1. G.R. No.

L-26400 February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
Facts
appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No.
R5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner owner of Lot No. 639
of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. Without priorexpropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lotfor the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in
bad condition and very narrow.
Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portionof her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed
to the Auditor General, whodisallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.
Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17,
1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership
and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages for the illegal occupation
of her land, moral damages, attorney'sfees and the costs of the suit.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding
due notice, so the trial courtproceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
Issue WON the appellant can sue the govt for the recovery of the lot and pymt
for compensatory damages
Held
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, involving a claim for
payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in
Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, heldthat where the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion
ofland in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restorationof possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes,
the only relief available is for the government to make due compensationwhich it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
shouldbe the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of theland from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is
made by the government. In addition, the governmentshould pay for attorney's fees, the
amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
court a quo for thedetermination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the
appellant is entitled as above indicated. Nopronouncement as to costs.
2. G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners,
vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTCPasig,
Metro Manila,Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL,
Facts:
Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P.
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters.
When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the
birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series
of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the
Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic,
through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the
Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
possession of the property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the
trial court issued, on 3 August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00)
and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over
the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the
main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally,
that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of Iglesiani Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued its denial of said
motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied. The
Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
On 15 January 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition/A motion for the
reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on 23 July 1992. The
Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder
of the religious sect Iglesiani Cristo, constitutes public use.
Held:
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as
condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need
not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution
on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power.
Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a

method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said
to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable
from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." This prescription is intended to
provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against
whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting
a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that
public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use"
is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. The purpose
in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not
the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical
reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most
others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental
and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character ofpublic
use.
3.G.R. No. L106528December 21, 1993
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
Facts
This is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.
R. SP No. 23338, whichdismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner,
assailing the orders of (a) respondent JudgeDomingo D. Panis of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case No. 9053531,and (b) respondentJudge Ricardo D. Diaz, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 9053346;and (2)
itsResolution dated July 30, 1992, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
decision.
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a nonstock,nonprofitdomestic
corporation and isengaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for
its members. Petitioner's office andfacilities are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and
adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90square meters owned by
petitioner.
Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while
respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr.and KarloButiong were dulyelectedcouncilors of the City
of Manila.
In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private
respondents before the metropolitanTrial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against
the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot andpay reasonable compensation
therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the Court ofAppeals and
subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.As a result of the favorable decision,
petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss thecomplaint, alleging, inter alia, that
the City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land;that theexpropriation is not for
public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the
depositof P2 million in the City of Manila representing the provisional value of the land, was
insufficient and was madeunder P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
and
entered an order of condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly
instituted inaccordance with law.
as a result of the expropriation proceedings, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Manila, in Civil Case No. 9053346issued an order, granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by theprivate respondents. A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied.
Issue
Won the city of manila has the power to specific power to expropriate private property.
Held
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general
powers over its territorialjurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain, and Section
100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform.
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low salaried employees of the city. That
only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish
its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for
all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987] ).
The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been
complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as
the court is required to do (National HousingAuthority v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]),
it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial andappellate courts. It is only now
before us that petitioner raises the issue of due process.
Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsideration. of
the trial court's order,denying its motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit
4. G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON.
BENJAMIN V.PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur,
petitioners,
vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN,respondents.
Facts
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in ACG. R. SP No.
20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this
Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform,
as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines

Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to
establish a pilot farm for nonfood and nontraditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor,
Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on
the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ
of possession.
The san Joaquin petitioned for injunction at the CA. In its answer to the petition, the
Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation
proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there
was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General
expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as
a housing project.
Issue
won the province of camarines has the power to expropriate the land owned by the san
joaquins.
Held
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public
purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old
concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g.
roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public
advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the
whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power
of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a nonagricultural land.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides: A local government unit may,
through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. Section
9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first
secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units
to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

