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RELATIONS 2010-2016

Family Code:
Privacy Art. 26
Absence of Essential Elements of




ART. 2(2)
Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc., (G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016)
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital

and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from
employment in 2006. Cadiz was suspended for Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. Cadiz became
pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such
time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law. Cadiz then
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with
prayer for Reinstatement.
W/N the condition requiring Cadiz to first enter into marriage before
she can be admitted back to employment

ART. 4, 35 (3)
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 18396, January 30, 2013)

The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony

between Syed and Gloria on January 9, 1993. The
marriage contract stated that the couple was issued a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar
to secure a copy of the marriage license in relation to a
bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification declaring that the office has
not issued a marriage license to Syed and Gloria. It further
verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and
Glorias marriage contract was issued to a different couple.

Conjugal Partnership of Gains Arts.

Abuse of Right Art. 19

Marriage Art. 4
Marriage with Foreigners Art. 26
Void ab initio Marriages Arts. 34, 35,
38, 39 & 40
Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 FC
Absence or Disappearance of Spouse
Arts. 41 & 42
Improvements on Paraphernal Property
Art. 92
Sale of ACP without consent Art. 96

116,117, 121, 122, 124, 129 &

Co-ownership with Impediment Art.
Family Home Arts. 152, 155, 160
Proof of Filiation Arts. 172 &175
Illegitimate Children (and Surnames)
Art. 176
Support Arts. 194 & 198
Demand and Payment of Support
Art. 203
Designation of Parental Authority
Art. 213
Interlocutory Orders on Support
pendente lite
RA 7610

Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.

It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and

deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is
a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and
inalienable right. Brent must prove two factors
necessitating its imposition: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job. Brent has not
shown the presence of neither of these factors. Perforce,
the Court cannot uphold the validity of said condition.

The RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was
a valid marriage license because the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said


Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013)


Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica

B. Kho, (G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016)

The purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid

marriage license because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that
the Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the
Marriage License series issued for the month of February 1982.
The Civil Registrar also said that it did not issue Marriage License
No. N-07568 to the couple.

Such certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to

prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, xxx "shall be void from the beginning."

Vitangcol v. People, (G.R. No. 207406, Jan. 13, 2016)

Not sufficient proof that there was no marriage license.

Ruling: In this case the Supreme Court ruled that the
Certification of the Local Civil Registrar was not sufficient
proof of absence of marriage license.

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book

on Application for Marriage License and License
Issuance available in this office, no record could be
found on the alleged issuance of this office of
Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.

ART. 26

David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras

(20 August 2014, G.R. No. 188289)


David and Leticia Noveras were married in the year

1988 in QC. They resided in California, USA and
eventually acquired US citizenship. They had 2 children.
In 2003, Leticia claims that David abandoned his family
and lived with one Estrellita Martinez in Aurora. Upon
learning that David had an affair Leticia divorced him in
California. The Superior Court of California granted
Leticia custody of both children and all the US properties.
With respect to the properties in the Philippines, Leticia
filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal

Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the

Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G.
Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972. Based on the
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was, in fact, issued.

This Certification does not prove petitioners first marriage

was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519
does not exist.
To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that
it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming
that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was
no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar.

The trial court ruling adopted the California Courts ruling.

The CA modified the decision on appeal by directing the
equal division of the Philippine properties between the
spouses. With respect to the common childrens
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both
spouses to each pay their children the amount of
W/N the spouses divorce is valid in our jurisdiction.
W/N the petition for separation of absolute community
of property should be granted.
W/N the distribution of the properties ordered by the
CA correct?


NO, the divorce is not valid and the trial court should not
have acknowledged the divorce decree.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.

