Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
L-12190
Beatriz
Alto ..............................................................
1 Bahagi
BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in
the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila
court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will
allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially in these words:
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon
R. San Jose, Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page
motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
5 Bahagi
2 Bahagi
1 Bahagi
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents
and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra,
Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose
testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned
to her first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She
confided however that it would be useless if her husband discovered or
knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan, nephew of Felicidad,
who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter replied it
could be done without any witness, provided the document was entirely in
her handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in
transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in the morning of
November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad
wrote, signed and dated a holographic will substantially of the tenor above
transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra (daughter of
Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day, Felicidad
was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to
read the will in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who again read it.
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario
Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the presence
of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital
for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a
purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her
husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason of
his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the
same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the
next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to
him but not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and
read the will for the last time.2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been
suffering from heart disease for several years before her death; that she
had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin
Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband and wife journeyed to the
United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the disease;
that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple
returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred,
she suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the
early morning of the first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole
household was surprised and alarmed, even the teachers of the Harvardian
Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the Yap spouses. Physician's
help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m.,
found the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her
husband. Injections and oxygen were administered. Following the doctor's
advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her
husband and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side.
These two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will,
and could have made no will on that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several
reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if according to his
evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her
husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the presence of
Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary; (b)
in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the decedent it
is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and
read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would
have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to
read her will, when she precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret
during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose being to
conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the
hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another be opened by
her husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded the purse from
Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe
that he returned it without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner
being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will
destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the
oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed
such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the
testimony of the oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to
discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of them, were
presented in the motion to reconsider; but they failed to induce the court a
quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other hand, aptly
answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over the same
matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the
weakness of the opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the
petitioner, who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along
with other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved August 7,
1901, adopted only one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including
holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts.
810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject
to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided
for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required
wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each
and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and
to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee
their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to
avoid those who have no right to succeed the testator would succeed him
and be benefited with the probate of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off.
Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections may be brushed aside when
authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off.
Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled
when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose
the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if
there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if
available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57
Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional
witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and
authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and
veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided
however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard,
since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be or not to be in the
hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says
the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that
the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence
of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the
court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the
holographic will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting,
or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand.
However, the oppositor may present other witnesses who also know the
testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after comparing the
will with other writings or letters of the deceased, have come to the
conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the
deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory
testimony may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the
document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the
testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition,
and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only
guaranty of authenticity3 the testator's handwriting has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated
upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? How can the
oppositor prove that such document was not in the testator's handwriting?
His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not examined it. His
experts can not testify, because there is no way to compare the alleged
testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the
testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper
millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the
nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity. Again the proponent's
witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may have been shown a
faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof
have taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers
boldly testifying, in the knowledge that none could convict them of perjury,
because no one could prove that they have not "been shown" a document
which they believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course, the
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers
the loss of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil
Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that
the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may
not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered
to adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such
holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive of this
controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway, decision of the
appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence
presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain
why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial
evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the
wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting
itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails
the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses
(four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be
checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day,
the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with
the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the
testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on
account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible 9
only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or
passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he
may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the
forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in
court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity.
The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in
an "accident" the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the
error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the
holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them
need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the
most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more
objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the
several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and
Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of
Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three
subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely
the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost
holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested
in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves
sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances
described in the appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the
deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who had received
nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her
into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its
execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if
she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not
entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for
instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged
execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a
lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner
is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to
measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by
failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect
after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof,
must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v.
Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitionerappellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with
another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in
an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the
appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will.
They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as
to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded
by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary
evidence unlike ordinary wills.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla
and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo
Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla on the following grounds:
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the
court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of
the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On
July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and
dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The
court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that
'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said
wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13,
1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original
of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had
discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself
as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says
that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic
or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order
dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late
Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the
ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that
the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
SO ORDERED.
August 5, 1960
actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on
November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil
Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent
"did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the
handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce
more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned;
and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic
will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of
the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall
be required.
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (691a).
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but
even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of
the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted
as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic
will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not
merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must
be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express)
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator".
There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so
parte de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre
acerca de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten
insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La
prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de
transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del testamento
olografo lo hace necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes
comprometidos en aquel.
