emedial Law Review

Digests

RULE 116 : ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS
FACTS: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the
complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa,
through deceit, received and encashed two checks
issued in the name of Abalos without the latters
knowledge and consent and that despite repeated
demands by Abalos, Adasa failed and refused to pay
the proceeds of the checks. Adasa filed a counteraffidavit admitting that she received and encashed the
2 checks. Then she alleged in a Supplemental affidavit
claiming that it was instead Bebie Correa who received
the 2 checks, but that Correa had already left the
country.
A resolution was issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City finding probable cause
against Adasa and ordering the filing of 2 separate
Informations
for
Estafa
Thru
Falsification
of
Commercial Document by a Private Individual.
Consequently, 2 separate criminal cases were filed
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782.
This instant petition concerns only one of these
criminal cases (Criminal Case No. 8782).
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of Adasa, the trial
court issued an order directing the OCP of Iligan City to
conduct a reinvestigation. After conducting the
reinvestigation, OCP issued a resolution affirming the
finding of probable cause. Meanwhile, during her
arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No.
8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not
guilty.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the OCP, Adasa
later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a
Resolution, the DOJ reversed and set aside the
resolution of the OCP and directed the said office to
withdraw the Information for Estafa.
Abalos thereafter filed a MR arguing that the DOJ
should have dismissed outright the petition for review
since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that
when an accused has already been arraigned and
the aggrieved party files a petition for review before
the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should
not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due
course thereto, but instead deny it outright.
On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted Adasas
Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 8782.
Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
regarding the DOJ resolution. CA granted the petition
and reversed the resolution of the DOJ. CA emphasized
that Section 7 of DOJ Circular used the phrase shall
not.
Sec 7. If an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall
not be given due course if the accused had already
been arraigned

While the permissive word "may" in Section 121

would seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has
discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the
fact that the accused has been arraigned. This
provision should not be treated separately, but should
be read in relation to Section 7.
ISSUE: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12
of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory
such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an
appeal despite the fact that the accused had been
arraigned? NO.
RATIO: CA is correct. When an accused has already
been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or
petition for review due course and must dismiss the
same. Arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of
the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of
the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such
instance, the DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an
accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for
review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12,
must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated
therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give due
course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
To give the second sentence of Section 12 in
relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application
would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the
Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice, but would also render its
other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7,
nugatory.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR M.

DOCUMENTO
FACTS: Oscar Documento was charged before the RTC
with 2 counts of Rape, as defined and punished under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was accused
of raping his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age.
One information was for the alleged rape committed on
April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, and
another information was for the alleged rape
committed on October 15, 1995 at Barangay
Antongalon,
Butuan
City.
Upon
arraignment,
Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he
changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such, the
RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellants
plea of guilt to the charges. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented evidence consisting of the
testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her
mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their
testimonies established that Documento started
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the
petition for review on any of the following grounds:
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the
appeal was taken; x x x.
1

Page 1 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

sexually molesting his daughterwhen she was 10

years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and gave
birth in 1993. Documento raped AAA on a number of
occasions in the houses both located in Butuan City.
AAAs mother, who was working in Manila, searched
for Documento and AAA. Upon learning that
Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she went to
the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in
securing custody of AAA. As soon as Documento was
arrested, AAA informed the police that Documento
raped her. Dr. Hugo testified that AAA was in fact
raped. Documento testified as the sole witness for the
defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the
crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Salise
convinced him to do so. Documento contended that he
did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a
consensual, sexual relationship. He further alleged that
the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in
Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on crossexamination, Documento disowned the handwritten
letters he had supposedly written to his wife and to
AAA, asking for their forgiveness. The RTC convicted
Documento of both counts of Rape. CA affirmed.
ISSUES: 1. WON the prosecution failed to establish
that the 2 counts of rape were perpetrated in Butuan
City NO!
2. WON the Court gravely erred in failing to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntainess and
full comprehension by accused of the consequences of
his plea YES!(but this was not enough to remand the
case to the trial court)
RATIO: 1. Contrary to the insistence of Documento
that the prosecution failed to establish that 2 counts of
Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed
to specific parts of the records which show that,
although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan
City" in her testimony, the incidents in the present
cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa
Avenue, both in Butuan City. The 2 informations also
clearly state that the crimes were perpetrated in
Butuan City. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the
City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice
by the trial court.
2. It is true that the appellate court noted the
trial courts failure to conduct the prescribed
"searching inquiry" into the matter of whether or not
Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently made.
Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant
proper. Nothing in the records of the case at bench
shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines
set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases
after appellants re-arraignment and guilty plea. The
questions propounded to appellant during the direct
and cross-examination likewise fall short of these
requirements. The appellant was not fully apprised of
the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued
by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him
that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the
imposable penalty, which is death as he might have

erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death

penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be
applied by the court regardless of any mitigating
circumstances that might have attended the
commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court
judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce
evidence despite the guilty plea.
With the trial courts failure to comply with the
guidelines, appellants guilty plea is deemed
improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious.
This does not mean, however, that the case should be
remanded to the trial court. This course of action is
appropriate only when the appellants guilty plea was
the sole basis for his conviction.
As held in People v. Mira: Notwithstanding the
incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea,
we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial
court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on
an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the
accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.

VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(sorry! Long case)
FACTS: Cesar Virata is one of the defendants in the
case of Republic vs Romualdez which was filed by the
PCGG. The case involves the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth allegedly amassed by the defendants in that
case during the marcos years. The complaint was
amended 3times. The last amended complaint filed
with the sandiganbayan states the following relevant
allegations against virata:
[summarized version]
Par.14: defendants...engaged in devises,
schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves
by... (b) giving meralco undue advantage (increasing
power rates while reducing electric franchise tax); (g)
justify meralcos anomalous acquisition of electric
cooperatives; (m) manipulated the formation of
Erecton Holdings for the purpose of assuming the
obligation of Erecton Inc with Philguarantee (Virata is
an official of philguarantee) so that Erecton Inc can
borrow more capital its obligation with philguarantee
amounting to more than P2B.
Par.17: acting as dummies, nominees...to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained.
Par.18: Acts of defendant... constitute gross
abuse of official position... to the grave and irreparable
damage of the Filipino people.
Virata filed a bill of particulars asserting that
these allegations are vague and not averred with
sufficient definiteness to enable him to effectively
prepare his responsive pleadings. Sandiganbayan
partially granted the motion. Only with regard to
Page 2 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

par.17 and 18 was the republic required to file a bill of

particulars. As to the others, Sandiganbayan declared
them to be clear and specific enough to allow Virata to
file an intelligent responsive pleading.
OSG submitted the bill of particulars relating to
par17 and 18. Virata filed a motion to strike out this
bill of particular and to defer the filing of his answer. It
is alleged that the bill of particulars aver for the first
time new actionable wrongs allegedly committed by
him in various official capacities and that the
allegations do not indicate that he was a dummy,
nominee or agent (which was the allegation in the
complaint) but rather a government officer acting in
his own name.
Meanwhile, Virata filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC with regard to the denial of his bill of
particulars with regard to par.14 and sections b,g and
m. SC granted the petition. OSG filed a manifestation
that since PCGG is the investigating body with the
complete records of the case, it is in a better position
to supply the bill of particulars. Thus, PCGG submitted
a bill of particulars (no.2) in relation to par.14 and
subparagraphs b,g and m.
Virata filed a comment with a motion to
dismiss. According to him, bill of particulars no.2 is
merely a rehash of the assertions made in the last
amended complaint hence, it is not the bill of
particulars required by the court. As to the 1 st bill of
particulars, it allegedly shows that new imputations are
being made which are different from the charge in the
complaint. Sandiganbayan found the bill of particulars
to be sufficient, hence, this recourse to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the bill of particulars should be
admitted or not? NO!
HELD: The rule is that a complaint must contain the
ultimate facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action. A
cause of action has the following elements: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violating the plaintiffs right. As long as the
complaint contains these three elements, a cause of
action exists. Even though the allegations are vague,
dismissal is not the proper remedy. Thus, the rules of
court provide that a party may move for more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such
motion shall point out the defects complained of and
the details desired. An order directing the submission
of such statement or bill is proper where it enables the
party asking for it to intelligently prepare a responsive
pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.
It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform
the opposite party and the court of the precise nature
and character of the cause of action or defense which
the pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to
guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and

reasonably to protect him against surprise at the trial.

It gives information of the specific proposition for
which the pleader contends, in respect to any material
and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of
the pleading which it supplements. It has been held
that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party
of the nature of the pleader's cause of action or
defense, and it must furnish the required items of the
claim with reasonable fullness and precision. Generally,
it will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially
gives the opposite party the information to which he is
entitled. It should be definite and specific and not
contain general allegations and conclusions. It should
be reasonably certain and as specific as the
circumstances will allow.
Bill of particular for Par14 (b): Complaint
alleges viratas alleged active collaboration in reducing
taxes. Yet, there is nothing in the bill of particular
about this active collaboration. It is silent as to what
acts of Virat that establish that he collaborated in
reducing the taxes.
Par14(g): BOP (bill of particular) on this also
failed to set forth particularly or specifically the
charges against virata. It is full of generalizations and
indefinite statements. So many questions about the
alleged acts which were not answered (ie. What were
these electric coops? Why were their acquisition
anomalous? Etc)
Par14(m): BOP is merely a restatement of the
charge in the complaint. Clearly, republic failed to
amplify the charges against Virata. The important
question as to what particular acts of Virata that
constituted support and assistance in the formation of
Erectors Holdings is left unanswered.
With regard to the 1st bill of particular,
basically SC had the same findings. That is, BOP failed
to supply Virata with material matters which he needs
in order to file a responsive pleading. Further, the 1st
BOP contains new matters which are not covered by
the charges in the complaint. The complaint alleges
that he was acting as a dummy but the BOP state that
he acted in his official capacity. Therefore, under the
BOP he acted as agent of the government whereas in
the complaint he allegedly acted as agent of his codefendants.
The two bills of particulars filed by the Republic
failed to properly amplify the charges leveled against
Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or
repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded
Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent,
they contain vague, immaterial and generalized
assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural
rules.
As a result, SC orders the dismissal of the
complaint in so far as the charges against Virata are
concerned. This is justified under the rules of court
(failure to prosecute plaintiff... fails to comply with
these rules or any order of the court)
Side issues: Whether PCGG can file the BOP in
behalf of the republic (contention is that only OSG can
act in behalf of republic)? YES. Admin code gives
Page 3 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

power to the OSG to deputize legal officers and to call

on any dept...etc., as may be necessary to fulfil its
functions. Here, OSG called PCGG for assistance and
authorized it to file the BOP.