The petition for separation of absolute community of

property should be granted. The records are replete
with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation
is highly improbable. More significantly they filed for
Divorce in California. These facts show that
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation
shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

Norma A. Del Socorro, for and in behalf of her minor child, Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem v. Ernst Johan Brinkham Van Wilsem
(10 December 2014, G.R. No. 193707)

Norma and Ernst, a Dutch national, married in 1990. In 1994, they

had a son, Rodrigo. Then the marriage ended and a Divorce
Decree was issued by the Court of Holland. Norma and Rodrigo
returned to the Philippines. According to the petitioner, respondent
pledged monthly support to their son, but this never happened.
Ernst eventually came to the Philippines again and remarried in
Cebu. He received a demand letter for support, but refused to
answer it. Hence, the petitioner filed a complaint affidavit for
violation of Sec. 5 para. E(2) of R.A. 9262 for the latters unjust
refusal to support his minor child with the petitioner.
The lower court ruled that since respondent is a foreign national,
the law on support and R.A. 9262 have no application.

Based on the Records only the divorce decree was

presented. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the California law on divorce
were not presented. Even if we apply the doctrine of
processual presumptionas the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a
valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that
the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.

Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee (G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012)

Under the principle of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a

valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce must first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his

Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code,

contending that notwithstanding the divorce decree,
respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation
to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis for financial support. Respondent
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated to petitioner for any financial support.
W/N a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and
W/N a foreign national can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his failure to support his minor child.



Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 in demanding support from

respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not

obliged to support petitioners son altogether.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its

application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary
to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign

Void ab initio Marriages [Art. 26, 35 ]

Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26, 2013)

FACTS: Fujiki a Japanese National married Marinay in the

Philippines. Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and
they eventually lost contact. Marinay remarried another
Japanese national but claimed she was being maltreated. She
contacted Fujiki and they reestablished their relationship. Fujiki
sought judgment from the Japanese courts for nullity of Marinays
second marriage on the ground of bigamy which was granted.
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment and Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The RTC dismissed the petition based on the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages which provides that it is only
the husband or wife who can file a declaration of nullity of

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign

law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same.

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of

the Netherlands, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.Thus, the law in the Netherlands is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the

Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled

R.A. 9262 also applies to the petitioner. Since the

respondent is living in the Philippines, there is basis for the
claim of the petitioner that the territoriality principle in
criminal law, in relation to article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the case.

HELD: The Rules on Declaration of Nullity and Annulment do not

apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
a foreign country. The rules also do not apply if the ground is
Bigamy. The parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. Since the recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.


Article 34

Santiago v. People (G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015)

Four months after Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor Santos were

married, they were charged with bigamy. Santiago pleaded not
guilty while Santos died during the pendency of the suit.

The prosecution presented evidence that Santos had been married

to Estela Galang when he asked Santiago to marry him. Santiago
argued that she could not be accused for bigamy because she
believed that Santos was still single when they married. She
argued that (1) her marriage to Santos was void to the lack of a
marriage license; and (2) the prosecution had to prove that her
second marriage was valid for her to be convicted of bigamy.

The RTC convicted Santiago of bigamy, and said that her

marriage with Santos did not need a marriage license as per
Article 34 of the Family Code because they cohabited long
before their marriage.

Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming her

conviction was misplaced because of the absence of a marriage
license. She added that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they did
not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for
at least five years. She alleged the records showed that she
married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. The CA affirmed her conviction.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted
of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. After a careful perusal of facts, it
is clear that the second marriage was void because the
cohabitation of Santiago and Santos were less that the five-year
requirement. Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this demonstrable fact.

However, despite such flaw in the second marriage, we

chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically
a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution.

The States penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered

nugatory by allowing individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and
to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment (Tenebro v. Court of

Art. 35

Void ab initio Marriages

Montaez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On
January 24, 1983, while the first marriage has not yet been
judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a
petition in 2001 to nullify her marriage with Socrates for
psychological incapacity. The first marriage was declared null
and void in 2003
In a case for bigamy filed against her, Lourdes alleged
that since her marriage was declared void ab initio in 2003,
there can be no bigamy. RTC ruled that bigamy was not
committed by the respondent. The subsequent marriage was
solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family Code;
hence, the existing law at that time did not require judicial
declaration of nullity as a condition to remarry.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario

(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)

In this Administrative case, the Supreme Court,

(in ruling against judges who irregularly
solemnized marriages from 2003 to 2007),
made a statement that for the exception
under Art. 34 to apply, the parties should
have been capacitated to marry each other
during the entire period [of five years of
cohabitation] and not only at the time of
the marriage.

ISSUE: W/N the declaration of nullity of respondent's first

marriage justifies the dismissal of the action for bigamy filed
against her.
HELD: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not
justify the dismissal of the bigamy case. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no judicial
declaration, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore,
he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage can be prosecuted for
bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.


Castillo v. Castillo, (G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016)

In 1972, respondent Lea married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). In

1979, Lea married petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). In May

2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage,praying that his marriage to Lea be
declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Lea
opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. In 2002,
Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista
void. In 2003, the RTC declared Lea's first marriage to Bautista
null and void ab initio. In 2004, Lea filed a Demurrer to
Evidenceclaiming that the proof adduced by Renato was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground that it was bigamous.

Ruling: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must

be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the

time of its celebration.In this case, the law in force at the
time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code
was in effecti.e.in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the
Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the
Civil Code on void marriages.
This Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza,
People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. This Court
clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, that
the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not
apply to marriages that were celebrated before the

Void ab initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]

People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)
FACTS: Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in
1980. Thirteen years after, he married Eleanor. However,
his first marriage was declared void ab initio because it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Meanwhile, the
second spouse died. Respondent was charged with
bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the
information do not charge an offense of bigamy since his
first marriage was void ab initio; hence, there is an
absence of an essential element in the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of bigamy.

The RTC denied respondent's demurrer stating that

the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting

when she married Renato in1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it
voidab initio.The RTC stressed that so long as no
judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid
and existing; that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled,
since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity
for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting
her second marriage with Renato.

effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the

parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this
Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the thenprevailing rule:
Since the second marriage took place and all the children were
born before the xxx effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of

the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the

absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under the Civil Code.

HELD: Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for

bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.


Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen (G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)

Eliseo Quiazon died, leaving behind his wife, Amelia GarciaQuiazon, two legitimate daughters, Jenneth and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon, his common-law wife, Maria Lourdes
Belen, and their daughter, Elise Quiazon. After his death,
Elise, represented by her mother, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on her claim, she
impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito).

A marriage certificate issued by the Diocese of Tarlac

was presented as proof of the previous marriage.

To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, attached to

the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of

Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left her real and
personal properties.
To preserve the estate of her father and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.
W/N Elise may impugn the void marriage between
Eliseo and Amelia Quiazon.

YES. The existence of the previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by the Certificate of
Marriage. In the absence of any showing that such marriage
had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage
was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage has taken
place. Thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally and
may be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. There is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father.

ART. 36
Aurelio v. Aurelio (G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011)

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the FC as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must
order the fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Sol. Gen. issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, to the petition.

Republic v. Galang (G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011)

The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the

disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity: (1)
Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;

It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion

in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established, citing Marcos v.
Pimentel v. Pimentel
(G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010)

The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no

effect on the alleged crime (frustrated parricide) that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.


Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)

Camacho-Reyes V. Reyes, (G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010)

Psychological incapacity contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling to constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown tha t the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity and abandonment
are merely grounds for legal separation.

Art. 36 & 147

Dio v. Dio (G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a VOID marriage,

regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
Article 50 of the FC only applies to Arts. 40 & 45 and does
not apply to marriages declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties as the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on coownership.

ART. 38

Vda. de Carungcong v. People

(G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010)

ISSUE: If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity

to the blood relatives of ones spouse, does the extinguishment
of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the
relationship by affinity?
HELD: We hold that the second view is more consistent with the
language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains
that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the
death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not.

A recommendation for therapy does not

automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical
psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage
behavior. The recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily
negate the finding that respondents psychological
incapacity is incurable.

Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato

(20 October 2014, G.R. No. 176492)

Article 147 is applicable, not Article 129. The marriage
between Nonato and Barrido was declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36. Article 147 states
that if the marriage is void, wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares, and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. This particular kind
of co-ownership applies when the following elements are
present: must be capacitated to marry each other; live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is

ART. 39

Isidro Ablaza v. Republic (G.R. No. 158298,

August 11, 2010)

In 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC in Masbate a petition for the

declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato, alleging that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. However, this specifically extends only to marriages covered
by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.


ART. 40


(G.R. 209741, April 15, 2015)

Edgardo and Edna Azote married on 1992, and their union
produced six children. Edgardo, a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) submitted to the SSS two E-4 forms in
1994 and 2001designating Edna and their six children as
beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away in January 2005.

The SSC dismissed Ednas petition stating that (1) Edgardo

did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wifebeneficiary; (2) Rosemarie was still presumed to be
Edgardos legal wife; and (3) the NSO records revealed that
Edgardo and Rosemarie wed in 1982 thus making Ednas and
Edgardos marriage as not valid without showing that his first
marriage was annulled or dissolved.

Edna filed her claim for death benefits as Edgardos wife,

but the Social Security Commission (SSC) denied this
because records showed that Edgardo had previously
submitted E-4 forms in 1982 designating Rosemarie Azote,
his spouse and son Elmer as beneficiaries.

W/N the SSS can determine the validity of Ednas marriage
to Edgardo considering Rosemarie or Elmer did not appear
or contest Ednas claim.
W/N Edna is entitled to Edgardos SSS death benefits as his
legitimate wife.


ART. 41

Yes. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to

determine the validity of marriages, Section 4(b)(7) of R.A.
8282 (Social Security Law) requires the SSC to examine
available statistics ensure that benefits go to the right
No. Edna is not qualified to be Edgardos legitimate wife,
thus she is not entitled to SSS death benefits. She could not
adduce evidence to prove that Edgardos earlier marriage
was either annulled or dissolved, or whether there was a
declaration of Rosemaries presumptive death before Ednas
marriage to Edgardo.

Republic v. Sareogon, Jr., (G.R. No. 199194, Feb.10, 2016)

HELD: By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering
judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Republic v. Narceda
(G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)

No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. Hearing of a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding. Article 247 of the Family
Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately
final and executory. Thus, by the express provision
of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.

The degree of diligence and reasonable search

required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
present the persons from whom the present spouse
allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouses
relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is
failure to report the missing spouses purported
disappearance or death to the police or mass media,
and (3) when the present spouses evidence might or
would only show that the absent spouse chose not to
communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was
indeed dead. Because of this, Joses efforts to locate
the missing Netchie are below the required degree of
stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence.


REPUBLIC v. Tampus, (G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016)

Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L.
Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975. Three days after,
Dante, as member of the AFP, was assigned to a combat
mission in Jolo, Sulu. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. In a petition for the declaration of resumptive death
which she filed 33 years after, Nilda testified that she
exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his parents,
relatives, and neighbors, who also did not know his
whereabouts; and that after 33 years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already

Celerina J. Santos v. Ricardo T. Santos

(8 October 2014, G.R. No. 187061)

ART. 42

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
Celerina and Ricardo were married in 1980. According to
Ricardo, when the family business did not prosper, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work abroad as a domestic
helper. She left the Philippines and was never heard from
again. He also exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He claimed
that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent. The
choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them
certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code
provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage. In turn, the Family Code
provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.

HELD: Other than making inquiries with Dantes parents,

relatives, and neighbors, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She never called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband. She
did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself
in finding him. Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives,
or neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated her
asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante.
Because of this, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
the strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief' of his death.

Celerina claimed that she learned about the petition only in

October 2008. She filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. She claimed that her residence was Quezon
City, which was also the conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo
left in May 2008. She also claimed that she never resided in
Tarlac and worked as a domestic helper. She referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations. She also argued that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.
The CA issued the resolution dismissing Celerinas petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. CA
ruled that filing of a sworn statement before the civil registry
declaring her reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
to be the proper remedy.

ART. 92

Muoz v. Ramirez (G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010)

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the
residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this
presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and
109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is
Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
Article 120 of the Family Code provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are made
on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. When the value of the paraphernal property is
considerably more than the conjugal improvement, said
paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.



ART. 117

ART. 116
Dela Pena v. Avila

(G.R. No. 187490, February 08, 2012)

In the case Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, the phrase

"married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status
of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that
the husband is also a registered owner.
"Since there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the
name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature
as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse. (Conjugal Partnership of Gains)

ISSUE: W/N Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the
purchase of the real properties subject to the dissolution
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates
no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. (Distinguish
from Borromeo v. Descallar (2009) relationship under Art. 148)

Beumer v. Amores (G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)

Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was
married on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the
basis of the formers psychological incapacity. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and prayed for the distribution of several
properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
Beumer testified that while the four other lots were registered
in the name of his wife, these properties were acquired with
the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit.

ART. 121
Aguete v. Philippine National Bank
(G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the

contract, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing
of the contract. Where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Art. 122
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
Prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia,
and others of murder before RTC Surigao. The RTC acquitted
Efren but found Melecia and another person guilty and
sentenced them to the death. The RTC ordered those found
guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and
severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on
March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names
of Efren and Melecia.

Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)

ISSUE: W/N the conjugal properties can be levied and

executed upon for the satisfaction of wifes civil liability in the
murder case.
YES, the conjugal properties may be levied and
executed in light of the fact that Melecia has no exclusive
No prior liquidation of those assets is required. Article 122
states that at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such
[offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for
the purposes above-mentioned. However, the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the FC must first be sufficiently
covered by conjugal properties before other properties may be
levied and executed.



Spouses Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr. And Parulan

(G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010)

Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties

made after the effectivity of the Family Code. The sale was
made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. :
Article124.The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision..
The power of administration does not include acts of disposition
or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an
authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa.

ART. 129

Quiao v. Quiao (G.R. No 176556, July 04, 2012)

FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation

against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be
divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes
of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further
held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The listed properties above are considered part of the

conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in
the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be accounted for
in the guilty party's favor.

ART. 124

FLORES v. LINDO (G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011)

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions
also state that the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power
of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of
the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

HELD: In the normal course of events, the following are the

steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their
separate properties. In the instant case, the trial court found
that the couple has no separate properties when they
married. xxx
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay
the debts of the conjugal partnership; xxx
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive
properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned
to each of them. In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

ART. 130

Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. Et. Al. v. Servacio and Go

(G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011)

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,

any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest to Servacio, but not the interest of his
The proper action in cases like this is the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy,supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.



Art. 147


(G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015)

In a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article

36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares.

Attempts to establish respondent as an

irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as
family man were made but the testimonies
adduced towards that end, failed to fully
convince the Court that respondent should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the
conjugal property because of his indiscretion. Thus,
the presumption remains that said properties
were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by
them in equal shares.

However, the celebration was not consummated because of the

bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they
were unable to secure a marriage contract. Rosca alleged that
Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her
which led to their physical separation before the year 1973.
HELD: Uy and Rosca were not married. Hence, the sale contracted by
Rosca is valid. There is a presumption established in our Rules
"that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. "Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven by testimony
of one of the parties to the marriage, or one of the witnesses to the
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. Documentary evidence may also be

For purposes of this Article, a party who did not

participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. Properties acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court
and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to
prove that the properties were acquired solely on her
own efforts.