En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion
facultativa del dicho profano de los testigos y un modo de desvanecer las
ultimas dudas que pudieran ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que
trata de averigaur y declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado
ultimo apartado, (siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido
o no testigos y dudaran o no estos respecto de los extremos por que son
preguntados.
El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los
sucesos y de su significacion, para responder debidamente de las
resoluciones que haya de dictar.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed,
no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer
expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with
the testimony of the lay witnesses.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the
Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has
been called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of
justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample
opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses,
should the Court deem them necessary.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a
new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on record
shall not be retaken. No costs.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will
on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress
employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and
personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death. 4
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will
was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression
that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on
will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the
one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature
should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and
not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud
and trickery.1wphi1.nt
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to
Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for
probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of
the late Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of
evidence and lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in
support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2)
Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5)
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture
permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for
pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had
lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter.
That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of
the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in the holographic
will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English
as follows:
Instruction
August 30, 1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan
Street.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.1wphi1.nt
A.
From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez
streets.12
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have
ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. 11
xxx
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil
or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is
to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
xxx
xxx
A. Yes, sir.13
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you
are referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.
Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose
signature is that Mrs. Binanay?
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de
Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?
Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided
with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the
court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep
herself busy that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say so?
A. Collecting rentals.
Q. From where?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of
tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire
familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?
A. Posting records.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from that?
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
A. Carrying letters.
A. I.
Q. Letters of whom?
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
A. Matilde.
A. It was in my mother's possession.
Q. To whom?
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
A. To her creditors.
15
A. Sorry, yes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to
you a document with its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring
to?
Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was
originally in the possession of your mother?
A. 1985.17
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother
left that will to you and therefore you have that in your possession?
A. My Aunt.
Q. Advice of what?
xxx
Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic
will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated
January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978.
Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully
written and legible?
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about
the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased.
Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to
petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person
is that correct?
xxx
xxx
A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was
healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was
exhausted?
A. In writing.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk
agilely and she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present
and you just tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent
inconsistencies?
A. Yes, sir.19
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year
as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no
retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid
movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one
of the petitioners?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned
signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but
in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and
tremors, do you notice that?
A. Yes, sir.21
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, sir.20
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated
and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and
Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the
services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?
A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then
to her transactions.
A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes
and to her lawyer.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde
Ramonal have legitimate children?
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the
handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?
A. Because I lived with her since birth. 22
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de
Ramonal?
A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel
as in what case is that, Fiscal?
xxx
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar
with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since
birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a
document.
xxx
xxx
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose
signature is this?
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. 27
xxx
xxx
xxx
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they
are similar.29
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde
Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of
Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de
Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature
because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you
have made?
A. That is true.30
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the
will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of
contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31
ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in
the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with
one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her
possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the
deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by
her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the
cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms.
Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting
expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes
are different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable.
There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33
and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for
pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and a letter dated June 16,
1978,35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows
of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that
of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling
holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow
petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate
of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo vda. de
Ramonal.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs
their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason.3
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a
condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in
custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were
given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent
was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that
respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the
controversy with her before he filed the suit.4
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed
to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will.
Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to
the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to
issue the writ of mandamus.5
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. 6 In its February 4, 2005
Order,7 however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter
order was denied on September 20, 2005. 8 Hence, the petition was
dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26,
2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the
writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy
would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an
action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent
could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or
probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in
the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the
will.91avvphi1
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this
Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the
proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate
court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. 12
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the respondent.13
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the
purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.15 The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a
deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the
parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the
Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 2 (a) admitting to probate
Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated
in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first
time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 4 affirming the assailed order
of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of
the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The
CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not
require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case,
said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to
this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners
abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution
before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance
with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that
local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves
that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign
country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c)
the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the
same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in
the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in
our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC
of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that
the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property
of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person
having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province. 7 The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed
by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have
in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here.
But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed
in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will,
it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local
AQUINO, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners
seek to annul the orders of respondent Judge dated May 3 trial June 17,
1968, wherein he reconsidered his order of January 10, 1968, dismissing,
on the ground of prescription, the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by
Florentino Hitosis, with an estimated value of P50,000, trial claims for
damages exceeding one million pesos. The undisputed facts are as follows:
1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938
when he was eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin,
Sorsogon. A childless widower, he as survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis.
