Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 66


1 Alonte vs Savellano
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver of Right to Due Process
Facts: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice
Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and
had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian,
Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor
later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change
of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor
continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for
decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding
on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing
that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence
of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has
not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by
Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision
earlier promulgated is nullified.
2 People vs Mariano
FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan
because of misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power

cord and electric cables being the person in authority to receive the same in
behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then moved to
quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the
items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military
commission for Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were
found guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.
RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more
than two hundred pesos Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of
1948. The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6)
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts
of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction
over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the
malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission.
Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case
now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the other.
Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular
offense and impose the punishment for it.
3 Antiporda vs Gartichorena
Facts: Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of
kidnapping, the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit amended
information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the
place where the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied
by the Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary

investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but
the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was
ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after
their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.

Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights

would be impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be
unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation
taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the
public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was
brought when he was kidnapped.

Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially

inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and
it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention
that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the
same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional
fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion
for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they
who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and
clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we

see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be

4 Hernandez vs Albano
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.


We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because
of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of
the Information.

FACTS: Isabela Rep. Delfin Albano (respondent-appellee) filed a complaint with

the Manila city fiscal against Finance Secretary & Central Bank Monetary Board
Presiding Officer Jaime Hernandez (petitioner-appellant) for violating RPC Art.
216 (possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act
626 *which provides for the penalty for violations of Article VII, Section 11,
subsection (2) of the Constitution) or RA 265 (Central Bank Act).

Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

Hernandez sought to enjoin the fiscals investigation of charges filed against

him. The courts only do so in extreme cases; Hernandez did not prove that his
belonged to those exceptions.

The complaint involved Hernandezs alleged shareholdings in University of
the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and
University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations obtained dollar
allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
Hernandezs incumbency as presiding officer thereof.

In total, there were five charges docketed in the fiscals office.

After joint investigation of the charges before Second Assistant City Fiscal
of Manila Carlos Gonzales (respondent), Albano moved to exclude the alleged
violation of RP Art 216 as the applicability of the statute was pending before the
SC in Solidum v Hernandez (it had since been resolved adversely against
Hernandez). The fiscal granted the motion.
Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds
that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution,
punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile
of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13
of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal and reconsideration

Hernandez went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and

prohibition praying for preliminary injunction to restrain the fiscals office from
continuing the investigation.

The CFI dismissed the petition.


could the Manila fiscal be restrained

investigation of the charges against Hernandez?






By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants
are empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial
jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an
investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate

postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly
and file the case of as speedily.
A rule was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction.
However, in extreme cases, a relief in equity could be availed of to stop a
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it was necessary: (a) for the
orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions;
(d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases,
because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of

Constitution Art VII sec. 11(2): a fine of not than P5000 or imprisonment of not
more than 2 years, or both.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of
the essential ingredients thereof took place. Where an offense is wholly
committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is
powerless to try the case.
Similarly, the Manila fiscal could not investigate a crime committed within
the exclusive confines of another province. Otherwise, they would be
overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and unlawfully encroach
upon powers and prerogatives of fiscals of the province.
Based on the facts of the case, Possession of prohibited interests is but
one of the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient
thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department: Secretary of
Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department and chairman of the
Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations
aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his
dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the
crime or an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say
that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate
the violation complained of.

Violation of RA 265 sec. 13 was criminal in nature, as the law clearly
provided the penal sanction for violating its provisions.

RULING: CFI judgment affirmed

5 Brocka vs Enrile

Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization

(ACTO) a demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently
dispersed a petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers Jan 28 85

Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases

filed before RTC QC

All petitioners released on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged
as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended

Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between
Feb.1-7 85 a On Feb. 7 or 9 85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered
Brocka, et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each a Brocka,
et al filed respective bail bonds BUT

Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a

respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly
issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 85

Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et

Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases;

hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows:
10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought
before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone call
subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to
be at 2:00PM
2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a complainants
affidavits had not yet been received

3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of
complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition
3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges
against Brocka, et al had been officially received a informed that said charges
were never coursed through the Records Office
ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142
are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim
cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on
bail as a matter of Constitutional right a appears that respondents have
conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail
AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver
of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsels request
that they be given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients a no
such requirement required under the rules

Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on orders of then Pres.

Marcos a release narrated in Courts resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed
by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:
In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had
already been released a four on Feb15 85 and one on Feb.8 85
Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become
moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the
law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition.

Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend:

bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on one
and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a matter of defense
in sedition charge so, only issue here is

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined YES

RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution
for the second offense of inciting to sedition.

upon receipt of TCs order of release a violates guideline that PDA shall be
invoked within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro, Manila

GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by

injunction, preliminary or final

Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a

purported xeerox copy of it a violates Court pronouncement that individuals
against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and
the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)



To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused

2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the

information instead of a petition for Habeas Corpus

When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions

When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice

The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted that such
course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances
then prevailing:


When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority

1. Spurious and inoperational PDA


Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation

2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation


When double jeopardy is clearly apparent


When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense


Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention

until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing
a warrant of arrest anew

Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground had been denied
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners

In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have
been undertaken by state officials in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from
detention BUT this PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85

"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of

criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious

If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as
in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until
such time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation
was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.

6 Defensor Santiago vs Vasquez

Facts: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with
bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her
bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure
order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving
for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person
as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold
departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She
likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.


1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without
any motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?

3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?


1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty
of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of

respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance
of Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for
purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed
"that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted"
and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by
her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary
after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to
exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the

presiding courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher
studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan

in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in

thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.

3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass
upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since
they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof. (Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), G.R.
Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993)
7 Alfelor vs Intia
8 Uy vs CA
9 Rivera vs CA
Lessons Applicable: attempted murder

Laws Applicable:

May 2, 1998 1:00 pm: Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo,
his neighbour, mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for
support and soon a heated exchange of words ensued.

May 3, 1998 7:30 pm (Sunday): Ruben with his 3 year-old daughter went to
the store to buy food and to look for his wife. Suddenly, the brothers Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo emerged from their house and ganged up on him.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows so he fell to the ground.
While lying on the ground, Edgardo hit Ruben 3 times with a hollow block on the
parietal area (narrowly missing the middle which is fatal) while Esmeraldo and
Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin
sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a
stone at him, hitting him at the back. The policemen on board a mobile car
arrived so Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared his lacerated wound
in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from 1-7 days.

Esmeraldo: May 3, 1998 1:00 pm, Ruben arrived at his house, banged the
gate and challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he got
out, Ruben punchd him and they wrestled but Edgardo pushed Ruben aside and
Esmeraldos wife pulled him away and brought to their house.
Ismael: He tried to pacify them but Ruben pulled his hair. Once he got free,
he fled to their house and did not see Edgardo in the scene.

Edgardo: May 3, 1998 1:00 pm, he was throwing garbage in front of their
house when Ruben arrived. He quickly went inside as Ruben banged the gate,
ordered him to get out and even threatened to shoot him. Esmeraldo went out to
ask what Rubens problem was but it led to a fist fight. He rushed outside and
pushed Ruben who fell to the ground. Ruben stood up, grabbed his hair and in
the process, Rubn hit his head on a lamp post.

Eyewitnesses Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo: revealed the suddenness
and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners


RTC: Frustrated murder

April 1998: Ruben Rodil stopped working as a taxi driver after a would-be
rapist threatened his life. He was cited as a Bayaning Pilipino by ABS-CBN for
saving the would-be victim. His wife is a manicurist and they have 3 children.

CA: Attempted murder


o They should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only since no intent
to kill and even if they had intent to kill, the prosecution failed to prove treachery

ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly held it as attempted murder.

HELD: NO. petition is DENIED for lack of merit. CA AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.

When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted.
Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.
evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter
alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused

Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the 3 brothers helped each other
maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground;
that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the
victim on the head with it 3 times; and that it was only the arrival of the
policemen that made them desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben
If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is presumed

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
overt or external act - some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
Reason: so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is

overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense

They attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was
walking with his 3-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life.
He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the
synchronized assault of the 3 siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack on the victim. Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden
and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend
himself, there would be treachery
There being conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered
against all of them
Part 2 VENUE R 110 S 15
Lopez v. City Judge
FACTS: Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez andAurora Mejia Villasor)
and other heirs of spousesManuel Meijia and Gloria Lazatin entered into
acontract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for thedevelopment and subdivision
of 3 parcels of landbelonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferredhis rights
to Terra Devt Co (TDC).-Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC
forrescission of said contract with Lazatin for allegedgross and willful violation of
its terms.-Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with FiscalsOffice of City of
Angeles a complaint againstpetitioners for violation of A172 in relation to
A171,par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted.Fiscal filed with Court in
Angeles City informationcharging petitioners with crime of falsification of private
document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelinamade it appear that they were the
guardians of minors George and Alexander Meijia (sons of thespouses?) when
they werent the guardians at thedate of the execution of the document, a

certainCarolina M. de Castro was the judicial guardian of thesaid minors).Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles CityFiscal reinvestigated to give
them opportunity topresent exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation,parties
charged moved for the dismissal of the case

document is actuallyfalsified with the intent to prejudice a 3 rd person,whether

such falsified document is or is not put touse illegally. The improper and illegal
use of thedocument is not material or essential element of thecrime of
falsification of a private document [US vs.Infante, US vs. Barreto]2.

mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the
offensebecause the private document that containedthe alleged false statement
of fact was signedby them outside the territorial limits of saidcity

NO. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule117 of the Rules of Court is
manifestly broader inscope than the demurrer, as it is not limited todefects
apparent upon the face of the complaint orinformation but extends to issues
arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that,among the
grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2of said Rule provides for former
jeopardy or acquittal,extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the
accused etc., which necessarily involve questionsof fact in the determination of
which a preliminarytrial is required.

(One in Makati, the other one in QC).-However, the resolution of their motion to
dismisswas delayed and the City Court already set theircriminal case for
arraignment. Petitioners securedseveral postponements of the arraignment. But
sinceCity Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion todismiss, petitioners
filed a motion to quash instead,on the ground that court had no
jurisdiction.Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed anopposition to the
motion to quash. Respondent judgedenied motion to quash, set arraignment.
Sopetitioners filed present action.
ISSUE: 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction totry and decide the
criminal case for allegedfalsification of a private document allegedly done bythe
parties named in the info even if the acts of falsification was allegedly done in
Makati and QC,and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court
Other procedural issues
2. WON the motion to quash was improper, andshould not be allowed since by
filing the said motion,the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of
theallegation of the information to the effect that theoffense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City3. WON the prayer for writs of
certiorari andprohibition is proper
1. NO. The place where the criminal offensewas committed not only determines
the venueof the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction
Petitioners are charged with havingfalsified a private document, not using a
falsifieddocument, so it is essential to determine when andwhere the offense of
falsification of a privatedocument is deemed consummated or committed. The
crime of falsification of a private document isconsummated when such

The argument of the respondents referto the now obsolete demurrer to an
information.3. YES
Ratio. The general rule is that a court of equity willnot issue a writ of certiorari to
annul an order of alower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue awrit of
prohibition to prevent said court fromproceeding with the case after such denial,
it beingthe rule that upon such denial the defendant shouldenter his plea of not
guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal
questionscovered by his motion to quash. In this as well as inother jurisdictions,
however, this is no longer thehard and fast rule.-The writs of certiorari and
prohibition, asextraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimateanalysis,
intended to annul void proceedings; toprevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of legalauthority and to provide for a fair and orderlyadministration of
Reasoning: In several cases, the court already tookcognizance of said writs,
overlooking the flaw in theprocedure followed in the interest of a
moreenlightened and substantial justice. The lack of jurisdiction of the City
Court of Angeles is patent andit would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners
toundergo trial in said court and suffer all theembarrassment and mental
anguish that go with it.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is herebyrendered declaring that the offense
charged in theinformation filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of theCity Court of
Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore,

saidcourt is hereby restrained and prohibited fromfurther proceedings therein.

Costs against the privaterespondents.

property. For the failure of the Ibasco spouses to settle their account, the Trivinio
spouses filed criminal cases against the former for violation of BP22.