UY V. SPOUSES LACSAMANA (G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015)

FACTS: Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Documents against his alleged wife Rosca and the
spouses Lacsamana to whom his wife sold two parcels of land. Uy
alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca; that they lived
together as husband and wife from the time they were married in
1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and
Rosca had eight children. Uy alleged that he and his wife acquired
2 parcels of land in 1964, but in gross and evident bad faith,
Rosca executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale
in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
Rosca argued that she was never married to Uy. She testified that
sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited
and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize
their marital union with a marriage ceremony.

The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage

contract itself. Uy was not able to present any copy of the
marriage certificate. The presumption of marriage has been
sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of
evidence showing that Uy and Rosca were never actually married
to each other. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies
when a couple living together were not incapacitated from
getting married. The provision states that properties acquired
during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is
proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and
appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the
subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.



ART. 148

Ventura v. Spouses Paulino

(G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013)

In unions between a man and a woman who are

incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence
of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties.
In Borromeo v. Descallar, it was held that it is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.

The divorce did not dissolve the marriage between JLL and Eugenia.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of JLL and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until JLLs death.
JLLs marriage to Soledad, being bigamous, was void, and the
properties acquired during their marriage are governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
Soledad failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to
purchase the condominium unit. Also, it is logical that Soledad, not
being a lawyer, had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase
of books for the law firm.

Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna (23 July 2015, G.R. No.


JLL obtained a divorce from Eugenia from the Dominican Republic,

and on the same day, contracted another marriage, with Soledad
Lavadia, the respondent. JLL and Soledad returned to the Phils.
where they lived as husband and wife. JLL organized a law firm
and bought a condominium unit to be used as the office of the law
firm. When JLL died, the firm was dissolved. The condominium unit
was partitioned, and the pro-indiviso share of JLL was determined
to be 25/100. This was claimed by his son from his first marriage,
The property, including law books, office furniture, and equipment,
is subject to the complaint by Soledad against the heir of JLL.
The RTC ruled that the property was acquired through JLLs sole
industry, and that Soledad has no right as owner. She was,
however, declared as the owner of the law books.

Art. 152:
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288 Aug. 15, 2012)
FACTS: The court issued a judgment against Sps. Fortaleza which
resulted to the execution of their conjugal house.
ISSUE: W/N he family home can be executed.
HELD: A family home is exempt from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code, provided such claim for
exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so
estops the party from later claiming the exemption.
In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the
one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the

ART. 155 DE MESA v. ACERO (G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of
exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before August 3, 1988 must
be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code;
Second, family residences constructed after August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences not judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale

under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor him/herself
before the sale of the property at public auction.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home
and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses
De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a
family home and its being exempted from execution at the
time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the
property from execution.



Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, July 8, 2015)

ART. 160
In a 1998 decision, the RTC ruled that the mortgage cannot
bind the property in question which was owned by the
Bells for violating Article 160 of the Family Code since the
mortgage was not consented to in writing by a majority
of the beneficiaries of the family home.

Respondents family home cannot be sold on execution under
Article 160 of the family Code. The issue of whether the
property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of Php300,000
has already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its
findings necessarily meant that the property is exempt from

In 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon the Bells

family home. The Bells claimed that the property cannot be
sold because it is a family home and that the Eulogios ploy
to re-litigate the issue had long been settled with finality
(res judicata) by the 1998 RTC decision. The CA ruled that
the RTC decision in 1998 only declared their house and lot
as a family home, not the issue of whether it may be sold in

To warrant the execution sale of respondents family home

under Article 160, the Eulogios must establish that (1) there was
an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the
persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157.
The Eulogios have not proven that they are protected by the
exceptions under Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code.

Art. 172

Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat (28 January 2015, G.R. 200169)

Salas v. Matusalem (G.R. No. 180284 April 10, 2013)

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign
in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity.
A baptismal certificate considered as public documents but
only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
childs paternity.

Spouses Aguilar died, intestate and without debts. Their estate
include two parcels of land which is the subject of the controversy.
Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G.
Siasat, alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses; that he discovered that the subject titles were
missing, and he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan had
stolen the same.
In her Answer,respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness
of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife,
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share
of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,

her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue;
and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners SSS E-1 Form, a public document, is

sufficient to establish legitimate filiation with his father,
Alfredo Aguilar and W/N respondent has personality to
impugn legitimacy of the petitioner.