RULE 117 : MOTION TO QUASH

LOS BAOS V. PEDRO
*sorry mahaba, the court
provisional dismissal kasi

compared

MTQ

and

FACTS: Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded

firearm without the authorization of the COMELEC a
day before the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections. The accusation was based on the Omnibus
Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine
National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his
firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac
election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro
for violating the election gun ban. After an inquest, the
Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed Information
against Pedro with the Marinduque RTC for violation of
the Codes Article XXII, Sec. 261 (q), in relation to
Sec. 264. The Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at
about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, in [S]itio
Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of
Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a
Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded
with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 17356836 outside his residence during the election
period, without authorization in writing from
the Commission on Election[s].
RTC
granted
Pedros
Motion
for
Preliminary
Investigation, which, however, did not materialize.
Instead, Pedro filed for Motion to Quash arguing that
the Information "contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense."
Pedro attached to his motion a COMELEC Certification
dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted"
from the gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed
the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the
police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles
to Pedro.
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos,
representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen
the case, as Pedros COMELEC Certification was a
"falsification," and the prosecution was "deprived of
due process" when the judge quashed the information
without a hearing. Attached to Los Baos motion were
two COMELEC certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was
not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the

signatures in the COMELEC Certification of September

24, 2001 were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as
Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion. Pedro
moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order
primarily based on Rule 117, Sec. 8, arguing that the
dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the
public prosecutors lack of express approval of the
motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his
express conformity with the motion to reopen the
case. The RTC rejected the position that Rule 117, Sec.
8 applies, and explained that this provision refers to
situations where both the prosecution and the accused
mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or
where the prosecution or the offended party failed to
object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a
situation where the information was quashed upon
motion of the accused and over the objection of the
prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment
date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition
to
nullify
the
RTCs
mandated
reopening. He argued that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in its ruling. CA denied the petition for the
reason that there is no grave abuse of discretion but
discussed that the TC erred in ruling that Rule 117,
Sec. 8 of the ROC does not apply to the case at bar.
Pedro filed a MR which was granted.
Los Baos also contends that the CA gravely erred
when: (1) it ruled in effect that the Order dated
November 22, 2001 granting the MTQ is considered a
provisional dismissal, which became permanent one
year from the prosecutors receipt of the order; the
order to quash the Information was based on Rule
117, Sec. 3 not on Sec. 8; (2) it granted Pedros MR
and denied Los Baos motion for modification of
judgment, when Rule 117, Sec. 6 of clearly provides
that an order granting a MTQ is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
ISSUE: WON Rule 117, Sec. 8 of the ROC is applicable
to the case NO
HELD: NO. The RTC decision reopening the case
prevails.
Motion to Quash
A MTQ is the mode by which an accused assails, before
entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint
or the criminal information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect
apparent on the face of the Information.
Provisional Dismissal

Page 4 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

A case is provisionally dismissed if the following

requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for its
provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion
and dismissing the case provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of
the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine
quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar
rule stated in the second paragraph of Rule 117, Sec. 8
of the ROC. We also ruled that the time-bar is a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the
given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the
lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right
of the State to prosecute the accused.
Comparison of MTQ vs. Provisional Dismissal
A dismissal based on a MTQ and a provisional dismissal
are different from one another as concepts, in their
features, and legal consequences. While the provision
on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117, it
does not follow that a MTQ results in a provisional
dismissal to which Rule 117, Sec. 8 applies.
First, Rule 117, Sec. 8 does not exactly state what a
provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional"
directly suggests that the dismissals which Sec. 8
essentially refers to are those that are temporary in
character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice
to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that
are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the
case).
Second, Sec. 8 does not state the grounds that lead to
a provisional dismissal. This is in contrast with a MTQ
whose grounds are specified under Sec. 3. The
delimitation of the grounds available in a MTQ suggests
that it is a class in itself, with specific and closelydefined characteristics. A necessary consequence is
that where the grounds cited are those listed under
Sec. 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a MTQ.
Conversely, where a ground does not appear under
Sec. 3, then a MTQ is not a proper remedy. A motion
for provisional dismissal may then apply if the
conditions required by Sec. 8 obtain.
Third, consequences of a meritorious MTQ is different
from provisional dismissal. The failure of the Rules to
state under Sec. 6 (which provides for the effects of
sustaining a MTQ the dismissal is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the
basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy) that a Sec. 8 provisional

dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the

framers did not intend a dismissal based on a MTQ and
a provisional dismissal to be confused with one
another; Sec. 8 operates in a world of its own separate
from MTQ, and merely provides a time-bar that
uniquely applies to dismissals other than those
grounded on Sec. 3.
(Just in case The court also included the following
differences between a MTQ and Provisional Dismissal:
First, a MTQ is invariably filed by the accused to
question the efficacy of the complaint or
information filed against him or her (Rule 117,
Sections 1 and 2); in contrast, a case may be
provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the
prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Rule 117, Sec. 8.
Second, the form and content of a MTQ are as
stated under Rule 117, Sec. 2; these requirements
do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a MTQ assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the information; a
provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons
other than the defects found in the information.
Fourth, a MTQ is allowed before the arraignment
(Rule 117, Sec. 1,); there may be a provisional
dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of
the case is already underway provided that the
required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own
terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies,
at which time it becomes a permanent
dismissal. In contrast, an information that is
quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant
of a MTQ does not per se carry any
connotation of impermanence, and becomes so
only as provided by law or by the Rules. In refiling the case, what is important is the
question of whether the action can still be
brought, i.e., whether the prescription of
action or of the offense has set in. In a
provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing
after the time-bar, and prescription is not an
immediate consideration.)
Quashal and provisional dismissal are different
concepts whose respective rules refer to different
situations that should not be confused with one
another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as
shown on its face, the remedy is a MTQ under the
terms of Rule 117, Sec. 3. All other reasons for
seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information,
before arraignment and under the circumstances
outlined in Rule 117, Sec. 8, fall under provisional
dismissal.
Page 5 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

Thus, we conclude that Rule 117, Sec. 8 does not

apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC
ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the
CAs order is legally proper.
Pedros MTQ
The grounds Pedro cited in his MTQ are that the
Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification [Sec. 3(h),
Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense [Sec. 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our
examination of the records that the Information duly
charged a specific offense and provides the details on
how the offense was committed. On the other hand,
we do not see on the face or from the averments of
the Information any legal excuse or justification. The
cited basis, in fact, for Pedros MTQ was a COMELEC
Certification (granting him an exemption from the ban
and a permit to carry firearms during the election
period). This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde
that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and
cannot support, a MTQ grounded on legal excuse or
justification found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the
prosecution to contest the genuineness of the
COMELEC certification.
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a
quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro, on the
other hand, also misappreciated the true nature,
function, and utility of a MTQ. As a consequence, a
valid Information still stands, on the basis of which
Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
(Just in case The Information was not rendered
defective by the fact that Pedro was charged of
violating Sec. 261(q) of the Code, instead of Sec. 32 of
R.A. No. 7166, which amended Sec. 261(q); these two
sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of
firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places
during the election period without the authority of the
COMELEC. The established rule is that the character of
the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble
of the information or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated; the
crime committed is determined by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information. Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals, we
specifically recognized that the amendment under Sec.
32 of R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of
the accused who was charged under Sec. 261(q) of the
Code.)

LAZARTE V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: NHA awarded a contract for infrastructure
works with A.C. Cruz Construction which was funded
by World Bank in the amount of P7.67M. During the
construction, the Project Engineer discovered that the

company issued a report on an additional work for the

excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling
works but after further investigation, learned that
there was no such actual work done (ghost activity).
The project engineer filed a recommendation with the
project office to terminate the contract with the
construction company. After several referrals, the NHA
decided to rescind the said contract due to the
anomalies discovered.
However, despite the
rescission, the construction company continued to
work on the project until the project was awarded to
the new construction company, Triad Construction.
Further investigations revealed that AC Cruz
Construction was doing ghost activities and was
undertaking substandard and defective works.
In
addition, officers of the NHA have overpaid AC Cruz
Construction for the portion that was already started
and finished by the said company (P232K overpaid)
(they were paid P1M for the partial work done).
Because of this, several officers of the NHA were
charged with violating Sec.3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ff
grounds: 1) the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense; (2) the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the
constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against them
have been violated by the inadequacy of the
information; and (4) the prosecution failed to
determine the individual participation of all the accused
in the information.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash of
petitioner. So Pet filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: w/n the motion to quash should be granted.
NO
HELD: The denial of a motion to quash is not
correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule
that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but
for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon
and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.
This general rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies.And in the case at bar, the
Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts
asseverated,
if
hypothetically
admitted,
would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined in
law. Matters aliunde will not be considered.
Page 6 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

The Court finds that the Information alleges the

essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that
petitioners are public officers working under the NHA;
and in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to the office and while in the performance of
their official functions, connived, confederated and
mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C.
Cruz (owner of company), with deliberate intent
through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz
Construction and to themselves, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.

PEOPLE v. LACSON
This is a resolution of an MR. No facts were stated, I
just got these based on what I gathered from
scattered kwentos in the decision.
FACTS: Ping Lacson was once indicted for murder for
allegedly being responsible for killing 11 people. These
criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge
Agnir on March 1999. At that time, the Rules on
CrimPro as we know now did not yet exist, because it
was only in December 1, 2000 that these rules were
passed. Basically, Lacson questions the applicability of
the time-bar under Sec 8, Rule 117 whether it should
be prospective or retroactive. The rule provides
(among others) that for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent after 2 years from
issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. Lacson argues that herein petitioners
(includes SOJ, DirGen of PNP, State Prosec, etc) refiled informations against him on June 6, 2001, which
is beyond the 2-year bar, following Sec 8 Rule 117. He
wants retroactive application of the CrimPro rules,
because he said it is more favorable to the accused. He
used the criminal law doctrine because he claims that
CrimPro is a branch of Crim. He also argues that if the
time-bar rule were to be applied prospectively only, it
would give the state more than 2 years to revive the
cases against him, which would violate his right to
speedy disposition of the case and equal protection of
the law. (equal protection: because he claims that he
was singled out to derail his candidacy for the
presidency)

time-bar should be respected unless it is shown

that the period is manifestly short or insufficient
that
the
rules
become
a
denial
of
justice.Moreover, the power of the court to
promulgate rules of procedure under the constitution
carries with it the power to determine whether to give
the said rules a prospective or retroactive effect.
(According to Rule 144, the court may not apply the
rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their
application would not be feasible or would work
injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall
apply.)
When the Court approved Section 8, it intended the
new rule to be applied prospectively, for if otherwise, it
would defeat the very purpose for which it was
intended which is to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the
accused. It would be a denial of the States right to
due process for the Court to apply the new rule
retroactively considering that the criminal cases were
provisionally dismissed on March 29, 1999 before the
new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A
retroactive application of the time-bar will result in
absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the
State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. If
the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or
until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year
period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if
the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would
have two years from December 1, 2000 or until
December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.

ISSUE: Should the time-bar rule under Rule 117 be

applied retroactively? No.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999

should be excluded in the computation of the two-year
period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in
effect at the time and the State could not be expected
to comply with the time-bar.Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. In that sense and to
that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.
However, this case is different, because when the
petitioners re-filed the Informations on June 6,
2001,the original criminal cases had long since been
terminated (provisionally dismissed). The two-year
bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from March
29, 1999, but from December 1, 2000 when the new
rule took effect.

RULING: The court is not mandated to apply Sec

8 retroactively simply because it is more
favorable to the accused. This rule was made
also for the benefit of the state. The court (which
issued the rule pursuant to its power under the
constitution to promulgate rules of procedure in
courts) believed that the time limit was reasonable for
the state to revive provisionally dismissed cases. This

Finally, even assuming that the time-bar should apply

retroactively, Lacson still failed to comply with the
essential prerequisite of Sec 8, Rule 117. He admitted
that he did not give his express consent to the
provisional dismissal of the said cases. Thus, he in fact
admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section
8, Rule 117 was absent.While it may be true that the
trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it
Page 7 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

finds no probable cause, absent the express

consent of the accused to such provisional
dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke
Section 8 to bar a revival thereof.