People v. Gorospe

Issue: Whether the checks were for accommodation or guarantee to acquire the
benefits of the interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 of the Department of Justice
in relation to BP 22.

Facts: Manuel Parulan is an authorized dealer of San Mig Corp in Bulacan. He

issued 2checks in connection with beer purchases and which he delivered to the
Sales supervisor (Mr. Cornelio) of San Mig. The checks were dishonored by
Planters Devt Bank (drawee) in Bulacan. From the evidence presented, Parulan
made false assurances that the checks issued by him were good and backed by
sufficient funds. But Judge Grospe of RTC Pampanga dismissed the case for lack
of jusrisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Grospe was correct in dismissing the case.

Held: No. He had jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

Estafa is a
Deceit took
check was

transitory crime. There are the elements of deceit and damage.

place in Pampanga and damage was done in Bulacan where the
dishonored. While the check was issued in Bulan, it was not
drawn. It was in Pampanga where the check was uttered and

The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to the consummation of
the obligation. Although the check was received by San Mig in Bulacan, it was
not the delivery contemplated by the law to the payee (San Mig). Mr. Cornelio is
not the person who could take the check as a holder. Thus, he had to forward the
check to the regional office of San Mig in Pampanga. Deceit took place in
Pampanga where the check was legally issued and delivered.
Gamboa,et al. v. CA
Ibasco v. CA
Facts: The Ibasco spouses requested credit accommodation fro the supply of
ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds from the Trivinio spouses. Ibasco
issued 3 checks for 3 deliveries of darak. The checks bounced and the Ibasco
spouses were notified of the dishonor. Ibasco instead offered a property in Daet.
The property, being across the sea, the Trivinio spouses did not inspect the

Held: Ministry Circular 4, issued 1 December 1981 by the Department of Justice,

provides that where a check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of the obligation, pre-existing or not, the drawer is not
criminally liable for either estafa or violation of BP 22. Incidents however indicate
that the checks were issued as payment and for value, and not for
accommodation (i.e. pertaining to an arrangement made a favor to another, not
upon a consideration received). as the checks failed to bear any statement for
accommodation and for guarantee to show Ibascos intent. ( It must be noted,
however, that BP22 does not distinguish and applies even in cases where
dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only. The erroneous
interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 was rectified by the repealing Ministry
Circular 12, issued on 8 August 1984).
Isip v. People
The Place Where The Crime Was Committed Determines Not Only The Venue Of
The Action But Is An Essential Element Of Jurisdiction
Manuel and his wife Marrietta were charged with several counts of Estafa and BP
22 for allegedly defrauding Atty. Leonardo Jose and misappropriating several
pieces of jewellery. According to the complainant, all the transactions happened
in his ancestral house in Cavite City while he was on leave from his work at the
Bureau of Customs, hence the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City. In their defense, Manuel and Marrietta alleged that the transactions
if indeed there was any, happened in Manila, where Atty. Leonardo was then
living in his condominium. After trial, the RTC convicted them for estafa, which
they appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Marrietta died. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC, and held that the
transactions occurred in Cavite City, as shown by numerous pieces of evidence.

In his petition to the Supreme Court, Manuel argues that the RTC and CA should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mere convenience suggests that
all the transactions occurred in Manila, since he and his late wife were residents

of Manila. It does not follow that since complainant have an ancestral house in
Cavite City, the transactions occurred there.
The Supreme Court:

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is

jurisdictional The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited
Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that
the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took
place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of
absence from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was
properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that
the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar
rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent

evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since
he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded.
The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any

person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell
so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable
or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one
day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry
from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late
wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with
banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the
transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment

deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. It is
to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court. In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to
reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to
apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that
the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.
1 Miranda vs Arizona
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police
interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (the Constitution). SELF
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform individuals of
their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an interrogation following an
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated
four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained
during police interrogations.

The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for
kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers
did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of
investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was
aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for
robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the
arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an
admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was
notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two
robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and
then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were
able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify
Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along
with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing
by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr.
Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted
to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of
their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they
interrogate the defendants?
Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth
Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an
explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their
right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if
necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an
interrogation will not be admissible in court.
Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution would apply to
interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a
new rule as the majority finds here.
The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also argues that
the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth

Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any and
all pressures against self-incrimination.
Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical support for
broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to include the rights that
the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with their
Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent
or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should cease. Further, the
individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the
government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule.
2 US vs Wade
Brief Fact Summary. Two men were indicted for bank robbery and appointed
counsel to defend them. They were brought before the employees to participate
in a line up identification procedure without the benefit of the presence of
counsel, after indictment, but prior to trial.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) guarantees an accused the right to counsel at post indictment
identification procedures, and the failure to provide the accused with counsel will
result in the suppression of the improperly conducted identification.
Facts: Two men robbed a bank in Eustace, Texas. One man, with two pieces of
tape on his face, went into the bank, pointed a gun at the cashier and demanded
the money. His accomplice waited outside in a stolen getaway car. Wade and his
accomplice were indicted for the robbery and counsel was appointed. About two
weeks later, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent caused the two men
to be part of a lineup consisting of five or six other men at which the bank
employees were asked to make an identification, and at which the two men were
in fact identified.
At trial, Wades defense counsel objected to the identification procedures, but his
efforts to have them stricken were in vain. Wade was convicted of the robbery.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup had violated Wades Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to counsel.
Issue. Whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be
excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses

before trial at a post indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes,

without notice to, and in the absence of, the accuseds appointed counsel?

officer testified that Orozco was under arrest, the Court held that Orozco was in

Held. Yes. The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendants rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of
counsel to help avoid that prejudice. The in court identification must be found to
have independent origin, free of the primary taint of the improperly conducted
lineup, in order to be admitted.

The Orozco decision clarifies the definition of custody by elaborating on when

and how a suspects freedom of movement is deprived in a significant way. The
decision illustrates how custody can take place in a suspects home. Finally, it
provides criteria for determining whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of

Discussion. The opinion emphasizes the fact that the Fifth Amendment right
against self incrimination is not implicated because nothing about the lineup
itself violated the long line of cases holding that only testimonial or
communicative evidence must be suppressed if coerced. The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, however, did attach to pretrial proceedings because of the
importance that they have carrying on an adequate defense. The right has been
interpreted to apply to critical stages of the proceedings. Identification
procedures are critical because of the many dangers that inhere in identification
procedures in general, and in eyewitness identifications in particular. Any
prejudice occurring in an identification procedure without counsel present would
denigrate the right of the defendant to effectively cross examine the witness in

4 US vs Brown

3 Orozco vs Texas (1969)

Four armed police officers arrived at Orozcos home at 4 a.m. to question him
about a murder. The officers entered Orozcos bedroom, woke him up, and
questioned him without reading Miranda warnings. Orozco admitted to being
present at the murder scene, owning a firearm, and told the officers its
whereabouts. Tests revealed that the firearm was the gun that fired the fatal
At trial, an officer testified that from the moment questioning began, Orozco was
under arrest and not free to leave. Orozcos statements were admitted and he
was found guilty. Orozco appealed, arguing that his statements were given while
he was in custody, thus violating Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
When is a suspect in custody? According to Miranda, custody takes place when a
suspect is deprived of freedom of movement in any significant way. To elucidate
this standard, the Orozco Court looked at a variety of situational factors,
including the time of day, the number of officers present, and the officers intent.
Because the questioning took place at 4 a.m. with four armed officers, and an

Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Jacqueline Panseta Brown (the defendant),
was charged with importing cocaine base and possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute. The cocaine base was found by United States Customs officers in
the defendants luggage cart frames. It was found at the time she was traveling
to Bermuda via Miami from Jamaica.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) Rule 703 allows
experts to rely on data which would not have been admissible if the date is
reasonably relied on by experts in their field.
Facts. The defendant was traveling to Bermuda via Miami when United States
Customs officers found cocaine base in the frames of her luggage carts. Cocaine
is derived from cocaine base. The defendant denied knowledge of the drugs, but
she was indicted for the importation of five hundred grams or more of a
substance containing cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute. The
defendant sought to substitute her appointed counsel for her own attorney,
David Rowe (Mr. Rowe). Mr. Rowe was substituted as counsel, but filed a
motion to withdraw seven weeks later. This motion was denied and the
defendant went to trial represented by Mr. Rowe. The government moved, prior
to trial, to exclude any evidence or argument from the defendant, a black
Jamaican national, that she was targeted by United States customs because of
her race. The trial court deferred ruling on this issue. The government used its
first two peremptory strikes against African-Americans, and defense objected
based on Batson. The trial court found that the government offered credible
reasons unrelated to race as to why they were struck. The government used a
third strike against an African American, and after the defendant objected,
offered that the juror had been on a prior jury panel that was unable to reach a

The prosecution relied on the testimony of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

agent to establish the defendants knowledge of the presence of cocaine in her
luggage carts. The DEA agent was offered as an expert in the field of drug
evaluation. The agent testified that the wholesale value of the cocaine base in
the defendants possession was approximately $217,000. The government
argued that an innocent, unknowing witness would not have been trusted with
such value. The defendant attempted to contradict the estimated value with a
copy of a written DEA price list referred to by the expert, but was not allowed to.
The defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to sixty-three
Issue. Did the trial court err in finding the race-neutral reasons offered by the
government for the peremptory strikes were credible?
Did the trial court improperly exclude the DEA drug price list offered by
Held. Circuit Judge Kravitch issued the opinion for the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals and found that the trial court did not err in holding the governments
race-neutral explanations credible in regards to the peremptory strikes.
The trial court did not err in excluding the price list.
Concurrence. Circuit Judge Hill issued a concurring opinion to note that he is
troubled that the defendant went to trial with a lawyer she did not prefer.
Discussion. The price list was not relied on by the DEA agent in forming his
opinion, and it made no reference to drug prices in Bermuda, which was the
defendants destination, or Jamaica, from where she originated. The list did not
reference prices for cocaine base in any market.
5 People vs Andan 1997
Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation
Confessions given to a Municipal Mayor w/o assistance of counsel
FACTS: Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her
way to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan
asked her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andans wife but
there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan
and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet
until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her

over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit
her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow
portion of the lot and abandoned it.
The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from
the vacant lot, they also searched Andans nearby house and found evidences
linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned
that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team
lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters
where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three
were then brought to Andans house where he showed the police where the bags
of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station
while waiting for the result of the investigation.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the
police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which the
mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell
the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor
opened the door of the room to let the public and the media representatives
witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the
appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his
relatives, Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and
that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. He
provided an alibi why he was at his fathers house at another barangay and
testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial
court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the
assistance of counsel is in violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted
as evidence in court.
RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellants
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has operational
supervision and control over the local police and may be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III

of the Constitution. However, Andans confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to the
mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law
enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellants confession to
the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
6 People vs Endino 2001
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October
1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly
and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the
chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded
momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby
Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward
Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the 2
assailants fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and
bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor.
He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could
receive medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of
Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin and warrants
were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the
trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives
without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November
1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo
and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was
immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the
evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by
PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to

be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they
stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where Galgarin was interviewed by
reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin
admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman .
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where
his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them
money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they
stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him
heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program
TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV
Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police
officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art.
III, of the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by
Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is
admissible as evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening
his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to
police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into
confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However, because of the
inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt,
and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting
similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to
the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system. It is not suggested that videotaped confessions given before media men
by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and

conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is

essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was
given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel
then to lower courts: "we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always
remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.
Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for
the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant
and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
7 People vs Caguioa
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on 14 September 1973, in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y
Gonzales (Criminal Case 146-V-73), with the case, after the raffle, being assigned
to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa. Upon arraignment on 5
October 1973, Yupo pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded, the
prosecution having presented 6 witnesses, including the father of the deceased,
Miguel Tribol, and his common-law wife, Lydia Begnotia, who allegedly received
the ante mortem statement of the victim, Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the hearing on
3 June 1974, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the
Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written statement of Yupo and
his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of
his own choice was taken. After this witness had identified the statement of Yupo
and the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating answers in such
statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of the defense
counsel based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible in evidence,
as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the
accused in the investigation. Judge Caguioa sustained the objection of the
defense on the view that such judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible
in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not
assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such right could
not be waived. Upon his refusal to reconsider such ruling, the petition for
certiorari was filed.
Issue: Whether the right to remain silent and right to counsel during custodial
investigation may be waived.

