1. Francisco vs.

Master Iron Works Construction Corporation

GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The
latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of
land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An
affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina,
the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over
the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity
to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from
defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered
judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of
levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount
due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land
in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on
record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got
married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it
does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art
148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money,
property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will
not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was
affirmed.
2.

3. Agapay vs Palang Digest

Facts:
Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he
refused to live with Carlina.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda
Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A house and lot was likewise purchased,
allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitationproduced a son named
Kristopher.
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle
and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase by
Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed
the decision.
Issues:
1.

Who owns the riceland?

2.

Who owns the house and lot?

3.

Does the trial courts decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the nature of
judicial confirmation of the separation of property between Miguel and Carlina and the
termination of their conjugal partnership?

4.

Can Kristophers status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action for recovery of ownershipand possession?

5.

Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-defendant in the case?

Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of
law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had
a sari-sari store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only
around 22 years of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as
her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought 2 months before she and
Miguel actually cohabited to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.
Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitationnot having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living
together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the
rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, there is
no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should
revert to the conjugal partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September
23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed
of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be
placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of the Civil Code because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal
union.

3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except
by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and
the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the
proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in
the

instant

ordinary

civil

action

which

is

for

recovery

of ownership and

possession.

5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda,
cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs.
Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997).

4. MAXEY V. CA
Nature:
Action to annul sale of properties and recovery thereof
Date: 11 May 1984
DOCTRINE: A common law wife owns property in common with herhusband because of her
contribution to the marriage, which need not come inmonetary form.
FACTS:Relevant Provision of Law:
Art. 144 of the Civil Code
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 but were only married in a
military fashion. However, they had a church wedding in 1919. The properties in dispute were
acquired in 1911 and 1912.In 1919, Regina died. Melbourne remarried and in 1953, his second wife
Julia (using a power of attorney) sold the properties to private respondents spouses Macayra. Julia is of
the belief that said properties were exclusive to Melbourne. Petitioners are children of Melbourne and
Regina. They seek the annulment of the above sale and recovery of possession. They allege that such
properties were conjugal properties of their parents marriage as they were bought with their joint
effort and capital. The trial court ruled for the petitioners, while the CA found otherwise.
ISSUES:(1)
W/N Melbourne and Regina were married in 1903 in military fashion
RULING:
Act No. 3613 recognizing military marriages was only enacted in1929. The military wedding did not
make a valid marriage. They were only legally married in 1919.
(2)
W/N the properties in question were conjugal or exclusive to Melbourne
RULING:
They were conjugal property. The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of the Civil Code because it
could not be applied retroactively in prejudice of vested rights. But even if Art. 144
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
did apply, the CA is of the view that the property could not have been acquired by the spouses joint
efforts because this pertains to monetary contributions and Regina was a mere housewife. SC rules
otherwise. It applies Article 144 retroactively because no vested rights of Melbourne were impaired
because there exists a concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share of the properties in question.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne and the estate of his late wife Regina
when they were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would be unjust to require a woman who is a wife in all
aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage to abandon her home and
children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business
before the rules on co-ownership would apply. It does not matter that she made no monetary
contribution, for the "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the
earnings of a woman but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through
caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
But given that the properties were owned in common by the spouses, Julias sale over Melbournes
share is valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land to private
respondents while the latter should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties.

5. GONZALES VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147-Property Regime of void marriage]

FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born
from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed
their pizza business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the time
they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for
its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he
exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not
satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn
affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The marriage
of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later affirmed by the
CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family
Code.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and
(2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of
the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have
been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

6. ABING V. WAEYAN (Coownership)

497 SCRA 202 July 31, 2006
Facts: In 1986, petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Together, they bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax
declaration was thereafter transferred to respondents name.
In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. Eventually, petitioner
demanded respondent to vacate the annex structure when respondent failed to pay petitioners share
in their properties. Petitioner alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the annex structure.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner.
Held: Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their