To prove filiation, petitioner presented school records stating that

Alfredo Aguilar is petitioners parent; ITR indicating that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother and Alfredo Aguilars
Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957,
a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo
Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks indicating that petitioner, who was
born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. Respondent
offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria SiasatAguilar announcing that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that
she is the sole heir to Alfredos estate.

Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship of petitioner to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Filiation may
be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is



As to petitioners argument that respondent has no personality

to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his
legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has
already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, the Court has held before that
Article 263 (Old Civil Code provision of Art. 170 of the FC)
refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a
child of Jose at all.
Nevertheless, since the petitioner has shown that he is the
legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is also the heir
to the latter's estate.

We do not agree with the conclusion of both courtsa quo.

The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities
consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth
and the name of the informant made the document
questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries
on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are
alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent
herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities
and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding
the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or good cause for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of


(G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015)

In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein

respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that
respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased
brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner
alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. When petitioner alleged
that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence
shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling
on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such
proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not
being a direct action to prove one's filiation.

ART. 175
Jesse U. Lucas V. Jesus S. Lucas (G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011)

FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to establish

FILIATION with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the RTC. Jesse alleged that he is the
son of Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include
(a) petitioners certificate of live birth (no father stated); (b)
petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d)
his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from UP College of Music; and (f)
clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

SURNAMES and 176 Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248

February 18, 2014)
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship,
two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
The parties relationship eventually turned sour, and Grande left
for the United States with her 2 children. This prompted Antonio to
file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to
take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/
Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Appending the petition was a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.



ISSUE: W/N Antonio may compel the use of his surname for
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother (Art 176 of the Family
Code). The exception provided is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on
the mother; hence, Antonios prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be

BBB v. AAA, (G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015)

FACTS: When BBB married AAA, the birth certificate of CCC

(who was AAAs son by a previous relationship) was amended to

make it appear that he was a legitimated of BBB and AAA. In a
VAWC case against BBB, the PPO included support for CCC. BBB
raises the issue of CCC not being his child.
HELD: BBB cannot raise the issue of CCCs status and filiation in

the instant petition. In Tison v. CA,the Court held that "the civil
status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The childs
legitimacy "cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose."The
instant petition sprang out of AAAs application for a PPO before
the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a
collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.

The amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for
his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses, etc.,
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses.

As to the matter of the change of surname of the

illegitimate children. There is no legal basis for the
court to change the surname of the children. To do
otherwise would be to contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of the law.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who
is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate children.

Support (Art. 194 )

Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)

Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for
support pendent lite amounting to P500,000. Respondent on the
other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give
as much as 75,000 as support. The RTC ruled that based on the
evidence presented the proper amount to paid should be
115,000. This was not assailed by any party thus, it became final
and executory. Issues once again arose, when respondent in
complying with its obligation, deducted from the amount of
support in arrears, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner representing the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses and purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods.

Art. 198: Interlocutory Orders on Support

Calderon, Ma Carminia v. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA
(G.R. No. 185595, Jan 9, 2013)

FACTS: Complaint of declaration of nullity of marriage was filed

by Calderon against husband Roxas. Trial court granted support
pendente lite, ordering Roxas to support minor children. Upon
motion, the support was reduced. The order to reduce support
was appealed from, but was denied by CA.
ISSUE: Whether orders on the matter of support pendente lite are
interlocutory or final.
HELD: Orders on matters of support pendente lite are
interlocutory. It decides an incidental matter but is not a final
decision on the main issue of the case. The proper remedy is a
special civil action, not an appeal of the interlocutory order. Thus,
CA properly dismissed the appeal.