Held: While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be

intelligently waived, otherwise a court's jurisdiction starting at the beginning of
the trial may be lost in the course of the proceeding. Statements made during
the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning
that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him,
and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or
appointed. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior
to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does not make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Tested by
such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver herein falls far short.
Yupo merely answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to Corporal Conrado B. Roca of
the Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay
sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko
ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita
kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong
gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring
gamitin ng ayon o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" and that was all.
8 People vs Maqueda

Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house
in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered
with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the
victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda
as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a
kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two
accused asked them for directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag,
Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of
his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was
brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda
filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering
to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least
guilty among the accused in this case."

Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial

admission is inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean
Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor
of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such
testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made
them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in
connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.

Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to

Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.

Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the

offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.

Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan
Salaysay is admissible as evidence.

9 People vs Amestuzo

Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear

violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of
his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the
accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,
despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still
confessed when he did not have to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights
anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has
been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and
to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights
are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation
for the commission of an offense."

Facts: On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple
rape, a group of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was
then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where
accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a
certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing
to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and
uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit
sino." It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as
he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. Thereafter, Bagas was
arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin.
They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed
under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias.
When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed
to turn to the left and then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant
Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Vias. Accusedappellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that
accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an
emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the

policemen intervened. Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a

serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented
by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the
complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accused-appellant
avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by
counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police
and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a critical stage
of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during
the trial proper.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not appellants right to counsel was violated.
(2) Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the
HELD :(1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel
when he was presented for Identification by the complainants because the same
was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing
that during this identification by the complainants, the police investigators
sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact,
records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was
presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the
constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In
the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial admission.
(2)YES. The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by
complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive.
Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant faceto-face when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them
for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the
suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as
one of culprits.
10 People vs Obrero
Appellant was convicted of robberry with homicide.He executed a written
confession as a result of a custodial ivestigation.The issue is whether such is

Held: The extrajudicial confession was invalid. The perfunctory reading of the
Miranda rights is inadequate to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art
IIISec12(1) requires an independent and competent counsel of the suspects
choice. Atty de los Reyes was not an independent counsel being the PC Captain
and Station Commander. As held in P v Bandula, the independent counsel cannot
be a special prosecutor, private or public prosecutor, municipal attorney or
counsel of the police whose interest is adverse to the accused.

While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is
no evidence of the robbery except the confession. The lack of objection of
appellant to the introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidence did not
satisfy the burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. Acquitted of robbery
with homicide.
11 Jesalva vs People

Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw (petitioner) was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide.

Sep. 9, 1992, Jesalva was charged of feloniously attacking Leticia Aldemo

with the aggravating circumstances of superior strength, treachery, evident
premeditation and use of motor vehicle in Sorsogon.

During arraignment, Jesalva pleaded not guilty. There were 2 varying

versions during trial.

The Prosecutions Version

Jesalva was with the deceased at about 12:20 am of Sept. 9, 1992 when
he drove the victim home from eating out with friends.

SPO1 Mendoza chanced upon Jesalvas Isuzu panel and called out to
Jesalva whom he knew since childhood, but the latter immediately drove away to
Sorsogon town proper, opposite his place of residence in Ticol.

On the same night, Noel Olbes saw the victim naked from the waist down.
He decided to carry her to a shed but realized that she was bleeding so he left
her at Hazelwood, fearing to be implicated with the crime.

De Vera initially saw Olbes near the site where the victim was found but
when he returned, Olbes was no longer there. He reported the incident to the
police station. De Vera further identified Olbes to be the last person with the

The prosecution highlighted that Jesalva was courting Leticia but the latter
turned him down since she was married. She subsequently jumped out of the
vehicle when Jesalva accelerated the vehicle beyond her point of destination.


WON the statements made by Jesalva in the police station were

admissible since he was not under custodial investigation despite sufficient
evidence on record?

The Defenses Version

Jesalva denied that he killed Leticia, saying that there were many reasons
why he should not kill her.

The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the
constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.

The defense proved a broken chain of circumstantial evidence by

presenting De Vera as a witness.

De Vera declared that as he was driving his tricycle, he saw Olbes with the
victim. Olbes had blood on his hands, face and arms and was in a squatting
position while the victim was lying on the ground. He decided to drive his
passenger home first but upon returning to the scene, there was no one there.

The victim was seen at a garage in Hazelwood without clothes below her

Dr. Dioneda and Dr. Abrantes testified that Leticia Aldemo was comatosed
when they received her. She had contusion hematomas and abrasions all over
her body. There were also puncture wounds probably caused by a fall or fist blow.
The victim died despite the operation done on her.

Particularly, a puncture wound caused by a pebble which the victim

landed on due to her fall is said to have been the cause of her death.

Jesalva, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the
police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his
vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992.

YES. The SC denied the petition and affirmed the RTC decision.

Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that
he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying
to elicit information or a confession from him.

The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to

be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating

The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner

and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that
petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police
station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle
at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be

convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in
the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient,
and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said
crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to
petitioner as the culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only
matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There
are instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms
part of circumstantial evidence.

In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing

circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct
evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who
committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not wellnigh impossible, to prove.

There can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence

when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others,
as the perpetrator of the crime.

However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to

convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites,
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence

clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the
positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an
accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the
CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial was weak,
self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated.

Petitioners silence as to the matters that occurred during the time he was
alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be exonerated if the

prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the

constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that prosecution met this
quantum of proof in this case.

Petitioner could not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo
de Vera saw the former holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in
the act of lifting her in order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that,
if any misdeed or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring
Leticia to a nearby hospital, because his fear of being implicated in the crime
clouded his better judgment.


1 Mapp vs Ohio
Facts: Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an
admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her
conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.
Question: Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment?
(May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment
be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?)
Conclusion: The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp
had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an
historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding
illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The
decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when
to apply the exclusionary rule.
2 People vs. Alicando
Facts: In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year
old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus
Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel
Alicando y Briones joined them but every now and then would take leave and
return. Alicando was living in his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from
Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.

At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of
Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but Alicando closed the
window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached Alicando's house and
peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her
Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She
retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed
her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana
was also overcome with fear and hastily left. Romeo Penecilla returned to his
house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her
until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas
were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead,
Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae
left his house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun
started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house
to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under
his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m.,
Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife
Julie Ann, that Alicando committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested
and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession and
follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from Alicando's
house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained
pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide. On 29 June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty.
After Alicando's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for Alicando, if he so
desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found Alicando guilty and sentenced him
to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D.
Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence
derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from
Alicando, may be admitted as evidence.
Held: It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as
inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provide that "Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent

counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense
to reduce the all-important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he
present any writing showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have
competent and independent counsel. It is not only the uncounseled confession
that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The
pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from
the uncounseled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando. The
Court has not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine
jurisdiction. It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in
the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible.
Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the
same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from
the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on
the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused waived
his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession
under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted
as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and
convincing evidence.
3 People vs. Januario
Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the
instructions of Doris Wolf, borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of
P48,500.00 and used an Isuzu passenger type jeepney (Plate DFB 550) as a
collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in
a check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from
Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back
portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it in his
account. On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of

attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons
failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house
in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed but Pons always
promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons also
failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a
complaint against him for estafa before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr.
reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to
the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang
and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4 September 1987, the body of 23-year-old
Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head
was severed from his body. The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago,
stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, was recovered after the
harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified
the body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the
relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the
jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and
conductor (deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers.
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI
team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of
the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a
group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto,
and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was
disposed of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the
carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine
partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been
found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila. From the "oral
investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the
team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar
plantation where presumably they were killed. Because Januario and Canape
volunteered that their companions were their neighbors in Paliparan,
Dasmarias, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to
take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled
with Januario and Canape to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28
March 1988. At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the
statements of Januario and Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar,
who was "just around somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the
investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took the statement of Januario while Supervising
Agent Toribio took that of Canape. On 7 November 1988, an Information signed

by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario
and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and
Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539
(AntiCarnapping Law). Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted
by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos
remained at large. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in
Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment
finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of Republic act 6539, otherwise known as
the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay jointly and
severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago
and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to
pay the costs of the proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue: Whether Saunars presence as counsel in the custodial investigations
satisfies the requirements of Article III, section 12 (1).
Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario
and Canape is, however, not a guarantee that their respective confessions had
been taken in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as
his custodial investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a
lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances described by the
prosecution however, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly
spoken of by the Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and
therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he
was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar
might have really been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional
right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the same cannot be said
about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights.
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are
simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant
Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked

whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any
means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed
of his rights to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on
the part of the police investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's
sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect
compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony of NBI Agent
Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents
should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and Canape's
constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1)
of Article III of the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph
of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that an admission of facts
related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it
would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.

the extrajudicial confession in compliance with the strict constitutional

requirements of the right to counsel as enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the
Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. The Court observed that
the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him
of such rights
Further, the appellant claimed that his confession was induced by a threat
against his life. The Court took cognizance, however, of his failure to present
evidence to prove such threat and neither did he file any case against the person
who threatened him nor did he report such incident to his counsel. He also
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was
read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his
daily discourse.
The Court also noted that even if improper interrogation methods were used at
the start, it does not bar the possibility of having a valid confession by properly
interrogating the subject.
Ho Wai Pang versus People, G. R. No. 176229, Oct. 19, 2011

People v. Mojello
Facts: The victim was last seen with the appellant Bebot Mojello. On December
16,200 the body of Lenlen Rayco was found lifeless, naked and bruised on the
seashore. The medico-legal report positively indicated that the victim was raped.
When apprehended by the police officers and was subjected to an investigation
on 17 December 1996, the appellant admitted to the crime. Six days after, on 23
December 1996, during custodial investigation, the appellant, assisted by his
counsel, executed an extrajudicial confession to the crime. The appellant was
charged of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.The
accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea. The lower court found him
guilty. Hence, an automatic review of the case was submitted to the Supreme
Issues: WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible
WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Held: The appellant avers that his extrajudicial confession, and admissions
therein, should be considered a fruit of a poisonous tree and being such, should
be inadmissible as evidence against him. The Court disagrees. The Court finds

Facts: Petitioner Ho Wai Pang assails the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals which also affirmed the RTC decision, finding him and his co-accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In this petition for
certiorari, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He also
claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent counsel of his choice.
Issue: Aside from extrajudicial confession, what are inadmissible in evidence if
the rights of an accused during custodial investigation have been violated?
Ruling: While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of
a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, the Court categorically ruled that the
infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are

not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken
in the course of custodial investigation. In the present case, petitioner did not
make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as
evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during
his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him.
Gaanan vs. IAC
The case: This is a petition for certiorari for an interpretation of RA 4200 or Antiwiretapping Act
Facts: In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
That same morning, Laconico, another lawyer, telephoned the appellant to
come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to
the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions, which the latter answered in affirmative.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money, he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but the latter insisted
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. And when he
received the money at a restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he
heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Complainant then charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for
listening to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs

The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the communication between the omplainant and Laconico was private in
nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard
such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear
the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the
term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Issue: WON extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of
the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute
unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a
telephone line.
Held: No. Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly
be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar
nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty.
Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public; the
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how
obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller
against the listener's. Such that ". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his
telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform
police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the
would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous
Telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. Telephone
party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.