5. G.R. Nos. 9419399February 25, 1992

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, 6th
Judicial Region,Branch 47, Bacolod City; JESUS, FERNANDO, MARIA CRISTINA and
MICHAEL, all surnamed GONZAGA;LUIS, DIONISIO, ROBERTO, GABRIEL, BENJAMIN,
ANA, ALEXANDER, CARLA, SOFIA and DANIEL, all
surnamed GONZAGA; ROSARIO P. MENDOZA; CELSOY AGROIND.
CORP.; EMMANUEL, LYDIA, HARRY,NOLI, CLIFFORD and CHRISTIAN DALE, all surnamed
AO; MAYO L. LACSON; and LUCIA GOSIENFIAO,
Facts:
The petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued
by respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process.
The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way
easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and
transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to
landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both parties did not
come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the
eminent domain case.
Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation
and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject
areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, incompliance to the order of
respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in
the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank.
Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the
assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as
P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the
provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to
deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in
abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the
petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay
in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order
to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge hence this petition.
Issue:
W/N the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the
petitioner was deprived of due process of law.
Held:
The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on
eminent domain proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the

right to take possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed
value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court.
The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the
writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in
compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in
increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both
parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary
restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his
orders. There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:
1.
Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit
2.
Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court
of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3)commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Orders of respondent Judge
of 25 June 1990, 12 July 1990, 16 July 1990 and 18 July 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE and
the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 31 July 1990 directing respondent
Judge to cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Orders is hereby made permanent.
The respondent Judge is hereby directed to fix the provisional values of the parcels of land
thereafter, the petitioner may retain in Savings Account No. 2495058657 with the
Philippine National Bank, NAPOCOR Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, a sum equivalent to the
provisional value as thus fixed, which the Bank shall hold subject to the orders and final
disposition of the court a quo, and withdraw the balance.
6. G.R. No. L18841
January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellant,
vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendantappellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres
and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for plaintiffappellant. Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo
and Belo for defendantappellant
Facts
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental
powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of
Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a
public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout
the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within
the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other
countries.The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case but has
contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact
business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to
operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless
messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radiotelephone
and radiotelegraphic communications services (Act 3180). Sometime in 1933, the
defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station,
could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice versa, for calls collected by

the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. On 2 February 1956,
PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract..
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own
Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties.
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the
conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the
PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk
lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the
general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said
violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the
telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of
the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958
that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call
basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government
Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an
agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the
Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission
and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues.
plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying
in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff,
through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout
the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might
consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant
company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore
those severed
.
Issue
won pldt may be compelled to enter an agreement tl permit interconnection with the govt
telephone system.
Held

Yes. the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system
and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power
of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed
of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter
service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case
private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6,
Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer
utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why
the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided
just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service

would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for
public use.
7. G.R. No. L55166 May 2l, 1987
Manotok v NHA
Facts
On June 11, 1977, the President of the Philippines issued Letter of Instruction (LOI)
No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR). On the
same date, the President also issued LOI No. 557, adopting slum improvement as a national
housing policy.
In compliance with LOI No. 555, the Governor of Metro Manila issued, on July 21,
1977, Executive Order No.677 adopting the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement
Program which included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the
SunogApog area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program (ZIP) because the
findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing
Authority (NHA) described these as blighted communities.
On January 28, 1980, the President issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos.
1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the SunogApog area
expropriated. the decrees gave the city assessor the authority to determine the market value
of the land involved.
The petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct
expropriation of the properties in question violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection of the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their
properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the
ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such
expropriation or to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled.
The Government as represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the NHA, on the other
hand, contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the
legislature itself or the President through his lawmaking prerogatives exercises this power,
the public use and public necessity of the expropriation, and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature, and the courts must respect the decision of the
lawmaking body, unless the legislative decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary,
unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that all that is required is that just
compensation be determined with due process of law which does not necessarily entail
judicial process.
Issue 1. Won the decrees deprived petitioners of due process 2. Won petitioners denied to
their right to just compensation
Held
After a careful examination of the questioned decrees, we find P.D. Nos. 1669 and
1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to due process of law and, therefore, they must
fail the test of constitutionality. The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of
hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the
expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation.
Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an
expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so.
Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because of the enactment of the questioned decrees
which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the expropriation of the
properties, moot and academic. In effect, the properties, under the decrees were
"automatically expropriated." This became more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of

Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said
Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its request.
2.This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe when
it exercises the power of eminent domain. In these petitions, a maximum amount of
compensation was imposed by the decrees and these amounts were only a little more than
the assessed value of the properties in 1978 when, according to the government, it decided
to acquire said properties.
The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which
are the assessed values of the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity
to prove a higher value because, the actual or symbolic taking of such properties occurred
only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were promulgated.
The decision of the government to acquire a property through eminent domain
should be made known to the property owner through a formal notice wherein a hearing or
a judicial proceeding is contemplated as provided for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the socalled "conditions" of the properties should not be determined
through a decree but must be shown in an appropriate proceeding in order to arrive at a
just valuation of the property.
8. G.R. No. L59603 April 29, 1987
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, LapuLapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
Facts
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered
76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the by the owner or as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower.
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No.
1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of
LapuLapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included,
among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters
owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore,
offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in accordance with the
valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI,
LapuLapu
City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession
against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D.
No. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation
proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to
Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
Issue
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as

the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated

in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?
Held
P.D. No. 1533:
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent
domain
proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner
or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor,
pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision
of the
appropriate Government office to acquire the property."
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation
unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this
Court inutile in a matter which under the constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the
decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to
appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and
void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in
the first place.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining
order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
9. G.R. No. 137285 January 16, 2001
ESTATE SALUD JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs. PHILIPPINES EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE, respondent.
DELEON, JR., J.:
Facts
On may 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then
called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings n three (3) parcels of irrigated riceland in
Rosario, Cavite. One of the owners is salud Jimenez . More than ten (10) years later6, the
said trial court in an Order7 dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent
PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order
was sought by petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose.
In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court reconsidered the Order dated July 11,
1991 and released Lot 1406A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406B was

maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, private respondent PEZA interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering two (2) proposals,
namely:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with respect to Lot 1406A I consideration of
the waiver of
claim for damages and lass of income for the possession of said lot by private respondent.
2. The swap of Lot 1406B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T14772 since private respondent
has no money yet to pay for the lot.
Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the compromise agreement
was signed by private respondent through its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano
assisted by Government Corporate Counsel. That the swap arrangement recognized the fact
that the lot 1406B covered by TCT No. T113498 of the state of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court
dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot,
the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T14772.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the
said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the
withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993,
the trial court approved the compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title. Acting on the petition, the Court of
Appeals in a Decision dated March 25, 1998 upheld the rescission of the compromise
agreement
issue won salud Jimenez was afforded just compensation
held
We have rules that the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of
the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.46
Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order
of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However,
the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable: it
must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.
We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to
petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991.
The compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993.
However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay
petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in making
the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406B;
and meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the
said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this oppressive exercise of the power of eminent
domain by respondent.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite City
is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings, docketed as
Civil Case No. N4029,
regarding the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406B, covered and described in
TCT No. T113498Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.

10. G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE
INFORMATION
AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF
LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS
IMPERIAL, respondents.
Facts
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, of contiguous land situated along MacArthur
Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of
radio transmitter facilities for the "Voice of the Philippines" project. Petitioner, through the
Philippine Information Agency ("PIA"), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the
"Voice of America," had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On
26 February 1979, or more than nine year after the institution of the expropriation
proceedings, the trial court issued this order "
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589square meter
property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor in interest of herein respondents,
which forms part of the expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or
on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the
expropriated property.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22,2
transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the
expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation
of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs
remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when
petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of
P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis
Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the
Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a countermotion
to adjust the compensation. Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the
assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be
unenforceable on the ground of prescription.
orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs
conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De
Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, without prejudice to any case which the parties may deem
appropriate to institute in relation with the amount already paid to herein oppositors and
the
purported transfer of a portion of the said realty to the Bulacan State University pursuant
to
Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph Ejercito .Respondents further questioned
the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State
University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled.
Issue
Held

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001
denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26
February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.