game We have played in the effectiveness of its
simulation of Napoleonic warfare.

SUMMARY
Overall Physical Quality Rating: (6) . The main
drawbacks (If one considers them as such) are
the unmounted, color.less map and the lack of
a hard box. That, of cou rse, is why the cost is
only $5,00. Overall Accuracy Rating: (8). The
best job yet for Napoleon ic wargaming. Playability Rating: (6). Fairly good, once the rules
have been hurdled. Rating for Novice Players:
(4) , New Players are advised to cut th eir te eth
on the earlier AH games or games of the "Napoleon at Waterloo" level. We understand S& T
will be turning to more of these games in fu"
ture issues. Overall Rating for "Playability"
Fans: (4). If you like to read the rules for a
game and sit right down to solving the problem
presented by the game. then Leipzig and, (dare
we say it,) Simulations Publicat ions games In
general are a pain in the neck. Overall Rating
for "Historical Realism" Players: (81. People
who delight in complication will enjoy this
one. It contains a number of really fine features not found in most games. Overall Rating
for "Action/Excitement" Players; (3). There
isn't much "bang, bang" in Leipzig. It would
be more appealing to a Manstei n than a Patton.
Slick maneuvering and forethought are the
keys to victory.
Leipzig is the kind of game we would never
pass over. It is outstanding for the number of
"new" concepts it introduces. The situation is
in trigu ing, The mechen ics are innovative, and
all in all, it is a rewarding invest ment. Before
you can play the game, a considerable amount
of time and effort has to be put into mastering
the rules. Our usual procedu re with Simulations Publications games like Kursk , Leipzig,
Korea. etc .. Is' to pru ne the ru les by about 30
to 40%. Conflicting, or apparently conflicting,
statements have to be examined and recon"
ciled, Repetitious prose has to be sliced off
and sometimes additional tables and charts
constructed. For example, we don't care for
the approach where elements influencing a
move {ZOC, terrain, weather, etc'! are all re"
flected in a movement point system. It becomes a monumental bore. We are experim enting with other ways of showing the effects of
conditioning factors. Some work and some
don't. If you are willing to g6 in for something
of this sort, and we are, the n Leipzig, and
other games on th is level, are gems.

29

Bibliography,
The American Army
in Europe, 1944-45
Considerations of space and time squeezed this
out of the article on the organization of the
American Army in Europe during the Second
World War. Issue 30 of S&T was crowded as it
was.
Th is is a very brief outl ine of some of the
sources used in the preparation of the American Army article. Unfortunately, th is article
was one of those which was long in preparation and which utilized considerable materials
from the personal files of various members of
the S& T organization , so th at the precise
source of some materials was lost, Consequently, this bibliography should be considered incomplete.
Two invaluable volumes are The Organization
of Ground Combat Troopss, and The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
in the series The Army Ground Forces o f the
American Official History. Both provided considerab le amounts of hard dat a along with
numerous significant insights and interpretat ions.
Material on the behavior of t roops in battle
came from t wo important. but large ly unknown, works, Souffler's The American Soldier ilnd Marshal's Men Against Fire. 80th provided impo rtant insights into combat psycho-

Kursk

Operation Zitadelle, 4 July 1943

The destruction of the German Sixth Army at

Stalingrad decided that the Nazis wouldn't win
the War in the East; the disastrous offensive at
Kursk decided they would lose it. In the
Spring of 1943, the Germans prepared Operation Zitadelle, their last major offensive in
Russia. The Russians also prepared, fortifying
the most vulnerab le sector of their front. the
Kursk Sillient, with tank traps. minefields. and
a massive concentra tio n of armor and infantry.
The Germans knew this and decided to
gamble. But they wilited. and kept waiting,
while Soviet strength built up faster than their
own. Kursk provides six vilrying Orders of
Battle so that plilyers can lilu nch the German
offensive in May. Ju ne, or Ju Iy agai nst the
increasingly powerful and dug-in Soviets. Or
the Germans may choose to wait for a Soviet
offensive and fight a mobile, defensive bilttle.
The die-cut counters in Kursk represent
German divisions a nd Soviet Corps; each hex
equals ten miles. and Game-Turns are two days
of combat. Air units are included, and motorized units use a dual Movement Phase system.
Kursk was a breakthrough in game design; the
parent of France '40 and the new Battle of
Stalingrad. Available from Simu lations Publications for $5.00.

logy and t he sociill organiziltion of combat

units. Panon's memoirs, War As I Have Known
It also provided some usefu I comments on t he
behavior of the American soldier in action, along with some compar isons to the Germiln
situat ion.