RULE 118 : PRE-TRIAL

OCA v. ESPANOL
FACTS:
Judge Dolores L. Espanol was set for
compulsory retirement on January 9, 2004. Prior to
this, on the basis of the findings of the audit team, a
memo was sent to her directing her to decided all
cases
submitted
for
decision,
resolve
all
motions/incidents submitted for resolution and to take
actions on the unacted cases as tabulated in the
memo. Judge submitted her compliance with the
memo. Judge Espaol in her compliance pointed out
that the directive requiring [her] to take appropriate
action in the cases was received by her two (2) days
before her compulsory retirement and due to human
limitations, all the listed cases for action could not be
completely done.
The OCAs investigation showed that upon her
compulsory retirement on January 9, 2004, Judge
Espaol left a total of 69 cases that had not been acted
upon. Respondent judge gave several excuses for the
delay. Respondent denied the charges of gross
inefficiency leveled against her.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent judge has committed gross
inefficiency
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution mandates trial judges to
dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide
cases and matters within three (3) months from the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. In
the disposition of cases, members of the bench have
always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to
the foregoing rule to prevent delay, a major culprit in
the erosion of public faith and confidence in our justice
system.
A clear failure to comply with the reglementary
period is regarded as inexcusable gross inefficiency.
To solve these problems (in delay), this Court
has, in several instances, advised judges to follow
certain guidelines to facilitate speedy case disposition.
Among these measures is the discouragement of
continuances, except for exceptional reasons.
To
enforce due diligence in the dispatch of judicial
business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing
cases to trial when counsels are unprepared, judges
should endeavor to hold them to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the public, as well as to their own
clients and to the adverse party.
In criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory
because, at the outset, litigation is abbreviated

by the identification of contentious issues. In civil

cases, judges are also required to take advantage of
the pretrial conference to arrive at settlements and
compromises between the parties, to ask the latter to
explore the possibility of submitting their cases to any
of the alternative modes of dispute resolution, and at
least to reduce and limit the issues for trial. Judges
are further directed to implement and observe strictly
the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 119, providing for a
continuous day-to-day trial as far as practicable until
termination.
They should be rational and realistic in
calendaring cases. Only a sufficient number should be
calendared in order to permit them to hear all the
cases scheduled. Hence, unless the docket of the court
requires otherwise, not more than four cases daily
should be scheduled for trial.
A continuous and
physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis is also
recommended, so that they would be aware of the
status of each case.
With the assistance of the clerk of court, a
checklist should be prepared, indicating the steps to be
taken to keep cases moving. While decision-writing is a
matter of personal style, judges are well-advised to
prepare concise but complete as well as correct and
clear decisions, orders or resolutions. With a table or
calendar indicating the cases submitted for decision,
they should note the exact day, month and year when
the 90-day period is to expire.
At times, circumstances beyond their control
result in the accumulation of ripe cases to a daunting
number, making it humanly impossible for them to
comply with the constitutionally mandated 90-day
period. In such instances, all that they should do
is write a request for extension from the
Supreme Court, stating therein their reasons for
the delay. Such administrative requirement finds
basis in the 1987 Constitution.
As we have stated in Maquiran v. Lopez, a
heavy case load may excuse the failure of judges to
decide cases within the reglementary period, but not
their failure to request an extension of time within
which to decide them on time.
***
FOR MICKEY INGLES: We close this Decision with a
final exhortation. The magistracy is a very exacting
and demanding vocation.
Judges are expected to
embody
four
character
traits:
integrity,
independence, intelligence and industry. Moreover, in
the performance of their tasks, they must exhibit four
work habits; namely, excellence, ethics, effectiveness
and expeditiousness.
Only those who patiently
cultivate these four character traits and four work
habits can succeed in journeying through the straight
and narrow judicial path.

PEOPLE V. SUNGA
FACTS:
Page 8 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

Jocelyn Tan, a 15 year old girl was raped then

killed by smashing a stone on her head. An information
was filed in the RTC of Puerto Princesa City charging
Sunga, among others for the crime of rape with
homicide. The prosecution relied on 2 supposed
extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
Exhibit A was a sworn statement bearing
Sungas signature and that of his assisting counsel,
Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto
Princesa City Legal Officer, stating that he knew details
about Jocelyns death. This was executed after being
informed of his rights under custodial investigation. He
chose Atty. Rocamora. Atty. Rocamora briefly
conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give
a confession and informing him of the consequences
thereof. Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with
Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions
before the police precinct.
Exhibit I was executed before the Special
Investigator of the Puerto Princesa office of the NBI.
This statement embodied a waiver by Sunga of his
right to counsel.
Sunga claims that he was subjected to violence
and intimidation in executing Exhibit A. He then
retracted his statements in Exhibit I.
ISSUE:
valid?

Were

the

extrajudicial

admissions

HELD: No.
A
person
under
investigation
for
the
commission of an offense is guaranteed the following
rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain
silent; (2) the right to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, and to be
provided with one if he cannot afford the services of
counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these
rights.
With regard to his admission under exhibit A,
such was invalid because Atty. Rocamora was the City
Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa. Independent counsel
for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of
the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of
the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and
support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, which includes
maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his
office is akin to that of a prosecutor who
unquestionably cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.
Furthermore, Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all,
fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to

giving his (Sungas) admission. Evidently, Atty.

Rocamora merely acted to facilitate the taking of the
admission from Sunga.
Exhibit I is also inadmissible due to the
absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it
before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. As to the
waiver of the right to counsel in the exhibit, such was
not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not
in the presence of counsel, contrary to the express
requirement of the Constitution.
The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary
investigation before the Municipal Trial Court whereby
he expressly acknowledged having executed Exhibit
"A" and affirmed the contents thereof did not render
his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which
could be used against him and his co-appellants.
Neither could his other statements in such proceeding
admitting his participation in the crime be utilized to
establish his and the other appellants guilt. For in that
preliminary investigation, Sunga again was effectively
denied of his essential right to counsel. Atty. Rocamora
was appointed Sungas counsel de officio but just like
the assistance he extended during the execution of
Exhibit "A," Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in
defense of Sungas cause. While Sunga was being
asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for
answers which could and did incriminate him, Atty.
Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield
his client from the damning nature thereof.
IMPORTANT: The right to counsel applies in certain
pretrial proceedings that can be deemed "critical
stages" in the criminal process. The preliminary
investigation can be no different from the in-custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes
part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to
no less than the States processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who
might be liable for criminal prosecution.

RULE 119 : TRIAL

PEOPLE vs. JUDGE HERNANDEZ (Pasig RTC),
ATTY. SALAYON and ATTY. LLORENTE (2006)
FACTS: This is a case about the right to speedy trial.
Bear with me for I need to include the dates in the
facts. To help you out, I underlined the important
dates to remember. Here we go
Based on a complaint filed by senatorial
candidate Aquilino Pimentel Jr. (for the 1995
elections), 321 informations were filed against Salayon
and Llorente (Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Pasig
City Board of Canvassers) for violating the Electoral
Reforms Law. They allegedly did some dag-dag
bawas to decrease the votes in favor of Pimentel.
Eventually, all these cases were consolidated, upon the

Page 9 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

motion of the accused, before Judge Hernandez (RTC

Pasig).
Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed an
Omnibus Motion to hold in abeyance all orders of the
court prior to his appearance as counsel, including the
order to consolidate the cases. Judge Hernandez
issued an order holding that there should only be 1
information filed, and setting arraignment and pretrial. The People filed an MR which was denied.
Arraignment was then set for June 15, 2001.
During
the
arraignment
Senior
State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo was absent but it still proceeded
in the presence of the public prosecutor assigned in
the trial court. The accused pleaded not guilty. Judge
Hernandez issued an order setting the pre-trial for
June 29, 2001. Before the schedule pre-trial, the
People filed a Motion to Postpone and MR on the
ground of lack of notice to the prosecution. So the trial
court reset the hearing to July 6, 2001. When the said
date came, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not
appear for he was indisposed. Hearing was reset to
July 26, 2001. But again, Bagabuyo was absent.
Hearing was cancelled and again reset to August 2,
2001. The trial court included in its order a warning
that if Bagabuyo fails to appear at the next scheduled
hearing, the Legal Dept of the COMELEC shall make its
appearance and take over the prosecution of the case.
Eventually, the trial court denied the Motion to
Postpone, as well as the MR. Nevertheless, the pretrial and trial were AGAIN cancelled and reset to
September 4, 2001 because of the prosecutions
manifestation that it was appealing the trial courts
order to a higher court. The trial court again warned
the prosecution that in the event that they do not get
any restraining order to stop the proceedings before it,
the hearing shall proceed as scheduled (take note of
this, well go back to this in the ratio).
True enough, Bagabuyo filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, injunction w/ a
prayer for a TRO with the CA. Petition was dismissed
because it was filed without the participation of the
OSG. He then filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC which
was granted. But when the Petition for Review was
filed, the SC denied the same for being filed out of
time (it was filed beyond the period of extension
given).
Meanwhile, the September 4, 2001 hearing did
not proceed because again, Bagabuyo was absent.
Apparently, he had his tooth extracted. But one of the
lawyers involved in the case actually saw Bagabuyo at
the Office of the Clerk in the 1st floor of the same
building where the court was.
Finally, the accused moved for the dismissal on
the ground of denial of their right to speedy trial. The
trial court gave the prosecution another chance,
denying the motion and setting the next hearings on
October 3 & 15, 2001, with a warning that failure to
proceed will be dealt with accordingly. Of course, when
October 3 came, the prosecution refused to proceed
because of its pending petition with the CA (case didnt

say what petition this was exactly). So, the accused

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of
right to speedy trial On October 4. This time, the trial
court granted. CA affirmed.
SO IN SHORT, BAGABUYO WAS ALWAYS
ABSENT DURING THE HEARINGS.
ISSUE:
W/N the right of the accused to speedy
trial was violated? YES!
HELD/RATIO:
Time limit within which trial must commence after
arraignment see Sec. 6 Rule 119, ROC
The time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial shall be 80 days. SC ruled that
111 days have elapsed from the time the accused were
arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of their
Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2001.
When is the right violated?
The right is violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. SC held here that the cancellation of hearings
by the prosecution w/o any valid ground is certainly
vexatious, capricious and oppressive. A dismissal by
the court based on this ground is not tantamount to
GADLEJ.
People invokes the exclusions provided in Sec. 3 (a)(3)
and (f), Rule 119
Sec. 3 of Rule 119 provides for delays which
shall be excluded in computing the time w/in which
trial must commence. The People particularly invokes
the following provisions: Sec. 3 (a)(3) delay resulting
from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory
orders; and Sec. 3 (f) delay resulting from a
continuance if the court granted it upon finding that
the ends of justice served outweighs the best interest
of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
SC held that delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders must be read in
harmony with Sec. 7 Rule 65 which states that the
petition under Rule 65 shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a TRO or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against public
respondent from further proceeding in the case. Judge
Hernandez clearly spelled this out in one of his orders
when he warned that if the prosecution fails to get a
TRO, the hearing on September 4 shall proceed as
scheduled.
As for Sec. 3(f), the SC ruled that nowhere in
the his orders did Judge Hernandez make a ruling that
the ends of justice that will be served outweighs the
best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial. To the contrary, the trial court was compelled to
grant the continuances because of the prosecutions
repeated absence.
Purpose of right of accused to speedy trial
The right to speedy trial and to speedy
disposition of cases are designed to prevent the
Page 10 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

oppression of the accused by holding criminal

prosecution suspended for an indefinite time, and to
prevent delays in the administration of justice. It
assures that an innocent person may be freed from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest
possible
time
compatible
with
the
presentation and consideration of his defenses.
Balancing Test
In determining whether there was been a
violation of the right, balancing the societal interests
and the rights of the accused is needed. This compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
basis.

Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a petition for

certiorari under 65 with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the
acquittal of Dayap but ordered the case remanded to
the MTC for the hearing of the civil aspect.
Sendiong filed a petition for review (42) with
the CA. the CA concluded that it was the RTC which
had jurisdiction and not the MTC. The CA explained
that according to Cuyos v Garcia, jurisdiction over
damage to property cases should be determined by the
imposable fine and not the penalty for the physical
injuries and following BP 129, MTC only has jurisdiction
over those felonies with imposable fine not exceeding
10,000. Since in this case, no proof of total damage
was given and Sendiong claims 1.5M in civil damages,
the same should have been brought before the RTC.

4 factors considered in determining existence of

violation of right to speedy trial
(1) Length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3)
defendants assertion of his right; and (4)
prejudice to the defendant.

ISSUE:

Laws related to right to speedy trial

Sections 14 (2) and 16 of Article III 1987 Constitution;
RA 8493 Speedy Trial Act of 1998; SC Circular No,.
38-98, Rule Implementing RA 8493 (this was adopted
in 2000 Revised ROC).

HELD:

Remedy for dismissal based on violation of right to

speedy trial is Certiorari Rule 65, not an appeal
Since a dismissal based on violation of right to
speedy trial is tantamount to an acquittal, an appeal is
not the proper remedy. If an appeal was filed, it would
be violative of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy (see Sec. 1 Rule 122). The order granting
dismissal can be challenged through certiorari 65 if the
judge committed GADLEJ.

DAYAP v SENDIONG
FACTS:
Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property. It was alleged that Dayap was the
driver of a cargo truck which figured in an accident
with a Colt Galant driven by Lou Gene Sendiong
causing instant death to the latter and less serious
physical injuries to the latters passenger. The MTC
granted Dayap Demurrer to Evidence saying that
prosecution failed to establish that Dayap was really
the one driving the cargo truck. The MTC further stated
that prosecution also wasnt able to prove the death
and injuries of the victim as there were not death
certificate and medical certificates submitted as
evidence. The MTC gave credence to the evidence of
the Dayap, showing that it was the victims car which
swerved into the cargo trucks lane thereby being the
proximate cause of the accident. The MTC relied on the
accident sketch contained in the police blotter to
support this conclusion.

Whether or not a grant of a demurrer is

reviewable ONLY UNDER 65
Whether or not remand to the MTC of the case
for the determination of civil liability was proper NO
A grant of a demurrer to evidence is
tantamount to an acquittal and cannot be reviewed on
appeal otherwise, the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy is offended. A demurrer must be filed
after the prosecution rests its case. It entails and
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and
when the same if found insufficient to support a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the demurrer is
proper. Once granted, the court must enter a partial
judgment of conviction but must continue with the trial
for the reception of the defense evidence on the civil
aspect. This is because at the moment the demurrer is
granted, only prosecutions evidence (both as to the
criminal and civil aspect) is on record. However, the
grant of a demurrer may still be reviewed by the
courts but only on grounds of GADLEJ under rule 65.
In this case, there being not finding of GADLEJ on the
part of the MTC, the demurrer stands.
The acquittal of an accused does not carry with
it the extinction of civil liability when (1) acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt (2) court determines that
there is only a civil liability (3) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise or is not based on the crime for
which he was acquitted. On the other hand, acquittal
of an accused carries the extinction of civil liability
when (1) there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or (2) the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. In
this case, the acquittal by the MTC was based on
findings that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him;
hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished
by his acquittal. Thus, because there was no civil
liability to hear, the case should not have been
remanded to the MTC.

Page 11 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

SALAZAR V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice
from J.Y. Brothers Marketing. As payment for these,
she indorsed a check drawn by one Nena Timario,
which J.Y. Bros. accepted. Upon presentment, the
check was dishonored as it was drawn under a closed
account. After she was informed of such dishonor,
Salazar replaced the check with a second one. This,
however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn
against uncollected deposit). Salazar and Timario were
charged with estafa.
Salazar filed a Demurrer to Evidence with leave of
court. RTC rendered a judgment acquitting Salazar of
the crime (crim aspect) but ordering her to remit to
J.Y. Bros. the payment of her purchase (civ aspect).
Salazar claims that after her demurrer was granted,
she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was
not civilly liable to J.Y. Bros. She thus filed an MR on
the civil aspect of the decision, with a plea that she be
allowed to present evidence, pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. The court denied the MR.
ISSUES:
Does the acquittal of the accused in the criminal
offense prevent a judgment against her on the civil
aspect of the case? No. Was the denial of the MR
proper? No.
HELD:
Case is set aside and nullified. SC ordered that the
case be continued for trial for Salazar to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect; also for J.Y. Bros. by way
of rebuttal, as provided for in Sec.11, Rule 119.
Ratio:
Criminal and civil case instituted. According to Section
1 (a), Rule 111, when a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In
this case, Salazar was charged with estafa. The civil
action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted
since there was no waiver of the civil liability or a
reservation of the civil action by J.Y. Bros. Neither did
it file a civil action before the institution of the criminal
action.
Acquittal in criminal case does not prevent civil case.
The Rules provide that the extension of the penal
action does not carry with it the extension of the civil

action. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case

does not prevent a judgment against a person on the
civil aspect of the case where a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; b) where the court declared that
the liability of the accused is only civil; c) where the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.
In addition, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the
court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the
civil aspect of the case within the period therefor. After
the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has
the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence
with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule
119, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives
the same.
After an acquittal or grant of the demurrer, the trial
should have proceeded with the presentation of
evidence on the civil aspect of the case. This is so
because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence
both on the criminal and civil aspect of the case. The
only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution.
In this case, Salazar was granted leave of court to file
a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order
granting the demurrer on its finding that her liability
was not criminal but only civil. However, even before
she could adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case, the court rendered judgment and ordered her to
pay for her purchases from J.Y. Bros. Patently,
therefore, she was denied her right to due process.
Case must be continued for trial.

MANGUERRA vs. RISOS, YONGCO, ABARQUEZ and

BONJE
FACTS: On Nov. 4, 1999, respondents (Risos, Yongco,
Abarquez and Bonje) were charged with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents before the RTC of
Cebu. It was alleged that the respondents made it
appear that Manguerra, owner of the Gorordo
Property, affixed her signature in a deed of real estate
mortgage over said property. However, prior to this
(Sept 1999), Manguerra, a resident of Cebu, was
Page 12 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

unexpectedly confined in Makati Med. while on

vacation in Manila. She was required to stay in Manila
for further treatment. On Nov. 24, 1999, respondents
filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in the
Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question.
They argued that the civil case filed against them for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage should first be
resolved. The RTC judge granted the motion,
afterwhich Manguerra filed a MR which was later on
denied. On Aug. 16, 2000, Manguerras counsel filed a
motion to take the formers deposition, since her weak
physical condition and old age limited her freedom of
mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that
Manguerras deposition be taken before the clerk of
court of Makati. The respondents filed a MR, but was
denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a
SCA for certiorari before the CA, assailing the 2 RTC
decisions granting the (1) motion for deposition as well
as the (2) denial of their MR. The CA resolved the
petition in favor of the respondents by setting aside
the RTC decisions. It declared that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court, which applies to depositions in civil cases.
Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule
119, Manguerras deposition should have been taken
before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the
assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse
of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N the Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure applies to the deposition of petitioner
Manguerra?
HELD/RATIO: NO. Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure
is applicable.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their
testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in
order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant
to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel
the chance to propound such questions as they deem
material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions,
Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to
by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either
to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections
12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses. Manguerra contends that her advanced age
and health condition exempt her from the application

of Section 152, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule
23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the SC
finds such contention bereft of merit. Rule 119
specifically states that a witness may be
conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the
witness has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning. Thus, when Manguerra
moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been
too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside
the trial court, she would have been compelled to
appear before the court for examination during the
trial proper. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth
in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus
required that the conditional examination be
made before the court where the case is pending.
It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so
that he can attend the examination, subject to his right
to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination
during trial, that is, through question and answer.
Rule 119 categorically states that the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall
be made before the court where the case is pending.
Contrary to Manguerras contention, there is nothing in
the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean
that such requirement applies only to cases where the
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not
when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.
Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the
Rules) qualifications not contemplated. When the
words are clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. It is
true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In
effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it
is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in
the instant case, SC finds no cogent reason to
apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least
2

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it

satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused
to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Page 13 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is

the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is
made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to
attend, as when he is under detention. More
importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge
would be able to observe the witness deportment to
enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is
especially true when the witness testimony is crucial
to the prosecutions case.

SALVANERA v. PEOPLE (and Lucita Parane, wife

of victim)
FACTS: Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano
Abutin, Domingo Tampelix , and Edgardo Lungcay (still
at large) is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane.
Salvanera was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the
hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle
which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission
of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood
money to Lungcay.
Salvanera applied for bail. This was granted.
The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused
Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as
state witnesses. This was denied.
The prosecution appealed to the CA, alleging
that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to discharge
accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses and
granting Salvaneras application for bail considering
the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the
hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
Prosecution alleged that the testimonies of the two
accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
Salvanera masterminded the murder.
CA sustained the prosecution. It discharged
Abutin and Tampelix to become state witnesses, and
cancelled the bail bond of Salvanera.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in discharging the 2 accused to
be state witnesses NO
WON CA erred in cancelling the bail bond of
SalvaneraNO
RATIO: In the discharge of an accused in order that
he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be met:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the
commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution
before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state
witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:

a) There is absolute necessity for the

testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
According to Salvanera, the testimony of an accused
sought to be discharged to become a state witness
must be substantially corroborated, not by a coaccused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other
prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the
same criminal case. He contends that it is a notorious
fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime,
is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing so, he
will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus,
Salvanera supposes that Abutin and Tampelix will
naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any
liability by putting the blame on one of their coaccused. He argues that the curent prosecution
witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused,
do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could
not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and
Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind or the
principal by induction.
This reasoning is wrong. To require the two
prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar to
corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on
the exact same points is to render nugatory the other
requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of the state
witness." The corroborative evidence required by the
Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses.
A conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method. As part
of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on
the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is
contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have
knowledge of the crime. It is enough that the
testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
satisfied from a reading of the records that the
testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated
on important points by each others testimonies and
the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of
the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent
that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, we held:

Page 14 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms

a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a
person for government to achieve a higher objective.
Its justification lies in the particular need of the State
to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals
who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the
law. Whether or not the power should be exercised,
who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its
grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound
judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute
includes the right to determine who shall be
prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not
to prosecute.
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the
respondent court is limited. For the business of a court
of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution
to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution
may err in the selection of its strategies, but such
errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more
than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.
CA was also correct in cancelling the bail bond of
Salvanera. The grant of his application for bail is
premature. It has to await the testimony of state
witnesses Abutin and Tampelix in considering whether
he is entitled to bail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. PABLO

