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1. Ty v.

CA
GR# 127406, NOV. 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 86
Article 40 Exception to the Rule

FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a
church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and
the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to
the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage
license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the
nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence
of a valid marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower court
however ruled that Ofelias marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by
the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be
invoked in the case at bar.

HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he
must first require a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such
declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented
and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court
and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were
solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must
be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelias marriage with Reyes is
valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in 87) cannot be applied retroactively especially
because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which was operational
during her marriage with Reyes.

2. Acebedo vs Arquero
399 SCRA 10 (2003)
and uprightness.

Position in the judiciary requires greater moral righteousness

FACTS:
Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality, alleging that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a
former stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point, and Arquero unlawfully and scandalously
cohabited as husband and wife.
Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had been cohabitating with another woman. Based on
Arqueros testimony, he justified his having a relationship with Irader solely on the written
document purportedly a Kasunduan or agreement entered into by Acebedo and Irader,
consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him
or her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty of immorality

HELD:
Arqueros justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, Arquero ought to have
known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage
between Acebedo and Irader. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the
judiciary. That is why the Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality and
decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary.
Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn
and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from any
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to
their behavior outside the court as private individuals
Arqueros act of having illicit relations with Irader is, within the purview of Section 46 (5)
of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
3. Republic v. Cagandahan
GR# 166676 / SEPT. 12, 2008
565 SCRA 72
FACTS:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna;
such that, her name be changed to Jeff and her gender to male.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name Jennifer
Cagandahan. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and
female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries,
no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
ISSUE:
WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.
HELD:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that
where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant biological
support for considering him as a male.
4. SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and
equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging
that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the
name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is
habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of
his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice
him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
5. Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an
Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of
Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady
of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they
were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as
evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was
valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated
by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
6. Navarro vs. Judge Hernando Domagtoy

259 SCRA 129 Civil Law Family Code Law on Marriage Presumptive Death; Absent
Spouse
Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted evidence
in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an
affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven
years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it
is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy
counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the
parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the
law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request
to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride,
NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

7. Laxamana vs Baltazar
92 Phil 32

8. COSCA V. PALYPAYON JR. 237 SCRA 249


FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same
Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was
field with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal
solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6
marriages even without the requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. The respondent Judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.

HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares
that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly , criminally and administratively liable.
* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code
provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law. This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
9. Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 429
FACTS:
Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas were married at Manila City Hall where they
executed a marriage contract. A marriage license number was indicated in the contract,
which Jaime never applied for. A church ceremony was conducted on May 31, 1969 using the
same license. They lived as husband and wife and later on went to Spain for Jaimes medical
education supported by Jaimes parents. When in Spain their marriage turned bad since
Jaime was having a hard time balancing marriage and medical studies; obsession of Jaime
with Carmelitas knees which he would take countless pictures of, intrafemural sex between
her knees which are attributed to Jaimes drug addiction. Their marriage became
unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their
marriage. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial separation in 1983.
Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Sevilla presented 3 certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan which states that
the marriage license with that number cannot be found. The parish where they were wed
presented a Certified copy of a Marriage certificate dated April 11, 1994. RTC ruled that
marriage is null due to lack of marriage license. CA reversed RTCs decision. Marriage license
was probably issued but cannot be located.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid
HELD: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed. The local civil registry of San Juan testified that
they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the
reason that "the employee handling is already retired." Failure to locate does not mean nonexistence of the marriage license. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
indissolubility of marriage bonds. Always presume marriage.

10.Alcantara vs. Alcantara


531 SCRA 446 Civil Law Family Code Marriage Valid Marriage Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio

FACTS:
Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara
alleging that on December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could

arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same
day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on
March 26, 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In
1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Restituto prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita however asserts the
validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite; that
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children; that Restituto only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a
case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. Restituto cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a
marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case,
the marriage contract between the parties reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Restituto, in a faint
attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the Supreme Court still holds that
there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day
period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is
not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

11.Soriano vs Felix
L-9005
June 20, 1958
12.Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the

marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?

HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot
be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma
is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
13. Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On
March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and
bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their
joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with
their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years
under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
14.Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June
1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a
sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the
Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab
initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right
to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.
15. Arsenio De Loria and Ricarda De Loria and Felipe Apelan Felix
Nature: Review of a decision of CA involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
Facts:
Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding
territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young
ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to confession.
They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter,
upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit
of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church.
Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave
her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized
her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra
acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to
compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the
deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be
the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up
his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on
appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal
question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief whether the
events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and
binding marriage.
Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis?
Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause
for nullity?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize
marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract
marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for
the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a
marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage
should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes
for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the
latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife" which in this case actually occurred
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of
such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence,
it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder
during the liberation of Manila and its environs.

16.EUGENIO vs. VELEZ


185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
was confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. She cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the intention of
escaping. She died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence on
Aug. 28, 1988.

Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas Corpus
on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court then issued a
writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff
on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. The court
ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio
assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?

HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:

Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a
child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.

Petitioners claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated under Art. 294 of
the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and
a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions.

In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

17.REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO


G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24, 1981. Both are Filipino
citizens. They cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went to the U.S. in 1986 with one
son.
Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year 2000,
Orbecindo learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried. Orbecindo then
filed a petition for authority to remarry. The court granted the petition since there was no
opposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory relief. The following
are the requisites:
1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen
who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarried can also
be allowed to remarry.
However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record and are only based on bare allegations that his wife was a naturalized American
citizen, had obtained divorce decree and had remarried an American. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon submission of evidence in his favor.