Moves

#1

The various military journals, such as Military

Review, Infantry Journal, Armor, and Field
Artillery Journal ilmong others were useful in
virtual! y a II aspec'ts o f the artie Ie.
The stand ard weapons reference 'Narks. such as
the Senger und Etterlin ilrmor books, were the
main source tor weapons data, supplemented
by a small ilmount of information from other
sources.
To do il tru ly careful job. however, one must
even t ually descend on the National Archives,
where the o riginal field manuals ilre on file,
along with a considerab le amount of other materials.
I n essence, t hese were the resources used, plus
the personal and organiZational f iles of Simulations Publications, J.F. DUnnigan. and A.A.
Nof i.

,..1
Grand-tactical game of 194~ in Russia.
Complete rules for tactical, air support.
Pioneered our basic WWII combat system.

MO VES #1 is now ava i Iab Ie as a bac k

issue. Like all first ed iti ons , it wi ll acqu ire
a certa in sentimental a nd "collector" value
over time. The lead article is particularly
memorable. It's a debate on game design
tha t reveals a great deal abou t the personil lit ies beh ind S&T and the way they view
their wor k. Some of th e pr incipil ls are
Steve Patric k, one of our editors. John
Young. o ur treasurer, AI No ti, human
encycloped is, Bob Champer, game tester
and taclici a n extraordinaire. designers.
Lou Zocchi and Dave Will ia ms. and S&T's
prime movers. Redmond Simonsen and
J im Dunnigan. Other articles inc lude a
revision of France '40, a s ludy a t the
combat resu lt tables in lilctica l games. a
ca mpaign analysis of the brief, bloody
Zulu War and il long art ic le by Jim
Dunnigan o n Manpower in World War
One. MOVES is t he companio n magazin e
to S& T with all emphasis on g(lr'nes them selves as well as history. MOVES #1 is
ava ilab le fo r $2.00 fro m Simu lat ions
Pu b Iicat ions.

30

LIMITED INTELLIGENCE
One of t he most difficult aspects of warfare to
sim ul ate is t he confusion of battle. A gl an ce at
most b oard games instantl y pi erces the "fog of
wa r" a nd reveal s the location, st rength, sta te
of supp ly an d movement capabilities of a ll
e nem y u nits. In war , commande rs are ra re ly so
well informed abou t the ir own troops. Th is is
the single gre atest deviance in t he feel of board
games from batt lefield dec ision mak ing.
T he f i rst attempt s to so lve th is p rob lem were
made in Ava lon Hi ll's naval gam es. After all.
it's im poss ib le t o conduct a "ga me" on the
sort ie of the Bismarck if the Briti sh pl ay er
knows al l along where t he Bisma rk is. The
so lut ion was two boards di vided by a screen
which enab led the "elusive" Bismark to maneuve r out of sigh t of t he Brit ish . Th e Briti sh
player "sea rched" fo r the German ba tt leship
by ca lling out th e co-o rd inates of the areas he
had sh ips in. If th e Bism ark was in t he same
a rea the G erma n p layer was forced to revea l Hs
location and battle took place on a tactica l
co mb at board. Bismark wa s a pu re "search"
game si nce the German pl aye r generally won
by avo idi ng combat. Two late r AH nava l
games, Midwav and Jutland requi re t he opposing fleets to close in order to win.

by Lenny Glynn

represents civil ians or Vietcong troops t he U.S.

player must con duct rec onnaisance by fire o r
enter the hex . T his of ten resu lt s in civilian
casu alt ies Iwhich count ag ainst th e U.S.l. Since
som e of the N l F cou nters are booby' t raps
U.S. u nits often t ake casua lt ies ju st by moving
into the hex , The game recreates the Imme nse
military advantage t he poo rly arm ed and equipped VC enjoy by retaining t he loyalty of
mu ch of the pop u lace. 0 ne ad d iti o nal f acto r
comp letes the "fog of war" in Grunt - many of
th e N IF counters are blank. T hey are "dummy" or "decoy" counters which rep resen t
nothi ng - no thi ng but ru mors, fears, diversionary efforts etc. Th ey have no combat power
and wh en di scovered are removed fr om the
map , on Iy to rettJ rn the next turn. T h ese
"dummy" counters are the key to the w hole
range of intelligence prob le ms in warg aming.