L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants.
FACTS:
At first, appellant Maritess Ang was charged
with kidnapping for ransom in the QC RTC. In the
Information, it was alleged that she conspired with 2
unknown persons to kidnap a businessman, Charlie
Chua from Casa Leonisa Bar in QC, and later on
demanded ransom money (P15 million).
Later on, the Information was amended to
implead the other appellant in this case, Estacio. The
information was also changed the crime charged from
kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. It
was further alleged that the victim was brought to
Bulacan and that he was killed by stabbing using a fan
knife.
Later on, the Information was further amended
to additionally implead one Hildo Sumipo, who was
later discharged as a state witness.
Prosecution, upon its presentation of evidence,
presented that the crime happened on the evening of
Oct 10, when Ang arrived with Estacio and Sumipo at
the Casa Leonisa where they met Chua. Past midnight,
the 4 boarded Chuas car, with the victim driving. Then
later, Estacio pulled out a gun and pulled Chua to the
backseat, tied his hands and taped his mouth. Sumipo
took the wheel.
Although Sumipo tried to dissuade Ang and
Estacio, they decided that they would kill Chua so that
he would not take revenge. They brought him to a

grassy place and left him there. On their way home,

Ang told Estacio, Honey, sana hindi muna natin
pinatay si Charlie (Chua) para makahingi tayo nang
pera sa magulang niya.
The next day, Estacio called up Chuas mother
and demanded the P15M ransom. Mother said they
couldnt afford that. It was lowered to 10M then to 5M.
Partial ransom money was to be left at Pizza Hut
Greenhills but when Estacio and Sumipo saw patrol
cars in the area they left. Sumipo soon learned that
Ang and Estacio sold Chuas gun, watch, and necklace
from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
Sumipo later on surrendered to the NBI.
Estacio surrendered to the police a few days after.
Police informed Chuas mother that Estacio admitted to
killing Chua and offered to accompany them to the
crime scene. So the police, accompanied by the
victims mother and Estacio, went to the crime scene
and recovered the remains of the victim which was
identified by his mother.
Sumipo explained in an affidavit, which he
identified in open court, that Maritess got angry with
the victim after he lent money to her husband, one
Robert Ong, enabling him to leave the country without
her knowledge, while Estacio was jealous of the victim
with whom Maritess had a relationship.
Estacio explained in his affidavit that the
stabbing with the fan knife was accidental. On crossexamination he said that during the quarrel in the car
there was confusion because there were talks of Chua
getting back at them so the stabbing happened.
RTC QC convicted Estacio and Ang of
kidnapping on the occasion of which the
victim was killed and sentenced them to
death. So this case is forwarded to the SC for
automatic review. But the SC referred the
matter for intermediate review to the CA. CA
affirmed, with modification on the amount of
damages awarded to victims family.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in discharging Sumipo as
state witness and relying on his testimony for the
conviction of the Ang and Estacio.
HELD/RATIO:
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a
state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and

Page 15 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

(e) Said accused has not at any time been

convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
These conditions were established by the prosecution.
Sumipo was the only person other than appellants who
had personal knowledge of the acts for which they
were being prosecuted. Only he could positively
identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He
does not appear to be the most guilty. He did not
participate in planning the commission of the crime. He
in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when
she said, "Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie." He tried
to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did
not participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to
extricate himself from the attempts to extract ransom
from the victims family.
Sumipos testimony was corroborated on material
points. The victims mother testified regarding the
demands for ransom. Cesar Moscoso, an employee of
Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim, Estacio,
and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at
the time in question. Henry Hong, the victims cousin
who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the
victims brother during the scheduled delivery of the
ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with
companions. And
the
victims
skeletal
remains
were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacios
information and direction.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time,
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo
as a state witness was erroneous, such error would not
affect the competency and quality of his testimony. His
testimony can still be admitted against Ang and
Estacio.
On the issue of whether kidnapping with murder
was proven: NO
The SC finds the offense of which the appellants were
convicted was erroneously designated. The crime
charged was kidnapping with murder. In such special
complex crime, the elements of both kidnapping and
murder must be sufficiently proven. In this case
however, the kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. It
was found that appellants bound and gagged Chua and
transported him to Bulacan against his will but there
was no intention to detain or confine him. They wasted
no time in killing him, which was their intention from
the beginning. The ransom was a mere after thought.
The crime committed was plain murder, qualified by
treachery.

RULE 120 : JUDGMENT

MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007)
FACTS:
Merencillo was charged for violating Sec. 3(b) of RA
3019 and for direct bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC.
Merencillo pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Facts established by prosecution:

Lucit Estillore went to the BIR Office in

Tagbilaran to register the sale of real property
to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc.
Fuentes entertained Estillore and computed
doc stamp tax (P37,500) and capital gains tax
(P125,000) due on the transaction. The
computation was approved by Merencillo
(accused) in his capacity as group supervisor.
Estillore paid the taxes and submitted the
application with the relevant documents to
Fuentes for processing. Fuentes prepared the
revenue audit reports and submitted them
together with the application for the CAR to
Merencillo for preliminary approval. Fuentes
advised Estillore that the CAR would be
released after 7 days.
On the same day, Maria Cesar (private
complainant) received a call from Estillore who
told her that Merencillo wanted to see her
(Cesar) for some negotiation. Merencillo
demanded P20k in exchange for the approval
of the CAR.
The following day, Merencillo called up Cesar
following up his demand and that she could get
the CAR after 4 or 5 days.
Cesar returned to the BIR Office after 5 days.
When Merencillo saw her, he repeated his
demand for P20k although the CAR had been
signed by RDO Balagon the day before and
was ready for release. The releasing clerk was
still waiting for Merencillos go signal to release
the document.
Cesar
complained
to
RDO
Balagon.
Subsequently, Cesar received a call from
Merencillo informing her that she could get the
CAR but reminded her of his demand and his
willingness to accept a lesser amount.
Cesar reported the matter to PNP Bohol though
Senior Superintendent Baraguer.
Baraguer referred Cesars complaint to the
chief of police of Tagbiliran City who
coordinated w/ Cesar to entrap Merencillo.
Cesar prepared 2 bundles of bogus money
(P100 on each side of the 2 bundles to make it
appear that the 2 bundles amounted to P10k
each or a total of P20k). The serial numbers of
the 4 P100 were recorded.
On the appointed day of entrapment, Cesar
called Merencillo and pleaded for the release of
the CAR and a reduction of his demand.
Instead of discussing the matter on the phone,
Merencillo asked Cesar to see him in his Office.
Cesar went to his Office w/ 2 bundles of bogus
money inside an envelope.
Merencillo handed the CAR to Cesar. While
Cesar signed the acknowledgement for the
release of the CAR, Merencillo informed her
that he was going down to the 2nd floor (w/c
Cesar took as cue for her to follow).
Upon reaching the 3rd floor lobby, Cesar
handed the (thick) envelope. Before Cesar
Page 16 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

could answer, a member of the PNP

entrapment team photographed Merencillo
holding the envelope. Merencillo panicked and
eventually threw the envelope (containing
bogus money) towards the window (but since
it hit the ceiling, it bounced and fell to the 1st
floor of the BIR Building. The PNP Entrapment
team introduced themselves to Merencillo and
invited him to go to their headquarters.
Charges were filed against Merencillo.
During
the
trial,
Merencillos
evidence
consisted of mere general denial of the charges
against him. He claimed that he never asked
for money and that the demand for money
only in Cesars mind after she was told that
there was a misclassification of the asset and
additional taxes to be paid.
RTC found Merencillo guilty.
Merencillo appealed to the Sandiganbayan
(SB), which denied the appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision (but reducing the penalty).
Merencillo appealed to the SC on a petition for
review.

ISSUES: whether the SB is at fault for (1) refusing to

believe his evidence over the prosecutions and (2)
failure to recognize that he was placed in double
jeopardy
Merencillo faults the SB for affirming the RTC decision
and disregarding his evidence. He claims that, had the
RTC and the Sandiganbayan not ignored the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses, he would have been acquitted.
HELD: Petition denied.
(1) Trial Courts Evaluation of Evidence Will Not Be
Disturbed
Both the RTC and the SB found the testimonies of the
Merencillos witnesses sufficient and credible enough to
sustain conviction. The calibration of evidence and the
relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court.
Its findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by the
SC unless there is no evidence on record to support
them. In this case, the findings of fact of the SB,
affirming the factual findings of the RTC, were amply
supported by evidence and the conclusions therein
were not against the law and jurisprudence. There is
no reason to disturb the congruent findings of the trial
and appellate courts.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the RTC and the SB
considered the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Both courts,
however, ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to
minor details that did not detract from the truth of the
prosecutions testimonial evidence. We agree.
Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to
be consistent in each and every detail. Differences in
the recollection of the event are inevitable and
inconsequential variances are commonly regarded as
signs of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect

to minor details and collateral matters do not affect

either the substance of their declaration, their veracity
or the weight of their testimony. In fact, such minor
flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony for
they guard against memorized falsities.
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair
the essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as
a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. The test
is whether the testimonies agree on essential
facts and whether the respective versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with each
other so as to make a consistent and coherent
whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for
acquittal.
The RTC and the SB correctly ruled that the
inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither
material nor relevant to the elements of the offenses
for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not
it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to
private respondent was immaterial. The fact was that
petitioner
demanded and
received
money
in
consideration for the issuance of the CAR.
(2) Petitioner Was Not Placed In Double Jeopardy
No double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy
prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is
whether one offense is identical with the other or
is an attempt to commit it or a frustration
thereof; or whether one offense necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the other,
as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct
bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity
nor necessary inclusion between the two offense. The
violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical
nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they
have common elements, not all the essential elements
of one offense are included among or form part of
those enumerated in the other.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed
from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to
two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy
attached since there was a variance between the
elements of the offenses charged.

CONSULTA v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Appellant Pedro Consulta was charged and
convicted with Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. It
was alleged in the Information that Consulta stole
private complainant Nelia Silvestre's 18k gold
necklace. It was alleged that At about 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon of June 7, 1999, Nelia, together with
Maria Viovicente and Veronica Amar, boarded a tricycle
Page 17 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching

Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin
Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their
threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and
Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying
Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal
ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin. Appellant added
Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala,
sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan,
papatayin kita.
Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelias 18K gold
necklace with a crucifix pendant which, according to an
alajera in the province, was of 18k gold, and which
was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying
Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang,
anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo.
Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami
maipapakulong kahit kailan!
Consulta denied the charges and claimed that Nelia
fabricated the charges to spite him and his family (he
claimed that Nelia was harrassing him and his family).
The trial court, however, convcited him of Robbery,
holding that intent to gain on appellants part is
presumed from the unlawful taking of the necklace,
and brushing aside appellants denial and defense. The
CA affirmed with modification on the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether Consulta has committed the crime for
which he was charged and whether the prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt - NO. But he is still liable for
Grave Coercion (an offense necessarily included
in the offense charged).
HELD:
(Consulta was charged with Robbery with Intimidation
of Persons but was convicted of Robbery only.)
The elements of robbery are: 1) there is a
taking of personal property; 2) the personal property
belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus
lucrand (intent to gain); and 4) the taking is with
violence against or intimidation of persons or with
force upon things.
The Court held that under the circumstances
surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the
taking of Nelias necklace does not indicate presence of
intent to gain on appellants part.That intent to gain on
appellants part is difficult to appreciate gains light
given his undenied claim that his relationship with
Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among
other things, the filing of complaints against him by
Nelia and her family which were subsequently
dismissed or ended in his acquittal.
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant,
robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily
scot-free, however. From the pre-existing sour
relations between Nelia and her family on one hand,
and appellant and family on the other, and under the
circumstances attendant to the incidental encounter of
the parties, appellants taking of Nelias necklace could

not have been animated with animus lucrandi.

Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable.
For [w]hen there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved. (Rule
120, Section 4).
(RULE 20) SEC. 5. When an offense
includes or is included in another.
An
offense
charged
necessarily
includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for
one of its elements. Under Article 286 of the RPC,
grave coercion is committed when "any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong." The Court found that by appellants
employment of threats, intimidation and violence
consisting of uttering of invectives, driving away of the
tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was
prevented from proceeding to her destination.
Hence, the Court set aside the CA decision
(Robbery conviction) and found Consulta guilty of
Grave Coercion.

