Evidence-Case-Digest 3rd Batch 2015

Evidence
Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016
SISON V. PEOPLE
Background of the Case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
This incident happened after the EDSA Revolution.

This was the time when the newly-installed
government of President Corazon C. Aquino was
being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations
and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists". Tension
and animosity between the two (2) groups
sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it
resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
"Coryista."
A rally without permit was conducted by the Marcos
loyalists at the Luneta. Because of lack of proper
warrant, they were dispersed by the police.
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists
converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos,
jogging around the fountain. They approached her
and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer
angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory
hecklers!" She was later on captured by the police.
As an act of vengeance, Marcos loyalists were then
attacking persons in yellow, the color of the
"Coryistas."
A man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a
group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory
iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and
his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They
caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled
him.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial
traumatic."
Eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists
charging them with the murder of Salcedo.

***
The prosecution presented twelve witnesses. In
support of their testimonies, the prosecution
likewise presented documentary evidence consisting
of newspaper accounts of the incident and various
photographs taken during the mauling.

8.
9.
Some of the accused were acquitted, some were

convicted. They then appealed all the way up to the
Supreme Court.

***
Appellants also contend that although the appellate
court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and
"P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to
Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira
Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-

39
13." The objection of Atty. Lazaro, one of the
accused, to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the
same was not presented to identify them.
10. Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken
of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta
starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at
41
the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard,
42
as he was being chased by his assailants and as
43
he sat pleading with his assailants. Exhibits "W",
"W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the
mauling published in local newspapers and
44
magazines such as the Philippine Star, Mr. and Ms.
45
46
Magazine, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the
47
Malaya. The admissibility of these photographs is
being questioned by appellants for lack of proper
identification by the person or persons who took
the same.
HELD:
11. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs,
when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified
as to the circumstances under which they were
48
produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in
its being a correct representation or reproduction of
49
the original, and its admissibility is determined by
its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of
50
the crime.
12. The photographer, however, is not the only witness
51
who can identify the pictures he has taken. The
correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be
proved prima facie, either by:
1. the testimony of the person who made it or
2. by other competent witnesses,
after which the court can admit it subject to
52
impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs,
therefore, can be identified by the photographer or
by any other competent witness who can testify to
53
its exactness and accuracy.
13. The accused, although initially had objected the
offer of the photographs in evidence, did not object
the subsequent use by the prosecution of the
photographs during the cross-examination of all the
accused who took the witness stand of the case on
the subsequent hearings. In fact, some of the
accused used the photographs to show their
alleged non-participation in the crime because they
were not there inside the photographs. This
1
Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

utilisation is an admission of the exactness and
accuracy thereof.
This court notes that when the prosecution
offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr.
objected to their admissibility for lack of proper
54
identification. However, when the accused
presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri
used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his
clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore
could not have participated in the mauling of the
55
victim. The photographs were adopted by
appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as
part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing,
Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per
understanding with their respective counsels,
including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At
subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the
photographs to cross-examine all the accused who
56
took the witness stand. No objection was made by
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro
appeared at the third hearing and interposed a
57
continuing objection to their admissibility.
We rule that the use of these photographs by some
of the accused to show their alleged non-
participation in the crime is an admission of the
exactness and accuracy thereof. That the
photographs are faithful representations of the
mauling incident was affirmed when appellants
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
identified themselves therein and gave reasons for
58
their presence thereat.

14. The absence of the two appellants, Sison and
Tamayo, does not necessarily follow their lack of
participation. Photographs only capture segments
of the entire crime. They still can be positively
identified by testimonies of witnesses.
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the
accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the
appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various
belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over
59
the victim. Appellant Romeo Sison appears only
once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown
60
merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito
Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures.
The absence of the two appellants in the
photographs does not exculpate them. The
photographs did not capture the entire sequence of

the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof.
While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo
hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified
61
by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants' denials and
alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
STATE V. TATUM

Tousin, of Pasco, received monthly welfare checks

from the state of Washington. In February, 1960, Tousin did
not receive his check because the February check for $28.90
was endorsed and cashed at Sherman's Food Store in Pasco
by someone other than the payee, Tousin.
Upon investigation, an employee of the store,
Caroline Pentecost, testified that, although she could not
specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction, the
initials appearing on the face of the check were hers. She also
testified that whenever a check was presented to her for
payment at the store, the store manager had instructed her
to initial it and then insert it into a "Regiscope" machine. This
machine is designed to simultaneously photograph, through
two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing
the machine.
When it was discovered that the endorsement of the
payee was a forgery, the Regiscope film of the transaction
was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be
developed. The processed film shows both the check and the
person of appellant (from his waist up) with the food store in
the background. Upon the trial, both the negative and the
print therefrom were admitted in evidence.
Tatum objects to the admission.
Issue: Were the Regiscope films (the negative and the print)
authenticated sufficiently to warrant their admission into
evidence?
HELD: YES
1.
Quantum of Authentication is only that some

witnesses, although not necessarily the
photographer, are able to give some indication of
when, where, and under what circumstances the
photograph was taken.

What quantum of authentication do courts require
before a photograph may be admissible in evidence?
It is simply this--that some witness (not necessarily
the photographer) be able to give some indication as
to when, where, and under what circumstances the
2

photograph was taken, and that the photograph
accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated.
The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to
be helpful to the court and the jury.
Witness Pentecost testified that she
recognized the background shown in the picture as
that of the food store, and, as mentioned previously,
she also testified as to the store's standard
procedure of "regiscoping" each individual who
cashed a check at the store.
Phillip Dale testified at length concerning
the Regiscope process.
The testimony of these two witnesses
taken together amounted to a sufficient
authentication to warrant the admission of the
photograph (both the print and the negative) into
evidence.
2.
Attacking the inaccuracy of the contents of the

paragraph attacks the weight, rather than the
admissibility, of evidence.

The authentication supplied by the testimony
summarized above, of course, did not preclude
appellant from attempting to prove that the
individual portrayed was someone other than
appellant, that the photograph was inaccurate in
one or more respects, the appellant was somewhere
else at the moment the photograph was taken, or
any other such defense. But these arguments go to
the weight rather than to the admissibility of the
exhibits in question. In our opinion, the Regiscope
exhibits, coupled with the other evidence produced
by the state, sufficed to establish a prima facie case
of first degree forgery.
PEOPLE V. CARPO

One evening, Carpo with Warlito Ibao and his sons Oscar and
Roche all went to the house of Dulay. Oscar hurled grenades
inside the house of Dulay. Seconds later, a loud explosion
occurred, killing the Dulay family members except Noemi
Dulay. The witness herein, Mr. Ruben Meriales, witnessed
the incident.
did. He identified the four aforementioned suspects as the

perpetrators of the offense. They were charged and
convicted with the complex crime of multiple murder with
attempted murder by the lower courts.
Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review. After the filing of briefs, the accused filed
an Addendum to Appellant's Brief urging that the favorable
results of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted
into the records.

Accuseds Alibis:
Jaime testified that Ruben implicated him because
the latter was angry at him. He alleged that as a matter of
fact, on 10 December 1996 while he was incarcerated at the
Balungao District Jail, Ruben supposedly visited him asking his
forgiveness for having named him as one of the perpetrators
of the crime.

Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao testified that on the
night of the explosion their family was having a farewell party
for the family's only girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for
Hongkong.

Issue: whether or not the favorable results of the lie detector
tests with the NBI be cogent enough to acquit them,
overturning Rubens testimony against them.

HELD: No.
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual
will undergo physiological changes, capable of being
monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not
telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on
the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not been
accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception
The explosion by means of a hand grenade on the
night of 25 August 1996 resulting in the death of Florentino,
Norwela and Nissan Dulay and in the wounding of Noemi
Dulay is an admitted fact. The identity of the perpetrators, as
tenaciously questioned by the accused, depends upon the
credibility of Ruben Meriales.
TIJING V. CA

1.

Investigation coursed through. Fearful however that
the culprits would return, Ruben Meriales refused to give any
statement but intimated to Police Officer Guillermo Osio that
he would go to the police station after the burial, which he
2.
This is a story of a mother, Bienvenida Tijing, and her

employer, Angelita Diamante.
Bienvenida use to do laundry works for Angelita until
this unfortunate day happened. One day, Angelita
went to the house of Bienvenida to ask her to do
some works for her but since Bienvenida was already
3
3.
4.
on her way to the market, Bienvenida told Angelita

to just wait for her at the house until she returned
and for the meantime, to watch over her son,
Ernesto Tijing (4 months old).
When Bienvenida returned, she was surprised that
Angelita and Bienvenidas son were gone and so she
went to the house of Angelita and makes a run
around until she learned that Angelita moved to
another unknown address. Four years after, the
husband of Bienvenida learned through a tabloid
about the death of the live-in partner of Angelita,
named Tomas, and it was stated that the remains of
Tomas is in a certain place in Cavite and so out of
that information, Bienvenida went to the wake.
Then, she saw her son, 4-year old boy Eduardo but
who is now named John Thomas. So when Angelita
refused to return the child/boy to Bienvenida, the
latter together with her husband where constrained
to file a case for HABEAS CORPUS against Angelita.
The crucial issue in this case is on the identity of the
boy--whether Eduardo Tijing, as claimed by
Bienvenida, is the same boy named John Thomas
and claimed by Angelita as her own son. So the issue
in is identity. How did the SC resolve the issue on the
identity of the child?
Ruling:
5.
6.
7.
John Thomas Lopez is actually the missing son of

Bienvenida based on the evidence presented.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer
bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that
after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she
lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation
removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no
evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to
1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in
court. No clinical records, log book or discharge
order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly
proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that
his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John
Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover,
Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan
Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years
together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also
bore no offspring.
8.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth

certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989,
four months after the alleged birth of the child.
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of
such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his
child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil
registrar within thirty days after the birth. 16
Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan,
which is false because even private respondent had
admitted she is a "common-law wife". 17 This false
entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate.
9. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that
when the child and Bienvenida were both in court,
the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes,
eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a
minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. 18
Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should
be given high respect, it having had the opportunity
to observe the physical appearances of the minor
and petitioner concerned.
10. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented
clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge
order and the signatures of petitioners. cTECHI
11. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that
subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The
writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of
said child.
12. A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19
for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the
mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. 20 Of course, being
a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. 21 Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in
aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
is to deny progress. 22 Though it is not necessary in
4
this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would

be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution
of parentage and identity issues.
Vallejo. So the result of the DNA

test
was
officially
accepted/admitted by the court
and in fact taken into
consideration in this case in the
resolution of the issue of identity
in the case. This was reiterated in
the subsequent case of PP v. Yatar.
The SC resorted to the conventional method of

resolving the issue of identity and that is why there
is a simple physical comparison. So when the trial
court resolved in favor of Bienvenida, one of the
evidence/factual circumstances the trial court cited
in its decision-- was the trial courts observation that
the boy and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarities, same face, same eyebrow and same
shape of their heads. So the trial court made a
conclusion that the boy might be the son that
Bienvenida claimed to be Eduardo Tijing. The
findings of the trial court was upheld by the SC. Now
you will note in this case that the SC used the
traditional or conventional method, but it was in this
case that the SC for the first time recognize the
evidentiary value of DNA evidence, the SC in effect
even holds courts for future cases to resort to DNA
testing and hold on to their rule on admissibility
and consider DNA results in the resolution of cases
especially on the issues of paternity and filiation
issues. SC said TO DENY ACCEPTANCE OF THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF DNA IS TO DENY PRACTICE,
otherwise, similar cases in the future, courts will be
constrained to resort to the conventional method.
The inspiration in Tijing v. CA did not die in vain
because years after, in the cases of PP v. Vallejo the
SC for the first time officially accepted, recognized
and applied DNA evidence in a resolution of an
actual case.
The case involves a prosecution for rape
with homicide. As in most rape cases, the
evidence against Vallejo were all
circumstantial, so it was necessary to
establish the identity of the assailant or the
convict.
o Now in ruling that Vallejo is indeed
the party responsible despite the
absence of direct evidence, the SC
took note that after the result of
the DNA test conducted, it was
established in the DNA test that
the vaginal swabs taken from the
victim showed the DNA profile of
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO
1.
2.
3.
The case involves a prosecution for rape with

homicide.
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that
she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to
their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario,
Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-
appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons.
Aimee's house, where accused-appellant was also
staying, is about four to five meters away from
Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the
house of her tutor. She was wearing pink short
pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later,
Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were
looking for a book which accused-appellant could
copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy
would submit to her teacher. After finding the book,
Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the
latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about
5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed
that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for
her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee,
Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that
Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to
help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not
feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma.
Nida looked for Daisy in her brother's and sister's
houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00
o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her
neighbor's house, and there saw accusedappellant,
who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's
house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went
there, she was told that Daisy had not been there.
Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they
saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida
that Daisy was playing in front of her house that
afternoon and even watched television in her
house, but that Daisy later left with accused-
appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for
Daisy the whole evening of June 10, 1999, a
Saturday, until the early morning of the following
5
4.
5.
6.
7.
day, June 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search

proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the
dead body of her daughter was found tied to the
root of an aroma tree by the river after the
"compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body
was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw
her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short
pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck.
As in most rape cases, the evidence against Vallejo
were all circumstantial, so it was necessary to
establish the identity of the assailant or the convict.
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet
Byron Buan showed accusedappellant to belong to
Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1)
white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches
"Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2)
one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants;
(3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with
reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short
pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut"
dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains,
were all positive for the presence of human blood
showing the reactions of Group "A".
Pet Byron Buan (the one who conducted the
examinations) also testified that before he took the
blood samples, he had a conversation with accused-
appellant during which the latter admitted that he
had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation
and stated that he was willing to accept the
punishment that would be meted out on him
because of the grievous offense he had committed.
Mr. Buan observed that accused-appellant was
remorseful and was crying when he made the
confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the
NBI laboratory.
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest
Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around noon of July 13,
1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him
a handwritten confession which he had executed
inside his cell at the Municipal Jail of Rosario.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato
Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to see him in the
investigation room of the police station and told him
that they would help him if he told the truth. Atty.
Leyva asked him whether he wanted him to be his
counsel, and accused-appellant said he answered in
the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of

his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed
that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and
Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was
because the police had maltreated him.
Decision of the Lower Courts:
8.
He was charged guilty of Rape with Homicide.
Arguments of Accused on Appeal:

9.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION.
10. The Accused also challenges the DNA analysis
conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-
Magsipoc. He argues that the prosecution failed to
show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing
were not contaminated, considering that these
specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters
before they were submitted to the laboratory.

Ruling of the Court:
11. We affirm the conviction of the accused. The appeal
should be denied.
12. First. An accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that

the accused committed the crime. 21 In rape with
homicide, the evidence against an accused is more
often than not circumstantial. This is because the
nature of the crime, where only the victim and the
rapist would have been present at the time of its
commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult since the victim could no longer
testify against the perpetrator. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand
direct evidence proving the modality of the offense
and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.
22
13. Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction if:
a) there is more than one circumstance;
b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
c) the
combination
of
all
6

circumstances is such as to
produce
conviction
beyond
reasonable doubt."
14. In the case at bar, the following circumstantial
evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused-appellant:
1.
The victim went to Aimee

Vallejo's house, where
accusedappellant
was
residing, at 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 10,
1999, for tutoring.
2.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the

afternoon,
accused-
appellant and Daisy went
together to the latter's
house to get a book from
which the former could copy
Daisy's school project. After
getting the book, they
proceeded to accused-
appellant's residence.
3.
4.
5.
From accused-appellant's
house, Daisy then went to
the house of Jessiemin
Mataverde where she
watched
television.
Accusedappellant thereafter
arrived and whispered
something to Daisy, and the
latter went with him
towards the "compuerta."
At about 4:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, the spouses
Iluminado and Charito Yepes
saw
accused-appellant
coming
out
of
the
"compuerta," with his
clothes, basketball shorts,
and t-shirt wet, although his
face and hair were not.
According
to
these
witnesses, he looked pale,
uneasy,
and
troubled
(balisa). He kept looking
around and did not even
greet them as was his
custom to do so.
The fishing boat which
accused-appellant used as a
bomber (a boat for catching
fish with dynamite) was

docked by the seashore.
6.
A little before 5:00 o'clock in

the afternoon, Jessiemin
Mataverde
also
saw
accused-appellant buying a
Marlboro cigarette from a
store.
Jessiemen
also
noticed
that
accused-
appellant's clothes were wet
but not his face nor his hair.
7.
By 5:30 o'clock in the

afternoon, as Ma. Nida
Diolola looked for her
daughter, she was told by
accused-appellant that Daisy
had gone to her classmate
Rosario's
house.
The
information proved to be
false.
8.
Daisy's body was found tied

to an aroma tree at the part
of the river near the
"compuerta."
9.
During
the
initial
investigation,
accused-
appellant had scratches on
his feet similar to those
caused by the thorns of an
aroma tree.
10.
The clothes which accused-

appellant wore the day
before were bloodstained.
The bloodstains on accused-
appellant's clothes and on
Daisy's clothes were found
positive of human blood
type "A."
11.
Accused-appellant has blood

type "O."
12.
The vaginal swabs from

Daisy's body contained her
DNA profile as well as that
of accused-appellant.
15. On the challenge against the DNA test results, we

find the argument as to be without merit.
7
16. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's

cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except
for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is
distinct and unique. 29
When a crime is committed, material is

collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the
evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the
suspect and the victim. 30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain
whether an association exists between the evidence

sample and the reference sample. 31 The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical

processes to establish their profile. 32 The test may
yield three possible results:
1)
2)
3)
The samples are

different
and
therefore must have
originated
from
different
sources
(exclusion).
This
conclusion is absolute
and
requires
no
further analysis or
discussion;
It is not possible to be
sure, based on the
results of the test,
whether the samples
have similar DNA
types (inconclusive).
This might occur for a
variety of reasons
including degradation,
contamination,
or
failure of some aspect
of
the
protocol.
Various parts of the
analysis might then be
repeated with the
same or a different
sample, to obtain a
more
conclusive
result; or
The samples are
similar, and could have
originated from the
same
source

(inclusion). 33 In such
a case, the samples
are found to be
similar, the analyst

proceeds to determine
the
statistical
significance of the
similarity. 34
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
17. In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the
clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the
smears taken from the victim as well as the strands
of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for
the presence of human DNA, 35 because, as Ms.
Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
A: Because when we received the
vaginal smears submitted
by Dr. Vertido, the smear
on the slide was very,
very dry and could have
chipped off. I already
informed Dr. Vertido
about it and he
confirmed the state of
the specimen. And I told
him that may be it would
be the swab that could
help us in this case, Sir.
And
so
upon
examination, the smears
geared negative results
and the swabs gave
positive results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the
hair and nails taken from
the victim, why did they
show negative results for
DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair.
This means that the hair
did not contain any root.
So any hair that is above
the skin or the epidermis
of one's skin would give
negative results as the
8
learned the name of accused-appellant

UMANITO. She recounted that accused-
appellant UMANITO waited for her by the
creek, and then with a knife pointed at
[AAA]'s left side of the [sic] abdomen, he
forced her to give in to his kisses, to his
holding her breasts and stomach, and to his
pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the
Q: So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for Home
this negative
result, nBuilding
ot the inadequacy
f the examination or
Economics
inside othe
premises
of
the
Daramuangan
Elementary
A:
Yes, Sir."
School where accused-appellant UMANITO
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens
first undressed her [AAA] and himself with
submitted for examination, and not the possibility
his right hand while he still clutched the
that the samples had been contaminated, which
knife menacingly on his left hand. Private
accounted for the negative results of their
complainant [AAA] recounted that she
examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the
could not shout because she was afraid.
victim yielded positive for the presence of human
She further recounted that accused-
DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed
appellant UMANITO laid her down on a
the DNA profile of accused-appellant.
bench, 4 meters long and 24 inches wide,
18. In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the
set the knife down, then mounted her,
evidence points to no other conclusion than that
inserting his penis into her [AAA's] vagina
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
and shortly thereafter, accused-appellant
Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or
UMANITO dressed up and threatened
circumstances which are proved are not only
[AAA] while poking the knife at her neck,
consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
not to report the incident to the police or
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in
else he said he would kill her. Accused-
its weight and probative force, may surpass direct
appellant UMANITO then left, while the
evidence in its effect upon the court. 37 This is how
victim [AAA] went on to her grandmother's
it is in this case.
house and she noticed that it was already

around 1:00 o'clock in the morning when

she reached there. SHCaDA

2. In January 1990, 6 months after the incident, private
7
Now in ruling that Vallejo is indeed the
complainant [AAA's] mother, [BBB], noticed the
prominence on [AAA]'s stomach. It was only then
party responsible despite the absence of
when the victim, private complainant [AAA],
direct evidence, the SC took note that after
divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told her
the result of the DNA test conducted, it was
the details of what had happened in July, [sic] 1989.
established in the DNA test that the vaginal
After hearing private complainant [AAA]'s story, her
mother brought her to the police station
swabs taken from the victim showed the
hair shaft is negative for
DNA. And then the nails
did not contain any
subcutaneous cells that
would be amenable for
DNA analysis also, Sir.
DNA profile of Vallejo. So the result of the

DNA test was officially accepted/admitted
by the court and in fact taken into
consideration in this case in the resolution
of the issue of identity in the case. This was
reiterated in the subsequent case of PP v.
Yatar.
PEOPLE V. UMANITO
1.
It was around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of

July 15, 1989, while on her way to her
grandmother's home, when private

complainant [AAA] 6 was accosted by a
young male. It was only later when she

3.
The accused was proven guilty of Rape.

Argument of the Accused-appelant:
4.
Appellant asserts that the court a quo erred in giving

full faith and credence to the testimony of the
complaining witness and in not acquitting him on
reasonable doubt. He avers that apparently AAA
filed the complaint against him only upon the
prodding of her mother. This aspect, appellant
insists, negates AAA's claim that he was the one
who raped her but rather supports his assertion
that the sexual congress AAA engaged in was with
another man, her real lover who was married to
another woman.
9
Issue presented before us:

5.
this Court is called upon to determine whether the

prosecution has successfully met the level of proof
needed to find appellant guilty of the crime of rape


6.
7.
8.
9.
The prosecution met the burden of proof.

A happenstance may provide the definitive key to
the absolution of the appellant. This is the fact that
AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape.
With the advance in genetics and the availability of
new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father
of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal may be
ordained.
We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively
determined that the accused did not sire the
alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of
reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this
basis, or at least least weigh heavily in the ultimate
decision in this case. Thus, we are directing
appellant, AAA and AAA's child to submit

themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence

23 (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October
2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of
whether appellant is the father of AAA's child, which
may be accomplished through DNA testing, is
material to the fair and correct adjudication of the
instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the
courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice,
motu proprio to order a DNA testing.

If the value of probability is 99.9% or higher the
positive result is a disputable presumption of
paternity. In the absence of contrary evidence the
putative father is presumed to be the father. But this
admits of controverting evidence like proof allowed
under the Family Code (e.g. impossibility of sexual
intercourse).

This case involves a crime of rape which resulted in

the birth of a child. On appeal the SC directed the conduct of
DNA test and remanded the case to the trial court for the
conduct of the DNA test to determine if the child, which was
the alleged result of the rape, was sired by the accused.

The SC said if the result would be negative then that
would create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Umanito
because the defense of Umanito was that there was no
sexual relation and therefore he could not be the father of

the child. True enough, the DNA yielded positive result -
99.999%- the SC said that this is just a disputable
presumption of paternity sufficient if allowed to stand
uncontroverted. Umanito himself failed to controvert the
presumption and as a matter of fact he even moved for the
withdrawal his appeal. That sealed the fate of Umanito.
PEOPLE V. YATAR
19. This case involves rape with homicide. Again, taking

cue from the result of the DNA test showing the
substantial match between the samples taken from
the victim and the samples taken from the accused.
The court said the accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt to be the party
responsible. So again, in the case of Yatar,
the SC officially recognized and ruled on
the admissibility of DNA evidence and in
fact considered the DNA results in the
resolution of the case.
HERRERA V. ALBA


1.
2.
3.
A party was so minded to challenge the admissibility

of the DNA test results. This involves a petition for
compulsory recognition of paternity. Then thirteen-
year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented
by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a
petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of
DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
In his defense, the putative father, opposed the
conduct of a DNA test on the ground that DNA
results has not yet gained acceptance or has a
doubtful admissibility in our jurisdiction.
In this case, the SC cited cases in the past on
the previous case of Vallejo and Yatar, the
SC in Herrerra v. Alba reaffirmed
recognition DNA evidence in its
admissibility and probative value in our
jurisdiction. The rulings in these cases
eventually culminated in the promulgation
of our own rule on DNA which took effect
10

on October 15, 2007. So, as of this date, we
now have as part of our Rules of Court, Rule
on DNA evidence.
Ruling of the Lower Court:
4.
5.
The RTC granted respondent's motion to conduct

DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and
Armi Alba.
CA affirmed the RTC decision upon appeal.

6.
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a

valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under
which DNA technology may be integrated into our
judicial system and the prerequisites for the
admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit.

7.
8.
The petition has no merit.

There are two affirmative defenses available to the
putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother,
because of either physical absence or impotency. 16
The putative father may also show that the mother
had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception. A child born to a husband and wife

during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 17
The child's legitimacy may be impugned only under
the strict standards provided by law. 18
9. Finally, physical resemblance between the putative
father and child may be offered as part of evidence
of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique
unique to a paternity proceeding. However,
although likeness is a function of heredity, there is
no mathematical formula that could quantify how
much a child must or must not look like his

biological father. 19 This kind of evidence appeals to
the emotions of the trier of fact.
10. In the present case, the trial court encountered
three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent's
mother, put forward a prima facie case when she
asserted that petitioner is respondent's biological
father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to
convince the trial court, she offered corroborative
proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner,
on the other hand, denied Armi Alba's assertion. He
denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba
and stated that respondent is Armi Alba's child with
another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner's
denial by submitting pictures of respondent and
petitioner side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.
11. Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility,
trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to

DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our
statement in Vallejo [THE VALLEJO STANDARDS]:
In
assessing
the
probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following
data: how the samples were
collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
51
12. We also repeat the trial court's explanation of DNA
analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the
forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions
in an individual to produce a DNA
profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it
is possible to determine which
half of the child's DNA was
inherited from the mother. The
other half must have been
inherited from the biological
father. The alleged father's profile
is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in
his profile, which match the
paternal types in the child. If the
man's DNA types do not match
that of the child, the man is
excluded as the father. If the DNA
types match, then he is not
excluded as the father. 52

13. It is not enough to state that the child's DNA
profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the
child and the DNA profile of the putative father
does not necessarily establish paternity. For this
reason, following the highest standard adopted in
an American jurisdiction: trial courts should
require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the
Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father
compared to the probability of a random match
11
of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate

reference population database, such as the
Philippine population database, is required to
compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of
paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher
when the putative father, mother and child are
subjected to DNA analysis compared to those
conducted between the putative father and child
alone. 54
14. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from
paternity should be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the
results of the DNA analysis should be considered
as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is
99.9% or higher, then there is refutable

presumption of paternity. 55 This refutable
presumption of paternity should be subjected to the
Vallejo standards.

LUCAS V. LUCAS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas,

filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimat Filiation
(with Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing)
Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his
mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila
from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate
Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent
nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes
accompany Belen to work. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant. Jesse was then born.
The name of petitioner's father was not stated
in petitioner's certificate of live birth. However,
Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is
respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was
baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue,
Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended
financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a
period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended,
Elsie refused to accept respondent's offer of
support and decided to raise petitioner on her
own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie
made several attempts to introduce petitioner
to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a)
petitioner's certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner's baptismal certificate among others.
The RTC scheduled a hearing for the petition
6.
(note: still a hearing)

The respondent opposed the hearing for the
petition for recognition. He argued that DNA
testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to respondent as
petitioner's father. Moreover, jurisprudence is
still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA
evidence.

7. The RTC dismissed Jesses petition for DNA
testing to establish paternity and filiation.
8. It held that there are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action which the parties have to face:
a. a prima facie
case,
b. affirmative
defenses,
c. presumption of
legitimacy, and
d. physical
resemblance
between
the
putative father
and the child.
The court opined that petitioner
must first establish these four procedural
aspects before he can present evidence of
paternity and filiation, which may include
incriminating acts or scientific evidence like
blood group test and DNA test results.
9. The court observed that the petition did not
show that these procedural aspects were
present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie case considering that (a) his mother did
not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioner's
statement as to what his mother told him
about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the
certificate of live birth was not signed by
respondent; and (c) although petitioner used
the surname of respondent, there was no
allegation that he was treated as the child of
respondent by the latter or his family. The
court opined that, having failed to establish a
prima facie case, respondent had no obligation
to present any affirmative defenses.
10. On motion for reconsideration, the RTC
reversed its previous decision, allowing
compulsory DNA testing. The court also
dismissed Jesus arguments that there is no
basis for the taking of DNA test, and that
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the
acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the
new Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct
of DNA testing, whether at the court's instance
12

or upon application of any person who has legal
interest in the matter in litigation.
11. The CA reversed the order of the RTC. It
dismissed the special proceedings case. The CA
remarked that petitioner filed the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, specifically
seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the
proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to
show that the four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action had
been met. The CA further held that a DNA
testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie
case

Ruling:
12. The petition must be granted.
13. The statement in Herrera v. Alba 34 that there
are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to
face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CA's observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case the first
procedural aspect in a paternity case is
therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built
by a party's evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading (thus a
hearing is required to be made first)
14. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune
time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case
vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to
discuss whether, under the circumstances, a
DNA testing order is warranted considering
that no such order has yet been issued by the
trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the
said case for hearing.
15. At any rate, the CA's view that it would be
dangerous to allow a DNA testing without
corroborative proof is well taken and deserves
the Court's attention. In light of this
observation, we find that there is a need to
supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid
the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing
order, particularly in paternity and other
filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order
16. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to

safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA
Testing Order. The appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:
(a)
A biological sample
exists
that
is
relevant to the case;
(b)
The
biological
sample: (i) was not
previously subjected
to the type of DNA
testing
now
requested; or (ii)
was
previously
subjected to DNA
testing, but the
results may require
confirmation
for
good
reasons;
HCSEIT
(c)
The DNA testing

uses a scientifically
valid technique;
(d)
The DNA testing has

the
scientific
potential to produce
new
information
that is relevant to
the
proper
resolution of the
case; and
(e)
The existence of
other factors, if any,
which the court may
consider
as
potentially affecting
the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA
13

testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
17. This does not mean, however, that a DNA
testing order will be issued as a matter of right
if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.
18. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the
test. A court order for blood testing is
considered a "search," which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by
a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case,
or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause.
19. The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
20. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed
that the issuance of a DNA testing order
remains discretionary upon the court. The
court may, for example, consider whether
there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing.
If there is already preponderance of evidence
to establish paternity and the DNA test result
would only be corroborative, the court may, in
its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

The SC enunciated a sort of supplement to DNA testing,
by way of jurisprudence and this supplement only applies to
cases involving paternity and filiation. SC said that in cases
involving paternity and filiation, it is not enough that the
conditions of section 4 on the rule on DNA evidence are met.
But just as important as it is necessary for the applicant to
ESTABLISH PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE or INTRODUCE PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY or REASONABLE POSSIBILITY
OF PATERNITY; this is provided as a supplement based on
jurisprudence of the case of Lucas v. Lucas:

20. FACTS: Jessie Lucas claims to be the illegitimate son
of Jesus Lucas, he filed a petition for compulsory

recognition of filiation and this petition is with
motion to submit the parties for DNA testing. The
defendant, the putative father, moved for the
dismissal of the action or denial of the motion for
DNA testing on the ground that the petitioner failed
to establish prima facie case of paternity; such
argument was upheld by CA and so the CA denied
the motion for DNA testing, and dismissed the entire
petition for the petitioner failed to establish prima
facie case of paternity or reasonable possibility of
paternity. The reasoning of the CA was that, it would
be terribly dangerous to allow DNA testing by mere
application of any party, allowing it as a matter of
right, would result to that DNA testing becoming a
tool for harassment or extortion that may be taken
advantage by some unscrupulous individuals who
prey on people who have no stomach for public
scandal thus, they are constrained to settle cases for
he has no stomach for public scandal. So CA states
that there should be some safeguard for the benefit
of the innocent alleged putative fathers to shield
them from harassment paternity suits.

SC thus said, there is a need to supplement
the existing rule on DNA evidence, so now
the rule is;
DNA TESTING IS ALLOWED, provided that:
1.
2.
The conditions set forth under section 4 on

DNA testing are met; and
There is prima facie evidence of paternity
or reasonable possibility of paternity.
Before a DNA testing could be conducted, based on

American jurisprudence, the conduct of DNA testing is akin to
a search which intrudes ones privacy. Thus, as a search,
there is a need to establish as a condition sine qua non the
existence of Probable Cause. As a counterpart of Probable
Cause, the SC said that prima facie evidence is needed as a
condition precedent to the conduct of a DNA testing to
safeguard interest of the putative fathers.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE
VILLA
(TN: this case was decided prior to the effectivity of Rules on
DNA evidence)
De Villa was convicted of rape of
14

his niece resulting in the birth of a child.
While on appeal one of the children of De
villa took it upon himself to resort to DNA
testing it just so happened that one of the
grandchildren of the accused (De Villa) was
the classmate of the child, allegedly to be
the child of De Villa as a result of the rape,
upon instruction of one of the sons of De
Villa the grandchild asked the child to spit
on the cup and submitted the samples to
the DNA Laboratory for examination. The
result is negative and thus the child could
not have been the child of De Villa.
But the SC ruled against de villa on

the grounds that the remedy of
Habeas corpus is a procedural
misstep - not allowed- the SC
enumerated the grounds for
Habeas Corpus which DNA result is
not one of them and the SC
disagreed with the defense that
the result of DNA test could not be
considered as a newly discovered
evidence because the failure of the
defense to avail of the DNA
evidence was through the fault of
the counsel whose negligence is
binding upon the client.
The SC made a definitive ruling
that a petition for Habeas Corpus
is NOT a proper remedy to get a
reversal of judgment of conviction
on the basis of the result of the
DNA test.
TN: With the promulgation of the Rules on

DNA Evidence the ruling of De villa is no longer
controlling. The rule now specifically provides that a
petition for Habeas corpus is the remedy if DNA test
result shows that the accused could not have
committed the crime, the petition for Habeas Corpus
can be filed in the court of origin, Court of Appeals
or even in the Supreme Court. In which case this
court may reverse the judgment of conviction, it may
declare the accused acquitted or modify the
judgment and order the release of the convict. So
Habeas Corpus is now the remedy prescribed under
the Rules on DNA evidence.
TN also of the ruling declared by the court
in the case of De Villa where it said that the fact of
the result of the DNA test yielded negative this does
not necessarily absolve the accused because the
pregnancy of the victim is not one of the elements of
the crime of rape. So long the crime of rape is

proven by other evidence/s the negative result of
the DNA testing is not enough to overturn the
conviction.
Sirs Observation: This is contrary to the
ruling declared by the court in case of Pp v Umanito
where it held that the negative result could very well
establish reasonable doubt especially if the defense
of the accused is consistent with the DNA result, like
when the defense of the accused that there was no
sexual relation or the child was fathered by a man
other than the accused. Except if the defense of the
accused that the sexual intercourse is consensual. If
the prosecution theorizes that as a result of the rape
a child was born, DNA testing is relevant. Forget
about DeVilla because it was overtaken by the case
of Pp v Umanito and Rules on DNA evidence.

PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ

Accused was charged with illegal possession and sale of illegal

drugs.
A confidential informant arrived at around 4:30 noon and
reported that there is a person who has been selling shabu.
An entrapment team was formed consisting of himself as
poseur buyer, SPO1 Brigido An, PO3 Virgilio Bernardo, PO2
Manny Paulilis and PO1 Cecil Collado.

The team was dispatched. The money was marked
with Sevillas initials LS. Sevilla offered to buy shabu from
the accused as pampapayat for the marked money of
P100.00, which the latter did furnish him a pack of shabu.
Upon giving the shabu, Sevilla made the warning and the
team busted in, capturing the accused.