Ava Ion Hi ll' s f i rst serious atte mpt to recrea te

t he "fog " of war on land csme w ith 191 4. In
this game t he initial depl oymen t of opposing
fo rces was made on sma ll reproductions of t he
mapb oard. On ly wh en bot h sides h ad deployed
land made their plans) were units p la ced on
the board. But the units were p laced upside
down so that even deployed you still could not
b e sure of the cente(of gravity of the enemy
force, Only actlJ s l attacks revealed t he enemy's
strength a nd inte ntio ns. The system t hough
cumbersome. was a n excellent on e except t hat
it did reveal t he pos ition of units whi le
concealing their strength . There had to be
some way to keep both locatio n end strength
sec ret. Refere es, screens and other devices are
too much 'trou b le for most pl ayers.

T he reason is th at dummy counters throw an

e lem en t of uncertainty into the location of all
units. An army with it s un its overturned and
composed of 20% dum my cou nters presents a
very conf using p icture to the enemy. T here is
no way to find out how stron g the e nemy is or
what his int entions s re without attacki ng his
units. Th is limited intelligence is pri marily
tactica l since play ers are awa re of th e general
fo rce mix OPPOSing them in most games. But it
is easy to int egra t e tactic a I and strateg ic
"b lindness"- What is required is a series of
scenarios altering the opposing forces. Ea ch
pl ay er roll s a die to dete rmi ne w hat strategic
footing he wil l be in whe n the game begin s.
T his system has been used in Franc-oPrussian
War, a new ga me now on the Simu lat io ns
plJ b lica t ions test ta bl es. Bot h sides receive
varyin g forces, a lli ances, and reinforceme nt
rates at the start of the game plus a nu mber of
dummy counters. The result is t hat players are
not on ly unaware exactly where real e nemy
stren gth is. they are unaw are of how mu ch
t here is a nd at what raTe it will be replaced.
I.E. Franco-P ru ssian War em bodies tact ic al and
strategic li mit atio ns on inte'llig ence. T he reSlJ lt
is t hat the game h as a un ique feel; players
move in a clolJd of uncertainty; attacks mu st
be launched to determ in e where the enemy
really is. Occasionally a bra akthrou gh occurs
whe n a player finds a du mm y counter in a key
posi ti on in t he enemy line. More ofte n w ho le
sections of th e fron t may be held by dummy
counters fo r several tu rns because the opposing
player chooses not to ri sk a costly " prob ing"
attack. Th e Fran co- Pru ssi an system is versatile
and wi II probab Iy fo rm the basis for a series of
games on t he America n Civil War. Ma ny
famous Civil Wa r battl es were essentially
"blind " me eti ng engageme nts. Th e use of
overturned co unters and b lanks greatly simplif ies the recreatio n of the so-called "id iocy
factor".

T he solution b egan to evolve in Grun t Simula

tions Publications game of ta ctical co mbat in
Vietnam. Grunt like Bismark,had many of the
Ch aracteristics of a pu re searc h ga me. The
Natio nal LiberJtion Front player often seeks
to avoid combat. T he remarkab le thi ng about
Grunt is th e way it represents t he inte lligence
situation in Vietnam. All U.S . unit s a re visib le
to the N LF player. They arr ive by he l icopt er
and move under the eyes of the enemy. But
N LF u nits are all p laced upside down on the
board. To f ind out whether a unit counter

Many f amous military blunders seem to stem

p lJ re ly f rom "idiocy" - Hitler's directive to
Six t h Army to hol d its grou nd at Stalingrad,
the Fre nch Army 's infamo us , stupid Pla n 17
for the invasion of Germany in 191 4, the
Anglo-Fre nch decision to move into Belgium
in 194 0 while the Germans pierced their li ne in
the Ardennes. These and similar m oves can be
att rib uted to doc tr ina l stubbo rness, command
se nilit y, even seemingly senseless evil. Bu t
t here is a deeper , simpler expla nation . At t he
ri sk of a bad pu n I wo u Id say th at the" idi ocy