properties in common in equal shares. Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question,
respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
V. FAMILY
1. Article 151 Members of Family
SPOUSES MANUEL and ROSEMARIE WEE vs. ROSARIO D. GALVEZG.R. No. 147394.August 11,
2004
Facts:
Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters.[3] Rosemarie lives with her
husband, petitioner Manuel Wee, in Balanga, Bataan, while Rosario resides in New York, U.S.A. The
present controversy stemmed from an investment agreement between the two sisters, which had gone
sour along the way. On April 20, 1999, Rosario, represented by Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact,
filed a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and Rosemarie
Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000 at the exchange rate of P38.30 per dollar. The
complaint, which was docketed, alleged that Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an agreement
whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to be deposited in a savings
account while the balance could be invested in the money market. The interest to be earned therefrom
would be given to Rosarios son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance. Rosario claimed that pursuant to
their agreement, she sent to Rosemarie on various dates in 1993 and 1994, five Chemical Bank
checks. However, sometime in1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000 and for an
accounting. Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so. In January 1999,
Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, sent Rosemarie a written demand for her
US$20,000 and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the demand, thus causing Rosario to file suit.
On May 18, 1999, the Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case on the following grounds: (1) the lack
of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made in accordance
with Article 151[5] of the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being
premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the certification
against forum shopping was defective, having been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the
plaintiff, as required by Rule 7, Section 5*6+ of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Wees opposed
Rosarios motion to have the Amended Complaint admitted.
Issues:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTSUFFICIENTY
STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
2) WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING EXECUTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS DEFECTIVE
Held:
Petitioners submit that the amended complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 violates Rule 8, Section 1
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the plaintiff relies for her claim. Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation of the
amended complaint that Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed is clearly
insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in
deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to
petitioners. Under Article 151 of the Family Code, a suit between members of the same family shall
not be entertained, unless it is alleged in the complaint or petition that the disputants have made
earnest efforts to resolve their differences through compromise, but these efforts have not
succeeded. The attempt to compromise as well as its failure or inability to succeed is a condition
precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Petition DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners
2.
3. Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former
executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to
each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In
October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also
issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the
annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to
vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for
conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.

HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The
petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent.
Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be
noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they
alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful
detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings,
no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to
file action.
4. SANTOS VS CA
NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and
ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787

November 15, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and
sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956,
Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition" covering
properties they inherited from their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against
petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Issue: Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no
application
Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the
provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an
action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving
members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family
Code. Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise
defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the
necessary averments of a defective complaint.

5. KELLEY VS PLANTERS PRODUCT

SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and
JORGE A. RAGUTANA,
G.R. No. 172263

July 9, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment
from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite demand,
PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After trial on
the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. After being
belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to
dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject property
was their family home which was exempt from execution.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.
Ruling:

Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988)
are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family
home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted
either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following
exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4)
For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

6. PATRICIO VS. DARIO

GR No. 170829
NOVEMBER 20, 2006
FACTS:
M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially
settled his estate. One of the properties he left was the family home. A new title for the said property
was thereafter issued under the name of the wife and the two children as co-owners. After some time,
the wife and one of the sons expressed their desire to partition the family home and terminate the coownership. The other son opposed the partition on the ground that the family home should remain
despite the death of one or both the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The
supposed minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to
such a partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants'
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also
the grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent has been
living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he
satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on his parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.

7. Manacop vs CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).
The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153
of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code
and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
8.
9. Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides
that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The
debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family
Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

10. Social Security System (SSS) vs. Aguas

Facts: Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas
filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was survived
by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13, 1997.
In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosannas claim, saying that
Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she was living with another man.
Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several
children with a certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the pension and conducted
an investigation. The investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and
that Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that
Pablo was infertile.
It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosannas request toresume payment and ordered Rosanna
to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to her and Jeylnn.
When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also claiming to be
a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition included a
photocopy of Jeylnn and Janets certificates of live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to
conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted
marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo
dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court
for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and
Romeo dela Pena)
The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo. As
for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablos legitimate child, even if her birth certificate was
signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same
person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal papers.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing
that they were children of the deceased.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased for his
SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits.
Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature of Pablo as her
father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo
were married on December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the
death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of
Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is
considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already
separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent from support upon the
husband.
Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She
therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary

11. Concepcion vs. CA

GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still

alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the
custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that
there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte,
her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested
oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy.
Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the
best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity
with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by
the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.
12.
13. De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
Facts:

Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses Danilo and Carolina. However, they were
acknowledged as an illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized document. Juan died.

Issue: Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.

Ruling:
No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate children
of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy
as being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.
14. Tison vs. CA
Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora
Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The present
action for reconveyance involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment which was originally
owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in
dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro
Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, mayattack the legitimacy of
Hermogenes
Held: NO. the private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue oflegitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is
only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

15. Andal vs. Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis
Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of
Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with
them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from
his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias
father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June
17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former
is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days
next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence
during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude
cohabitation between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.