His other brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito), Leoncio (Aloncio) trial
Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.
2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The
notice of hearing was duly published. In that will, Florentino bequeathed
his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his one-half share
would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the
reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under
the care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro
has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise
the proceedings would have been converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960
Civil Code) and the settlement of the estate of the said deceased would
have been made in accordance with the provisions of law governing legal
or intestate succession ... , in which case the said plaintiffs, as the nearest
of kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Mitosis, would have succeeded to the
ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question forming
part of his estate (art. 1003, Civil Code).
However, the derision of the Court was adverse to them, when it their
opposition trial ordered the probate of his will. From this decision (Annex K)
legalizing the said will, the oppositors did not file any appeal within the
period fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly notified thereof, so
that the said decision had become final trial it now constitutes a bar to any
action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of a redetermination
of their rights to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.
In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case special ) No.
3171, in which the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest had
intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination
of the issue that the said plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal rights
to succeed to any of the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis;
consequently, their present claim to the ownership trial possession of the
61 parcels of land in question is without any legal merit or basis.
7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should
have set the matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the
probate of the will, trial their heirs, with a persistence befitting a more
meritorious case, filed on September 21, 1967, or fifteen years after the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 trial twenty-eight years after the probate of
the will another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses
trial Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis
trial and for the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They
prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses,
through fraud trial deceit, caused the execution trial simulation of the
document purporting to be the last will trial testament of Florentino Hitosis.
While in their 1952 complaint the game plaintiffs alleged that they were in
possession of the lands in question, in their 1967 complaint they admitted
that since 1939, or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the defendants
(now the petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands (Par.
XIV of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch,
which was transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special
Proceeding No. 3171 trial Civil Case No. 696 were decided trial which was
re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233).
9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants,
now the petitioners, was dismissed by respondent Judge. The plaintiffs filed
a motion for reconsideration Respondent Judge. granted it trial set aside
the order of dismissal. He denied defendants' motion for the
reconsideration of his order setting aside that dismissal order.
The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that
the lower court has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate
trial the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 trial that it acted with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondents' 1967
complaint.
The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private
respondents have a cause of action the "annulment" of the will of
Florentino Hitosis trial for the recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land
adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
reconsideration its order of dismissal trial in ignoring the 1939
testamentary case trial the 1952 Civil Case No. 696 which is the same as
the instant 1967 case.
A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for
an ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967
complaint that it is baseless trial unwarranted.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament
duly probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled
with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the
same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a
resuscitation of The complaint of the same parties that the same court
dismissed in 1952.
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint trial from defendants'
motion to dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a
double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription, acquisitive trial extinctive,
or by what are known in the jus civile trial the jus gentium as usucapio,
longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872,
December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a
will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is
mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76,
Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98
Phil. 249).
The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of
the testator's estate. A special proceeding is distinct trial different from an
ordinary action (Secs. 1 trial 2, Rule 2 trial sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).
We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of
plaintiffs' 1967 complaint, is a two-pronged defense because (1) the 1939
trial 1943 decrees of probate trial distribution in Special Proceeding No.
3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 of the lower
court constitute bars by former judgment, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a
will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties trial their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating of the same thing trial under the same title trial in
the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually trial necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerna vs.
Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil.
142).
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res
judicata with respect to private respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of
dismissal rendered by Judge Maalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in
personam was an adjudication on the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of
Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the aforequoted
section 49(b) (Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).
The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the
annulment of the testamentary proceeding trial the proceeding in Civil
Case No. 696. Obviously, they realized that the final adjudications in those
cases have the binding force of res judicata and that there is no ground,
nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders trial judgments
in those two cases.
It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a
principle of public policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object for which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies." (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield and
O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la Cerna vs.
Potot, supra).
After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set
aside only on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process
of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or
collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is
four years from the discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil.
1159).
To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting
the theory of plaintiffs' counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the
lands had not prescribed because the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code,
that "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe", applies to wills.