On the procedures that was observed by the police
during the taking, the accused was brought to the police
station and the bag of shabu was in Sevillas possession. He
simply marked the shabu with his initials (and to make
matters worse, he marked it not at the site of the crime but
only later at the police station) and turned them over to the
Desk officer of the police station.
Accused now appeals the decisions of the lower courts
convicting him of the charges of selling illegal drugs.
Issue: are the procedural requirements by the Illegal Drugs
Act violated by the police?
HELD: Yes. By such violation, the accused is hereby acquitted.
Non-observance of the requirements of Section 21,
15
paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
and photograph the same in the

presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative
or
counsel,
a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: .
. . Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.
[Emphasis supplied]
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment

employed by peace officers to apprehend prohibited drug
law violators in the act of committing a drug-related offense.
Because of the built-in danger for abuse that a buy-bust
operation carries, it is governed by specific procedures on
the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the
general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of
people under criminal investigation and of the accused
facing a criminal charge are safeguarded. We expressed this
concern in People v. Tan, when we recognized that "by the
very nature of anti-narcotic operations, the need for
entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as
informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or
grams of heroin can be planted in the pockets or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks [planting of evidence], and
the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the
possibility of abuse is great. Thus, the courts have been
exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses." IATSHE
The required procedure on the seizure and custody
of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1)
The apprehending team having

initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of:
a. the accused or the person/s
confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or
counsel,
b. a representative from the
media
c. and the Department of Justice
(DOJ),
d. and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
[Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of

the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165,
which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team
having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory
The records of the present case are bereft of evidence

showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined
procedure despite its mandatory terms, as indicated by the
use of "shall" in its directives.
The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the
trial:
A: We turn [sic] him over to the Desk Officer.

Q:
A:
What did you turn over?
The accused and the evidences
Q: Before you turn over that plastic

sachet Mr. Witness, what did
you put there?

A:
I put my initial and initial of the accused.
Other than the markings that SPO2 Sevilla alleged,

it is clear that no physical inventory and no photograph of
the seized items were taken in the presence of the accused
or his counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elective official. Based
on the above testimony, SPO2 Sevilla the prosecution's
lone witness also did not mark the plastic sachet of shabu
immediately upon seizure; it was only marked upon arrival at
the police station. Thus, other than the stipulation regarding
the handling and results of the specimen at the forensic
laboratory, SPO2 Sevilla's testimony and the evidence he
identified constitute the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution on the handling of the allegedly seized items.
16
We recognize that the strict compliance with the

requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always
be possible under field conditions; the police operates under
varied conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot
at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence. The participation of a
representative from the DOJ, the media or an elected official
alone can be problematic. For this reason, the last sentence
of the implementing rules provides that "non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items". Thus, non-compliance with the strict
directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily
fatal to the prosecution's case; police procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses,
as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable
grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.

The "chain of custody" over the confiscated items was not

proven
Under Section 5, Article II 25 of R.A. No. 9165, the
elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale
of shabu are:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.
Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti the
body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug.
26
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that
unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the
corpus delicti: every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established. The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures
that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed. In a long line of cases, we have considered it fatal
for the prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused.
Black's Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in
this wise:
In evidence, the one who offers real
evidence, such as narcotics in a trial of
drug case, must account for the custody
of the evidence from the moment in
which it reaches his custody until the
moment in which it is offered in

evidence, and such evidence goes to the
weight not to admissibility of evidence.
Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232
N.E.2d 335.
Likewise, Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 30 which implements R.A.
No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly
recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage,
from
the
time
of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
Such is evident in the following testimony:
Q: By the way Mr. Witness after you
turned over to the investigator the plastic
sachet, did you happen to know where the
investigator brought the plastic sachet?

A: I gave that plastic sachet first to the table of the
Desk Officer and the Desk Officer gave it to the
investigator.
Significantly, this was the only testimony in the case that
touched on the chain of custody of the seized evidence. It
failed to disclose the identities of the desk officer and the
investigator to whom the custody of the drugs was given, and
how the latter handled these materials. No reference was
ever made to the person who submitted the seized specimen
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Likewise, no
one testified on how the specimen was handled after the
chemical analysis by the forensic chemist.
The recent case of Lopez v. People 32 is particularly
instructive on how we expect the chain of custody or
"movement" of the seized evidence to be maintained and
why this must be shown by evidence:
17

As a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not

really identifiable, or
when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or
when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness
in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering
without regard to whether the same is advertent
or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain of custody rule.
That the prosecution offered in evidence the

request for laboratory examination
(Exh. "A"), the initial laboratory report (Exh. "B"),
and final Chemistry Report No. D366-03 (Exh. "C"), to which
the defense did not object, has no bearing on the question of
whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis and
subsequently presented in court was the same as that
seized from the appellant. All that these exhibits proved
were the existence and authenticity of the request for
laboratory examination and the results of this examination,
not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of
the evidence. Evidently, the prosecution has not proven
beyond reasonable doubt the indispensable element of

corpus delicti of the crime.

Physical inventory and photograph requirement under
Section 21
vis-a-vis "marking" of seized evidence
While the first sentence of Section 21 (a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 states
that "the apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same,"
the second sentence makes a distinction between
warrantless seizures and seizures by virtue of a warrant,
thus: ASHaTc
(a) . . . Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph
shall be conducted
st
(1 priority)
at the place where the search warrant
is served; or
nd
(2 priority only in cases of

warrantless seizures)
at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the
[Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the venues of the physical inventory and
photography of the seized items differ and depend on
whether the seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant
or through a warrantless seizure such as a buy-bust
operation.
In seizures covered by search warrants, the
physical inventory and photograph must be conducted in the
place where the search warrant was served. On the other
hand, in case of warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust
operation, the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable;
18
however, nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team

from immediately conducting the physical inventory and
photography of the items at the place where they were
seized, as it is more in keeping with the law's intent of
preserving their integrity and evidentiary value.
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its

implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to
ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the
same evidence subjected to inventory and photography
when these activities are undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the
"chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the
seized items to truly ensure that they are the same items
that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons
from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as
well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based
on planting of evidence under Section 29 36 and on
allegations of robbery or theft. 37
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing
by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her
initials and signature on the item/s seized. If the physical
inventory and photograph are made at the nearest police
station or office as allowed by the rules, 38 the inventory
and photography of the seized items must be made in
accordance with Sec. 2 of Board Resolution No. 1, Series of
2002, 39 but
in every case, the apprehended violator or counsel
must be present. Again, this is in keeping with the desired
level of integrity that the handling process requires.
Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope
or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized
items require a different type of handling and/or container.
The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by
the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the
chain of custody.
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA

Accused was charged of selling to a poseur buyer (PO1 Arnel

D. Diocena) shabu for a marked money of P500.00 which
occurred when the police organized a buy-bust operation.
After frisking him, they recovered another sachet of shabu
from him. Diocena marked the first two 'LEM-1' and
'LEM2'while the one taken after the frisk he marked 'LEM-3'
Accused was convicted by the lower courts.
Hence, this appeal was made.

Issue: In this appeal, the accused presents the lone issue of
whether the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 5 and Section
11 of RA No. 9165.
HELD: YES, it did. Accused is hereby acquitted.

1.
The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial

lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the chain
of custody; hence, the guilt of the accused for the
crime charged was not established beyond
reasonable doubt
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court

is material if not indispensable in every prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the
dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by
showing that the dangerous drugs offered in court were the
same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This
rigorous requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain
of custody, performs the function of ensuring that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed. 12 As the Court has expounded i n People v.
Catalan, 13 the dangerous drugs are themselves the corpus
delicti; hence: HITAEC
To discharge its duty of establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus
delicti. That proof is vital to a judgment of
conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does
not comply with the indispensable requirement of
proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also
when there are substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise
doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.

An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust
team did not observe the statutory procedures on preserving
the chain of custody.
I.
Here, the State did not show the

presence during the seizure and
confiscation of the contraband, as
well as during the physical
inventory and photographing of
the
contraband,
of
the
representatives from the media or
the Department of Justice, or of
any elected public official. Such
presence was precisely necessary
to insulate the apprehension and
incrimination proceedings from
any taint of illegitimacy or
irregularity.
It is notable that PO1
Diocena,
although
19
II.
specifically
recalling
having
marked
the
confiscated sachets of
shabu with the initials of
the accused immediately
after the seizure, did not
state, as the following
excerpts
from
his
testimony indicate, if he
had made his marking in
the presence of the
accused himself or of his
representative, and in the
presence
of
a
representative from the
media or the Department
of Justice, or any elected
public official
In all, the buy-bust team
had about 48 days the
period
intervening
between July 10, 2007,
when the test buy was
conducted, and August
28, 2007, when the crimes
charged were committed
within which to have
the media and the
Department of Justice be
represented during the
buy-bust operation, as
well as to invite an
elected public official of
the place of operation to
witness the operation. It
puzzles
the
Court,
therefore, that the buy-
bust team did not
prudently follow the
procedures outlined in
Section 21 (1), supra,
despite
their
being
experienced policemen
who knew the significance
of the procedures in the
preservation of the chain
of custody
Secondly, the records nowhere
indicated, contrary to the claim of
P/Insp. Lim, that the buy-bust
team, or any member thereof, had
conducted the physical inventory
of the confiscated items. We know
this because the State's formal
offer of evidence did not include
such inventory,
Without the inventory
having been made by the
III.
seizing
lawmen,
it
became doubtful whether
any shabu had been
seized from the accused
at all.
And, thirdly, although PO1 Diocena
asserted that photographs of the
confiscated items and the marked
money were taken at the police
station, 20 it still behooved him to
justify why the photographs of the
seized shabu was not taken
immediately upon the seizure, and
at the place of seizure. The State
did not explain this lapse. The
pictorial evidence of the latter kind
would
have
more
firmly
established the identity of the
seized shabu for purposes of
preserving the chain of custody.
PEREZ V. ALCUIZAR
Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (illegal

sale), 6 (maintaining a drug den), 11 (illegal possession) and
12 (illegal possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia
During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the
genuineness, authenticity and truthfulness of the Forensic
Chemistry Report. Both parties thus agreed to dispense with
the testimony of the forensic chemist
The lone witness for the prosecution, SPO1 Meliton
Agadier (SPO1 Agadier), testified on the following facts:
SPO1 Agadier, PO3 Rolando Gantuangco (PO3
Gantuangco), SPO1 Roland Navales (SPO1 Navales), who
were all assigned at the Municipality of Carcar Police Station
in Cebu City, secured a search warrant 5 from the court to
search the house of appellant on the suspicion that the latter
is selling and in possession of shabu. On 15 June 2003, they
first conducted a buy-bust operation in Sitio Awayan. The
subject of the operation is appellant.
SPO1 Agadier was standing in a store across the
house of appellant. He witnessed the poseur buyer hand the
marked money to appellant in exchange for one deck of
shabu. 6 Upon the consummation of the sale, SPO1 Agadier
immediately pursued appellant, who ran to his parents'
house where he was eventually caught. After effecting the
arrest, SPO1 Agadier and his team went back to the house
of appellant to conduct a search. 7 The items recovered
inside appellant's house were one (1) big heat-sealed
transparent plastic pack with white crystalline substance
believed to be shabu, two (2) packs containing thirteen (13)
decks each of suspected shabu, three (3) disposable
lighters, a tooter, a tin foil with traces of shabu residue, and
an improvised lamp. E
20
SPO1 Agadier related that appellant, appellant's

sister-in-law, one barangay captain, o n e barangay tanod,
and several photographers were present during the
implementation of the search warrant. 9 A receipt of the
seized items was prepared and the barangay captain,
barangay tanod, and two (2) photographers were asked to
sign the receipt. The seized items were initially in the custody
of SPO1 Navales. Upon reaching the police station, SPO1
Navales turned them over to SPO1 Agadier for marking. SPO1
Agadier prepared the request for laboratory examination
before turning them over back to SPO1 Navales, who then
delivered the items and the request to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. 10 Forensic Chemistry Report
No. D-983-03 was issued confirming that the specimen
submitted are positive for shabu.
The trial court held that the prosecution has clearly

proven that appellant was guilty of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs since the plastic packs of shabu were found
inside his room. The trial court relied on the presumption that
when prohibited drugs are found in a house or building
belonging to and occupied by a particular person, such
person is in possession of such drugs in violation of the law.
Appellant cites the failure of the police officer to
mark the evidence immediately after purportedly taking it
from him. This omission, appellant contends, renders the
chain of custody dubious.
SPO1 Agadier admitted that he only marked the
seized items at the police station. While the rule allows
marking of evidence to be done in the nearest police station,
this contemplates a case of warrantless searches and
seizures. 24 In this case, the police officers were able to
secure a search warrant prior to their operation. SPO1
Agadier did not offer an explanation or a justification on why
he did not immediately mark the plastic packs of shabu
seized inside appellant's house notwithstanding that an
inventory receipt was even prepared while the police officers
were still inside the house of appellant. They were given
sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its
implementation. Thus, failure to comply with the marking of
evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes a first
gap in the chain of custody.
Appellant also points out the failure of the police
officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory receipt upon
the accused or any of his family members pursuant to
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Adherence to the guidelines under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 relating to custody and disposition of
confiscated or seized dangerous drugs accounts for a crucial
link in the chain of custody rule. It provides: HcDaAI
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA

shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia
and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
1. The apprehending team
having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and
confiscation,
physically
inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from
whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.
But it was provided further under Section 21 (a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 that non-compliance with the
prescribed procedures does not necessarily result in the
conclusion that the identity of the seized drugs has been
compromised so that an acquittal should follow as long as the
prosecution can demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved.
SPO1 Agadier narrated that a certain photographer
took pictures of the items seized from the house of
appellant. However, the photograph/s do not appear on the
records nor were they offered by the prosecution as
evidence. Thus, the requirement of taking a photograph was
not clearly proven. Anent the inventory receipt, while it was
prepared and appeared on records, the police officers failed
to provide appellant a copy of the inventory receipt.
Appellant construed this omission as fatal.
This omission alone is not necessarily fatal to the

cause of the prosecution. However, this Court cannot ignore
Custody and Disposition
of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
the nagging doubt created in our mind with respect to the
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
barangay tanod's testimony pertaining to the inventory
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
receipt which affects the integrity of the corpus delicti in
general.
Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or
He testified:
Section 21.
21

Q: On June 15, 2003, could you please
witness wherein the policemen
tell us whether you were there
went there?
when the police officers of

A:
That is right. 25
Carcar implemented the search

Note from the testimony of the barangay tanod
warrant against him for
that he and the barangay captain arrived later than the
violation of RA 9165, the Anti-
police officers. And when they reached appellant's house,
Drugs Law?
confiscated
shabu were already on top of a table.
A:
We were there but we arrived the
late atlleged
han the
policemen.
He was merely asked to sign the inventory receipt, which he

did without hesitation. As can be gleaned from his
Q: Nevertheless, Mr. Witness, when you
testimony, the barangay tanod did not witness how the
arrived what did you observe
police officers conducted their search and how they were
there at the place of Alberto
able to discover the packets of shabu inside appellant's
Alcuizar, if you remember?
house. Aside from the barangay tanod, no other signatories
A: When we arrived there we were
in the receipt were presented by the prosecution to
provided with flashlights and
authenticate the document.
we were told to assist them in
This second gap in the chain of custody was evident
looking for shabu.
in SPO1 Agadier's statements.
Q:
What happened next after you were given flashlights to look
Verily, the failure of the police officers to mark the
for shabu? DAEaTS
dangerous drugs immediately after their seizure and the
A:
I was continuously looking but I did not find any.
vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier concerning the custody
Q: How about the policemen, did they
of the drugs from the residence of appellant up to the time it
recover shabu in that house of
was submitted to the crime laboratory constitute a huge and
Alberto Alcuizar, Mr. Witness?
significant gap in the chain of custody which substantially
A: When we arrived the alleged shabu
affects the identity of the corpus delicti.
were already on top of the

table.
Q: You were only told by the police that
there was shabu on top of the
PEOPLE V. RIVERA
table?
Again this is a buy-bust operation.
A: No, we were not told by the
policemen but we were told to
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 21
sign before we left.
October 2002, a confidential informer personally appeared at
Q:
What is the affixing of signature stheir
tands police
for according
the police? information was relayed to
station. to
Confidential
A: He told us that the document we
PO2 Allan Llantino of the District Drug Enforcement Unit,
signed was to attest only that
Northern Police District Office, Larangay, Caloocan City that
we were there and assist the
one alias 'Boy' was selling shabu. Said information was then
apprehension. I do not know
relayed to the Chief of the Station Police, Superintendent
that it refers to the shabu.
Reynaldo B. Orante, who immediately ordered PO2 Llantino
to organize a team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Q:
It was only the policemen who
pointed you the shabu on top
PO2 Llantino was designated as poseur-buyer while the rest
of the table?
of the team served as his back-up. One marked one hundred
A: They did not also tell us, they just asked us to
peso bill was used for the operation.

sign.

Accused and the confiscated drug was brought to the

Q:
They never told you that they were Caloocan
able to recover
shabu?
Police
Station. PO2 Llantino turned over the
A:
No, sir.
confiscated plastic sachet containing the white crystalline
Q: You only assumed that what was put
substance to the investigator who put his markings "BB"
on the table colored white is
(meaning buy-bust) and made a laboratory request.
shabu, Mr. Witnes?
We, however, find no cogent reason to warrant the acquittal
A:
I only believe that it was the shabu.
of accusedappellant in this case and reversal of the findings
Q: Nevertheless, Mr. Witness, you only
of the trial and appellate courts. The case records support the
went there not to the fact as
conclusion that prosecution was able to discharge its burden
of establishing with moral certainty the presence of all the
witness to the recovery of
elements necessary for the conviction of herein accused-
shabu, you thought all the
appellant for the illegal sale of shabu.
while you were there as
22
In prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited or

dangerous drugs, what determines if there was a sale of
dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the
elements of the offense. Conviction is proper if the following
elements concur:
counsel, a representative from the

media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the
(Emphasis ours.) IcDHaT
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,

(2) the object, and the consideration; and
(3) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.

What is material is proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus
delicti as evidence.

Moreover, the chain of custody is unbroken and
thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved. dangerous drugs is outlined in Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which
stipulates:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation,
physically
inventory
and
photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or
seized,
or
his/her
representative or counsel, a
representative from the media
and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy
thereof. CTEDSI
The same is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately
after
seizure
and
confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or
The failure of the prosecution to show that the

police officers conducted the required physical inventory
and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to
said guidelines, is NOT fatal and does not automatically
render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the
implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso
added that 'noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items'. The
same provision clearly states as well, that it must still be
shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable
reasons existed, if any, since the defense did not raise this
issue during trial. 40 Be that as it may, this Court has
explained in People v. Del Monte 41 that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition
sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction. 42 Thus, it is essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.
The chain of custody requirement performs the function of
ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as
to the identity of the evidence are removed

PEOPLE V. GARCIA
Buy Bust operation of marijuana.

Garcia and the others arrived at the area of operation for the
23
accused to arrive on board a red scooter. Garcia told the

accused that he will buy P200.00 worth of marijuana, as
agreed upon between the confidential informer and the
accused. The accused in turn gave Garcia the marijuana
wrapped in a yellow page of the PLDT directory. Garcia
verified the contents thereof and thereafter gave the
P200.00, consisting of two P100.00 bills earlier given for him
to use as buy-bust money . . . whose serial numbers were
listed in the dispatch order . . . Garcia then gave the signal to
his companions for them to approach. He also arrested the
accused whom he told of his rights and brought him to a
lyingin clinic and then to the police headquarters
and photograph the same in the

presence of the accused or the person/s
representative
or
counsel,
a
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the
[Emphasis supplied.]
According to PO1 Garcia, after the arrest, they brought Ruiz

to the DEU 7 office for investigation. He (PO1 Garcia) turned
over the seized items to the investigator, who then placed
markings on the wrapper. 8 The seized items were thereafter
sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination; they
tested positive for marijuana
The lower courts convicted him of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.
[ISSUE] Ruiz Garcia argues, among others, that: (f) there was
no compliance with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 or the chain of
custody rule on seized drugs.
HELD: Ruiz is acquitted from the charge.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the
police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of evidence requirement
of this Act.
The records utterly fail to show that the buy-bust

team complied with these procedures despite their
mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the
directives of the law and its implementing rules. The
procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimony of
PO1 Garcia. ITcCSA
Testifying on the handling of the seized marijuana,
he stated that:
The first procedural safeguard that the police failed

to observe (and which both the RTC and the CA failed to take
into account) is that provided under paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. This provision states:
Q: So what happened to the pack of

marijuana that you were able
to buy from the accused?
1) The apprehending team having initial custody

and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and
confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were
representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis
supplied.]
A: I turned it over to our investigator

and then he placed markings
on the wrapper.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.

No. 9165 further elaborate on the legal requirement by
providing, under its Section 21 (a), that:
(a) The apprehending office/team
having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory
xxx xxx xxx

Q: I am handing to you now the
improvise [sic] wrapper. Is this
the marking that you placed?

A:
Yes, sir, RP-1.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: What happened after you have
seized the item from the
accused or after you have
recovered this and placing [sic]
markings?
A:
It was sent to the PNP Crime

24

Laboratory for
examination. 23
laboratory
crime scene to the lying-in center, and from the lying-in

center to the police station. DTEHIA
(b)
Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the
police investigator (whose identity was not disclosed),
no physical inventory was ever made in the

presence of the accused, and
no photograph of the seized items was
taken in the presence of the accused under
the circumstances required by R.A. No.
9165 and its implementing rules.
Also, while there was marking made, no
mention whatsoever was made on whether
the marking had been done in the presence
of Ruiz or his representatives.
Also, no mention was made that any
Department of Justice, or any elected
official had been present during this
inventory, or that any of these people had
been required to sign the copies of the
inventory.
The records utterly fail to show that the buy-bust team

complied with these procedures despite their mandatory
nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of
the law and its implementing rules.
"Chain of Custody" means the duly
recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage,
from
the
time
of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and used in court as
evidence, and the final disposition;
(a)
The first crucial link in the chain of custody

The first crucial link was from the time the
marijuana was seized by PO1 Garcia to its delivery to the
police investigator at the police headquarters. Only PO1
Garcia testified to this link. From his own testimony, he did
not mark the seized marijuana after it was handed to him by
Ruiz; he only marked it at the police station when he turned
it over to the investigator. In the interim, he and the rest of
the buy-bust team had taken Ruiz to a lying-in clinic for
medical examination. The evidence does not show who was
in possession of the marijuana during the ride from the
The second link in the chain of custody

The second link in the chain of custody of the
seized marijuana is from PO1 Garcia to the police
investigator. The identity of this police investigator to whom
the custody of the seized marijuana was turned over was not
disclosed. Although a reading of the Memorandum dated
February 28, 2003 shows that a certain Ferdinand Lavadia
Balgoa, as Police Inspector Chief SDEU, prepared the request
for the laboratory examination of the seized marijuana to
the PNP Crime Laboratory, this piece of evidence does not
establish the latter's identity as the police inspector to
whom PO1 Garcia turned over the marijuana, and who
subsequently made the corresponding markings on the
seized items.
(c)
The subsequent links in the chain of custody

The evidence on record relating to the subsequent
links in the chain of custody from the police inspector to
the PNP Crime Laboratory did not identify the person who
submitted the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. Whether it was the Police Inspector Chief
SDEU is not clear from the evidence that only shows that he
signed the request for the laboratory examination of the
seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. At the same
time, the identity of the person who had the custody and
safekeeping of the seized marijuana, after it was chemically
analyzed pending its presentation in court, was also not
disclosed.
In this regard, Sections 3 46 and 6 47 (paragraph 8)
of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 2003
48 require laboratory personnel to document the chain of
custody each time a specimen is handled or transferred until
the specimen is disposed. The board regulation also requires
the identification of the individuals participating in the chain.
The available records in the case fail to show compliance
with this regulation.
Pp vs Casimiro

FACTS:
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named
Rose, walked into the office of Police Chief Inspector
Benson Dagiw-a Leleng at the 14th Regional Narcotics
Office, DPS Compound in Baguio City. She informed Chief
Inspector Leleng and PO3 Juan Piggangay that a certain
Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant herein, was engaged in
the distribution or sale of marijuana. As proof, Rose told
the police officers to wait and accused-appellant would call
them up on that day. Accused-appellant, however, did not
call up. Nonetheless, Police Chief Inspector Leleng formed
a buy-bust team.
25
The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again

told the Narcotics agents to wait for a call from accused-
appellant. True enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the telephone
rang. When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he found
that it was accused- appellant who was calling. Rose
introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa to accused-
appellant as someone who wanted to buy marijuana.
Accused-appellant allegedly agreed to meet PO2 Supa at
around 1:00 p.m. the following day. PO2 Supa said he
wanted to buy one kilogram of marijuana and accused-
appellant said it would cost P1,500.00.
On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2

Supa and Rose went to the grocery store. SPO2 Madlon and
PO3 Piggangay waited secretly inside the Post Office
building, around 12 meters across the street, where they
could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At around 1:30 p.m.,
accused-appellant arrived.
PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and
asked for the marijuana. Accused- appellant gave the
poseur-buyer a paper bag, which contained an object
wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After determining from
its appearance and smell that the object inside was
marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up team to
make an arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no
longer gave the marked money to accused-appellant
because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to him
his rights, while the back-up team ran from across the
streets.
After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen
took him to the 14th Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2
Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the
brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence
custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and
arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory
examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also
prepared a "receipt of property seized,"
Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the
assistance of counsel. The dried leaves were then
examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Cordillera
Administrative Region.
The trial court rendered a decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE: WON the evidence against the accused is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes.
First. With respect to the receipt of property
seized from accused-appellant, the receipt states that a
brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the
suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant
Albert Casimiro as " suspect/ owner. " In effect, accused -
appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to

another, which is an offense under the law. Having been
made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be
accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is
inadmissible in evidence. An uncounseled statement is
presumed by the Constitution to be psychologically
coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and
surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the
guiding hand of counsel.
Second. Nor is there other credible evidence
against accused-appellant. As he points out, he could not
have been so careless as to call the telephone number of
the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to
the policemen there. Nor can we believe that when
accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed
place, Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one
who wanted to buy marijuana as if the latter were buying
something not prohibited or illegal. While drugs may
indeed be sold to police officers, these transactions are
usually done face to face. It is improbable that a drug
dealer would discuss the details of an illegal sale over the
telephone with someone he has never seen before.
Third. The prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a
drug- related case.
In People v. Dismuke, this Court ruled that the
failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana examined
by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused
was fatal to the prosecution's case.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the
crucial first link in the chain of custody. The prosecution
witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay
admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of
marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it from
accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did so
in their headquarters. The narcotics field test, which
initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was
likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only
at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to
whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant
is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in
their headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory for examination.
According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw
accused-appellant give PO2 Supa was colored gray or blue,
the same color as that of the bag sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service for laboratory examination. PO2 Supa
stated, however, that the bag of marijuana which accused-
appellant was carrying in the grocery was colored brown.
The discrepancy in the testimony of these two police
officers casts additional doubt on the identity of the
prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti.
26

We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not

the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence
rule. Such testimony is admissible.
Air france vs carascoso

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group
of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
traveled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class'
seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who,
the Manager alleged, had a 'better right to the seat. When
asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that
his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of
the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to
give his seat to the 'white man; and plaintiff reluctantly
gave his 'first class' seat in the plane.
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebooks
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused
to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's
testimony above] which is incompetent.
Petitioner assails respondent court's award of
moral damages and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith.
On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
declared:
"That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the
first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant AirFrance while at Bangkok, and was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the
purser of the plane in his NOTEBOOK
ISSUE:
incompetent
WON
Carrascosos
testimony
RULING:
was
When the dialogue happened, the impact of the

startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be
felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and
mental and physical condition of the declarant". The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed.
It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms
part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the
Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have
contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true
that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony
of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
PP vs Tan
FACTS:
Respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others

are charged with the crime of falsification of public
documents, in their capacities as public officials and
employees, by having made it appear that certain relief
supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Pacita
Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or
sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and from
such business establishments or persons as are made to
appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in
truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as
valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal
Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever
been made.
In order to prove the charge of falsification, the
prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts of
the Metro Drug Corporation, Magallanes corner Jakosalem,
Cebu City. The booklet contained the triplicate copies, and
according to said witness the original invoices were sent to
the Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the
customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the
booklet. Witness further explained that in preparing
receipts for sales, two carbons were used between the
three sheets, the original, the duplicate and the triplicate,
so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by
the used of the carbons in the course of the preparation
27
and signing of the originals. The witness giving the

testimony was the salesman who issued the triplicates.
H o n . B i e n v e n i d o M . Ta n , t h e n p r e s i d i
n g i n t h e c o u r t b e l o w , interrupted the proceeding
holding that the triplicates are not admissible unless it is
first proven that the originals were lost and can not be
produced.
After the cross-examination of the last witness,
the prosecution again went back to the identification of the
triplicate invoice. It was at this stage that the judge below
told the prosecution that the law applicable is Section 46,
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
production of the originals. In response to the above
ruling, the special prosecutor claimed that the evidence of
the prosecution the originals on account of their loss.
ISSUE: WON the carbon copy of the invoice is
admissible
RULING:
The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has
long been a settled question and we need not elaborate on
the reasons for the rule. This matter has received
consideration from the foremost commentator on the
Rules of Court thus:
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or
more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a
contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of
the party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon
the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced
by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or
exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are
regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be
introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.'
The said confession Exhibit B, being carbon copy
of the original and bearing as it does the signature of the
appellant, is admissible in evidence and possess all the
probative value of the original, and the same does not
require an accounting for the non-production of the
original.
Two principal authors on the law on evidence
have sustained the theory of the admissibility of duplicate
originals, as follows:
"SEC. 386. . . . the best evidence rule is that rule
which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to
prove a disputed fact p. 616. A "duplicate sales slip has
been held to be primary evidence"
SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. Where letters are
produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with the
original, duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon
paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface at

the same time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of
them may be introduced in evidence without accounting
for the nonproduction of the other.
"SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at
the same time and on the same machine as the original, are
duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much
primary evidence as the originals.
We find that the ruling of the court below to the
effect that the triplicates formed by the used of carbon
papers are not admissible in evidence, without accounting
first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and must be
reversed.
PP vs Tandoy
FACTS:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr.

of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la
Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor
Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines,
Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-
bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas,
Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street,
and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone
near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The
other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of
them was the accused-appellant, who said without
preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said
yes. The exchange was made then and there two
rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00
bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the
accused-appellant and took from him the marked money,
as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed
leaves.
The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after
having been informed of his constitutional rights.
Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic
examination was performed on the confiscated marijuana.
The marijuana was offered as an exhibit.
ISSUE: WON the best evidence rule should apply
in the presentation of a Xerox copy of the marked P10 bill
RULING:
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said
28
marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec.

2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes
the introduction of secondary evidence except in the five
(5) instances mentioned therein.p
Thus, the issue of whether the company should

pay for the stevedoring service became a sore point of
contention between the parties.
The best evidence rule applies only when the

contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was
actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence
rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Plaintiff company's evidence. Jose C. Teves, the

company's branch manager at Iligan City, testified that on
August 24, 1954 he terminated the arrastre and
stevedoring contract with the union (Exh. J) upon
instruction of the head office. The contract was terminated
in order to avoid further losses to the company caused by
the union's inefficient service
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented

by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing
its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
The company supposedly suffered losses as a

result of the union's inefficient service since September 1,
1954 Teves hired auditors to ascertain the losses suffered
by the company during the period from January 1 to
September 11, 1954.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the

"buy-bust money" w as not indispensable to the conviction
of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana
had been adequately proved by the testimony of the police
officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the
failure to produce the marked money itself would not
constitute a fatal omission.
The trial court awarded actual damages

amounting to P450,000 on the basis of the auditor's
reports, Exhibits A to I. It did not carefully examine the
said exhibits. Contrary to the trial court's impression,
Exhibits B, C and D are not auditors' reports.
Compania Maritima vs Allied Free

Workers Union

FACTS:
On August 11, 1952 the Compaia Maritima and
the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written
contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre
and stevedoring work for the company's vessels at Iligan
City.
It was stipulated that the company could revoke
the contract before the expiration of the term if the union
failed to render proper service.
The union agreed to the stipulation that the
company would not be liable for the payment of the
services of the union "for the loading, unloading and
deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such
services would be paid "by the owners and consignees of
the cargoes" as "has been the practice in the port of Iligan
City"
The union found out later that stipulation was
oppressive and that the company was unduly favored by
that arrangement.
Under the contract, the work of the union
consisted of arrastre and stevedoring services.
The trial court did not bother to make a

breakdown of the alleged damages totalling P450,000. The
reports of the two hired accountants, Demetrio S. Jayme
and M. J. Siojo, show the following alleged damages in the
aggregate amount of P349,245.37.

ISSUES: WON the report of the accountants were
admissible
RULING:
The best evidence on the cost of the said
equipment would have been the sales invoices instead of
the oral testimony of Teves. He did not produce the sales
invoices.
On the basis of the reports of the two accountants,
the damages claimed by the company, as a matter of
simple addition, does not reach the sum of P450,000 fixed
by the trial court. The damages shown in the accountants'
reports and in the statement made by the company's chief
clerk (who did not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or
much less than P450,000.
The company argues that the accountants' reports
are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when
the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole", the
original writings need not be produced.
That rule cannot be applied in this case because
29
the voluminous character of the records, on which the

accountants' reports were based, was not duly established.
It is also a requisite for the application of the rule

that the records and accounts should be made accessible to
the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary
may be tested on cross-examination.
What applies to this case is the general rule "that
an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records,
books of accounts, reports or the like"
That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case
because the company failed to make a preliminary
showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the
production of the records in court and their examination
and analysis as evidence by the court
A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports
reveals their lack of probative value.
Jayme used the pronouns "we" and "our" and
made reference to the examination made by the "auditors"
and his accounting office. He did not disclose the names of
other "auditors" who assisted him in making the
examination of the company's records.
He gave the impression that he was an
independent accountant hired by the company. The truth
is that Jayme was a "personal friend" of Teves, the
company's branch manager at Iligan City. Teves was the
company's principal witness in this case.
He suppressed that fact in his report of
examination. Apparently, the practice of accounting was
his sideline or he practiced accounting and, as the saying
goes, he moonlighted as the company's branch manager.
Obviously, Jayme would be biased for the company. He
violated a rule of the accountants' code of ethics by not
disclosing in his report of examination that he was an
employee of the company.
Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of
lading proving that the company was not able to collect the
stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should
have been presented in evidence as supporting papers for
Jayme's report. No such exhibits were presented.
Damages computed by Salvador M. Magante.
The trial court erred in allowing the damages
totalling P82,680.12 because Magante's statement, Exhibit
B, is hearsay. Magante should have been presented as a
witness.
More appropriate still, the documents and records
on which the statement was based should have been
presented as evidence or at least brought to the court for
examination by the union's counsel and its accountant.