16. JANICE MARIE JAO VS CA

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28 1987
FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico V. Jao. Jao
denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by
the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and
Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared
the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have
been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the trial
court decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity.
RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.
Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early
as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with
in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the
defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child;
he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father
of the child."

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity,
rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood

typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now
almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.

In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has
already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a
case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
recognized as final on the question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting
of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had
cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the
competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such
testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.

17.
18.
19. ILANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
FACTS:

Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata.

Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again. Later,
he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of
marriage, they eloped.

While they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio
Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to
return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.

During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern
as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he
signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods.

CA REVERSED RTC judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged
and recognized illegitimate child.
ISSUE: W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
YES.

Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by
fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a
spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. A
recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would
be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects
public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such
act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues
(De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated
the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and
clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.

The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that

Merceditas is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand
diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger
to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures
and handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between
Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee
in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his
belated denials.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may
still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence,
as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiatio
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of
petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into
account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
or extrajudicial demand.
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December
30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending about
P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about
P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years, 4
months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering
the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of
P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding 3 years; and
P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she attained the age of
majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article
2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts
and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

20. Lagabala vs Santiago GR No. 132305 Dec 4, 2001

21. De Aparicho vs Paraguya GR No. L-29771 May 29, 1987
22. Barrueco vs Consul General 74 Phil 151

23. MENDOZA VS CA
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA
MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-23102
April 24, 1967
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married to
Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954,
when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession.
Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and
neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and
still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be
pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a
hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of
the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when
the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit
being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts
in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that
the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out
of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the
case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the
Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the
same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article
222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222,
future support.
24. Cruz vs. Cristobal GR. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
25. TIJING VS CA
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest
child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered
Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him
over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned
the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.
ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person

is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be
stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by
the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no
clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were
presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of
siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living
together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas
Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or
midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the
LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were
typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a
"common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two
had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records
and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.

26. Rosendo Herrera vs Rosendo Alba

Remedial Law Evidence Object Evidence Daubert Test DNA Evidence Vallejo
Guidelines
FACTS:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for
the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis allegations. In
the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to
establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera
questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread
acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is
unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the
decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other
hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court
provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data:
1.

how the samples were collected,

2.

how they were handled,

3.

the possibility of contamination of the samples,

4.

the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,

5.

whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,

6.

and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts
before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
1.

Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2.

Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,

3.

Whether the rate of error is acceptable,

4.

Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had,
the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the
biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% )
does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It
does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the
biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can
be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against selfincrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the
getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

27. Colorado vs CA GR No 39948 February 28, 1985

28. Liyao vs Liyao
GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a
petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional
rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There
were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but
living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the
deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the
deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.
HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled
that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by
the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

29. LIM vs. CA

270 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also worked as a receptionist
in a Club where she met petitioner during her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and
Maribel reciprocated his love and soon lived together. Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already
pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same year. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth
to their daughter and he egistered the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the childs birth certificate. After
Joanna Roses birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioners feelings toward her started to wane. He
subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel then filed a complaint for support.
Petitioner negated all of Maribels claims and even his paternity. The trial court rendered a decision on
in favor of Maribel ordering herein defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter.
Petitioner then elevated his case and argues before the Court that there is no clear and convincing
evidence on record to show that there was actual cohabitation between him and Maribel.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented sufficient to claim filiation therefore, making the father liable
for support.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
3. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
4. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a
good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the
Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
30. Rivero vs CA May 17, 2005
31. Bernabe vs. Alejo
GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was
named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina
(legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a
complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a
share of his fathers estate.

Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or
deny the childs filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action
for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
HELD:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to
establish the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

32. Mossesgeld vs CA GR No 111455 December 23, 1998

Case Doctrines:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother , and this is rule regardless of whether or
not the father admits paternity.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law
Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar Calasan
(married), signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the childs name
as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the
certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In addition,
Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the childs surname in the certificate
of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of
Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular
No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the
surname of their mother.
Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his
surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration. Later, he filed a
motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the childs mother
Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity?
Held:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil
Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using
the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative father,
though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the
child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the fathers surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not
lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. (Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 111455. December 23, 1998)

33. Republic vs Vicencio December 14, 1998