On e of the major proble ms of AH's nava l

games is th at th e search process (i.e. cal lin gout
t he zones you have ships in ) reveals y our
positio n to the enemy. He then either closes or
runs fo r it; in eit he r case you do n't have the
feeling of suddenlY finding a p lum e of smoke
or a fli ght of Ze ros o n the hor izon ; the
enemy '5 own search ing has largely eliminated
the element of su rp rise.
It 's iron ic t ha t li mited intelligen ce was applied
so BX Ten sive ly to naval w arfa re befo re it was
even t ho ug ht of for land war. It is probab ly
harder t o hid e sh ips on th e ocean th an 'to hide
men and arms in t he cover of she ltering
te rrain .

factor" in mi Iita ry operatio ns is most often the

resu It of limited intelli gence. T he genera ls and
leaders t hat have com mitted history's most
glorious snafus ac ted in Ig no rance, T hey wo u Id
not have d one so had thei r intelligence staffs
given t he m accura te estimates of the ir own and
ene my capabilities.
Th e re have been various attempts to build t he
historical "idiocy factor" into wargames, For
. example 1914 has an o pti ona l rule requiring
the F re nch player to lau nch heavy attacks into
A lsace Lo rra ine as provi ded for in Plan 17 for
severa I turns no matter what the Germ a n
player does. France '40, soon to be publ ish ed
by Ava lon Hill provides for All ied doctrine by
requiring t he Anglo-F re nc h player t o ad vance
deep into Belgi um with strong forces if the
German p laye r invades that nation . Battle of
Staling rad, Sim ulatio ns Pu blications latest
vVW II game du p Iicates the effect of Hitler's
"stand fast " o rder by forcing th e German
player to leave u nits in fortified lines in place
for several turns. Th ese and similar optional
ru les in other war ga,mes d o give th fl player t he
feel of "idiocy" . Unfortu natel y, t his idiocy
see ms to be imposed from ab ove, i.e. the
p layer knows that he wou ld not make suc h
stu p id decisio ns he is obey ing the d ictates of
one of the game scenarios. This may be the
same sinking feeling von Pau lus felt reading
Hit le r's o rd ers but it reduces t he gamer to th e
level of a tactica I com ma nder. I n games usi ng
overturned counte rs and du m mies such rules
are unnecessary. Because of the unce rtai nty
abo ut ene my strength and intentions any
player is bound to make serious blu nde rs in
the cou rse of a ga me. Yes it's tnu e, th is syste m
f in ally allows pl ayers to make asses of the mselves in t he trad ition of such greats as
Burnside. Haig, Lord Gort and Westmore land .
There are no girnmicks; th e confusion in here nt
in t he system ensu res that players will naturally and spontaneously create their own errors.
Mil it ary historians are often too critical of
fail ed general s and too fawn in g t owards successful ones. A few experiences with the
Franco-Prussian War systern wi II show th at
vict ory of ten goes to th e player who gets away
wit h an insan e gamble wh ile ano the r player
taking a similar gamble is sm as hed and appears
"id iot ic" . Anothe r elemen t of warfare that can
be built in to th e overtlJrned and d u mmy
count er system is the varied in te ll igence capa bil it ies of opposin g armies. For example, if
one player has comm an d of th e air in a game
he m ight be allowed to overturn a nd inspect a
nu m be r of enemy cou n ters each tu rn . E s pi onage cou ld be int egrated by allowing one piaye r
to see th e scen ari 0 care t hat outlines the
oppos ing p layer's strategic stance. Mora le
could be easil y accou nted for. Once a player in
a campaign ga me su'f fers over a certa in number
of casua lt ies his dese rt ion and defection rate
might rise, revealing to ene my in te lligen ce the
identit y and strength of m ore and more of his
un its each su cc eed i ng t u rn . These are only a
few of the variations thaT can be integrated
into the new system. Th e beauty of it is how
si mp ly they ca n be inco rporated. In sum the
tactical and strategic lirn ited in te ll igence system used in Franco-Prussian War lays the basis
for incorporating varied intel ligence capabiliti es, th e " id ioey factor", esp ionage, moral e
and many other hum an el ements of warfare.