Lost freight revenue and operating expenses for
the forklifts. The said damages were computed in the
reports of Miguel J. Siojo, an accountant who, for two days
and nights, March 8 to 10, 1960, or shortly before and
during the trial, allegedly examined the company's record
at Iligan City, such as its cash book, cash vouchers, reports
to the head office, shipping manifests, and liquidation
reports. Those records were not produced in court. Their
non-production was not explained. If the accountant was
able to summarize the contents of those records in two
days, they could not have been very voluminous. They
should have been offered in evidence.
To avoid fraud or fabrication, the documents
evidencing the alleged expenses should have been
presented in evidence. Siojo's reports were not the best
evidence on the said operating expenses.
Consolidated Bank vs Del Monte

FACTS:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC
of Manila a complaint for recovery of sum of money
against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent
Narciso O. Morales. Petitioner, a domestic banking and
trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it
extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a
promissory note executed by respondents on the same
date. Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte
Motor Works, I nc. (respondent corporation) and Morales
bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner
the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly
installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged
at 23% per annum.
As respondents defaulted on their monthly
installments, the full amount of the loan became due and
demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note.
Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes
"A," "B," and "C," respectively, a photocopy of the
promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a
copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20
January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to
respondents' loan.
During the trial on the merits of this case,
petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A.
Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection
Department.
Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for
petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the
promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit "A;"
30
petitioner's 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as

Exhibit "B;" Tolentino's letter to petitioner dated 10
February 1983 and marked as Exhibit "C;" and the 09
March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents
marked as Exhibit "D.
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal

offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit
"A" could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the
admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note
which was identified and marked as Exhibit "E."
Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit "E"
should not have been admitted as it was immaterial,
irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay
evidence.
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately
filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that
with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E," petitioner no
longer possessed any proof of respondents' alleged
indebtedness.
The courts below ruled in favor of respondents
and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: WON the courts below erred in ruling that
the respondents were able to specifically deny under oath
the allegations in petitioners complaint.
RULING:
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to
specifically deny the allegations in petitioner's complaint
in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect,
respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory
note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling
of the trial court that the "best evidence rule or primary
evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to
establish the terms of the writing meaning the alleged
promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the
money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents
herein)."
The "best evidence rule" is encapsulated in Rule
130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
( c ) W h e n t h e o r ig in a l c o n s is t s o f n u m e
r o u s a c c o u n t s o r o t h e r documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The "best evidence rule," according to Professor
Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one
case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating
that they should take into consideration the usages of
trade and that "the best proof that the nature of the thing
will afford is only required."
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules
of evidence, "the only actual rule that the 'best evidence'
phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production
of the original writing" the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the
exact words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts,
since a slight variation in words may mean a great
difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral
testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a
writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the
case of attempts at describing other situations generally. In
the light of these dangers of mistransmission,
accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting
the writing itself, the preference for the original writing is
justified.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission
of the contents of a writing is the justification for the "best
evidence rule," we declare that this rule finds no
application to this case. It should be noted that
respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of
the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far
as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or
content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for
disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents'
principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration
of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales
also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal
capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the
"precise wording" of the promissory note which should
have paved the way for the application of the "best
31
evidence rule." It was, therefore, an error for the Court of

Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this
point.
Besides, the "best evidence rule" as stated in our

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted
earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when
the original of the subject document is in the possession of
the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its
motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the
court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the
original of Exhibit "A" was in the possession of
respondents which would have called into application one
of the exceptions to the "best evidence rule."
Significantly, and as discussed earlier,
respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the
promissory note. This being the case, there was no need
for petitioner to present the original of the promissory
note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to
the genuineness and execution of the promissory note
sufficiently established their liability to petitioner
regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the
original of said note.
Arceo vs PP

FACTS:
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan
from private complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the amount
of P100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter, [petitioner]
obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal].
[Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the
Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated
August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizal's house located
at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991
came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately
because [petitioner] promised [] that he would replace the
check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven
(7) times. When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the
check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated
December 5, 1991, informed [Cenizal] that the check
bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of
[petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the check but
[Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left the place. So,
[Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a
letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to
pay the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to
make good the amount of the check. As a consequence,
[Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and
submitted documents in support of his complaint for
[e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner].

The check in question and the return slip were
however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred
near his residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal]
executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the
check in question and the return slip.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate
courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
prosecution to present the dishonored check during the
trial.
ISSUE: WON the failure to present the dishonored
bill was fatal to the case of the prosecution
RULING:
Petitioner's insistence on the presentation of the
check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for
conviction under BP 22 is wrong.
Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where
the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry.
Where the issue is the execution or existence of the
document or the circumstances surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing
and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the
inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not
its content. THCSEA
Here, the due execution and existence of the check
were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he
presented the originals of the check, the return slip and
other pertinent documents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his
complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.
The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against
petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the
corresponding information based on the documents.
Although the check and the return slip were among the
documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his
residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless
able to adequately establish the due execution, existence
and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of
loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admitted that he
issued the check. He never denied that the check was
presented for payment to the drawee bank and was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds.
32
Sps Santos vs Alcazar

FACTS:
In February 2001, respondent Lolita Alcazar,
proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted
through her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaint for
sum of money against the petitioners, spouses Fernando
and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint and
construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC
amounting to P1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid
despite written demand.
Respondent's cause of action is based on a
document entitled "Acknowledgment" apparently
executed by hand by petitioner Fernando.
In their Answer, petitioners sought the dismissal
of the Complaint
On November 8, 2005, respondent presented her
evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. On
November 21, 2005, she made a formal offer of her
evidence and rested her case.
Petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which
respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that the
Acknowledgment respondent's Exhibit "A" which was
presented in court was not an original copy and thus
inadmissible; petitioners' receipt of the written demand
was not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and
construction materials were not covered by delivery
receipts; and respondent's testimony was merely hearsay
and uncorroborated.
The CA held that petitioners failed to deny
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the Acknowledgment; consequently, 1) its genuineness
and due execution are deemed admitted, 2) there was thus
no need to present the original thereof, and 3) petitioners'
liability was sufficiently established.
Petitioners, in their Petition and Reply, assert that
during the proceedings below, only a photocopy of the
Acknow ledgment w as presented and identified by
respondent even as the original was not lost, the same
having been made part of the record of the case when
respondent's evidence was first presented ex parte. For
this reason, they argue that the photocopy presented and
offered in evidence is inadmissible and could not be the
basis for arriving at a finding of liability on their part,
pursuant to the best evidence rule.
ISSUE: WON presentation of a mere photocopy of
the Acknowledgment materially affects the outcome of the
case.
RULING:
Respondent's failure to present the original copy
of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony
for the second time, and the presentation of a mere
photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially
affect the outcome of the case. It was a mere procedural
inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect
petitioners' cause in any manner. As conceded by them
and as held by the CA, the original exists and was made
part of the records of the case when respondent's evidence
was first taken. Though respondent now claims that she
had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document
resides in the record. This would explain then why
respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the
court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there
is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of
the photocopy that was presented and identified in court;
petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is
inadmissible as a result of respondent's failure to present
the original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is
found and included in the record of the case.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the
original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no
harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof
are authenticated, identified and formally off ered in
evidence by the party proponent.
More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed
to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The
effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of
the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. "By the
admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such
document] is meant that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by
law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,
which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as
that the signature is a forgery . .
.; or that it was unauthorized . . .; or that the party
charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than
that alleged in the pleading setting it out . . .; or that it was
never delivered . . ., are cut off by the admission of its
genuineness and due execution."
"There is no need for proof of execution and
authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness
and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse
party." With the consequent admission engendered by
petitioners' failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment
in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication,
identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention
petitioners' admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their
Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the
33
Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the

document, and there is no need to present receipts and
other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness. The
Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment
receipt, is "valid and binding between the parties who
executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement
they had entered into." The absence of rebutting evidence
occasioned by petitioners' w aiver of their right to present
evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best
evidence of the transactions between the parties and the
consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect of
the admission is such that "a prima facie case is made for
the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of
evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the
pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as
payment, is interposed by the defendant."
As for petitioners' claim that in CA-G.R. CV No.

87935, the same division of the CA made a complete
turnaround from its original pronouncement in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71187 thus doing away with the requirement of
presenting receipts and statements of account which it
originally required in the latter case, the Court finds no
irregularity in this. The admission of liability resulting
from petitioners' admission of indebtedness in their
Answer and other pleadings, their failure to specifically
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgment, as well as their waiver of their right to
present evidence all these did away with the necessity
of producing receipts and statements of account which
would otherwise be required under normal circumstances.
HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ

represented by EDRONEL DELA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ,
FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both
surnamed MADRID, respondents.

FACTS:
On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action
for reconveyance with damages against private
respondents involving a parcel of land.
In their complaint, petitioners assert that the
subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest
from the private respondents, Madrid brothers, for
P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and
since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous
and open possession of the property. However, sometime
in October 1986, much to their dismay and surprise,
private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title
over the said land.
On the other hand, the Madrids denied having
executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said

document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified.
Moreover, while they admit petitioners' possession of the
land, they assert that this possession is in defiance of their
repeated demands that the former relinquish the same.
Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an
innocent purchaser for value of the property having
bought the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976.
During the trial, petitioners were unable to
present the original deed of sale since it was lost.
Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit
"A," a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of
the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction.
However, in disposing of the case, the trial court
ruled that Exhibit "A" was inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE: WON the photocopy is admissible in
evidence and bears probative value.
RULING:
To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the
notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that
the document has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is
imperative that all the originals must be accounted for
before secondary evidence can be presented. These
petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none
of these five copies was even presented during the trial.
Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or
could not be found in the National Archives was not even
supported by any certification from the said office.
It is a well-settled principle that before secondary
evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or
counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the
non- production of the original document itself can be
regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when
Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents failed, not
only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public,
Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon
private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" when
it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To
be sure, even if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value
must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is
to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade
must be considered for admissibility of evidence should
not be confused with its probative value.
Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from
the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. A cursory
glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any
of the parties and undated as to when it was executed.
Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit "A," the
contents were based on an alleged carbon original which
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest presented to him,
34
without bothering to check his own files to verify the

correctness of the contents of the document he was
copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangay's failure to
determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by
the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit
"A" unreliable.
However, despite our prescinding discussion, all
is not lost for the petitioner.
The records show that the disputed property has

been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They
have since been introducing several improvements on the
land which certainly could not have escaped the attention
of the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land
was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners' exclusive claim
of ownership. The construction of various infrastructure
on the land rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements
and other buildings w as undoubtedly a clear exercise of
ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not
one of them protested.
To m a k e m a t t e r s w o r s e , t h e r e c o r d i s
b e r e f t o f a n y documentary evidence that the Madrids
sent a written demand to the petitioners ordering them to
vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a
shout of dissent to the petitioners' possession of the
subject land in a span of almost thirty 30 years is simply
contrary to their claim of ownership.
Petitioners are hereby declared as the legal
owners of the subject land.
MEYERS v US
had financial interest in the corporation or otherwise has

substantial interest in the corporation. Because of the
allegedly perjurious testimony of Mr. Lamarre, he was
charged with three counts of perjury for falsely denying
that Mr. Meyers had interest in the company when in truth
and if fact Mr. Meyers has financial interest in the
corporation. During the arraignment, Mr. Lamarre pleaded
guilty to the charges but he confessed that before he gave
his prejurious testimony before the Senate Investigation
Hearing, he claimed that Mr. Meyers instructed him to lie
under oath. On the basis of this info, three counts of
subornation of perjury were filed against Mr. Meyers. In
the prosecution for subornation of perjury, it is necessary
to establish that someone committed perjury and in the
determination of whether that someone committed
perjury, it is necessary to establish that someone made a
statement under oath during the senate investigation. So
the crucial issue in the subornation of perjury charges of
Mr. Meyers is as to what exactly was the testimony of
Lamarre during the senate investigation. To prove this fact,
the prosecution presented the special counsel who
presided the hearing, the one who examined Mr Y as
witness to testify as to what exactly did Mr. Y testify during
the hearing. Subsequently, the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during the testimony of Mr.
Lamarre were also presented in court.
The accused never raised the issue as to the
admissibility of the testimony of the special counsel. But
since this issue was raised in the dissenting opinion of the
decision, the SC was constrained to address the issue of
whether or not it was proper of the court to admit the
testimony of the special counsel considering that the
transcript of stenographic notes was available in the light
of the best evidence rule.

FACTS:
This involved criminal prosecution for
subornation of perjury. Three counts against Meyers.
Meyers was a government official connected with the
department of defense of the US. Now, after the war and
wanting to investigate reports of corruption perpetrated
by officers of department of defense, the US Senate
conducted an investigation. One of those investigated was
Mr. Meyers who was accused of maintaining financial
interest in a certain business entity which conducted
substantial business transactions with the government.
This corporation, Aviation Electric Corporation, was
engaged in the business of manufacturing airplane parts
and accessories. It was alleged that this corporation
cornered substantial transactions with the government.
One of the witnesses and also accused in the case was Mr.
Lamarre who was the president of Aviation Electric
Corporation. During his testimony before the Senate
Committee, he testified under oath that Mr. Meyer had no
financial interest or has no connection to Aviation Electric.
It was also established that somewhere in the testimony,
he also made a contradictory claim that indeed Mr. Meyer
In this case, the US SC had the occasion to rule

that the best evidence rule applies only to a situation
where the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the
document which is not the case here. The purpose of the
testimony of the special counsel is to prove the exact
testimony of Mr. Lamarre given during the senate
investigation hearing. He was not presented to prove the
contents of the transcript of stenographic notes. While the
exact testimony of Mr. Lamarre could also be proved by
the transcript, it does not mean that the transcript is the
only evidence of that fact. The fact of the exact testimony of
Mr. Lamarre can be proved either by the transcript or
someone who heard him testify. In this case, the special
counsel.

SEILER vs LUCASFILM

FACTS:
35
Lee Seiler (plaintiff), a graphic designer, accused

Lucasfilm (defendant) of copyright infringement with
regard to machines called Imperial Walkers depicted in
The Empire Strikes Back. Seiler claimed that Imperial
Walkers were copied from science fiction creatures he
created and published in 1976 and 1977 called Garthian
Striders. In 1981, Seiler obtained a copyright on the
Garthian Striders, depositing with the Copyright Office
reconstructions of the originals as they as had appeared
in 1976 and 1977. Lucasfilm argued that Seiler did not
obtain his copyright until after The Empire Strikes Back
was released and there is no evidence that Seiler created
the Garthian Striders prior to The Empire Strikes Back.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of the reconstructions of the Striders. It
found that Seiler had lost or destroyed the original
drawings of the Striders in bad faith and under the best
evidence rule, the reconstructions were not admissible.
The district court granted summary judgment to Lucasfilm.
Seiler appealed.

RULING:
Seiler argues that the best evidence rule does not
apply to his work, in that it is artwork rather than
"writings, recordings, or photographs." He contends that
the rule both historically and currently embraces only
words or numbers. Neither party has cited us to cases
which discuss the applicability of the rule to drawings.
To recognize Seiler's works as writings does not,
as Seiler argues, run counter to the rule's preoccupation
with the centrality of the written word in the world of legal
relations. Just as a contract objectively manifests the
subjective intent of the makers, so Seiler's drawings are
objective manifestations of the creative mind. The
copyright laws give legal protection to the objective
manifestations of an artist's ideas, just as the law of
contract protects through its multifarious principles the
meeting of minds evidenced in the contract. Comparing
Seiler's drawings with Lucas' drawings is no different in
principle than evaluating a contract and the intent behind
it. Seiler's "reconstructions" are "writings" that affect legal
relations; their copyright ability attests to that.
A creative literary work, which is artwork, and a
photograph whose contents are sought to be proved, as in
copyright, defamation, or invasion of privacy, are both
covered by the best evidence rule. We would be
inconsistent to apply the rule to artwork which is literary
or photographic but not to artwork of other forms.
Furthermore,
blueprints,
engineering
drawings,
architectural designs may all lack words or numbers yet
still be capable of copyright and susceptible to fraudulent
alteration. In short, Seiler's argument would have us
restrict the definitions of Rule 1001(1) to "words" and
"numbers" but ignore "or their equivalent." We will not do
so in the circumstances of this case.
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON,

petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S.
ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE,
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO
ALVAREZ, JR., respondents.

FACTS:
In their complaint for quieting of title and
damages against Margarita Prodon, 3 the respondents
averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the
registered owners of that parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in
possession of the property during their lifetime; that upon
their parents' deaths, they had continued the possession of
the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due
thereon; that they could not locate the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No.
84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was
intact; that the original copy contained an entry stating
that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had
been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale
with right to repurchase covering the property did not
exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be
cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the
property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the
Register of Deeds of Manila.
Trial Court ruled in favor of it opined that
although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence
in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by
secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or
existence and of the cause of its unavailability being
without bad faith. It found that the defendant had
established the execution and existence of the deed.
ISSUE: whether the pre-requisites for the
admission of secondary evidence had been complied with.
RULING:
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving
the terms of a written document the original of the
document must be produced in court. The rule excludes
any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the
existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
36
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-

production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the
part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is

to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought
before the court, considering that (a) the precision in
presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of
more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills
and contracts, because a slight variation in words may
mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial
hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a
copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects
oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms
of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in
the case of attempts at describing other situations
generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against
fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that
the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes
that its production would expose and defeat. Lastly, the
rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from
the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected
portions of a larger set of writings.
Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of
a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to
its terms, the Best
Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case,
secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title. It
is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or
contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The
principal issue raised by the respondents as the plaintiffs,
which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the
deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.
In the course of the trial, however, a question was
propounded to Prodon as to who had signed or executed
the deed, and the question was objected to based on the
Best Evidence Rule. The RTC then sustained the objection.
At that point began the diversion of the focus in the case.
The RTC should have outrightly overruled the objection
because the fact sought to be established by the requested
testimony was the execution of the deed, not its terms.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not
applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to
address and determine whether the existence, execution,
and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon's

evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined
whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed
as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of
evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove
the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other
than the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon
and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo
Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of
Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the
loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics
still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of
the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed.
This was because the deed, although a collateral document,
was the foundation of her defense in this action for
quieting of title.

BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA,

FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF
EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA
represented by GLICERIA PAPAFRANCISCO, et al., petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and
LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and

Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona,
married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children
and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10,
1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the
disputed parcel of land.
The disputed property was mortgaged by
respondents Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty.
Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the
respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo
Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to
them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated
February 11, 1956.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered
the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in
the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of
Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name
of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the
Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.
37
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was

issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356 (M) was issued in
his name.
it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and

recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the
parties to the instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof.
On September 1, 1980, the respondents wrote to

the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa
Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and
demanded partition thereof on threats that the
respondents would be charged with perjury and/or
falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the
respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe
on April 28, 1959.
After the due execution of the document has been

established, it must next be proved that said document has
been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument
may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss
may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss,
or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court,
a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept
by the person in whose custody the document lost was,
and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that
the instrument is indeed lost.
Petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356
In ruling in favor of the respondents, the trial
court admitted, over the objection of the respondents,
Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged
deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents
selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe
the disputed parcel of land
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners have
satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so
as to allow the presentation of the xerox copy of the same.
RULING:
We rule in the negative.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the
original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution loss; contents although this order
may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the
admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial
discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of
the particular case. 2
A reading of the decision of the trial court shows
that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of
the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to
look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss
or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of
sale.
In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale
of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a
xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document the
same may be established by the person or persons who
executed it, by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be

accounted for before using copies. For, since all the
duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to
be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing
itself can be regarded as established until it appears that
all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the
opponent or by a third person or the like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary
public who notarized the document testified that the
alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies.
Hence, all originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. This,
petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners
merely accounted for three out of four or five original
copies.

COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ANTONIO LAGMAN, respondent.

FACTS:
Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with
the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the
business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay
valued at P5,250,000.00 in his warehouse at Barangay
Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the
General Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval
for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash
bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a
duly authorized bonding company, the amount of which
shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than
thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the
market value of the maximum quantity of rice to be
received.
38
Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance

Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse Bond
No. 03304 for P1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and
Warehouse Bond No. 02355 5 for P749,925.00 on 13
December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio
Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond principal, Lagman
was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through
the NFA was t h e o b l i g e e . I n consideration of these
issuanes, corresponding Indemnity Agreements 6 were
executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban
Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine
(Reguine) and Lagman, as co- signors.
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse
receipts as collateral. 8 When the loan matured, Santos
defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by
the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the
bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country
Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint
for a sum of money.
In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989
Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of their
issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were
never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that
on 5 November 1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse
Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one
year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for
the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels,
and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.
Country Bankers questions the existence of a
third bond, the 1990 Bond, which allegedly cancelled the
1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed
to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has
been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence;
Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved
and processed by Country Bankers; Third, the NFA as bond
obligee was not in possession of the 1990 Bond. Country
Bankers stresses that the cancellation of the 1989 Bonds
requires the participation of the bond obligee.
ISSUE: WON the presentation of a photocopy of
the alleged 1990 bond is admissible in evidence to prove
the alleged novation of the contract
RULING:
The provision in the bonds is but in compliance

with the second paragraph of Section 177 of the Insurance
Code, which specifies that a continuing bond, as in this
case where there is no fixed expiration date, may be
cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the
Insurance Commissioner, and by the court.
The clear import of these provisions is that the
surety bonds in question cannot be unilaterally cancelled
by Lagman.
Lagman's insistence on novation depends on the
validity, nay, existence of the allegedly novating 1990
Bond. Country Bankers understandably impugns both. We
see the point. Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the
1990 Bond. We rule as inadmissible such copy.
Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is
not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its non- production in court;
and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith
to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the
direct examination that there are actually four (4)
duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by
the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in
Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth
was in his possession. A party must first present to the
court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the
non-production of the original instrument. When more
than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of
them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for the
other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and
whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely
presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of
the 1990 Bond but he could no longer produce it because
he had already severed his ties with Country Bankers.
However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by
itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of
the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989
Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman
explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the
three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony.
While he apparently was able to find the original with the
NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing
its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent
efforts to produce the original.
Having discounted the existence and/or validity
of the 1990 Bond, there can be no novation to speak of.
39
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel v. BF

Corporation

FACTS:

Both petitions stemmed from a construction
contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of
Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project 4
that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991.
Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a
monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-
measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress
Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing.
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted
a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure
agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI
paid BF PhP86,501,834.05.
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress
Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re- measure the work done,
did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let
alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In
this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working
continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the
assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already
being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid
billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for
a sum of money and damages.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of BF ordering the
ESHRI, Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon
Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen to pay jointly and severally
respondent BF Corporation (BF) a sum of money with
interests and damages.
ISSUE:
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial
court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the
complementing Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs) and
the Work Variation Orders (WVOs).
Ruling:
The only actual rule that the term "best evidence"
denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing
must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary
evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the
original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced;

exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;S
b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis
added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of
Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse
party's custody or control. If the document is in the
custody or under control of the adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written
instrument or document refers to evidence other than the
original instrument or document itself. A party may
present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing
not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it is in the custody or under the control of the
adverse party. In either instance, however, certain
explanations must be given before a party can resort to
secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the
presentation of the photocopied documents in question as
secondary evidence.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from
the above stenographic notes, to wit: (1) the existence of
the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2)
a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents;
(3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them;
and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case
fall under the exception under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 130. In
other words, the conditions sine qua non for the
presentation and reception of the photocopies of the
original document as secondary evidence have been met.
These are: (1) there is proof of the original document's
execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of
the original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror
is in good faith. While perhaps not on all fours because it
involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v.
40
People is very much apt, thus:
. . . To warrant the admissibility of secondary

evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or
control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable
notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court
and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its
existence.
--xxx--
When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or
refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
admitted.

41
NPC V. CODILLA
For purposes of the Best Evidence rule, to consider

a document as electronic document, ALL the PROCESSES
must be ELECTRONIC.
The processes mentioned here must be free
from any manual intervention. The moment
manual intervention supervenes, it cannot be
considered as an electronic document. This is
the ruling in the case of NPC vs Codilla:

NPC VS CODILLA
v This case involves an action filed by
NPC arising from an incident where a
foreign vessel rammed into one of
NPCs barges. During the trial, NPC
presented various documents, but NPC
formally offered in evidence only the
photocopies of their documentary
exhibits. This was objected to by the
defendant under the BER. The court
gave NPC time to produce the original
but NPC did not bother to care. The
lower court ruled against NPC. On
appeal, NPC argued that under the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, there is
no more original or copies to speak of,
all are considered originals.

The SC held that by its
definition, the contents must
be processed electronically. In
this case, the document in
question appears to have been
manually signed. By no stretch
of the imagination can a
persons signature affixed
manually in the photocopies
be considered as information
ELECTRONICALLY received,
recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or
produced. The presence of the
MANUAL signature as PART of
the CONTENTS of these
documents disqualifies the
document from being
electronic. Not being

electronic, it should be treated
as an ordinary paper-based
document, and under the BER,
a photocopy can only be
allowed as secondary if the
original is accounted for,
which NPC failed to do in this
case.
SC even went on to castigate
NPC because what happened
there was that NPC in their
last ditch effort to present the
original, asked the SC that
they be allowed this time to
present the original. SC said
that NPC was given ample
opportunity to present the
original but NPC was bull-
headed so it is already late in
the day for NPC to submit the
original.
If it is manually signed,
cannot be considered
electronic document.

If the contents of the electronic document is the
subject of an inquiry, the original electronic document must
also be presented.

On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of
foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent
Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged
petitioner's Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the
Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner
filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against
private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged
damages caused on petitioner's power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint
dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private respondent
Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending
that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co.

Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial
of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower
court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V"
together with the sub-marked portions thereof.
Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and
Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to
petitioner's formal offer of evidence.
42
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge

issued the assailed order denying the admission and
excluding from the records petitioner's Exhibits "A", "C", "D",
"E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings,
"K", "L", "M" and its submarkings, "N" and its sub-markings,
"O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its submarkings, "R"
and "S" and its sub-markings. According to the court a quo:
The record shows that the plaintiff has been given

every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced
the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission
of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies
offered are equivalent to the original of the document" on
the basis of the Electronic Evidence
But as rightly pointed out in
defendant Wallem's Reply to the
Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies
do not constitute the electronic
evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as
follows:
"(h)
"Electronic
document"
refers
to
information
or
the
representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression,
described
or
however
represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact
may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved
or
produced
electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and
any printout, readable by sight
or other means which
accurately
reflects
the
electronic data message or
electronic document. For the
purpose of these Rules, the
term "electronic document"
may be used interchangeably
with "electronic data message".
aITECD
The information in those Xerox
or photocopies was not received,
recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Moreover, such electronic
evidence must be authenticated
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on
Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff
failed to do. Finally, the required
Affidavit to prove the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of the alleged

electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid)
was not executed, much less presented
in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore,
be stricken off the record.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E",
"H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K",
"L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O",
"P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R"
are hereby DENIED admission and excluded from the records.

[ISSUE] The focal point of this entire controversy is
petitioner's obstinate contention that the photocopies it
offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable
interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial
court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented
as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic
evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic
document" as defined under Section 1 (h), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is
received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document"
can also refer to other modes of written expression that is
produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in
the section's catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means".
HELD:
1.
Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of

a letter manually signed by a
certain Jose C. Troyo, with
"RECEIVED"
stamped
thereon, together with a
handwritten date;
2.
Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of

a list of estimated cost of
damages of petitioner's
power barges 207 and 209
prepared by Hopewell Mobile
Power
Systems
Corporation and manually
signed by Messrs. Rex Malaluan
and Virgilio Asprer; cTECIA
3.
Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of

a letter manually signed by a
certain Nestor G. Enriquez,
Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped
handwritten notation of the
43

date it was received;
4.
5.
Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of

a Standard Marine Protest
Form which was filled up and
accomplished by Rex Joel C.
Malaluan in his own
handwriting
and
signed by him. Portions of the
Jurat were handwritten, and
manually signed by the Notary
Public;
Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of
a letter manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.
with "RECEIVED" stamped
handwritten notation of the
date it was received;
6.
Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a

computation
of
the
estimated
energy
loss
allegedly
suffered
by
petitioner
which
was
manually signed by Mr.
Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
STECDc
7.
Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a

letter
containing
the
breakdown of the
cost
estimate,
manually signed by Mr. Nestor
G.
Enriquez,
Jr.,
with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten
notation of the date it was
received,
and
other
handwritten notations;
8.
9.
Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of

the Subpoena Duces Tecum
Ad Testificandum written
using a manual typewriter,
signed manually by Atty.
Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes,
with a handwritten notation
when it was received by the
party;
Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a
portion of the electricity
supply and operation and
maintenance
agreement
between petitioner and

Hopewell,
containing
handwritten notations and
every page containing three
unidentified manually placed
signatures;
10.
Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of

the Notice of Termination
with attachments addressed
to Rex Joel C. Malaluan,
manually signed by Jaime S.
Patinio, with a handwritten
notation of the date it was
received. The sub-markings
also
contain
manual
signatures
and/or
11.
Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of

a letter of termination with
attachments addressed to
Virgilio Asprer and manually
signed by Jaime S. Patino. The
sub-markings contain manual
signatures
and/or
handwritten
notations;
EACIaT
12.
Exhibit "O" is the same

photocopied
document
marked as Annex C;
13.
Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of

an incident report manually
signed by Messrs. Malaluan
and Bautista and by the
Notary Public, with other
14.
Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of

a letter manually signed by
Virgilio Asprer and by a
Notary Public, together with
other handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to

information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact
may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
44
However, what differentiates an electronic

document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the

photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of
the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons
who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can
a person's signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared
that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing
must be produced; exceptions. There
can be no evidence of a writing the
contents of which is the subject of
inquiry, other than the original writing
itself, except in the following cases:
(a)
(b)
When the original has been

lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court;
When the original is in the
possession of the party against
whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c)
When the original is a record or

other document in the custody
of a public officer;
(d)
When the original has been

recorded in an existing record a
certified copy of which is made
evidence by law;
(e)
When the original consists of

numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be

examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from
them is only the general result
of the whole." ADHCSE
When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the

order stated. 11 The offeror of secondary evidence is
burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or
destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;

12 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown
that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has
been made for the document in the proper place or places.
13 However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in
offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the
exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo
denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by
petitioner as documentary evidence.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES V.

SSANGYONG CORPORATION

FACSIMILE COPY
What about a FACSIMILE COPY?
Facsimile copies are considered electronic subject to
the qualification provided for under the case of MCC
Industrial Sales vs. Ssanyong Corporation.
MCC Industrial Sales vs. Ssanyong Corp.
v MCC Industrial Sales is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of importing and selling
stainless steel bars. One of the suppliers of its
products is Ssanyong, an international trader.
Ssanyong also, sourced their products from
manufacturers abroad. Over the years, they entered
into various transactions and their practice was for
Ssanyong to send by fax, the invoices detailing the
specifications, design, qualities and quantities of the
products ordered. And if MCC Sales approves it, then
45
their officer would affix his signature to indicate

conformity to the invoices. MCC Sales would open a
letter credit before the items are shipped to the
Philippines. One of these transactions bugged down
for failure of MCC Sales to open the required letter
of credit but in the meantime, Ssanyong already
ordered the products from its
suppliers/manufacturers. Then Ssanyong, because of
the delay of the shipment of the items, incurred
some cost for storage of the items. So to cut the long
story short, Ssanyong was forced to go to court to
collect damages arising from the alleged breach of
contract.
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by
9
fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC
10
Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki
Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and
Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot
rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of
US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the
corporations, assented and affixed his signature on
11
the conforme portion of the letter.
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro
12
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401 containing the
terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent
back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the
13
conformity signature of Chan. As stated in the pro
forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel
products would be made through an irrevocable
14
letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong.
Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods
was to be made after the L/C had been opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed
transaction with MCC, Ssangyong placed the order
with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel
15
Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea and paid the
same in full.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of
credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split into
16
two, one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice
17
No. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and another for 110MT
18
covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2, both dated April 17,
2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila
Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a
fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT
of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It
requested that the opening of the L/C be
19
facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax
transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to
20
Ssangyong.
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila
Office informed Sanyo Seiki, thru Chan, that it was
able to secure a US$30/MT price adjustment on the

contracted price of US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT
stainless steel, and that the goods were to be
shipped in two tranches, the first 100MT on that day
and the second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000.
Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation
21
of the L/C's opening.
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a
letter, on June 26, 2000, to the Treasury Group of
Sanyo Seiki that it was looking forward to receiving
22
the L/C details and a cable copy thereof that day.
Ssangyong sent a separate letter of the same date to
Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of the L/C
covering payment of the first 100MT not later than
23
June 28, 2000. Similar letters were transmitted by
24
Ssangyong Manila Office on June 27, 2000. On June
28, 2000, Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to
MCC stating that its principal in Korea was already
25
in a difficult situation because of the failure of
Sanyo Seiki and MCC to open the L/C's.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong
received, by fax, a letter signed by Chan, requesting
an extension of time to open the L/C because
MCC's credit line with the bank had been fully
availed of in connection with another transaction,
26
and MCC was waiting for an additional credit line.
On the same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting
that it be informed of the date when the L/C would
be opened, preferably at the earliest possible time,
since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was having problems
27
and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing costs.
To maintain their good business relationship and to
support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong
offered to negotiate with its steel manufacturer,
POSCO, another US$20/MT discount on the price of
the stainless steel ordered. This was intimated in
28
Ssangyong's June 30, 2000 letter to MCC. On July 6,
29
2000, another follow-up letter for the opening of
the L/C was sent by Ssangyong to MCC.
However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to
30
open a letter of credit. Consequently, on August
15, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo
Seiki that if the L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong
would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold
MCC liable for damages for breach thereof
amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of warehouse
31
expenses, related interests and charges.
32
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and
33
ST2-POSTS080-2 dated August 16, 2000 were
issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The
invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro
forma invoices (ST2-POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1
and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was now
officially 100MT per invoice and the price was
reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned
46
from the photocopies of the said August 16, 2000

invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the
conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with
PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering payment for
100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma
34
Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2. The goods covered
by the said invoice were then shipped to and
35
received by MCC.
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August
22, 2000 signed by Chan, requesting for a price
adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice
No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing
price of steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT
(from 1,700), and that MCC lost a lot of money due
36
to a recent strike.
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23,
37
2000, sent a demand letter to Chan for the opening
of the second and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a
warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC
on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be
constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC
liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost
difference, warehousing expenses, interests and
charges as of August 15, 2000) and other damages
for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a
letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the
sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-
POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of
US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing
38
expenses, interests and charges.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil
action for damages due to breach of contract against
defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its
39
complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants
breached their contract when they refused to open
the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a
40
Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma
invoices on which the civil action was based.
In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied
the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence
presented had already been admitted in the
41
December 16, 2002 Order and their admissibility
finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000.

v During the trial and in order to prove the existence

of the contract, Ssanyong presented a photocopy of
the facsimile copy of the invoices. Not the original
but the photocopy of the facsimile copy.
v The CA affirmed the RTCs decision, declaring that
the invoices were admissible in evidence although
they were mere facsimile printouts of MCCs steel
orders.
v The issue on the admissibility of the photocopy of
the facsimile copy of the invoices subject of the case
was brought to the fore because it was objected to
under the BER.
Ssanyong argued that under the new rules
of electronic evidence, photocopies of the
facsimile copies are now considered as
functional equivalents of the originals.

What we have here are photocopies of the
facsimile copies, but in order to resolve the
issue whether the photocopy of a facsimile
copy are admissible under the BER, we need
to determine first whether, in the first
place, a facsimile copy is an electronic
document because if it is, the photocopy
may be considered a functional equivalent
of the original.

Critical issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of
facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such;
v Arguments:
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of
the pro forma invoices presented by
respondent Ssangyong to prove the
perfection of their supposed contract of
sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not
fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792,
because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal
On the other hand, respondent posits that,
from a reading of the law and the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is
admissible in evidence since it is an
electronic document and, therefore, the
best evidence under the law and the Rules.
Respondent further claims that the
47

photocopies of these fax transmittals
(specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the
Rules on Evidence because the respondent
sufficiently explained the non-production of
the original fax transmittals.
HELD: The documents in question are inadmissible in
evidence. However, MCC is still bound to pay Sssangyong
because preponderance of evidence submitted by Ssangyong
other than the two purchase invoices established the
existence of the valid contract of sale and the alleged breach
committed by MCC.
A. Facsimiles of documents originally in paper are
excluded in the ECA, in the same way as they are
excluded in the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act
of Canada which Senator Santiago had used to
define what is included and excluded in the scope
of the Philippine ECA. The phrase "but not limited
to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL
Model Law was deliberately deleted in both
Canadian and Philippine ECA.