That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills
trial testaments. The trial court trial plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case
of Dingle vs. Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410, allegedly decided by this Court,
which cited the ruling in Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, that mere lapse of
time cannot give efficacy to void contracts, a ruling elevated to the
category of a codal provision in article 1410. The Dingle case was decided
by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains to verify the
misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel that the Dingle case was decided
by this Court. An elementary knowledge of civil law could have alerted the
trial court to the egregious error of plaintiffs' counsel in arguing that article
1410 applies to wills.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are
reversed trial set aside trial its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is
affirmed. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to
annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at
78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived
by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named
Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm
Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first
marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his
estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two
children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his
property outside this country, the testator said: t.hqw
AQUINO, J.:
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda
and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald
B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorneyin-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris
and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not
be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila
(par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the
Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall
share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net
distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also
dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61,
Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that
forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of
the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and.
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate.
She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's
will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She
submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine
estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to
dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned
Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in
the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and
approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the socalled Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and
Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned
out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by
Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p.
90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they
sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed
by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated
to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth
(1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No
mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved
to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the
motion moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of
heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that
he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the
Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who
negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to
sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner
of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that
Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he
interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p.
153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its
order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was
no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita
Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so
that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was
notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law
firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel
for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that
the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March
11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and
furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm
was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On
September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition
praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah),
that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and
the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due
to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah
compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void
because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for
lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding
be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated
and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 2223, Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479
and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It
is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers
her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served
with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is
dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED
devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof
to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned
legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both
surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly
entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my
above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally
married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for
reasons and justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia
J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and
affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past;
that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent,
did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact,
as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the
last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will
was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.
court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article
1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question
declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared
null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy
to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion
for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last
sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to
"appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on
intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to
costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10,
1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This
was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28,
1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her
favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but
in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a
Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the
mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that
even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be
made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for
the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the
testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the
testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will
and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the
Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the
fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the
doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and
Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June
27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of
the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the
legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator
instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her
surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may
appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings
to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba,
21 SCRA 428)
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in
Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its
intrinsic provisions.
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity,
and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with
the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing
upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity
of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was
executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had
the mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she
completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the
question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate
of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A
of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of
Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to
declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and
void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a
belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case,
et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply
because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its
face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the
devisee.
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator
in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there
was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe
argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina
Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that
Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would
seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so
much so that an action in court was brought concerning the marriage.
(Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another,
knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain
human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was
already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely
his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off
with the deceased during their younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the
Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the oppositorsappellants (such as the weather condition at the time the will was
executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses; and the length of
time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant details of the
impressions of the witnesses about certain details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and
which inconsistencies, by themselves, would not alter the probative value
of their testimonies on the due execution of the will [cf. Peo. vs. Sigue, 86
Phil. 139-140 (3 years interval)].
In Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, L-13781, 30 January 1960, 106 Phil.
1076, this Court ruled:
For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not
necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and
detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the
signing of the document by the said witnesses. It is sufficient that they
have seen or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have
seen each other sign, had they wanted to do so. In fact, in the instant case,
at least two witnesses, ... both testified that the testator and the 3
witnesses signed in the presence of each and every one of them (Jaboneta
vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 451; Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2817; Fernandez vs.
Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.).
Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses were better known
to proponent Andres Pascual than to the testatrix suffices to render their
testimony suspect. Under the circumstances, considering the admitted fact
that when the will was executed (1954) the testatrix was already 83 years
old, suffering from rheumatism to the extent that she had to wear thick
socks and soft shoes, it did not unlikely that she should have entrusted the
task of requesting them to act as witnesses to Andres Pascual himself,
albeit the said witnesses, testifying eight years later, should have stated
that they were asked by Catalina to witness her testament. The error of
recall, considering the eight-year interval, is consonant with the well known
vagaries of human memory and recollection, particularly since the main
detail that must have stuck in his minds is that they did witness the signing
of the will, upon which their attention must have principally concentrated.
That they did so is attested by their signatures and those of the deceased
testatrix, which are nowhere impugned; nor is there any claim by
appellants that the latter was incapable of reading and understanding the
will that she signed. In fact, the evidence is that she did read it before
signing. The authorities are to the effect that friendly relations of the
witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do not affect the credibility
of the former, 4 so that the proven friendship between the proponent and
not really that of Jiongco. And considering that he denied that fact under
oath, that the tape recording was not supported by truly impartial
evidence, and was done without the knowledge of the witness, we cannot
see our way clear to rule that Jiongco has been successfully impeached,
and shown guilty of false testimony. It would be dangerous to rule
otherwise.