What the law refers to is a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording
the communication. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section
1 of RA 4200 . There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
In statutory construction, in order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase
"device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA 4200, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
The court also ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could
hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and
permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or
not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement",
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone as
ruled in PP vs. Purisima
Wherefore, the petition is granted, decision of the IAC is annulled and set aside
and petitioner is acquitted for the crime of violating RA 4200.
Brief Fact Summary.
The petitioner, Katz (the petitioner), was convicted of transmitting wagering
information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had
entered into evidence the petitioners end of telephone conversations that the
government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that

the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners contention
that the evidence should be suppressed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution (Constitution), against unreasonable searches and seizures,
follows the person and not the place.
Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering
information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law.
After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the
telephone booth and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone
conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The
petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected
the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.
Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone
conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from
introduction as evidence against a person?
Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously
asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However,
the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from
public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the
uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to
a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth
may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he
assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the
world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Governments activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone conversations
constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained
is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black
observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were
certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution
(Constitution). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that
would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it
plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of
things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to
eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a dissenting opinion. The
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a
twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a
person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The
critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the
door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in
the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the
expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.
Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional
protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this
protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.
Brief Fact Summary. Government authorities, through the use of an informant,
secretly recorded conversations with the Respondent, James A. White (the
Respondent). The informant was not present during the trial, but the recorded
conversations were admitted.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The secret simultaneous (electronic) recording of
conversations between an individual and government agents, without a warrant,
does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Facts. Federal authorities, working with an informant, were able to electronically
record conversations with the Respondent that were later used to convict the
Respondent. Authorities used radio equipment to record several conversations,

as well as personally overhearing the conversations. The electronic recordings

were shared with other agents.

Issue. Whether the electronic recording of private conversations with the

Respondent for the purpose of instantaneous dissemination with other agents
violates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. The recordings do not violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
The majority affirms that the Respondent cannot rely on the expectation that a
conversation is private, and in doing so affirm a line of cases that upheld the
seemingly private conversations recorded by government agents. The majority
believes that it would be illogical to draw a line between conversations heard
through agents without electronic recording and those without the electronic

Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented citing a concern for the dilution
of an individuals First Amendment constitutional rights.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) dissented, believing that the burden on an
innocent individual is too great when allowing monitoring without a warrant.
Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissented, stating that On Lee, in light
of Katz, is no longer good law.
Concurrence. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) concurred because he did
not want to apply Katz retroactively, but he would consider On Lee and Lopez
Discussion. The majority notes that the decision stands whether or not the
informer is available at trial because the availability of an informer is
independent of the Fourth Amendment constitutional issue. The reasoning aligns
the court with the prior On Lee decision. The majority strongly affirms On Lee
while distinguishing the Katz decision. Notably, four justices disagreed with the
majority opinions reasoning.



Monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of
privacy on respondent's part, and thus there was neither a "search" nor a
"seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The beeper
surveillance amounted principally to following an automobile on public streets
and highways. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. While respondent had
the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place insofar as his cabin
was concerned, such expectation of privacy would not have extended to the
visual observation from public places of the automobile arriving on his premises
after leaving a public highway, or to movements of objects such as the
chloroform container outside the cabin. The fact that the officers relied not only
on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper, does not alter the
situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting their sensory faculties with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them in this case. There is no indication that the beeper was
used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the chloroform
container within the [460 U.S. 276, 277] cabin, or in any way that would not
have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin. Pp. 280-285.

No. 81-1802

662 F.2d 515, reversed.


REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and
WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 285.
BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 287. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post,
p. 288.

United States Supreme Court

Decided: March 2, 1983

Having reason to believe that one Armstrong was purchasing chloroform to be

used in the manufacture of illicit drugs, Minnesota law enforcement officers
arranged with the seller to place a beeper (a radio transmitter) inside a
chloroform container that was sold to Armstrong. Officers then followed the car
in which the chloroform was placed, maintaining contact by using both visual
surveillance and a monitor which received the beeper signals, and ultimately
tracing the chloroform, by beeper monitoring alone, to respondent's secluded
cabin in Wisconsin. Following three days of intermittent visual surveillance of the
cabin, officers secured a search warrant and discovered the chloroform
container, and a drug laboratory in the cabin, including chemicals and formulas
for producing amphetamine. After his motion to suppress evidence based on the
warrantless monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted in
Federal District Court for conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
monitoring of the beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him
on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen,
Elliott Schulder, and Gloria C. Phares.
Mark W. Peterson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. In this case, a beeper was
placed in a five-gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by one of

respondent's codefendants. By monitoring the progress of a car carrying the

chloroform Minnesota law enforcement agents were able to trace the can of
chloroform from its place of purchase in Minneapolis, Minn., to respondent's
secluded cabin near Shell Lake, Wis. The issue presented by the case is whether
such use of a beeper violated respondent's rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Respondent and two codefendants were charged in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota with conspiracy to manufacture controlled
substances, including but not limited to methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. 846. One of the codefendants, Darryl Petschen, [460 U.S. 276, 278] was
tried jointly with respondent; the other codefendant, Tristan Armstrong, pleaded
guilty and testified for the Government at trial.
Suspicion attached to this trio when the 3M Co., which manufactures chemicals
in St. Paul, notified a narcotics investigator for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension that Armstrong, a former 3M employee, had been stealing
chemicals which could be used in manufacturing illicit drugs. Visual surveillance
of Armstrong revealed that after leaving the employ of 3M Co., he had been
purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Co. in Minneapolis. The
Minnesota narcotics officers observed that after Armstrong had made a
purchase, he would deliver the chemicals to codefendant Petschen.
With the consent of the Hawkins Chemicals Co., officers installed a beeper inside
a five-gallon container of chloroform, one of the so-called "precursor" chemicals
used to manufacture illicit drugs. Hawkins agreed that when Armstrong next
purchased chloroform, the chloroform would be placed in this particular
container. When Armstrong made the purchase, officers followed the car in which
the chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using both visual
surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from the beeper.
Armstrong proceeded to Petschen's house, where the container was transferred
to Petschen's automobile. Officers then followed that vehicle eastward towards
the state line, across the St. Croix River, and into Wisconsin. During the latter
part of this journey, Petschen began making evasive maneuvers, and the
pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance. At about the same time officers
lost the signal from the beeper, but with the assistance of a monitoring device
located in a helicopter the approximate location of the signal was picked up
again about one hour later. The signal now was stationary and the location

identified was a cabin occupied by respondent near Shell Lake, Wis. The record
before us does not reveal that the beeper was used after the [460 U.S. 276, 279]
location in the area of the cabin had been initially determined.
Relying on the location of the chloroform derived through the use of the beeper
and additional information obtained during three days of intermittent visual
surveillance of respondent's cabin, officers secured a search warrant. During
execution of the warrant, officers discovered a fully operable, clandestine drug
laboratory in the cabin. In the laboratory area officers found formulas for
amphetamine and methamphetamine, over $10,000 worth of laboratory
equipment, and chemicals in quantities sufficient to produce 14 pounds of pure
amphetamine. Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the five-gallon
container of chloroform.
After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless monitoring of
the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted for conspiring to manufacture
controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. He was sentenced to five
years' imprisonment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the monitoring of the
beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its use had violated
respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy, and that all information derived
after the location of the cabin was a fruit of the illegal beeper monitoring. * 662
F.2d 515 [460 U.S. 276, 280]
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1131
(1982), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), this Court held that the
wiretapping of a defendant's private telephone line did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the wiretapping had been effectuated without a physical
trespass by the Government. Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Stone, dissented
from that decision, believing that the actions of the Government in that case
constituted an "unjustifiable intrusion . . . upon the privacy of the individual,"
and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 478. Nearly 40 years
later, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court overruled Olmstead
saying that the Fourth Amendment's reach "cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 389 U.S., at 353 . The
Court said:
"The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while

using the telephone booth and thus constituted a `search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed
to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have
no constitutional significance." Ibid.
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), we elaborated on the principles
stated in Katz:
"Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can
claim a `justifiable,' a `reasonable,' or a `legitimate expectation of privacy' that
has been invaded by government action. [Citations omitted.] This inquiry, as Mr.
Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces [460 U.S.
276, 281]
two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his
conduct, has `exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' 389 U.S.,
at 361 - whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that
`he seeks to preserve [something] as private.' Id., at 351. The second question is
whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is `one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' id., at 361 - whether, in the words of the
Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is `justifiable'
under the circumstances. Id., at 353. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S., at 143 -144,
n. 12; id., at 151 (concurring opinion); United States v. White, 401 U.S., at 752
(plurality opinion)." 442 U.S., at 740 -741 (footnote omitted).
The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case
amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and
highways. We have commented more than once on the diminished expectation
of privacy in an automobile:
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function
is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 -154, and n. 2 (1978) (POWELL, J.,
concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When
Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who

wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular [460 U.S. 276, 282]
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact
of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.
Respondent Knotts, as the owner of the cabin and surrounding premises to which
Petschen drove, undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a
dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned:
"Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern
to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not
only to the individual, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), quoted with approval in Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
But no such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of
Petschen's automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway,
nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in
the "open fields." Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Visual surveillance from public places along Petschen's route or adjoining Knotts'
premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police. The fact
that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the
use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen's automobile to the police
receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them
in this case. In United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), the Court said: [460
U.S. 276, 283]
"But no search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the boatswain shows
that he used a searchlight. It is not shown that there was any exploration below
decks or under hatches. For aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck
and, like the defendants, were discovered before the motor boat was boarded.
Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field
glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." Id., at 563.

We have recently had occasion to deal with another claim which was to some
extent a factual counterpart of respondent's assertions here. In Smith v.
Maryland, we said:
"This analysis dictates that [Smith] can claim no legitimate expectation of
privacy here. When he used his phone, [Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and `exposed' that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, [Smith] assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The
switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for
the subscriber. [Smith] concedes that if he had placed his calls through an
operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. [Citation omitted.]
We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required
because the telephone company has decided to automate." 442 U.S., at 744
Respondent does not actually quarrel with this analysis, though he expresses the
generalized view that the result of the holding sought by the Government would
be that "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be
possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision." Brief for Respondent 9
(footnote omitted). But the fact is that the "reality hardly suggests abuse,"
Zurcher v. Stanford [460 U.S. 276, 284] Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978); if such
dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable. Ibid. Insofar as respondent's
complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper
enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no
constitutional foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.
Respondent specifically attacks the use of the beeper insofar as it was used to
determine that the can of chloroform had come to rest on his property at Shell
Lake, Wis. He repeatedly challenges the "use of the beeper to determine the
location of the chemical drum at Respondent's premises," Brief for Respondent
26; he states that "[t]he government thus overlooks the fact that this case
involves the sanctity of Respondent's residence, which is accorded the greatest
protection available under the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. The Court of Appeals
appears to have rested its decision on this ground:

"As noted above, a principal rationale for allowing warrantless tracking of

beepers, particularly beepers in or on an auto, is that beepers are merely a more
effective means of observing what is already public. But people pass daily from
public to private spheres. When police agents track bugged personal property
without first obtaining a warrant, they must do so at the risk that this enhanced
surveillance, intrusive at best, might push fortuitously and unreasonably into the
private sphere protected by the Fourth Amendment." 662 F.2d, at 518.
We think that respondent's contentions, and the above-quoted language from
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, to some extent lose sight of the limited use
which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper. As we
have noted, nothing in this record indicates that the beeper [460 U.S. 276, 285]
signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the drum containing
the chloroform had ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent's
premises in rural Wisconsin. Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual
surveillance, the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to
ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when they would not have
been able to do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific
enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance
would not also raise. A police car following Petschen at a distance throughout his
journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the
cabin owned by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car. This fact,
along with others, was used by the government in obtaining a search warrant
which led to the discovery of the clandestine drug laboratory. But there is no
indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the
movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin. Just as notions of physical
trespass based on the law of real property were not dispositive in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), neither were they dispositive in Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of our inquiry in
discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the beeper signals complained of by
respondent invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? For the
reasons previously stated, we hold it did not. Since it did not, there was neither a
"search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