64
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic

Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
65
written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on
66
Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related
laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the
67
said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
68
to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data
message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data
message and electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the
purposes of this Act, the following terms
are defined, as follows:

xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to
information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar
means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to
information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished,
or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
69
8792, which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then
Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the
purposes of this Act and these Rules, the
following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to
means, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy. Throughout these Rules,
the term "electronic data message" shall be
equivalent to and be used interchangeably
with "electronic document."
x x x x
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to
48

produced electronically. Throughout these
Rules, the term "electronic document" shall
be equivalent to and be used
interchangeably with "electronic data
message."
The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's
definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
70
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A.
71
No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR
reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is
significant and pivotal,
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court
defines the said terms in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For
purposes of these Rules, the following
terms are defined, as follows:
x x x x
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to
means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to
produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data
message."
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question:

Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic
data message or electronic document?
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance,
convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are
electronic data messages or electronic documents because
they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of
an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with
the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory
considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document
75
from one place to another via a fax machine.
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory
construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 provides that
Unless otherwise expressly provided for,
the interpretation of this Act shall give due
regard to its international origin and the
need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good
faith in international trade relations. The
generally accepted principles of
international law and convention on
electronic commerce shall likewise be
considered.
Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this
section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the
UNCITRAL's definition of "data message":
"Data message" means information
generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means
including, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
76
telex or telecopy.
is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an
"electronic data message."
However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as
found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data
message."
Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the
principal author of Senate Bill 1902 (the predecessor of R.A.
49

No. 8792), sponsored the bill on second reading, he proposed
to adopt the term "data message" as formulated and defined
79
in the UNCITRAL Model Law. During the period of
amendments, however, the term evolved into "electronic
data message," and the phrase "but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was deleted.
Furthermore, the term "electronic data message," though
maintaining its description under the UNCITRAL Model Law,
except for the aforesaid deleted phrase, conveyed a different
meaning
In the Legislative proceedings in drafting
this law, the exchange followed:
Senator Santiago: "ELECTRONIC RECORD"
MEANS DATA THAT IS RECORDED OR
STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR BY A
COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR
DEVICE, THAT CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED
BY A PERSON OR A COMPUTER SYSTEM OR
OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT INCLUDES A
DISPLAY, PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT OF
THAT DATA.
The explanation for this term and its
definition is as follows: The term
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the scope of
our bill. The record is the data. The record
may be on any medium. It is electronic
because it is recorded or stored in or by a
computer system or a similar device.
The amendment is intended to apply, for
example, to data on magnetic strips on
cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it would
not apply to telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, unlike the
United Nations model law on electronic
commerce. It would also not apply to
regular digital telephone conversations
since the information is not recorded. It
would apply to voice mail since the
information has been recorded in or by a
device similar to a computer. Likewise, video
records are not covered. Though when the
video is transferred to a website, it would be
covered because of the involvement of the
computer. Music recorded by a computer
system on a compact disc would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in
digital form is covered. A computer or a

similar device has to be involved in its
creation or storage. The term "similar
device" does not extend to all devices that
create or store data in digital form.
Although things that are not recorded or
preserved by or in a computer system are
omitted from this bill, these may well be
admissible under other rules of law. This
provision focuses on replacing the search for
originality proving the reliability of systems
instead of that of individual records and
using standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by
a computer system such as printouts are
themselves electronic records being just the
means of intelligible display of the contents
of the record. Photocopies of the printout
would be paper record subject to the usual
rules about copies, but the original printout
would be subject to the rules of admissibility
of this bill.
However, printouts that are used only as
paper records and whose computer origin is
never again called on are treated as paper
records. In that case, the reliability of the
computer system that produces the record
is irrelevant to its reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my
memory does not fail me, earlier, the lady
Senator accepted that we use the term
"Data Message" rather than "ELECTRONIC
RECORD" in being consistent with the
UNCITRAL term of "Data Message." So with
the new amendment of defining
"ELECTRONIC RECORD," will this affect her
accepting of the use of "Data Message"
instead of "ELECTRONIC RECORD"?
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you
for reminding me. The term I would like to
insert is ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE in lieu
of "ELECTRONIC RECORD."
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in effect,
amending the term of the definition of
"Data Message" on page 2A, line 31, to
which we have no objection.
x x x x
50

Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have
proposed all the amendments that I desire
to, including the amendment on the effect
of error or change. I will provide the
language of the amendment together with
the explanation supporting that
amendment to the distinguished sponsor
and then he can feel free to take it up in any
session without any further intervention.
Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr.
President, I understand from the proponent
of these amendments that these are based
on the Canadian E-commerce Law of 1998.
Is that not right?
80
Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term
"electronic data message," it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it
would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-
generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on
electronic commerce." In explaining the term "electronic
record" patterned after the E-Commerce Law of Canada,
Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term "electronic
data message." This term then, while maintaining part of the
UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message," has
assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the
term "electronic record" in the law of Canada. It accounts for
the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the
phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is
that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the
term "electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic
Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago's
explanation during the Senate deliberations:
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the
term "electronic data message," it intended the same
meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law.
This construction of the term "electronic data message,"
which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's
focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional
82
equivalent approach" that it espouses. In fact, the
deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions
on paperless and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but
verily are paper-based.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and
authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact
copy preserving all the marks of an original.

Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic
and was originally signed by the party and
his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
87
pleading.
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there
exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or
paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have
88
the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further,
in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual
reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as
89
originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data
message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
"electronic document," could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as
sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two
copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal
effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
90
communications and computer technology when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated
faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term "electronic data message."
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law
when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's
definition of "data message," without considering the
intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy."
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data
message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data
message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be
considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2
51

(Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary
to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
(Exhibits "1", "1-A" to "1-R") referring to Pro

Forma Invoice for Contract No.
ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of
US$170,000.00, and which bears the
signature of Gregory Chan, General
Manager of MCC. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, presented Pro Forma Invoice
referring to Contract No. ST2-POSTS080-1,
in the amount of US$170,000.00, which
likewise bears the signature of Gregory
Chan, MCC. Plaintiff accounted for the
notation "1/2" on the right upper portion of
the Invoice, that is, that it was the first of
two (2) pro forma invoices covering the
subject contract between plaintiff and the
defendants. Defendants, on the other hand,
failed to account for the notation "2/2" in
its Pro Forma Invoice (Exhibit "1-A").
Observably further, both Pro Forma
Invoices bear the same date and details,
which logically mean that they both apply
106
to one and the same transaction.
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove

the existence of the original fax transmissions of Exhibits E
and F, and likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or
destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be
admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
B.
However, the existence of the sales contract was

still proven in preponderance of other evidence
presented by Ssangyong.
It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not

rely merely on Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected
contract. It also introduced in evidence a variety of other
documents, as enumerated above, together with the
testimonies of its witnesses. Notable among them are Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2
which were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. As
already mentioned, these invoices slightly varied the terms of
the earlier invoices such that the quantity was now officially
100MT per invoice and the price reduced to US$1,700.00 per
MT. The copies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices
submitted to the court bear the conformity signature of MCC
Manager Chan.
Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit "X"),
however, is a mere photocopy of its original. But then again,
petitioner MCC does not assail the admissibility of this
document in the instant petition. Verily, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
104
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Issues
not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits "1-A"
and "2-C"), which was certified by PCIBank as a true copy of
105
its original, it was, in fact, petitioner MCC which introduced
this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC paid for the order
stated in this invoice. Its admissibility, therefore, is not open
to question.
These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-
POSTS080-2), along with the other unchallenged
documentary evidence of respondent Ssangyong,
preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was
perfected by the parties.
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of
the trial court:
Defendants presented Letter of Credit
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half
of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of
both parties, started with the petitioner and the respondent
agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless steel
at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract was perfected.

SC: The facsimile copies, subject of the case,

are not electronic evidence. Although the
SC said, not all facsimile copies are not
electronic because in this case, SC
distinguished TWO KINDS OF FACSIMILE
PROCESSES/MACHINES:

a) Traditional or ordinary, where the
information originated from an
ordinary paper-based document
fed into the machine, scanned,
sent through the telephone line
and reprinted at the receiving end.
b) Computer-generated fax machine:
machine where the original
information/data is electronically
generated, does not originate from
a paper-based document but
already electronic then sent to the
52
other end through the telephone

line resulting in a facsimile copy

The ordinary, traditional type of facsimile machine
which originated from an ordinary paper-based
document resulting in a facsimile copy also in a
paper-based form, cannot be considered electronic.

SC cited TWO JUSTIFICATIONS:

A. The obvious purpose of the framers in
enacting the Electronic commerce act and
then the electronic evidence rule is to
promote a paperless writing as the
functional equivalent of an ordinary paper-
based document. It should be treated
similarly in all respects.
B. The Model Law mentioned a list of
electronic processes which include
"telegram, telex, telecopy". SC noted that
the last phrase "Telecopy, telex, telegraph"
was deleted/not adopted in our own
definition of Electronic Evidence.
DISCUSSION:
FIRST REASON: In this case however, SC said, the

facsimile copies in question as received originated from an
ordinary paper-based document (the invoices), which were
scanned and then, sent through the telephone line and
reprinted at the other end. In other words, it started with an
information/data originated from an ordinary paper-based
document and ended up with an ordinary paper-based
facsimile copy as received. This is contrary to the obvious
purpose of the rules which is to promote a paperless
environment. What started out as ordinary will result to an
ordinary document in this context.
SC said if the source of the data/information is
purely electronic (like in the case of a computer-generated
fax machine) the resulting facsimile copy will be considered
as electronic because it did not start with a paper-based
document.

NUEZ V. CRUZ-APAO
BASIC FACTS TO ESTABLISH

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (ex. libel)
IN
AUTHENTICATING
1
PARTIES TO THE COMMUNICATION

1

This is not a kulang list as per Sirs discussion. After parties to the
communication, he proceeded to Parol Evidence. We are not aware of any

other enumeration about this is in the past transcripts...
One is the parties to the communication. There is

difficulty in identifying the sender or receiver such as when
the other party uses an alias/other name or when the other
end denies ownership of the account. It would only be easy
for the offended party to call witnesses when the account
used is known to many.

The simplest way if you happen to defend
someone who is charged with any wrongdoing and the
evidence against your client consists of electronic like email,
facebook and so on is to deny authorship which is the safest
defense.
v In the case of NUEZ VS. APAO, the respondents
there admitted that the text messages originated
from there cellphone. It would have been difficult
without the admission. But they made it easier for
the court to confirm or to find them guilty because
of their admission. So deny, let the other party prove
it.
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct 3 against Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent),
Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of
the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The
complaint arose out of respondent's solicitation of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant)
in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the
latter's pending case in the CA, 4 more particularly, CA-G.R.
SP No. 73460 entitled "PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez."

Complainant's case referred to above had been
pending with the CA for more than two years. 15
Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered
complainant's reinstatement but a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by
the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not
reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case.
16 Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant
sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004
after learning of the latter's employment with the CA from
her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone
conversation 17 and thereafter through a series of messages
they exchanged via SMS, 18 complainant informed
respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly,
complainant thought that respondent would be able to
advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone
conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a
favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but
the person who was to draft the decision was in return
asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). 19
Complainant then asked for time to determine
whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the
decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance
of Imbestigador. 24 The crew of the TV program
53
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a

complaint against respondent for extortion. 25 Thereafter,
he communicated with respondent again to verify if the
latter was still asking for the money 26 and to set up a
meeting with her. 27 Upon learning that respondent's offer
of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in
cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and

respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor
of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., 28 the place where the
entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia Siringan
(Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied
complainant and posed as his sister-in-law. 29 During the
meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he
gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he
would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the
latter together with the assurance that it would take about a
month for the decision to come out. 30 Respondent also
explained that the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the
CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case
be appealed later. 31
When respondent was asked where the money will
go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose
name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a
lawyer in the CA Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case
was pending. 32 She also claimed that she will not get any
part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her
some. 33
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower
amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the
amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their
second transaction and the reason why the amount was
closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on
a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the
amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00). 34 Complainant then
proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three
Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the
decision had been released. 35 However, respondent
refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having
learned their lesson from their previous experience for as
then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come
out. 36
Complainant brought along copies of the
documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting.
After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered,
"Ah, panalo ka." 37 The parties set the next meeting date at
lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that

the money would be handed over by complainant to
respondent then. And in that next meeting, he was
entrapped by police officers.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in
conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a
favorable decision of the former's pending case with the CA.
The text messages were properly admitted by the
Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k),
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence 65 which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication
refers to telephone conversations, text
messages . . . and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this
case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages
and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on
their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that
the cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone
from which the messages originated was hers. 66 Moreover,
any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility
of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her
counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text
messages between her and complainant. 67 It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. 68 We have
no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of
respondent in this case.
Complainant's testimony as to the discussion
between him and respondent on the latter's demand for One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the
testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter
of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in
person. Siringan was privy to the parties' actual conversation
since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held
on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.

MALIKSI V. COMELEC
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of

Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought
an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus,
Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting
54
of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC

held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing
the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the
COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's
motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor.
revision
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, Maliksi raises the following argument:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION DESPITE A CLEAR
VIOLATION
OF
PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS
OF
LAW
CONSIDERING
THAT
DECRYPTION,
PRINTING
AND
EXAMINATION
OF THE DIGITAL IMAGES OF THE
BALLOTS, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE
ASSAILED 14 SEPTEMBER 2012
RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT, WHICH IN TURN
AFFIRMED THE 15 AUGUST 2012
RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST
DIVISION, WERE DONE
INCONSPICUOUSLY UPON A MOTU
PROPRIO DIRECTIVE OF THE COMELEC
FIRST DIVISION SANS ANY NOTICE TO
THE PETITIONER, AND FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division,

without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the
ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images
from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28,
2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary
to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the
ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17,
2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. THaDEA
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a
resolution nullifying the RTC's decision and declaring
Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. 1
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that he had been denied his right to due process because
he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He
argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images,
which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted
because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper
ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc
resolved to deny Maliksi's motion for reconsideration. 2
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for
certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without
prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the
ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the
First Division.
II.
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by

a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi's petition for certiorari.
The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due
process because: (a) he had received notices of the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by
the First Division referring to the orders of the First
Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash
deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images;
and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the
decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion
in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper
ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images
were not secondary images, but considered original
documents with the same evidentiary value as the official
ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the
First Division's finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes
had been tampered had been fully established by the large
number of cases of double-shading discovered during the
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS

HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC
GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION'S RULING
TO DISPENSE WITH THE PHYSICAL
BALLOTS AND RESORT TO THEIR
DIGITAL IMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE BALLOTS ARE
THE BEST AND MOST CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF THE VOTERS' WILL, AND
THAT BALLOT IMAGES CAN BE
RESORTED TO ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL
BALLOTS ARE LOST OR THEIR INTEGRITY
WAS COMPROMISED AS
DETERMINED BY THE RECOUNT/REVISION
COMMITTEE, CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH ARE WANTING IN THIS CASE,
AND IN FACT THE INTEGRITY OF THE
BALLOT BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS WAS
PRESERVED AND THE ISSUE OF
TAMPERING
WAS
ONLY
BELATEDLY
55

RESPONDENT AFTER THE REVISION
RESULTS SHOWED THAT HE LOST.
EaHATD
signs of tampering of the ballots are

present, will the recount proceed. In
case there are signs that the ballots
contained therein are tampered,
compromised, wet or are otherwise in
such a condition that it could not be
recounted, the Recount Committee
shall follow paragraph (l) of this rule.

I.
Due process requirements
The picture images of the ballots are electronic
documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
original official ballots themselves. 6 In Vinzons-Chato v.
HRET, 7 the Court held that "the picture images of the
ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
'official ballots' that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A.
No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and,
thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest."
xxx xxx xxx
(l)
In the event the Recount

Committee determines that the
integrity of the ballots has been
violated or has not been preserved,
or are wet and otherwise in such a
condition that it cannot be
recounted, the Chairman of the
Committee shall request from the
Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD), the printing of
the image of the ballots of the
subject precinct stored in the CF card
used in the May 10, 2010 elections in
the presence of the parties. Printing
of the ballot images shall proceed
only upon prior authentication and
certification by a duly authorized
personnel of the Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD) that the
data or the images to be printed are
genuine and not substitutes.
(Emphases supplied.) TADaES
That the two documents the official ballot and

its picture image are considered "original documents"
simply means that both of them are given equal probative
weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one
is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the
courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly
and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them
without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative
weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of
their picture images, the Rules for the Revision of Ballots
adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the
voters' will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots
are to be used only when it is first shown that the official
ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
aScITE
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In
Re: Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes in An Automated
Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Elections), as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164,
itself requires that "the Recount Committee determines that
the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been
preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that
(the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the printing of the
image of the ballots should be made, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Only when the Recount
Committee, through its chairman,
determines that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved or that no
xxx
xxx xxx
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010

Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests, which
governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts
exercising original jurisdiction over election protests,
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(m)
In the event that the revision

committee determines that the
integrity of the ballots and the ballot
box have not been preserved, as
when proof of tampering or
substitution exists, it shall proceed to
instruct the printing of the picture
image of the ballots stored in the data
storage device for the precinct. The
court shall provide a non-partisan
56

technical person who shall conduct
the necessary authentication process
to ensure that the data or image
stored is genuine and not a
substitute.
Only
after
this
determination can the printed picture
image be used for the recount.
(Emphases supplied.) HTcDEa
xxx
xxx xxx xxx

(d) When it has been shown, in a
preliminary hearing set by the parties or
by the Tribunal, that the integrity of the
ballots and ballot boxes used in the
May 10, 2010 elections was not
preserved, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitutions, the Tribunal
shall direct the printing of the picture
images of the ballots of the subject
precinct stored in the data storage
device for the same precinct. The
Tribunal shall provide a non-partisan
technical person who shall conduct the
necessary authentication process to
ensure that the data or image stored is
genuine and not a substitute. It is only
upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for
the revision. (As amended per
Resolution of February 10, 2011;
Emphases supplied.)
xxx xxx
A similar procedure is found in the 2010 Rules of

the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision.
The revision of votes shall be done
through the use of appropriate PCOS
machines or manually and visually, as
the Tribunal may determine, and
according to the following procedures:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) In the event that the RC
determines that the integrity of the
ballots and the ballot box was not
tampering or substitution, it shall
proceed to instruct the printing of the
picture image of the ballots of the
subject precinct stored in the data
storage device for the same precinct.
The Tribunal may avail itself of the
assistance of the COMELEC for the
service of a non-partisan technical
person who shall conduct the necessary
authentication process to ensure that
the data or images stored are genuine
and not merely substitutes. It is only
upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for
the revision of votes. (Emphases
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Also, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal's Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots requires a
preliminary hearing to be held for the purpose of
determining whether the integrity of the ballots and ballot
boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved,
as when there is proof of tampering or substitutions, to wit:
HDITCS
Section 10. Revision of Ballots.
xxx xxx xxx

All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots
stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the
ballots may be resorted to only after the proper
Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that
the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not
preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the
decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images take place during the
revision or recount proceedings.
There is a good reason for thus fixing
where and by whom the decryption and the printing
should be conducted:
It is during the revision or recount
conducted by the Revision/Recount
Committee when the parties are allowed
to
be
represented,
with
their
representatives witnessing the proceedings
and timely raising their objections in the
course of the proceedings. Moreover,
whenever
the
Revision/Recount
Committee makes any determination that
the ballots have been tampered and have
become unreliable, the parties are
immediately made aware of such
determination. HDAECI
HERE THOUGH, it was not the Revision/Recount
57
Committee or the RTC exercising original jurisdiction over

the protest that made the finding that the ballots had been
tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a
formal notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that

crucial finding because the First Division did not even issue
any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the
printing of the picture images. The parties were formally
notified that the First Division had found that the ballots
had been tampered only when they received the resolution
of August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division nullified the
decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly
elected Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the First Division
to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for
the finding of ballot box tampering, and did not also
particularize how and why the First Division was concluding
that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised. All
that the First Division declared as justification was a simple
generalization of the same being apparent from the
allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon
inspection of the ballot boxes
Moreover, due process of law does not only require
notice of the decryption, printing, and recount proceedings
to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be
present at such proceedings or to be represented therein.
Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First
Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment his
cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and
venue of the decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly,
the First Division had no intention of giving the parties the
opportunity to witness its proceedings.
We should not ignore that the parties' participation
during the revision and recount proceedings would not
benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for
the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would
the COMELEC's proceedings attain credibility as to the result.
The parties' presence would have ensured that the requisite
procedures have been followed, including the required
authentication and certification that the images to be
printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was less
than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the
decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots
and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely
content with listing the guidelines that the First Division had
followed in the appreciation of the ballots and the results of
the recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule
had been followed in the decryption and printing
proceeding.

PEOPLE V. CHATO
QUESTION: if the data or information originated

from an ordinary paper-based document and subsequently
subjected to electronic, mechanical or chemical processes for

purposes of reproduction, what will become of the resulting
copy?
Im referring to the process of SCANNING. The
ordinary scanning procedure is that there is a paper-based
document, feed it to the machine and then a digital image of
the paper-based document will be created in the process.
Judging it in the light of the Ssanyong ruling, it would appear
that the resulting copy will not be considered electronic.
For example, ordinary paper-based document, you
scan it, and then a digital image is created and you print it
out. You will then have another paper-based copy resulting
from the scanning. There is parallelism here with facsimile
transmission as what happened in the case of Ssanyong. So to
be consistent with Ssanyong, an argument can be made that
the resulting printout, which is the same as a facsimile
transmission copy cannot be considered electronic because it
started with an ordinary paper-based document.
But this question has already been
answered in the many cases involving election
protest: Mayor Maliksi and Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato. All these cases involved the admissibility of
picture images of ballots created through the
process of scanning using PCOS machine (Precinct
Count Optical Scanner).

CHATO VS. HRET
v Liwayway Vinzons-Chato ran for
representative of Camarines Norte, but she
lost in the elections. But typical of a Filipino
politician who would either proclaim victory
or decry being a victim of electoral fraud,
she filed an election protest, an initial
recount of votes was conducted. The other
candidate noticed that the result of the
initial recount, Chato was able to establish a
pattern of fraud. Initial tally showed that
Chato was actually ahead in the counting.
So the other party moved that the recount
should not be based on the actual ballots
but on the picture images of the ballots
stored in the PCOS. The other candidate
moved that the picture images stored in the
PCOS be printed and should be used as
basis for the recount.

v The issue there is whether or not the
printout of the picture images of the ballots
can be considered as official ballots and
therefore can be used in the recount of the
votes without accounting for the actual
58

paper-based ballots. Because the origin of
the picture messages were paper-based
ballots, the one filled-up by the voters at
the precinct level.

SC: Under the rules on electronic
evidence and even in the rules
promulgated by the COMELEC, the
picture images of the paper-based
ballots as scanned and stored and
printed out are functional
equivalents of the paper-based
ballots. So therefore, they are
considered as equivalent of the
original and considered official
ballots.
TN: Print-out resulted from a
scanning process, the origins of
which are paper-based ballots
which are not electronic and yet, in
these cases, SC said that printouts
of the picture images created
through the scanning of the paper-
based ballots are electronic
evidence.

So this debunks any argument which will be
based on the ruling in the case of Ssanyong. The first
reason advanced by the SC in ruling that the
facsimile transmission copy is not an electronic.
Because there really is parallelism between facsimile
process and scanning. In fact, facsimile transmission
presupposes a scanning process.
SECOND REASON Advanced by the Supreme Court.
Our definition on Electronic data message, our own EER and
Electronic Commerce Act are patterned from the MODEL
LAW adopted by the UN Commission of International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL). The Electronic Data message here is "as
something that is processed electronically". The Model Law
mentioned a list of electronic processes which include
"telegram, telex, telecopy".
SC noted that the last phrase "Telecopy, telex,
telegraph" was deleted/not adopted in our own definition of
Electronic Evidence. Taking cue from this omission/deletion,
SC concluded that the intention of the congress was really to
exclude them from being considered as Electronic Data. SC
said that telecopy there refers to facsimile transmission.

So the RULE NOW is:
If the resulting copy as received originated from an

ordinary paper-based document and scanned and
sent thru the use of ordinary facsimile machine, the
controlling doctrine is that of SSANYONG, therefore
cannot be considered as ELECTRONIC. But this rule
should again only refer to FACSIMILE.
Because notwithstanding the parallelism, SC in other
cases said that a copy/document resulting from a
2
scanning process is considered as ELECTRONIC.
What happens now when you received an email,

you print it out and you have a printout of an electronic
document which is considered by section 1 as a functional
equivalent of the original? In other words, the PRINTOUT of
the EMAIL is SUBJECTED TO SOME MECHANICAL,
ELECTRONIC, CHEMICAL REPRODUCTION?(sec.2, Rule 4)
ex. Mr. Erojo is a writer, wrote a
masterpiece on Kamasutra. He printed a hard copy
of his Kamasutra out of the soft copy from his
computer, and photocopied it many times. These
PHOTOCOPIES can be argued as functional
equivalent of the original because they are a
counterpart produced by the same impression or
same matrix or by mechanical or chemical
reproduction...(Sec.2). So, they are functional
equivalent of the original
You might say that the hard copy is a PAPER-BASED.
But that can be an inaccurate proposition because it can be
argued that the HARD COPY is NOT REALLY PAPER-BASED
because the SAID HARD COPY is an ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
IN THE FIRST PLACE(sec. 1, Rule 4). The SOFT COPY WAS
PRINTED out and under sec.1, they are Electronic Document
in the first place. Again, the HARD COPY from SOFT copy is
ALREADY AN ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT!

Atty. T: Ssangyong is a special case. I have a feeling
that these photocopies are really functional equivalent of
original.
So again, if a printout like these NOTES your printout
generated from your computer which is electronically
produced, the printout is in turn reproduced into many
copies thru the processes mentioned in sec. 2, so long as the
copies accurately reflect the data or information, these
copies can be considered as functional equivalent of the
original.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in
the May 10, 2010 elections as representative of the Second
Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of the
seven (7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes,
Talisay, San Vicente, and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205
clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes)
2

So, remember: ORDINARY FACSIMILE (Traditional) NOT electronic
(Ssanyong); SCANNING Electronic (Election cases)
59
who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having

garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822
votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes
On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which was docketed as HRET Case No. 10-040,
assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four
(4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and
Mercedes. 5 No counter-protest was interposed by Panotes.

st
1 Results of the initial revision of ballots

The initial revision of ballots, conducted on March
21-24, 2011, showed a substantial discrepancy between the
votes of the parties per physical count vis-a-vis their votes
per election returns in the following precincts of the
Municipalities of Basud and Daet.

nd
2 Panotes prays that the integrity of the ballots be first

determined, which he alleged are not, and therefore the
HRET should use instead the printed picture images of the
ballots scanned thru the PCOS machine.
On March 24, 2011, as a response, Panotes prayed
that a preliminary hearing be set in order to determine first
the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the
elections. He further urged that, should it be shown during
such hearing that the ballots and ballot boxes were not
preserved, the HRET should direct the printing of the
picture images of the ballots of the questioned precincts
stored in the data storage device for said precincts.
Panotes motion was prompted by certain
irregularities 8 in the condition of the ballot boxes subject
of the revision, which Panotes described as follows:
Outer condition:
a. The top cover

of the ballot box is
loose and can be
lifted,so
the
election documents
e.g., ballots,
minutes of voting,
election returns
can be taken out.
b.
In some ballot
boxes, when the
key was inserted
intothe padlock, the
upper portion of
the
lock
disconnected from
its body, which
means that the lock
had been previously
tampered with.
c.
In
the
municipalities
where Petitioner
(Panotes)
was
ableto seal the
ballot boxes with
packing tape, this
tape seal was
broken/cut/sliced,
which means that
the ballot boxes
had been opened
prior to the initial
revision.
d. Some of the
self-locking security
seal
was
not
properlyattached.
Inner condition:
a. The contents
of the ballot box
e.g., ballots and the
documents were
in total disarray,
which means that it
was tampered with.
b. Some of the
Minutes of Voting
and
Election
Returns
were
MISSING and only
the ballots were
found inside the
ballot box.
c. The ballots
were unnecessarily
folded
and/or
crumpled
inthe
clustered precincts
where the votes of
(Panotes)
were
60

substantially
reduced.

rd
3 HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of

ballots (that it is to be counted in printed form was not
mentioned)
Consequently, in its Resolution 9 No. 11-208, the
HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of
ballots relative to the protest, which was scheduled to
commence on April 25, 2011 and everyday thereafter until
completion. 10

th
4 Chato opposes the copying of the ballot images for 1.)

lack of legal basis to copy them and 2.) the Compact Flash
(CF) cards used to store the ballot images were polluted.
Chato, however, moved 11 for the cancellation of
the decryption and copying of ballot images arguing inter
alia that there was no legal basis therefor and that the HRET
had not issued any guidelines governing the exercise thereof.
cSHATC
Notwithstanding, the decryption and copying
proceeded as scheduled.
Chato then filed an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the
Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images
in the Instant Case 12 reiterating the lack of legal basis for
the decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no
preliminary hearing had been conducted showing that the
integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved.
She cited Section 10 (d) of the HRET Guidelines on the
Revision of Ballots, which reads:
(d) When it has been shown, in a
preliminary hearing set by the parties
or by the Tribunal, that the integrity of
the ballots and ballot boxes used in
the May 10, 2010 elections was not
tampering or substitutions, the
Tribunal shall direct the printing of the
picture images of the ballots of the
subject precinct stored in the data
storage device for the same precinct.
The Tribunal shall provide a
nonpartisan technical person who
shall
conduct
the
necessary
the data or image stored is genuine
and not a substitute. It is only upon
such determination that the printed
picture image can be used for the
revision, (as amended per Resolution
of February 10, 2011).

Moreover, Chato alleged that the ballot images
were taken from polluted Compact Flash (CF) cards.
Panotes, on the other hand, stressed in his
Opposition 14 to the foregoing motion that the decryption
and copying of the ballot images was at the behest of the
HRET itself, acting through Atty. Marie Grace T. Javier-Ibay,
who formally requested on February 10, 2011 the copying of
the picture image files of ballots and election returns in 13
election protests pending before it. Should he then decide to
use the decrypted and copied ballot images, there is nothing
in the HRET rules that prohibit the same.
With respect to the allegation that certain defective
CF cards were replaced, Panotes argued 15 that it was during
the election day, May 10, 2010, that the CF cards were found
to be not working so they had to be re-configured.
Consequently, the voting in some precincts in the
Municipalities of Labo, Vinzons and Basud started late, but
the voting period was extended accordingly. For this reason,
the canvassing before the Provincial Board of Canvassers was
halted in order to wait for the transmission of the results
from the Municipal Board of Canvassers, which could not be
done until each and every clustered precinct was duly
accounted for.

th
5 - Decision of the HRET: Chatos Motion is denied. There

is clear legal basis because the picture images are
equivalent of the original actual ballots scanned.
On June 8, 2011, the HRET issued the assailed
Resolution 18 No. 11-321 denying Chato's Urgent Motion to
Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied
Ballot Images in the Instant Case on the ground that she
failed to show proof that the CF cards used in the twenty (20)
precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with
substantial variances were not preserved or were violated.
The Tribunal stressed that, since Atty. Cortez was not
presented in court to clarify the matter of the alleged
replacement of CF cards, it remained unclear whether the
replacement was done before or after the elections, and
which precincts were involved. Moreover, the testimonies of
the witnesses that were actually presented were found to be
irrelevant and immaterial. cHAaEC
Significantly, the HRET declared that, although the
actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are the
best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images of
the ballots are regarded as the equivalent of the original,
citing Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
reads:
Sec. 1. Original of an electronic
document. An electronic document
shall be regarded as the equivalent of an
original document under the Best
Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown
61

to reflect the data accurately.
IN RESOLUTION NO. 11-321
Sec. 2. Copies as equivalent of the

originals. When a document is in two
or more copies executed at or about the
same time with identical contents, or is a
counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or
electronic rerecording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent
techniques which accurately reproduces
the original, such copies or duplicates
shall be regarded as the equivalent of
the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies
or duplicates shall not be admissible to
the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to

the authenticity of the original; or
(b)
in the circumstances it would be

unjust or inequitable to admit thecopy in
lieu of the original.
Aggrieved, Chato filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 19 which was denied in the Resolution 20
No. 11-487 dated September 15, 2011. The HRET
categorically held that:
. . . (T)he votes determined after the
revision in the 20 precincts in Basud
and Daet, which yielded reversal of
votes, cannot be relied upon, as they
do not reflect the true will of the
electorate. Hence, the Tribunal has to
rely on what is reflected in the
election returns and/or statement of
votes by precinct the same being the
best evidence of the results of the
election in said precincts in lieu of the
altered ballots.
The Issues
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
prohibitory injunction, Chato claims that the HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 11-321 dated
June 8, 2011 and Resolution No. 11-487 dated
September 15, 2011. Her petition is anchored on
the following grounds: THE HON. PUBLIC RESPONDENT HRET
HELD:
(DATED 08 JUNE 2011) REGARDED

THE PICTURE IMAGES OF THE
BALLOTS AS THE EQUIVALENT OF THE
ORIGINAL, AND USED THE PICTURE
IMAGES OF THE BALLOTS IN ITS
SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION NO. 11-
487 (DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 2011)
DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 THE PICTURE
IMAGES OF THE BALLOTS ARE NOT
THE "OFFICIAL BALLOTS" SINCE THE
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES)
USED DURING THE MAY 2010
ELECTIONS WAS PAPER BASED.
Chatos petition must be dismissed.

The crucial issue posed by Chato is whether or not the picture
images of the ballots may be considered as the "official
ballots" or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which
the voters filled out. She maintains that, since the automated
election system (AES) used during the May 10, 2010 elections
was paper-based, 31 the "official ballot" is only the paper
ballot that was printed by the National Printing Office and/or
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas pursuant to Section 15 of R.A.
No.
8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369, which reads in
part as follows:
Sec. 15. Official Ballot. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to a paper-based election
system, the official ballots shall be
printed by the National Printing Office
and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at
the price comparable with that of
private printers under proper security
measures which the Commission shall
adopt. The Commission may contact the
services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing
Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it
cannot meet the printing requirements.
Accredited political parties and
deputized citizen's arms of the
Commission shall assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of
official ballots.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official
62
ballot" where AES is utilized as the "paper ballot, whether

printed OR generated by the technology applied, that
faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter
recorded or to be recorded in electronic form."
EDHCSI
An automated election system, or AES, is a

system using appropriate technology which has
been demonstrated in the voting, counting,
consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process. 32
There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No.
9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2)
direct recording electronic election system. A
paper-based election system, such as the one
adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is the
type of AES that "use paper ballots, records and
counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and
transmits electronically the results of the vote
count." 33 On the other hand, direct recording
electronic election system "uses electronic ballots,
records, votes by means of a ballot display provided
with mechanical or electro-optical component that
can be activated by the voter, processes data by
means of computer programs, record voting data
and ballot images, and transmits voting results
electronically." 34
As earlier stated, the May 10, 2010 elections used a

paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an
official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names
of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to
personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical
Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the
ballots simultaneously, 35 meaning, in just one pass. 36 As
established during the required demo tests, the system
captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format
which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be
digitized representations of the ballots cast. 37
We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and
Panotes that the picture images of the ballots, as scanned
and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots"
that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by
the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As
such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of
the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be
used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral
protest. CHaDIT
It bears stressing that the digital images of the
ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an
encrypted format in the CF cards. 38 "Encryption is the
process of encoding messages (or information) in such a way
that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that
authorized parties can. In an encryption scheme, the
message or information (referred to as plaintext) is
encrypted using an encryption algorithm, turning it into an
unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done with the use of an
encryption key, which specifies how the message is to be

encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should
not be able to determine anything about the original
message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode
the ciphertext using a decryption algorithm, that usually
requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not
have access to." 39
Despite this security feature, however, the
possibility of tampering or substitution of the CF cards did
not escape the HRET, which provided in its Guidelines on the
Revision of Ballots that:
Sec. 11. Printing of the picture
images of the ballots in lieu of
photocopying. Unless it has been
shown, in a preliminary hearing set by
the parties or motu propio, that the
integrity of any of the Compact Flash
(CF) Cards used in the May 10, 2010
elections was not preserved or the same
was violated, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitution, the Tribunal,
in lieu of photocopying of ballots upon
any motion of any of the parties, shall
direct the printing of the picture image
of the ballots of the subject precinct
stored in the data storage device for the
same precinct. The Tribunal shall provide
a non-partisan technical person who
shall
conduct
the
necessary
the data or image stored is genuine and
not a substitute.
Accordingly, the HRET set the instant case for
preliminary hearing on May 27, 2011, and directed Chato,
the protestant, to present testimonial and/or documentary
evidence to show proof that the integrity of the CF cards
used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved or
was violated. 40
However, in the assailed Resolution No. 11-321,
the HRET found Chato's evidence insufficient. The
testimonies of the witnesses she presented were declared
irrelevant and immaterial as they did not refer to the CF
cards used in the 20 precincts in the Municipalities of Basud
and Daet with substantial variances.

GARCILLANO V. HRET

NACHURA, J p:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a
63
wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President

of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
contained the President's instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.
Investigations and inquiries within both chambers of the
Congress were made and conducted.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees

decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
they decided to prepare committee reports based on the
said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.
3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O.
Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4
docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent
House Committees be restrained from using these tape
recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and
any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of
the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed
to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings. 5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and
debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No.