The second point that renders incredible the alleged assertion of Jiongco in
the tape recording, that he signed the testament only in 1958 or 1959, is
that in the Notarial Registry of the notary, Gatdula, the ratification of the
testament appears among the entries for 1954, as well as in the
corresponding copies (Exhibit I) filed by him with Bonifacio Sumulong, the
employee in charge of the Notarial Section of the Clerk of Court's office,
who produced them at the trial upon subpoena, and who testified to his
having searched for and found them in the vaults of the Clerk of Court's
office. No evidence exists that these documents were not surrendered and
filed at the Clerk of Court's office, as required by law, and in the regular
course of official duty. Certainly, the notary could not have reported in
1954 what did not happen until 1958.
In view of the evidence, we do not feel justified in concluding that the trial
court erred in accepting the concordant testimony of the instrumental
witnesses as warranting the probate of the will in question, taking into
account the unexcelled opportunity of the court a quo to observe the
demeanor, and judge the credibility, of the witness thereby. Furthermore, it
would not be the first time in this jurisdiction that a will has been admitted
to probate even if the instrumental witness testified contrary to the other
two, provided the court is satisfied, as in this case, that the will was
executed and attested in the manner provided by law (Fernandez vs.
Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Cuyugan vs.
Baron, 69 Phil. 639; Ramirez vs. Butte, 100 Phil 635). There is greater
reason to admit the will to probate where only the testimony of one
witness is subjected to serious, if unsuccessful attack.
Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground that the
execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted by
proponent on the testarix, and affirm that it was error for the lower court to
have rejected their claim. Said the court in this regard (Record on Appeal,
page 87):
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was
made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was
obtained through fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have
numerous instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the
institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not
related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a
stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of
fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres
Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that
Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her
property in her Will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is worthwhile to
recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by
the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express
the will of another rather than his own (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil.
596; Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico vs. Del Val, L18753, 26 March 196); that the contention that a will was obtained by
undue influence or improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere
conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised
(Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence
that it was actually exercised (Ozatea vs. Cuartero, ante; Teotico vs. Del
Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is on the person challenging
the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution
(Teotico vs. Del Val, ante); that mere general or reasonable influence is not
sufficient to invalidate a will (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, ante); nor is
moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the
testator (Barreto vs. Reyes, L-5831-31, 31 January 1956), or omission of
relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence (Bugnao vs. Ubag,
14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 416).
Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the
contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence or improper
pressure exercised on the testarix by the proponent. Their main reliance is
on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the
deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" (t.s.n., page 7, 27
January 1962), which does not amount to proof that she would sign
anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of
contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for
the testarix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de
la Cruz" to be painted thereon in bold letters to mislead the deceased,
even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to
overpower to destroy the free will of the testarix. Because if the mind of
the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married
to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said
Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
August 9, 2010
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan2 a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP
No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC
and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng
balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na
2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupat
bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang MalolosPaombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na
nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente;
ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at
anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)
ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang
pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila
at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay
ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo,
Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang
pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng
aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang
magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na
ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o
pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa
incomes of the properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of
the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime)
in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered
an accounting of their administration from such death of the testator up to
the present or until transfer of said properties and its administration to the
said legatees.
x x x x20
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should
be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
expired on September 16, 1993.
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel
and consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and
T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names
of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar
Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia
Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel
and consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044
[Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana
Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma.
Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated
December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 24
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed and
terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties
cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the
testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more
has to be done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on September 16, 1973,
hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16, 1993.
Movants cause of action accrues only from the said date and for which no
prescription of action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate
proceeding which is continuing in character, and terminates only after and
until the final distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the
deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of the testator. The
Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the accounting, partition, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the
date of the filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to
August 14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978 order it does not
terminate the appointment of petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and
res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the
present petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and
47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 The first, known as "bar
by prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action. 31
The second, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the
present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the
reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present
petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of
administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the
legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no
similarity of claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition
and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards
the issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime,
which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the
present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The
records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of
the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in
CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio
should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit
the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios estate and
does not pertain to respondents supervening right to demand the
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their
names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and
P.
Arellano,
and
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate
estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that:
III
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name
of Nona Arellano;
xxxx
i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No.
181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
and
V
Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that
since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his
parents, it should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of
Donation in Vicentes favor was not notarized nor registered with the
Register of Deeds. Joses motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.