31

Feedback
Moves Nr. 2 published April 1972

18 - No question
19 - No question
20 - No question

COMBAT COMMAND
29-Question A (mapsheet)
3O-Question B (rules)
31-Qu~stion C (count~rs)
32-Question 0 (~as~ of play)

21 - No question

22 - No question

33-Qu~stion

23 - No question

How to Use the Feedback Response Card:

After you've finished read ing this issue of
Moves, please read the Feedback questions
below, and give us your a nswers and opinions
on the Feedback RespollSe Card. The most
convenient way to use the card is to t10ld it
directly alongside the list of questions and
t hen write your answer-number in the response-box on th e card which corresponds to
the questio n nu mber. Please be sure your
answer numbers are legible and be cert ain tha t
the number of the response-box matches t he
number of the question you are answering,

24 - On the basis of t his issue, would you

re-su bscribe?
25 - Your age: 1 = 13 years or less, 2 = 14-17,
3 = 18-21,4 = 22-27,5 = 28-35, 6 = 36+.

What the Numbers Mean: Generally speaking,

t here are two ty pes of questions asked in the
Feedback section: (1) Ra t ing questions and
(2) "yes/no/no opinion" type questions.

Yes/No Questions: When t he question is a "yes

or no" question "'" means YES; "2" means
NO (and "0" mea ns NO OPINION or NO T
APPLICABL E).
We hope you will use your Feedback Response
Card as your d irect-li ne to the editors.
QUESTIONS
1 - No question

2 - No question
3 - No Question
Questions 4-23 ask you to rate the articles in
this issue (O = no opinion, 1 = poor, , 9 =
excel/en t).

4-

Game Profi le: Battle of Stalingrad

5-

Why Some Games Never Materialize

6 -

Gustavus Adolphus' Contribution to War

7-

Adding Realism to Armor

8-

Simulations and Education

9 - Some Panzerblitz Optional Rules

10 11 -

Panzerblitz Revisited
Idiocy or Reality

12 -

Gamespeak

13 -

Anschluss

14 15 -

Game Review: Leipzig

Limited Intell igence
This issue of Moves loveralll

16 -

17 - No question

of rul~s)

35-Qu~stion G (length)
36-Qu~stion

H (s~t-up time)
J (compl~xity)
38-Qu~stion K (r~alism)
39-Qu~stion ~ (overa/!)
40-Qu~stion M (then & now)
37-Qu~stion

41-Question N (money's worth)

27 - How long have you subscribed to 5&T? 1

= less than 1 yea r, 2 = 1 year , 3 = 2 years, 4 =
3 years, 5 = 4 years, 6 = 5 years, 7 = 6 years.

42-Qu~stion

28 - Was Moves a ll that you expected it to be 7

1 = yes, 2 = no, 3 = don't know yet, 4 = yes,

~ach gam~

th~r~ ar~ thirte~n

questions

(fett~r~d

"A" through "N"). Unless otherwis~

noted, thes~ qu~stions ar~ answered with a "1"
(poor) through "9" (exc~lI~nt) rating.
Question A - What did you think of the
physical Quality and layout of th~ mapsh~~t?
Qu~stion B What did you think of th~
physical quality and layout of th~ rules folder?
Qu~stion C - What did you think of th~
physical Quality and layout of th~ unit
count~rs?

Qu~stion

What did you think of th~

gam~'s "eas~ of play" (how well the gam~
"mov~d along")?
Qu~stion E What did you think of the
"comp/~t~ness" of th~ gam~'s rules (was ev~rv
thing thoroughly explain~d)?
Qu~stion F What did yOIl think of th~
gam~'s play balance (was the gam~ int~r~sting
for both sid~s)?
Question G - What did you think about th~
I~ngth of th~ av~rag~ game?
Qu~stion H What did you think of th~
amount of "s~t-up time" ne~ded b~for~ you
could b~gin playing th~ gam~?
Qu~stion J - What did you think of the
complexity of this gam~?
Qu~stion K What did you think of this
game's r~alism?
Qu~stion L - What did you think of this game
0

ov~rall

Question M - Would you still hav~ bought this

gam~ if you knew then what you know now
about it? (Yas: 1, No. : 2, Maybe '" 3).
Question N - 00 you think you r~c~ived your
money's worth with this game? (Yes: 1, N[] =-

2, Maybe

U.S.N,
43-Qu~stion
44-Qu~stion

45-Question
46-Question
47-Qu~stion

Using th~ results of th~ fallowing surv~y w~

will att~mpt to d~v~lop a n~w system of
reviewing gam~s. Basically, this system will
rely on th~ respons~s of th~ peopl~ who hav~
play~d th~ gam~s, Add~d to thes~ standardiz~d
results there will be a short ~ssay by our own
analysis peopl~, which will attempt to sh~d
some fight on th~se numbers.
For

Rating Questions: When a nswer ing a rating

question (such as what you t ho ught of a
particular article in tllis issue) write one
number from "0" 'through "g": "1" is th e
WORST ratin g, "g" is t he BEST rating, "5"
means an AVERAGE ra'ling, and all numbers
in-betwee n express va rious shades of approva l
or disapproval. "0" indicat es NO OPINION or
NOT APPLICABLE.