179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that
the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. 11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate
proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes
on September 7, 12 17 13 and October 1, 14 2007.
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate
G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello
Garci" recordings, they have different objectives
the first is poised at preventing the playing of the
tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in
the committee reports, and
the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct
of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
HELD:
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the
same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's

speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon,
who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to regulate the
sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to
prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties. 7
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. 42
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines." 44 EScaIT
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and

Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings

and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo

Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech,
"The Lighthouse that Brought Darkness". His speech sought
an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.
64
and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of the

14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same
question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, 46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of
the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution, requiring that the
inquiry be in accordance with the "duly
published rules of procedure". We
quote the OSG's explanation:
The phrase "duly published
rules of procedure" requires
the Senate of every Congress
to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries
in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are
held every three (3) years for
one-half of the Senate's
membership, the composition
of the Senate also changes by
the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a
different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring

Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization: CcSEIH
The present Senate under the 1987
Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has
twenty-four members, twelve of whom
are elected every three years for a term
of six years each. Thus, the term of
twelve Senators expires every three
years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like
the 1935 Constitution, requires a
majority of Senators to
"constitute a quorum to do business".
Applying the same reasoning in Arnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body
because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the
Rules of Procedure must be republished
by the Senate after every expiry of the
term of twelve Senators.
47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our
Resolution 48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the
same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a
"continuing body", this Court sees fit to
issue a clarification. Certainly, there is
no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing", as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of
its members. However, in the conduct of
its day-to-day business the Senate of
each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the
Senate itself confirms this when it
states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business

at the end of the session shall
be taken up at the next session
in the same status.
All pending matters and
proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by
the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all
pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to
65

take up such unfinished matters, not in
the same status, but as if presented for
the first time.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of

the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or
otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or
until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for
its present rules on legislative inquiries
to be effective even in the next
Congress, it could have easily adopted
the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite
that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate's internet
web page. 49 HIESTA
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment
to the rules cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or
not these rules have undergone amendments or revision.
The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by
the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of
Procedure in the website of the Senate,
or in pamphlet form available at the
Senate, is not sufficient under the
Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Rules of Procedure even provide
that the rules "shall take effect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation",

precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance
with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement
because the Rules of Procedure put a
person's liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. 51 In other words,
the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. 52 It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
"in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure".

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin
and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the
recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry
sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as
the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by
the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

CASES 39-46
YU TEK & CO., plaintiff -appellant, vs.
BASILIO GONZALEZ, defendantappellant.

FACTS:

The basis of this action is a written contract which
66
contains the following provisions:
"1. That Mr. Basilio Gonzalez hereby

acknowledges receipt of the sum of P3,000 Philippine
currency from Messrs. Yu Tek & Co., and that in
consideration of said sum he obligates himself to deliver to
the said Yu Tek & Co., 600 piculs of sugar of the first and
second grade, according to the result of the polarization,
within the period of three months, beginning on the 1st
day of January, 1912, and ending on the 31st day of March
of the same year, 1912.
"2. That the said Mr. Basilio Gonzalez obligates
himself to deliver to the said Messrs. Yu Tek & Co. of this
city the said 600 piculs of sugar at any place within the
said municipality of Santa Rosa which the said Messrs. Yu
Tek & Co. or a representative of the same may designate.
"3. That in case the said Mr. Basilio Gonzales does
not deliver to Messrs. Yu Tek & Co. the 600 piculs of sugar
within the period of three months, referred to in the
second paragraph of this document, this contract will be
rescinded and the said Mr. Basilio Gonzalez will then be
obligated to return to Messrs. Yu Tek & Co. the P3,000
received and also the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity
for loss and damages."
Plaintiff alleges that the court erred in refusing to
permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended
that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which the
defendant raised on his plantation, and that he was unable
to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of
his crop.
ISSUE: WON court erred in refusing to permit
parole evidence
RULING:
This case appears to be one to which the rule
which excludes parol evidence to add to or vary the terms
of a written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not
the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was
to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to
have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their
contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of
ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud
or mistake. In an early case this court declined to allow
parol evidence showing that a party to a written contract
was to become a partner in a firm instead of a creditor of
the firm. (Pastor vs. Gaspar, 2 Phil. Rep., 592.) Again, in
Eveland vs. Eastern Mining Co. (14 Phil. Rep., 509) a
contract of employment provided that the plaintiff should
receive from the defendant a stipulated salary and
expenses The defendant sought to interpose as a defense
to recovery that the payment of the salary was contingent
upon the plaintiff's employment redounding to the benefit
of the defendant company. The contract contained no such

condition and the court declined to receive parol evidence
thereof.
In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the
sugar was to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised
by the defendant. There is no clause in the written contract
which even remotely suggests such a condition. The
defendant undertook to deliver a specified quantity of
sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no
restriction upon the defendant in the matter of obtaining
the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the
market or raise it himself. It may be true that defendant
owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar
himself, but he did not limit his obligation to his own crop
of sugar. Our conclusion is that the condition which the
defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence
cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be
determined by the writing itself.
GUILLERMINA BALUYUT , petitioner,

vs. EULOGIO POBLETE, THE HON.
COURT of APPEALS , SALUD
POBLETE and respondents.

FACTS:
On July 20, 1981, herein petitioner, Guillermina
Baluyut (Baluyut), loaned from the spouses Eulogio and
Salud Poblete the sum of P850,000.00. As evidence of her
indebtedness, Baluyut signed, on even date, a promissory
note for the amount borrowed. Under the promissory note,
the loan shall mature in one month. To secure the payment
of her obligation, she conveyed to the Poblete spouses, by
way of a real estate mortgage contract, a house and lot she
owns.
The Poblete spouses subsequently decided to
extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage. On
August 27, 1982, the mortgaged property was sold on
auction by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to the Poblete
spouses who were the highest bidders, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Sale issued pursuant thereto. Baluyut failed
to redeem the subject property within the period required
by law prompting Eulogio Poblete to execute an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Title. Subsequently, TCT No. 43445 was
issued in the name of Eulogio and the heirs of Salud, who
in the meantime, died. However, Baluyut remained in
possession of the subject property and refused to vacate
the same. Hence, Eulogio and the heirs of Salud filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the
RTC of Pasig.
However, before Eulogio and the heirs of Salud
could take possession of the property, Baluyut filed an
action for annulment of mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure
67
and sale of the subject property, as well as cancellation of

the title issued in the name of Eulogio and the heirs of
Salud, plus damages.
The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a

complaint for collection and damages against petitioner
Lucio Cruz.
Trial court dismissed Baluyuts complaint.
Plaintiff and defendant, through their respective

counsel, during the pre-trial conference, agreed on the
following stipulation of facts:
Petitioner contends that herein private

respondents' witness, a certain Atty. Edwina Mendoza, is a
competent witness and that her testimony, that the
maturity of the loan is one year, is acceptable proof of the
existence of collateral agreements which were entered into
by the parties who executed the Promissory Note and the
Real Estate Mortgage prior, contemporaneous and
subsequent to the execution of these documents.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of Atty. Mendoza is
admissible to prove the real maturity date of the PN
RULING:
Petitioner makes much of the testimony of Atty.
Edwina Mendoza that the maturity of the loan which
petitioner incurred is one year. However, evidence of a
prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation
of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. In
the instant case, aside from the testimony of Atty.
Mendoza, no other evidence was presented to prove that
the real date of maturity of the loan is one year. In fact
there was not even any allegation in the Complaint and in
the Memorandum filed by petitioner with the trial court to
the effect that there has been fraud or mistake as to the
date of the loan's maturity as contained in the Promissory
Note of July 20, 1981.
Moreover, during her cross-examination,
petitioner herself never claimed that the loan shall mature
in one year despite being questioned regarding its
maturity.
In sum, petitioner failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to prove her allegation that the real
agreement of the parties is for the loan to mature in one
year.
LUCIO R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND
CONRADO Q. SALONGA,
respondents.

FACTS:
1) That plaintiff Conrado Salonga entered into a

contract of what is commonly called as 'pakyawan' with
defendant Lucio Cruz on the fishes contained in a fishpond
which defendant Lucio Cruz was taking care of as lessee
from the owner Mr. Nemesio Yabut, with a verbal contract
for the sum of P28,000.00 sometime in May 1982.
2) That because of the necessity, defendant Lucio
Cruz at that time needed money, he requested plaintiff
Conrado Salonga to advance the money of not only
P28,000.00 but P35,000.00 in order that Lucio Cruz could
meet his obligation with the owner of the fishpond in
question, Mr. Nemesio Yabut;
3) That the amount of P35,000.00 as requested by
defendant Lucio Cruz was in fact delivered by plaintiff
Conrado Salonga duly received by the defendant Lucio
Cruz, as evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982, duly
signed by defendant Lucio Cruz
4) That pursuant to said contract of "pakyaw,"
plaintiff Conrado Salonga was able to harvest the fishes
contained in the fishpond administered by Lucio Cruz in
August 1982.
5) Immediately thereafter the aforesaid harvest
thereon, they entered again on a verbal agreement
whereby plaintiff Conrado Salonga and defendant Lucio
Cruz had agreed that defendant Lucio Cruz will sublease
and had in fact subleased the fishpond of Nemesio Yabut to
the herein plaintiff for the amount of P28,000.00 for a
period of one year beginning August 15, 1982.
6) That sometime on June 15, 1983, Mayor
Nemesio Yabut, who is the owner of the fishpond, took
back the subject matter of this case from the defendant
Lucio Cruz.
7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with
their verbal sublease agreement had received from the
plaintiff Conrado Salonga the following sums of money:
a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982 as evidenced by
Annex "B" of the Complaint. (Exh. E);
b) The sum of P500.00 on September 4, 1982, as
evidenced by Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. F);
c) The sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982
as evidenced by Annex "D" of the complaint (Exh. G); and
68
d) The sum of P3,750.00 on September 30, 1982

as Annex "E" of the complaint (Exh. H).
At the trial, the private respondent claimed that

aside from the amounts of P35,000.00 (Exh. D), P8,000.00
(Exh. E), P500.00 (Exh. F), P3,000.00 (Exh. G) and
P3,750.00 (Exh. H) mentioned in the partial stipulation of
facts, he also delivered to the petitioner P28,000.00, which
constituted the consideration for their "pakyaw"
agreement. This was evidenced by a receipt dated May 14,
1982 marked as Exhibit I.
Salonga also claimed that he had paid Cruz the
amount of P4,000 but the receipt of which had been lost
and denied being indebted to the petitioner for P4,000 for
the lease of other portions of the fishpond.
For his part, the petitioner testified that he
entered into a "pakyaw" and sublease agreement with the
private respondent for a consideration of P28,000 for each
transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the
private respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full
payment of their "pakyaw" agreement while the remaining
P7,000 constituted the advance payment for their sublease
agreement. The petitioner denied having received another
amount of P28,000 from Salonga on May 14, 1982. He
contended that the instrument dated May 14, 1982 (Exh. I)
was executed to evidence their "pakyaw" agreement and
to fix its duration. He was corroborated by Sonny Viray,
who testified that it was he who prepared the May 4, 1982,
receipt of P35,000.00, P28,000 of which was payment for
the "pakyaw" and the excess of P7,000.00 as advance for
the sublease.
Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, on
appeal, decision of the trial court was reversed and
ordered petitioner to pay the respondent, it also found that
the amounts of P35,000.00, P8,000.00, P500.00, P3,000.00,
P3,750.00 and P4,000.00 were not payments for the
"pakyaw" and sublease agreement but for loans extended
by Salonga to Cruz.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I" despite
the fact that these documents fall under the exceptions
provided for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and
thereby in making a conclusion that the transaction
effected between the private respondent and petitioner is
one of contract of loan and not a contract of lease.
RULING:
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is to be considered as containing all such terms, and
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in
the following cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing

or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue
by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the
writing. The term "agreement" includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that
when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing
they have made such writing the only repository and
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived or
abandoned.
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at
bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a
document embodying the terms of an agreement, but
Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a
receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the
petitioner received from the private respondent the
amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been
intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their
agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even
mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At
most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual
memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an
acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by the
petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A
writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not covered
by the parol evidence rule.
A distinction should be made between a
statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the
terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by
parol evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130
clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides
that "there can be, betw een the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing."
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's
receipt of the P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a
mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made
b y t h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t . I t s r e f e r e n ce t o t
h e a m o u n t o f P 2 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s consideration of the
"pakyaw" contract does not make it part of the terms of
their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be
introduced to explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to
the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of
the date when the said amount was received.
Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are
covered by the parol evidence rule, its application by the
Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows that no
objection was made by the private respondent when the
petitioner introduced evidence to explain the
circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the
said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence
must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become
69
reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence,

the objection must be made when the objectionable
question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of
such answer.
Lechugas under a public instrument (exhibit A) which was

prepared at the instance of Victoria Lechugas and
thumbmarked by herself (the vendor).
For failure of the private respondent to object to

the evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to
have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
ISSUE: WON the defendant court erred in

admitting the parol evidence OVER THE OBJECTION OF
THE PETITIONER IN ORDER TO VARY THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE (EXHIBIT A)
ALTHO THE LAND THEREIN IS DESCRIBED AND
DELIMITED BY METES AND BOUNDS AND IDENTIFIED AS
LOT NO. 5456 OF LAMBUNAO CADASTRE.
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals

to disregard the parol evidence introduced by the
petitioner and to conclude that the amount of P35,000.00
received on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner was in the
nature of a loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals
should have considered the partial stipulation of facts and
the testimonies of the witnesses which sought to explain
the circumstances surrounding the execution of Exhibits D
and I and their relation to one another.
VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA
LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO
LOZA, CARMELITO LOZA, DAVID
LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA
LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA,
respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry
with damages against the private respondents. She alleged
that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves,
and refused to surrender the possession of the same
despite demands made by the petitioner. The complaint
was dismissed.
The case was dismissed.
RULING:
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding
the trial court's action in admitting the testimony of
Leoncia Lasangue. The petitioner claims that Leoncia
Lasangue was the vendor of the disputed land. The
petitioner denies that Leoncia Lasangue sold Lot No. 5522
to her. She alleges that this lot was sold to her by one
Leonora Lasangue, who, however, was never presented as
witness in any of the proceedings below by herein
petitioner.
As explained by a leading commentator on our
Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and
may not properly be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least one of the
parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim
on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby.
In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the

land which plaintiff bought from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950
as evidenced by the deed exhibit A, is different from the
land now subject of this action, and described in paragraph
2 of plaintiff's complaint.
". . . and the rule therefore applies, that as

between parties to a written agreement, or their privies,
parol evidence cannot be received to contradict or vary its
terms. Strangers to a contract are, of course, not bound by
it, and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the
construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases; and
it is relaxed where either one of the parties between whom
the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement,
and does not claim under or through one who is party to it.
In such case the rule is binding upon neither. . ."
Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor in exhibit A,

testifying for defendants declared that during his lifetime
her father, Emeterio Lasangue, owned a parcel of land in
Lambunao, Iloilo, containing an area of 36 hectares; that
said Emeterio Lasangue sold a slice of 4 hectares of this
property to Hugo Loza, evidenced by a deed of sale (Exh. 2)
dated March 17, 1941; that other sales were made to other
persons, leaving only some twelve hectares out of the
original 36; that these 12 hectares were transferred by her
parents in her (witness) name, being the only child and
heir; that on December 8, 1950, she (Leoncia Lasangue)
sold six hectares of her inherited property to Victoria
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence

rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document
and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by
Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The
dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner
and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the
testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she
really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A
was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and
fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the
petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of
70
paper which petitioner told her was the document

evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the
disputed lot instead.
From the foregoing, there can be no other

conclusion but that Lasangue did not intend to sell, as she
could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her
father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.
HEIRS OF MARIO PACRES, namely:

VALENTINA Vda. DE PACRES,
JOSERINO, ELENA, LEOVIGILDO,
LELISA, and LOURDES a l l s u r n a
m e d PA C R E S , a n d V E A R A
NDAVda.DEABABA,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS of CECILIA
YGOA, namely BAUDILLO YGOA
YAP, MARIA YAP DETUYA,
JOSEFINA YAP, EGYPTIANA YAP
BANZON, and VICENTE YAP and
HILARIO RAMIREZ, respondents.

FACTS:

The lot originally belonged to Pastor Pacres
(Pastor) who left it intestate to his heirs Margarita,
Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario (petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest)
and
Vearanda
(herein
petitioner). Petitioners admitted that at the time of
Pastor's death in 1962, his heirs were already occupying
definite portions of Lot No. 9. The front portion along the
provincial highway was occupied by the co-owned Pacres
ancestral home, and beside it stood Rodrigo's hut (also
fronting the provincial highway). Mario's house stood at
the back of the ancestral house.
Four of the Pacres siblings (namely, Rodrigo,
Francisco, Simplicia and Margarita) sold their shares in the
ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez.
The deeds of sale described the subjects thereof
as "part and portion of the 300 square meters actually in
possession and enjoyment by vendee and her spouse,
Hilario Ramirez, by virtue of a contract of lease in their
favor."
Rodrigo, Francisco, and Simplicia sold their
remaining shares in Lot No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoa
(Ygoa). In 1983, Margarita also sold her share to Ygoa.
The total area sold to Ygoa was 493 square meters.
The Pacres siblings executed a Confirmation of
Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate of Pastor Pacres.

Mario, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, filed
an ejectment suit against Ramirez' successor-in-interest
Vicentuan. Mario claimed sole ownership of the lot
occupied by Ramirez/Vicentuan by virtue of the oral
partition. He argued that Ramirez/Vicentuan should pay
rentals to him for occupying the front lot and should
transfer to the rear of Lot No. 9 where the lots of Ramirez's
vendors are located.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were able to prove the
existence of the alleged oral agreements such as the
partition and the additional obligations of surveying and
titling
RULING:
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed
petitioners' complaint on the ground that they had failed
to prove the existence of an oral partition.
Petitioners' only piece of evidence to prove the
alleged oral partition was the joint affidavit (entitled
"Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate"), to
the effect that such an oral partition had previously been
agreed upon. Petitioners did not adequately explain why
the affidavit was executed only in 1993, several years after
respondents Ygoa and Ramirez took possession of the
front portions of Lot No. 9.
Petitioners allege that when Ygoa bought
portions of Lot No. 9 from petitioners' four siblings, aside
from paying the purchase price, she also bound herself to
survey Lot No. 9 including the shares of the petitioners
(the non-selling siblings); to deliver to petitioners, free of
cost, the titles corresponding to their definite shares in Lot
No. 9; and to pay for all their past and present estate and
realty taxes. 45 According to petitioners, Ygoa agreed to
these undertakings as additional consideration for the sale,
even though they were not written in the Deeds of Sale.
In the first place, under Article 1311 of the Civil
Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable
here).
Consequently, petitioners, not being parties to the
contracts of sale between Ygoa and the petitioners'
siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of the supposed
obligations arising from said contracts.
While petitioners claim that there was an oral
stipulation, it cannot be proven under the Parol Evidence
Rule. Under this Rule, "[w]hen the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
71
between the parties and their successors in interest, no

evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement." While the Rule admits of exception,
no such exception was pleaded, much less proved, by
petitioners.
In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that

sometime in December 1994, Lucia was approached by
Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase gravel and sand
from her. Kimwa allegedly asked that it be "assured" of
40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to "the parties

and their successors in interest." Conversely, it has no
application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the
Parol Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the
beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a
contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to
that contract. It has been held that a third party who avails
himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract
becomes a party to that contract. This is why under Article
1311, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required
to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never

committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of
40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper limit or
the maximum quantity that it could haul.
Moreover, to preclude the application of Parol

Evidence Rule, it must be shown that "at least one of the
parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim
on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby. " A
beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his
claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a
stranger to the contract and resist the application of the
Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral
undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed
stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners' claim cannot
prosper, because they are barred from proving them by
oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule.
Paras vs Kimwa Consrtuction

FACTS:
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a "concessionaire of a
sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City[.]" 9
Kimwa is a "construction firm that sells concrete
aggregates to contractors and haulers in . . . Cebu."
On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered
into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of
Aggregates" (Agreement).
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000
cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this, however,
Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates.
Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia, joined by her husband, Bonifacio, filed
the Complaint for breach of contract with damages that is
now subject of this Petition.
Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated

the parties' true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a
maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a
deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that
Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence
which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Kimwa Construction and
Development Corporation is liable to petitioners Spouses
Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters
of aggregates from petitioner Lucia Paras.
RULING:
Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the
remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire
from petitioner Lucia Paras.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on
admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts
in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
72

The term "agreement" includes wills.
Per this rule, reduction to written form,

regardless of the formalities observed, "forbids any
addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to
show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying the purport of the written contract."
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in
deferring to the contracting parties' articulated intent. In
choosing to reduce their agreement into writing, they are
deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully,
employing specific frequently, even technical
language as are appropriate to their context. From an
evidentiary standpoint, this is also because "oral testimony
. . . coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome
of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a
written contract which speaks of a uniform language."
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided
that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four (4)
items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section 9, "a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of the agreement[.]"
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally
imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced
points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting
it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in
[the] existence" 44 of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent
extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence. TIADCc
In sum, two (2) things must be established for
parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of
any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a
party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion,
petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they
filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the
Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure to express
the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa,
through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses
Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional
case allowing admission of parol evidence.
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras'
Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases
such as "mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the
true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that
the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint is their
assertion that the Agreement "entered into . . . on 6
December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the
parties' supposed understanding that the quantity of

aggregates allotted in favor of respondent Kimwa must be
hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered
impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras'
permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation of
petitioners' having come to court for relief.
Gaje vs Vda. De Dalisay

FACTS:
Desiderio Dalisay, Sr. (Dalisay, Sr.) bought from
Juan Abrea and R i c a r t e A g u d o n g t w o p a r c e l s o f l
a n d.
The Deeds of Sale indicated the name of Desiderio
Dalisay, Jr. (Dalisay, Jr.) as vendee per instructions of
Dalisay, Sr. for expediency and convenience. Dalisay, Sr.
maintained possession of the two parcels of land from the
date of sale in 1973 until his death in 1989. They became
part of the landholdings of Desidal Fruits, Inc. which is
owned by Dalisay, Sr. In 1981, the parcels of land were
leased by Dalisay, Sr. to Davao Premier Fruits Corporation.
Petitioner, having been appointed as
administratrix, donated 100 square meters thereof to the
Barangay San Miguel Water System Association, Inc. to be
used as a site for the installation of the water pump and
reservoir of the said water system.
Petitioner Dalisay, Jr. sold Lot No. 729-A to
petitioner Silvano B. Gaje (Gaje). Likewise, on even date,
the former sold Lot No. 729-F to Emilio C. Mellonida
(Mellonida)
Patricia, for herself and in her capacity as special
administratrix of the testate estate of Dalisay, Sr., initiated
with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Deeds of Sale
and Reconveyance with prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. In fine, the Complaint
prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Deeds of Sale
executed by Dalisay, Jr. in favor of Gaje and Mellonida.
The courts a quo ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the CA gravely erred in affirming in toto the
ruling of the trial court stating that the parcel of land
belonged to Dalisay Sr.
RULING:
Petitioners' contention that the Deeds of Sale
indicating the name of Dalisay, Jr. as vendee is the best
evidence to prove his ownership of the parcels of land
does not hold water. In the case at bar, Patricia, is not
party to the Deeds of Sale. The rule excluding extrinsic
73
evidence in the construction of writings is inapplicable in a

case where one of the parties to the case is a stranger to
the contract. Patricia, the widow of Dalisay, Sr., is a
stranger to the said Deeds of Sale; thus, the trial court
properly admitted extrinsic evidence adduced by
respondent against its efficacy, and can be deemed
competent to defeat the deed.
ZACARIAS ROBLES, plaintiffappellee, vs. LIZARRAGA

HERMANOS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
This action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros by Zacarias Robles against
Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile partnership organized
under the laws of the Philippine Islands, for the purpose of
recovering compensation for improvements made by the
plaintiff upon the hacienda "Nahalinan" and the value of
implements and farming equipment supplied to the
hacienda by the plaintiff, as well as damages for breach of
contract.
Hacienda "Nahalinan," belonged originally to the
spouses Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la Rama, parents
of the present plaintiff, Zacarias Robles. Upon the death of
Zacarias Robles, sr., several years ago, his widow Anastacia
de la Rama was appointed administratrix of his estate; she
leased the hacienda to the plaintiff, Zacarias Robles, for
the period of six years beginning at the end of the milling
season in May, 1915, and terminating at the end of the
milling season in May, 1920. It was stipulated that any
permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and
exploitation of the hacienda should be made at the expense
of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the
term.
Three years before the lease was to expire,
Anastacia de la Rama died, leaving as heirs Zacarias Robles
(the plaintiff), Jose Robles, Evarista Robles, Magdalena
Robles, Felix Robles, and the children of a deceased
daughter, Purificacion Robles. Shortly thereafter Zacarias
Robles, Jose Robles, and Evarista Robles acquired by
purchase the shares of their coheirs in the entire
inheritance; and at this juncture Lizarraga Hermanos came
forward with a proposal to buy from these three all of the
property belonging to the Robles estate.
In course of the negotiations an obstacle was
encountered in the fact that the lease of Zacarias Robles
still had over two years to run. It was accordingly
proposed that he should surrender the last two years of his
lease and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession
as purchaser in June, 1918.
The plaintiff agreed to the proposal that the
defendant would pay him the value of all betterments that

he had made on the hacienda and furthermore to purchase
from him all that belonged to him personally on the
hacienda in consideration for his surrender of the
unexpired term of the lease and subsequently executed an
instrument of conveyance.
It will be noted that the three grantors in the deed
conveyed only their several rights, interest, and share in
the estate of their deceased mother.
What was conveyed by the plaintiff is not defined
as being, in part, the hacienda "Nahalinan," nor as
including any of his rights in or to the property conveyed
other than those which he possessed in the character of
heir.
No reference is made in this conveyance to the
surrender of the plaintiff's rights as lessee, except in fixing
the date when the lease should end; nor is anything said
concerning the improvements or the property of a
personal nature which the plaintiff had placed on the
hacienda.
The plaintiff says that, when the instrument was
presented to him, he saw that in the sixth paragraph it was
declared that the plaintiff's lease should subsist only until
June 30, 1918, instead of in May, 1920, which was the
original term, while at the same time the promise of the
defendant to compensate for him for the improvements
and to purchase the existing crop, together with the cattle
and other things, was wanting; and he says that upon his
calling attention to this, the representative of the
defendant explained that this was unnecessary in view of
the confidence existing between the parties, at the same
time calling the attention of the plaintiff to the fact that the
plaintiff was already debtor to the house of Lizarraga
Hermanos in the amount of P49,000, for which the firm
had no security. Upon this manifestation the plaintiff
subsided; and, believing that the agreement with respect
to compensation would be carried out in good faith, he did
not further insist upon the incorporation of said
agreement into this document. Nor was the supposed
agreement otherwise reduced to writing.
RULING:
We are of the opinion that the preponderance of
the evidence supports the contention of the plaintiff and
the finding of the trial court to the effect that, in
consideration of the shortening of the period of the lease
by nearly two years, the defendant undertook to pay for
the improvements which the plaintiff had placed on the
hacienda and take over at a fair valuation
The plaintiff introduced in evidence a letter
(Exhibit D), written on March 1, 1917, by Severiano
Lizarraga to the plaintiff, in which reference is made to an
appraisal and liquidation. This letter is relied upon by the
plaintiff as constituting written evidence of the agreement;
74
but it seems to us so vague that, if it stood alone, and a

written contract were really necessary, it could not be
taken as sufficient proof of the agreement in question. But
we believe that the contract is otherwise proved by oral
testimony.
In this connection stress is placed upon the fact

that there is no allegation in the complaint that the written
contract fails to express the agreement of the parties.
There is no rule of evidence of wider application
than that which declares extrinsic evidence inadmissible
either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract.
The execution of a contract in writing is deemed
to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations
concerning its terms and the subject-matter which
preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of
accident, fraud or mistake of fact
But it is recognized that this rule is to be taken
with proper qualifications; and all the authorities are
agreed that proof is admissible of any collateral, parol
agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the
written contract, though it may relate to the same subject-
matter.
"The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or
contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude
the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of
whether or not the written agreement contains any
reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the
action is at law or in equity."
It has accordingly been held that, in case of a w
ritten contract of lease, the lessee may prove an
independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord
to put the leased premises in a safe condition; and a
vendor of realty may show by parol evidence that crops
growing on the land were reserved, though no such
reservation was made in the deed of conveyance
In the case before us the deed of conveyance
purports to transfer to the defendant only such interests in
certain properties as had come to the conveyors by
inheritance. Nothing is said concerning the rights in the
hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or
concerning the things that he had placed thereon by way of
improvement or had acquired by purchase. The verbal
contract which the plaintiff has established in this case is
therefore clearly independent of the main contract of
conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is
admissible under the doctrine above stated. The rule that a
preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not
admissible to vary a written contract appears to have more
particular reference to the obligation expressed in the
written agreement, and the rule has never been
interpreted as being applicable to matters of consideration
or inducement. In the case before us the written contract is

complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in
itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract,
notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters.
Cases 47-52
SPOUSES WILFREDO and ANGELA
AMONCIO, petitioners, vs. AARON
GO BENEDICTO, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered
into a contract of lease with a certain Ernesto Garcia.
Petitioners entered into another contract of lease, this time
with respondent Aaron Go Benedicto over a 240 sq. m.
portion of the same property.
Garcia pre-terminated his contract with
petitioners. Respondent, on the other hand, stayed on until
June 8, 2000. According to petitioners, respondent stopped
paying his monthly rentals in December 1999. Shortly
thereafter, petitioners claimed they discovered respondent
putting up improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of
their property which was never leased to him nor to
Garcia. They added he had also occupied Garcia's portion
immediately after the latter left.
Petitioners filed in the RTC of Quezon City a case
for recovery of possession of real property against
respondent.
respondent denied petitioners' accusations and
alleged that it was them who owed him money. According
to him, he and petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio agreed to
construct five commercial buildings on petitioners'
property. One of the buildings was to go to Garcia, two to
petitioners and the last two to him. They also agreed that
he was to finance the construction and petitioners were to
pay him for the two buildings assigned to them.
Respondent added he was to pay the rentals for
five years and surrender the buildings (on his leased
portion) to petitioners after the lapse of said period.
However, in June 2000, he vacated the premises after he
and petitioners could no longer settle things amicably.
RTC gave credence to respondent's version and
dismissed petitioners' case for lack of factual and legal
basis.
On appeal, petitioners likewise contended the
trial court disregarded the parol evidence rule which
disallowed the court from looking into any other evidence
relating to the agreement of the parties outside the written
75
contract between them. CA affirmed the RTC's decision

and dismissed petitioners' appeal.
ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred in ruling that
petitioners waived their right to respondent's assertion of
facts that were not embodied in the lease contract.
RULING:
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.
When the terms of the agreement have been reduced in
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement. ITHADC
xxx xxx xxx The so-called "parol evidence" forbids
any addition to or contradiction of the terms
of a written instrument by testimony purporting
to show that, at or before the signing of the document,
other terms were orally agreed on by the parties. Under
the aforecited rule, the terms of the written contract are
conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is
inadmissible to vary an enforceable agreement embodied
in the document. However, the rule is not absolute and
admits of exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity,
imperfection in the written agreement;
mistake
or
(b) The failure of the written agreement to

express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement. EDATSC
The term "agreement" shall include wills.
The first exception applies when the ambiguity or
uncertainty is readily apparent from reading the contract.
The wordings are so defective that what the author of the
document intended to say cannot be deciphered. It also
covers cases where the parties commit a mutual mistake of
fact, or where the document is manifestly incomplete as
the parties do not intend to exhibit the whole agreement
but only to define some of its terms.
The second exception includes instances where
the contract is so obscure that the contractual intention of

the parties cannot be understood by mere inspection of the
instrument. Thus, extrinsic proof of its subject matter, of
the relation of the parties and of the circumstances
surrounding them when they entered into the contract
may be received as evidence.
Under the third exception, the parol evidence rule
does not apply where the purpose of introducing the
evidence is to show the invalidity of the contract. This
includes cases where a party alleges that no written
contract ever existed, or the parties fail to agree on the
terms of the contract, or there is no consideration for such
agreement.
The fourth exception involves a situation where
the due execution of the contract or document is in issue.
The present case does not appear to fall under
any of the given exceptions. However, a party to a contract
may prove the existence of any separate oral agreement as
to any matter which is not inconsistent with its terms. This
may be done if, from the circumstances of the case, the
court believes that the document does not convey entirely
the whole of the parties' transaction.
In this case, there are tell-tale signs that
petitioners and respondent had other agreements aside
from those established by the lease contract. And we find it
difficult to ignore them. We agree with the trial court:
IADaSE
. . . [T]hat [respondent], indeed,
undertook the construction subject hereof, is not
disputed by [petitioners]. [Respondent] testified
that two units thereof were intended for
[petitioners], another two units for him and one
for . . . Garcia at the cost of P300,000.00 per unit or
for a total budget of P1.5 million.
Evidence further disclosed that the
[b]uilding [p]ermit issued therefor by the Building
Official bore the signature of [petitioner] Wilfredo
Amoncio . . .
. . . the Court cannot be unmindful of
[petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio's denial by any
knowledge of the whole construction undertaken
by herein [respondent.] But it is evident that
[petitioners] have chosen to adopt inconsistent
positions which, by applicable jurisprudence, [are]
barred. Said the Court in this regard:
The doctrine of estoppel prohibits a party
from assuming inconsistent position based on the
principle of election, and precludes him from
repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed
after having accepted benefits therefrom. To
countenance such repudiation would be contrary
to equity and would put a premium on fraud and
76
misrepresentation . . .
Moreover, petitioners also failed to make a timely

objection against respondent's assertion of their prior
agreement on the construction of the buildings. Where a
party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule
allows such evidence to be received without objection, he
cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been
decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a
reversal of the judgment. Hence, by failing to object to
respondent's testimony in the trial court, petitioners
waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.
CARLOS PALANCA, plaintiffappellant, vs. FRED WILSON & CO.,

defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Song Fo & Co., of Manila, through its manager
Carlos Palanca, entered into a contract with Fred Wilson &
Co. for the purchase of a distilling apparatus. Wilson & Co.
ordered the apparatus of Turner, Schon & Co., London.
Five months after the machine was installed, Palanca
wrote Wilson & Co. that the rectifying machine had been
examined by a number of competent persons who stated
that the machine was not capable of producing the amount
of alcohol stipulated in the contract. Getting no satisfaction
from the reply of Wilson & Co., action for damages for
breach of contract was begun
It is around the first clause of the contract (Exhibit
D) that all the argument centers.
Appellant would require that all the terms of the
contract be given effect with special emphasis upon the
phrase "de un grado de 96-97 Gay Lussac.
Carlos Palanca, the manager of Song Fo & Co., and
now the successor of the company, testified that he told
the agents of Wilson & Co., that he need a machine that
would produce at least 6,000 liters of alcohol a day. The
agent of Wilson & Co., James F. Loader, squarely
contradicted this on the stand and said that Palanca asked
him to get a price on an apparatus to treat 6,000 liters.
ISSUE: Lalis sila kay ingon ang plaintiff the
apparatus cant produce 6,000 liters of alcohol per 24
hour work, respondent on the other hand said that, it has
complied with the terms of the agreement because the
apparatus has the capacity of 6,000 liters per day and
produces an alcohol grade 96-97 Gay Lussac.
RULING:
In connection with the distilling of liquor, the
word "capacity" may have different meanings unless

restricted in terminology, is disclosed by the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Chicago Distilling Co.
vs. Stone ([1891] 140 U. S., 647), where the qualifying
phrases "working capacity" and "producing capacity" are
specifically" mentioned. The ordinary meaning of the word
is defined in the English Dictionaries as "ability to receive
or contain; cubic extent; carrying power or space; said of
that within which any solid or fluid may be placed, and
also used figuratively; as the keg has a capacity of 10
gallons; the ship's capacity is 1,000 tons." The ordinary
meaning of the Spanish equivalent "capacidad" as
disclosed by the Spanish dictionaries is "ambito que tiene
alguna cosa y es suficiente para contener en si otra; como
el de una vasija, arca, etc. En el vaso se debe atender la
disposicion y capacidad." Both definitions denote that
which anything can receive or contain.
We believe in the first place, that it is undeniable
from the evidence, that the apparatus in question, while it
could treat 6,000 liters of raw material a day, did not
produce 6,000 liters a day, but on the contrary only
something over 480 liters a day or rectified alcohol of the
required grade.
In order to reach a proper conclusion as to the
meaning of clause one of the contract, we approach the
subject from two directions. Under the first view, we take
up the meaning of the words themselves. Under the second
believing that it is necessary to explain intrinsic ambiguity
in the contract, we can go, as we are permitted to do under
chapter IV title II, book IV of the Civil Code, and chapter X
of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially section 285, to
evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement
was made.
We think, however, that it can be laid down as a
premise for further discussion that there is intrinsic
ambiguity in the contract which needs explanation. Section
285 of the Code of Civil Procedure to contain all the terms,
nevertheless "does not exclude other evidence of the
circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to
which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic ambiguity."
Turning, therefore, to the surrounding circumstances, we
find the following: Wilson & Co. in their offer to Song Fo &
Co. on June 9, 1913, while mentioning capacity, only did so
in express connection with the name and description of the
machine as illustrated in the catalogue. They furnished
Song Fo & Co. with plans and specifications of the distilling
apparatus; and these describe a capacity of 6,000 liters of
jus (ferment). Wilson & co.'s order to manufacturer, while
mentioning a capacity of 6,000 liters per day, does so again
in connection, with the description in the maker's
catalogue. And, finally, it was stated during the trial, and it
has not been denied, that a machine capable of producing
6,000 liters or rectified alcohol every 24 hours from nipa
ferment would cost between P35,000 and P40,000.
We are accordingly constrained to hold that the
proper construction of clause 1 of the contract, in question
77
in connection with the conduct of the parties and

surrounding circumstances, is that Wilson & Co. were to
furnish Song Fo & Co. a distilling apparatus, type C
(Agricola), as described on page 30 of the maker's
catalogue, capable of receiving or treating 6,000 liters
every 24 hours of work and of producing alcohol of a
grade 96-97 Gay Lussac.
RODRlGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL.,

plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SOCORRO
A. RAMOS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
The evidence of record discloses the following
facts: On November 6, 1956, plaintiffs entered into a
contract of conditional sale with one Pedro del Rosario
covering a parcel of land in Quezon City described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11483 which has a total
area of 77,772 square meters in consideration of a
purchase price of P10.00 per square meter. To guarantee
the performance of the conditions stipulated therein a
performance bond in the amount of P100,000.00 was
executed by Pedro del Rosario. Del Rosario was given
possession of the land for development as a subdivision at
his expense. He undertook to pay for the subdivision
survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light
and water, and the income tax plaintiffs may be required to
pay arising from the transaction, in consideration of which
Del Rosario was allowed to buy the property for
P600,000.00 within a period of two years from November
6, 1956 with the condition that, upon his failure to pay said
price when due, all the improvements introduced by him
would automatically become part of the property without
any right on his part to reimbursement and the conditional
sale would be rescinded.
Unable to pay the consideration of P600,000.00 as
agreed upon, and in order to avoid court litigation,
plaintiffs and Del Rosario, together with defendant Socorro
A. Ramos, who turned out to be a partner of the latter,
entered into a contract of rescission on November 24,
1958. To release the performance bond and to enable
defendant to pay some of the lots for her own purposes,
plaintiffs allowed defendant to buy 20 of the lots herein
involved at the rate of P16.00 per square meter on
condition that she will assume the payment of P50,000.00
as her share in the construction of roads and other
improvements required in the subdivision. This situation
led to the execution of the contract of sale Exhibit A subject
of the present foreclosure proceedings.
Defendant contends that the contract of sale
Exhibit A does not express the true agreement of the
parties because certain important conditions agreed upon
were not included therein by plaintiffs' counsel among
which is the promise assumed by plaintiffs that they would
undertake to construct the roads that may be required in

the subdivision subject of the sale on or before January,
1959; that said condition was not placed in the contract
because plaintiffs' counsel said that it was a superfluity
inasmuch as there was then in Quezon City an ordinance
which requires the construction of roads in a subdivision
before the lots therein could be sold; and that, upon the
suggestion of plaintiffs' counsel, such commitment was not
included in the contract because the ordinance aforesaid
was already deemed to be part of the contract.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, dispute the above
contention arguing that there was no such oral agreement
or understanding because all that was agreed upon
between the parties was already expressed and included in
the contract of sale Exhibit A executed between the parties
and since defendant failed to pay the balance of her
obligation within the period stipulated, the whole
obligation became due and demandable thus giving
plaintiffs the right to foreclose the mortgage in accordance
with law.