[ Footnote * ] Respondent does not challenge the warrantless installation of the

beeper in the chloroform container, suggesting in oral argument that he did not
believe he had standing to make such a challenge. We note that while several
Courts of Appeals have approved warrantless installations, see United States v.
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (CA9 1980); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382 (CA5
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d
1190 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d
489 (CA9), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d
887 (CA5), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d
1153 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); United States v. Abel, 548
F.2d 591 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Hufford, 539
F.2d 32 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), we have not before and do not
now pass on the issue.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the
I join JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S and JUSTICE STEVENS' opinions concurring in the
judgment. I should add, however, [460 U.S. 276, 286] that I think this would
have been a much more difficult case if respondent had challenged, not merely
certain aspects of the monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform
container purchased by respondent's compatriot, but also its original installation.
See ante, at 279, n. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), made quite clear
that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental invasions of a
person's reasonable "expectation[s] of privacy," even when those invasions are
not accompanied by physical intrusions. Cases such as Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 -512 (1961), however, hold that, when the
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected
area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment even if the same information could have been obtained
by other means. I do not believe that Katz, or its progeny, have eroded that
principle. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 203-204
I am also entirely unconvinced by the Court of Appeals' footnote disposing of the
installation issue with the statement: "we hold that the consent of the owner [of
the chloroform drum] at the time of installation meets the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, even if the consenting owner intends to soon sell the
`bugged' property to an unsuspecting buyer. Caveat emptor." 662 F.2d 515, 517,
n. 2 (1981) (citation omitted). The Government is not here defending against a

claim for damages in an action for breach of a warranty; it is attempting to

justify the legality of a search conducted in the course of a criminal
investigation. I am not at all sure that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
there is a constitutionally significant difference between planting a beeper in an
object in the possession of a criminal suspect and purposefully arranging that he
be sold an object that, unknown to him, already has a beeper installed inside it.
Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 -306 (1921); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). [460 U.S. 276, 287]
Respondent claimed at oral argument that, under this Court's cases, he would
not have standing to challenge the original installation of the beeper in the
chloroform drum because the drum was sold, not to him, but to one of his
compatriots. See ante, at 279, n. If respondent is correct, that would only
confirm for me the formalism and confusion in this Court's recent attempts to
redefine Fourth Amendment standing. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
114 (1980) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978)
(WHITE, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's opinion gratuitously refers to the "open fields" doctrine and twice
cites Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Ante, at 282 and 285. For me,
the present case does not concern the open fields doctrine, and I regard these
references and citations as unnecessary for the Court's decision. Furthermore,
and most important, cases concerning the open fields doctrine have been
accepted by the Court for argument and plenary consideration. State v. Brady,
406 So.2d 1093 (Fla.), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982); United States v. Oliver,
686 F.2d 356 (CA6 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983). See also United
States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (CA5 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-508.
It would be unfortunate to provide either side in these granted cases with
support, directly or by implication, for its position, and I surely do not wish to
decide those cases in this one. Although the Court does not indicate its view on
how such cases should be decided, I would defer all comments about open fields
to a case that concerns that subject and in which we have the benefit of briefs
and oral argument.
I therefore do not join the Court's opinion. I concur only in the result it reaches.
[460 U.S. 276, 288]

concurring in the judgment.
Since the respondent in this case has never questioned the installation of the
radio transmitter in the chloroform drum, see ante, at 279, n., I agree that it was
entirely reasonable for the police officers to make use of the information
received over the airwaves when they were trying to ascertain the ultimate
destination of the chloroform. I do not join the Court's opinion, however, because
it contains two unnecessarily broad dicta: one distorts the record in this case,
and both may prove confusing to courts that must apply this decision in the
First, the Court implies that the chloroform drum was parading in "open fields"
outside of the cabin, in a manner tantamount to its public display on the
highways. See ante, at 282. The record does not support that implication. As
JUSTICE BLACKMUN points out, this case does not pose any "open fields" issue.
Second, the Court suggests that the Fourth Amendment does not inhibit "the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them." Ibid. But the
Court held to the contrary in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although
the augmentation in this case was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that
the use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. [460 U.S. 276, 289]
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013, SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained
Bill and Victoria, spouses, filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with
prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Alexander and
Allan. According to them, they own the lot adjacent to the lots owned by Aldo
Development and Resources, where Alex and Allan are stockholders. The
corporation built an auto-shop building on Lot 1900-C adjacent to the lot owned

by Bill and Victoria. In April, 2005, Aldo filed a case for injunction and damages
against Bill and Victoria claiming that they were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and the construction would destroy its building. The court denied
the application by Aldo for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations. To gather evidence against the spouses, Aldo illegally set-up on the
building of Aldo two video surveillance camera facing petitioners party and
through their employees and without the consent of spouses took pictures of
their on-going construction; thus it violates their right to privacy. The spouses
prayed that Alexander and Allan be ordered to remove their video-cameras and
stopped from conducting illegal surveillance.
Answering, Alexander and Allan claimed that they did not install the cameras,
nor ordered their employees to take pictures of the spouses construction; they
also averred that they are mere stockholders of Aldo;
The Regional Trial Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining order and
directed Alexander and Allan to remove their video cameras and install them
elsewhere where the spouses property will no longer be viewed.
Alexander and Allan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
granted their petition.
Bill and Victoria therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court:
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is
defined as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a persons ordinary sensibilities. It is the right of an individual to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned. Simply put,
the right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them
against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right
of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except
in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards, can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
Our Code specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers residence.
This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy,

because the law covers also similar acts. A business office is entitled to the
same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as
are allowed to enter may come in. x x x[ (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into
the privacy of anothers residence, therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code only to residences.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable. Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals reasonable expectation
of privacy. Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy
must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to
pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for [ones] personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
[non]-interference demands respect.

Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008

Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank
accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial;
namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of
absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.[
Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an
application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138,
presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application
was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the
Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the
documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati
RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the
authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad,
Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed
p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details
of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal
prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations,
Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS
proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web
accounts of the four.[16]
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis VillaIgnacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to
investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved
in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the
bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special
Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121

Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to

inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of
Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum
attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the
existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of
Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older
law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature.
Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that
nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.

Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically

legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions
whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government
official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the
depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to
the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar
recognitions as well.

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against

petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit
and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for
violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code,
and Revised Penal Code.

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11,
the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4
thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations
under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot
be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to
the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to
serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such
does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA
establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that


Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers,
money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation
proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially
lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held: Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,
thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant
did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a

fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if
warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those
taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated
as personality different from that of the corporation.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper,
were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid
to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v.
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials
may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the

complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under PD 885, as amended is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to
Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect
the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the
package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job
Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample
of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents
to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case
was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by
the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from
his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas
that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who
opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The
mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the
constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
People v. Bangcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 (2002)
Facts: The security officer of Super Ferry 5, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint
from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of
her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other
members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. Bongcarawan was informed of
the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he
was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2)
security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused
took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested
by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and
small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the
substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the matter
to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized
items. NBI Forensic Chemist later confirmed the substance to be shabu. Accused
was convicted of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
Bongcarawan appealed, arguing that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not

applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform

the duties of a policeman.
Issue: Whether the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against accused.
Held: As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, [i]n the absence of
governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase
that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out
without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar
is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In
contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign
function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them
and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures may be invoked.
A violation of ones constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be
the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code.
U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
Brief Fact Summary. DEA agents met the respondent, Raymond Place, on Friday
at his destination after questionable behavior at his departing airport. They then
proceeded to hold his bags over the weekend and get a search warrant for them
Monday morning.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Seizing a persons luggage for an entire weekend until a
warrant may be obtained violates the Fourth Amendment as beyond the scope of
a valid Terry stop. Also, a sniff by a well-trained narcotics dog that does not
require opening of the luggage is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Facts. The respondent Raymond Place was met on a Friday by drug enforcement
agents on arrival at the airport and he refused to consent to a search of his bags,
leading an agent to tell him that they were going to take the bags to a judge to
get a search warrant. The agents took the bags to another airport to have the
drug detection dogs sniff them, and the dogs reacted positively ninety minutes
after seizure of the bags. The agents kept the bags over the weekend, and on
Monday they were able to get a search warrant for the bags which yielded
cocaine. The trial court convicted the respondent of drug possession, and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, claiming that such a prolonged seizure
of the respondents baggage amounted to a seizure without probable cause
counter to the Fourth Amendment. The government was granted certiorari.

Issue. Does the seizure of a persons luggage for an entire weekend until a
warrant may be procured violate the Fourth Amendment as exceeding the limits
of a Terry stop?
Is the canine sniff of a narcotics dog a search for Fourth Amendment purposes?
Held. Affirm the decision of the Second Circuit.
When there is reasonable suspicion that a traveler is carrying narcotics in their
luggage, the concepts of Terry allow the officer to detain the luggage temporarily
to investigate the circumstances, as long as the investigative detention is
appropriately limited in scope. However, the actions here went beyond the scope
allowable under Terry since the luggage was held for three days, thus it is in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The agents failure to tell the respondent where the bags were being transported
to, how long they may be gone, and how they would be returned if no suspicion
of criminal activity remained, made the unreasonableness of their actions under
the Fourth Amendment even more clear.

A drug-sniffing dogs actions are not invasive enough of privacy to constitute a

search under the Fourth Amendment.

Concurrence. Justice William Brennan stated that the Fourth Amendment was
violated as soon as the respondents luggage was seized by the officers.
Justice Harry Blackmun expressed the view that the validity of a drug dog sniff
under the Fourth Amendment should not even have been opined upon under
these facts.
Discussion. This opinion clarifies why courts and law enforcement have such
fondness for drug sniffing dogs. The Supreme Court here articulates that
governmental conduct like drug dog sniffing that can reveal whether a substance
is contraband yet no other private fact compromises no privacy interest, and
therefore is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. This appears to be
settled law, even though Justice Blackmun would argue that it is merely dictum,
and that the majority should not have passed an opinion on their validity under
these facts.
Pendon v. CA, 191 SCRA 429 (1990)
Facts: Based on the application and joint deposition, a search warrant was issued
against Siao and the same complaint was filed against petitioner for violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the application for the search
warrant and the joint deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the requirements
prescribed by the Constitution on the ground that probable cause was not
personally determined.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the said warrant is valid.
Held: No, Probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
before the issuance of a search warrant.
Silva v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Negros Oriental, 203 SCRA 140

M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, as chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in

Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental filed an application for the search warrant with
the RTC against petitioners. The application was accompanied by deposition of
witness executed by Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
Judge Hickarter Ontal, Presiding judge issued search warrant no. 1
directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the
residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of the dangerous drugs law.. under the
search warrant its state that :seize and take possession of the following property
marijuana, dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring said property to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
In the course of the search, the serving officer also seized money
belonging to Antoinette Silva in the amount of 1231.40. Antoinette filed a motion
the return of the said amount. Acting on said motion Judge Ontal issued an order
stating that the court holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount
pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court provides for the requisite for the issuance oa a search warrant.
Section 3 a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the Judge
after eamination under oath
People v. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 (2004)
FACTS: On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 oclock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis Gotidoc,
along with the members of Intel Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), implemented Search Warrant No.
144C dated 18 March 2003 issued by Judge Alipio Yumul of Branch 66, Regional
Trial Court, Capas, Tarlac against the appellant in her residence at Zone 1,
Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City, Province of Tarlac.
Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad Oscar Tabamo of
Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search and seizure operation in
the appellants house. With Barangay Kagawad Tabamo, the police team
presented the search warrant to appellant and informed her of the purpose of
the search and her constitutional rights.

Afterwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the

appellants house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo. During
his search, he found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of
Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the appellant refused to sign.
The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located
at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination.
The examination
conducted by Engr. Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white
crystalline substance, yielded positive results for 0.055 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The factual version presented by the defense is:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o clock in the evening the police officers arrived at
appellants house and showed her a search warrant. Thereafter, the policemen
searched her house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan
asked her where she was sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut,
the police officers proceeded to and searched the place and found the plastic
sachet containing the shabu.
Thereafter, she was brought to the sub-station at Maliwalo and was told,
particularly by SPO4 Gotidoc and a certain Maam Dulay that in exchange of
P20,000.00, no case would be filed against her. When she told them that she did
not have money, she was detained. However, on cross-examination, the
appellant admitted that the alleged extortion of P20,000.00 was not reported to
the higher ranking police officers.
Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and planted the shabu
inside her house because of her refusal to give them money.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused-appellant is innocent of violating Section 11,

Article II, of RA 9165.
RULING: No. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence for the prosecution
fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully
prosecute a case for illegal possession of a regulated drug, namely, (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a
regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed said drug.