(compl~teness

26 - Education; 1 = 11 years or less, 2 = 12

years, 3 = 13-15 years, 4 = 13-15 and still in
school, 5 = 16 years, 6 = 17+ ye~rs, and still in
schoo l.

and much more.

Please be sure to answer all the questions
asked. Cards which are incompletely filled-out
cannot be processed, When a questio n-number
has "no ques'tion" after it , do not write
anything in t hat particular responsebox,

34-Qu~stion F (balance)

= 3).

We will ask you to rat~ four gam~s. If you hav~

not played th~s~ games, or have not play~d
th~m ~nough to b~ able to evaluate them, then
simply place "D's" in the boxes.

48-Qu~stion

49-Question
50-Question
51-Question
52"Qu~stion

53-Qu~stion
54-Qu~stion

A (mapshoot)
B (ru/~s)
C (counters)
D (ease of play)
E (complet~n~ss of rules)
F (balanc~)
G (/~ngth)
H (s~t-up time)
J (complexity)
K (r~alism)
L (avera/!)
M (then & now)
N (money's worth)

FLYING CIRCUS
55-Question A (mapsh~et)
56-Question B (rules)
fi1Qu~stion C (counters)
58Qu~stion D (eas~ of play)
59Question E (completeness of rul~s)
SO-Question F (balanc~)
61-Qu~stion G (length)
62-Qu~srjon H (s~t-up time)
63Qu~stion

(compl~xity)

64 Qu~srion K (realism)
65Qu~stion L lov~rall)
66Question M (th~n & now)
67-Question N (money's worth)

LOST BATTLES
6iJQuestion A (mapshoot)
69-Qu~stion B (rules)
70-Qu~stion C (counters)
71-Qu~stion 0 (~ase of plav)
72-Qu~stion E (completeness of rul~s)
73-Question F (balanc~)
74-Question G (I~ngth)
75.Qu~stiOn H (s~t-up time)
7&-Qu~srion J Icompl~xity)
77-Qu~stion K Ir~alism)
7B-Question L (overa/!)
79-Qu~stion M (th~n & now)
80-Qu~stion N (Mon~y's worth)

SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS, INC.

44 East 23rd Street

NewY ork ,N.Y. 10010

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U.S. POST AG E
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NEW!

Battle of Stalingrad
Soviet Winter Offensive 1942
Novem ber 1942 : Th e German Sixth Army
grinds block by bloc k th rough the rubble of
Stali ngrad. In the Caucasus. Army Group A
cl oses on Maiko p and Batum, the "oil ci ties,"
sou rce of fu el for Sovi et ar mies and ind ustries.
Suddenly the Red Army st rikes, shocking t he
German High Command . Soviet troo ps envelop
Sixth Army in Stalin grad and threate n to
isolate A rmy Group A t o t he south . Battle of
Stalingrad simulates t he Soviet Winter Offensive with six 'teen scenarios of t he major alte r
natives t il at cou Id have occu rred. Battle of
Stalingrad is a grand tactical (division/corps)
game w ith hexes equal t o 16 kilometres. Each
Game-Turn represents two days . The game
system is simi lar to Kursk and France '40 but
it has been ref in ed and mo dified to reflect the
pec u la riti es of the sit uati o n. Soviet cavalry, for
examp le, can move in the motorized movement phase. An optiona l ru le forcing t he
German units to hold their positions simulates
the disa strou s effect of Hitler's i nsistance 1 hat
"Where a German so ldier st ands he w ill not
retreat ." But if th e Germans do conduct a
figh ti ng wit hd rawal , Battle of Stal i ngrad revea ls just how mu ch the So viets gamb led to
achieve t he turning point of the War in the
East. Ava ilabl e from Si mu lat ions Pub l icat ions
f o r $5.00.

Sixteen scenarios show alternatives and . .

The effect of Hitler's "stand fast" order.
How much the Soviets gambled at Stalingrad.