ISSUES: WON the action for foreclosure of
mortgage filed by the petitioner was premature
RULING:
We find no error in the conclusion reached by the
court a quo for indeed that is the condition to be expected
by a person who desires to purchase a big parcel of land
for purposes of subdivision. In a subdivision the main
improvement to be undertaken before it could be sold to
the public is feeder roads as otherwise it would be
inaccessible and valueless and would offer no attraction to
the buying public. And so it is correct to presume, as the
court a quo did, that when the sale in question was being
negotiated the construction of roads in the prospective
subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind of
defendant for her purpose in purchasing the property was
to develop it into a subdivision. That such requirement
was uppermost in the mind of defendant is proven by the
execution by the plaintiffs of the so called "Explanation"
(Exhibit 3) on the very day the deed of sale was executed
wherein it was stated that the sum of P50,000.00 was
advanced by defendant as her contribution to the
construction of the roads which plaintiffs assumed to
undertake "in accordance with the provisions of the City
Ordinance of Quezon City." It is to be noted that said
document specifically states that the amount of P50,000.00
should be deducted from the purchase price of
P235,056.00 appearing in the deed of sale, and this is a
clear indication that the real purchase price is only
P185,000.00, as claimed by defendant, which would
approximately be the price of the entire area of the land at
the rate of P16.00 per square meter.
It is argued that the court a quo erred in allowing
the presentation of parole evidence to prove that a
78
contemporaneous oral agreement was also reached

between the parties relative to the construction of the
roads for the same is in violation of our rule which
provides that when the terms of an agreement had been
reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing all
that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other than
the terms thereof can be admitted between the parties
(Section 22, Rule 123). This rule, however, only holds true
if there is no allegation that the agreement does not
express the true intent of the parties. If there is and this
claim is put in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the
subject of parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that such
failure has been put in issue in this case is patent in the
answer wherein defendant has specifically pleaded that
the contract of sale in question does not express the true
intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the
roads.
It appearing that plaintiffs have failed to comply
with the condition precedent relative to the construction
of the roads in the subdivision in question, it follows that
their action is premature as found by the court a quo.
LAND SETTLEMENT AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
plaintiff-appellant, vs . GARCIA
PLANTATION CO., INC., and/or
SALUD GARCIA and VICENTE B.
GARCIA, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
This is an action for specific performance filed by
the petitioner for the unpaid balance from the purchase of
tractors by the latter from the former.
The defendants, in their Answer, admitted the
execution of the two promissory notes, but contended that
the same had been novated by a subsequent agreement
contained in a letter (Exh. L) sent by Filomeno C. Kintanar,
Manager, Board of Liquidators of the LASADECO, giving
the defendant Salud C. de Garcia an extension up to May
31, 1957, within which to pay the account, and since the
complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, they claimed
that the action was premature and prayed that the
complaint be dismissed. The plaintiff in the reply and
answer to the counterclaim, admitted the due execution
and genuineness of the letter marked Exhibit L, but
contended that the same did not express the true intent
and agreement of the parties, thereby placing the fact in
issue, in the pleadings.
At the trial, the defendant admitted all the
documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, showing
that they were indebted to said plaintiff. However, when
the plaintiff presented Atty. Lucido A. Guinto, Legal Officer
of the Board of Liquidators, to testify on the true

agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the
letter (Exh. L for the defendants), was drafted and
prepared, the lower court, upon the objection of the
counsel for defendants, ruled out said testimony and
prevented the introduction of evidence under the parol
evidence rule. The lower court dismissed the case, stating
that the action was premature.
ISSUE:
WON the court a quo erred in excluding parol
evidence, tending to prove the true intention and
agreement of the parties and the existence of a condition
precedent, before the extension granted the defendants,
contained in Exhibit L, could become effective.
RULING:
The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of
Attys. Guinto and Kintanar, to the effect that in view of the
plea of defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants
an extension of time to pay their accounts, Atty. Kintanar
gave the defendants up to May 31, 1957, to coincide with
their ramie harvest "provided that they will make a
substantial down payment immediately, with the
understanding that upon non-payment of the substantial
amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted and
the LASADECO shall feel free to seek redress in court".
That there was such condition precedent is manifested by
the second paragraph of the letter Exhibit L.
The subject of agreement alluded to in the second
paragraph of the above letter, was the condition to be
complied with or the consideration given for the extension
of time, within which the Garcia spouses pay their account.
The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence
sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the
document in question to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. It should not have improvidently
and hastily excluded said parol evidence, knowing that the
subject-matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions
to the parol evidence rule. When the operation of the
contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an
event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such
may be established by parol evidence. This is not varying
the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement,
for the simple reason that there is no contract in existence;
there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule. ". . .
This rule does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to show that a supposed contract never became
effective by reason of the failure of some collateral
condition or stipulation, pre-requisite to liability". The rule
excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing,
does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of
extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous
collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the
written agreement contains reference to such collateral
79
agreement.
In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous

agreement, in the second paragraph of letter Exhibit L, and
although a document is usually to be interpreted in the
precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise
of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding
circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of
the parties.
Had the trial court permitted, as it should, the
plaintiff to prove the condition precedent to the extension
of the payment, the said plaintiff would have been able to
show that because the defendants had failed to pay a
substantial down payment, the agreement was breached
and the contract contained in Exhibit "L", never became
effective and the extension should be considered as not
having been given at all. So that, although the complaint
was filed on February 20, 1957, three months before the
deadline of the extension on May 31, 1957, there would be
no premature institution of the case. The lower court,
therefore, erred in dismissing the case.
owner of Uniline. On the other hand, Yu is the president

and stockholder of Seaoil and is at the same time owner of
Focus.
In short, Seaoil claims that the real transaction is
that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In
lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the
excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks issued by
Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks
issued by Uniline. . . .
RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents and that
the transaction between Autocorp and Seaoil was a simple
contract of sale payable in installments.
It held that the transaction between Yu and
Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot alter the sales
contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will run
counter to the parol evidence rule which prohibits the
introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify the
terms of the contract.
ISSUE:
SEAOIL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
AUTOCORP GROUP and PAUL Y.
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:
Defendant-appellant Seaoil purchased one unit of
LC Excavator, from plaintiff-appellee Autocorp.
Furthermore, it was agreed that despite delivery of the
excavator, ownership thereof was to remain with Autocorp
until the obligation is fully settled. Seaoil's contractor,
Romeo Valera, issued 12 postdated checks. However,
Autocorp refused to accept the checks because they were
not under Seaoil's name. Hence, Yu, on behalf of Seaoil,
signed and issued 12 postdated checks for P259,376.62
each with Autocorp as payee. The relationship started to
turn sour when the first check bounced. However, it was
remedied when Seaoil replaced it with a good check.
However, the remaining 10 checks were not honored by
the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped.
It was downhill from thereon. Despite repeated demands,
Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance. Autocorp filed
a complaint for recovery of personal property with
damages and replevin.
Seaoil, on the other hand, alleges that the
transaction is not as simple as described above. It claims
that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to
settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline
Asia (herein referred to as Uniline), in favor of another
foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated
(Focus for short). Paul Rodriguez (Rodriguez for brevity) is
a stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also the
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in

partially applying the parol evidence rule to prove only
some terms contained in one portion of the document but
disregarded the rule with respect to another but
substantial portion or entry also contained in the same
document which should have proven the true nature of the
transaction involved.
RULING:
Petitioner does not question the validity of the
vehicle sales invoice but merely argues that the same does
not reflect the true agreement of the parties. However,
petitioner only had its bare testimony to back up the
alleged arrangement with Rodriguez. Unsubstantiated
testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which
tends to vary the terms of a written agreement, is
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence embodies the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or
contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract.
This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would
have the Court rule that this case falls within the
exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
This argument is untenable.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain
80
the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of

incorporating
into
the
contract
additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement
is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract.
The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of

the transaction. Commercial documents or papers are
those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions. These documents are
not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but
vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They
are written memorials of the details of the consummation
of contracts. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions,
coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not
as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Hence, petitioner's contention that the document
falls within the exception to the parol evidence rule is
untenable. The exception obtains only where "the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood
from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case,
extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of
the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts
and circumstances surrounding them when they entered
into the contract may be received to enable the court to
make a proper interpretation of the instrument."
Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta

FACTS:

Alfonso Ureta(Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely,
Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda,
Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio
(Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonso's
children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his
children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and
Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who
was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to
reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it
appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children.
Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale
covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio,
Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana
Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969,
in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which
are the properties in dispute in this case.
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the
lands and their produce.

Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the
parcels transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the
Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the
produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but
to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said
portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever
took possession of the subject lands. Alfonso's heirs
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included
all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of
sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing
the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. After their father's death,
the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name
covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they
obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October
25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to
their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to
amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso.
Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of
Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and
Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the
Deed of Sale was void. It found the Deed of Sale to be
absolutely simulated as the parties did not intend to be
legally bound by it.
The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the
circumstances surrounding the actual arrangement and
agreement between the parties prior to the execution of
the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be
unrebutted. The RTC's assessment of the credibility of her
testimony was accorded respect, and the intention of the
parties was given the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling
that the Deed of Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is void
for being absolutely fictitious and in relation therewith,
may parol evidence be entertained to thwart its binding
effect after the parties have both died.
RULING:
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from
the finding of the CA that the Deed of Sale is null and void
for being absolutely simulated.
The objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper time, as soon as the
81
grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not

so made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the
case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made
when the objectionable question is asked or after the
answer is given if the objectionable features become
apparent only by reason of such answer. In this case, the
Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to the testimony
of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have
waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
probative value whatsoever.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely

objected to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, their
argument would still fail.
n the case at bench, there were other prevailing

circumstances which corroborate
Paragraphs (b) and (c), Section 9 of Rule 30 of the

Rules of Court are applicable in the case at bench.
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue
in the Answer of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It
was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen
the payment of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant
to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is
allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of
the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over
what the document appears to be on its face. As the true
intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it
now prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in
issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of the issues
submitted to the RTC for resolution. The operation of the
parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid
written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a
proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the fact
in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of
consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has been
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for
lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not
precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule
requires that the case be between parties and their
successors-in-interest. In this case, both the Heirs of
Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-
interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim
rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The
parol evidence rule excluding evidence aliunde, however,
still cannot apply because the present case falls under two
exceptions to the rule.
Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on
hearsay was violated when the testimony of Amparo
Castillo was given weight in proving that the subject lands
were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person
alien to the contract. Even granting that they did not object
to her testimony during trial, they argued that it should not
have been appreciated by the CA because it had no
It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence

whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for
having no probative value. This principle, however, has
been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to
object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there
were other pieces of evidence presented or there were
other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.
the testimony of Amparo Castillo. First, the other

Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of Liberato,
Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same day as that of
Policronio's were all presented in evidence. Second, all the
properties subject therein were included in the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third,
Policronio, during his lifetime, never exercised acts of
ownership over the subject properties (as he never
demanded or took possession of them, never demanded or
received the produce thereof, and never paid real estate
taxes thereon). Fourth, Policronio never informed his
children of the sale.
As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the
evidence presented, and to timely object to the testimony
of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly
accorded probative weight to her testimony.

IV. WAIVER
PER is not a self-executing rule. It has to be invoked
by the parties and must be invoked seasonably.
Failure to invoke results to waiver. Parol evidence
becomes admissible.

v WILLEX VS CA

Parties in this case:
Inter-Resin = principal debtor
Manila Bank = lending bank
IUCP (later Atrium Capital Corp) = surety with Inter-
Resin for the Manila Bank Loan under a Continuing
Surety Agreement
Willex = guarantor of Inter-Resin to pay IUCP for the
money Inter-resin had obtained by virtue of IUCPs
undertaking of being a surety under a Continuing
Guaranty agreement.
Involves a series of commercial transactions. Risen
Corp. obtained a credit line with Manila Banking
Corp. To facilitate the credit, Manila Banking
demanded for a surety agreement and to put up
82
some collateral so Risen had a continuing surety

agreement with Investment Underwriting Corp. To
facilitate the surety, Risen together with Willex
executed a guaranty agreement in favour of
Investment Underwriting.
Willex is a guarantor.
Risen failed to pay so Investment Underwriting had
to pay. In turn, Investment Underwriting, called on
the guaranty agreement. Risen and Willex refused to
pay. Risen contended that it already paid. Willex also
said that it only guaranteed payment for whatever
obligation Risen may have against Investment
Underwriting. It did not guaranty payment for
obligations Risen incurred against another party.
On April 5, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment,
ordering Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex Plastic
jointly and severally to pay to Interbank the
following amounts:
P3,646,780.61, representing their
indebtedness to the plaintiff, with interest
of 17% per annum from August 11, 1982,
when
Inter-Resin
Industrial
paid
P687,500.00 to the plaintiff, until full
payment of the said amount;
In denying liability to Interbank for the amount,
Willex Plastic argues that under the "Continuing
Guaranty," its liability is for sums obtained by Resin
Industrial from Interbank, not for sums paid by the
latter to Manilabank for the account of Inter-Resin
Industrial
Issue:
whether under the "Continuing Guaranty" signed on April 2,
1979 petitioner Willex Plastic may be held jointly and
severally liable with Inter-Resin Industrial for the amount by
Interbank to Manilabank.

HELD:
SC disagreed and ruled that PER can be waived by failing to
object. Willex failed to object to the oral testimony tending to
prove the actual intention of the parties.
What Willex Plastic has overlooked is the fact that
evidence aliunde was introduced in the trial court to explain
that it was actually to secure payment to Interbank (formerly
IUCP) of amounts paid by the latter to Manilabank that the
"Continuing Guaranty" was executed. In its complaint below,
Interbank's predecessor-in-interest Atrium Capital, alleged:

5. to secure the guarantee made by
plaintiff of the credit accommodation
granted to defendant IRIC [Inter-Resin
Industrial] by Manilabank, the plaintiff
required defendant IRIC [Inter-Resin
Industrial] to execute a chattel
mortgage in its favor and a Continuing
Guaranty which was signed by the other
defendant WPIC [Willex Plastic].
In its answer, Inter-Resin Industrial admitted this allegation
(stipulation 5)
On the other hand, Willex Plastic, while denying the
allegation in question, merely did so "for lack of knowledge or
information of the same." But, at the hearing of the case on
September 16, 1986, when asked by the trial judge whether
Willex Plastic had not filed a crossclaim against Inter-Resin
Industrial, Willex Plastic's counsel replied in the negative and
manifested that "the plaintiff in this case [Interbank] is the
guarantor and my client [Willex Plastic] only signed as a
guarantor to the guarantee."
For its part Interbank adduced evidence to show that the
"Continuing Guaranty" had been made to guarantee payment
of amounts made by it to Manilabank and not of any sums
given by it as loan to Inter-Resin Industrial. Interbank's
witness testified under cross-examination by counsel for
Willex Plastic that Willex "guaranteed the exposure/of
whatever exposure of ACP [Atrium Capital] will later be made
because of the guarantee to Manila Banking Corporation."
It has been held that explanatory evidence may be received
to show the circumstances under which a document has been
made and to what debt it relates. 4
At all events, Willex Plastic cannot now claim that its
liability is limited to any amount which Interbank, as
creditor, might give directly to Inter-Resin Industrial as
debtor because, by failing to object to the parol evidence
presented, Willex Plastic waived the protection of the parol
evidence rule.
ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ
1.
Marriage (Spousal Immunity)

Neither the H nor the W may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the
affected SPS, EXC:
83
A. Civil case between each other

B. Criminal casefor crimes
committed by one against the other or
against the direct ascendants or
descendants of the other
Purpose:
A. marital disqualification is
intended to preserve marital relations and
promote domestic peace and harmony
B. Prevent Perjury: love can move
mountains so if a spouse can take one
bullet for the other s/he might lie for the
other.
This Rule does not apply: When the reason for
the rule does not exist
Alvarez vs Ramirez: Alvarez was
married to sister of Ramirez. Six months
before the incident in question they
separated de facto. Alvarez could not move
on, he followed his wife who was then
staying with her sister, and set the house
on fire. Arson was filed against him and
during the trial the principal witness was
his wife who claimed that she saw her
husband set the house on fire. Alvarez
moved for her disqualification b/c the
marriage was then still subsisting.
The issue for our
resolution is whether Esperanza
Alvarez can testify against her
husband in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
"Sec.
22.
Disqualification
by reason of
marriage.

During
their
marriage, neither
the husband nor
the wife may
testify for or
against the other
without
the
consent of the
affected spouse,
except in a civil
case by one
against
the
other, or in a
criminal case for
a
crime
committed
by
one against the
rule are:
other or the
latter's
direct
descendants or
ascendants."
The reasons given for the
1.
There is identity
of interests between husband and
wife;
2.
If one were to
testify for or against the other,
there is consequent danger of
perjury;
3.
The policy of the
law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at
the risk of an occasional failure of
justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and
4.
Where there is
want of domestic tranquility there
is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of
the other.
SC said the purpose of this rule is
to preserve marital relations. The reason
for the rule does not exist anymore, there
is no basis to apply the disqualification
rule.
It should be stressed that as
shown by the records, prior to the
commission of the offense, the relationship
between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were
separated de facto almost six months
before the incident. Indeed, the evidence
and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between
petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an
interest the State aims to protect.

REQUISITES
A. Valid Marriage: what happens in void
marriage? The popular opinion is that if
the marriage is void, this prohibition
rule will not apply. But this must be
revisited to be in line with recent case
where SC held that a void marriage is
presumed valid unless declared void by
the court.
B. Witness Spouse can be or cannot be a
party to the case, but the OTHER
spouse for whom or against whom the
testimony of the witness spouse is
offered, must be a party to the case.
C. This disqualification rule exist so long as
the marriage subsist.
84
Different
in
Privileged
Communication Rule between
SPS because the H nor the W
cannot disclose any information
s/he may have obtained during
the existence of the marriage
even if the marriage is dissolved.
GUERRERO V. ST. CLAIRES

REALTY
REQUISITES FOR DEAD MANS STATUTE TO APPLY:
1) The defendant in the case where dead man
statute is invoked must be sued in his/her
representative capacity: either as executor,
administrator, or an heir or representative of the
deceased.
2) Applies only in a situation where the suit
involves a claim/demand upon the estate of the
deceased/person of unsound mind
3) Not all witnesses are disqualified under DMS.
Only plaintiff, his assignor, or person in whose
behalf the suit is prosecuted are disqualified
from being witnesses under DMS.

1. THE DEFENDANT IN THE CASE WHERE DEAD
MAN STATUTE IS INVOKED MUST BE SUED IN HIS/HER
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY: EITHER AS EXECUTOR,
ADMINISTRATOR, OR AN HEIR OR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
DECEASED.

GUERRERO VS ST. CLAIRE: A land was
owned by father, before his death he conveyed
ownership of his property to son Andres who took
possession of his property after death of her father,
and entrusted possession to his sister Christina.
When Andres died, the property transferred to his
children, but was still possessed by his sister
Christina. Heirs of andres were shocked when they
were told by manuel (another heir) that he already
owned the property. The sale was evidenced by a
deed of sale executed by sister in favor of Manuel.
Manuel sold to relatives, and eventually sold it to st.
Claire. When heirs of andres learned of transactions,
they filed a case for recovery of property, claiming
the property belonged to their father. That their
deed of sale is void since sister of andres was not the
owner of the property. Alleged that sister of Andres
only executed REM in contemplation of a loan.
Defendants sought to disqualify witnesses under
dead mans statute since Andres was already dead.
__________________________________________________
_____________________________________

Isidoro > Andres > [entrusted to Cristina] > Heirs of Andres - -
- Manuel > Nieces and Nephews of Manuel (?) [basta they are
the children of Felicisimo Guerrero who helped Manuel file
an application for registration of land with the RTC.] > St
Claire
-
Manuel is a cousin of the
Heirs of Andres
__________________________________________________
______________________________________

The spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay
Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed
property, which is a parcel of land located at San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, with an area of 42,299
square meters, more or less.
The spouses had six children, named
Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina,
and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos
predeceased Isidoro Guerrero.
Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero
verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot
be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as
his share in the inheritance, the other children
having been assigned other lots.
Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro
Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the
lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador
Ramirez, who earned a 50% share in the net
produce, the other 50% being retained by Andres
Guerrero who defrayed the cultivation expenses and
real estate taxes on the property.
Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese
occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to
his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have
the property cultivated and to retain the owner's
share in the harvests. The arrangement between
brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could
continue in the cultivation of the land and
enjoyment of the owner's share in the produce for
as long as she needed the property. Dominador
Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before
the death of Andres Guerrero.
Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero
died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum,
and their children, who are the petitioners in this
case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the
deceased Andres Guerrero.
The complaints further alleged that as early
as December 10, 1957, the land was surveyed by the
Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres
Guerrero as Lot No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No.
229 of the Paraaque Cadastre. Sometime during
the latter part of 1971 certain people who
introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the
land approached some of the plaintiffs in order to
85
secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said

plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in
the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero.
Plaintiffs (the heirs of Andres Guerrero)
made inquiries and discovered the following: that
Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in
his name on the basis of a 'Deed of Sale of Land'
dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by
Cristina Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero,
assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the
defendants Guerreros, filed an application for
registration of land with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal; that notwithstanding the opposition of the
heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court ruled that
Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite
oppositors' appeal to a higher court, the Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 to
the applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there
was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed
of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel
Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that
the Register of Deeds gave due course to the
registration of that deed; that on the same day that
the deed of sale was registered, the defendants
Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of
Partnership" of St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.,
constituting themselves as partners; that on
September 28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros sold
the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the
St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue
thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No.
340842 in the name of said realty company.
According to the original and amended
complaints, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel
Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for
the reason, among others, that Cristina Guerrero
was not the owner of the land at the time she
purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained
OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the
Deeds of Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St.
Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer
certificates of title in their favor are fraudulent and
simulated, and ineffective against the plaintiffs for
the reason, among others, that at the time of
execution of the Deeds of Sale, the defendants
Guerreros knew that the property belonged to
Andres Guerrero
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes
testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had
been sick for a long time before she died at the age
of 80 years in 1948; and that her mother could walk
only inside their house in Paraaque; that the
money spent for the illness of her mother came
from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her
children, Cristina Guerrero could ask money from
Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres
Guerrero had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified,
counsel for the defendants Guerreros objected to

the line of questioning on the ground that the said
witness was testifying "on matters which are
prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court." The trial court having ruled that the
witness "may answer", defendants' counsel
registered a continuing objection. The court
allowed the witness to continue her testimony
subject to such objection.
Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes
stated that the land was lent by Andres Guerrero to
Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned
money to Cristina Guerrero for quite some time; that
shortly after the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel
Guerrero went to their house, accompanied by
Felicisimo Guerrero, and summed up the loans he
had extended to Cristina Guerrero in the total
amount of P1,900.00; and that Felicisimo Guerrero
asked Laura Cervantes to sign a piece of paper to
attest to the fact that a certain amount of money
had been borrowed from Manuel Guerrero. LexLib
On October 24, 1973, the defendants
Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura
Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a),
Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion was
opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973,
the trial court granted the motion and declared that
Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other
witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to
testify in the case.

Issue:
The first question of importance that
engages the attention of this Court is whether or not
the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes
were correctly disqualified from testifying in the
case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of
Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, which
provides as follows:
"Section 20. Disqualification by
reason of interest or relationship. The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested,
directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, /against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind,/ upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person
or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such became of
unsound mind."
86

HELD: Laura and Jose Cervantes must be allowed to testify.

Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully
persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were made in error.

I.
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes are 1.) not parties in the present case, and
2.) neither are they assignors of the parties 3.) nor
"persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the
plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the
disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to
Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not
really sell but merely mortgaged the property to
Manuel Guerrero.
"Following this rule of construction, it may
be said that incompetency to testify established in
the provision above quoted, affects only the persons
therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only
parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are
neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are
not included in the prohibition." (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166.)

II.
personal, capacity. And that is

emphasized by the law by using the
words 'against the estate of such
deceased persons', which convey the
idea of an estate actually owned by the
deceased at the time the case was
brought and that, therefore, it is only his
rights that are to be asserted and
defendant in the litigation by the person
representing him, not the personal
rights of such representative." (Moran,
ibid, pp. 169-171.)

IOW, the SC said that Dead Man Statute does not
apply, since the defendant must be acting in a
representative capacity of the estate of the
deceased. Defendants were all sued in their
personal capacities
ABRAHAM V. RECTO-KASTEN
Parties to the case:
Ysmael debtor whose estate now is being subjected to the

payment of the loan from Abraham
Abraham creditor
Florencia Vda de Abraham wife of the creditor
Recto-Kasten administratrix
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand

against the estate of the deceased Manuel
Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the
executors or administrators or representatives of
such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of
ownership in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of
Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the
dead man's rule.
"It has been held that statutes
providing that a party in interest is
incompetent to testify where the
adverse party is dead or insane, must be
applied strictly in accordance with their
express wording, irrespective of their
spirit. The law uses the word 'against an
executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person.' It
should be noted that after the mention
of an executor or administrator the
words or other representative follows,
which means that the word
'representative' includes only those
who, like the executor or administrator,
are sued in their representative, not

1.
2.
3.
4.
Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso

Abraham Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in
Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory
note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan
within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10%. The
wife of Abraham was a witness to the execution
thereof.
Upon maturity, a demand was made for the
payment thereof but the note remained unpaid.
On November 13, 1954, in Special Proceedings No.
Q-285 for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juan Ysmael, pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, Florencia Q. Vda. de
Abraham together with her sons, Alfonso and Jesus,
all surnamed Abraham, filed a pleading entitled
"Reclamacion" demanding payment of the amount
represented by the note.
As soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed
administratrix, the claimants reproduced their
"Reclamacion" before the lower court and the same
87

3
5.
was finally set for hearing. During the hearings, the

counsel for the administratrix interposed a general
and continuing objection to the testimony of
Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions
of Section 26 (c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
However, after the claimant had testified, he
lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters
against which he interposed a general objection.

Decision of the lower courts:
6.
7.
The lower court ruled that the claimants have

established a valid claim against the estate of
Ysmael.
The administratrix appealed to the Court of Appeals.
There, the decision of the lower court was reversed
on the grounds of prescription, estoppel, and laches.

The issue presented before us:
8.
The main issue is a.) whether or not petitioners

have established a just and valid claim and b.) if the
answer is in the affirmative, whether the same is
already barred by prescription and laches. (for the
sake of Evidence, we will only touch on the first
issue)

Ruling of the Supreme Court:
9.
The decision of the RTC must be upheld. The

decision of the CA should consequently be reversed.
10. The record shows that petitioners have established
the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note and that respondents failed to
present any evidence to destroy the same. Further,
the wife of Abraham was able to extensively
describe the due execution of the instrument during
the hearing (it is to be noted that the wife of
Abraham was a witness to the execution of the
instrument; see par. 1)
11. Much to the surprise of the Court, this description
was more vividly given by the said witness not in
answer to the questions propounded by her lawyer
but on cross-examination of counsel for the
administratrix.
12. It is true that Section 26 (c), Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court provides:
"(c) Parties or assignors
of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor administrator
or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a
3
claim or demand against the

estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased
person or before such person
became of unsound mind;"

However, there was a waiver of the prohibition
when the counsel for the administratrix extensively
cross-examined the witness on the very matters
subject of the prohibition. It was for this reason
that the trial judge eventually overruled the
counsel's previous general and continuing objection
and admitted the testimony of the witness.
13. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the
counsel's lengthy cross-examination on the
prohibited matters was merely for the purpose of
establishing the "motive, prejudices and
predilection" of the witness. In this connection, it
has been said:
". . . The reason
for the rule apparently is
that a litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate as
to what his examination of
a witness may bring forth.
Having made his selection
of one of two courses
which he may pursue, he
has no light, after he
discovers that the course
selected is not to his
advantage, and after he
has put the opposite party
to the expense, and has
consumed the time of the
courts in a trial of the case
in accordance with the
course selected, to change
his position and make
another and different
selection. Such course
would be unfair both to the
opposite party and to the
court and should not be
countenanced in any court
of justice. (IV Francisco,
RULES OF COURT, 876,
877, citing the case of
Comstock's Adm'r vs.
Jacobs, 89 VT. 133, 94 A.
497, Ann. Cas. 1913A,
465)".
Because the first production of their Reclamacion was not

acted upon due to absence of an administrator.
88
14. It is indeed unfortunate that counsel for the

administratrix did not choose to present evidence to
destroy the alleged genuineness of the promissory
note. Again counsel manifested that if the note was
indeed a genuine document, the same had been
fully paid already, (t.s.n., p. 85). However, counsel
did not present any proof to support this contention.
GONI V. CA
Parties to the Case:

1.
2.
3.
4.
The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian,

Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally
owned by the Compaia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas [TABACALERA].
Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva,
predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated
with TABACALERA for the purchase of said
haciendas.
However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay
the price, Villanueva with the consent of
TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one
Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by
Joaquin Villegas.
Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas being
without a guaranty, private respondent Gaspar
Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of
TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in a
document denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de
Cuenta."

Villegas
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tabacalera
(where Villanueva
got money in advance
for Hacienda Sarria)
Vicente

Hacienda Sarria Sale)
Villanueva
|
|
(Guarantor
for

(Offeree for Fields 3, 4,
and 13 of Hacienda Dulce)
5.

Either because the amount realized from the
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell
short of the purchase price of the three haciendas,
or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by
private respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or
promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of
P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing

and signed by petitioner Genaro Goi as attorney-in-
fact of Villanueva
6. Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised
TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount
of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the
purchase price. However, as only the amount of
P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the
purchase price, only the latter amount was debited
from private respondent's account. The difference
was supposedly paid by private respondent to
Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such
payment was presented in court, this fact was
disputed by petitioners.
7. It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the
execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva
was able to raise funds by selling a property in
Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private
respondent Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the
contract/promise to sell. However, as the amount of
P12,460.24 had already been debited from private
respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and
13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would
merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a
period of five (5) years, the rent thereof to be
deducted from the money advanced by private
respondent (the amount of 12,460.24) and any
balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered by
Vicente together with the lots at the end of the
stipulated period of lease.
8. TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale
covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva.
Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the
name of Villanueva under TCT No. T-4780 of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental. The fields were
likewise mortgaged by Villanueva to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), later
transferred to the Philippine National Bank on
December 16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of
P334,400.00. 3
9. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to
private respondent Vicente after the 1949-1950
milling season in January and February, 1950.
10. On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a
"Documento de la Venta Definitiva" in favor of
Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot No. 314 of the
Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627
square meters, more or less, (Hacienda Sarria). A
supplemental instrument was later executed by
Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include in the sale
of June 17, 1950 the sugar quota of the land.
11. Villlanueva later on died. Intestate proceedings
were then instituted before the CFI (now RTC).
Among the properties included in the inventory
submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Field no. 13
with an area of 1 hectare, 44 ares and 95 centares
89
12.
13.
14.
15.
was listed as Lot no. 723 of the inventory, while

fields nos. 3 and 4, with areas of 3 hectares, 75 ares
and 60 centares, and 1 hectare, 69 ares and 80
centares, respectively, were included in Lot no. 257
of the inventory.
On the day before the intestate proceedings were
ordered closed and the estate of the late Praxedes
Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent
Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property
and damages before the then Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goi in his
capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of
Praxedes Villanueva.
Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement
thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by
the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor
On October 25, 1954, petitioner Goi, as defendant
in Civil Case No. 2990, filed an answer with
counterclaim for accounting of the produce of fields
nos. 4 and 13, as well as the surrender thereof on
June 20, 1955, the end of the fifth crop-year,
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts,
agreeing, among others, on the costs of production
and produce of the three fields in question. The case
thereafter proceeded to trial. Plaintiff presented two
(2) witnesses: then party-plaintiff Gaspar Vicente,
himself, who over the objection of therein
defendants testified on facts occurring before the
death of Praxedes Villanueva, and Epifanio Equio, a
clerk of TABACALERA Agency.

Decision of the lower courts:
16. The trial court ordered the defendants-heirs to
deliver to Vicente field no. 3, to execute a formal
deed of sale over fields 3, 4, and 13. The decision of
the RTC was affirmed by the CA with slight
modification as to damages.

Issues presented before us:
17. Petitioners (the heirs of Villanueva) presents this
question of law on evidence among others upon
appeal by certiorari: May respondent Gaspar Vicente
testify on matters of fact occurring before the death
of Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand
upon his estate in violation of rule 130, Sec. 20, par
(a)?