Centered on the conduct of the search of appellants house that yielded the
prohibited substance, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the finding
that after a careful evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the
prosecution and the defense, we hold that the search conducted by the INTEL
Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in coordination with the PDEA, on the
residence of the accused-appellant on 25 March 2003 at Zone 1, Barangay
Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white
crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing
0.055 gram are legal.
As a consequence of the legal search, the said
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu seized on the occasion thereof, is
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorneys
Office, goes further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant
was not based on probable cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained
through it may not be admitted to support the accused-appellants conviction
and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by
public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
The original position of the accused which, in this petition, begins with the
contention of non-compliance with all the requisites of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. We agree with the rulings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that there was indeed full satisfaction of the requisites for the conviction
of the accused.

innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive.

Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that no proof was
proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers alleged ill motive.
Malaloan v CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)
FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City
an application for search warrant. The search warrant wassought for in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive documents were
seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant
and the validityof which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served
notonly within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the
judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE: W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorialboundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's
supposed territorial jurisdiction
HELD: A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process.

The trial court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
adequately defeated. Re-stating that in illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
there are only three (3) elements to secure conviction: (1) accused is in
possession of the prohibited drugs; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) accused consciously and freely possessed the prohibited drugs, the trial
court held that all these were established beyond doubt. It determined that
appellant failed to proffer evidence enough to discredit the prosecution and
render doubtful his guilt.

A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction asan order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him tosearch for personal property and bring it before the

The argument is without merit.

warrant , subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear,

therefore, that a searchwarrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, orin anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process,
not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expresslyor
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability.
Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for theenforceability of

In the case at hand, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of
credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the search
warrant, was found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on
firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frameup.The defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of

A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.

It isa special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.A judicial process is defined as a writ,

warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant
of arrest for execution a return thereon mustbe made to the issuing judge,said
warrant does not become
functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or
recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of
jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
searchwarrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property
intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:1. The court wherein the
criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that theapplicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court
which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the
validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with
primary jurisdiction thereover.2. When the latter court issues the search warrant,
a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
withoutprejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds andobjections
then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwisethey shall be deemed
waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved
by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court wherethe
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property
seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein forsaid purpose. Since
two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and amotion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shallconsequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during
theproceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of
the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion tosuppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.4.
Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the
same and is not otherwise prevented from furtherproceeding thereon, all
personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it
to the court wherein the criminal case ispending, with the necessary safeguards
and documentation therefore.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense
is charged in different informations or complaints and filed intwo or more courts
with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of
which court will try the case shall have beenresolved, such court shall be
considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminalcase.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED
Groh v Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004)
Petitioner federal agent sought a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the decision that a search of
respondent individuals' home was unconstitutional and that the federal agent
was not entitled to qualified immunity. Certiorari was granted to address the
constitutionality of the search and the availability of qualified immunity.

The issues were whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and if so,
whether the federal agent was entitled to qualified immunity, given that a
magistrate, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in
question, found probable cause to conduct the search.


The warrant was plainly invalid as it provided no description of the type of

evidence sought.
The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized did
not save the warrant from its facial invalidity because the warrant did not
incorporate other documents by reference and neither the affidavit nor the
application accompanied the warrant.

The magistrate's authorization of the search did not render it constitutional

because the warrant's obvious deficiency required the court to consider the
search warrantless and presumptively unreasonable.
The federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable
officer could have believed that a warrant that plainly did not comply with the
Fourth Amendment's particularity requirements was valid nor been unaware of
the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search was
presumptively unconstitutional.
The judgment was affirmed.

the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed
to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described
with particularity.
People v. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174 (1993)
(Constitutional Law Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, General Warrant,
Inadmissible Evidence)

Paper Industries Corp. v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 687 (1984)

FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied
for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the
management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept]
and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be
issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the
described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4,
1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized
a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and
the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the
trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion
to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC
issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3,
1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.

Facts: A search warrant of marijuana and shabu in appellants residence was

issued after probable cause was personally determined by the judge after
examination of the applicant. Appellant contends that the search warrant is a
general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated,
and the search conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Held: No. The search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it

particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies
the offense involved. Items seized are admissible.
People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001)

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined
by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In

A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives
started searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of
Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal

Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing,
the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.

them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets,
transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against

inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and
investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the
application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest
in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or
indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).



ISSUES: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to
support the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be
included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of
shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable
cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact
that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by
the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu
from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge
under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of
the plain view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana
was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of
the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

Kho v. Macalintal, 307 SCRA 70 (1999)

Facts: Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the objects
seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against

Issue: Whether petitioners contention of the absence of probable cause in the

given situation is tenable.
Held: Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents
who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that
they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and
motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B.
Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together with his
witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw
the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises
referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms
being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the aformentioned
house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound
posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore
decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was
based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the
question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be
determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v.
Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a
large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required
examination of the applicants and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and
conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants
and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their
testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances

enough to create a probable cause.

The Judge was the one who personally
examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions visa-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and
determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate
accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to
be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was
recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so
conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability
and correctness of his findings and impressions.

Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, 713 SCRA 18 (2014)

Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
Facts: Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating
local lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to
suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the
motions, citing a lack of probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of
evidence was appealable.
Question: Was the order for suppression of evidence appealable?
No. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority
opinion, reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the United
States had no right to appeal the suppression order. The order was sufficiently
separate from the criminal trial to be final and not appealable under statutes
relating to criminal cases.
People v. Que, 265 SCRA 721 (1996)
(Constitutional Law Publication of Bank Circulars and Regulations)
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign

exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the
claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not
published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said
appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and
2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued
for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to
have force and effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Caballes v. CA, 373 SCRA 221 (2002)
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting
that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When asked
what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and
nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor
wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where
the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the
vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.
Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged
with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the
arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment,
finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a
resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15

September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari. Issue: Whether

Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will
look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be
considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases
where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched
and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search
and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search
warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants
if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable
wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes'
vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol
became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact
that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to
be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would
justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police

authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped

information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which
could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is
replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in
the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the
two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was
flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those
words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for
permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents
and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will
search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In
addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will
be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission
be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting
aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established
without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
search and seizure.
U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
ISSUE: Is a warrantless search of a footlocker that the police have PC to believe
contains the F&I of crime valid under the 4th Amdt. if it has been seized by
police and under their exclusive control?
HOLDING: No, the footlocker is protected by the 4th Amdt. Warrant Clause, so it
may only be searched with a warrant or under exigent circumstances.
FACTS: Train officials saw D load a 200-lb. footlocker leaking talcum powder into
a train heading for Boston
Police alerted officials in Boston who released their canine to sniff the trunk upon
arriving, and the dog alerted the presence of drugs

Police arrested D and her companions when they loaded the footlocker into a car
to leave

wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner
of the bag, but no one know.

Police took the footlocker to the FBI building and it was under their exclusive
control when they searched it without a warrant

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag
and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught
up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that
they were under arrest, but on the women got away.

Indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
REASONING: Footlocker protected by 4th Amdt.: By placing the lock on the
footlocker, D manifested a subjective expectation of privacy for the contents
inside, and the 4th Amdt. Warrant Clause protects that expectation
Exception if officers believe there are explosives inside
Vehicle exception doesn't apply: Just because the footlocker is mobile does not
mean that it falls under the vehicle exception because luggage is intended as a
repository for personal effects
Footlocker here was securely in police custody, so there was no risk of losing its


PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Not incident to arrest: Warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized

at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to arrest if the search is
remote in time or place from the arrest

This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

No danger that the arrestee might gain access to it

This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be

COMMENTS: Take caution in how you use this case. I believe the major reason
why this case graces a criminal procedure casebook is because is shows that not
all "inherently mobile" objects will be relegated to the broad Vehicle Doctrine. A
one-line summary for this case would be, "A footlocker is not a vehicle, so don't
apply the Vehicle Doctrine."
People v. Mariacos, 621 SCRA 327 (2010)
FACTS: October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for
the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent
described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said
jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana

MALUM PROHIBITUM: When an accused is charged with illegal possession or

transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack
of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charge is malum prohibitum

U.S. v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir., 1978)

CASE SYNOPSIS: Defendant was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland on five counts of mail fraud and three counts of wire fraud,
18 U.S.C.S. 1341, 1343, relating to her receipt of insurance proceeds following
the deaths of her second husband and a former paramour. She was sentenced
to, inter alia, 40 years' imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and
restitution of $ 170,000. She appealed her conviction and sentence.
CASE FACTS: The indictment alleged that defendant "intentionally caused the
deaths" of both her husband and the paramour and then fraudulently concealed
her role in their murders from insurance companies.
DISCUSSION: The court first concluded, as to all counts, that the evidence
supported the jury's finding that she intended to deprive the insurance
companies of their "money" and "property" by means of a fraudulent scheme.
Second, it determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove that she
intended to defraud an insurer and thus sufficient to support her conviction on
Counts One through Four.
Third, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
Government to reopen its case-in-chief for the limited purpose of presenting
testimony from a witness establishing that he mailed the pleadings specified in
Counts Seven and Eight.
Fourth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain
Next, the court determined that her sentence was increased based upon a
factual finding that the jury was not required to make.
It concluded that the district court committed an error that was plain and that
affected defendant's substantial rights.
CONCLUSION: The court affirmed defendant's conviction for mail fraud and wire
fraud. It vacated the sentence, however, and remanded for resentencing in
accordance with Booker.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)

Brief Fact Summary. When investigating a shooting in an apartment, a police

officer moved certain stereo equipment, which was very fancy and looked out of
place, and learned that it had been taken during an armed robbery.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Only when a police officer had probable cause, not
reasonable suspicion, could they invoke the plain view doctrine.
Facts. A bullet was fired through the floor of the Respondents apartment, hitting
an individual in the apartment below. In response to the shooting, the police
entered the Respondents apartment and found three weapons and a stokingcap mask. One of the officers who entered the Respondents apartment noticed
expensive stereo equipment that looked out of place and he moved the
components to check their serial numbers. After phoning the police station, the
officer learned that the equipment was taken during a recent armed robbery. The
officer seized some of the equipment immediately and obtained a warrant to
seize the rest of it, which was determined to have been taken during the same
armed robbery.
The Respondent was indicted for robbery. The state trial court granted the
Respondents motion to suppress, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, the
Arizona Supreme Court refused to review, and the state filed a petition to the
Supreme Court.
Issue. Did the officers conduct constitute a seizure?
Did the officers conduct constitute a search?
Can the plain view doctrine be invoked when the police have less than
probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is
contraband? Was the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?
Held. No. The majority first observed the mere recording of the serial numbers
did not constitute a seizure.
Yes. The court observed that the officers moving of the equipment did
constitute a search separate and apart from the search for the shooter,
victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the
apartment. The officers actions were unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion, [and] exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment
or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondents privacy unjustified by
the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.

No. The majority first observed that the general rule dictates that pursuant to
[Coolidge] under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain
view without a warrant. These occasions occur [w]here the initial intrusion that
brings the police within plain view of such [evidence] is supported . . . by one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The majority then held
that only when a police officer had probable cause, not reasonable suspicion,
could they invoke the plain view doctrine.
In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that [d]ispensing with the need
for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the
seizure than a warrant would require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No
reason is apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds,
during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain
a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be on the premises.
Dissent. Justice Powell, the Chief Justice and Justice Sandra Day OConnor drafted
a dissenting opinion pointing out how the court holds for the first time that the
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate limitation on the
application of the plain-view doctrine. The [dissent observes how the majority]
holds that merely looking at an object in plain view is lawful, but moving or
disturbing the object to investigate a reasonable suspicion is not. In other
words, this distinction between looking at a suspicious object in plain view and
moving it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Sandra Day OConnor, the Chief Justice and Justice Powell filed a
dissenting opinion arguing that the majority was addressing the wrong question
and the correct questions was whether police must have probable cause before
conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain view. In answering this
question, the dissenting justices would have found that such an inspection is
reasonable if the police are aware of facts or circumstances that justify a
reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a crime.
Discussion. It is interesting to recognize how the different opinions treat the
movement of an individuals property a few inches.
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
Brief Fact Summary. A police officer initiated a warranted search of a robbery
suspects home. The warrant specified only the proceeds of the robbery, and not
the weapons, even though a description of the weapons was available.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Inadvertence is not a necessary

view seizures. As long as a police officer . . . had a prior
intrusion in the course of which he came . . .across a
incriminating the accused and so long as the scope of
enlarged in the slightest, it is constitutional.

condition to plain
justification for an
piece of evidence
the search is not

Facts. A police sergeant investigating a robbery had a warrant to search

petitioner Hor-tons home. The warrant issued specified a search for the
proceeds of the robbery, spe-cifically, three rings. However, while weapons had
been described in the police report, the warrant did not include them. The
sergeant entered the petitioners home. He did not find the three rings, but he
did find weapons in plain view and seized them.
Issue. [W]hether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery of the evidence was not
Held. No. The court first described the plain view doctrine as an exception to
the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but
that the doctrine implicates a seizure of an article as an invasion of privacy. A
search is not implicated, as the article is already in plain view. Quoting from
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the court affirmed the basic doctrine that the police
officer . . . had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
However, the court took issue two limitations: that plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence, and that the discovery of
evidence in plain view must be inadvertent. The court dismissed the underlying
concern that the doctrine might be used to turn an initially valid . . . limited . . .
search into a general one on two grounds. First, it seems unlikely that the police
officer woul
d deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the
application of a valid search warrant simply to create a plain view exception.
This was important to the present case because the weapons had been left off of
the warrant. Second, if the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the
terms of a . . . warrant, then the . . . seizure is unconstitutional without more.
Dissent. The dissent argued that the inadvertent discovery requirement . . .
does protect possessory interests.