NICDAO VS CHING
FACTS: In October 1995, Clarita Nicdao, as the
proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together
with her husband, approached Ching, a Chinese
national, to borrow money. This was done in order for
the Nicdao spouses to settle their financial obligations
in the business. They agreed that respondent Nicdao
would leave the checks undated and that she would
pay the loans within one year. However, when
petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one
year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly
said that she had no cash.
On October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching deposited the
checks that she issued to him. As he earlier stated, the
checks were dishonored by the bank for being
"DAIF."(drawn against insufficient cheverloo). Shortly
thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma
Nuguid, wrote a demand letter to respondent Nicdao
which, however, went unheeded. Accordingly, they
Page 18 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

separately filed the criminal complaints against the

latter.
Eleven (11) Informations were filed with the MCTC of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan. At about the
same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints
also for violation of BP 22, were filed against
respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the
common law spouse of petitioner Ching. As such, there
are now 2 criminal cases, one for the 11 informations,
the other for 14 infromations.
Petitioner Ching explained that from October 1995 up
to 1997, he regularly delivered money to respondent
Nicdao, in the amount of P1,000,000.00 until the total
amount reached P20,000,000.00. He did not ask
respondent Nicdao to acknowledge receiving these
amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed that he was
confident that he would be paid by respondent Nicdao
because he had in his possession her blank checks. On
the other hand, the latter allegedly had no cause to
fear that he would fill up the checks with just any
amount because they had trust and confidence in each
other. When asked to produce the piece of paper on
which he allegedly wrote the amounts that he lent to
respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not present
it; he reasoned that it was not with him at that time.
The defense of Nicdao alleged that sometime in 1995,
she was informed by her employee that one of her
checks was missing. At that time, she did not let it
bother her thinking that it would eventually surface
when presented to the bank. Respondent Nicdao could
not explain how the said check came into petitioner
Chings possession.
After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC
rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443
convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of
violation of BP 22.
The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Chings
testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed money
from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00.
Petitioner Ching delivered P1,000,000.00 every month
to respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to 1997 until the
sum reached P20,000,000.00.
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise
rendered its judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 94589471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the fourteen
(14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by
Nuguid.
RTC affirmed in toto the 2 judgements of the MTC.
Nicdao appealed to CA via Petition for Review on the 2
cases. CA reversed stating that Nicdao has already
paid her loan obligations. Notwithstanding the acquittal
in the CA, Nicdao appealed to the SC to assail the civil
aspect of the case.
She contends that according to Supreme Court Circular
No. 57-97 dated September 16, 1997: The criminal
action for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, and no reservation to file such civil action

separately shall be allowed or recognized.

As such, the criminal action for violation of BP 22
necessarily includes the corresponding civil action,
which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to
the payee.
On the other hand, petitioner Ching theorizes that,
under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 arising from the
same act or omission of the accused is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal in the criminal
case of BP22 necessarily includes the dismissal of the
civil case arising from the same transaction.
HELD: No. Nicdao is wrong.
Notwithstanding
respondent
Nicdaos
acquittal,
petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of
the case within the reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable."34 Under the pertinent
provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action
is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. At the time of petitioner Chings filing of the
Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section 1
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier,
provided in part:
(GENERAL RULE) SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
(RELEVANT WITH JUDGMENT) As a corollary to the
above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with
it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the
accused. Section 2(b)of the same Rule, also quoted
earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of
acquittal are required to state "whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated
that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;
(b) where the court expressly declares that the liability
Page 19 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature;

and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or
based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based
upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In
the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued
that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil
aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he
did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor
did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

RULE 121: NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

IN RE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF REYNALDO
DE VILLA
FACTS: Reynaldo de villa was convicted of raping his
12 year old niece Aileen. Part of his conviction was
based on the fact that the timeline if her rape fit the
time she gave birth to Leahlyn an eight month old
premature baby. After 3 years, June, the son or
Reynaldo then found out from Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) that DNA testing can be conducted to
determine the paternity of the child. They requested
for testing which was denied by the court so instead
June asked one of his nephews to have Leahlyn spit in
a sterile cup and sent it for testing. The results
revealed
that
Reynaldo
couldnt
have
sired
Leahlyn.Reynaldo De Villa then filed for habeas corpus
with Director of prisons and a petition for new trial
based on a DNA test conducted on him and the child
born of the alleged rape.

the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been

imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess.None of these were present, although the
defense counsel abruptly left. Also Leahlyns
paternity is not determinative of whether rape
occurred but the result may be used to cast doubt
and result in an acquittal.
ISSUE2: W/N the motion for NEW TRIAL will prosper?
No!
Under Rule 121, Sec 1, a motion for new trial may
be filed at any time before a judgment of
conviction becomes final, that is, within
fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore,
a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121
mentions a ground
(b) That new and material evidence has
been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
There are two elements to consider with a
MNT, first that it is filed on time and second that it
based on either the 2 grounds provided by law. This
case fails on both parts. The MNT was filed long after
the decision had attained finality. Also it failed to prove
that the DNA test constituted as newly discovered
evidence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that that, if
admitted,
it
would
probably
change
the
judgment.
Although the evidence was discovered after trial the
claim that they were unaware of the existence of DNA
testing until after trial speaks of negligence and they
are bound by it and although the DNA test proved that
Reynaldo was not the father it failed to disprove that
Reynaldo raped Aileen.

SUMIRAN VS SPOUSES DAMASO

ISSUE1: W/N the writ of habeas corpus will issue?
NO! The writ is being used to collaterally attack the
decision convicting Reynaldo. The relief is for those
who are illegally deprived of their freedom and not
when an individuals liberty is restrained through
some legal process. In Feria v CA, the court
provided the limited grounds to which habeas
corpus can be used as a post-conviction remedy,
when (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose

FACTS: SUMIRAN filed a complaint for sum of money

and damages, and a BP 22 case against spouses
DAMASO in the RTC. The cases were consolidated. RTC
acquitted DAMASOs in the crim case.
March 6 SUMIRAN filed MR to Feb 21
decision.
May 9 RTC denied MR
May 19 Date of receipt of Order denying MR
May 29 SUMIRAN filed Notice of Appeal

Page 20 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

RTC said notice of appeal filed out of time since

decision was rendered in Feb 21. RTC said that since
SUMIRAN filed MR on the 13th day, his notice of appeal
was filed late since it was 10 days after receiving the
order denying MR.
ISSUE: W/N SUMIRANs period to appeal has lapsed. NO.
RATIO: In Neypes vs CA., the court allowed a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. The retroactivity of this Neypes
rule was stated Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. HomenaValencia, where the court stated that procedural laws
may be given retroactive effect to actions pending,
there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or
remedial in character as they do not create new or
remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it
prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following
the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the fresh
period rule should be applied to pending actions.
Since the case was already pending during the
Neypes ruling (Sept. 14, 2005), SUMIRAN is entitled to
a fresh period of 15 days counted from May 19, date
of receipt of order denying his MR. When he filed a
notice of appeal on May 29, only 10 days had elapsed
and his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

RULE 122-125
PEOPLE v. ABON
(Incestuous rape case)
Facts:
While his 13-year-old daughter was sleeping, Abon
raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina and
made a push and pull movement for about 20 to 30
minutes. Because her grandmother did not believe
her, she went to a friends house who helped her
report the incident to the police.
The physical
examination found her hymen to have already been
ruptured and that she had old lacerations inflicted
approximately 3 months before.
Abon pleaded not guilty and interposed denial and alibi
as defenses. He claimed he was working in another
place (Rizal) and did not see his children who were
living in Pangasinan. He said his daughter filed the
case against him because he used to whip her very
hard on the buttocks with a stick.

The RTC imposed the death penalty. On automatic

review, CA affirmed, observing that Abon failed to
show any inconsistency in daughters testimony and
neither did he prove any ill-motive which would prompt
her to concoct her incest rape story. Abon appealed to
the SC.
Issue: Whether death penalty is the proper penalty NO
The SC discussed appeals as a preliminary matter,
which is the important topic here.
HELD:
Rules on Appeal
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a
decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory
privilege to be exercised only and in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.
Sec. 3 of Rule 122 provides that where the penalty
imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, an appeal is made directly to the SC by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final appeal from and by serving a
copy upon the adverse party. On the other hand, a
case where the penalty imposed is death will be
automatically reviewed by the SC without a need for
filing a notice of appeal. However, the case of Mateo
modified these rules by providing an intermediate
review of the cases by the CA where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death.
Pursuant to this, the SC issued AM No. 00-5-03-SC
2004-10-12, amending the governing review of death
penalty cases, the pertinent provision of which reads:
(c) The appeal in cases where the
penalty imposed by the Regional
Trial Court is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment or where a
lesser penalty is imposed for
offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to
the more, serious offense for
which the penalty
of death,
reclusion
perpetua,
or
life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be
by notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals
in
accordance
with
paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in
cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court
of Appeals shall automatically review
the judgment as provided in Section 10
of this Rule.

Page 21 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

The CA judgment in these cases may be appealed to

the SC by notice of appeal filed with the CA.
Also affecting the rules on appeal
Also affecting the rules on appeal is the enactment of
RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty, which took effect in 2006. Under Sec.
2, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited and
in lieu thereof, it imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC, or life
imprisonment, if otherwise. Hence, in the provisions of
the Rules of Court on appeals, death penalty cases are
no longer operational.
SC said penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
pereptua without eligibility for parole.

ROSIE QUIDET V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Version of the Prosecution
On October 19, 1991, at around 8pm, Jimmy,
Andrew, Edwin Balani, and Rolando Mabayo visited a
friend in Sitio Punta. Along the way, they saw Taban,
together with Quidet and Tubo, come out of the house
of one Tomas Osep. Taban suddenly stabbed Andrew
on the chest with a knife. Andrew retaliated by boxing
Taban. Jimmy tried to pacify Andrew and Taban but
the latter stabbed him in the abdomen. Taban then
immediately fled.
Meanwhile, after Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw
a drinking glass at Andrew's face while Quidetboxed
Andrew's jaw. Tubo stabbed Jimmy who was then lying
face down on the ground twice on the back with an ice
pick after which he fled. Quidet then boxed Jimmy's
mouth. At this juncture, Balani rushed to Jimmy's aid
and boxed Quidet who retaliated by punching Balani.
Thereafter, Quidet left the scene. Mabayo was unable
to help Jimmy orAndrew because he was shocked by
the incident.
Version of the Defense
On the night of the stabbing incident, Taban,
Tubo and Quidet were drinking liquor in the house of
Osep. Taban left the group to urinate on a nearby
coconut tree. Outside Osep's house, he was suddenly
boxed by Andrew and kicked by Jimmy causing him to
fall near a fishing boat. ThereTaban found a fishing
knife with which he stabbed Jimmy and Andrew in
order to defend himself. After which, he fled for fear
for his life. Meanwhile, Quidetwent out to look for
Taban. As he was stepping out of Osep's house, he
was boxed by Balani. Quidet fought back. Andrew tried
to help Balani but Quidet was able to evade Andrew's
attacks. Instead, Quidet was able to box Andrew.
Petitioner then called out to Tubo to come out and run.
When Tubo stepped out of the house, neither Taban
nor petitioner was present but he saw a person being
lifted by several people. Upon seeing this, Tubo,
likewise, fled for fear for his life.

FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, Rosie Quidet, Feliciano
Taban, Jr., and Aurelio Tubo were charged with
homicide for the death of Jimmy Tagarda. On the same
date, they were charged with frustrated homicide for
the stab wounds sustained by Jimmy's cousin, Andrew
Tagarda
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a
plea of not guilty in the frustrated homicide case. In
the homicide case, only Taban entered a voluntary
plea of guilt
The
trial
court
rendered
a
partial
judgmentsentencing Taban to imprisonment and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
RTC rendered a judgment finding Quidet and
Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused guilty of
frustrated homicide. The trial court found that the
stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned
by the accused. The active participation of all three
accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the
crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses cannot be offset
by the defense of plain denial.
The CA held that conspiracy was duly
established as shown by the concerted acts of the
accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence,
all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death
of Jimmy.The CA, however, disagreed with the trial
court's finding that the accused are liable for frustrated
homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by
Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to
inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter
successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only
minor injuries which could have healed within five to
seven days even without medical treatment. The crime
committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
ISSUE:
W/N the decision of the CA finding Quidet to
have acted in conspiracy with the other accused
(Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses
charged is in accordance with law and/or jurisprudence
HELD:
The existence of conspiracy was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Quidet is criminally
liable only for his individual acts. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.
To determine if Quidet conspired with Taban
and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily
be the overt acts of Quidetbefore, during and after the
stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several
facts of substance which militate against the finding
Page 22 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.

First, there is no evidence that Quidet, Taban
or Tubo had any grudge or enmity against Jimmy or
Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses, as well as the
three accused were one in testifying that there was no
misunderstanding between the two groups prior to the
stabbing incident.
Second, the stabbing incident appears to have
arisen from a purely accidental encounter between
Taban's and Andrew's groups with both having had a
drinking session.
Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, Quidet was
unarmed during the incident, thus, negating his intent
to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses'
account, petitioner's participation was limited to boxing
Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and Tubo had stabbed
the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor
indispensable to the commission of the crimes as they
were done after the stabbing. Thus, Quidet's act of
boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show
of sympathy to or camaraderie with his two coaccused.
Taken
together,
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty
in order to establish that Quidet conspired with Taban
and Tubo to commit the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide.
For failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, Quidet's liability
is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly
established that Quidet boxed Jimmy and Andrew and
absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by
the latter from these acts, Quidetshould only be made
liable for two counts of slight physical injuries.
[APPEAL]In the frustrated homicide case, the
CA correctly modified the crime to attempted homicide
because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were
not life-threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not
appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate
court's judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are
entitled to a reduction of their prison terms.The rule is
that an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court
is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Petition partially granted. Rosie Quidet is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical
injuries. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
homicide

DEUS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Deus was charged for the crime of
illegal sale of shabu, in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He was caught through a buy-bust
operation.
On May 17, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment
finding accused Deus guilty. Accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on May 17,

2006. On August 24, 2006, accused filed a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA. He raised as issue the failure of the trial court
judge to comply with Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure requiring that the pre-trial order be signed
by the accused and his counsel. The CA then appointed
and designated the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) as
counsel de oficio for the accused. PAO filed a motion to
admit the petition for certiorari to appeal his conviction
for the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
According to the CA, in the higher interest of
justice, the petition for certiorari filed by PAO is
admitted (note: not granted ha, just admitted for the
court to consider). In resolving the petition, the CA
dismissed this petition for certiorari.
From the CA, the accused filed a Petition for
Review in the SC. He urges the application of Section
8, Rule 1243 of the Rules of Court by analogy to the
petition for certiorari filed before the CA. He argues
that the appellate court should not have dismissed his
petition for certiorari since he was represented by a
counsel de oficio. Essentially, he appeals for a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure in the interest
of substantial justice.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused resorted to a
proper mode of appeal from the RTCs decision
to the CA. (NO. Accused should have filed
an appeal to the CA, and not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.)
2. Should a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure be made considering that accused
acted without the assistance of counsel when
he filed his urgent motion for reconsideration
of the RTCs judgment of conviction and the
special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. (YES)
HELD:
1. Re issue #1: A perusal of the petition reveals
that the assailed Decision (decision of
conviction) was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the
proper remedy for a party aggrieved thereby is
an ordinary appeal pursuant to Sections 3 and
6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended, which can be availed of
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment, within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. However, instead of
3

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure

to prosecute. The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of
the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant
in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file
his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where
the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (8a)
Page 23 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

filing an appeal within 15 days from notice of

the denial of his motion for reconsideration of
the subject decision on June 24, 2006,
accused-petitioner resorted to the instant
petition for certiorari which the Court cannot
treat as an appeal for having been filed on
August 24, 2006 or way beyond the period to
appeal.
2. Re issue #2: The SC in this case qualified its
answer. In sum, it said that the judgment of
conviction became final and executory since
accused resorted to the wrong mode of appeal,
hence the running of the reglementary period
was not tolled. However, in the interest of
justice, the case is remanded.
In detail, the SC said: Since the
judgment of conviction had not been appealed
within the time and in the manner prescribed
by the rules, it became final and executory
upon the lapse of the reglementary appeal
period.
Petitioner likewise erred in contending
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
prohibits the dismissal of the certiorari petition
when appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio. First, said provision only refers to
dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure
to prosecute. Second, the dismissal of the
appeal is conditioned on the appellant's failure
to file a brief. An appellant's brief is a pleading
filed in an ordinary appeal. Clearly, Section 8
contemplates an ordinary appeal filed before
the Court of Appeals.
The
aforecited
legal
principles
notwithstanding, we agree with the OSG that
the appellate court should have treated the
certiorari petition as an appeal. Petitioner was
not represented by counsel when he filed the
petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Thus, he cannot be presumed to know
the legal remedies to take in pursuing his
appeal. Moreover, his right to liberty is at
stake. These attending circumstances should
have spurred the appellate court to relax the
rules of procedure in the interest of substantial
justice.

TAMAYO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Aurora Tamayo and her friend, Erlinda
Anicas (Anicas), were charged with estafa.
According to the information, Tamayo and Anicas
were given 120K by the Sotto spouses for the
assembly of a jeepney. They eventually became
suspicious when no progress was being shown.
Hence, they sent a lawyer to get reimbursement.
Unfortunately, the found out that the money was
misappropriated for the petitioners personal use.

As a defense, Tamayo said that she gave the

money to one Ernesto Rayana who was supposed
to assemble the jeep. Tamayo and Rayana
allegedly had problems resulting to the former
filing a complaint against the latter before the
officials of the barangay where Ravana resided.
Eventually, he also sued Rayana for estafa but the
latter has gone into hiding.
RTC convicted Tamayo. CA affirmed. The decision
became final and executor and was entered into
the Books of Entries of Judgments. The RTC issued
an Order for her arrest.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation before the RTC
alleging that while the instant case was pending
with the CA, she and Pedro (Sotto) had settled
their disputes and that Pedro would no longer
pursue the present case against her. She prayed
for the cancellation of the RTC order.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend the Writ of
Execution of the RTC Order stating that when the
case was pending review in the CA, the Private
Complainant compromised wherein payment was
made by petitioner to the complainant (a receipt
was issued).
RTC denied petitioner's motion on the ground that
the Decision of the CA was already final and
executor. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the motion to suspend execution should

be granted.
HELD/RATIO: NO.
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides for the rules in modifying a
judgment of conviction, to wit:
SEC. 7. Modification of Judgment. - A judgment of
conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. As can be
gleaned from the foregoing provision, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only if the
judgment is not yet final. Further, a judgment
becomes final when no appeal is seasonably
perfected.
Under the Rules of Court, judgments of the Court of
Appeals in criminal cases must be appealed by the
accused within fifteen (15) days from service of a copy
thereof upon the accused or her counsel either (a) by
filing a motion for reconsideration, or (b) by filing a
motion for new trial, or (c) by filing a petition for
review oncertiorari to this Court. Petitioner did nothing
of these.
Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes
final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed,
Page 24 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

altered or modified in any respect except to correct

clerical
errors
or
to
make nunc pro
tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final
judgment except to execute it. No court, not even this
Court, has the power to revive, review, or modify a
judgment which has become final and executory. This
rule is grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that the judgment of the
court must become final at some definite date fixed by
law. It is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the
issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.
As in this case, the alleged compromise between
petitioner and Pedro, wherein petitioner allegedly
reimbursed to Pedro the amount swindled in exchange
for Pedro's consent to dismiss the instant case, does
not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability for estafa.
With regard to the effect of the alleged compromise on
petitioner's civil liability, it is true that a compromise
extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability of an accused.
However, such rule cannot be applied in favor of
petitioner.
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving
through convincing evidence that she and Pedro had
entered into a compromise.

RULE 126: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

SPOUSES MARIMLA V. PEOPLE
FACTS: NBI Anti-Organized Crime Lagasca filed two
applications for a search warrant with the RTC of
Manila seeking permission to search the Marimlas
house in Angeles, Pampanga and the premises of
another house in Porac, Pampanga. The applications
were based on the personal knowledge of Lagasca and
a certain Fernandez who had conducted surveillance
operations and made a test buy at Marimlas house.
The application was for the alleged violation of RA
6425 and to seize shabu, marijuana and other drug
paraphernalia.
Executive Judge Guaria III of the Manila RTC issued
the search warrants. The search in Angeles City lead to
the seizure of the following:
1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a
packing tape marked "RCL-1-2677," (net weight 915.7 grams);
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped
in a newsprint marked "RCL-2-2677" (net weight 491.5 grams);
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen
(16) transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a
newsprint marked "RCL-3-2677" (net weight - 127.9
grams); and
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9)
plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic
bag marked "RCL-4-2677" (net weight - 18.2736
grams).

An information for violation of Section 8, Article II of

R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was
filed against the spouses Marimla before the RTC of
Angeles City.
The spouses filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized, claiming the
application for search warrant was filed and issued
outside the territorial jurisdiction and and judicial
region of the court where the alleged crime was
committed. As products of a void warrant, they claim
the evidence is inadmissible.
The RTC denied their Motion to quash and the
Marimlas subsequent MR. The spouses now go to the
SC via Rule 65.
ISSUE: WON the search warrants may be issued
outside the RTCs territorial jurisdiction? Yes! Valid
exception to Rule 126 Sec. 2
RATIO: Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC
Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application
for the Enforceability of Search Warrants
In the interest of an effective administration of justice
and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme
Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized
to act on all applications for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of firearms.
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by
the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with
the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the
Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places to
be particularly described therein, and the seizure of
property of things as prescribed in the Rules of Court,
and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of said courts.
The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book
listing the details of the applications and the result of
the searches and seizures made pursuant to the
warrants issued....xxx
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on
the enforceability of search warrants provided therein
shall continue until further orders from this Court. In
fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are
reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines
On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges
And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties,
which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases
by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an
exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of
Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision

Page 25 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special

criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. The Executive Judges and,
whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the ViceExecutive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City shall have authority to act on applications filed by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter
be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the
heads of such agencies and shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property
or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of
Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive
Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified,
which may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall
keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to
whom the applications are assigned, the details of the
applications and the results of the searches and
seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.