Ruling of the Supreme Court:
18. The decisions of the lower courts must be affirmed
insofar as the admissibility of the testimony of
Vicente is concerned. We find that neither the trial
nor appellate court erred in ruling for the
admissibility in evidence of private respondent
Vicente's testimony. However, as to the issue of

novation and the consequent ownership of the fields
in question, the lower courts decision must be
reversed and set aside. Vicente is ordered to return
the possession of the fields to petitioners as the
heirs of Villanueva.
19. Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent
Vicente 8 would be disqualified by reason of interest
from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of
Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which
provides as follows:
"Section 20. Disqualification by
reason of interest or relationship. The
matters in which they are interested,
directly or indirectly, as herein
enumerated:
"(a) Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon
a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound
mind."
20. The object and purpose of the rule is to guard
against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part of
the surviving party and further to put the two parties
to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the
opportunity of giving testimony. 9 It is designed to
close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has
closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to
remove from the surviving party the temptation to
falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims
against the deceased.
21. The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs
of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter
had been distributed to them, remains within the
ambit of the protection, The reason is that the
defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives"
of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to
the decedent's right by descent or operation of law,
but more importantly because they are so placed in
litigation that they are called on to defend which
90
22.
23.
24.
25.
they have obtained from the deceased and make the

defense which the deceased might have made if
living, or to establish a claim which deceased might
have been interested to establish, if living.
Such protection, however, was effectively waived
when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when
plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative
of the estate or when counsel for the representative
cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring
during deceased's lifetime."
It must further be observed that petitioners
presented a counterclaim against private respondent
Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand,
it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for
recovery of property and as defendant in the
counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields
nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying
as to matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been
brought against, but by the estate or representatives
of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the
adverse party is competent to testify to transactions
or communications with the deceased or
incompetent person which were made with an agent
of such person in cases in which the agent is still
alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of
the adverse party must be confined to those
transactions or communications which were had
with the agent. 13 The contract/promise to sell
under consideration was signed by petitioner Goi
as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes
Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of such contract and
therefore could either confirm or deny any
allegations made by private respondent Vicente with
respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice
sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
where one of the parties no longer has the
opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony
of the other because death has permanently sealed
the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case
at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goi could and
did not negate the binding effect of the
contract/promise to sell.
On the second issue, petitioners, having clearly and
sufficiently shown that the contract/promise to sell
was subsequently novated into a verbal lease
agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a
favorable decision on their counterclaim. The
properties must be returned to them.

1. DMS does not apply if the estate of the deceased
interposes a counterclaim against the complainant
The complainant may then testify on any fact

occurring before the death of the decedent without
violating the DMS. This is so because when a complainant
testifies in the case, he is testifying in a dual capacity. He
testifies as a plaintiff in the complaint and at the same
time, he testifies as a defendant in the counterclaim.
Insofar as the counterclaim is concerned, the estate is
the complaining party and the complainant is the
defending party.
CASE: GUNYE V. CA
-
3 haciendas owned by a corporation Tabacalera sold

to a certain Villanueva who didnt have enough
funds to buy the haciendas
Tabacalera wanted someone to stand as guarantor

of villegas where petitioner (Gaspar Vicente) came
into the picture as agent of Villanueva
proceeds of sale was not enough to cover purchase

price of the haciendas
when Villanueva died, the rice fields in haciendas

where Villanueva sold to Vicente was included in the
estate
Vicente filed case to claim ownership over these rice

fields claiming that these were sold by Villanueva to
him
Testimony of Vicente was objected to under DMS by

Gunye (administrator of Villanueva)
Held: rejected by SC on the ground that while

Villanueva is dead, it is established that the
transaction was entered into by Villanueva through
Gunye as agent who can very well protect the
interest of Villanueva
When Gaspar Vicente testified, he did it as
a party-plaintiff insofar as the complaint is
concerned and as a party-defendant insofar as the
counterclaim is concerned. The estate of Villanueva
cannot invoke DMS in disqualifying Gaspar Vicente
from testifying. Vicente is also testifying on his
counterclaim and the counterclaim is in the nature
of complaint.
2. DMS cannot be used in a transaction entered

into with the deceased represented by an agent and the
agent was still alive
One of the purposes of DMS is to level the
playing field where one party is already dead, the
surviving party should also be disqualified from telling
their story.
When represented by an attorney-in-fact, the
91
evil or purpose of the DMS is not present because the

attorney-in-fact or agent who is still alive may always
rebut or controvert whatever the surviving party
testifies.
CASE: GUNYE V. CA
While Villanueva is already dead, no longer

around to refute the testimony of Vicente regarding the
transaction, this transaction was entered into by
Villanueva through his agent Gunye who was still alive.
Agent Gunye is still alive who is in a position to rebut or
controvert whatever Vicente may testify.
Intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco,

represented by JOSEFA TONGCO,
administratrix, plaintiff -appellant, vs.
ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendantappellee.
FACTS:
Marcelino Tongco and
contracted marriage on July 5,
Anastacia
Vianzon
Marcelino Tongco died leaving Vianzon a widow.

The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named
administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before
the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in
a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain
properties in the name of the conjugal partnership
consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding
decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the
conjugal partnership not long after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action on
April 28, 1926, when she presented a motion for a revision
of certain decrees.
Decision was rendered by the Judge of first
instance annulled and set aside certain certificates of title
and ordered in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of
title be issued as the exclusive property of Anastacia
Vianzon. Administratrixs motion for reconsideration was
denied.
The administratrix of the estate began action
against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery of specified
property and for damages. The court dismissed the case.
Hence, an appeal was filed.
ISSUE:
WON the ruling of the trial judge in both the
cadastral case and property case to the effect that the

widow was compentent to testify was proper.
RULING:
We still think that the widow has proved in a
decisive and conclusive manner that the property in
question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it would,
unless we are forced to disregard her testimony.
Counsel for the appellant, however, asserts that if
the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should be,
then the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the
unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises, which
means that the entire fabric of appellee's case is
punctured. Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Partied or
assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons
in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person . . .,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person . . ." Counsel is eminently
correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this
statute is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the
part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the
equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in
arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the
truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against."
The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix
of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against"
the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the
administratrix to enforce a demand "by" the estate. In the
second case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the
claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one
sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.
We are of the opinion that the witness was
competent.
The result, therefore, must be adhere to the
findings and rulings of the trial judge.
Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS

FITZSIMMONS, deceased. MARCIAL
P. LICHAUCO , administratorappellee, vs. ATLANTIC, GULF &
PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA,
claimant-appellant.

FACTS:
92

This is a case for a claim against the estate of

Fitzsimmons filed by Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company of
Manila. Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one
of the largest stockholders of said company when the
Pacific war broke out. Fitzsimmons died and special
proceeding was subsequently instituted for the settlement
of his estate. Said company filed a claim against the estate
of Richard T. Fitzsimmons. He held 1,000 shares of stock,
of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for
which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the
company aggregating P245,250, at the rate of P450 a
share. In 1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his
favor on account of the purchase price of the said 545
shares of stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he
was entitled from the company. Under his agreements
with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should
he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of
stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the
said 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the
amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the
corresponding number of the company's shares of stock
equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.
In the same claim the company offered to
reacquire the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons
upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid
thereon, and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the
amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of
P64,500 returnable to the estate.
The evidence for the administrator against this
claim of P63,000 consisted of Exhibit 1 and the testimony
of Mr. Marcial P. Lichauco explaining the circumstances
under which said document was prepared and signed by
the deceased Fitzsimmons. According to Exhibit 1 the
gross value of the assets of the conjugal partnership
between the deceased Fitzsimmons and his wife Miguela
Malayto as of November, 1943, was P174,700, and the
total amount of the obligations was P30,082. These
obligations consisted of only two items one of P21,426
in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust Company and
another of P8,656 in favor of the Philippine Bank of
Commerce. In other words, no obligation whatsoever in
favor of the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila was
listed in said inventory Exhibit 1.
Claimant also called as witnesses Mr. Henry J.
Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-president-treasurer
and president, respectively, of the claimant company, to
testify on the status of the personal account of the
deceased Fitzsimmons with the company as of December,
1941; but upon objection of the administrator the trial
court refused to admit their testimony on that point on the
ground that said witnesses were incompetent under
section 26(c) of Rule 123, they being not only large
stockholders and members of the board of directors but
also vice-president- treasurer and president, respectively,
of the claimant company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of a

corporation which is a party to an action against an
executor or administrator of a deceased person are
disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person, under
Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court
RULING:
In the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal.,
167; 67 Pac., 52, 55, the Supreme Court of California,
interpreting said article 1880, said:
". . . The provision applies only to parties or
assignors of parties, and Haslam was neither the one nor
the other. If he was a stockholder, which it is claimed he
was, that fact would make no difference, for interest no
longer disqualifies under our law, Civ. Code Proc. sec.
1879. Appellant cites section 14, Civ. Code, to the effect
that the word 'person' includes a corporation; and claims
that, as the corporation can only speak through its officers,
the section must be held to apply to all who are officially
related to the corporation. A corporation may be conceded
to be a person, but the concession does not help appellant.
To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from
testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation
would be equivalent to materially amending the statute by
judicial interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only
'parties or assignors of parties,' and does not apply to
persons who are merely employed by such parties or
assignors of parties."
In a later case, Merriman vs. Wickersman, 141
Cal., 567; 75 Pac., 180, 181- 182, the same tribunal, in
passing upon the competency of a vice-president and
principal stockholder of a corporation to testify, reaffirmed
its ruling in City Savings Bank vs. Enos, supra, after
examining decisions of other state supreme courts in
relation to their respective statutes on the same subject.
The court said:
---xxx---
"Our own statute, it will be observed, is broader
than any of these. It neither disqualifies parties to a
contract nor persons in interest, but only parties to the
action (Code Civil Procedure, sections 1879, 1880); and
thus it is that in City Savings Bank vs. Enos, 135 Cal., 167,
67 Pac., 52, it has been held that one who is cashier and at
the same time a stockholder of a bank was not disqualified,
it being said: 'To hold that the statute disqualifies all
persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of
a corporation would be equivalent to materially amending
the statute by judicial interpretation.' It is concluded,
therefore, that our statute does not exclude from testifying
a stockholder of a corporation, whether he be but a
stockholder, or whether, in addition thereto, he be a
director or officer thereof."
Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies
93
only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to

hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation
are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the
corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or
demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person.
It results that the trial court erred in not
admitting the testimony of Messrs. Belden and Garmezy.

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his
capacity as Administrator of the
Estate of the Deceased JUAN T.
CHUIDIAN, respondents.

FACTS:
Main issue in the case is the ownership of 1,500
shares of stock in E. Razon Inc. covered by a certificate of
stock registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the
books of the corporation.
In his complaint, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that
defendants be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks
representing the share holdings of the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to
restrain the defendants from disposing of the said shares
of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment v. properties
of defendants having possession of shares of stock and for
receivership of the properties of defendant corporation . . ..
Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared that
Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the
owner of the said shares of stock.
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial
court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the
deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R.
No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock.
Petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate
court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead
man's statute rule under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute"
rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the
private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to
his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between
him and the deceased Juan T. Chidian that the ownership
of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner
unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the
petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination

regarding such testimony.
ISSUE:
WON dead mans statute is applicable in the
instant case
RULING:
Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
(Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) states:
"SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly,
as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the
death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind." (Italics supplied). xxxxxxxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this
Court in this wise:
"The reason for the rule is that if persons having a
claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties
were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements
made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted
to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the
latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law
is to 'guard against the temptation to give false testimony
in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party.'
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it
contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the
appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein)
to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of
private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of
the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,5000 shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant
unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same
which never happened. The case was filed by the
administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by
94
the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the

petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The
case was not filedagainst the administrator of the estate,
nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private
respondent never objected to the testimony of the
petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction
with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony
was subject to cross-examination by the private
respondents' counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is
deemed to have waived the rule.
LEONOR MENDEZONA, plaintiffappellee, vs. ENCARNACION C.

VIUDA DE GOITIA, administratrix of
the estate of Benigno Goitia,
defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Benigno Goitia was the

representative and attorney-in-fact
of the plaintiff s in the joint-account
partnership known as the 'Tren de
Aguadas' which the plaintiff Leonor
Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista
Goitia, owns 180 shares worth
P18,00, and the plaintiff Valentina
Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares
worth P7,200; Benigno Goitia, at
that time the manager of the
aforesaid copartnership, collected
the dividends for the plaintiffs,
which he remitted to them every
year; that from 1915 until his death
in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia
failed to remit to them the dividends
upon their shares in the 'Tren de

Aguadas'; that some time before his
death, more particularly, in July,
1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no
longer the manger of the said
business, received as attorney-infact of both plaintiffs, the amount
P90 as dividend upon plaintiff
Leonor Mendezona's shares, and
P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y
Nazabal's stock;
Leonor
Mendezona
and
Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal, filed
separate claims with the committee
of claims and appraisal against the
intestate estate of Benigno Goitia y
Lazaga. By order of the court dated
June 16, 1927, these claims were
heard by the committee. The
claimants presented their evidence,
which the committee deemed
insufficient and disapproved their
claims. Both claimants appealed
from the report of the committee.
Defendant
answered
the
amended complaints, pleading in
special defense, that not having
intervened in any of the transactions
of Benigno Goitia y Lazaga as
attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs, and
having no knowledge of the
supposed management of their rights
in the "Tren de Aguadas," and,
furthermore, not having seen nor
received any money of the plaintiff's
95
from said business, she is not in a

position to render an account of any
sort to the plaintiffs, either own
personal capacity or as judicial
administratrix of Benigno Goitia's
intestate estate.
The lower court ordered the
defendant, as judicial administratrix
of the estate of the deceased
Benigno Goitia, to pay plaintiff
Leonor Mendezona the sum of
P13,140 with legal interest from the
date of the filing of the complaint,
and to pay the plaintiff Valentina
Izaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal
interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint, and moreover, to pay
the costs of both instances.
Defendant
questions
the
admission
of
the
appelles
deposition
made
before
the
American consul at Bilbao, Spain.
ISSUE:
WON the appellees were competent to
testify
RULING:
Counsel for the appellant was

notified of the taking of these
depositions, and he did not suggest
any other interrogatory in addition to
the questions of the committee.
When these depositions were read in
court, the defendant objected to their
admission, invoking section 383,

No. 7, of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Her objection referred
mainly to the questions on whether
the deceased has rendered an
accounting for the appellee from
1915 onwards.
It is to be noted that deponents
deny having received from the
deceased Benigno Goitia any money
on account of profits on their shares,
since 1915. We are of the opinion
that the claimants' denial that a
certain fact occurred before the
death of their attorney-in-fact
Benigno Goitia does not come
within the legal prohibitions. The
law prohibits a witness directly
interested in a claim against the
estate of a decedent from testifying
upon a matter of fact which took
place before the death of the
deceased. The underlying principle
of this prohibition is to protect the
intestate estate from fictitious
claims. But this protection should
not be treated as an absolute bar or
prohibition from the filing of just
claims against the decedent's estate.
They testify, denying any such
liquidation. To apply to them the
rule that "if death has sealed the lips
of one of the parties, the law seals
those of the other," would be to
exclude all possibility of a claim
96
against the testamentary estate. We

do not believe that this was the
legislator's intention.
The plaintiffs-appellees did not
testify to a fact which took place
before their representative's death,
but on the contrary denied that a
liquidation had been made or any
money remitted on account of their
shares in the "Tren de Aguadas"
which is the ground of their claim. It
was incumbent upon the appellant to
prove by proper evidence that the
affirmative proposition was true,
either by bringing into court the
books which attorney-in-fact was in
duty bound to keep, or by
introducing copies of the drafts kept
by the banks which drew them, as
was the decedent's usual practice
according to Exhibit I, or by other
similar evidence.
The appellant admits having
found a book of accounts kept by the
decedent showing an item of P90 for
the account of Leonor Mendezona
and another of P36 for the account
of Valentina Izaguirre, which agrees
with the statement of Ruperto
Santos, who succeeded Benigno
Goitia in the administration of said
partnership, to the effect that the
deceased plaintiffs as dividends on
their shares for the months of May
and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor
Mendezona, and P36 for Valentina

Izaguirre, amounts which had not
been remitted by the deceased to the
plaintiffs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FAUSTO V. CARLOS, defendantappellant.

FACTS:

Dr. Sityar, the victim of the murder was the
physician who performed surgical operation upon the
defendants wife. After her release from the hospital she
was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor
Sityar On these occasions she was accompanied by her
husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one
of the visits, that of March 20, 1924, Doctor Sityar sent him
out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while the
defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar
outraged the wife. The defendant, suffering from some
stomach trouble, entered the Philippine General Hospital
where he remained until May 18, 1924, and where he was
under the care of two other physicians. While in the
hospital he received a letter (Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar
asking for the immediate settlement of the account for the
professional services rendered his wife.
Shortly after his release from the hospital the
defendant sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and
went to the latter's office several times without finding
him in. On one of these occasions he was asked by an
employee of the office, the nurse Cabanera, if he had come
to settle his account, to which the defendant answered that
he did not believe he owed the doctor anything.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again
went to the office of the deceased and found him there
alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the
defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between
the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and
stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape
but the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the
hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him
and as a consequence of the three wounds he died within a
few minutes. The defendant made his escape but
surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos,
Bulacan, in the evening of the following day.
The defendant admits that he killed the deceased
but maintains that he did so in self-defense.
97
The court below found that the crime was

committed with premeditation and therefore constituted
murder. This fining can only be sustained by taking into
consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant
by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects
on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before the
commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared
that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
UY CHICO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that

the letter was a privileged communication and therefore
not admissible in evidence.
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two

insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by
fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897,
at which time he was conducting a business under his own
name, Uy Layco.
The letter in question was obtained through a

search for which no warrant appears to have been issued.
ISSUE:
WON the letter written by the wife is admissible
RULING:
The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded
for reasons not because in the briefs. The letter was
written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified
at the trial the letter might have been admissible to
impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the
witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for
the purpose. If the defendant either by answer or
otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible,
but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter
in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent
on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure
hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the
constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to
be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and
have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary
communication and one originally privileged.
The question is radically diff erent from that of
the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
conversation between a husband and wife overheard by
the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on
the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both
spouses took part and on the further ground that where
the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement
made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence
implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is
contained in an unanswered letter.
If Exhibit L is excluded, there is in our opinion not
sufficient evidence in the record to show that the crime
was premeditated.

FACTS:

At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily

indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors petitioned
for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the
plaintiff's father.
During the course of these proceedings, the
plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to
the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the
insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000.
The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining
that the policies and goods insured belong to him and not
to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is
not bound by the compromise effected by the
administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show
that the plaintiff had agreed to the compromise settlement
of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence
showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the
policies to the administrator with the understanding that
such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was
asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection
to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the
policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney
was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for
the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously
given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the
attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on
this appeal, base their argument on the proposition that a
waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any
time before acted upon
ISSUE:
WON the testimony was privileged
RULING:
It will be noted that the evidence in question
concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a
third person.
98
It is evident that a communication made by a

client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being
communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent
with the confidential relation. When the attorney has
faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the
communication to the third person for whom it was
intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any
reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his
client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching
the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and
that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary
or agent.
"The proposition advanced by the respondent and

adopted by the trial court, that one, after fully authorizing
his attorney, as his agent, to enter into contract with a
third party, and after such authority has been executed
and relied on, may effectively nullify his own and his duly
authorized agent's act by closing the attorney's mouth as
to the giving of such authority, is most startling. A perilous
facility of fraud and wrong, both upon the attorney and the
third party, would result. The attorney who, on his client's
authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his reputation
and integrity that he binds his client. The third party may
well rely on the assurance of a reputable lawyer that he
has authority in fact, though such assurance be given only
by implication from the doing of the act itself.
It is manifest that the objection to the testimony
of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to compromise
was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect
that when the attorney delivered the policies to the
administrator, he understood that there was a compromise
to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of
the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff
made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to
show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise
settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the
compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an
action for the recovery of their face value.

Regala vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Presidential Commission on Good Government against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,

which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations.
Among the defendants named in the case are herein
petitioners who all were then partners of the ACCRA Law
Firm. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients, which included, among others, the organization
and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of
these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its
client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name,
and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said
shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative to
the assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
These ACCRA lawyers were impleaded for
purposes of revealing the name of their client.
ISSUE: WON under the peculiar facts of this case,
the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
RULING:
Court ruled in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity
should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise,
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are
well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the
subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that
99
the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his

adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who
his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark
against unknown forces.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general
rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1.
2.
3.
Client identity is privileged where a strong

probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v.
Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the New
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to
the effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist

other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule.
For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on
which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where
the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has
been held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information
relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
of the privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would then
reveal client confidences.
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that
the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the
general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the
very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier,
protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and
the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG

itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid
down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to
non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners'
legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted
an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners,
therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their
clients would implicate them in the very activity for which
legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY,

petitioner, vs. E. P. REVILLA, Judge
of First Instance of Manila, and TEAL
MOTOR CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS:
The object of the petition is to obtain an order
requiring the respondent judge to permit the attorney for
the petitioner to examine a letter (Exhibits 49 and 49-A)
part of which has been read into the record in the course of
the examination of one of the witnesses testifying for the
plaintiff in the case of Teal Motor Co., Inc. vs. Orient
Insurance Company
Teal Motor Co., Inc., is plaintiff in a civil action
instituted for the purpose of recovering upon two fire
insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance
Company. In one of the clauses of the policies sued upon is
a stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the policy
would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be
rejected by the insurer and action or suit should not be
commenced within three months after such rejection. In
the answer of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in
the civil case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of defense,
that the company rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that
notice of such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter
on the same day, and that suit was not instituted on the
policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three
100
months after the rejection of the claim.
The witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal

Motor Co., Inc., while being examined in chief by the
attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the
circumstances surrounding the institution of the action,
said that he had reported certain conversations to
plaintiff's attorneys. He was asked by the counsel for the
defendant to produce the other part of the letter referred
to, but the witness refused stating that it contained private
matter, "between the attorney and ourselves," meaning
between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys.
The court thereupon inquired of the attorney for
the Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any objection, and
the attorney observed that he would have no objection to
the disclosing of that part of the letter which referred
exactly to the point of the urging of the filing of the
complaints, and he added: "Unfortunately, the other part of
the letter being a communication between a client and
attorney, I don't think, if your Honor please, it can be
disclosed without the consent of both."
It was stated by the attorney for the plaintiff that
only a part of the letter had anything to do with the urging
of the presentation of the complaints in the cases to which
the witness had testified, and that the other part of the
letter referred to the contract of fees, or retaining of the
services of plaintiff's attorneys in connection with said
cases, a matter, so the attorney suggested, entirely distinct
from the urging of the presentation of the cases. The
attorney for the defendant thereupon insisted before the
court that, inasmuch as all the letter refers to the case then
in court, the entire document should be exhibited, in
conformity with the rule that when part of a document is
offered in evidence, the entire document must be
presented.
FACTS:
WON the presentation of the part of the letter
constitutes a waiver to present the the whole
RULNG:
A witness for the plaintiff made an oral statement
as to the substance of part of a letter which had been
received by the plaintiff from its attorney, and when the
fact was revealed that the communication had been made
by letter, the attorney for the defendant requested that the
witness be required to produce the letter in court, and if
not, that his answer should be stricken out. This in legal
effect was a demand for the production of "the best
evidence," it being a well-known rule of law that a witness
cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the
contents of a paper writing which can be produced in
court.
The respondent judge appears to have considered
that the excerpt from the letter thus incorporated in the
record was either proof of the defendant, its production

having been demanded by defendant's counsel, or that at
least the legal responsibility for the incorporation of said
excerpt into the record was attributable to the defendant.
We are unable to accept this view. The incorporation of
this excerpt from the letter was a necessary support of the
oral statement which the witness had made, and if this
basis for such statement had not been laid by the
incorporation of the excerpt into the record, the oral
statement of the witness concerning the tenor of the letter
should properly have been stricken out. But instead of
withdrawing the oral statement of the witness concerning
the nature of the written communication, the witness
produced the letter and the part of it already quoted was
read into the record. The excerpt in question must
therefore be considered as proof submitted by the
plaintiff; and there can be no question that, part of the
letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, the
whole of the letter could properly be examined by the
other party, in accordance with the express provision of
section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It was stated in court by the attorney for the
plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other portions of
the letter in proof, that the other parts were privileged,
because they related to the terms of employment between
attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid to the attorney.
With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a
contract for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant
it might, under certain circumstances, certainly be, but not
privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and
clients are inherently personal and private matters, but
they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts
relating to fees are essentially not of a privileged nature.
Privilege primarily refers to communications from client to
attorney, an idea which of course includes
communications from attorney to client relative to
privileged matters.
But, even supposing that the matter contained in
the letter and withheld from the inspection of the
adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the
privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of
part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code
of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration,
conversation, or writing admissible when part has been
given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to
privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject
does not recognize any exception.
We are led to the conclusion that the attorney for
the defendant in the court below was entitled to examine
the whole of the letter with a view to the introduction in
evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to the
case on trial, and the respondent judge was in error in
refusing to permit the inspection of the letter by said
attorney.

101
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Background of this case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of

the Sandiganbayan which denied petitioner's motion
for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet
to be utilized as a witness
Respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and
Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in
Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a
practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal
charges involved in the present recourse.
Respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over
Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land
Subdivision Survey. His application was approved
and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an
original certificate of title was issued in his favor for
that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an
action 2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes'
patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the
aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
rendered judgment 3 nullifying said patent and title
after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained
the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in
his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet
served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
LAWYER OR THE ADVICE OF THE LAWYER GIVEN TO THE

CLIENT IN THE COURSE OF OR IN THE VIEW OF
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT RESPECTING A PAST
CRIME/ACT
Meaning, it must be for:
A legitimate purpose; and

Related to a past crime-NOT an ongoing or future
crime.
The information regarding an ongoing or future

crime are not covered by the privilege on two grounds:
No longer in the course/ with the view of
professional employment because the employment
there must be in the course of/ with the view of a
lawful employment.
The legal profession is intended for a lawful or
legitimate purpose.
Reckoning point to be considered as
communication in relation to a PAST CRIME:
- At the time when the information was learned in
confidence by the lawyer.
People v. Sandiganbayan

5.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the

petition at bar actually turns are therefore
a. (1) whether or not the projected testimony
of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state
witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege; and
b. (2) whether or not, as a consequence
thereof, he is eligible for discharge to
testify as a particeps criminis.

6.
7.
The decision of the Sandiganbayan must be reversed

and set aside.
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these
cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the
rule.
The case that involves a prominent

politician in Mindanao, Paredes, who was
formerly the provincial attorney, then
governor, and congressman.
During his stint, Paredes was able to acquire
a free patent over a vast tract of land in
Mindanao.
Fast-forward, someone came forward and
accused Paredes of committing fraud in his
application for titling. The Bureau of lands
even move for cancellation of the title on
the ground of misrepresentation. Because
of this, someone filed a case of perjury
against Paredes which was then dismissed.
After, another case was filed in court
against Peredes for violation of the
provisions of the anti-graph and corrupt
practices act, a special law.
By way of defense, Paredes contended that
the second complaint filed in court arose
from the same incident subject, same act or
omission, of the earlier perjury case which
was already dismissed. They alleged that
double jeopardy has already attached. For
THE INFORMATION RELAYED BY THE CLIENT TO THE
102
double jeopardy to attach: there must be

arraignment and the case was dismissed
without the consent of the accused.
To support such defense the accused
presented court records and transcripts as
proof that he was arraigned in the perjury
case.
Unfortunately, such documents were
discovered to be falsified. It was done in
conspiracy with the lawyer of Paredes and
clerk of court where the perjury case was
filed. Because of this, another case was filed
against the three for falsification of judicial
records.
The lawyer then offered to testify against
his client. He was suggested by the
prosecution to be a state witness against
Paredes but the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion on the ground of client-lawyer
privilege since lawyer could not testify
against his own client.
Held: SC said that there is no privileged

communication rule to talk about; the privilege
applies only if the information was relayed by the
client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. Here,
the information was given in contemplation of a
future crime.
SC said reckoning point is when communication
was given, not when the lawyer was made to testify. SC
also said that the communication referred in the rule
does not only cover oral or written communication but
even PHYSICAL ACTS.
clients
3.
Brenda Marchand was charged as a codefendant

with the crimes for which appellant was convicted.
Marchand subsequently pled guilty on Count I of the
indictment and testified at trial for the Government.
Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two
meetings in the office of appellant's attorney, Atty.
1
Estrumsa. On each of these occasions, several of
the codefendants were present. It must be noted
however that Marchand was not a client of
Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether all the other
persons in these meetings were Estrumsa's clients.
4.
Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the

second conversation was the subject of thorough
cross-examination by Estrumsa. The second
conversation
involved
Estrumsa's
alleged
recommendation that Marchand leave the country
and go to Venezuela.
5.
On redirect, the Government inquired, over defense

objection, into the substance of the conversation
during the first meeting.
6.
Marchand testified that at this meeting the

participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion, agreed to
give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the
effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine,
but instead merely happened to be at a party where
the cocaine was discovered.

The Issue presented before this Court:

7.
The principal issue in this regard is whether the

statements in attorney Estrumsa's office were
2
protected by the attorney-client privilege. There
were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's
office on this occasion; at least one of the persons,
Brenda Marchand, and perhaps others, were not
clients of Mr. Estrumsa.

US v. Gordon-Nikkar


1.
2.
Appellant, Ana Gordon-Nikkar, was convicted after a

trial by jury on all three counts of an indictment
charging her with conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute approximately four kilograms of
cocaine, and the substantive charges of possession
with intent to distribute and distribution of the
cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1), 846.
On appeal, appellant contends her conviction should
be reversed because the district court permitted a
Government witness, Brenda Marchand, to give
testimony
regarding
allegedly
privileged
conversations between appellant's attorney and his

8.
The decisions of the lower courts must be affirmed.
9.
A communication divulged to "strangers" or

outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
communication between attorney and client.
Therefore, this communication is not protected by
the attorney-client privilege.
10. But even if it appeared that the communication in

question were otherwise privileged (i. e., that the
communication was considered confidential despite
the presence of a stranger), the testimony was
nonetheless admissible. The conversations in
question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to
hide the criminal activity of appellant and others. It
is beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege
does not extend to communications regarding an
103
intended crime.
11. The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is

to promote the administration of justice. It would be
a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to
protect communications designed to frustrate justice
by committing other crimes to conceal past
misdeeds.

2. LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
RULE 130; Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
XXX
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity;
This includes the scenario where the client relayed

information to the lawyer or the lawyer gives an advice to the
client with the view for professional employment; meaning,
preliminary to the actual perfection of the contract. What is
important is that it is a communication between a client and
a lawyer.
TN: not only the information given during the
lawyer-client relationship but any information that the client
may relay to the lawyer or any advice that the lawyer may
give to the client even before the relationship is formalized is
covered, by virtue of the phrasewith the view for
professional employment.
An exception to the rule is: even if the
communication is made not between a client to a lawyer or
made between a lawyer to a non-client, the privilege/rule still
appliesPrinciple of Common Defense or Joint Interest. Any
information that one party may relay to the lawyer of
another party with respect to matters of common interest or
joint defense is still covered by the privilege even absent the
client-lawyer relationship between them. This is the doctrine
enunciated in the case of US v. McPartlin:

PURPOSE:
To encourage free flow of information between the
lawyer and the client, the objective being, to enable the
lawyer to effectively perform his official function as counsel.
Facts:
And what better way to achieve this purpose than

assuring that whatever information, however incriminating,
given by the client to the lawyer is protected by the rule on
confidentiality.
WHO OWNS THE PRIVILEDGE?
The interest sought to be protected is the interest of
the client. Therefore, the privilege belongs to the CLIENT.
The lawyer may not be examined without the
consent of the client on any information that the lawyer
obtain or may have obtained from the client as well as any
advice that the lawyer may give to the client in the course of
or with the view to professional employment.
REQUISITES:
1.
2.
3.
There must be a Client-Lawyer Relationship

The information relayed by the client to the lawyer
or the advice of the lawyer given to the client in the
course of or in the view of professional
employment respecting a PAST CRIME/ACT
Advice or information given must be given in
confidence

THERE MUST BE A CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP
This involves a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to

commit fraud against the government of US and
obstruction of justice. Filed against some
government officials, one of those is congressman
Mcpartlin by certain private individuals. This involves
a government contract for sludge hauling project
with a private corporation, Ingram Corporation.
The star witness for the prosecution was the former
VP of the contractor of a private corporation, Mr.
Benton. Mr. Benton was part of the series of
negotiation where the conspiracy took place.
In the course of these negotiations and series of
meetings, Benton claim that he keep a diary of all
the meetings specifying the details which includes
incriminating information-- the conspiracy between
mcpartlin and ingram corporation.
To the best interest of mcpartlin and ingram, they
came up with a common defense against Benton--to
their mutual interest to destroy the testimony of
Benton. In pursuit of their common defnese, the
lawyer of ingram engaged services of investigator
who interviewed mcpartlin, hoping that mcpartlin
could provide significant information that can be
used to destroy testimony of Benton--divulged
information beneficial to ingram, where lawyer of
104
ingram tried to introduce this information.

Mcpartlin objected to this, under lawyer/client
privileged communication.

Issue presented before the Court:
Can a defendant offer testimonial evidence made to

his lawyer by his co-defendant pursuant to a joint or
common defense?