Discussion. Reliance on privacy concerns . . . is misplaced when the inquiry

concerns the scope of an exception that merely authorizes an officer a lawful
right of access to an item to seize it without a warrant.
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in
selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by
NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa.
The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of
Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa
the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected
it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the
living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped
away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa
about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally
and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999)
FACTS: Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one
Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and
arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not
find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the
house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Jun
identified her as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked
money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house].
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table.
One of the box s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic,
and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His
suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked
inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her.
The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA
6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21
[Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE AND HOLDING: WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO

Re: warrantless arrest

Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the
basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his
associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked
bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with
Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.

buy-bust marijuana. Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags white,
pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that
the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of
the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was
fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered
by the trial court.

Plain view issue

The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao
s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the

submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.


Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he

received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the

The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent

Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria

in the sale of said drug

It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be

evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure



An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object
seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Valeroso v. CA, 598 SCRA 41 (2009)

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents
of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said
contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed
the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the

FACTS: On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Section Division, Central Police District Command received a dispatch order
which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest
against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team
conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite,
Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National
Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was
about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.
They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily
searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial
Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the
subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed
that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner
moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May
4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.

SC affirmed CAs decision.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into
account that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the
governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD: (1)
YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward
(prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not
retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a
habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to
the exception on effectivity of laws).
Miclat, Jr. v. People, 656 SCRA 539 (2011)
Facts: Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of drug
trafficking in Palmera SpringII, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The informant of the
police directed them to the residence of a certainABE PO3 Antonio then
positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
membersof the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the
curtain-covered window, PO3Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of
1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which
he believed to be containing shabu. At the same instance they arrested the
petitioner. However, the version of the petitioner is that, together with her father
and sister whilewatching television the police operatives barrage themselves
into their house and that the shabu was later planted to the petitioner while
travelling to the police station.The trial court rendered the decision finding the

petitioner guilty of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA

subsequently affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this appeal.
COURT.Supreme Court ruled that at the time of petitioners arraignment, there
was no objection raised asto the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trialcourt. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submittedhimself
to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is notsufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial freefrom error. It will not even negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused.While it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights
preserves the rights of individuals of illegal searchand seizure. However, a
settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of
an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a
previously issued warrant.Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the RevisedRules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful . a peace office of a private
person may,
without awarrant , arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed,
is actually committing , or isattempting to commit an offense;For the exception
in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following
elements must beestablished: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an
object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not

authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely andconsciously aware of being
in possession of the drug.Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling reason to
reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. Noevidence exist that shows any
apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of
theevents which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful
evaluation of the records, Wefind no error was committed by the RTC and the CA
to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged
against him

Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissented, reasoning that

unless the respondent knew he had a right to refuse a search, there was no
voluntary consent.
Discussion. The test to determine if consent was not the product of duress or
coercion is to look at all the circumstances rather than one sole factor.
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)


Brief Fact Summary. The home that a robbery suspect was leasing was searched
by the police after obtaining the consent to enter the home from somebody who
lived with the suspect.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Voluntary consent was not present because the state
did not show actual authority to consent to the search.

Brief Fact Summary. Police stopped a vehicle containing the respondent, Robert
Bustamonte (the respondent), and they asked to search the vehicle. Another
passenger in the car gave permission, and the search produced stolen checks
that were entered into evidence against the Respondent.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. To determine whether a search was voluntary does not
require that a person knew of his rights, but whether the totality of
circumstances indicated that the person was voluntarily allowing the search.
Facts. The police stopped the vehicle containing the respondent and five other
passengers after they noticed a broken headlight and license plate light. When
the driver could not produce a license, the police asked for someone who could
produce identification. Another passenger responded, and when the police asked
him if they could search the vehicle he consented. Three stolen checks were
found, and they were used as evidence to convict the respondent.

Issue. The issue is whether the respondent voluntarily consented to the search of
the vehicle.
Held. The consent to a vehicle search did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (Constitution). The test to
determine if a subject has voluntarily consented is to review the totality of the
circumstances. If the subject knows he or she has a right to refuse, it is a factor
to be considered, but that fact is not the sole consideration.

Facts. The Respondent, Matlock (the Respondent), was arrested for robbing a
federally insured bank. The Respondent filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized at a home in which he was living. The Respondent leased the home from
the Graff family. The Respondent lived in the home with various other people.
Three police officers went to the Respondents home and were allowed into the
home by Ms. Graff who also lived there. The police were admitted to enter the
home. The officers told Ms. Graff that they were looking for money and a gun
and asked if they could search the home. The trial court found at the suppression
hearing that there was consent to search the home although Ms. Graff denied
consenting. The officers found money in a bag in the closet of the Respondents
bedroom who he shared with the individual that answered the door.
The District Court found that the seized evidence was admissible. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.

Issue. [W]hether the evidence presented by the United States with respect to
the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the
respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in
evidence at the respondents criminal trial[?]
Held. The court first observed that recent decisions clearly indicate that the
consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is
valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is

It appears to us, given the admissibility of Mrs. Graffs and respondents out-ofcourt statements, that the Government sustained its burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Graffs voluntary consent to search the
east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting into evidence the
$4,995 found in the diaper bag.
Discussion. This case elaborates on the Supreme Courts consent to search

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)

Brief Fact Summary. An individual was accused of rape and one piece of
evidence used to accuse him was a .22-caliber rifle found in his grandmothers
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot
later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was
Facts. The petitioner lived with his grandmother, a 66-year-old negro widow, in a
rural area. Two days after an alleged rape, four white police officers went to the
widows house and her that they had a search warrant to search her house. She
told them they could conduct their search and they found a .22 caliber rifle gun
eventually introduced into evidence.
During a suppression hearing, the four officers testified that they relied not on
the search warrant, but on the widows consent to conduct their search. The
widow testified that she believed the officers had a valid search and that she did
not know her grandson was being accused of anything when the search was
conducted. The trial court found that the widow consented to the search.

Issue. [W]hether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent

when that consent has been given only after the official conducting the search
has asserted that he possesses a warrant?
Held. No, there can be no consent under such circumstances.
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a
search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and

voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than

acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon
a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the
warrant was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the
State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to
show that there was, in fact, any warrant at all.
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion albeit colorably lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.
Discussion. It is interesting to recognize that the court in a footnote observed
Mrs. Leath owned both the house and the rifle. The petitioner concedes that her
voluntary consent to the search would have been binding upon him. Conversely,
there can be no question of the petitioners standing to challenge the lawfulness
of the search. He was the one against whom the search was directed, and the
house searched was his home. The rifle was used by all members of the
household and was found in the common part of the house.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the Petitioner), was stopped
and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly
casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a
warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that
the person may be armed and dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a
street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men
would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men
also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The
officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and
given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of
the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a

concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that it is a
reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search
for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A
typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from
searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented, reasoning that the
majoritys holding would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and
seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.

beyond that already authorized by the officers search for weapons; if the object
is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.
The Respondent moved to suppress the cocaine, but the trial court concluded
the officers undertook a justifiable [Terry] stop when they stopped the
Respondent. Also, that the officers were justified in patting down the Respondent
to check if he was armed. Finally, pursuant to the plain-view doctrine, the
seizure of the contraband did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed. The court disagreed that the officers were allowed to
seize the cocaine. The court would not adopt the plain feel exception. The
Minnesota State Supreme Court affirmed and like the Court of Appeals found the
seizure to be unconstitutional. Also like the Court of Appeals, the court refused to
extend the plain-view doctrine to encompass a sense of touch. Further, that
the pat search went beyond what was permissible under [Terry].

Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an
additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (J. White) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized
that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act,
merit the forcible stop and frisk.
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme
Courts willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent
crime, armed robbery, and if the officers suspicions were correct then he would
be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without
searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time
to constitute an arrest without probable cause.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
Brief Fact Summary. A police officer patted down a suspect and discovered a
small amount of crack cocaine in his jacket.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer
clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspects privacy

Issue. [W]hether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband

detected through a police officers sense of touch during a protective patdown
Held. The majority first discussed the parameters of [Terry] and observed [i]f
the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect
is armed, it is no longer valid under [Terry] and its fruits will be suppressed.
An officer may seize non-threatening contraband detected during a protective
patdown search of the sort permitted by [Terry], if they stay within the bounds of
The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that, if contraband is left in open view
and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been
no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus no search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or at least no search independent of
the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. The warrantless
seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed justified by
the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances
would often be impracticable, and would do little to promote the objectives of
the Fourth Amendment. The same can be said of tactile discoveries of
contraband. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer clothing and
feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent,

there has been no invasion of the suspects privacy beyond that already
authorized by the officers search for weapons; if the
object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same
practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.
In rejecting the Minnesota Supreme Courts holding, the majority observed
[f]irst, [Terry] itself demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable of revealing
the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure. The very
premise of [Terry], after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence of
weapons through the sense of touch, and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure.
Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the
sense of sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify
seizures of unseen contraband. Regardless of whether the officer detects the
contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendments requirement
that the officer have probable cause to believe that the item is contraband
before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures. The courts
second concern that touch is more intrusive into privacy than is sight is
inapposite in light of the fact th
at the intrusion the court fears has already been authorized by the lawful search
for weapons. The seizure of an item whose identity is already known occasions
no further invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the suspects privacy interests are
not advanced by a categorical rule barring the seizure of contraband plainly
detected through the sense of touch.
[T]he dispositive question before this Court is whether the officer who
conducted the search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by [Terry] at
the time he gained probable cause to believe that the lump in respondents
jacket was contraband. Under the State Supreme Courts interpretation of the
record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police
officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search
for weapons allowed under Terry. Further, [w]here, as here, an officer who is
executing a valid search for one item seizes a different item, this Court rightly
has been sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will enlarge a specific
authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a
general warrant to rummage and seize at will. Here, the officers continued
exploration of respondents pocket after having concluded that it contained no
weapon was unrelated to [t]he sole justifica

tion of the search [under Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others
nearby. It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry
expressly refused to authorize, and that we have condemned in subsequent
Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondents
pocket, because [Terry] entitled him to place his hands upon respondents jacket,
the court below determined that the incriminating character of the object was
not immediately apparent to him. Rather, the officer determined that the item
was contraband only after conducting a further search, one not authorized by
[Terry] or by any other exception to the warrant requirement. Because this
further search of respondents pocket was constitutionally invalid, the seizure of
the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional.
Discussion. This case should be read alongside [Terry] to see the courts
progression of this line of cases.
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
Facts: On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were conducting
an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons
roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they met the 5man group of accused Nilo Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage
uniform. His companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Nio
told Salayao not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he
seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped
in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked
Salayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was
connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that
he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated
the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of
firearm. Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that
this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining,
when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using the coconut
leaves as a torch. Salayaos claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano. On 15
August 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao guilty of illegal
possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating

circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison

term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. Salayao
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search upon Solayao, yielding the firearm wrapped in
coconut leaves, is valid.
Held: Nilo Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in
a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace officers,
his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on
an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming
around the barangays of Caibiran. The circumstances are similar to those
obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court held that "at the time
the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant." As with Posadas, the case herein constitutes an instance where a
search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was
justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Thus, there was
no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the
homemade firearm as evidence.

People v. Sy Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003)

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn
Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives.

The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which

just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant
alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2
Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As
accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a
crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .
22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked
into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag,
the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the
car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who
arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez
at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a

different version of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her
and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to
buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and
examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the
man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the
course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to
open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to
search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene
in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his
car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom
for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call
the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and
accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet
convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this
appeal to the Court.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accusedappellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Reliable information
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu
allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the
accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its
vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to
secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and frisk.

The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search

incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and
in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the

validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made
the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two

With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also
be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure
of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police
operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in
the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had
custody of accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk
principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search
and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed. She only raised the issue of warrantless arrest on
the AC- clearly an omission on questioning the legality of her arrest.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

A stop and frisk operation is part of the exception of a valid search warrant. In
such instances where the exception applies, a judicial question can be posed to
determine if the circumstance warrants a reasonable search. This includes the
manner of the search, the place or thing searched, and the nature of the articles
produced by the act.

Romines v. People, 629 SCRA 370 (2010)

Facts: Romines was caught in possession of 0.1224 grams of shabu when Cruzin,
a police officer in a surveillance operation for a snatcher named Ryan saw her
place a sacheted white substance in a cigarette case.
She ran from the policeafter being questioned and was subsequently caught in a
stop-and frisk operation after the law enforcer asked her about the sachet
She and the contents were tested for drug presence. The latter was confirmed to
be shabu.
Her alibi was that the evidence was used to frame her when the police dangled a
wallet containing shabu near her in the detention facility.

The circumstances made the arrest as a warranted one. It was instinctive for a
law enforcer to notice something suspicious about the white substance.

People v Chua: The policeman must introduce himself and make inquiries and
restrain a person who manifests suspicious conduct. He must have a genuine
reason to warrant the belief that the person has contraband.
Purpose of stop and frisk is a. general crime prevention under the recognition
that a policeman can approach a person for possible criminal behavior, given
that the conduct was carried out in an appropriate manner.
Cruzin followed the procedure.

In court, she admitted to the truth of the toxicology report on the substance and
the presence of shabu in her body.

Romines also admitted to the truth of the toxicology reports in reference to her
defense. The admission tested her credibility. (which showed her to be

The trial court convicted her under RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
drugs Act.

The petitioner also failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support
her theory of frame-up.

In the Appellate court, she contended that the arrest without a warrant was

People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, 30 July 2015

The appellate court found her arrest valid in People v Chua where the stop-andfrisk operation was established as an exception to warrantless arrests.
In the Supreme Court, she contended that Cruzin failed to justify the hunch that
there was a criminal act in the placement of something in a case. The OSG
contended for a penalty modification.

Issue: Is her arrest without a warrant valid?

[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for
searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should
be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and
during a checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the
police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaeds bag; the
police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the
contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and

that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed
subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was
then arrested by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the
marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated
shall not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by
a judge.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are:


Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest


Seizure of evidence in plain view,


Search of a moving vehicle;


Consented warrantless search;


Customs search;


Stop and frisk; and


Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The search involved in this case was initially a stop and frisk search, but it did
not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Stop and frisk searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal

arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced

with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness
present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This
may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not
have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a
genuine reason to serve the purposes of the stop and frisk exception.
The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The
person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and
his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest.
None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension,
Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed
was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for
the last allowable warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume
that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellants
silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit

of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general
warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence
obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures that the fundamental rights to
ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the
search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that
there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.


Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Chimel (the defendant), was arrested
inside his home and police asked him for consent to search the home. The
defendant refused the request. The police proceeded nonetheless, incident to
the lawful arrest and searched in different rooms. The police also had the
defendants wife open various dresser drawers and remove their contents.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Incident to a lawful arrest, a search of any area beyond
the arrestees immediate control, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), unless there is a clear danger that
evidence may be destroyed or concealed or there is an imminent threat of harm
to the arresting officers.
Facts. The police came to Defendants home with an arrest warrant for an
alleged burglary. The police asked permission to look around the house. The
defendant refused the request and the police proceeded to search the home
anyways. The police also made the defendants wife remove contents of various
dresser drawers. The police seized coins and medals which were later used to
convict the defendant of burglary.
Issue. Where a defendant is lawfully arrested inside his home, is a warrantless
search of the area beyond the defendants immediate control constitutional?

Held. Any search in an arrestees home beyond arrestees person and the area
within his immediate control is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution.
Dissent. Where there is probable cause to search and there is a clear danger that
the items which are the subject of the search may be removed prior to police
obtaining a search warrant, a warrantless search of the area beyond an
arrestees immediate control is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the
Concurrence. Given the variety of circumstances which police encounter, this
decision will create additional burdens on law enforcement. Whether or not the
warrant requirement will protect individual rights in each and every local
situation is uncertain.
Discussion. Contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable
to seize weapons as well as prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.
Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
Brief Fact Summary. A police officer arrested four people in a speeding car. He
examined passenger compartment, and found a jacket containing incriminating
Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile and that
the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within
the . . . compartment.
Facts. A New York state police officer pulled over a speeding vehicle, with four
occupants, including Roger Belton ["the respondent"]. The vehicle belonged to
none of the men present. The police officer smelled burnt marijuana, and saw an
enveloped associated with the drug. He ordered the men out, arrested them for
possession. He split them up, confiscated the drug, and searched each of them.
He then searched the passenger compartment of the car, and found the
respondents leather jacket. He found cocaine in one of the pockets.

Issue. Whether the constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his

arrest include the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was
Held. Yes. The court set out to firmly define the parameters of a search incident
to arrest, established under previous law as the area within the immediate
control of the arrestee. A reading of case law suggests the generalization that
articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of
an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within the area into
which an arrestee might reach . . . a weapon or evidence. Any containers within
the passenger compartment could be searched for that same reason.
Dissent. J. Brennan, joined by J. Marshall, felt that the court had not been specific
enough, citing timing issues, the potentially broad definition for interior, the
impact of the make and model of the vehicle, and the nature of any containers
inside the passenger compartment.
Discussion. If there is a proper arrest, any part of a vehicle that might be in the
arrestees reach can be searched without a warrant or probable cause.
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)
Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of
La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the
boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with
Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When
the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands,
carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By
this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform
and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua,
prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid
introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking
in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to

open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign
language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but
the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders
of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police
station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to
remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from
the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to
act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29
plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr.
Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his
constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he
retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name
Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for
laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan
Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann
Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic
packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative
examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos,
to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La
Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in
violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal
transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the
amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to
Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in
the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign
Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags
belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat;
that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery;
that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand
movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a
chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the

speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected
opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February
1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the
RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry
into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when
he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
constitute "probable cause."
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home
and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or
incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches
and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of
Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched
without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive
search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated
mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying
the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause.
Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats
that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw

the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not
constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the
same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist
accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the
case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was
not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the
area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To
reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by
the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing
but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction.

Cadua v. CA, 312 SCRA 703 (1999)

there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch
was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify
the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met
with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the
officers invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby
area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported
statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the
offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.

Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)

FACTS: The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the
accused prevented Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at
the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by

subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and
other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and

Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the
incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

Roy Padilla, et al
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and
the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted
municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se

(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of
9,000. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated
coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted
some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief

Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds

1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising
from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted
in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil
liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not
be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for
the recovery of the said amount
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in
requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.

3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall
owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premise

No, the Court of Appeals is correct.


Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition
that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The
exceptions are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately.

(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and
Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5)
months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the
amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.

1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply
because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise
did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or omission can create
two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the
liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types
of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended
party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in
a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in
the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in
this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
People v. Martinez, 637 SCRA 791 (2010)
FACTS On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on
duty at the PoliceCommunity Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a
concerned citizen reported that apot session was underway in the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision,Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1
Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons andTactics (SWAT)
proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the houseof
Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria
was arrestedwhile coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez,

Edgar Dizon, and RezinMartinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic
sachets (containing shabu residue), piecesof rolled used aluminum foil and
pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested andbrought to police
station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police
CrimeLaboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for
methylamphetamine HCL.On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez,
Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and RafaelGonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt
under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165and sentenced each to life
imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit.The CA supported the
findings of the lower court.
ISSUE: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING : No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyondreasonable doubt because (1) evidence against the accused are
inadmissible and (2) even if theevidence were admissible, the chain of custody
was not duly established .
The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure.
Searches and
seizures without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) plain
view search of
evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs search,
(6) stop and frisk,(7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of
RRCP warrantless arrest can only bedone in
in flagrante cases
, hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants were
based solely on the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance of the
placewas conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive case does not apply. In flagrante
and hot pursuit casemay apply only upon probable cause, which means actual
belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground of suspicion
when suspicion of a person to be arrested isprobably guilty of the offense based
on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In caseat bar, this is not the
case since the entire arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of
aconcerned citizen.The chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165
was not observed as no properinventory, photographing, was done in the
presence of the accused nor were thererepresentatives from the media, the DOJ
and any popularly elected official present, although inwarrantless seizures,

marking and photographing of evidence may be done at the nearest

policestation.Court sets aside and reverses the decision of the CA dated August
7, 2009, acquits the accusedand orders their immediate release.

Exigent and emergency circumstances

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)

Brief Fact Summary. A police officer pulled over a speeder, issued a citation
rather than arrest, and then searched the speeders car, finding drugs. The
search was authorized by Iowa law even though there was no arrest.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer issuing a traffic citation cannot search the
cited persons vehicle.
Facts. Petitioner Knowles was stopped for driving 43 mph in a 25 mph zone. The
officer issued a citation, and then searched the petitioners car, discovering a
bag of marijuana and a pipe. Under Iowa code, an officer may arrest a traffic
violator, or he may issue a citation. The law permitted a search of the vehicle in
either case.
Issue. [W]hether [issuing a citation or similar] such . . . procedure authorizes the
officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the
Held. No. The court cited two historical rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. The court
concluded that neither of these rationales . . . [are] sufficient. For the former,
the court reasoned that a routine traffic stop . . . is a relatively brief encounter.
For the latter, the court argued that once the respondent was issued a citation
all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense has been obtained. No
further evidence was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in
the passenger compartment of the car.
Discussion. The court was unwilling to extend a rule of search incident to
citation in a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the
same extent and the concern for the destruction or loss of evidence is not
present at all.
People v. Delos Reyes, 656 SCRA 417 (2011)

People v. Dimalanta, 727 SCRA 20 (2014)

People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)

Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed
Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their
"tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th Marine
Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout
Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations
Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements
of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren
Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command,
was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together
with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt.
Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which
actually started on the night of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was
conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked
the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar building near P.
Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct
his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office
watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group
of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of
the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car
and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters away, the
latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack
resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car
and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-

fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching

them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt.
Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to
find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites
M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the
building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw
Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present
inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As
a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made
to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding
team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office,
aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was
able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez
and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in two
separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-9011755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de Gracia
pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties
likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November
30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during
the height of the December 1989 coup detat.
Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales
Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually
precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as

headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted
on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men
coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place,
the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the requests for them to
do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales
Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal
which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily
and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual
quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office
and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The
courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances,
the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account
the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime
was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing,
the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant
from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989
when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed witt.
People v. Ayangao, 427 SCRA 428 (2004)

Hot pursuit
People v. De Lara, 236 SCRA 291 (1994)

Customs searches
Boac, et.al. v. People of the Philippines, 570 SCRA 533 (2008)
Bureau of Customs, et.al. v. Ogario, et.al., 329 SCRA 289 (2000)

Airport Searches

People v. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 (2000)

People v. Canton, 394 SCRA 478 (2002)

U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir., 1973)