CHAN VS. HONDA MOTORS

FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation, through Special
Investigator Glenn Lacaran, applied for search
warrants with the RTC against petitioners (Hon Ne
Chan and Yunji Zeng) for the alleged violation of
Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293
(Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines).
RTC Judge Artemio Sipon issued 2 search warrants.
The first warrant was directed against Hon Ne Chan
and John Does, operating under the name and style
Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center, located at No. 192
M.H. del Pilar St. Cor. 10th Ave., Grace Park, Caloocan
City, Metro Manila. The second warrant was directed
against Yunji Zeng and John Does, operating under the
name and style Dragon Spirit Motorcyle Center,
located at No. 192 E. Delos Santos Ave., Caloocan
City, Metro Manila.
On the strength of these search warrants, the NBI
agents conducted a search of petitioners premises and
seized the following items:
1. From Hon Ne Chan
a. 7 motorcycles bearing the model name
DSM WAVE R
b. 3 motorcycles (DSM SUPER WAVE)

c. 1 motorcycle (WAVE CX)

2. From Yunji Zeng
a. 21 motorcycles (WAVE CX 110)
b. 8 motorcycles (WAVE 110)
c. 35 motorcycles (WAVE 135)
d. 1 motorcycle (WAVE R)
e. 8 motorcycles (SUPER WAVE 110)
f. 2
plastic
bags
containing
various
documents
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Joint Motion to Quash
Search Warrants and to Return Illegally Seized Items,
averring that the search warrants were issued despite
the absence of probable cause and that they were in
the nature of general search warrants. The motion was
granted. The RTC held that the return of the 22 WAVE
CX 110 motorcycle units was proper since they were
never specifically mentioned in the search warrants. As
to the rest of the items seized, the return was justified
due to lack of probable cause.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1. WON probable cause existed in the issuance of
the search warrants? YES.
2. WON search warrants were in the nature of
general search warrants? NO.
3. WON there existed an offense to which the
issuance of the search warrants was
connected? YES.
RULING:
1.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant
rests upon the following factors: (1) it must issued
upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.4
In the case at bar, petitioners argue that the
requirements in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were
not fulfilled because there was no probable cause. In
the application for search warrant by Lacaran, it was
stated that he has information and verily believes that
petitioners are in possession or has in their control
properties which are being sold, retailed, distributed,
imported, dealt with or otherwise disposed of, or
intended to be used as a means of committing a
violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of
Republic Act No. 8293 otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Said
Rule 126, Sec. 4: Requisites for issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
4

Page 26 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

statement, petitioners insist, failed to meet the

condition that probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or
the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
It is settled that in determining probable cause, a
judge is duty-bound to personally examine under oath
the complainant and the witnesses he may
present. Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the
oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. Search warrants are
not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or
on mere suspicion or belief.
In the case at bar, petitioners capitalize on the first
paragraph of the application for search warrant
executed by Lacaran to support their argument that he
lacked the personal knowledge required by both the
Rules of Court and by jurisprudence. However, the
very next paragraph of the application reveals the
tremulous nature of their argument for it is clearly
stated therein that far from merely relying on mere
information and belief, Lacaran personally verified the
report and found it to be a fact. This removed the
basis of his application from mere hearsay and
supported the earlier finding of probable cause on the
part of the examining judge.
The pronouncement by the RTC that there was no
probable cause since petitioners are not guilty of unfair
competition is premature since all that was presented
by respondents before it was evidence which was
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The
evidence required in determining probable cause is far
less stringent than that required in the trial on the
merits of the charge involving unfair competition.
2.
Petitioners argue that the search warrants
were in the nature of general search warrants since
they included motorcycles bearing the model name
WAVE. They insist that the word WAVE is generic and
that it fails to pass the requirement of particularity of
the items to be seized.
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity
of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant
to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and
thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and
(2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not,
however, required that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities.

In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, it was

pointed out that one of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be
seized under a search warrant is when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. A reading of the search warrants
issued by the RTC in this case reveals that the items to
be seized, including motorcycles, are those which are
connected with the alleged violation of Section 168 in
relation to Section 170 of RA 8293, notwithstanding
the use of the generic word WAVE.
3.
Anent petitioners contention that the search
warrants were issued in relation to no particular
offense, they rely on the holding of the SC in Savage
v. Judge Taypin where it was held that it is unclear
whether the crime of unfair competition exists since
there was no mention of such crime involving design
patents in RA 8293.
To be sure, the search warrant in Savage was issued in
the face of possible violation of RA 8293. The acts
complained of in said case were the alleged
manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture
similar to that patented by private respondent
therein sans any license or patent for the same, for the
purpose of deceiving or defrauding private respondent
and the buying public.
On the other hand, in the application for search
warrant filed by Lacaran, it is clearly stated that what
respondents are complaining about was the alleged
violation of the goodwill they have established with
respect to their motorcycle models WAVE 110 S and
WAVE 125 S and which goodwill is entitled to
protection in the same manner as other property
rights. It is quite obvious then that their cause of
action arose out of the intrusion into their established
goodwill involving the two motorcycle models and not
patent infringement, as what existed in Savage.

SY TAN VS SY TIONG
FACTS: On February 17, 2010, the Court rendered a
Decision in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v.
Sy Tiong Gue, et al.,the decretal portion of which
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC
dated
September
1,
2003 and October
28,
2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant
Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a MR wherein
respondents informed the Court, albeit belatedly, that
the RTC granted their motion for the withdrawal of the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375.
According to the Respondents, the RTC took into
Page 27 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August
29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that
the elements of Robbery were absent. Thus, there was
lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of
the Information.
Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the
Information for Robbery, respondents argued that the
quashal of the subject search warrants and the
determination of the issue of whether or not there was
probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of
the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts
of
robbery
has
been
rendered
moot
and
academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further
delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search
warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.
On the other hand, Tan, in his Comment, maintains
that the motion is a mere reiteration of what
respondents have previously alleged in their Comment
and which have been passed upon by the Court in the
subject decision. Tan alleges that he also filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for
Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the
same incidents and that should the Information for
Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the
items seized by virtue of the subject search
warrants will be used as evidence therein.
On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.
According to respondents, even if an Information for
Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same
incident subject matter of the dismissed case of
robbery, Tan cannot include the seized items as part of
the evidence therein. For respondents, he cannot use
the items seized as evidence in any other offense
except in that in which the subject search warrants
were issued.
ISSUE. Whether Tan may utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with
the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified
Theft. NO.
RATIO. A search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicants personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Tan cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence
seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in
connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case
of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from
the same incident.
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to

be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the
Information was based on the findings of the CA, as
affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which
is likewise an essential element for the crime of
Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily
included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed,
much more, prosper.

GWYN
QUINICOT
PHILIPPINES

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

FACTS: Two informations were filed before the RTC of

Negros Oriental charging petitioner Quinicot with
violation of Sections 15 and 16, respectively, of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. When arraigned,
petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not
Gulity" to the crimes charged. The prosecution
presented three witnesses: PO 1 Marchan, PO2
Germodo and Police Inspector Llena, Forensic Chemist,
PNP
Crime
Laboratory.
From
their
collective
testimonies, the version of the prosecution is as
follows: An informant called petitioner Quinicot by
phone. Thereafter, PO1 Marchan talked to petitioner
and informed the latter that he was buying P300.00
worth of shabu. A team was formed by team leader
Police Senior Inspector Tolentino to conduct a buy-bust
operation against petitioner. PSI Tolentino gave PO1
Marchan three one- hundred peso billswhich he
marked with his initials. They went to Chin Loong
Restaurant and conducted the buy-bust operation. PO1
Marchan approached petitioner and asked him if he
had shabu worth P300.00. Petitioner answered in the
affirmative. PO1 Marchan gave the P300.00 marked
money, and in return, petitioner gave him a plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance. When
PO1 Marchan executed the pre-arranged signal
touching his hat PO2 Germodo rushed towards
petitioner and PO1 Marchan and identified themselves
as police officers. Petitioner was informed he violated
the law on selling shabu. PO2 Germodo bodily
searched petitioner and recovered two plastic
sachetsfrom the brown belt purse of the latter. He
likewise recovered from petitioner the marked money,
a disposable lighter, and a tooter. The petitioner was
brought to the police station. PO1 Marchan issued a
receipt for the items recovered from the him. Per
request of PSI Tolentino, the three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance were sent to the
Crime Laboratory for forensic laboratory examination.
The results showed that the substance was in fact
Page 28 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

shabu. PO1 Marchan disclosed that prior to the buybust, he first saw petitioner at Music Box to familiarize
himself with petitioners physical features and voice.
He added he could not reveal the identity of the
informant in court, because it would endanger the life
of the latter. Quinicot, on the other hand, alleged that
no buy-bust operation occurred and that the evidence
allegedly confiscated from him was planted evidence.
He said he ordered take out from Chin Loong
Restaurant and the police officers in civilian attire
forced him to go with them. No warrant of arrest or
search warrant was presented. He was forced to ride a
pedicab and was bought to the police station. During
the inquest proceedings, he knew that the police had
planted the shabu. He denied possession of the shabu
and ownership of the wallet.Trial court found Qiunicot
guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act
No. 6425. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Quinicots guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt YES!
WON the fact that the Receipt of Property Seized was
only signed by PO1 Marchan without any witnesses
was evidence of frame-up NO!
HELD:
In asserting that there was no buy-bust operation and
that he was framed, petitioner asserts that (1) a
surveillance was not conducted: (2) it was highly
unbelievable that PO1 Marchan would know that
petitioner was a drug pusher and that the former, a
total stranger, would sell shabu to the latter; (3) it was
unlikely that the buy-bust operation was conducted at
noon; (4) the confidential informant was not presented
in court; and (5) the receipt of property seized was
signed only by PO1 Marchan without any
witnesses.
(part relevant to Rule 126) The Receipt of Property
Seized issued by PO1 Domingo Marchan was validly
made. It enumerated the items three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, and other
paraphernalia recovered from petitioners body after
he was arrested for selling shabu to the poseur-buyer.
The lack of witnesses signing the same, petitioner
claims, is evidence of a frame-up. This contention is
false. The two witnesses were not required to sign the
receipt. This two-witness rule applies only to searches
-- made under authority of a search warrant -- of a
house, room, or any other premises in the absence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family. In the case at bar, there was no search warrant
issued and no house, room or premises searched.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as
seller and possessor of the shabu can no longer be
disputed. Against the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, petitioners plain denial of the
offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and
convincing evidence, must simply fail. Allegations of
frame-up and extortion by the police officers are
common and standard defenses in most dangerous
drugs cases. They are, however, viewed by this Court

with disfavor, for such defenses can be easily

concocted and fabricated. To prove such defenses, the
evidence must be clear and convincing.
(not so important) These assertions will not
exonerate the petitioner. Settled is the rule that the
absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is
no
textbook
method
of
conducting
buy-bust
operations. The Court has left to the discretion of
police authorities the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much
less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where
the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during the entrapment. The fact that the
police officer who acted as back-up was briefed only
for a few minutes does not prove that there was no
buy-bust operation that happened. Also, the
contention of the accused that it would be highly
improbable for PO1 Marchan a complete stranger to
the accused to offer to buy shabu from the latter is not
tenable. What matters in drug related cases is not the
existing familiarity between the seller and the buyer,
but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale
and delivery of the dangerous drug (People v.
Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685). Besides, drug pushers,
especially small quantity or retail pushers, sell their
prohibited wares to anyone who can pay for the same,
be they strangers or not (People v. Madriaga, 211
SCRA 711). It is also not surprising that the buy-bust
operation was conducted at noontime. As we have
ruled, drug-pushing when done on a small scale, as in
this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at any time and at any place.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant is
not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their
identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police. It is well-settled that except when the petitioner
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there
are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that
the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely
against the petitioner, or that only the informant was
the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire
transaction, the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.

Page 29 of 30

emedial Law Review

Digests

Page 30 of 30