Held:
defendants, even though Ingram's defense

was based, in part, on the argument that he
had made the payments in response to the
threats Benton had reported to him,
because Ingram's account of events in issue
differed materially from Benton's, and
because the government's case hinged
largely on Benton's testimony. Since
Benton's diaries corroborated so much of
his testimony, it was imperative from the
standpoint of all defendants that an effort
be made to discredit them.
53
No.
The privilege still covers instances where the
common/joint defense exists. When a client communicates
with the lawyer of the other party pursuant to a common
defense, the lawyer of the other party is deemed the lawyer
of the other.
As in this case, but when there is no client-lawyer
relationship between the accused and the lawyer of the other
accused who hired the services of the investigator who
interviewed the accused it is obvious that the interview was
contracted pursuant to a matter of common defense--to
discredit the testimony of Mr. Benton and his diary; where it
not for this common purpose, the interview would not have
been conducted. SC called this as the Common Defense or
Joint Interest Privilege. SC said that any communication that
one party disclose to another party on matters of common
interests covered/protected by the client-lawyer privilege
communication rule. This US case has persuasive effect in our
jurisdiction.
50
1. The McPartlin Statements and the
Attorney-Client Privilege Among Co-
defendants and Their Counsel
51
Throughout the period covered by the
indictment, Benton kept diaries, or
appointment calendars, in which he made
notes concerning meetings and telephone
conversations, naming the persons involved
and often recording the substance of the
conversations. The Benton diaries figured
prominently in the government's case, for
they corroborated much of his testimony.
52
Destroying Benton's credibility was
important to Ingram, as it was to the other
Such an effort was made, and Frederick

Ingram and McPartlin cooperated in that
effort. In a brief supporting a pretrial
"Motion for Additional Time to Conduct
Document Analysis," Ingram's counsel
stated, with reference to contemplated
tests on the Benton diaries,
55
An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's
counsel twice interviewed McPartlin with
the consent of the latter's counsel12 for the
purpose of determining whether there was
a basis for challenging the truth of some of
the diary entries. In the second of these
interviews McPartlin made certain
statements, which Ingram argues tend to
support his defense. At trial, when Ingram
offered evidence of these statements,
McPartlin's counsel objected on the ground,
Inter alia, of the attorney-client privilege,
and the court, after an In camera hearing,
sustained the objection on this and another
ground.13
56
The exclusion of the McPartlin statements
would not be reversible error even if he had
not been entitled to claim the privilege. We
are satisfied from our examination of the
transcript of the In camera hearing, which
was sealed and made a part of the record
on appeal, that the statements merely
corroborated facts which were admitted in
evidence and which the jury obviously
found to be true.14 We do not disclose the
contents of the statements because they
remain protected by the attorney-client
privilege, on which we alternatively base
our ruling on this point.
105

57
McPartlin was entitled to the protection of

the attorney-client privilege, because his
statements were made in confidence to an
attorney for a co-defendant for a common
purpose related to both defenses. They
were made in connection with the project
of attempting to discredit Benton, a project
in which Ingram and McPartlin and their
attorneys were jointly engaged for the
benefit of both defendants. Ingram
acknowledges that communications by a
client to his own lawyer remain privileged
when the lawyer subsequently shares them
with co-defendants for purposes of a
common defense. The common-defense
rule, which is not as narrow as Ingram
contends, has been recognized in cases
spanning more than a century. Chahoon v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822
(1871); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2
N.W.2d 413 (1942); Continental Oil Co. v.
United States, 330 F.2d 347 (1964);
Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th
Cir. 1965); Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena,
406 F.Supp. 381, 387-389 (S.D.N.Y.1975);
See State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799,
259 P.2d 845, 854-855 (1953); Note,
"Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on
Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information," 63
Yale L.J. 1030 (1954); Note, "The Attorney-
Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations,"
8 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Prob. 179 (1972).
Uninhibited communication among joint
parties and their counsel about matters of
common concern is often important to the
protection of their interests. Note, Supra, 8
Colum.J.L. & Soc.Prob. at 179-180. In
criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair
opportunity to defend. Therefore, waiver is
not to be inferred from the disclosure in
confidence to a co-party's attorney for a
common purpose.
58
In the case at bar, the judge found, as a
preliminary question of fact, from the
evidence adduced at the hearing held
pursuant to Rule 404(a), Fed.R.Evid., that
McPartlin had made the statements to the
investigator in confidence. That finding is
not clearly erroneous.
59
Ingram argues that the co-defendants'
defenses must be in all respects compatible
if the joint-defense privilege is to be
applicable. The cases do not establish such
a limitation,15 and there is no reason to
impose it. Rule 503(b)(3) of the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by
the Supreme Court, stated that the
privilege applies to communications by a
client "to a lawyer representing another in
a matter of common interest." See 2 J.
Weinstein, Evidence 503-52 (1977). The
Advisory Committee's Note to proposed
Rule 503(b) makes it clear that the joint-
interest privilege is not limited to situations
in which the positions of the parties are
compatible in all respects:
60
The third type of communication occurs in
the "joint defense" or "pooled information"
situation, where different lawyers represent
clients who have Some interests in
common. . . . The rule does not apply to
situations where there is No common
interest to be promoted by a joint
consultation, and the parties meet on a
purely adversary basis.
61
Quoted in 2 J. Weinstein, Supra, at 503-6 to
503-7. (Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted.) Although the Congress, in its
revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
deleted the detailed privilege rules and left
the subject of privilege in federal question
cases to "be governed by the principles of
common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States," R. 501
Fed.R.Evid., the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee, approved by the
Supreme Court, are a useful guide to the
federal courts in their development of a
common law of evidence. 2 J. Weinstein,
Supra, at 501-20.4 to 501-20.5. In this
instance we follow the recommendation.
The privilege protects pooling of
information for any defense purpose
common to the participating defendants.
Cooperation between defendants in such
circumstances is often not only in their
own best interests but serves to expedite
the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial
106

preparation.16
62
8 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2301 at 583
(McNaughton rev. 1961); Cf. United States
v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-922 (2d Cir.
1961) (client's communications to an
accountant employed by his attorney).
63
Nor was it, as Ingram contends, fatal to the
privilege that McPartlin made the
statement, in effect, to Ingram's attorney
rather than his own. When the Ingram and
McPartlin camps decided to join in an
attempt to discredit Benton, the attorney
for each represented both for purposes of
that joint effort. The relationship was no
different than it would have been if during
the trial the Ingram and McPartlin attorneys
had decided that Ingram's attorney would
cross-examine Benton on behalf of both,
and during cross-examination McPartlin
passed Ingram's attorney a note containing
information for use in the cross-
examination. The attorney who thus
undertakes to serve his client's co-
defendant for a limited purpose becomes
the co-defendant's attorney for that
purpose. A claim of privilege was upheld in
circumstances such as these where
communications were made directly to the
attorney for another party in In the Matter
of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
supra, 406 F.Supp. at 391. United States v.
Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.4 (9th
Cir.), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct.
326, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971), relied on by
Ingram, is not to the contrary. In Friedman
the court held its decision in Hunydee v.
United States, supra, inapplicable, because
no joint defense or common interest was
alleged. The court went on to state, in the
footnote relied upon, that even if Hunydee
was applicable, there was no privilege since
"the facts of the conversation negate
confidentiality." 445 F.2d at 1085 n.4.
statements even if those statements had

not been merely cumulative.

NELLY LIM V. CA


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
64
Inasmuch as McPartlin was entitled to
assert the privilege whether Ingram was
tried jointly or separately, no prejudice
would have resulted from the joint trial by
reason of the exclusion of the McPartlin
8.
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully

married to each other.
private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a
petition for annulment of such marriage on the
ground that petitioner has been allegedly
suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present."
Trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent
presented three (3) witnesses before taking the
witness stand himself to testify on his own
behalf. Private respondent's counsel
announced that he would present as his next
witness the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado,
a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
requiring Dr. Acampado to testify.
Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the
ground that the testimony sought to be elicited
from the witness is privileged since the latter
had examined the petitioner in a professional
capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering
from schizophrenia.
Petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus
motion to quash the subpoena ad
testificandum and suspend the proceedings
pending resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand
on 25 January 1989, the court heard this
urgent motion. Movant argued that having
seen and examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred
from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality
of
a
physician-patient
relationship.
Counsel for private respondent contended,
however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not
testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional
capacity.
The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied
the motion and allowed the witness to testify.
Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was
qualified by counsel for private respondent as
107

an expert witness and was asked hypothetical
questions related to her field of expertise. She
neither revealed the illness she examined and
treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the
results of her examination and the medicines
she had prescribed.
"SECTION
24.
Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
Rulings of the Lower Courts:

9.
The RTC denied the omnibus motion. It was

denied again by the CA upon appeal due to
failure in establishing the confidential nature of
the testimony given. The CA ruled:
Given a set of facts and asked a
hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado
rendered an opinion regarding the history
and behaviour of the fictitious character in
the hypothetical problem. The facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer and (sic) had no
bearing to (sic) whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained from attending
the (sic) patient. A physician is not
disqualified to testify as an expert
concerning a patient's ailment, when he can
disregard knowledge acquired in attending
such patient and make answer solely on
facts related in (sic) the hypothetical
question. (Butler vs. Role, 242 Pac. 436;
Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926).
Expert testimony of a physician based on
hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of
illness of a person whom he has attended is
not privileged, provided the physician does
not give testimony tending to disclose
confidential information related to him in
his professional capacity while attending to
the patient.

The Issue presented before the Court:
10. The petitioner appeals before the Court to
reverse the decisions of the lower courts in not
finding that all the essential elements of the
rule
on
physician-patient
privileged
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at
bar.

11. The petition must be denied.
12. The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
(c) A person
authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or
obstetrics cannot in a
civil case, without the
consent of the patient,
be examined as to any
advice or treatment
given by him or any
information which he
may have acquired in
attending such patient in
a professional capacity,
which information was
necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity,
and which would blacken
the reputation of the
patient."
13. This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section
21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the
inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment
given by him," and (b) substitution of the word
reputation for the word character.
14. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of
paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940
Rules of Court with a modification consisting in
the change of the phrase "which would tend to
blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9
Verily, these changes affected the meaning of
the provision.
15. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient
if the information would tend to blacken the
character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of
Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it
was imperative that the information would
blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the
rule was relaxed once more by the substitution
of the word character with the word
reputation. There is a distinction between
these two concepts. "'Character' is what a man
is, and 'reputation' is what he is supposed to be
in what people say he is. 'Character' depends
on attributes possessed, and 'reputation' on
attributes which others believe one to possess.
The former signifies reality and the latter
merely what is accepted to be reality at
108

present."
16. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is
intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the
physician of all facts, circumstances and
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end
that the physician may form a correct opinion,
and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for
the general interest of the community.
17. In order that the privilege may be successfully
claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2)
the person against whom the

privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice
medicine,
surgery
or
obstetrics;
3)
such person acquired the

information while he was
attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4)
the
information
was
necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and
5)
the
information
was
confidential, and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the
patient." 14
18. These requisites conform with the four (4)

fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
1. The communications must
originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
2)
This
element
of
confidentiality must be
essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of
the relation between the
parties.
3)
The relation must be one

which in the opinion of the
community ought to be
sedulously fostered
4)
The injury that would inure to
the relation by the disclosure

of the communications must
be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation." 15
19. The physician may be considered to be acting in
his professional capacity when he attends to
the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would
have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized
that "it is the tenor only of the communication
that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations,
are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so
long as the subject communicated is not
stated."
20. Firstly, As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained
in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor
obtained while attending to the patient. There
is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado's
answers to the questions propounded to her
relating to the hypothetical problem were
influenced by the information obtained from
the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or
knowledge she had about the petitioner which
was acquired by reason of the physician-patient
relationship existing between them. As an
expert witness, her testimony before the trial
court cannot then be excluded.
21. Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's
testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always
conducted in the presence of a third party,
thus:

Q I am asking you, doctor, whom
did you interview?
A I interviewed the
husband first, then the
father and after having
the history, I interviewed
the patient, Nelly.
There is authority to the effect that
information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties
removes such information from the mantle of
the privilege:
"Some courts have held
that the casual presence of a third
109

person destroys the confidential
nature of the communication
between doctor and patient and
thus destroys the privilege and
that under such circumstances the
doctor may testify.
22. Thirdly, except for the petitioner's sweeping
claim that "(T)he information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic)
reproach to petitioner by falsely making it
appear in the eyes of the trial court and the
public that the latter was suffering from a
mental disturbance called schizophrenia
which caused, and continues to cause,
irreparable injury to the name and reputation
of petitioner and her family," 22 which is
based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or
concrete was offered to show that indeed, the
information obtained from Dr. Acampado
would blacken the former's "character" (or
"reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed
any information obtained from the petitioner
regarding the latter's ailment and the treatment
recommended therefor.

was objected under physician-patient privilege rule.

The wife argued that the privilege will not apply it
only applies when then the physician is examined or
the testimony of the physician, not the records.
SC disagrees. When a physician attends to
a patient, the former would obviously put into
writing his/her findings/diagnosis/treatment into the
latters medical record. These medical reports serve
as repository of all the findings/diagnosis/treatment
administered by the physician to the patient. So,
producing this medical record in court is not
different from the physician testifying therefore,
covered by the privilege.
INFORMATION MUST BE GIVEN IN CONFIDENCE
If the advice is given in the presence of a third party,
not exclusively in the presence of the patient, it is not
covered.
CASE: Lim V. CA
The wife objected to the production of her
medical record based on the interview conducted by
her psychiatrist.
SC SAID:
ANY INFORMATION/TREATMENT/ADVICE GIVEN

SHOULD BE MADE IN THE COURSE OF A PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYMENT
1.
professional employment
2.
Interpreted as PREVENTIVE OR CURATIVE

TREATMENT. For example: Autopsy is neither
preventive nor curative, it is only a fact finding
procedure--not covered.
CASE: Lim V. Ca
SC: what is prohibited by the rule is the
disclosure of the specific informationthe treatment
given or procedure administered, the diagnosis, the
information relayed by the patient to the physician but
NOT THE FACT OF CONSULTATION. So the physician may
disclose that indeed a certain patient is under my care or
under my medical treatment.
Physician may not be EXAMINED
covers not only the testimony of the
physicianwhen the physician is called to be examined.
CASE: Chan V. Chan (if mockbar examiner is
updated, this is a good case)
A wife filed a case for nullity of marriage
under art. 36the husband is mentally deficient due
to his incessant alcoholism and excessive drug use.
To prove such, the wife move for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum for the submission of the
medical records of the husband, who was once
confined in the hospital for drug rehabilitation. It
What is prohibited by the rule is the disclosure

of specific information, not the fact of
consultation.
Even if the disclosure is of specific information
regarding the treatment of the advice, it will not
be covered by the privilege if it is established
that during the interview the patient was always
accompanied by third party.
Relate this ruling to Rule 28

Mode of discovery called mental and physical
examination
The court, upon motion of adverse party, may order
the submission to physical examination of a party. Sec. 4 in
relation to Sec. 3 the effect is when a party examined
request for the copy of the result of the report of the
examination caused to be conducted by the adverse party/at
the instance of the adverse party, the party subjected to the
physical examination is deemed to have waived any
confidential information relating to any other examination
conducted relating to the same mental condition. So, if there
is other examination conducted, he cannot anymore object to
the disclosure of the results of the other examinations
because he has deemed to have waived his right to the
confidential nature of his other reports related to the same
mental condition subject of the examination contemplated in
rule 28.
MAY ONLY BE INVOKED AGAINST A PERSON
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE, SURGERY, OR
110
OBSTETRICS
TN: the communication must be between the

physician and the patient and if such communication was
made with the presence of a third party, it ceases to be
confidential or privileged.

KROHN V. CA
Facts:
1)
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being

presented in evidence before the trial court in a
petition for annulment of marriage grounded on
psychological incapacity.
The witness testifying on the report is the husband
who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the
physician who prepared the report.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz
Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de
Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union
produced three children. Their blessings
notwithstanding, the relationship between the
couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma.
Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in
an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort
however proved futile. In 1973, they finally
separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared
and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and
Baltazar Reyes.
November 1978, presenting the report among
others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from
the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz
on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at
the time of the wedding and thereafter." On 10
July 1979, the decree was confirmed and
pronounced "Final and Definite."
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the
trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which
Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either
unfounded or irrelevant."
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the
witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This
was objected to on the ground that it violated the
rule on privileged communication between
physician and patient.
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

8)
9)
The trial court resolves to overrule the objection

because the psychiatric report is very material and
relevant to the issue of the case.
The CA affirmed the RTC and denied the appeal.

Arguments of the Petitioner on Appeal:
10) Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and
disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report.
She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired
in attending to a patient in a professional capacity,
"WITH MORE REASON should a third person (like
respondent-husband in this particular instance) be
PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting
any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared
by a physician which the latter has acquired as a
result of his confidential and privileged relation
with a patient."
11) She further argues that to allow her husband to
testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation
report "will set a very bad and dangerous
precedent because it abets circumvention of the
rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and
confidence to the relation of physician and his
patient."

Arguments of the Respondent on Appeal:
12) Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however
contends that "the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . .
the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to
the case at bar where the person sought to be
barred from testifying on the privileged
communication is the husband and not the
physician of the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to
him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering
that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil
case filed by one against the other.
13) Besides, private respondent submits that privileged
communication may be waived by the person
entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did
when she gave her unconditional consent to the
use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was
presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account among
others in deciding the case and declaring their
marriage null and void. Private respondent further
argues that petitioner also gave her implied
consent when she failed to specifically object to the
admissibility of the report in her Answer where she
merely described the evaluation report as "either
unfounded or irrelevant."

The issue presented before us:
111
14) The issue is whether the objection on the ground of

privileged communication between a psychiatrist
and a patient should be sustained as to exclude the
testimony of the husband about the contents of the
psychiatric report from evidence.
BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE V.

OLIVARES
1.

The Ruling of the Court:
15) The appeal should be denied.
16) The treatise presented by petitioner on the
privileged nature of the communication between
physician and patient, as well as the reasons
therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making
communications between physician and patient
privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the
patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure
to his physician of his symptoms and condition.
17) Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however
misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down
the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a
civil cases; (b) the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such
person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient."
18) In the instant case, the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply
the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and
effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.
19) Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting
to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation
before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he
invoked the rule on privileged communications but
never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a
fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
counsel waived his right to make such objection
and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.

2.
3.
4.
5.
Respondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health

care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health
Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm.
For the period October 16, 2002 to October 15,
2003, 6 she paid the amount of P11,117. For the
same period, she also availed of the additional
service of limitless consultations for an additional
amount of P1,000. She paid these amounts in full
on October 17, 2002. The application was approved
on October 22, 2002. In the health care agreement,
ailments due to "pre-existing conditions" were
excluded from the coverage.
On November 30, 2002, or barely 38 days from the
effectivity of her health insurance, respondent
Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the
Medical City which was one of the hospitals
accredited by petitioner. During her confinement,
she underwent several laboratory tests. On
December 2, 2002, her attending physician, Dr.
Edmundo Saniel, 8 informed her that she could be
discharged from the hospital. She incurred hospital
expenses amounting to P34,217.20. Consequently,
she requested from the representative of petitioner
at Medical City a letter of authorization in order to
settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to
issue the letter and suspended payment pending
the submission of a certification from her attending
physician that the stroke she suffered was not
caused by a pre-existing condition.
She was discharged from the hospital on December
3, 2002. On December 5, 2002, she demanded that
petitioner pay her medical bill. When petitioner still
refused, she and her husband, respondent Danilo
Olivares, were constrained to settle the bill. They
thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against petitioner in the MeTC on January 8,
2003. 11 In its answer dated January 24, 2003,
petitioner maintained that it had not yet denied
respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr.
Saniel's report.
In a letter to petitioner dated February 14, 2003,
Dr. Saniel stated that:
This is in response to your letter
dated February 13, 2003. [Respondent]
Neomi T. Olivares called by phone on
January 29, 2003. She stated that she is
invoking patient-physician confidentiality.
That she no longer has any relationship with
[petitioner]. And that I should not release
any medical information concerning her
neurologic status to anyone without her
approval.
112
Arguments of the Parties:

6. Blue Cross argues that respondents prevented Dr.
Saniel from submitting his report regarding the
medical condition of Neomi. Hence, it contends
that the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced should
apply in its favor.
7. Olivares counter that the burden was on petitioner
to prove that Neomi's (the wife) stroke was
excluded from the coverage of their agreement
because it was due to a pre-existing condition. It
failed to prove this.
8. The MeTC denied Olivares complaint for lack of
cause of action. It held that the best person to
determine whether the stroke she suffered was not
caused by pre-existing conditions is her attending
physician Dr. Saniel.
9. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MeTCs ruling. It
ordered Blue Cross to pay the medical bill among
other damages. The RTC held that it was the
burden of Blue Cross to prove that the stroke of
respondent Neomi was excluded from the coverage
of the health care program for being caused by a
preexisting condition. It was not able to discharge
that burden.
10. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

The Issues presented before us:
11. The issue is whether Blue Cross was able to prove
that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a
pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded
from the coverage of the health care agreement.

12. The petition must be denied.
13. In Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA, we ruled
that a health care agreement is in the nature of a
non-life insurance. It is an established rule in
insurance contracts that when their terms contain
limitations on liability, they should be construed
strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of
adhesion the terms of which must be interpreted
and enforced stringently against the insurer which
prepared the contract. This doctrine is equally
applicable to health care agreements.
14. Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove
that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a pre-
existing condition. It merely speculated that Dr.
Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi, based
on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege.
This was a disputable presumption at best.
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court states:
Sec.
3.
presumptions.
Disputable

The
following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) That evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced

5) However, this presumption does not apply if (a)
the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b)
the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative and (d) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
6) Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the
presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It
was privileged communication between physician
and patient.
7) Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability
on the part of the insurer or health care provider
must be construed in such a way as to preclude it
from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they
should be scrutinized by the courts with "extreme
jealousy" and "care" and with a "jaundiced eye."
Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception
to liability, it should have made its own assessment
of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing
condition when it failed to obtain the attending
physician's report. It could not just passively wait for
Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. The mere reliance on
a disputable presumption does not meet the strict
standard required under our jurisprudence [insofar
as insurance contracts are concerned].

CHAN V. CHAN
Background of the case:
1.
2.
3.
This case is about the propriety of issuing a

subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's
hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of
marriage where one of the issues is his mental
fitness as a husband.
The wife (Josie) filed before the RTC a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage to her husband
Johnny on the ground that he failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed
him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking
and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she
had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement
for detoxification and rehabilitation.
During the PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, Josielene pre-
marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The
113
4.
5.
form carried a physician's handwritten note that

Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse."
Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City (the rehabilitation center), covering
Johnny's medical records when he was there
confined. The request was accompanied by a motion
to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records
sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the
medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege.

Decisions of the Lower Courts:
6. The RTC sustained Johnnys opposition
7. The CA denied Josies appeal. It ruled that, if courts
were to allow the production of medical records,
then patients would be left with no assurance that
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made
to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also
affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can
waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He
attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the
limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
confinement.

The Issue presented before us:
8. The issue is whether the refusal of the lower courts
to issue the subpoena to obtain Johnnys hospital
records in the light of the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication was proper.

9. Josies petition should be denied.
10. The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient
cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient's consent as to any facts which would
blacken the latter's reputation.
st
11. 1 - The case presents a procedural issue, given that
the time to object to the admission of evidence, such
as the hospital records, would be at the time they
are offered. The offer could be made part of the
physician's testimony or as independent evidence
that he had made entries in those records that
concern the patient's health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that
objections to evidence must be made after
the offer of such evidence for admission in
court. Thus:
SEC.
36.
Objection. Objection to
evidence offered orally
must
be
made
immediately after the
offer is made.
12. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial,
Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. Here, the case is still in the PRE-TRIAL
stage. She will have to wait for trial to begin before
making a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital records. It
is when those records are produced for examination
at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just
to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure. Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of
privileged matters.
nd
13. 2 - It is of course possible to treat Josielene's
motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for
production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27
of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for
production or inspection; order.
Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a)
order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf
of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers,
books,
accounts,
letters,
photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in
the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or
(b) order any party to permit entry
upon designated land or other
property in his possession or
control for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or
any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner
of making the inspection and
taking copies and photographs,
and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just. (Emphasis
supplied)

114
14.
15.
16.
17.
But the above right to compel the production of

documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged."
rd
3 - Josielene of course claims that the hospital
records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that
may be regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of Rule
130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined"
regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital
records (which is a document only), but only the
examination of the physician at the trial.
We cannot agree to this argument. To allow the
disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's
illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patient's consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient's records. Disclosing them would be
the equivalent of compelling the physician to
testify on privileged matters he gained while
dealing with the patient, without the latter's
prior consent.
th
4 - Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted
in his answer to the petition before the RTC that
he had been confined in a hospital against his will
and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth
claim form covering that confinement, he should
be deemed to have waived the privileged
character of its records. She invokes Section 17,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of
transaction, writing or record given
in evidence, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing
or record is given in evidence by
one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by
the other, and when a detached
act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in
evidence,
any
other
act,
declaration, conversation, writing
or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given
in evidence.

Yet again, this is still premature to invoke. Note
again that the proceedings are still at the PRE-
TRIAL stage. The Trial Proper in the case had not
yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that
Johnny had already presented the Philhealth
claim form in evidence, the act which would

justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into
the details of his hospital confinement. Offering
of evidence is only made during the trial proper.
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in
the case when he filed his answer. Any request
for disclosure of his hospital records would again
be premature.

BANCO FILIPINO V. MONETARY

BOARD


1.
2.
Banco Filipino is about to close and be liquidated.

Hence, it was subjected under receivership.
This is a Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce
Documents as ordered by the RTC for the production
for the production, inspection, and copying of
certain papers and records which are claimed as
needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of
its comments, objections, and exceptions to the
Conservator's report dated January 8, 1985, and
Receiver's Report dated March 19, 1985. The
documents now asked to be produced, inspected,
and copied are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the
Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the
closure of Banco Filipino (BF) and its
meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22,
1985;
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first
conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the
MB and to Central Bank Governor Jose
Fernandez;
(3) Papers showing computations of all the
interests and penalties charged by the CB
against BF;
(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of
reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated
March 19, 1985;
(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr.
Tiaoqui's report;
(6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint
report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and
115

the Bank as a result of such violation or
negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply
to the disclosure of any information of a
confidential nature about the discussion or
resolutions of the Monetary Board, except
as required in Section 13 of this Act, or
about the operations of the Bank, and to
the use of such information for personal
gain or to the detriment of the
Government, the Bank or third parties. (As
amended by Presidential Decree No. 72).
(Italics supplied).
Mrs. Valenzuela;
(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises
of Paseo de Roxas of same report;
(8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from
P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25,
1985;
(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs.
Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.
3.
4.
In issuing the challenged order, the court below took

the view that the Supreme Court's resolution
referring to it the matters relative to the bank's
closure does not preclude the petitioner from
availing of this mode of discovery as an additional
means of preparing for the hearing. It considered
the documents sought to be produced as not
privileged because these constitute or contain
evidence material to the issues into by the Court.
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take
exception to the said order and pray in their petition
before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of
the same.
Counter-argument of Banco Filipino:

6.

Argument of the Monetary Board of the BSP:
5.
Among others, they argue that the tapes and

transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the
Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a
personal interest. Whenever any member
attending a meeting of the Monetary Board
has a material personal interest, directly or
indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of
any given matter, said member shall not
participate in the discussion or resolution of
the matter and must retire from the
meeting during the deliberation thereon.
The subject matter, when resolved, and the
fact that a member had a personal interest
in it, shall be made available to the public.
The minutes of the meeting shall note the
withdrawal of the member concerned. (As
amended by PD No. 1827).
Sec. 15. Responsibility. Any member of
the Monetary Board or officer or employee
of the Central Bank who wilfully violates
this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence
in the performance of his duties shall be
held liable for any loss or injury suffered by
The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to

produce the Central Bank records because it is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality.
Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine
established in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 713, which states that "when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law."
Counter-argument of the Monetary Board:

7.
The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions

cited by petitioner are inapplicable because the
authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege
based only on the generalized interest of
confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is
merely presumptive. On the other hand, the so-
called MB deliberations are privileged
communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court because statements and opinions
expressed in the deliberation of the members of the
MB are specifically vested with confidentiality under
Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The "public
interest" requirement for non-disclosure is evident
from the fact that the statute punishes any
disclosure of such deliberations.

8.
The issue in this case is whether the order for the

production of the documents mentioned above (Par
2) was proper.

9.
Yes it was proper. We accept the view taken by the
116
court below that the documents are not privileged.
10. As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary

Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino
and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22,
1985, (Item No. 1), the Monetary Board contends
that "it is obvious from the requirement (Sections 13
and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject
matter (of the deliberations), when resolved. . . shall
be made available to the public but the deliberations
themselves are not open to disclosure but are to be
kept in confidence."
11. The Court does not agree with the Monetary Board.
The deliberations may be confidential but not
necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no
specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in
Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits
absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on
said deliberations when these are relevant or
material to a matter subject of a suit pending before
it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain
information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause
detriment to the government, to the bank or to
third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here
that is interested in obtaining what it considers as
information useful and indispensably needed by it
to support its position in the matter being inquired
to by the court below.
12. On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule
130, Rules of Court which states:
examined as to communications made to him in

official confidence does not apply when there is
nothing to show that the public interest would suffer
by the disclosure question. ... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52
SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the
Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 199).
13. In the case at bar, the respondents have not
established that public interest would suffer by the
disclosure of the papers and documents sought by
petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was
already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure
of the aforementioned letters, reports, and
transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our
economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor
compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason for
their resistance to the order of production are
tenuous and specious. If the respondents public
officials acted rightfully and prudently in the
performance of their duties, there should be nothing
at all that would provoke fear of disclosure
14. On the contrary, public interests will be best served
by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the
banks and its employees but also its numerous
depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed
as to whether or not there was a valid and legal
justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will
be well to consider that
Public interest means more than a mere
curiosity; it means something in which the
public, the community at large, has some
pecuniary interest by which their legal
rights or liabilities are affected (State vs.
Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and
Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
Section 21. Privileged Communications. The

matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined
during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official
confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by disclosure.
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is
intended not for the protection of public officers
but for the protection of public interest (Vogel vs.
Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where
there is no public interest that would be prejudiced,
this invoked rule will not be applicable.
The rule that a public officer cannot be
NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
1.
2.
This is about the ZTE scandal.

On April 21, 2007, the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290
117
3.
4.
5.
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was

to be financed by the People's Republic of China.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation
by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was among those invited. He was
summoned to appear and testify on September 18,
20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he
attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming
he was "out of town" during the other dates.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before
respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, 6
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, 7
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a
Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring
him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. It argued:
Maintaining the confidentiality of
conversations of the President is
necessary in the exercise of her
executive and policy decision making
process. The expectation of a President
to the confidentiality of her
conversations and correspondences, like
the value which we accord deference
for the privacy of all citizens, is the
necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making.
Disclosure
of
conversations of the President will have
a chilling effect on the President, and
will hamper her in the effective
discharge of her duties and
responsibilities, if she is not protected
by the confidentiality of her
conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be
6.
7.
8.
9.
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as

economic relations with the People's Republic of
China.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear
before respondent Committees. Thus, on November
22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited
in contempt.
Petitioner reasoned that: (1) his (petitioner) non-
appearance was upon the order of the President;
and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt
with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials
and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines.
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner
filed with this Court the present petition for
certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated
November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioner's
explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to
his request for advance notice of the matters that he
should still clarify, they issued the Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt.

Arguments of Neri:
10. Neri contends that respondent Committees' show
cause Letter and contempt Order were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his
conversations with President Arroyo are "candid
discussions meant to explore options in making
policy decisions." According to him, these
discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials on the
country's diplomatic relations and economic and
military affairs and the possible loss of confidence
of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines."

Arguments of the Senate Committee:
11. Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They

argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material and
pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of
legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is
no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's
arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court
with clean hands.

12. At the core of this controversy are the two (2)
crucial queries, to wit:
First, are the communications elicited by
118
the subject three (3) questions covered by

executive privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees

commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?

13. Neris petition should be granted.
14. In Senate v. Ermita, Senate draws in bold strokes
the distinction between the legislative and
oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied
under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI
of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate
or the House of Representatives
or any of its respective
committees
may
conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

SECTION 22. The heads
of department may upon their
own initiative, with the consent of
the President, or upon the
request of either House, or as the
rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the
security of the state or the public
interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.
15. Senate cautions that while the above provisions are
closely related and complementary to each other,
they should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its
aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power

to conduct a question hour, the objective of which
is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress'
oversight function. Simply stated, while both
powers allow Congress or any of its committees to
conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
16. This distinction gives birth to another distinction
with regard to the use of compulsory process.
Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22.
The Court's pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita 20
is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be
informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is
not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter
of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request
their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is 'in aid of legislation'
under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
17. Despite the revocation of EO 464, the claim of
executive privilege still exists.
18. In United States v. Nixon, 29 the U.S. Court
recognized a great public interest in preserving "the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in
the President's performance of his official duties."
It thus considered presidential communications as
"presumptively privileged." Apparently, the
presumption is founded on the "President's
generalized interest in confidentiality." The
privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the
President and those who assist him. . . with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately."
19. In In re: Sealed Case, 30 the U.S. Court of Appeals
delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds
of executive privilege; one is the presidential
communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains
to "communications, documents or other materials
119
20.
21.
22.
23.
that reflect presidential decision-making and

deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential." The latter includes
'advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are
formulated."
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked
distinctions. Presidential communications privilege
applies to decision-making of the President while,
the deliberative process privilege, to decision-
making of executive officials. The first is rooted in
the constitutional principle of separation of power
and the President's unique constitutional role; the
second on common law privilege. Unlike the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in
their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones 31 As a
consequence, congressional or judicial negation of
the presidential communications privilege is always
subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the
presidential communications privilege, In Re Sealed
Case confines the privilege only to White House
Staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is
meant to encompass only those functions that form
the core of presidential authority, involving what
the court characterized as "quintessential and non-
delegable Presidential power", such as commander-
in-chief power, appointment and removal power,
the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-
authority to receive ambassadors and other public
officers, the power to negotiate treaties etc. 32
The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of
Justice 33 tested the In Re Sealed Case principles.
There, while the presidential decision involved is the
exercise of the President's pardon power, a non-
delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy
Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were
deemed to be too remote from the President and his
senior White House advisors to be protected. The
Court conceded that functionally those officials were
performing a task directly related to the President's
pardon power, but concluded that an organizational
test was more appropriate for confining the
potentially broad sweep that would result from the
In Re Sealed Case's functional test. The majority
concluded that, the lesser protections of the
deliberative process privilege would suffice. That
privilege was, however, found insufficient to justify
the confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents.
But more specific classifications of communications
covered by executive privilege are made in older
cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a
right to withhold documents that might reveal
military or state secrets 34 identity of government

informers in some circumstances, 35 and
information related to pending investigations. 36
An area where the privilege is highly revered is in
foreign relations. In US v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp, the US Court held:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires
caution, and their success must often depend on
secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a
full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or
eventual concessions which may have been
proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence
on future negotiations or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in
relation to other powers.
24. In Chavez v. PEA, 39 there is also a recognition of the
confidentiality of Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re
Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide
the elements of presidential communications
privilege, to wit:
1)
The protected communication must

relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power."
2)
The communication must be authored

or "solicited and received" by a close
advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President.
3)
The presidential communications

privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the
information sought "likely contains
important evidence" and by the
unavailability of the information
elsewhere
by
an
appropriate
investigating authority.
25. Simply put, the bases are presidential

communications privilege and executive privilege
on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
26. Using the above elements, we are convinced that,
indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications
privilege.
First,
the
communications relate to a "quintessential and
120
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the

power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 45
Second, the communications are "received" by a
close advisor of the President. Under the
"operational proximity" test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States. v. Nixon held that a claim of
executive privilege is subject to balancing against
other interest. In Nixon v. Sirica, it was held that
presidential communications privilege are
presumptively privileged and that the presumption
can be overcome only by mere showing of public
need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing
interests of the political branches of the
government "in the manner that preserves the
essential functions of each Branch."
Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or critical need for the answers to the
three (3) questions in the enactment of a law.
Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the
same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation."
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of
executive privilege does not guard against a
possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We
see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States
v. Nixon 48 that "demonstrated, specific need for
evidence i n pending criminal trial" outweighs the
President's "generalized interest in confidentiality."
However, the present case's distinction with the
Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a
pending criminal proceeding where the information
is requested and it is the demands of due process of
law and the fair administration of criminal justice
that the information be disclosed. This is the reason
why the U.S. Court was quick to "limit the scope of
its decision." It stressed that it is "not concerned
here with the balance between the President's
generalized interest in confidentiality . . . and
congressional demands for information." Unlike in
Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a

criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In
this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the
validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
not only on the ground invoked but, also, the
procedural setting or the context in which the claim
is made.
32. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not
interpose any claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In
the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita
categorically claims executive privilege on the
grounds of presidential communications privilege
in relation to her executive and policy decision-
making process and diplomatic secrets.
33. Respondent Committees further contend that the
grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.
50 We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
34. The right to public information, like any other right,
is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
35. The provision itself expressly provides the
limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713, 51 Article 229 52 of the Revised Penal Code,
Section 3 (k) 53 of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24 (e)
54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in
addition to what our body of jurisprudence
classifies as confidential 55 and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger
concept of executive privilege.
36. Further, in Senate v. Ermita, it was held
that: Thus, while Congress is composed
of representatives elected by the people,
it does not follow, except in a highly
121

qualified sense, that in every exercise of
its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.

122

Evidence-Case-Digest 3rd Batch 2015

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Evidence

Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

This incident happened after the EDSA Revolution.

Some of the accused were acquitted, some were

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

photographs did not capture the entire sequence of

Tousin, of Pasco, received monthly welfare checks

Quantum of Authentication is only that some

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

Attacking the inaccuracy of the contents of the

did. He identified the four aforementioned suspects as the

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

This is a story of a mother, Bienvenida Tijing, and her

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

on her way to the market, Bienvenida told Angelita

John Thomas Lopez is actually the missing son of

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would

Vallejo. So the result of the DNA

The SC resorted to the conventional method of

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

The case involves a prosecution for rape with

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

day, June 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of

He was charged guilty of Rape with Homicide.

Arguments of Accused on Appeal:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

The victim went to Aimee

At around 2:00 o'clock in the

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

fish with dynamite) was

A little before 5:00 o'clock in

By 5:30 o'clock in the

Daisy's body was found tied

The clothes which accused-

Accused-appellant has blood

The vaginal swabs from

15. On the challenge against the DNA test results, we

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

16. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's

When a crime is committed, material is

The samples are

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

similar, the analyst

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

learned the name of accused-appellant

DNA profile of Vallejo. So the result of the

It was around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of

Rheland S. Servacio; Dana Flynch de Lira

The accused was proven guilty of Rape.

Appellant asserts that the court a quo erred in giving

Evidence Case Digests 3rd Batch A.Y. 2015-2016

Issue presented before us:

this Court is called upon to determine whether the

Ruling of the Court:

The prosecution met the burden of proof.