Académique Documents
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People of the
Philippines
GR No. 173822
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for murder.
What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, a minor during the
time of the commission?
Ruling: Conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal
is suspended.
First Issue
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law
prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a
case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the
Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours
from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is
pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to
determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the
main case shall be suspended.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of
his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present.
Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was
committed on April 18, 1994. His counter-affidavit, the police blotter
and trial records show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the
commission. Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed
with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned
shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict
with the law. Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is,
from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given
that the entire period of Monreals detention should be credited in the
service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No.
9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his
immediate release from the penitentiary
Joemar Ortega v. People of the Philippines
GR No. 151085
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in committing the crime of rape.
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare ACT of 2006
(RA 9344) should be applied in the resolution of the case.
Ruling: Conviction is affirmed. However, imposed penalty on Joemar
Ortega is suspended by virtue of RA 9344.
First Issue
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Whether or not RA 9344 should be applied to accusedappellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, in their alleged
minority
In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accusedappellants could muster are denial and alibi, and for
accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar,
their alleged minority.
More so where, as in the present case, the accusedappellants failed to present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the
crime scene at the time of the commission thereof.
The Court sustains the trial court's and the appellate court's
ruling regarding the minority of accused-appellants Iblong,
Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born
on August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated his birth date as July
6, 1987; Salcedo said he was born on January 10, 1985; and
Jaafar claimed he was born on July 13, 1981.
If Jaafar's birth date was indeed July 13, 1981, then he was
over 18 years of age when the crime was committed in June
of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority.
Hence, the rule was still that the burden of proving the
minority of the accused rested solely on the defense.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four accusedappellants were indeed less than eighteen years old at the
time the crime was committed, at this point in time, the
applicability of R.A. No. 9344 is seriously in doubt
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section
38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was
to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of
P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the
imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are
disqualified from having their sentences suspended
Issues:
(1 Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 on the petitioner's exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the
defense to present the petitioner's birth certificate to invoke Section
64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the
prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344;
Ruling:
SC granted petition. The case is dismissed and the petitioner is
referred to the appropriate local social welfare.
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the
prosecution but on the accused. Age can be established by birth
certificate or other documents provided for in RA 9344. In fact, Sec. 7
provides that in the absence of such document, age may be based
from the information of the child, testimonies of other persons,
physical appearance and other relevant evidence. Moreover, in case
of doubt, the child shall be presumed to be a minor unless the
contrary is proven.
In the case at bar, minority was established by the
testimonies of the petitioner and his mother. This was not
objected by the prosecution and contrary evidence was not
even presented. Thus, minority is established.
Furthermore, the law should be given retroactive application since this
favors the accused as provided for in the Revised Penal Code - penal
laws favoring the accused should be given retroactive effect. Hence
the accused is considered a minor with an age of not above 15 years
old.
(SC answer to the issues presented)
(1) Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect
on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a
child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system
that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner
appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition
measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling,
probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs
and other alternatives to institutional care. 26 More importantly in the
context of this case, this law modifies as well the minimum age limit
of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, previously provided i.e., from "under nine years of age"
and "above nine years of age and under fifteen" (who acted without
discernment) to "fifteen years old or under" and "above fifteen but
below 18" (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption
from criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law as the
old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did presumes that the
minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right
from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which
they cannot be held accountable. 27 The current law also drew its
changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it
considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors
of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and
intervention measures. 28 DHITcS
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption
from criminal liability because he was not more than 15 years
old at the time the rape took place. The CA disbelieved this
claim for the petitioner's failure to present his birth certificate
as required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344. 29 The CA also
found him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence
because the imposable penalty for the crime of rape is
reclusion perpetua to death.
the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable
upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Petition is DENIED. Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1.)
2.)
RULING
YES
The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buybust operation took place or when the said offense was committed,
but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006,
while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14,
2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance The Child and
Youth Welfare Code and the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,
the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his
sentence under Sec. 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its
retroactive application , thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below
the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia that
while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of
sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with
the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the
same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA
9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot
and academic
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be
appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. Therefore,
A penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable
penalty.