Art. 203

Designation of Parental Authority (Art. 213)

Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012)

HELD: Since filiation is beyond question, support

follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his/her child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. The amount is variable and, for this
reason, no final judgment on the amount of support
is made as the same shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities
of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to

During the conference on the application for habeas

corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed
inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying,
not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the
father, was a total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.s outburst,
Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directing Eltesa to return
Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of
did not materialize.
Hence, Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of
the Order. But instead of enforcing said order, Judge
Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr. . It is Geoffreys main contention
is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional
custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on
compromise agreement.

RA 7610

People v. Caballo (G.R. No. 198732, Jun 10, 2013)

AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old. The
two became sweethearts. Sometime in 1998, Caballo persuaded
AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more incidents of sexual congress.
Issue: W/O Caballo is guilty of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x

Beckett v. Sarmiento(A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013)

Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to
Eltesa, a Filipino citizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr.
The couple were subsequently divorced and by virtue of a
compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was granted to
Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly
Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits, Geoffrey
consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the
holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011.
However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey Jr.,
hence, this prompted Geoffrey to file a petition for violation of RA
7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus.


Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody, did not

disregard the res judicata rule. The matter of custody, to borrow
from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, is not permanent and
unalterable [and] can always be re-examined and adjusted.
The situation of the parents and even of the child can change,
such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be
to the latters best interest.
Under, the Family Code, in parental authority the Court shall take
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be
turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As
such, he was very much capable of deciding, based on his past
experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12)yeasof age shall bereclusion temporalin its medium period,
(c) xxx

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
1.The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
3.The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age
(Jojit Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011)



A child is deemed exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Consent is not
material in cases under RA 7610.
Moreover, the abuse is punishable whether habitual
or not. In the case, Caballos actuations of assuring AAA
of his love and promise to marry may be classified as
coercion and influence within the purview of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610. These were meant to influence
AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give
into having sex with him, in which he succeeded.

Interpretation was criticized as early as in Olivarez v. CA, G.R. No. 163866,

July 29, 2005
J. Carpio, dissenting: The Information failed to allege the second

essential element of the crime as defined in Section 5 of RA 7610

[The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse], thus, Olivarez cannot be convicted
for violation of RA 7610.The Information is void to charge Olivarez
for violation of Section 5 of RA 7610. Otherwise, Olivarez would be
deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge
against him.
This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs
acts of lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness
that the accused performs on the child are separate and different
from the childs exploitation in prostitution or subjection to other
sexual abuse.

George Bongalon v. People, (G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013)

Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the

acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited

in prostitution nor subjected to other sexual abuse.

The phrase other sexual abuse refers to any sexual

abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness complained of

and other than exploitation in prostitution. Such other
sexual abuse could fall under acts encompassing
[O]bscene publications and indecent shows mentioned
in Section 3(d)(3) of RA 7610.

Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron v. People, (G.R No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

Jabalde is guilty of slight physical injuries only and not child abuse

under R.A. 7610. Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin,
but the records do not show that Jabalde intended to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human
being. The laying of hands on Lin was an effect of Jabaldes
emotional outrage after being informed that her daughters head was
punctured which made her think that she was already dead. Dr. Munoz
stated that the abrasions may have been mildly inflicted. This runs
contrary to the accusation that she intended to abuse or maltreat Lin,
because if she did, she could have easily hurt the 7 year old boy with
heavy blows. As a mother, the idea of the death of her child caused
an instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm
and danger in the form of the mild abrasions inflicted on Lin. Having
lost the strength of her mind, she lacked the intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that is essential in the child of crime abuse.

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC

and CA that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with
their holding that petitioners acts constituted child abuse
under RA 7610. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended
to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent

to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and

dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse. Crime is slight physical injuries.

Felina Rosaldes v. People, (G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014)

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes

the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act

No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard
Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the boy fell down, his
body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead]
of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further
held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."



Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly

discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the

physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive.
The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.
She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake
of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by
a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child
care exercising special parental authority.


Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable

doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds

that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Michael Ryan as a human being.