Jose later filed before the appellate court a "Motion to Withdraw Petition"
which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground
that, inter alia, a grant thereof would "end" the administration proceedings.
The appellate court, by Resolution of January 18, 2008, 8 granted the
withdrawal on the ground that it would "not prejudice the rights of the
oppositors."
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be
referred to as "oppositors,"5 questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six
lots via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion
the court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her
mother Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been
transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to
submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation.
Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared
that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of
Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro,
Sr.6
It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the
provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003, 7 thus modified its April 5, 2002
Order as follows:
Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be
excluded. The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to
submit a revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5,
2002, as here modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her
administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring
supplied),
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC
erred in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as "what the lower
court should have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in
the inventory of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where its
ownership can be threshed out."
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the
probate court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-
controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the
testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her
own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of
the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some
P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the
will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon),
to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he
payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the
requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired
is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the
last wishes of the testatrix."
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as
constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositorsappellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11
as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix'
project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil
Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced,
the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process
has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is
observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully
restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld,
will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution
and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that
his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in
the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully
obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may
substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted
by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary
disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in
the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all
her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and
the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is
my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the
Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the
right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of
the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as
they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of
partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively
distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each
were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were
favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than
their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even
in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as
Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the
provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as
under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was
intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the
efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us,
for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which
perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of
Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court
rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositorsappellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or
partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they
would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the
disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment
of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the
testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run
counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition
legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will
of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in
favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other
compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in
accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made
by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor
in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory
heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became
the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to
rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659,
and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in
question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties,
especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary
dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by
operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion,
that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the
compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature
of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the
remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in
the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the
will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some
small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through
her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into
devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the
estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions
were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the
fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament
any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at
the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary
dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs,
do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code
precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of
his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own
theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored
by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he
devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,
provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is
the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as
well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the
testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080
of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the
primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left
by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise
provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and
invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or
chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in
an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have
a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which
would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having
left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the
legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants,
the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the
Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the
remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed
with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the
approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the
purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them
to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with
and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by
implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, * which
held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay,
expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in,
and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court **
holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to
collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation
and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of
the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa
akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda,
may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may
pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the
petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all
surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen
(18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga,
Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought
into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought
into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her
parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by
other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1
which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the
Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio
Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano
Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife,
Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was
drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they
had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should
revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering
illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138,
CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As
directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate.
Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the
inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate
court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos.
1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his
capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items
Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to
her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria
Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last
two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio
was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties;
and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina
Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own
nephews and nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this
case
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian
nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and
hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties
which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that
the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended
solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to
Doa Catalina did not join the action.
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00
each as moral damages; and
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the
plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire
estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the
nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio,
both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange
and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J.
Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known
properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all
certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this
case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new
ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership
and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all
muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and
incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal
interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery
cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the
same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any
contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186)
which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming
the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private
respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more
than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part
of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to
a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and
do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had
transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may
lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her
estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if
those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising
under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa
Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her late
husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in
violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she
had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be
impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom
to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth
in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents
may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the
time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported
by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90
years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her
advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced
and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the
petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from
Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa
Catalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces
the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m.
lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13
On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43
hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or
on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian
Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa
Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least
Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped
from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of
Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition
agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot
2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the
sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano
Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was
mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can
any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was
transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously
disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her
nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) onehalf (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967,
she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to
her relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo
Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro
Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions
was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not
only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was
competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any
doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of
property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire
estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the
implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had
inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's admission
in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private
properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital
at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42
are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have
known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her
paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included.
The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the
probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of
Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel,
Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false
inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his
own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that
before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless,
had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to
their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses
and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale
out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among
Doa Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyernephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena
Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and
their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not
join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made
in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to
do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina
acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor
of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it
would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud,
undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or
donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian,
daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her
nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her
properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the
petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew,
Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated
February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed
dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all
witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's niece,
Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece,
Maria Olbes. 26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July
15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given
those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but
free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and
reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after
the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa
Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions
were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action
based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs.
The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions
because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to
them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March
14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts
and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the
private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.