G.R. No.

202242

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

Francisco I. Chavez,
petitioner

July 17, 2012

Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G.

Escudero and Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr.,
respondents
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
- Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
- The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court
Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
- Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC).
- In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC
to act as one of the ex officio members.
- In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
- The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other
house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
- The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members
of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees
- Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the conditions are sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case

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Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

July 17, 2012

2. Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members is unconstitutional
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
HELD:
1. YES
- The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely:
a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
b) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement;
c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
- Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
- The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal
stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees
for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit
heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may
be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations
to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition
of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.
2. YES
- Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
o Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
- From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision
is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same
under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members
are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the
Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a representative of Congress.
- The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.

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July 17, 2012

Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in
the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
- One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
- Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
- It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process,
especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory,
defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
- The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word Congress in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
- It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers.
An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play.
- The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of
a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have

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consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put
in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid.