A.C. No.

3405 June 29, 1998

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every
member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting
standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her
privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative
complaint 1 for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M.
Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty.
Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college
instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the
Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year
college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his
influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal
profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao,
Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until
the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in
the community, but which they managed to from me. It therefore came
as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain
when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in
utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of
Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at
Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms.
Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and
morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador
M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old
woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3

On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the
Comment of respondent to the IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20
2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him
not even a square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a
purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes from what
she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more
than education and the higher and nobler aspirations in life.
Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways
of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant
was reared and raised in an entirely different environment. Her value
system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he
could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his
family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love,
education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name.
He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and children. Even
in the most trying times, he remained calm and never inflicted violence
on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and
gainfully employed. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social
institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy,
Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the
very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their marriage has
become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been
incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and
HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the Complainant,
in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the
pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if
only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is not to be.
The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving,
and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent
does not seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital
and familial landscape.

This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4

Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from

enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the Maiden", can the
torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?

On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
received from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the
administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the
allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the
love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and
(3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising from extreme
jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a
faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had
neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor
abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of
Desistance 6 and a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which
she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared
October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of
Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10

Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising

mind whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy,
Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .

The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant, with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her
husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him
because of his continuous threats against her. 14
In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in
compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6,
1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be
affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife,
he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of
Desistance 16and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the
investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she
prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own
free will and affirmed the contents thereof."
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied
abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his
wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably
jealous and possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy
rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in
every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just
to satisfy the consuming demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is
her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she
repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus,
when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the
grips of one of her bouts of jealousy.18

5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But

your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other
people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in
compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for
better or for worse, in sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your
Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It is only
now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage,
Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless,
good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and
universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and all other
sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and immoral her
husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or
any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this
love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a man's
dearest possession in life his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her
husband, employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his
ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced,
shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is
he who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the
Complainant. 21
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed
against him and Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P5-90. . . .
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of
Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . .
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage.
OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. . . .
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061.
DISMISSED.

3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of

Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion
for Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt].
Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (. . .). Reinstituted (. . .).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405.
Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini,
Isabela. Pending. . . . 22
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are
inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996.
(. . .).
xxx xxx xxx
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted
Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused
the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any
illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with
her as husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini
or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He never begot a child or
children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other
allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two
sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After
that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with
the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from
collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in
one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return home
and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these
efforts of respondent Narag. . . .
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent,
vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of
the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured,
abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag,
physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, . . .
V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated
March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag,
Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and
intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely,
voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by
the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent
Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the
trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al.,
before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man a senior citizen of 63
years sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by
progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his
own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and economic
conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to
him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical certificates, . .
., among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments.
Respondent is also suffering from hypertension. 23
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his
report, 24 recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the
practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence
submitted by the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the
disposition of the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of
respondent's own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour,
Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina
Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph
1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the
due execution and contents of which, although he objected to their
admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on
the witness stand much less presented and offered proof to support
otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies
tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous
wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy,
respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and
be cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he present his
alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous relationship
between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children,
namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,

respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for

disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject
to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession. 25
In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and
approved the investigating commissioner's recommendation for the
indefinite suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the complaint
sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she
filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its
Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence
presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants
the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.Thus, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral
conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.29
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards."
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family
in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie
Espita, 36 Magdalena Bautista, 37Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr.
Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F. Reyes. 42
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated
complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements
he gave to the investigating officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now
living together as husband and wife and that they already have two
children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
xxx xxx xxx
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie
Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the
respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as
husband and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and
you have already two children and I know that is really an immoral act
which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values don't
allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you
see them in the house?

A Yes, si[r].
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children,
Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your
family. 44
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs.
Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty.
Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment
proceedings. 45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita
in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the
name of Charlie Espita.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?

Respondent may have provided well for his family they enjoyed a
comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may have also
established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But
these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to
continue being a member of the noble profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties
e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right
precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he
is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity; and to render help and support. 53
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away
from home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of
his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who
bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a
position to be a good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up
mostly under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth
of their father's love.
Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his
father's moral frailties in his testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be
forgiven, is there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of
forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the
emotional part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although
am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in
order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.

Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the
residence of Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly
living as husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir. 46
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple,
testified that she learned from the Narag children Randy, Bong and
Rowena that their father left his family, that she and her husband
prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag
couple again separated when the respondent "went back to his woman,"
and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was
able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with
another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an
ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are
deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that
respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged
as his own. In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards
that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that
handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings
with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm
that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same
person. 48 Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that
the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he
wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the
duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit
to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when
his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this
Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49 This
he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina
Espita. At the same time, he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater,
vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous
woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him
as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against
him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight
(98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did
not establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by
the profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither
did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that
he had abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had
two children. Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual
knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent
himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good
character of his wife.

COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your
father is the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to
jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to
be given a lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will
have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered for quite
sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his
flesh is your flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him
because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your
father has sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was
still a kid because my father is not always staying with us at home. So,
how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir,
you did not give me love. 54
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating
officer the trauma he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the
fact that your father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell
this Honorable Commission the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and
sisters, especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children
so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I
and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted
ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and
that she could not face the people, our community, especially because
my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us
what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because
she knows so well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on
thinking about my mother.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family,
Your Honor.
Q In your wife's family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that
my father went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a
"puta" in provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated him so
much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a
fact that my father has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he

bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle

Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor. 55
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage,
his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has
contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to
love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage."
57

In Toledo vs. Toledo, the respondent was disbarred from the practice of
law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child.

they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it
continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none
other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or
government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as
well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive
of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status
of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of
Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the
Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4
Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:

Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an
adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to
mutually assist each other.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa
vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court."

ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him
when he charges his domicile or residence.

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision
be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts
of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer
upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a
cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff
declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant
cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915,
and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the
complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with
the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just
refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face
and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by
any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires
and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and
with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its
civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs.
Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the
termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed
between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To
this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it
is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties
but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties,
and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the
parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second
paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)

Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court

may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes
his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to
the whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option,
satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving
and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the
same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give
support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not
one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code
fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful
to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect
his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him
when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a
foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at
his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his
conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the
pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute?
The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its
decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the
option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping
in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so
absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because
this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or
because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to
the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this
appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the
option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to
furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one
who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged
or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara
Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the
natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better
attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him
toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the
mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances,
together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it
would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her
daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent
the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such
decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questions
previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at
this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir
(9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article
149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a
preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed
to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the
person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had
married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the

right to support had already been established by a final judgment in a

criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established
the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may
not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision
of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don
Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to
prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of
her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title,
mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the
safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all
his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently
he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in
opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted
in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her
answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a
situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and
accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff.
From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to
the Audencia Territorialwherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in
her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to
the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of
the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the
spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with support,
cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which
regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally
separated, among which duties are those of their living together and
mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the
spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who has no
property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as
limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has
been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect
to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered,
since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the
management of his wife's property and of the product of the other
property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail,
it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and
separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing,
contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil
Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects
of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing
the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela
Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and
afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be
held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may
live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to
be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits
of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses
and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to
his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition
of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil
Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of
the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears
quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an
agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this
effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal
prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and
separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis
upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the
doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of
the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or
where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to
force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of
the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife
brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and
voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever.
The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon
the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito
who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however
proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation
was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of
affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband
not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he
therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under
the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the
natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with
paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the
mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or
relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates,

has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged,
because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is
compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse
does not create any illicit situation of the court above
described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of
Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as
contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration,
that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the
conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the
injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or
holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that
the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain.
As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in
the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing
the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles
44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining
spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce,
such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the
husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom;
personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by
the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion;
the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the
husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the
connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a
spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only
ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34,
45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the
case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject.
Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal
did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery
being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was
promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or
modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well
settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to
granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living
separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to
decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate
maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in
the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is
dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent
upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations
of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part
of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much
on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of
which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to
seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor
is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment
calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the
public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so
base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The
pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a
weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it
does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.

G.R. No. L-19671

July 26, 1966

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff and appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants and appellees.
Isabelo V. Binamira, Filemon B. Barria and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates
for appellants.
Vicente L. Faelnar for appellee Mamerto Escao and Mena F. Escao.
Jalandoni and Jamir for appellee Vicenta F. Escao
Norberto J. Quisumbing for intervenor Russel Leo Moran.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Not satisfied with the decision of this Court, promulgated on 29 November
1965, in the above-entitled case, plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez
and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escao, respectively, move for its
reconsideration; in addition, Russell Leo Moran, whom said defendant
married in the United States, has filed, upon leave previously granted, a
memorandum in intervention.
Movant Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao
are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of
contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to
dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez
obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory
cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below;
second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's
previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence
involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.
The prayer of appellant Tenchavez in his motion for reconsideration to
increase the damages against Vicenta (P25,000 for damages and attorney's
fees were awarded to Tenchavez in the decision) should, likewise, be
denied, all factors and circumstances in the case having been duly
considered in the main decision.
In seeking a reexamination of the decision, defendant-appellee Vicenta
Escao, in turn, urges a comparison between the two marriages, stating, in
plainer terms, that the Tenchavez-Escano marriage was no more than a
ceremony, and a faulty one at that, while the Moran-Escao marriage fits
the concept of a marriage as a social institution because publicly
contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and
blessed by three children. She concludes that, since the second marriage is
the better one, it deserves the laws recognition and protection over the
other. This is a dangerous proposition: it legalizes a continuing polygamy by
permitting a spouse to just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as
many jurisdictions as would grant divorce on the excuse that the new
marriage is better than the previous one; and, instead of fitting the concept
of marriage as a social institution, the proposition altogether does away
with the social aspects of marriage in favor of its being a matter of private
contract and personal adventure.
The said appellee claims that state recognition should be accorded the
Church's disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez. On this point, our main
decision limited itself to the statement, "On 10 September 1954, Vicenta
sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. P-2)", without stating that
papal dispensation was actually granted, the reason being that Vicenta's
claim that dispensation was granted was not indubitable, and her counsel,
during the trial in the lower court, did not make good his promise to submit
the document evidencing the papal dispensation; in fact, no such
document appears on record. The Church's disavowal of the marriage, not
being sufficiently established, it cannot be considered. Vicenta's belated
appeal to Canon law, after she had sought and failed to obtain annulment
in the civil courts, and after she had flaunted its principles by obtaining
absolute divorce, does not, and can not, sound convincing. Particularly
when account is taken of the circumstances that she obtained the Nevada
divorce in 1950 and only sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to
Tenchavez in 1954.
The award of moral damages against Vicenta Escao is assailed on the
ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial
of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the
enumeration of cases where moral damages may lie. The argument is
untenable. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds
not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a
wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article
2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. Neither the case
of Ventanilla vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 January 1961 (which was a suit filed
by a client against his lawyer for failure to perfect an appeal on time), nor
the case of Malonzo vs. Galang, L-13851, 27 July 1960 (wherein the precise
ruling was that moral damages may not be recovered for a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding), now invoked by the said defendantappellee, is in point.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect
of legal separation has been added to Article 106. Appellee obviously
mistakes our grant of damages as an effect of legal separation. It was plain
in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the
codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.

Appellee-movant commits a similar mistake by citing Arroyo vs. Arroyo, 42

Phil. 54, and Ramirez-Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, L-20043, 28 November 1964,
to support her argument that moral damages did not attach to her failure
to render consortium because the sanction therefor is spontaneous mutual
affection, and not any legal mandate or court order. The Arroyo case did
rule that "it is not within the province of courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other", but it referred to physically coercive means, the Court
declaring that
We are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel prostitution of the purely personal right of consortism.
(Cas cit., p. 60) (Emphasis supplied)
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the
respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who
unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178,
Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse
renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may
not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to
do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred
under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
For analogous reasons, the arguments advanced against the award of
attorney's fees must be rejected as devoid of merit.
Contrary to intervenor Moran's contention, the decision did not impair
appellee's constitutional liberty of abode and freedom of locomotion, as, in
fact, Vicenta Escao did exercise these rights, and even abused them by
stating in her application for a passport that she was "single", the better to
facilitate her flight from the wrongs she had committed against her
husband. The right of a citizen to transfer to a foreign country and seek
divorce in a diverse forum is one thing, and the recognition to be accorded
to the divorce decree thus obtained is quite another; and the two should
not be confused.
Intervenor reiterates that recognition of Vicenta's divorce in Nevada is a
more enlightened view. The argument should be addressed in the
legislature. As the case presently stands, the public policy of this forum is
clearly adverse to such recognition, as was extensively discussed in the
decision. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that
foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public
policy (Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law, p. 232).
It is thoroughly established as a broad general rule that foreign law or
rights based therein will not be given effect or enforced if opposed to the
settled public policy of the forum. (15 C.J.S. 853)
SEC. 6. Limitations. In the recognition and enforcement of foreign
laws the Courts are slow to overrule the positive law of the forum, and
they will never give effect to a foreign law where to do so would
prejudice the state's own rights or the rights of its citizens or where the
enforcement of the foreign law would contravene the positive policy of
the law of the forum whether or not that policy is reflected in statutory
enactments. (11 Am. Jur., 300-301).
A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree confirming
or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country, unless
contrary to the policy of its own law. Cottington's Case, 2 Swan St. 326,
note; Roach vs. Garvan, I Ves St. 157; Harvey vs. Farnie, LR 8 App. Cas.
43; Cheely vs. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701 [28:298]. (Hilton vs. Guyot 159 U.S.
113, 167; 40 L. Ed. 95, 110) (Emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, error for the intervenor to ask that "private international
law rather than Philippine civil law should decide the instant case", as
if the two branches of the law contradicted one another.
In a consolidated paper (intervenor's rejoinder and appellee Vicenta
Escao's supplemental motion for reconsideration), the issue is raised that
"the Supreme Court cannot reverse the decision of the lower court
dismissing the complaint nor sentence Vicenta Escao to pay damages,
without resolving the question of lack of jurisdiction over her person".
A resolution by the Supreme Court of the issue of jurisdiction over the
person of appellee Vicenta Escao, and which was disallowed by the court
below, was unnecessary because the matter was not properly brought to
us for resolution, either on appeal or by special remedy which could have
been availed of by the appellee when the lower court, on 1 June 1957,
overruled her challenge to its jurisdiction. Neither was the alleged error of
the lower court put in issue in her brief as appellee, as it was incumbent
upon her to do (Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563; Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45
Phil. 852). Not affecting the jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court
properly ignored the point (Rev. Rule 51, section 7).
SEC. 7. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated
in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the
court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also
clerical errors.
At any rate,
... .When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant
affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for
separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may
validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction

over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the
non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of
the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, ... . (1 Moran 411, 1963 Ed.,
citing Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254)
The award of damages, in the present case, was merely incidental to the
petition for legal separation. For all these reasons, and because she filed a
counterclaim against plaintiff (Rec. App. pp. 205-206), Vicenta should be
deemed to have withdrawn the objection to the lower court's jurisdiction
over her person, even though she had stated in the counterclaim that she
was not waiving her special defense of lack of jurisdiction.1wph1.t
It is urged that the actions for legal separation and for quasi-delict have
prescribed: the first, because it was not filed within one year from and
after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and,
the second, because it was not filed within four years since the TenchavezEscao marriage in 1948.
The argument on both points is untenable.
The action for legal separation was filed on 31 May 1956. Although in a
letter, under date of 10 December 1954, the Department of Foreign Affairs
informed plaintiff Tenchavez that "According to information, she (appellee)
secured a decree of divorce on October 21, 1950 ... and married an
American citizen, Russel Leo Moran, on September 13, 1954", there is no
satisfactory and convincing evidence as to the time when plaintiff
Tenchavez, received the said letter; nor was she duty-bound to act
immediately upon hearsay information. Since prescription is an affirmative
defense, the burden lay on the defendant to clearly prove it, and her proof
on it was inadequate.
On the argument about the action on tort having prescribed, the basis
thereof is erroneous: the marriage was not the cause of appellee's
wrongful conduct. Her denial of cohabitation, refusal to
render consortium and desertion of her husband started right after their
wedding but such wrongs have continued ever since. She never stopped
her wrongdoings to her husband, so that the period of limitation has never
been completed.
Finally, we see no point in discussing the question of appellee Escao's
criminal intent, since nothing in the main decision was designed or
intended to prejudge or rule on the criminal aspect of the case, if any, or
any of its constituent elements. It is to be noted that in this civil case only a
preponderance of evidence is required, and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. While much could be said as to the circumstances surrounding the
divorce of the appellee, we prefer to abstain from so doing in order not to
influence in any way the criminal case, should any be instituted.
For the reasons above cited, all motions for reconsideration are hereby
denied.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar
and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
R E S O L UT I O N
September 14, 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Their first motion for reconsideration having been denied, Vicenta Escao
and Russel Leo Moran, through counsel, have filed a second motion for
reconsideration.
It is first averred that this Court's decision contradicts the doctrine laid
down in Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem the relief must be confined to the res,
and the Court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment.
Movant's own quotation from that decision demonstrates the diffirence in
the facts between the case at bar and the authority cited. For their own
excerpt shows that the rule now invoked was laid down for instances
where the defendant never submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts. We
said then:
If, however, the defendant is a non-resident, and remaining beyond the
range of the personal process of the court refuses to come in voluntarily,
the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. ... (Cas. Cit. p.
930)
The defendant Palanca, in 37 Phil. 921, so much refused to come in
voluntarily that he was declared in default. Was this the case of Vicenta
Escao? The records show on their face that it was not. While she objected
to the jurisdiction of the Court over her person, she also filed an answer
with a counterclaim asking for an award of damages against plaintiffappellant Tenchavez. Instead of "refusing to come in voluntarily", as
Palanca did (in 37 Phil. 921), Escao took the offensive and asked the Court
for a remedy, a judgment against her opponent; and this after the court
below overruled her objection that she was not within its jurisdiction. In
asking the Court for affirmative relief, Escao submitted to its jurisdiction.
In the United States, whence our adjective law finds its sources, the Federal
Supreme Court has rules (Merchant's Heat & Light Co. vs. Clow & Sons, 204
U.S. 286, 51 Law Ed. 488):
We assume that the defendant lost no rights by pleading to the merits,
as required, after saving its rights.Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 25 L.
ed. 237; Southern P. Co. vs. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 36 L. ed. 943, 13 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 44. But by setting up its counterclaim the defendant became a
plaintiff in its turn, invoked the jurisdiction of the court in same

action, and, by invoking, submitted to it. It is true that the counterclaim

seems to have arisen wholly out of the same transaction that the
plaintiff sued upon, and so to have been in recoupment rather than in
set-off proper. But, even at common law, since the doctrine has been
developed, a demand in recoupment is recognized as a cross demand, as
distinguished from a defense. Therefore, although there has been a
difference of opinion as to whether a defendant, by pleading it, is
concluded by the judgment from bringing a subsequent suit for the
residue of his claim a judgment in his favor being impossible at common
law, the authorities agree that he is not concluded by the judgment if he
does not plead his cross demand, and that whether he shall do so or not
is left wholly to his choice. Davis vs. Hedges, L.R. 6 Q.B. 687; Mondel vs.
Steel, 8 Mees. & W. 858, 872; O'Connor vs. Varney, 10 Gray, 231.This
single fact shows that the defendant, if he elects to sue upon his claim in
the action against him, assumes the position of an actor and must take
the consequence. The right to do so is of modern growth, and is merely a
convenience that saves bringing another suit, not a necessity of the
defense. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason for the rule is manifest. The courts can not look with favor upon
a party adopting not merely inconsistent, but actually contradictory,
positions in one and the same suit, claiming that a court has no jurisdiction
to render judgment against it, but has such jurisdiction to give to give a
decision in its favor (Dailey vs. Kennedy, 64 Mich. 208, 31 N.W. 125; Harvey
vs. Bishop, 171 Okla. 497, 43 Pac. 2d, 48; Haverstick vs. Southern P. Co.
(Calif.) 37 Pac. 2d, 146).
Another reason, equally valid, is that if such defendant shall ask for any
relief other than that addressed to his plea, he is seeking to gain an
unconscionable advantage over his adversary, whereby, if the
determination be in his favor, he may avail himself of it while if it be
against him, he may fall back upon his plea of lack of jurisdiction of the
person. (Olcese vs. Justice's Court, 156 Calif. 82, 103 Pac. 318).
True, Escao made a reservation of her former plea when she fled her
counterclaim; but such reservation did not remove the obnoxious
contradictory positions she assumed.
Secondly, appellee Vicente Escao not only adopted inconsistently
positions in the court below but abandoned all pretense that court's lack of
jurisdiction over her person upon appeal to this Court. She made no
reference whatever to that question in her brief as appellee. Coupled with
her previous demand for affirmative relief, Vicente's silence on appeal only
confirms her waiver of the point. Her excuse it that, the lower court having
ruled in her favor, she could not very well assign as error the overruling of
her plea of non-jurisdiction. That excuse is unserviceable; for this Court has
repeatedly held (and it is now well settled) that an appellee can make
counter assignments of error for the purpose of sustaining the appealed
judgement, altho it is not allowed to ask that the same be reversed or
modified (Bunge Corp. vs. Camenforte Co., 91 Phil. 861, and cases cited
therein; Cabrera vs. Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas, 75 Phil. 780; Pineda &
Ampil vs. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930; David vs. De la Cruz, L-11656, April 18,
1958). Having failed to do so, this Court had every reason to consider the
issue of jurisdiction abandoned, and appellee's belated attempts to
resurrect it, by alleging an imaginary error on our part, are pointless and
vain. The same thing can be said of her effort to escape the jurisdiction she
had invoked in her counterclaim by not appealing its rejection by the trial
court. At most, it amounts to equivocal conduct that can not revive the
inconsistent claim of non-jurisdiction, abandoned by her seeking
affirmative relief.
Wherefore, the second motion for reconsideration is denied.

G.R. No. L-29959 December 3, 1929

AURELIA DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RAFAEL VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellee.
Harvey and O'Brien for appellant.
Jose G. Generoso for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted on May 27, 1927, in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila by Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva against her husband,
Rafael Villanueva, for the purpose of obtaining separate maintenance and
custody of the two younger minor children, Guillermo and Sergio
Villanueva, as well as a proper allowance for professional legal services
rendered by the plaintiff's attorneys in this action, as well as costs. Upon
hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint and abrogated a prior order of the court for
maintenance pendente lite, with costs against the plaintiff. From this
judgment the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff, Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, was married to the defendant,
Rafael Villanueva, on July 16, 1905, in the City of Manila, where the pair
have since resided. To them have been born three children, namely,
Antonio, Guillermo, and Sergio, who were, at the time of the trial of this
case in the lower court, aged respectively 18, 10 and 9 years. The grounds
on which separate maintenance is sought infidelity and cruelty. With
respect to the first of these charges the proof shows that during the period

of about ten years prior to the institution of the action, the defendant was
guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women, and even
after the action was begun, he is shown to have had illicit relations with
still another, an incident which is incorporated in the case by means of the
amended complaint. Thought at all times protesting against these
irregularities in her husband's conduct, the plaintiff appears to have
exhibited forbearance; and she long continued in marital relations with him
with a view to keeping the family intact as well as with hope of retrieving
him from his erring course. In the end, however, the incorrigible nature of
the defendant in his relations with other women, coupled with a lack of
consideration and even brutality towards the plaintiff, caused her to
withdraw from the domestic hearth and to establish a separate abode for
herself and two younger children. This final separation occurred on April
20, 1927, about one month before the present action was begun.
The proof with respect to the charge of cruelty shows that the defendant
has not infrequently treated the plaintiff roughly and that he has at times
directed abusive words to her and challenged her to carry her troubles into
court. The proof in support of this charge does not in our opinion establish
a case for separate maintenance, without relation to the graver charge of
conjugal infidelity; and if the case depended, for its solution, upon cruelty
alone, the case could doubtless be affirmed, in conformity with the
doctrine stated in Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo (42 Phil. 54), where the
charges of cruelty were found to be unproved or insufficient. In that case,
however, we were able to record the fact that neither of the spouses had
at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, and that neither had, so far as
the proof showed, even given just cause to the other to suspect illicit
relations with any person. In the case before us repeated acts of conjugal
infidelity on the part of the husband are proved, and he appears to be a
recurrent, if not an incurable offender against the sanctity of the marriage
tie. This give the wife an undeniable right to relief.
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital
relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other
women makes common habitation with him unbearable. Deeply rooted
instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such case, and the law
is not so unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of the
injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature. In order to entitle a
wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance
from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with
women outside of the marital establishment are enough. As was said by
Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband
cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support
his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and
unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he
cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to
the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.
In her complaint the plaintiff asks for an allowance of P750 per month, but
we are of the opinion that the sum of P500 per month will suffice, this
being in addition to the use which she makes for living quarters of a
modest property belonging to the conjugal estate. During their marital life
the spouses have acquired real estate which, at the time of the trial, was
assessed at more than P85,000, and which at the same time was
reasonably valued at more than P125,000. In addition to this the defendant
appears to be now earning a substantial salary in commercial activities. The
plaintiff is also entitled to an allowance for attorney's fees which we fix at
P1,000 for services rendered in the trial court and the same amount for
services rendered in this court. It appears that the two younger children
are now living with the plaintiff, and her right to their custody will not be
disturbed. While this litigation was pending in the lower court the
defendant was required to pay the amount of P500 per month for
maintenance of the plaintiff, under an interlocutory order of June 15, 1927.
But these payments ceased when the appealed decision was promulgated
on or about the end of March, 1928. The plaintiff in this case is therefore
entitled to judgment at the rate of P500 per month beginning April 1, 1928,
until judgment shall be promulgated in this case, and from that date the
defendant will be required to pay P500 per month for maintenance as
already suggested. The plaintiff will also be awarded the sum of P720 in
satisfaction of the amount paid out for the transcript necessary to this
appeal.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and it is ordered that the plaintiff have
and recover of the defendant the sum of P2,000 for attorney's fees, the
sum of P720 for expenses of procuring transcript, and the sum of P500 per
month, beginning April 1, 1928, until the promulgation of this decision,
after which the date the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff by way
of maintenance, on or before the 10th day of each month, the sum of
P500. So ordered, with costs against appellee.

G.R. No. L-28904

December 29, 1928

CIPRIANA GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ISABELO SANTIAGO and ALEJO SANTIAGO, defendants-appellees.
Gregorio Perfecto for appellant.
M. H. de Joya and Pompeyo Diaz for appellees.

OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal but the plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing the complaint.
In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that she was married to the defendant
Isabelo Santiago on April 8, 1910, and that from that date they lived
together as husband and wife, until continued family dissentions
compelled her to leave the conjugal dwelling on February 3, 1925; that
defendant Alejo Santiago is a son of Isabelo Santiago by his first wife, and
Prisca Aurelio is a daughter of plaintiff by her first husband; that said Alejo
Santiago seduced Prisca Aurelio, and the latter gave birth to a child; and
that the other defendant Isabelo Santiago, instead of seeing to the
vindication of the honor of plaintiff's daughter by requiring his son to marry
her, has refused to have anything to do with the matter, thus seemingly
countenancing the illicit relations between them; that with a view to
favoring materially the said Alejo Santiago and fostering his whims and
caprices, defendant Isabelo Santiago has been conveying, and is attempting
to convey, to said Alejo Santiago property belonging to their conjugal
partnership, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff's rights; that, among
the property that defendant has conveyed or is attempting to convey Alejo
Santiago, the lands specially described in the complaint are the most
important ones, which, with others, had been acquired by plaintiff and
defendant Isabelo Santiago during their married life with money belonging
to the conjugal partnership, and with the products and fruits of the
property of the conjugal partnership, or through the industry of the two;
that said property produces annually around the neighborhood of 4,500
cavanes of palay at P4 per cavan; that by reason of the attitude of
defendant Isabelo Santiago, respecting the illicit relations of his son and
Prisca Aurelio, and his fraudulent acts conveying to said Alejo Santiago
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, plaintiff and Isabelo
Santiago have been several discussions and quarrels, which culminated in
their separation of February 3, 1925, which separation became necessary
in order to avoid personal violence; that notwithstanding plaintiff's
repeated demands, defendants Isabelo Santiago has continually refused to
provide for her support, and plaintiff could not live in their conjugal
dwelling, because of illicit relations between Alejo Santiago and Prisca
Aurelio, countenance by the other defendant Isabelo Santiago; that taking
into consideration the actual financial conditions of the conjugal
partnership, plaintiff is entitled to a monthly pension P500 pendente lite;
and that in the meanwhile, the court should restrain defendant Isabelo
Santiago from conveying of attempting to convey any property of the
conjugal partnership; that defendant Isabelo has publicly maintained illicit
relations with a woman by the name of Geronima Yap; and that by said
immoral conduct and acts, defendant Isabelo Santiago has shown himself
unfit to administer the property of the conjugal partnership, and the court
should therefore order that its administration be placed in the hands of
plaintiff. The defendants' answer to the complaint was a general denial.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
(1) The court erred in declaring her separation from the defendant Isabelo
Santiago unjustified.
(2) The court erred in dissolving the preliminary injunction and refusing to
set aside the transfer of title made by Isabelo Santiago in favor of Alejo
Santiago.
(3) The court erred in not granting the plaintiff the right to administer the
conjugal property.
(4) The court erred in not granting the plaintiff the right to administer the
conjugal property.
(5) The court erred in not granting the other remedies prayed for in the
complaint.
The second and fourth assignments of error are entirely without merit. The
plaintiff has failed to prove that the property conveyed to Alejo Santiago is
community property; on the contrary, it is shown by documentary
evidence that the land was acquitted by Isabelo Santiago previously to his
marriage to the plaintiff. Neither can we find any sufficient reason for
depriving the husband of his right to administer such conjugal property as
may exist.1awphi1.net
The first and third assignments of error deserved some consideration. It
clearly appears that the spouses led a rather stormy life subsequent to the
dishonor of the plaintiff's daughter, Prisca, and that husband, according to
the plaintiff's testimony, went so far as to order her to leave his house and
threatened to illtreat her if she returned. It also appears that, aside from
the quarrels, she had very unpleasant experiences in other respects. Her
young daughter was, and still, under her care, and her assertion that her
husband's son was the cause of her daughter's pregnancy is probably not
unfounded. It requires no stretch of the imagination to conclude that to
keep the two young people under the same roof with the opportunity to
continue their illicit relations would create a very embarrassing situation
for the girl's mother.
Taking into consideration the facts stated, we do not think that the
plaintiffs' separation from the husband in unjustified. Ordinarily, it is not
the fault of one that two quarrel, and in all probability, the plaintiff is not
free from blame, but she was virtually driven out of their home by her
husband and threatened with violence if she should return. Under these
circumstances, to compel the plaintiff to cohabit with her husband can only

lead to further quarrels and would probably be unfortunate for both

parties. The separation therefore seems necessary.
As to the plaintiff's maintenance allowance it is the evident that the sum of
P500 monthly is much too large and that an allowance of P50 per month is
all that ought be granted at present.
The fifth assignment of error relates principally to the plaintiff's prayer for
an allowance of attorney's fees. Under the circumstances of the case, we
do not think that the court below erred in refusing to grant such allowance.
The judgment appealed from is therefore modified, and it is ordered that
the defendant, Isabelo Santiago, pay to the plaintiff the sum of P50 per
month for her maintenance and that such payments be made within the
first ten days of each month. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-11086

March 29, 1958

PILAR ATILANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHUA CHING BENG, defendant-appellant.
Quisumbing, Sycip & Associates for appellant.
Jose G. Bermas, Jr. for appellee.
FELIX, J.:
The facts of this case as appearing on record and in the stipulation
submitted by the parties and approved by the lower court, are as follows:
Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were joined in lawful wedlock in
Zamboanga City in May of 1951, after which marriage, the couple sailed for
Manila and established their residence with the parents of the husband. In
October of the same year, at the husband's initiative, they went to
Zamboanga City to pay the parents of the wife a visit, and it seems that he
was prevailed upon by the wife's parents to return to Manila leaving her
behind, with the understanding that she would follow him later, which
apparently she failed to do.
On September 30, 1953, Pilar Atilano filed with the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga a complaint for support against her husband, alleging that
they had been estranged and living separately since October, 1952, by
reason of incessant marital bickerings and quarrels brought about by
incompatibility of temperament and above all, by defendant's inability to
provide for themselves a home separate from the latter's parents; that she
was staying with her parents in Zamboanga City, without employment nor
had she any property of her own. She therefore, prayed that as defendant
was under legal obligation to support her, he be ordered to give her a
monthly allowance, P200.00 from the date of the filing of the complaint.
Defendant husband filed his answer contending that when they were still
residing in Manila, their married life was characterized by harmony and
understanding; that when they visited plaintiffs parents in Zamboanga in
October 1952, he was prevailed upon by the latter to allow his wife to stay
with them a while with the understanding that she would follow him later
to Manila; that through insidious machinations, plaintiff's parents caused
her to be alienated from him resulting in her refusal to return to Manila
and live with her husband again; that defendant went back to Zamboanga
City to fetch her, but through force and intimidation she was prevented by
her parents from going with him; and that her parents also exerted undue
pressure and influence upon his wife to file the complaint. Defendant
further averred that while he was not evading his obligation to support his,
he preferred to fulfill said duty by receiving and maintaining her in Manila;
that as the husband, defendant had the right to fix the residence of his
family, and he would even be willing to establish a conjugal dwelling in
Manila separate from that of his parents if that was the plaintiff's desire.
Thus, it was prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
In the meantime, plaintiff filed a petition for alimony pendente
lite premised on the same facts as, stated in her complaint, which was duly
opposed by the defendant, and on May 3, 1954, based on stipulation of
facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the
wife a monthly allowance of P75 after finding that the wife's refusal to
return to Manila was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of her
husband after she had experienced some previous in-law troubles; that her
demand that they establish their home in Zamboanga could not be met by
the husband because of the latter's job in Manila and due also to the
husband's fear that his wife would always be under the influence and
pressure of the latter's parents. No evidence was, however, adduced to
support her allegation of incompatibility of temperament and marital
quarrels, and upon receipt of the decision, defendant filed a petition
electing to fulfill his; obligation as thus fixed by the trial court by receiving
and maintaining plaintiff at his residence at Pasay City, which was, apart,
from that of his parents, with the prayer that in the event, plaintiff would
refuse to receive support under that set-up, that he be declared under, no
compulsion to remit the allowance to her at Zamboanga City. As it was
denied, defendant brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, but this
Tribunal certified the case to Us for adjudication pursuant to the provisions
of Section 17-6 of Republic Act No. 296. The only question presented for,
our consideration by this appeal is whether a wife is entitled to received
support from his husband where she refused to live with him on account of
some misunderstanding she had with the husband's immediate relatives.

It is clear to Us, and this is borne out by the findings, of the court a quo,
that plaintiff wife, then 19 yeas of age, had the unfortunate experience of
finding herself in some sort of domestic controversy, with her husband's
immediate relatives in the opposite camp, which made her feel that living
with them would already be intolerable and unbearable. Most likely,
therefore, when they visited her parents, she recounted her plight to them
and as the usual reaction of parents in matters of this nature, they picked
up and championed the cause of their daughter which resulted in the
estrangement of the young couple. Indeed disagreement among in-laws is
a problem as old as the world itself, but despite this discouraging facet of
married life there would always be in-laws as long there are marriages and
the same vicious cycle would be repeated. In the case at bar, which is a
clear illustration of this perennial domestic problem, We find that while the
wife remains adamant on her stand to effect a separation in fact between
her and her husband, the latter, has adopted a more conciliatory attitude
by acknowledging his obligation to support her and even going to the
extent of expressing his willingness to abide by her wish to have a conjugal
dwelling apart from his parents, although it, appears that he may find it
hard to make adequate provisions for their family, for he is allegedly
receiving a salary of only 170 a month as salesman in a commercial firm.
Defendant does not dispute that our civil Code imposes on the husband the
responsibility of maintaining and supporting, his wife and the rest of the
family (Art. 111). He insists, however, that under the, Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 299. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfill
his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving
and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in this case there
is a moral or legal obstacle thereto;
he is given the option to fulfill the said duty either by paying the allowance
as fixed by the Court or receiving and maintaining the person entitled
thereto in his house; and that he elects to perform his obligation by the
second means allowed him by law.
The aforeqouted provision of the law is clear enough to require any further
elucidation. In giving the obligor the option to fulfill his duty, it provides for
only one occasion when the second alternative could not be availed of i.e.,
when there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. It is true that plaintiff wife
charged that they were estranged because of marital troubles and
incessant bickering. While physical ill-treatment may be ground to compel
a husband to provide a separate maintenance for his wife (
Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil., 54 ) said allegation was not proved
during the trial. Instead, the lower court found that the root-cause of all
their differences could be traced to disagreements common among
relatives by affinity. Certainly, We do not think that misunderstanding with
in-laws, who may be considered third parties to the marriage, is the moral
or legal obstacle that the lawmakers contemplated in the drafting of said
provision. The law, in giving the husband authority to fix the conjugal
residence (Art. 110), does not prohibit him from establishing the same at
the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality,
especially if he is not fully capable of meeting his obligation as such head of
a family without the aid of his elders. But even granting arguendo that it
might be "illegal" for him to persist on living with his parents over the
objection of his wife, this argument becomes moot in view of defendant's
manifestation that he is willing to establish a residence, separate from his
parents, if plaintiff so desires. We are aware are that although the husband
and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and assistance ( Art. 109), and that the wife
is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the
wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she
establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet
and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be
allowed any support from the husband. It appearing that defendant
husband availed of the option granted him by Article 299 of the Civil Code
and there being no legal or moral hindrance to the exercise of the second
alternative as elected by him, the answer to the question presented by this
appeal is certainly obvious.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by giving the
defendant husband Chua Ching Beng the option of supporting his wife at
their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband.
Should plaintiff wife refuse to abide by the terms of this decision, then the
defendant-appellant shall be considered relieved from the obligation of
giving any support to his wife. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. L-4089

January 12, 1909

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
Filemon Sotto, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in
Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting
forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the
plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas,
and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child;
that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr.
Escao, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove
the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the
plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was
occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same
day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable value
of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to
pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he
prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with
any other relief that might be deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the
allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that
when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a
separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on
the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her
stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore,
he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs
against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained
the demurrer, directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to
amend their answer. In compliance with this order the defendants
presented, on the same date, their amended answer, denying each and
every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and requesting
that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered
by the court below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were
absolved from the former complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient
evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants, with costs
against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition
moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to
law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course
presented the corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the
defendants requesting that the declaration contained in the judgment that
the defendants had demanded therefrom, for the reason that, according to
the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied, and to the
decision the defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the
plaintiff, by virtue of having been sent for by the former, attended a
physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law of the
said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to
decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it
becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the
father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law,
by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly
determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable
ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the
contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among
the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual
support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art.
1088), and spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be
no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in
need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation
to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be
restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is
jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for
all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional
services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation
which the law has expressly established between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person
bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that
he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth,
is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the

defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the
plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment
of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger,
to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered
that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the
husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at
such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen,
and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who
believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action
against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance
to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to
have brought an action against the defendants simply because they were
the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient
during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her
father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The
defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of
any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any
contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such
obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the
supreme court of Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a
contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support
another who was not his relative, established the rule that the law does
impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the
liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be
held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers
with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide
support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at
the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear
that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician,
for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay
fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear
that they consented to bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors
assigned to the judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has
no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether
or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our
opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-13114

August 29, 1961

ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ESTHER PERALTA, defendant-appellee.
E.B. Garcia Law Offices and Ledesma, Puno Guytingco and Antonio &
Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Quijano, Abellera, Santos Corrales & Nitrorreda for defendant-appellee.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appellants spouses Saturnino Silva and Elenita LedesmaSilva pray for
reconsideration of this Court's decision of November 25, 1960, claiming
that
(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther
Peralta's unauthorized use of the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva";
(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is
unwarranted by the facts and the law.
It is contended that the prohibition imposed upon appellee Esther Peralta
from representing herself, directly or indirectly, as the wife of Saturnino
Silva should result in an award of moral damages in favor of appellant
Elenita Ledesma, whose exclusive right to the appellation is recognized by
the decision.
This argument misapprehends the bias of the decision. Esther Peralta was
forbidden from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva for the reason
that it was proved in this case that she was not legally married to him, and
because he is now lawfully married to Elenita Ledesma. But an award of
damages in the latter's favor would require a further finding that the
assumption of the disputed status by Esther Peralta was made in bad faith
or through culpable negligence and no such finding has been made in the
decision. The facts are that the Esther in good faith regarded herself as
Saturnino's lawful wife, and that the man himself led her into this belief
prior to his desertion. That later on, unknown to Esther, Silva should have
married his co-appellant in the United States is not sufficient to impose
upon Esther any liability for damages or to destroy her original good faith,
there being no proof that the existence of a valid marriage between
Saturnino and Elenita was adequately driven home to Esther before this
case was instituted. That the two appellants Silva were living together as
husband and wife was certainly not sufficient proof, considering Saturnino
Silva's past history and conduct. How was appellee to know that
Saturnino's connection with Elenita Ledesma was any more legitimate than
his previous one with appellee herself?
Moreover, the trial court found Elenita Silva's claim for damages not
adequately proved, and we have not found in the record any justification
to depart from that finding.
II
As to the award of damages against Saturnino Silva, it is to be noted that
while the latter's liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under the
Civil Code of 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are measured in the
same manner as those due from a contractual debtor in bad faith, since he
must answer for such damages, whether he had foreseen them or not, just
as he must indemnify not only for dumnum emergens but also forlucrum
cessans, as required by Article 1106. Article 1902 of the 1889 Civil Code of
Spain formulated no standard for measuring quasidelictual damages, the
article merely prescribing that the guilty party "shall be liable for the
damages so done". This indefiniteness led modern civil law writers to hold
that the standards set in Articles 1106 and 1107, place in the general rules
on obligations, "rigen por igual para las contractuales y las extra
contractuales, las preestablecidas y las que broten ex-lege de actos ilicitos".
(Roces, Notesto Fisher, "Los Daos Civiles y su Reparacion," (1927). Since
liability for damages arises in either case from a breach of a pre-existing
obligation (to behave without fault or negligence in case of quasi-delicts,
and, in case of contracts, to observe the conduct required by the
stipulation),it is logical to conclude with Planiol that "La responsabilidad
contractual y la extra contractual tienen el mismo fundamento, por lo que
se hallan sujetas en principio a identicas regalas" (6 Planiol-Ripert, Derecho
Civil, p. 529,sec. 378). Giorgi is of the same opinion (5 Teoria de
Obligaciones, pp. 133, 207-208). So is de Cossio y Corral("El Dolo en el
Derecho Civil", pp. 132-133):
Pero si ello es asi, resulta claro que la aproximacionentre esta clase de
culpa y la contractual, es cada dia mayor,hasta el extremo de que,
segun hemos antes indicado solamente se pueden sealar diferencias
accessorias, y muchas veces aparentes entre una y otra. En primer
termino, porque el conceptode culpa contractual se extiende no solo a
las obligacionesnacidas ex contractu, sino, en general, a todas aquellas
preexistentes entre las partes a la realidad del acto daoso
(obligaciones legales). de otra parte, porque si bien consideramoslas
cosas, la responsabilidad llamada extracontractual, deriva siempre del
quebrantamiento de un deber general, implicitamentereconocido por
la ley, cual es el de que todos deben actuar socialmente con la debida
diligencia, evitando causar dano a los demas, y una dercho que todo
ciudadano tine, correlativamente,a no ser da__ado en su patrimonio
y bienes por la conducta dolosa o negligente de los demas. En tal
sentido, habria siempre entre el autor del dao y la victima, una
relacion juridica,constituida por este derecho y aquel deber.

Este idea de unidad entre ambas instituciones se traduce en que las

pretendidadas diferencias en order a la extension de la indemnizacion,
en ambos casos, no puedan defenderse a la vista de los preceptos de
nuestro Derecho positivo. En efectono contiene el Capitulo II del Titulo
XVI del Libro IV de nuestroCodigo civil norma alguna referente a la
extension de la indemnizacion que en cada caso haya de prestarse, lo
que nosobliga forzosamente a acudir a las normas general
contenidasen el Capitulo II, del Titulo I de dicho libro, IV, relativeo a los
"efectos de los obligaciones", que ninguna razon peermite limitar.a
naturaleza contractual, ya que el articulo 1.101 hable genericamente
de obligaciones el 1.102, de "todas las obligaciones";el 1.103, de toda
clase de obligaciones", y en ninguno de los articulos subsifuientes se
hace referencia a una clase especial de obligaciones, sino a todas en
general.
Que las disposiciones de este Capitulo son aplicables en loscasos de
culpa extracontractual, es doctrina constantemente reconocida, por la
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo. Asi,en la sentencia de 14 de
diciembre de 1894, concretandose a losarticulos 1.101, 1.103 y 1.104,
afirma que son de caracter generaly applicables a toda clase de
obligaciones, no ofreciendocontradiccion con las especiales de los
articulos 1.902 y 1.903; la sentencia de 15 de enero de 1902, permite
interpretar los articulos1.902, t 1.903 por los 1.103 y 1.106, a los
efectos de determinar los elementos que han de entrar en la
indemnizacion.La misma doctrina se mantiene en la senencia de 2 de
diciembrede 1946, y en otras muchas que puedieramos aducir.
Whether or not the damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct
consequence of Silva's deceitful maneuvers in making love to appellee, and
inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his wife (when
Silva knew all the time that he could not marry Esther Peralta because of
his undissolved marriage to an Australian woman, a prior wedlock that he
concealed from appellee), is a question of appreciation. It is clear that
Esther Peralta would not have consented to the liaison had there been no
concealment of Silva's previous marriage, or that the birth of the child was
a direct result of this connection. That Esther had to support the child
because Silva abandoned her before it was born is likewise patent upon the
record, and we can not see how said appellant can be excused from liability
therefor.
Silva's seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his
illegitimate child were likewise the direct cause for the filling of the support
case in Manila, and in order to prosecute the same, appellee had to quit
her employment in Davao. While the case could have been filed in Davao,
we do not believe that this error in selecting a more favorable venue (due
to her unfamiliarity with the technicalities of the law) should be allowed to
neutralized the appellant Silva's responsibility as the primary causative
factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by appellee.
It is argued that the maintenance of the child can not be considered as an
element of damage because the child's case for support was dismissed.
This contention fails to take into account the action there was for support
as an acknowledged natural child, and that under the Civil Code of 1889
(the law in force when the child was born), the right of natural children to
be supported by their father depended exclusively on the recognition by
the father of his paternity; the rule being that
the mere fact of birth gave no legal right to the child, and imposed no
legal duty upon the father, except, perhaps, in cases arising under the
criminal law.. . . The father was not, prior to the Civil Code, and is not
now, bound to recognize his natural son by reason of the mere fact that
he is the father. . . . But as to the father the question is, and always has
been, Has he performed any acts which indicate his intention to
recognize the child as his?" (Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil., pp. 2-3).
It follows that in said suit, the real issue was whether the child had been
duly recognized, the support being a mere consequence of the recognition.
Therefore, the failure of the child's action for support did not adjudge that
he was not the defendant's child, but that the defendant never recognized
him as such. That the decision of the Court of Appeal (CA-G.R. No. 24532-R)
rejecting the child's action did not declare him without right to support
under all circumstances can be seen from the following statement in the
decision:
The proofs so far found in the record may possibly warrant the filing of
an action for compulsory recognition, under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art.
283, but there was no action presented to that effect.
Plainly, the issues and parties being different, the result of the child's
action can not constitute res judicata with regard to the mother's claim for
damages against the father on account of the amounts she was compelled
to spend for the maintenance of their child. On the contrary, the very fact
that the child was not allowed to collect support from the father (appellant
therein) merely emphasizes the account of his birth and rearing, which, in
turn, was a direct consequence of appellant's tortious conduct. Since
Esther Peralta had expressly that she had to support the child (Record of
Appeal, p. 27, in fine),and had prayed for such relief "as may be deemed
just and equitable in the premises", there is no reason why her expenses
for the child's maintenance should not be taken into account.
Appellants submit that the damages allowed for maintenance of the son
should be limited to P600.00 a year, because the income tax law allows
only that much deduction for each child. We do not believe that income tax
deductions constitute a reasonable basis for an award of damages, since

they are fixed an entirely different purpose (to arrive at the net taxable
income) and merely represent the amount that the state is willing to
exempt from taxation. At that, it should be noted that the deductible
amount has been lately increased to P1,000.00 per annum. But even at
P600.00 per annum, the damage suffered by appellee on this count, from
1945 to 1960, already amount to around P9,000.00 a year, to which must
be added the loss of appellee's salary as executive of the Girl Scouts in
Davao; so that the P15,000.00 damages awarded by the court below is by
no means excessive, as already held in our decision in chief.
Appellants also contend that the claim for pecuniary damages has
prescribed, because they date back to 1945. Suffice it to note that the
defense of prescription was not invoked by appellants against the claim for
pecuniary damages, and this defense must be regarded as waived in
relation to the same. Appellant's reply to the appellee's first
counterclaim in her second amended answer (which was for actual or
pecuniary damages) read as follows (Answer to Counterclaim, Rec. App. p.
33):
1. That plaintiff is without knowledge or information
sufficient to to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
continued under paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the first
counterclaim and, therefore, specifically denies the same.
The defense of prescription was actually interposed only against the second
counterclaim, in this wise:
1. That the cause of action alleged in the second counterclaim has
already prescribed more than ten years having already elapsed. (Answer
to Counterclaim, Rec. App., p. 34).
The second counterclaim referred to was for damages due to "mental
torture, anguish and hurt feelings, all to her damage in the amount of
P250,000." (Rec. App. p. 28).Upon the other hand, our own award for
moral damages was based, not on the deceit practiced by Silva in securing
Esther's assent to live maritally with him, but on his subsequent
harassment of her in 1945, by filing suit against her in different provinces
and otherwise applying pressure to cause her to abandon her child's case.
As this cause of action arose less than three years before the present
action was filed, the defense of prescription is rendered untenable against
it, for the limitation period had not yet expired when the suit was brought.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not a
woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined
by the latter's present wife from using the surname of her former husband.
A complaint was filed by petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino with the then
Court of First Instance of Quezon City against Consuelo David for the
purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from using the
surname Tolentino. The complaint also contained a claim for damages
which the petitioner, however, waived. An application for a writ of
preliminary injunction was filed as well.
On January 13, 1972 respondent Consuelo David filed her answer admitting
she has been using and continues to use the surname Tolentino.
The application for the writ was heard with both parties presenting
evidence in support of their respective claims.
On January 18, 1972, the trial court issued an order granting the
petitioner's action for a writ of preliminary injunction with the actual writ
being issued on January 20, 1972. The order granting said writ reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City, that, until
further orders, you CONSUELO DAVID, your agents and/or
representatives and/or persons acting under your control, direction,
instruction and/or supervision, ARE ENJOINED from using, employing
and/or applying, in any manner, form or means whatsoever, the
surname TOLENTINO. (p. 17, Original Record On Appeal)
On February 2, 1972, respondent Consuelo filed a motion for leave to file a
third party complaint against her former husband. The motion was granted
on March 18,1972. Thereafter, third party defendant Arturo Tolentino filed
his answer on April 19,1972.
After the hearings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
confirming the preliminary injunction and making the same permanent
and perpetual-restraining and enjoining defendant, her agents and/or
representatives and/or persons acting under her control, direction,
instruction and/or supervision, from using, employing and/or applying,
in any manner, form or means whatsoever, the surname" TOLENTINO."

No pronouncement as to costs, the same having been waived by the

plaintiff.
The third-party complaint is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs. (p. 93, Original Record on Appeal)
The private respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
raising several issues, among them, the prescription of the plaintiff's cause
of action and the absence of a monopolistic proprietary right of the
plaintiff over the use of the surname Tolentino.
On June 25, 1975, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, sustaining Error 1, this Court is constrained to
reverse, as it now reverses, judgment appealed from, complaint is
dismissed, with costs. (p. 76, Petitioner's Brief)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
in a resolution dated August 29,1975.
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
The uncontroverted facts of the case are:
The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, their marriage
having been celebrated on April 21, 1945 in Manila. The union produced
three children.
Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino on
February 8, 1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage
was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese
occupation on September 15, 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce granted
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Divorce Case No. R-619 entitled
"Arturo Tolentino v. Consuelo David" on the ground of desertion and
abandonment by the wife. The trial court granted the divorce on its finding
that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three
(3) continuous years.
Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who
however, died soon after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married
Constancia on April 21, 1945.
Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino
after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint.
The third party defendant, in his answer, admitted that the use of the
surname Tolentino by the private respondent was with his and his family's
(brothers and sisters) consent.
The petition mainly revolves around two issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed,
and
2. Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David
from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was
divorced.
The petitioner's contention that her cause of action is imprescriptible is
without merit. In fact, it is contradictory to her own claim. The petitioner
insists that the use by respondent Consuelo David of the surname
Tolentino is a continuing actionable wrong and states that every use of the
surname constitutes a new crime. The contention cannot be countenanced
because the use of a surname by a divorced wife for a purpose not criminal
in nature is certainly not a crime. The rule on prescription in civil cases such
as the case at bar is different. Art. 1150 of the Civil Code provides: "The
time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may
be brought."
All actions, unless an exception is provided, have a prescriptive period.
Unless the law makes an action imprescriptible, it is subject to bar by
prescription and the period of prescription is five (5) years from the time
the right of action accrues when no other period is prescribed by law (Civil
Code, Art. 1149). The Civil Code provides for some rights which are not
extinguished by prescription but an action as in the case before us is not
among them. Neither is there a special law providing for imprescriptibility.
Moreover, the mere fact that the supposed violation of the petitioner's
right may be a continuous one does not change the principle that the
moment the breach of right or duty occurs, the right of action accrues and
the action from that moment can be legally instituted (Soriano v.
Sternberg, 41 Phil. 210).
The respondent Court of Appeals, on the other hand, is of the opinion that
the period of prescription should be four (4) years, since it appears to be an
action based on quasi-delict. hatever the period, it cannot be denied
that the action has long prescribed whether the cause accrued on April 21,
1945 when the petitioner and Arturo Tolentino got married, or on August
30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951 when
Constancia Tolentino came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino. It is the legal possibility of bringing the
action which detemines the starting point for the computation of the
period of prescription (Espanol v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314).
The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the
private respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private

respondent of the surname of her former husband. As it is, action was

brought only on November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands in between
and an action to reconstitute the divorce case. The petitioner should have
filed her complaint at once when it became evident that the private
respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting for
twenty (20) years.
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, "where the plaintiff fails to go to
the Court within the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but not
because the defendant had acquired ownership by adverse possession over
his name but because the plaintiffs cause of action had lapsed thru the
statute of limitations." (p. 37, Rollo)
On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue
using the surname of her former husband, Philippine law is understandably
silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and consequently, the
use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for.
There is no merit in the petitioner's claim that to sustain the private
respondent's stand is to contradict Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code.
It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on
Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive
right to use the husband's surname. She cannot be prevented from using it;
but neither can she restrain others from using it." (Tolentino, Civil Code,
1974 ed., P. 681).
Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of
annulment while the case before us refers to absolute divorce where there
is a severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of divorce is more akin to
the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be
referred to as the Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried
rather than to annulment since in the latter case, it is as if there had been
no marriage at all.
The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the
petitioner would be an act of serious dislocation to her. She has given proof
that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and
entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. The
petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any
legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her
husband's surname and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the
surname Tolentino for illegal purposes.
There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so
that the mere use of the surname Tolentino by the Private respondent
cannot be said to have injured the petitioner's rights. "The usurpation of
name implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It
consists in the possibility of confusion of Identity ... between the owner
and the usurper. It exists when a person designates himself by another
name ... The following are the elements of usurpation of a name: 1) there is
an actual use of another's name by the defendant; 2) the use is
unauthorized; and 3) the use of another's name is to designate personality
or Identify a person" (Tolentino, supra, p. 685). None of these elements
exists in the case at bar and neither is there a claim by the petitioner that
the private respondent impersonated her. In fact, it is of public knowledge
that Constancia Tolentino is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino so that all
invitations for Senator and Mrs. Tolentino are sent to Constancia. Consuelo
never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but
simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino. The private respondent has
legitimate children who have every right to use the surname Tolentino. She
could not possibly be compelled to use the prefix "Miss" or use the name
Mrs. David, different from the surnames of her children. The records do
not show that she has legally remarried.
In Silva, et al. v. Peralta (110 Phil. 57) cited by the petitioner, it was not the
mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendant's
representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva. There was,
therefore, a usurpation of the wife's status which is absent in the case at
bar.
We rule that the use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on the
rights of the petitioner.
Considering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent
who may be seriously prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to
further legal procedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal
transactions where she used the surname Tolentino, and the effects on the
private respondent who, while still not remarried, will have to use a
surname different from the surnames of her own children, we find it just
and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no actual legal injury
to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for
injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The writs of preliminary and
mandatory injunction issued by the trial court are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S.
CENTI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga City, respondent.

RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in
Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc.
No. 06-3). The petition reads:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this
act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by
virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of
which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a
Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is
now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on
March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao
Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the
divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his
Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted
another marriage to another woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371 (2) of the New
Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the
use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as
follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of
Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be
adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should
include all the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao
Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA
[483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar
v. Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary
amendment of the petition within one (1) week from receipt hereof so
as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging
that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is
merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname
after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her
former husband to another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August
10, 1990, on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of
name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court
on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would
result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and
surname.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule
103 of the Rules of Court to the instant case.
In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others,
contends:
5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition
is substantially one for change of name, particularly of surname
Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being her maiden
name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage,
and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden name and
surname. In effect, if petition is granted, it will result in the resumption
of the use of her surname.
Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title
XIII, New Civil Code). This is the substantive requirements. And as to
procedural requirements, no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the
Philippines) (Emphasis supplied). Change of name under judicial
authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province (now
RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the names borne
by individual and entities for purposes of identification. A change of
name is a privilege and not a matter of right. Therefore, before a person
can be authorized to change his name (given him either in his birth
certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling reason,
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied
(Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 4647)

The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment
of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the
former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to
file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of
maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name.
The Court rules in the negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the
civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956];
Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35
SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the
only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in
the Civil Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16 SCRA 483
[1966]), held:
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop
up: What is the name to be changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a
person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is, that the civil
register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal
purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is
an official record of the civil status of persons. A name given to a person
in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community when at variance with that entered in the civil register
is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of
name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition,
petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but,
instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name
in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a
decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, as follows:
Art. 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the
marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after
exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses.
It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Judicial decree ( faskh).
Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD
1086 provides:
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon
as it become irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may
contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting
called idda (Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses
after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under
Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court
and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be
applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the
marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371,
Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is
permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372,
Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former
husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
According to Tolentino:
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may"
is used, indicating that the use of the husband's surname by the wife

is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides

that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon
marriage. This is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use
only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a
duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided
by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724,
1983 ed.)
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial
authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before
her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden
first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly,
when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death
of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or
divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil
status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former
husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil
Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her
husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither
was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her
husband after the marriage as no law requires it.
In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the
use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a
superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so
as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial
confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the
procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such
circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the
right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In
the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding,
where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as
annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for
confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden
name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a
right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in
matters of form and averment of concise statements of ultimate facts
constituting the petitioner's cause of action, nevertheless, giving it a most
liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's desire
and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from
her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another
woman.
The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final
disposition of this case and would not serve the public interest. We have
consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the
dispute on the basis of the records before it (Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA
143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]:
Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court
dated July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
authorized to resume her maiden name and surname.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14874

September 30, 1960

ANTONIO PEREZ, in his own representation and as Guardian Ad litem of

his son BENIGNO PEREZ Y TUASON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGELA TUASON DE PEREZ, defendant and appellee.
Alfonso Felix Jr. for appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for appellee.

(d) proceedings brought under the provisions of Articles one

hundred sixteen, two hundred twenty-five, two hundred fifty, two
and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
While Article 116 of the Civil Code (referred to in subsection [d] above)
states:.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal
union or brings danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, the
injured party may apply to the court for relief.

Appeal from an order, dated October 27, 1958, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dismissing its Civil Case No. 34626 for lack of
jurisdiction.

The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her
duties, and take such measures as may be proper. (Emphasis
supplied.)1awphl.nt

Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad

litem of his adoptive son, Benigno Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case
against Angela Tuason de Perez, the plaintiff's wife and Benigno's mother.
The complaint states three causes of action.
Under the first causes of action, it is averred that the defendant is
squandering all of her estate on a young man by the name of Jose Antonio
Campos Boloix, because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason, acting through
his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his mother, the defendant, be
declared a prodigal and placed under appointed to administer her
properties; and that during the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be
issued to prevent the continued waste and disposition of her properties.
In his second cause of action, the husband Antonio Perez, for and his own
behalf, asserts that by virtue of the said alleged acts of prodigality
committed by the defendant wife, the conjugal partnership of gain is being
dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses; wherefore, he prays for a writ
of injunction to restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal
partnership of gains."
Finally, as third case of action, the plaintiff husband avers that, in addition
to the aforementioned acts, the defendants had repeatedly advised him, as
well as other persons, that she intends to marry Jose Campos Boloix and to
have a child by him not withstanding her present marriage to the plaintiff,
Antonio Perez; and that, if she could not have such a child, she was willing
to have one by any other person, just to put plaintiff in a ridiculous and
embarrassing position. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks to recover from her the
total sum of P185,000.00 by way of damages and attorney's fees.
On January 2, 1958, after a preliminary hearing, wherein plaintiff was
heard ex parte, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preliminary
injunction as prayed for in complaint.
On March 19, 1958, the defendant appeared through counsel and prayed
for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata, and that the
preliminary injunction be dissolve. Said motion was denied by the court a
quoin its order of April 2, 1958.
On April 16, 1958, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the case,
this time on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction over the present proceedings, which, according to her, is vested
under Republic Act No. 1401 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. While this last motion was being considered by the Court, a
compromise agreement was arrived at and submitted for approval of the
court on May 2, 1958. On May 31, 1958, before the Court could act,
defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the compromise
agreement, on the ground that (a) the same is contrary to law and (b) it
was not freely or validly entered into by her representative. Without
resolving this particular question, the lower court asked the parties to
submit further memoranda on the sole issue of jurisdiction. After this was
done, the trial court, by order of September 30, 1958, ordered the
dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Hence, plaintiffs Perez (father and son) appealed.
Appellants assign three alleged errors in the order appealed from, as
follows:
The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila
has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in
the complaint.
The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila
has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Benigno Perez y
Tuason in the complaint.
The trial court erred in holding that the Doctrine of Estoppel of
Jurisdiction is not applicable in this country and erred further in failing to
apply said doctrine to the present proceedings.
We find the appeal to be untenable.
Republic Act no. 1401, creating the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of
the City of Manila and defining its jurisdiction, provides, among other
things, that:
SEC. 38AProvision of the Judiciary Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act:
(b) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is easy to see that the first cause of action set forth in the complaint,
wherein the minor Benigno Perez y Tuason, through his representative, ask
his mother be placed under guardianship because of her alleged
prodigality, and prays that a suitable person or institution be appointed to
administer her properties, is exclusively cognizable by the Domestic
Relations Court. The action falls squarely under the provisions of
subsection (b), Section 38-A, R.A. 1401, above-quoted, as a "case involving .
guardianship." No error was, therefore, committed in the appealed order in
holding that this cause of action lay outside the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance.
The same thing can be said of the third cause of action wherein Antonio
Perez seeks to recover damages and attorney's fees because his wife's act
(avowing openly her intention to marry and have a child by Campos Boloix
or if not, by anyone else) placed the plaintiff "in an embarrassing and
contemptible position" (sic) and causing him "grave anxiety, wounded
feelings, extreme humiliation." The case involves acts of a spouse that
"brings . . .dishonor . . . upon the other (spouse)" under Article 116 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, and also lies within the jurisdiction of the
Domestic Relations Court. The law (subsection (d), Sec. 38-A) expressly
gives that courtexclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings under the
provisions of Article 116 of the Civil Code.
More controversial is the issue involved in the second cause of action of
the complaint, wherein Antonio Perez alleges that the prodigal acts of his
wife result in the conjugal partnership of gains being dissipated to the
prejudice of both spouses, and prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her
from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains." The
Court of First Instance held that this cause of action is also one of those
provided by Article 116 of the Civil Code, as a case where one spouse
"bring danger . . . or material injury" upon the other, and, therefore, relief
should be sought in the Court of Domestic Relations.
We are inclined to think that "material injury" as used in Article 116 does
not refer to patrimonial (economic) injury or damage, but to personal (i. e.
physical or moral) injury to one of the spouses, since Article 116 lies in the
chapter concerning personal relations between husband and wife.
Nevertheless, the court below was correct in viewing this cause of action as
primarily predicated on the grant of guardianship due to alleged prodigality
of the wife, sine the allegation thereof is therein reiterated, and the
remedy of injunction sought against further (i. e. future) acts of disposition
(no annulment of her past transactions is demanded) must be necessarily
based on the wife's being subject to guardianship.
If the wife were not in any way incapacitated, the mere fact that the
alienation of her paraphernal would deprive the conjugal partnership of
the future fruits thereof would not give rise to a cause of action for
injunction, since the conjugal partnership is only entitled to the net fruits of
such property, after deducting administration expenses (People's
Bank vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil., 167), and it is nowhere alleged that any
such net fruits exist. More fundamental still, the wife's statutory power to
alienate her paraphernal (Phil Civil Code, Article 140) necessarily implies
power to alienate its future fruits, since the latter are mere accessory to
the property itself.
WHEREFORE, the second cause of action is inextricably woven into and
cannot stand independently of the demand for guardianship of the wife,
injunction being a mere incident thereof; so that like the first cause of
action, the second also lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Domestic Relations.
The third alleged error charged against the Court below, that it should have
that defendant was in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the trial
court is, on its face, without merit. Assuming for the sake of argument that
defendant appellee was placed in such estoppel by merely executing the
compromise and submitting it to the Court's approval, such estoppel could
not operate against the Court. Regardless of the parties, the Court, at any
time, could motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, and could dismiss the case (as it did)
if it found that it had no power to act therein.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants.

G.R. No. L-17014

August 11, 1921

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.
Powell & Hill for appellee.
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the
bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a
few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife
in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her
husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to
induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a
dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and
that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred
by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to
leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in
turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation;
(2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the
cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing
her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of
P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the
defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the
trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual
formalities by appeal to this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached
the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that
his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every
line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly
untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition
of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause
are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have
attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to
pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the
resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a
reminder to either of the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the
fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has
at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the
other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the
part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the crossaction, are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal
wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time
to become involved and would have little significance apart from the
morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be
recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without
sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to
dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the
obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a
duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in
articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by
the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a
divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce.
Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave
the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this
jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance
(Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the
expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such
obligation, (Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the
interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the
courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of
the de facto separation of the spouses a state which is abnormal and
fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it
follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in
favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the
pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the
husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through
the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the
support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when
the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity
is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also
appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the
State of South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been
procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of
the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible
for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court
has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate
maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-

treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper conduct.

(Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597;
Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the
English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the
husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the
following eloquent words, which are perhaps even more applicable in a
proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a
divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and
this, too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution
for that crime. Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the
parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? . . .
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted
where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or
menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to
legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state
undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are
not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such
misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as
well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the
consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent
resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both
must suffer in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked.
Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is
justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which
confined its views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it
would be a question easily decided upon first impressions. Every body
must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each
other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and
consequently with any degree of happiness; but my situation does not
allow me to indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings of an
individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally
separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit
together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a
judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this
respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true
wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of
mankind. For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to
dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with
great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that
the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility.
When people understand that they must live together, except for a very
few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining
husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the
happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and
more general good. (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint,
466, 467.)
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the crosscomplaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be
granted.
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint
conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing
to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and
cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character
and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial
decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal
rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is
entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the
precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in
unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for
contempt, in case she should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present
writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction
whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the

practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the

Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at
the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by
process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution
of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may
serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in
the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her
failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the
marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to
the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration
that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is
her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the
original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de
Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient
cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is
absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to
costs of either instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-11622

January 28, 1961

(a) Administrator's Fee

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-11668

P1,204.34

(b) Attorney's Fee

6.000.00

(c) Judicial and Administration

expenses as of August 9, 1952

1,400.05

January 28, 1961.

8,604.39

DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.

Real Estate Tax for 1951 on

Baguio real properties (O.R.
No. B-1 686836)

BARRERA, J.:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary
estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable
thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of
British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22,
1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved
and established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will
executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated
in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted
his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal
properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines,
Gross Estate
Real Property 2 parcels of land in Baguio, covered
by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379

P43,500.00

Personal Property
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at P10.00
each
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc.
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
& China
Total Gross Assets

1,770.00

79,800.00
4,870.88

851.97
P130,792.85

described and preliminary assessed as follows:

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the
Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by
our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the
estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax
return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally
appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.
Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to
secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance
tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States.
Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the
valuation of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the
appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair
market value in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After
allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral
expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration
expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the
amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a
total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on
June 6, 1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate
and inheritance tax return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time
of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the
right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as
originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of
P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was
based by the ancillary administrator on the market notation of the stock
obtaining at the San Francisco California) Stock Exchange six months from
the death of Stevenson, that is, As of August 22, 1931. In addition, the
ancillary administrator made claim for the following deductions:
Funeral expenses ($1,04326)
Judicial Expenses:

P2,086.52

Claims against the estate:

($5,000.00) P10,000.00
Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to
22, 1951
Sub-Total

652.50

P10,000.00

22.47

10,022.47
P21,365.88

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson

assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas
and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended
estate and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the
same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22,
1952, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross
estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal
Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was
allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case
No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2)
exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also
pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only
for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax
and that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of
the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested
by the estate. The Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as
assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of
Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half ()
share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as
diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property
should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue
Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of
said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the
provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in
relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is
not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the
estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the
Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be
entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial
expenses of P8,604.39.
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned
four errors allegedly committed by the trial court, while the assignees,
Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called respondents, made six
assignments of error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following
main issues for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent,
one-half () of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share
of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership
and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso
embodied in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting
exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00
allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in
Baguio City and the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court;

(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions:

P8,604.39 for judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral
expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the
amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his
lifetime; and

of a state in the United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity

between the Philippines and the state of California in that while the former
exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible
personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance
tax..

(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the
amount it claims to have overpaid the government and to be refundable to
it.

To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for
herein respondents, testified that as an active member of the California Bar
since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of
California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California
law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness
cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and
Revenue Code as published in Derring's California Code, a publication of
the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full
quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by
the respondents.

In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in
our civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the
contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. The
application of this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, however,
by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to
Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses
Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the
national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is
alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal partnership
between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is another
regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during the
marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support
of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the
old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount of
successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the national law
of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons
in the Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of
the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became
effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called
nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses where
one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to
the administration disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties.
In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law
in determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a
difference between the two articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil
Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether
the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article
13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign
land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed
marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case,
both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa,3 in
his Commentaries, has this to say on this point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones
otorgadas en Espana y entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el
extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la
regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos
espanoles en el extranjero hay que atender en el primer caso a la
legislacion de pais a que aquellos pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las
reglas generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo.
(Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property
relation of the Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even
if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being
foreigners. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent
English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full ownership of
the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by
petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not
sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says
on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in
indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming
that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil
Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of
the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it
does not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property
relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of
successional rights and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers
to the extent or amount of property that each heir is legally entitled to
inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be pointed out
that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their
successional rights, is governed differently by the specific and express
provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of
the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly
deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary
estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the
exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in
relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on
the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code has not been duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity
exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of residents

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our

jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving
foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it
desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in
the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a
reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a
foreign law." In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-atlaw of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on
the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as
proved by respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or
death taxes, between the State of California and the Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part,
provides:
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title
in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time
of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his
death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country
of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a
similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character
in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law,
insofar as pertinent, reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal
property is exempt from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at
the time of his death was a resident of a territory or another State of
the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed a
legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal
property of its own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in
respect to intangible personal property of residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible
personal property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other
State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the
nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to
intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of
the United States or foreign state or country of residence of the
decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be
total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every
character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or
death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the California law.
Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt
any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work. This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity
clauses in both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or nonresident with properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its
settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of
California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal
Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens
of the United States,7 but does not provide for any exemption on the basis
of reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals
did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is
non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here,
will the subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the
payment of the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino, nonresident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be

entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian
has not been exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or
death tax because he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate
tax? Upon the other hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the
estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar
estate tax in California because under the Federal Law, which is equally
enforceable in California he is bound to pay the same, there being no
reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino
citizen is always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature
has intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own
government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower
court erred in exempting the estate in question from payment of the
inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54
O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from
payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal
Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity between
the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that of the State of California
was not there squarely raised, and the ruling therein cannot control the
determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that in
view of the express provisions of both the Philippine and California laws
that the exemption would apply only if the law of the other grants an
exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character,
there could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at
all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of
P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being
claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in
the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the
Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an
exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the
provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is
reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land
situated in Baguio City, it is contended that their assessed values, as
appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, ought to
have been considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to
section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed out,
however, that in accordance with said proviso the properties are required
to be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof
shall be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to the
contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are
satisfied that such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by
petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax court aptly
observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued
by the administrator of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax
returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said
properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this Court can take judicial
notice of it, that assessments for real estate taxation purposes are very
much lower than the true and fair market value of the properties at a
given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or in 1952
the said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no
showing that special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden
increase from the price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as
a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even more, the counsel for
plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to purchase
the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts
we believe and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the
real estate in Baguio made by defendant is fair, reasonable and justified
in the premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic corporation), respondents contend
that their value should be fixed on the basis of the market quotation
obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory
that the certificates of stocks were then held in that place and registered
with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree with respondents'
argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, being
located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and
considering that they are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent
with the exercise of our government's taxing authority, their fair market
value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that
the said shares of stock commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock
Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison
Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that time a share of said stock was
bid for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty.
Gibbs in this respect has never been questioned nor refuted by petitioner
either before this court or in the court below. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on
this point and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining company
on August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by
respondents..

It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share
of stock of P.38 on the basis of the declaration made by the estate in its
preliminary return. Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of
the fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed of his
legal right to have the properties of the estate declared at their fair market
value as of six months from the time the decedent died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the
allowance or disallowance of which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and
respondents have appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to
support the allowance of the sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.
1) Administrator's fee

P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee

6,000.00

3) Judicial and Administrative

expenses

2,052.55

Total Deductions

P8,604.39

An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items

were considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval
by the probate court to which said expenses, we may presume, had also
been presented for consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate
court would not have approved said items were they not supported by
evidence presented by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the
Tax Court had before it the pertinent order of the probate court which was
submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the
Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the
probate court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses were
actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no ground to reverse
this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California National
Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G.
Stevenson obtained we are not inclined to pass upon the claim of
respondents in respect to the additional amount of P86.52 for funeral
expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of
realty taxes paid in 1951 on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio
City, which respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax Court, we find
that this claim has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a
careful review of the record will reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing
the liabilities of the estate, viz:
1) Administrator's fee

P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee

6,000.00

3) Judicial and
Administration expenses as
of August 9, 1952

2,052.55

Total

P9,256.89

added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the
P1,400.05 for judicial and administration expenses approved by the court,
making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived at
by the Tax Court for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the
difference between the total of P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as
deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, which is
P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty taxes. An evident oversight
has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses
in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the
lower court and there is no reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section
89(b) (1) in relation to section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National
Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should have been
allowed the estate as a deduction, because it represented an indebtedness
of the decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support thereof, they
offered in evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the probate court in
California by the Bank of California National Association, which it would
appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of
$5,000.00 secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The
Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local probate court
had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and because
it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property
which the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the
deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this
particular indebtedness of the decedent is necessary. This is so although
the same, it is averred has been already admitted and approved by the
corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or
domiciliary administration. It is true that we have here in the Philippines

only an ancillary administration in this case, but, it has been held, the
distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and ancillary
administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the
other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent.8 The reason
for the ancillary administration is that, a grant of administration does
not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a will
duly probated outside of the Philippines can have effect here, it must first
be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the same manner as
wills originally presented for allowance therein.9 And the estate shall be
administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration
granted by the court, and disposed of according to the will as probated,
after payment of just debts and expenses of administration.10 In other
words, there is a regular administration under the control of the court,
where claims must be presented and approved, and expenses of
administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be
authorized. Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own probate
court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate situated here,
subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts
have no control. We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or
contemplated in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction,
springs from the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the
National Internal Revenue Code which reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions (1) No deductions shall be
allowed in the case of a non-resident not a citizen of the
Philippines unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the
heirs, as the case may be, includes in the return required to be
filed under section ninety-three the value at the time of his
death of that part of the gross estate of the non-resident not
situated in the Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the nonresident Stevenson not situated in the Philippines appears in the three
returns submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector of
Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue
officer to determine how much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be
deducted, pursuant to (b), number (1) of the same section 89 of the
Internal Revenue Code which provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. In the case of
a non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines, by deducting
from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the time
of his death is situated in the Philippines
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. That proportion
of the deductions specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of
this section11 which the value of such part bears the value of his
entire gross estate wherever situated;"
In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of
the portion of the indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that
the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated.
Stated differently, if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of
the entire assets wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may
be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to, there is no statement of
the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no part of the
indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89, letter
(d), number (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court
disallowing the deduction of the alleged indebtedness in the sum of
P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in
the conjugal partnership property constitutes his hereditary
estate subject to the estate and inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from
inheritance tax, there existing no complete total reciprocity as
required in section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
nor is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines,
Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in
the determination of the net asset of the deceased Stevenson.
In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any
actually results after a recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby
denied in line with our recent decision in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St.
Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in
the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or
authorizing such payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the
National Government cannot be required to pay interest."

WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the

judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not
inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-8166

February 8, 1916

JORGE DOMALAGAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-appellant.
M. Abejuela for appellant.
Troadio Galicano for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Misamis, on the 17th of December, 1910. It was not presented to the
Supreme Court until the 11th of January 1916. Its purpose was to recover
of the defendant the sum of P516, together with damages estimated in the
sum of P350 and interest, and costs.
In support of his claim the plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November,
1909, he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms
of which he was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the
marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the
defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer, that later, in the month of August, 1910, he
completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant
the said sum of 500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or
token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said
Bonifacio Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful
wedlock to Laureano Sisi; that immediately upon learning of the marriage
of Bonifacia Bolifer he demanded of the defendant the return of the said
sum of P516 together with the interest and damages; that the damages
which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum
of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located
in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.
To the complaint the defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged
that the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
Upon the issue presented the cause was brought on for trial. After hearing
the evidence the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, in an extended
opinion in which all of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause is
carefully analyzed reached the conclusion "of fact that plaintiff delivered to
defendant the sum of P516 sued for and that Carlos Bolifer and Laureana
Loquero received and did not return the said amount," and for the reason
that the evidence did not sufficiently show that the plaintiff had suffered
any additional damages, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant in said sum of P516 together with the interest at the
rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910, and costs.
From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court and made the
following assignments of error:
1. In holding to be proven the fact of the delivery by the plaintiff of the
sum of P516 to the defendant, Carlos Bolifer; and
2. In holding to be valid and effective the verbal contract entered into by
the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage.
The first assignment of error presents a question of fact. The lower court
found that a large preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff
had delivered to the defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the
manner alleged in the complaint. Taking into consideration that the lower
court saw and heard the witnesses, together with the further fact that
there is an abundance of uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of
the lower court, we are not inclined to disturb its judgment for any of the
reasons given by the appellant in support of his first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant calls our
attention to the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Action. The appellant argues that by virtue of the
provisions of said paragraph and by virtue of the fact that the agreement
upon which the plaintiff relies and under which he paid to the defendant
the sum of P516 had not been reduced to writing, he could therefore not
recover. The appellant contends that a contract, such as the one relied
upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing. We
have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial
of the cause objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the
plaintiff which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged
contract. That part of said section 335 which the appellant relies upon for
relief provides:
In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can
not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its
contents:
1. . . .
2. . . .
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than
a mutual promise to marry.
It will be noted, by reference to said section, that "evidence " of the
agreement referred to "can not be received without the writing or
secondary evidence of its contents." As was said above all of the
"evidence" relating to said "agreement" was admitted without the slightest
objection.

Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be
valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove
it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action
unless the same is evidence by some note or memorandum. Said section
simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may
be proved. It does not declare that said contract are invalid, which have not
been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5
of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even
though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in
confirmity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper
objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to
prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver
of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of
the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to
support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be
proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the
parties as if it had been reduced to writing. (Anson on Contracts, p. 75;
Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387; Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20
Phil. Rep., 241, 246; Kuenzle and Streiff vs. Joingco, 22 Phil. Rep., 110, 112;
Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil. Rep., 485, 489.)
For the foregoing reasons we find nothing in the record justifying a reversal
or modification of the judgment of the lower court based upon either
assignment of error. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-12093

June 29, 1959

ESTANISLAO SERRANO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MELCHOR SOLOMON, defendant-appellee.
Constante Pimentel for appellant.
Faustino B. Tobia, Eufrecino T. Tagayana, Pedro R. Arce and Emmanuel U.
Ujano for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Estanislao Serrano is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, Judge Jose G. Bautista presiding, declaring null and void the
supposed donation propter nuptias on which his complaint was based and
dismissing the later upon motion of the defendant. The motion for
dismissal was filed before the hearing but the trial court deferred action
upon it until after submission of evidence by the parties. Said parties
entered into a stipulation of facts after which they declined to submit any
other evidence except Exhibit "A", the supposed deed of donation propter
nuptias, the translation of which, for purposes of reference, is reproduced
below:
That, I Melchor Solomon, single, Filipino, of legal age, native of the
municipality of Sinait, province of Ilocos Sur and residing at present in
Sinait, having decided to get married with the consent of my parents,
brothers, or sisters and relatives, have announced and manifested my
determination and desire to Mr. Estanislao Serrano to whose family the
flower I intend to win belongs, namely Miss Alejandria Feliciano single,
born in Hawaii but is actually residing in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.
This ardent desire favored by good luck and accepted by the noble lady
the one concerned, is to be realized and complied with under
agreement or stipulation which affirms, promotes and vivifies the union.
This agreement donating all my exclusive properties in order that we
shall have a basic capital for our conjugal life and in order that there will
be ready maintenance and support of offsprings has come out
voluntarily and expontaneously from me, I the very one concerned.
These which I am donating my exclusive properties because I have
honestly acquired the same with the sweat of my brows and I donate
them gladly, to wit . . .;
The referred to properties are donated in accordance with the existing
laws of the Philippines and our children out of the wedlock will be the
ones to inherit same inherit same with equal shares. But if God will not
bless our union with any child one half of all my properties including the
properties acquired our conjugal union will be given the (to) my brothers
or sisters or their heirs if I, the husband will die before my wife and if my
beloved wife will die before me, one half of all my properties and those
acquired by us will be given to those who have reared my wife in token
of my love to her. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Alejandria Feliciano, whose father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and
who until now resides there, had been left to her father's friend named
Estanislao Serrano who took care of and raised her from the age 12 until
she reached womanhood. On June 21, 1948, defendant Melchor Solomon
married Alejandria. On the same day of the marriage but before the
marriage ceremony he executed the alleged Deed of Donation, Exhibit "A"
above reproduced. Less than nine months after marriage, or rather on
March 2, 1949, Alejandria died without issue. Several months thereafter
Estanislao Serrano commenced the present action to enforce and
implement the terms of the alleged donation particularly that portion
thereof to the effect that if Alejandria died before her husband Melchor
and left no children, then one half of Melchor's properties and those
acquired by him and his wife would be given to those persons who had
raised and taken care of her namely, Estanislao Serrano.

Acting upon the motion for dismissal the trial court found that the
donation could not be regarded as a donationpropter nuptias for the
reason that though it was executed before the marriage, it was not made in
consideration of the marriage and, what is more important, that the
donation was not made to one or both of the (marriage) contracting
parties, but to a third person.
After a careful study of the case, we fully agree with the trial court. Article
1327 of the Old Civil Code reads:
Art. 1327. Donations by reasons of marriage are those bestowed
before its celebration in consideration of the same, upon one or both
of the spouses.
This article was reproduced in the Civil Code under Article 126. Whether
we apply Article 1327 for the reason that the document Exhibit "A" was
executed in 1948 before the promulgation of the New Civil Code in 1950 or
whether we apply Article 126 of the New Civil Code the result would be the
same.
Was the donation made in considerations of the marriage between
Melchor and Alejandria or was it made consideration of the death of either
of them in the absence of any children? True, the Deed of Donation was
executed on the occasion when they married. But, the marriage in itself
was not the only consideration or condition under which terms of the
donation would be carried out. The marriage would have to be childless
and one of the spouses would have to die before the other before the
donation would operate. So, strictly, speaking, the donation may not be
regarded as one made in consideration of the marriage.
But assuming for the moment that it was made in consideration of the
marriage, still, we have the fact that the donation was being made not in
favor of Alejandria, the wife, but rather in favor of those who acted as her
parents and raised her from girlhood to womanhood in the absence of her
father. That does not place it within the provisions of Article 1327 and
Article 126 of the Old Civil Code and the New Civil Code, respectively.
Manresa, in his commentary on Article 1327 of the Civil Code says the
following:
Donations excluded are those (1) made in favor of the spouses after
the celebration of marriage; (2) executed in favor of the future spouses
but not in consideration of the marriage; and (3) granted to persons
other than the spouses even though they may be founded on the
marriage (6 M. 232).
Having come to the conclusion that the Deed of Donation does not fulfill
the requirements of a donation propter nuptias and that it might be
considered a donation inter vivos, can it be considered valid and effective?
Hardly, because it was never accepted by the donee either in the same
instrument or donation or in a separate document as required by law.
Again, may the donation be regarded a donation mortis causa, and given
effect? The answer has to be in the negative for the reason that this
Tribunal has heretofore consistently held that a donation to take effect
after the death of the donor, is equivalent to a disposition or bequest of
property by last will, an it should be executed in accordance with the
requisites and strict provisions governing the execution wills;1 and Exhibit
"A" does not fulfill said requirements. Moreover, in the present case, the
donor is still alive and naturally, even if the donation were otherwise valid,
still, the time and occasion have not arrived for considering its operation
and implementation.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

G.R. No. L-27939

October 30, 1928

FORTUNATA SOLIS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAXIMA BARROSO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Mabanag and Primicias, Emiliano A. Ramos and Eugenio S. Estayo for
appellants.
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for appellee.
AVANCEA, C. J.:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three children
named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919 said spouses
made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands described in the complaint
in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private
document (Exhibit A) in consideration of the marriage which the latter
were about to enter into. One of the conditions of this donation is that in
case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands thus
donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain
the other half. On the 8th of the said month of June 1919, Alejo Lambino
and Fortunata Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors
delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. On August 3, 1919
donee Alejo Lambino died. In the same year donor Juan Lambino also died.
After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of
the donated lands.
The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject
matter of this appeal, against the surviving donor Maxima Barroso and

Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the deceased donor Juan

Lambino, with their respective husbands, demanding of the defendants the
execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, transferring
one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to proceed to the
partition of the donated property and its fruits.
The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code
granting plaintiff's prayer and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of
donation in favor of the plaintiff, adequate in form and substance to
transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands
assigned to her in the original donation.
We are of the opinion that article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to
contracts, is not applicable to the present case.
We are concerned with a donation propter nuptias, which, according to
article 1328 of the Civil Code, must be governed by the rules established in
Title II, Book III of this Code, on donations (articles 618 to 656), Article 633
provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must
be made in a public instrument. This is the article applicable to
donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. The
only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so
far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then
governed by the rules on contracts (art. 622), and those which are to take
effect upon the donor's death, which are governed by the rules established
for testamentary successions (art. 620).
We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did
not create any right, since it was not made in a public instrument, and
hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court applied is not
applicable thereto. The last named article provides that, should the law
require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order
to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may
compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that
consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the
contract exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is
inapplicable to the donation in question which must be governed by the
rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that this article
presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to
the form required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather
to that required simply to make it effective, and for this reason, it would, at
all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein the form is
required precisely to make it valid. 1awph!l.net
But the lower court states in its judgment that the present donation is
onerous, and pursuant to article 622 of the Civil Code must be governed by
the rules on contracts. This opinion is not well founded. Donations for
valuable consideration, as may be inferred from article 619 of the Civil
Code, are such as compensate services which constitute debts recoverable
from the donor, or which impose a charge equal to the amount of the
donation upon the donee, neither of which is true of the present donation,
which was made only in consideration of marriage. The lower court insists
that, by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the
marriage as a consideration, and must be considered onerous. Neither is
this opinion well founded. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is
really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth
to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from article 1333, which
makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the
revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted that there may be a
valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since that which
has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be
forever valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for
revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse of the
statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a
donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such,
presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or
revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendants are hereby
absolved from the complaint, without special pronouncement of costs. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-26270

October 30, 1969

BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.
Pedro P. Tuason for petitioners.
Isaiah Asuncion for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (In CAG.R. Nos. 30064-R and 30065-R), raising as only issue the correctness of the
appellate court's reduction of a donation propter nuptias, for being
inofficious.
The established facts of this case are as follows:
Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land
situated in Asingan, Pangasinan, referred to as Lot No. 998, with an area of
11,080 sq.m., more or less and covered by O.C.T. No. 362; Lot No. 6541,
with an area of 808 sq.m., more or less, covered by O.C.T. No. 6618; and

Lot No. 5106, with an area of 3,303 sq.m., covered by O.C.T. No. 8137.
Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public
instrument, donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in
consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage
was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took
possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the
donor's name.
In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her
infant daughter lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then
undertook the farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the start,
Cipriano Lagua was giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest
from the land. In 1926, however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share,
thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of
Asingan, Pangasinan, from where she obtained a judgment awarding to her
possession of the two lots plus damages.
On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed of sale of the same two
parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. This sale
notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner's
share of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only
then that Bonifacia Mateo learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-inlaw, who had the sale in his favor registered only on 22 September 1955.
As a consequence, TCT Nos. 19152 and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan were issued to Gervasio.
Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, assisted by her husband, Luis
Alcantara, went to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No.
T-339), seeking annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua
and for recovery of possession of the properties. On 3 January 1957,
judgment was rendered in the case
... declaring the sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of the other
defendants, Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero, as null and void and
non-existent; ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 19152 and
19153; condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs the sum of P200.00; ordering the defendants Gervasio Lagua
and Sotera Lagua to vacate and deliver the possession over the two
parcels of land to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs of this suit.
The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter,
Anatalia Lagua, were installed in possession of the land.
On 18 August 1957, the spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero
commenced in the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, an
action against Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter for reimbursement of the
improvements allegedly made by them on Lots 998 and 6541, plus
damages. Dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court for being barred by
the judgment in Civil Case No. T-339, therein plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. T-433. At about the same time, another case was filed, this time
by Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, for annulment of the donation of
the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned (civil Case
No. T-442). It was their claim that in donating the two lots, which allegedly
were all that plaintiff Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff not only
neglected leaving something for his own support but also prejudiced the
legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.
Being intimately related, the two cases were heard jointly. On November
12, 1958, while the cases were pending final resolution, plaintiff Cipriano
Lagua died. On 23 December 1960, the court rendered a single decision
dismissing Civil Case No. T-433 for lack of cause of action, plaintiffs spouses
Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero having been declared possessors in
bad faith in Civil Case No. T-339 and, therefore, not entitled to any
reimbursement of the expenses and improvements put up by them on the
land. The other suit, Civil Case No. T-442, was, likewise, dismissed on the
ground of prescription, the action to annul the donation having been
brought only in 1958, or after the lapse of 41 years. Defendants'
counterclaims were similarly dismissed although they were awarded
attorneys' fees in the sum of P150.00.
Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos.
30064 and 30065-R). Said tribunal, on 18 March 1966, affirmed the ruling
of the trial court in Civil Case No. T-433 denying plaintiffs' claim for
reimbursement of the improvements said to have been made on the land.
In regard to the annulment case (C.F.I. No. T-442), however, the Court of
Appeals held that the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a
combined area of 11,888 square meters execeeded by 494.75 square
meters his (Alejandro's) legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano
Lagua could have freely given by will, and, to the same extent prejudiced
the legitime of Cipriano's other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation was
thus declared inofficious, and defendants-appellees were ordered to
reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of 494.15 square meters to
be taken from any convenient part of the lots. The award of attorneys' fees
to the defendants was also eliminated for lack of proper basis.
Bonifacia Mateo, et al., then resorted to this Court, assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it ordered them to reconvey a portion of
the lots to herein respondent Gervasio Lagua. It is petitioners' contention
that (1) the validity of the donation proper nuptias having been finally
determined in Civil Case No. T-339, any question in derogation of said
validity is already barred; (2) that the action to annul the donation, filed in
1958, or 41 years after its execution, is abated by prescription; (3) that a

donation proper nuptias is revocable only for any of the grounds

enumerated in Article 132 of the new Civil Code, and inofficiousness is not
one of thorn; and (4) that in determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers
in the hereditary estate of Cipriano Lagua, the Court of Appeals should
have applied the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889, and not Article 888 of
the new Civil Code.
Petitioners' first two assigned errors, it may be stated, are non-contentious
issues that have no bearing in the actual controversy in this case. All of
them refer to the validity of the donation a matter which was
definitively settled in Civil Case No. T-339 and which, precisely, was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be "beyond the realm of judicial
inquiry." In reality, the only question this case presents is whether or not
the Court of Appeals acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the
donation for being inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to
reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 squaremeter portion of the donated lots.
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not
one exclusively for annulment or revocation of the entire donation, but of
merely that portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime of
respondent Gervasio Lagua;1 that the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's
legitime, having accrued only upon the death of his father on 12 November
1958, the dispute has to be governed by the pertinent provisions of the
new Civil Code; and that a donation proper nuptias property may be
reduced for being inofficious. Contrary to the views of appellants
(petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without
onerous consideration, the marriage being merely
the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities,
they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's
death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2
It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under review,
the Court of Appeals acted on several unsupported assumptions: that the
three (3) lots mentioned in the decision (Nos. 998, 5106 and 6541) were
theonly properties composing the net hereditary estate of the deceased
Cipriano Lagua; that Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only
legal heirs; that the deceased left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for
which the estate would be answerable.3 In the computation of the heirs'
legitime, the Court of Appeals also considered only the area, not the value,
of the properties.
The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article
908 the new Civil Code specifically provides as follows:
ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the
death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts, and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he
made them.
In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting an
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined,
the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being
inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as
legitime in the properties of the donor.4 In the present case, it can hardly
be said that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position
to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order
its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, insofar as Civil Case No. 442 of the court a quo is concerned, is
hereby set aside and the trial court's order of dismissal sustained, without
prejudice to the parties' litigating the issue of inofficiousness in a proper
proceeding, giving due notice to all persons interested in the estate of the
late Cipriano Lagua. Without costs.

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

and wife between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and
later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the
deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That
the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of selfadjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations
of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A
1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If
the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor
que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together
as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted
that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks
to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such
donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone
of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the
donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between
him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28.
1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving
sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are
called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff,
now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila
Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court,
after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to
the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as
noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was
appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate
response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a
donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is
"null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
plaintiffs complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by
Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under
the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand
did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956
and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the
defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate:
(1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2)
That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor
of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3)
That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect
immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to
plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133
of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage.
When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the
defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena
were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became
spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the
deed of donation had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers
as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals
decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the
old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to]
the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit
of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over
the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist,
lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.
So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and
morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above
pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It
would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should
not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where
the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of
the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed
objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley
debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus
disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in
the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing
the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared
void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court
for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-12707

August 10, 1918

MRS. HENRY E. HARDING, and her husband, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Lawrence & Ross for appellant.
Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for appellees.
FISHER, J.:

This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of

P3,000 and interest, alleged to be due under the terms of a policy of
insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount
demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the defendant
appeals.
The court below stated the issues made by the pleadings in this case, and
its finding of fact, as follows:
It is alleged by plaintiffs and admitted by defendant that plaintiffs are
husband and wife and residents of the city of Manila; that the defendant
is a foreign corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of Great Britain and duly registered in the Philippine Islands,
and Smith, Bell & Co. (limited), a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its principal domicile in the
city of Manila, is the agent in the Philippine Islands of said defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 1916, the plaintiff Mrs. Henry
E. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile, registered
number 2063, in the city of Manila; that on said date; in consideration of
the payment to the defendant of the premium of P150, by said plaintiff,
Mrs. Henry E. Harding, with the consent of her husband, the defendant
by its duly authorized agent, Smith, Bell & Company (limited), made its
policy of insurance in writing upon said automobile was set forth in said
policy to be P3,000 that the value of said automobile was set forth in
said policy (Exhibit A) to be P3,000; that on March 24, 1916, said
automobile was totally destroyed by fire; that the loss thereby to
plaintiffs was the sum of P3,000; that thereafter, within the period
mentioned in the said policy of insurance, the plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E.
Harding, furnished the defendant the proofs of her said loss and
interest, and otherwise performed all the conditions of said policy on
her part, and that the defendant has not paid said loss nor any part
thereof, although due demand was made upon defendant therefor.
The defendant, by its answer, admitted the allegations of the residence
and status of the parties and denied all the other allegation of the said
complaint, and for a separate and affirmative defense alleged (1) that on
February 17, 1916, at the city of Manila, P.I. the defendant upon request
of plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, issued to the said plaintiff the policy
of insurance on an automobile alleged by the said plaintiff to be her
property; that the said request for the issuance of said policy of
insurance was made by means of a proposal in writing signed and
delivered by said plaintiff to the defendant, guaranteeing the truth of
the statements contained therein which said proposal is referred to in
the said policy of insurance made a part thereof; (2) that certain of the
statements and representations contained in said proposal and
warranted by said plaintiff to be true, to wit: (a) the price paid by the
proposer for the said automobile; (b) the value of said automobile at the
time of the execution and delivery of the said proposal and (c) the
ownership of said automobile, were false and known to be false by the
said plaintiff at the time of signing and delivering the said proposal and
were made for the purpose of misleading and deceiving the defendant,
and inducing the defendant, relying upon the warranties, statements,
and representations contained in the said proposal and believing the
same to be true, issued the said policy of insurance.
The defendant prays that judgment be entered declaring the said policy
of insurance to be null and void, and that plaintiffs take nothing by this
action; and for such further relief as to the court may seem just and
equitable.
The evidence in this case shows that some time in the year 1913 Levy
Hermanos, the Manila agents for the Studebaker automobile, sold the
automobile No. 2063 to John Canson for P3,200 (testimony of Mr.
Diehl); that under date of October 14, 1914, John Canson sold the said
automobile to Henry Harding for the sum of P1,500 (Exhibit 2); that
under date of November 19, 1914, the said Henry Harding sold the said
automobile No. 2063 to J. Brannigan, of Los Baos, Province of Laguna,
P.I., for the sum of P2,000 (Exhibit 3); that under date of December 20,
1915, J. C. Graham of Los Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., sold the said
automobile No. 2063 to Henry Harding of the city of Manila for the sum
of P2,800 (Exhibit 4 and testimony of J. C. Graham); that on or about
January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave the said automobile to his
wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding, one of the plaintiffs, as a present; that said
automobile was repaired and repainted at the Luneta Garage at a cost of
some P900 (testimony of Mr. Server); that while the said automobile
was at the Luneta Garage; the said Luneta Garage, acting as agent for
Smith, Bell & Company, (limited), solicited of the plaintiff Mrs. Harding
the insurance of said automobile by the defendant Company (testimony
of Mrs. Henry Harding and Mr. Server); that a proposal was filled out by
the said agent and signed by the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding, and in
said proposal under the heading "Price paid by proposer," is the amount
of "3,500" and under another heading "Present value" is the amount of
"3,000" (Exhibit 1).
The evidence tends to show that after the said proposal was made a
representative of the Manila agent of defendant went to the Luneta
Garage and examined said automobile No. 2063 and Mr. Server, the
General Manager of the Luneta Garage, an experienced automobile
mechanic, testified that at the time this automobile was insured it was
worth about P3,000, and the defendant, by and through its said agent
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), thereafter issued a policy of insurance

upon proposal in which policy the said automobile was described as of

the "present value" of P3,000 and the said defendant charged the said
plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding as premium on said policy the sum of
P150, or 5 per cent of the then estimated value of P3,000. (Exhibit A.)
The "Schedule" in said policy of insurance describes the
automobile here in question, and provides in part of follows:
"Now it is hereby agreed as follows:
"That during the period above set forth and during any period for
which the company may agree to renew this policy the company
will subject to the exception and conditions contained herein or
endorsed hereon indemnify the insured against loss of or damage
to any motor car described in the schedule hereto (including
accessories) by whatever cause such loss or damage may be
occasioned and will further indemnify the insured up to the value
of the car or P3,000 whichever is the greater against any claim at
common law made by any person (not being a person in the said
motor car nor in the insured's service) for loss of life or for
accidental bodily injury or damage to property caused by the said
motor car including law costs payable in connection with such
claim when incurred with the consent of the company."
The evidence further shows that on March 24, 1916, the said
automobile was totally destroyed by fire, and that the iron and steel
portions of said automobile which did not burn were taken into the
possession of the defendant by and through its agent Smith, Bell &
Company (limited), and sold by it for a small sum, which had never been
tendered to the plaintiff prior to the trial of this case, but in open court
during the trial the sum of P10 as the proceeds of such sale was
tendered to plaintiff and refused.
Upon the facts so found, which we hold are supported by the evidence, the
trial judge decided that there was no proof of fraud on the part of plaintiff
in her statement of the value of the automobile, or with respect to its
ownership; that she had an insurable interest therein; and that defendant,
having agreed to the estimated value, P3,000, and having insured the
automobile for that amount, upon the basis of which the premium was
paid, is bound by it and must pay the loss in accordance with the stipulated
insured value. The assignments of error made on behalf of appellant put in
issue the correctness of those conclusions of law, and some others of
minor importance relating to the exclusion of evidence. Disposing of the
minor objections first, as we have reached the conclusion that the trial
court was right in holding that the defendant is bound by the estimated
value of the automobile upon which policy was issued, and that the
plaintiff was not guilty of fraud in regard thereto, the exclusion of the
testimony of the witness Diehl is without importance. It merely tended to
show the alleged actual value of the automobile, and in the view we take of
the case such evidence was irrelevant.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile
at the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable
interest in it. The court below found that the automobile was given to
plaintiff by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in
question. Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this finding, but
contends that the gift was void, citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which
provides that "All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of
the family are not included in this rule."
We are of the opinion that this contention is without merit. In the case of
Cook vs. McMicking 27 Phil. Rep., 10), this court said:
It is claimed by the appellants that the so-called transfer from plaintiff's
husband to her was completely void under article 1458 of the Civil Code
and that, therefore, the property still remains the property of Edward
Cook and subject to levy under execution against him.
In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They are
not in a position to challenge the validity of the transfer, if it may be
called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the
transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate,
present, remote, or otherwise, in the property in question at the time
the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from husband to wife
or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to, such
prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself that
such transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a
relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked.
Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a
defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question
does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say, as a
matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not
a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the
circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is disclosed by the record.
Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the
automobile was a warranty, that the statement was false, and that,
therefore, the policy never attached to the risk. We are of the opinion that
it has not been shown by the evidence that the statement was false on
the contrary we believe that it shows that the automobile had in fact cost
more than the amount mentioned. The court below found, and the
evidence shows, that the automobile was bought by plaintiff's husband a

few weeks before the issuance of the policy in question for the sum of
P2,800, and that between that time and the issuance of the policy some
P900 was spent upon it in repairs and repainting. The witness Server, an
expert automobile mechanic, testified that the automobile was practically
as good as new at the time the insurance was effected. The form of
proposal upon which the policy was issued does not call for a statement
regarding the value of the automobile at the time of its acquisition by the
applicant for the insurance, but merely a statement of its cost. The amount
stated was less than the actual outlay which the automobile represented to
Mr. Harding, including repairs, when the insurance policy was issued. It is
true that the printed form calls for a statement of the "price paid by the
proposer," but we are of the opinion that it would be unfair to hold the
policy void simply because the outlay represented by the automobile was
made by the plaintiff's husband and not by his wife, to whom he had given
the automobile. It cannot be assumed that defendant should not have
issued the policy unless it were strictly true that the price representing the
cost of the machine had been paid by the insured and by no other
person that it would no event insure an automobile acquired by gift,
inheritance, exchange, or any other title not requiring the owner to make a
specific cash outlay for its acquisition.

Wis., 241; Davenport vs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276.) An insurance company,
establishing a local agency, must be held responsible to the parties with
whom they transact business, for the acts and declarations of the agent,
within the scope of his employment, as if they proceeded from the
principal. (Sav. Bk. vs. Ins. Co., 31 Conn., 517; Hortwitz vs. Ins. Co., 40
Mo., 557; Ayres vs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 176; Howard Ins. Co. vs. Bruner, 23
Pa., 50.)

Furthermore, the court below found and the evidence shows, without
dispute, that the proposal upon which the policy in question was issued
was made out by defendant's agent by whom the insurance was solicited,
and that appellee simply signed the same. It also appears that an examiner
employed by the defendant made an inspection of the automobile before
the acceptance of the risk, and that the sum after this examination. The
trial court found that Mrs. Harding, in fixing the value of the automobile at
P3,000, acted upon information given her by her husband and by Mr.
Server, the manager of the Luneta Garage. The Luneta Garage, it will be
remembered, was the agent of the defendant corporation in the
solicitation of the insurance. Mrs. Harding did not state of her own
knowledge that the automobile originally cost P3,000, or that its value at
the time of the insurance was P3,000. She merely repeated the information
which had been given her by her husband, and at the same time disclosed
to defendant's agent the source of her information. There is no evidence to
sustain the contention that this communication was made in bad faith. It
appears that the statements in the proposal as to the price paid for the
automobile and as to its value were written by Mr. Quimby who solicited
the insurance on behalf of defendant, in his capacity as an employee of the
Luneta Garage, and wrote out the proposal for Mrs. Harding to sign. Under
these circumstances, we do not think that the facts stated in the proposal
can be held as a warranty of the insured, even if it should have been shown
that they were incorrect in the absence of proof of willful misstatement.
Under such circumstance, the proposal is to be regarded as the act of the
insurer and not of the insured. This question was considered in the case of
the Union Insurance Company vs. Wilkinson (13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617),
in which the Supreme Court of the United States said:

The modern decisions fully sustain this proposition, and they seem to us
founded on reason and justice, and meet our entire approval. This
principle does not admit oral testimony to vary or contradict that which
is in writing, but it goes upon the idea that the writing offered in
evidence was not the instrument of the party whose name is signed to
it; that it was procured under such circumstances by the other side as
estops that side from using it or relying on its contents; not that it may
be contradicted by oral testimony, but that it may be shown by such
testimony that it cannot be lawfully used against the party whose name
is signed to it. (See also Am. Life Ins. Co. vs. Mahone, 21 Wallace, 152.)

This question has been decided differently by courts of the highest

respectability in cases precisely analogous to the present. It is not to be
denied that the application logically considered, is the work of the
assured, and if left to himself or to such assistance as he might select,
the person so selected would be his agent, and he alone would be
responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known, so well that no court
would be justified in shutting its eyes to it, that insurance companies
organized under the laws of one State, and having in that State their
principal business office, send these agents all over the land, with
directions to solicit and procure applications for policies furnishing them
with printed arguments in favor of the value and necessity of life
insurance, and of the special advantages of the corporation which the
agent represents. They pay these agents large commissions on the
premiums thus obtained, and the policies are delivered at their hands to
the assured. The agents are stimulated by letters and instructions to
activity in procuring contracts, and the party who is in this manner
induced to take out a policy, rarely sees or knows anything about the
company or its officers by whom it is issued, but looks to and relies upon
the agent who has persuaded him to effect insurance as the full and
complete representative of the company, in all that is said or done in
making the contract. Has he not a right to so regard him? It is quite true
that the reports of judicial decisions are filled with the efforts of these
companies, by their counsel, to establish the doctrine for the acts of
these agents to the simple receipt of the premium and delivery of the
policy, the argument being that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is
the agent of the assured. This proposition is not without support in
some of the earlier decision on the subject; and, at a time when
insurance companies waited for parties to come to them to seek
assurance, or to forward applications on their own motion, the doctrine
had a reasonable foundation to rest upon. But to apply such a doctrine,
in its full force, to the system of selling policies through agents, which
we have described, would be a snare and a delusion, leading, as it has
done in numerous instances, to the grossest frauds, of which the
insurance corporations receive the benefits, and the parties supposing
themselves insured are the victims. The tendency of the modern
decisions in this country is steadily in the opposite direction. The powers
of the agent are, prima facie, co-extensive with the business intrusted to
his care, and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to
the person with whom he deals. (Bebee vs. Ins. Co., 25 Conn., 51;
Lycoming Ins. Co. vs. Schoolenberger, 44 Pa., 259; Bealvs. Ins. Co., 16

In the fifth edition of American Leading Cases, 917, after a full

consideration of the authorities, it is said:
"By the interested or officious zeal of the agents employed by the
insurance companies in the wish to outbid each other and procure
customers, they not unfrequently mislead the insured, by a false or
erroneous statement of what the application should contain; or,
taking the preparation of it into their own hands, procure his
signature by an assurance that it is properly drawn, and will meet the
requirements of the policy. The better opinion seems to be that,
when this course is pursued, the description of the risk should,
though nominally proceeding from the insured, be regarded as the
act of the insurers." (Rowley vs. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N.Y., 550.)

The defendant, upon the information given by plaintiff, and after an

inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was
worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part
of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent
matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of
all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such
estimated value. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of the First National Bank vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (5 Otto,
673; 24 L. ed., 563), at. p. 565 of the Lawyers Edition:
The ordinary test of the value of property is the price it will commend in
the market if offered for sale. But that test cannot, in the very nature of
the case, be applied at the time application is made for insurance. Men
may honestly differ about the value of property, or as to what it will
bring in the market; and such differences are often very marked among
those whose special business it is to buy and sell property of all kinds.
The assured could do no more than estimate such value; and that, it
seems, was all that he was required to do in this case. His duty was to
deal fairly with the Company in making such estimate. The special
finding shows that he discharged that duty and observed good faith. We
shall not presume that the Company, after requiring the assured in his
application to give the "estimated value," and then to covenant that he
had stated all material facts in regard to such value, so far as known to
him, and after carrying that covenant, by express words, into the written
contract, intended to abandon the theory upon which it sought the
contract, and make the absolute correctness of such estimated value a
condition precedent to any insurance whatever. The application, with its
covenant and stipulations, having been made a part of the policy, that
presumption cannot be indulged without imputing to the Company a
purpose, by studied intricacy or an ingenious framing of the policy, to
entrap the assured into incurring obligations which, perhaps, he had no
thought of assuming.
Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that "the effect
of a valuation in a policy of fire insurance is the same as in a policy of
marine insurance."
By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy of
marine insurance is conclusive if the insured had an insurable interest and
was not guilty of fraud.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of
the automobile in question and had an insurable interest therein; that
there was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the
valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding
upon the defendant corporation, and that the judgment of the court below
is, therefore, correct and must be affirmed, with interest, the costs of this
appeal to be paid by the appellant. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 106060. June 21, 1999]

EMILIE T. SUMBAD and BEATRICE B. TAIT, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, EDUARD OKOREN, OLIVIA T. AKOKING, EVELYN W. SACLANGEN,
assisted by her husband Julio Saclangen, MARY ATIWAG assisted by her
husband Arthur Atiwag, JAIME T. FRONDA, BARBARA TALLONGEN, JULIA
PIYES, assisted by her husband Edward Piyes, GLEN PAQUITO and
FELICITAS ALINAO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,

Fifth Division, dated May 28, 1992, in CA-G.R. CV No. 32711, affirming, with
modification, the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain
Province, Branch 36, of a complaint for quieting of title, annulment of sale,
and recovery of possession filed by petitioners against private respondents.
The facts are as follows:
After the death of his wife, Agata B. Tait, in 1936, George K. Tait, Sr.
lived in common-law relationship with Maria F. Tait to whom on April 2, 1974
he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc,
more particularly described as follows:
One (1) parcel of unregistered agricultural land situated in sitio Sumat,
Bontoc, Mt. Province, bounded on the North by Sumat Creek and the rice
field of Inginga Limayog, East by the Hospital Reservation of Bontoc and the
lots of Agustin Ututan and Inginga, South by a Foot Trail and West by the
Roman Catholic Mission, Pakeopan and the rice fields of Narding and Pappi,
previously declared under Tax Dec. No. 6000 of Bontoc, Mt. Province;[2]
George K. Tait, Sr. himself passed away on December 24, 1977. From
1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in
favor of private respondents Eduard Okoren, Gregorio Acoking, Evelyn
Saclangan, Mary Atiwag, Jaime T. Fronda, Barbara Tallongen, Julia Piyes,
Glen Paquito, and Felicitas Alinao. Private respondents purchased the lots
on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the
seller, Maria F. Tait, to be the owner of the property in question and
thereafter planted different kinds of fruit trees and plants on the lots
purchased by them.
On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and Beatrice B. Tait
brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and
recovery of possession with damages against private respondents. They
alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs of the spouses
George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait of Bondoc, Mountain Province; that said
spouses died on December 24, 1977 and April 30, 1936, respectively; that
said spouses owned real property in Otucan, Bauko, Mountain Province; and
that after the death of their mother, their father George K. Tait, Sr. sold the
Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot
in Sum-at, Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Petitioners further alleged that from 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait,
without their knowledge and consent, sold lots included within the Sum-at
property to private respondents; that prior to the sales transactions, private
respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria
F. Tait but to the heirs of George K. Tait, Sr.; that this notwithstanding,
private respondents proceeded to purchase the lots in question from Maria
F. Tait; that Maria F. Tait had no right to sell the Sum-at property; that the
deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private
respondents; that petitioners discovered the transactions only in 1988 but,
as soon as they learned of the same, they lost no time in communicating
with private respondents; and that private respondents refused petitioners
request for a meeting, leaving the latter no other alternative but to file the
case in court.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, but their
motion was denied by the trial court in its Order, dated September 26,
1989.[3] They then filed their answer in which they denied they had been
informed of petitioners claim of ownership of the lots. They also denied that
petitioners learned of the sales to them only in 1988. They alleged that the
Sum-at property, covered by Tax Declaration No. 399, did not belong to the
conjugal partnership of George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait for the reason
that the latter died more than thirty (30) years before the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 399 in 1973; that the late Maria F. Tait, second wife of
George K. Tait, Sr., did not need the consent of petitioners to be able to sell
the Sum-at property to private respondents; that private respondents were
purchasers in good faith and for value; that the action was barred by laches;
that they were in possession of the lots and had introduced improvements
thereon; and that they had separate tax declarations covering their
respective lots. As a compulsory counterclaim, private respondents prayed
that petitioners be ordered to pay P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000 as
attorneys fees to each private respondent, the appearance fees, and costs.
On November 21, 1989, the trial court issued a pre-trial order stating
the parties stipulation of facts, as well as the factual and legal issues, as
follows:
B. Stipulations or Admissions of the Parties:
1. Plaintiffs admit the following:
a. That Agata Banagui Tait died on April 30, 1936;
b. That the property in issue was bought by George Tait after the death of
Agata Banagui Tait;
c. That a deed of donation was executed by George Tait in favor of Maria
with the land in dispute as the subject matter thereof;
d. That deeds of sale of the property in question were executed in favor of
the defendants by Maria Tait in 1984;
e. That Maria Tait died in 1988.
2. . . . .
C. Issues Involved:
1. Factual:

a. Whether or not George Tait and Agata Banagui Tait owned and sold a lot
at Otucan, Bauko, Mt. Province and the proceeds thereof used in buying
the property in dispute;
b. Whether or not Maria Tait sold the lot in issue to the defendants without
the knowledge of the plaintiffs;
c. Whether or not defendants before buying the land were forewarned of
its controversial status;
d. Whether or not plaintiffs only recently discovered the sale made by
Maria Tait to the defendants.
1. Legal:
a. Whether or not plaintiffs are the compulsory heirs of the deceased
George Tait and Agata Banagui Tait;
b. Whether or not the property covered by TD 399 and the subject hereof
was owned by George Tait and Agata Banaga Tait;
c. Whether or not the deed of donation executed by George Tait in favor of
Maria Tait is valid and effective;
d. Whether or not the sale made by Maria Tait to the defendants is valid
and effective;
e. Whether or not defendants are buyers in good faith;
f. Whether or not laches barred the claim of the plaintiffs.[4]
Realizing that the pre-trial order included their admission that a deed
of donation was executed by George K. Tait, Sr. in favor of Maria F. Tait of
the Sum-at property, petitioners subsequently moved for the inclusion as
one of the factual issues the alleged forgery of the deed of donation. The
Court did not act on petitioners motion. However, petitioners were allowed
to present evidence on the alleged forgery without objection by the private
respondents.
On April 3, 1990, the trial court, on motion of petitioners, authorized
the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Baguio City to take
the deposition of one of petitioners witnesses, Shirley Eillinger.
During the trial, petitioners presented the following as witnesses:
Beatrice B. Tait, Dalino Pio, Rosita Aclipen, and Atty. Angela D. Papa.
Petitioner Beatrice B. Tait, a 60-year-old missionary nun and resident
of Capangan, Benguet, testified that she and co-plaintiff Emilie T. Sumbad
are sisters; that their parents are George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Sumbad;
that the late Maria F. Tait was their stepmother; that Maria F. Tait became
their stepmother some time in 1941; that her parents had a property in Sumat but it was sold; that her parents had a property in Otucan; and that she
did not know what happened to the said property although she thought that
her parents sold it in order to purchase the Sum-at property.[5]
On cross-examination, petitioner Beatrice Tait testified that her
mother, Agata B. Tait, died in 1936; that she lived with her parents in Otucan
from 1940 to 1941; and that the house at Sum-at was occupied by her
grandmother (her stepmothers mother).[6]
Dalino Pio, a 60 year-old farmer and resident of Payag-eo, testified
that Agata B. Tait was her sister and George K. Tait, Sr. was the latters
husband; that George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait lived in Otucan; that Agata
B. Tait inherited the Otucan property from their father; that George K. Tait
moved to Bontoc at a place near the market; and that the spouses sold the
Otucan property and afterwards purchased the Sum-at property.[7]
On cross-examination, Dalino Pio said that at the time that George K.
Tait, Sr. sold the Otucan property, Agata B. Tait was already dead; that she
does not know Maria F. Tait; that she did not personally see the Sum-at
property; and that her sole basis for saying that George K. Tait, Sr. had used
the proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property to purchase the property at
Sum-at was what George K. Tait related to her.[8]
Lanoy Takayeng, a farmer, testified that she knew the late George K.
Tait, Sr.; that she also knew someone named Fani-is; that George K. Tait, Sr.
gave money to Fani-is for the purchase of the Sum-at property; that she does
not know the exact amount given by George K. Tait, Sr. to Fani-is; that also
present during that meeting were three (3) other persons named Samoki,
Amok, and Aclipen; and that George K. Tait, Sr. afterwards planted coffee
and orange trees on the Sum-at property and built a house thereon.[9]
On cross-examination, Lanoy Takayeng testified that George K. Tait,
Sr. was her uncle; that when George K. Tait, Sr. acquired the Sum-at
property, he was already married to Maria F. Tait; and that the money used
to purchase the Sum-at property came from the proceeds of the sale of the
house at Bauko.[10] She testified that George K. Tait, Sr. was an educated man
and a former member of Congress.[11]
Rosita Aclipen, a 48-year-old housewife and resident of Bontoc,
testified that she knew the private respondents; that she sent a letter to
private respondents on May 30, 1989; that she was instructed by petitioners
to send the letter to private respondents; and that the letter was prepared
and signed by petitioners lawyer.[12]
Atty. Angela D. Papa testified that she had been the register of deeds
of Bontoc since February 16, 1987; that as such, she was in charge of keeping
records of all documents relating to the registration of real property,
instruments, and mortgages; that she did not recall receiving a letter from
Emilie T. Sumbad; and that she issued a certification, marked as Exhibit F, to
the effect that no deeds of sale between Maria F. Tait and Acoking, Arthur

Atiwag, Blanza, Glenn Paquito, Jaime Fronda, and Lolita Tolentino were
registered in her office.[13]

assessors office, he was only shown one tax declaration and did not ask to
be shown previous tax declarations on the Sum-at property.[21]

For their documentary evidence, petitioners presented tax

declarations covering the Sum-at property in the name of George K. Tait, Sr.;
a certification showing payment of real estate taxes made by George K. Tait,
Sr. on the property; official receipts; a certification by the register of deeds
of Bontoc that no deed of sale covering the Sum-at property was registered
in her office; a copy of the deed of donation, dated April 2, 1974; a letter,
dated May 30, 1989, addressed to private respondents; and the transcripts
of the deposition of Shirley Eillenger.[14]

Edward Okoren, a 46-year-old teacher and resident of Guina-ang,

Bontoc, testified that he purchased a lot from Maria F. Tait; that he had a tax
declaration covering the lot in his name; that the deed of sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Bontoc, Mountain Province; that after
purchasing the lot, he planted camote and constructed a stone wall thereon;
that he had never been disturbed in his possession until the present; that he
paid real estate taxes on the lot; and that he was asked to attend a
conference with petitioners but he declined because he was busy.[22]

In her deposition, Shirley Eillinger stated that she knew Beatrice B.

Tait and Emilie T. Sumbad, daughters of the late George K. Tait, Sr.; that she
personally knew George K. Tait, Sr.; that she also knew a person named
Raquel Tait who had been her boardmate at the Perpetual Help Dormitory
in Baguio City when the witness was in the third year of her college
education; that Raquel Tait was George K. Tait, Sr.s ward; that she saw a
Deed of Donation regarding the Sum-at property and other documents
containing the signature of George K. Tait, Sr.; and that she was able to read
the contents of the Deed of Donation. She identified Exhibit I as a carbon
copy of the document she referred to. She further testified that in 1979 or
1980 she saw Raquel type the Deed of Donation at the Perpetual Help
Dormitory; that George K. Tait, Sr. was already dead at that time, having died
in 1976 when the witness was a third year high school student; that she saw
Raquel Tait forge the signature of George K. Tait, Sr. on a piece of paper; that
Raquel herself at first tried to copy the signature of George K. Tait, Sr. on the
paper then asked other male boarders to copy the signature of George K.
Tait, Sr.; that she told Raquel Tait that it was wrong to forge the signature of
any person but Raquel Tait ignored her and told her to keep quiet; that
Raquel Tait personally signed the Deed of Donation; that Raquel Tait also
tried to forge the signature of Maria Tait; that she did not see Raquel Tait
put Maria Taits signature on the document but only saw Raquel Tait forge
Maria Taits signature on a piece of paper; and that the following day, Raquel
Tait went to Bontoc bringing with her the Deed of Donation.[15]

Private respondents presented copies of the deeds of sale executed

in their favor by Maria F. Tait as documentary evidence.

On cross-examination, this witness stated that it took Raquel about

20 to 30 minutes to type the Deed of Donation; that Raquel Tait had a form
from which she copied the Deed of Donation; that Raquel Tait did not refer
to a tax declaration in preparing the Deed of Donation; and that it took the
male boarders the entire morning, from 8 oclock until 11 oclock, to copy the
signature of George K. Tait, Sr.[16]

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

APPLYING ART. 133, NEW CIVIL CODE, (NOW ART. 87, FAMILY CODE) AND
ART. 749 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE;

On the other hand, private respondents presented the following

witnesses: Felipa Piyes, Julio Saclangen, Glenn Paquito, and Edward Okoren.

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT THE LATE MARIA FAS-ANG TAIT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO DISPOSE OF
THE LAND IN CONTROVERSY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID
NOT BELONG TO HER AND THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGED DEED OF
DONATION IN HER FAVOR IS A FORGERY AND VOID AB INITIO;

Felipa Piyes, a 61-year old businesswoman and resident of Loc-ong,

Bontoc, testified that her son is one of the lot purchasers of the Sum-at
property; that Rosita Aclipen called for her and demanded additional
payment for the lot purchased by her son; that she asked Rosita Aclipen why
additional payment was being demanded when the price of the lot had
already been fully paid to Maria F. Tait; that Emilie T. Sumbad was also
present when Rosita Aclipen demanded money from her; and that Emilie T.
Sumbad is the stepdaughter of Maria F. Tait.[17]
On cross-examination, Felipa Piyes narrated that it was her son,
Edward Piyes, who provided the money for the purchase of the Sum-at lot;
that she received a letter some time in May or June, 1989 from Rosita
Aclipen; that she affixed her signature on the letter; that during that time,
Edward, who was in Saudi Arabia, told her to purchase the lot for as long as
there was no controversy over the same; that Mrs. Tait had a tax declaration
under her name and on the faith thereof, she purchased the lot from Maria
F. Tait; that a deed of sale was executed between Maria F. Tait and Julia
Piyes, her daughter-in-law, as purchaser; that as a resident of Bontoc, she
knew George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait; that George K. Tait, Sr. was
formerly a congressman for the Mountain Province; that George K. Tait, Sr.
and Maria F. Tait lived together as husband and wife but did not have any
children; and that she knew that the petitioners are stepdaughters of Maria
F. Tait.[18]
Julio Saclangen, a resident of Omfeg, testified that a deed of sale was
also executed between him and his wife Evelyn Saclangen, on the one hand,
and Maria F. Tait, on the other; that from the records of the municipal office,
they verified that Maria F. Tait was the owner of the Sum-at property; that
they also verified from other lot purchasers that Maria F. Tait is the real
owner of the property; that after purchasing the lot, they planted camote
and banana on the lot; and that he and his wife caused the issuance of a tax
declaration in their name.[19]
Glenn Paquito, 48 years old and a resident of Chakchakan, Bontoc,
claimed that upon learning that lots were being offered for sale in Sum-at,
he verified from the municipal assessors office that the Sum-at property was
owned by Maria F. Tait; that he had a tax declaration covering the lot
purchased from Maria F. Tait; that he planted camote and papaya on the lot;
that he had been paying real estate taxes on the lot from the time he
purchased it; and that since acquiring the lot he had never been disturbed in
his possession.[20] On cross-examination, he revealed that he also received a
letter, dated May 30, 1989, from the petitioners representatives; that after
receiving the letter, a conference was held between the parties at the house
of Rosita Aclipen wherein the latter asked the purchasers for additional
payment for the purchased lots; that aside from them, other lot purchasers
were present at the conference; and that upon investigation in the municipal

On April 8, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the

complaint. The dispositive portion provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the instant action and
ordering the plaintiffs to pay each of the defendants herein P500.00 by way
of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[23]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with
the modification that the award of attorneys fees was set aside.[24] Hence,
this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors as having been allegedly
committed by the appellate court:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF MARIA TAIT AS NULL AND
VOID;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
DEEDS OF SALE TO THE DEFENDANTS AS NULL AND VOID IT HAVING
ORIGINATED FROM A VOID DOCUMENT AND TRANSACTION;

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CATEGORICAL DECLARATIONS OF SHIRLEY
EILLENGER REGARDING THE FORGERY OF THE DONATION INTER VIVOS;

6. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

DEFENDANTS OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS (UNLAWFULLY) SOLD TO THEM,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE SELLER DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT
OR AUTHORITY TO DO SO;
7. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANTS HAVE THE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PREMISES IN
QUESTION;
8. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR RIGHT OF SUCCESSION
TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
9. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO TITLE, LEGAL OWNERSHIP OR EQUITABLE, TO THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
10. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY LACHES.[25]
Petitioners contend that the deed of donation, dated April 2, 1974, is
void for the following reasons: (1) it is a forgery; (2) it was made in violation
of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of the Family Code; and (3) it was
notarized by a person who had no authority to act as a notary public. They
further contend that Maria F. Tait had no authority to sell the Sum-at
property and, therefore, the sales in favor of private respondents are null
and void; that as heirs of George K. Tait, they are entitled to the Sum-at
property; and that since they only learned of the sales transactions
sometime in 1988 when Maria F. Tait became seriously ill, they are not
barred from bringing the present action.
The petition has no merit. It is settled that factual findings of the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has overlooked or
ignored some fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance,
which, if considered, would alter the result of the case.[26] When there is no
conflict between the findings of the trial and appellate courts, a review of
the facts found by the appellate court is unnecessary.[27] In the case at bar,
even a review of the evidence fails to yield any reason for us to disregard the
factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
First. Petitioners fault both the trial and appellate courts for not giving
credence to the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of
the deed of donation. As the Court of Appeals ruled, however:
The plaintiffs assail the validity of the deed of donation in question on the
ground that it is a forgery. On this point, the plaintiffs presented a witness
who testified in a deposition taken before the Clerk of Court of the

Municipal Trial Court in Baguio City on April 11, 1990 a certain Shirley
Eillenger.
....
Remarking on this testimony of Shirley Eillenger, the trial court had said:
. . . Anent the deed of donation inter vivos the validity of which is put in
issue by plaintiffs, the deposition of Shirley Eillenger to the effect that she
personally saw one Raquel Tait draft the document and forge the signature
of George K. Tait now appearing therein is incredible and grossly
unconvincing. For considerations difficult to pin down, the statements of
the witness on the point somehow does not ring true and appear to have
been rehearsed. It is too pat to be credible.
We agree with the lower court when it said that this testimony of Eillenger
is vague and incredible. We have studied with care the deed of donation in
question and find unworthy of credence the claim of Eillenger that Raquel
Tait, who must have been a young girl about 20 years of age in 1979 or
1980 (she gave her age as 30 on April 11, 1990), could have, in 20 to 30
minutes, prepared the document in all its legal form supposedly copying
only from a format. It also taxes the mind to believe that Raquel Tait had
called the boys in the boarding house and, within the view of every one,
asked them to forge the signature of George K. Tait, Sr. and, with the boys
failing to accomplish the task, herself forged the signature not only of
George K. Tait, Sr. but also of Maria Tait in that one sitting and in that short
span of time.
The alleged forgery could have been proven with more competent
evidence, such as by handwriting experts. This, the plaintiffs failed to do. As
stated by the trial court, the validity of the public document cannot be
impugned or overcome by the testimony of the witness Eillenger.[28]
Forgery should be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and
whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.[29] Not only is Shirley
Eillengers testimony difficult to believe, it shows it had been rehearsed as
she anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel, and sometimes said
more than was called for by the question. This is illustrated by the following
portions of her testimony:
Q When you were boardmates with Raquel Tait at Perpetual Help, along
Gen. Luna, Baguio City, do you recall if you have seen any
document regarding that Sum-at property of George Tait, Sr.?
A Yes, sir, I saw it.
Q And, what document is that if you could still recall?
A I saw a Deed of Donation... and other documents where the signature
of George Tait, Sr. was written.
ATTY. SOKOKEN:
There was an Ilocano word.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
May we put it in Ilocano?
WITNESS:
A Ania daguidiay nga documento tattayen?
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q You mentioned about a Deed of Donation. Were you able to read or
see that Deed of Donation?
A Yes, sir.
Q I have here a duplicate original of a Deed of Donation Intervivos dated
April 2, 1974. Will you go over that document?
HEARING OFFICER:
Witness is going over the document handed to her by counsel.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q Have you gone over the document?
A Yes, sir.
Q What relation has that document to the Deed of Donation which you
claim to have been typewritten by Raquel Tait in your
boardinghouse at Perpetual Help, along Gen. Luna, Baguio City?
A It was the carbon copy of the Deed of Donation that Raquel Tait typed
in our boardinghouse.
Q By the way, Mrs. Witness, what year was that when you saw Raquel
Tait typewriting the Deed of Donation, if you could still recall?
A As far as I can recall, it was in the year 1979 to 1980.
Q And, at that time, do you recall where George Tait, Sr. was?
A George Tait, Sr. is already dead during that time.
Q When did George Tait, Sr. die, if you could still recall?
A As far as I can recall, he died in the year 1976 when I was in 3rd year
high school.
Q Going back to the Deed of Donation which you have just identified,
what was the condition of this document to that Deed you saw
being typewritten by Raquel Tait?
ATTY. SOKOKEN:
May we interpose an objection? The question maybe ambiguous insofar
as to the condition of the document when it was typed.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
We will reform the question, your Honor.
Q I noticed that in this Deed of Donation there are written entries as
well as signatures. At the time you saw this Deed of Donation
being typewritten by Raquel Tait, were the written entries and
signatures already there?
A The signatures were not yet there when Raquel Tait typed this Deed
of Donation. However, the following day ....
ATTY. SOKOKEN:

May we request that the question be just answered.

HEARING OFFICER:
Make it of record that there is an objection of the defendants counsel,
asking that the deponent will only answer the question asked.
....
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q After seeing the document already marked as Exh. I being typewritten
by Raquel Tait, was there any occasion wherein you have seen
again that document aside from todays hearing?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q When was that, if you can still recall?
A Last April.
ATTY. SOKOKEN:
May I manifest, Mr. Hearing Officer, that the witness is taking time to
remember the answer.
HEARING OFFICER:
Make that of record.
WITNESS:
A April 6, 1990.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q Whereat?
A At the office of Atty. Lockey.
Q And how come that you went there in the office of Atty. Lockey on
April 6, 1990?
A Atty. Lockey asked for me to go there.
Q Do you know for what purpose that you were asked to go there?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell the Court.
A To inquire about that Deed of Donation.
Q And was there really an inquiry about what was done or made in the
Office of Atty. Lockey regarding that Deed of Donation?
A Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q What else did Raquel Tait do, if any, after typewriting that Deed of
Donation in your boardinghouse at Perpetual Help?
WITNESS:
A I saw her forging the signature of George Tait, Sr. on a piece of bond
paper.
Q And how did you see her forging the signature of George Tait, sr. on
that bond paper?
A I saw her try to copy the signature of George Tait, Sr. and calling some
boys, our boardmates, to copy the signature of George Tait, Sr. in
that bond paper also.
Q From where was Raquel Tait copying the signature of George Tait, Sr.?
A In a separate document.
Q You said that Raquel Tait was also requiring the boys to copy. Did the
boys accede to the request of Raquel Tait?
A Some boys tried to forge it, but they did not follow it.
Q Seeing this situation meaning Raquel Tait trying to forge the signature
of George Tait, what step or steps did you take, if any?
A I warned her by saying that she is making kalokohan out of that Deed
of Donation.
HEARING OFFICER:
Make it of record also that the witness made use of the word kalokohan
in Filipino language. Let that term be put on record.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q And, what did Raquel Tait tell you, if any, in connection with your
comment?
A She said I will just keep quiet.
Q What else did Raquel Tait do in connection with the Deed of Donation
you have earlier identified aside from what you have already
stated, if any?
A She personally signed this one.
HEARING OFFICER:
Witness pointing to the document earlier marked as Exh. I particularly
to the signature above the typewritten name George K. Tait,
Donor.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Perhaps it would not be remiss for us to say that the signature pointed
to by the witness be encircled and be marked as Exh. I-1.
HEARING OFFICER:
Mark it.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q Aside from that, what else did she do, if any?
A She wants to try to forge the signature of Maria Tait.
Q Was she able to do it?
A Yes, sir.[30]
Petitioners should have presented handwriting experts to support
their claim that George K. Tait, Sr.s signature on the deed of donation was
indeed a forgery.
Second. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation is invalid under
Art. 749 of the Civil Code, which requires a public instrument as a requisite
for the validity of donations of immovable property. They contend that the
person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However,
petitioners have not shown this to be the case. The acknowledgment clause

states that the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court,
Gonzalo Reyes, who acted For and in the absence of the Clerk of Court. Sec.
21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270
and 641, provides:
SEC. 21. Officials authorized to administer oaths. The following officers
have general authority to administer oaths, to wit:
Notaries public; justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace; clerks of court; the Secretary of the National Assembly; bureau
directors; registers of deeds; provincial governors and lieutenantgovernors; city mayors; municipal mayors, municipal district mayors; any
other officer in the Philippine service whose appointment is vested in the
President of the Philippines, Secretary of War, or President of the United
States. A person who by authority of law shall act in the capacity of the
officers mentioned above shall possess the same power. (Emphasis
added).[31]
In accordance with the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy clerk of court who
notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by the clerk
of court.
Third. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation contravenes Art.
133 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after
the death of the donor.
Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
in view of our ruling in Matabuena v. Cervantes[32] that the prohibition in Art.
133 extends to common-law relations. Indeed, it is now provided in Art. 87
of the Family Code:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage. (Emphasis added).
This point is being raised for the first time in this Court. The records
show that in the trial court, petitioners attack on the validity of the deed of
donation centered solely on the allegation that George K. Tait, Sr.s signature
had been forged and that the person who notarized the deed had no
authority to do so. But petitioners never invoked Art. 133 of the Civil Code
as a ground to invalidate the deed of donation.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair
play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners
were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on
record does not show whether George K. Tait, Sr. was married to Maria F.
Tait and, if so, when the marriage took place. If, as petitioners claim, Maria
F. Tait was not married to their father, evidence should have been presented
to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, their father and
Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Taits
testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their
stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and
Maria F. Tait continuously maintained common-law relations until April 2,
1974 when the donation was made.
Fourth. Petitioners claim that they only learned of the sales to private
respondents of lots included in the Sum-at property in 1988 when they
visited Maria F. Tait in Bontoc because she was seriously ill.As admitted by
petitioners, their mother, Agata B. Tait, died on April 30, 1936, while their
father, George K. Tait, Sr., died on December 24, 1977.[33] Yet, petitioners
waited for twelve (12) years before claiming their inheritance, having
brought their present action only on July 24, 1989. Petitioners are thus guilty
of laches which precludes them from assailing the donation made by their
father in favor of Maria F. Tait. Laches is the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier.[34]
Finally, Lanoy Takayengs testimony that George K. Tait, Sr. gave Faniis money to purchase the Sum-at property does not necessarily mean that
the money came from the proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property. For
one, Lanoy Takayeng could not state with certainty when the alleged
meeting took place. Second, this witness could not even remember the
amount of money allegedly given by George K. Tait, Sr. to Fani-is. Third,
Takayeng did not state when the purchase supposedly took place or if the
sale was consummated in accordance with George K. Tait, Sr.s instructions. It
is anybodys guess whether George K. Taits orders were carried out by Faniis and whether George K. Tait, Sr. tapped other funds to purchase the Sumat property.
In sum, petitioners have not sufficiently shown the nullity of private
respondents title to the lots purchased by them. To the contrary, as the
Court of Appeals well observed:
The deed of donation in question was executed by their father in
1974. Assuming that the plaintiffs were not aware of the existence of said
document, as they now claim, they could not have failed to notice that the
land in question had been occupied by Maria F. Tait and later by
defendants who bought portions thereof and that said defendants,

numbering nine (9), and their families, had built their respective houses
and introduced other improvements on the portions they had purchased
from Maria F. Tait and had resided therein since 1982 and 1983. As stated
by the trial court, the plaintiffs offered no plausible excuse for their failure
to assert their rights sooner. They apparently waited until Maria F. Tait died
in 1988 before assailing the validity of the sales made by the latter in favor
of the defendants.
We believe that the defendants herein bought their respective portions
they now possess in good faith. The land is not registered under the
Torrens system and they checked with the Assessors Office and found that
the same was declared in the name of Maria F. Tait. Further, it was the said
Maria F. Tait and not the plaintiffs who was in possession thereof. The
claim of the plaintiffs that the defendants were forewarned [prior to the
sales transactions] that the property was not owned by Maria F. Tait but by
the heirs of George K. Tait, Sr. was not proven in these proceedings.
Indeed, the plaintiffs have failed in the duty to prove their allegations in
their complaint as required by the Rules of Court. We find their evidence
too inadequate to be considered as preponderantly in their favor.
In fine, there is no reason for this Court to set aside the findings of the trial
court, except insofar as it orders the plaintiffs to pay the defendants
attorneys fees. As aptly pointed out by the plaintiffs-appellants there
should be no premium on the right to litigate. We find that the plaintiffs
filed this complaint in good faith and that the defendants claim for
attorneys fees was not adequately established.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165879

November 10, 2006

MARIA B. CHING, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR., EVELYN GOYANKO, JERRY GOYANKO, IMELDA
GOYANKO, JULIUS GOYANKO, MARY ELLEN GOYANKO AND JESS
GOYANKO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On December 30, 1947, Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz
(Epifania) were married.1 Out of the union were born respondents Joseph,
Jr., Evelyn, Jerry, Imelda, Julius, Mary Ellen and Jess, all surnamed Goyanko.
Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square meter
property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu City but that as they (the
parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was registered in
the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia).
On May 1, 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale2 over the property in
favor of respondents father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on
October 12, 1993 a deed of sale3 over the property in favor of his commonlaw-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 138405 was thus issued in petitioners name.
After Goyankos death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that
ownership of the property had already been transferred in the name of
petitioner. Respondents thereupon had the purported signature of their
father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory which found the same to be a forgery.4
Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against petitioner, praying
for the nullification of the deed of sale and of TCT No. 138405 and the
issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.
In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the property
as it was she who provided its purchase price. To disprove that Goyankos
signature in the questioned deed of sale is a forgery, she presented as
witness the notary public who testified that Goyanko appeared and signed
the document in his presence.
By Decision of October 16, 1998,5 the trial court dismissed the complaint
against petitioner, the pertinent portions of which decision read:
There is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void,
fictitious and simulated. The signature on the questioned Deed of Sale is
genuine. The testimony of Atty. Salvador Barrameda who declared in court
that Joseph Goyanko, Sr. and Maria Ching together with their witnesses
appeared before him for notarization of Deed of Sale in question is more
reliable than the conflicting testimonies of the two document examiners.
Defendant Maria Ching asserted that the Deed of Sale executed by Joseph
Goyanko, Sr. in her favor is valid and genuine. The signature of Joseph
Goyanko, Sr. in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine as it was
duly executed and signed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. himself.
The parcel of lands known as Lot No. 6 which is sought to be recovered in
this case could never be considered as the conjugal property of the original
Spouses Joseph C. Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz or the exclusive capital
property of the husband. The acquisition of the said property by defendant
Maria Ching is well-elicited from the aforementioned testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the defendant. Although for a time
being the property passed through Joseph Goyanko, Sr. as a buyer yet his
ownership was only temporary and transitory for the reason that it was

subsequently sold to herein defendant Maria Ching. Maria Ching claimed

that it was even her money which was used by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in the
purchase of the land and so it was eventually sold to her. In her testimony,
defendant Ching justified her financial capability to buy the land for herself.
The transaction undertaken was from the original owner Sulpicia Ventura
to Joseph Goyanko, Sr. and then from Joesph Goyanko, Sr. to herein
defendant Maria Ching.
The land subject of the litigation is already registered in the name of
defendant Maria Ching under TCT No. 138405. By virtue of the Deed of Sale
executed in favor of Maria Ching, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138405
was issued in her favor. In recognition of the proverbial virtuality of a
Torrens title, it has been repeatedly held that, unless bad faith can be
established on the part of the person appearing as owner on the certificate
of title, there is no other owner than that in whose favor it has been issued.
A Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack. It is a well-known doctrine
that a Torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty
of the court is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless
challenged in a direct proceedings [sic].6(Citations omitted; underscoring
supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents appealed, they argued that
the trial court erred:
1. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining
the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and the defendantappellee, despite the proliferation in the records and admissions by both
parties that defendant-appellee was the "mistress" or "common-law
wife" of Joseph, Sr..
2. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining
the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and the defendantappellee, despite the fact that the marriage of Joseph, Sr. and Epifania
was then still subsisting thereby rendering the subject property as
conjugal property of Joseph, Sr. and Epifania.
3. . . . in dismissing the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining the
validity of the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and the
defendant-appellee, despite the clear findings of forgery and the noncredible testimony of notary public.7
By Decision dated October 21, 2003,8 the appellate court reversed that of
the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale and
TCT No. 138405. Held the appellate court:
. . . The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a
valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko,
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, we find no evidence on record to conclude
otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife Epifania
have been estranged for years and that he and defendant-appellant Maria
Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband and wife,
there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his
marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore
undeniable that the 661-square meter property located at No. 29 F.
Cabahug Street, Cebu City belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Even if we were to assume that the subject property was not conjugal, still
we cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to
defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on
records that they have been living together as common-law husband and
wife. On this score, Art. 1352 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no
effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy."
We therefore find that the contract of sale in favor of the defendantappellant Maria Ching was null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy. The purported sale, having been made by Joseph Sr. in favor
of his concubine, undermines the stability of the family, a basic social
institution which public policy vigilantly protects. Furthermore, the law
emphatically prohibits spouses from selling property to each other, subject
to certain exceptions. And this is so because transfers or conveyances
between spouses, if allowed during the marriage would destroy the system
of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. The prohibition was
designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over
the other and is likewise applicable even to common-law relationships
otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition, petitioners arguing that the appellate court
gravely erred in:
I.
. . . APPLYING THE STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST
CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE
AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THE SAME
BEING FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO, AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF
PETITIONER, AND THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER PART OF THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS MOTHER
EPIFANIA GOYANKO AND PETITIONERS COMMON LAW HUSBAND,
JOSEPH GOYANKO, SR., NOR THE EXCLUSIVE OR CAPITAL PROPERTY OF

THE LATTER AT ANYTIME BEFORE THE SAME WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED BY

PETITIONER.
II.
. . . NOT FINDING THAT A JURIDICAL RELATION OF TRUST AS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER ARTICLES 1448 AND 1450 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE CAN
VALIDLY EXIST BETWEEN COMMON LAW SPOUSES.
III.
. . . NOT FINDING THAT A CONVEYANCE OVER A PROPERTY MADE BY A
TRUSTEE, WHO BECAME AS SUCH IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, AND
WHO HAPPENS TO BE A COMMON LAW HUSBAND OF THE BENEFICIARY,
IS NOT A VIOLATION OF A STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST
CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE
AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES.
IV.
. . . ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ABANDON THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY
OF THEIR CASE DURING APPEAL.10
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which apply to the present case
read:
ART. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no
effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
ART. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal
object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the
defense of illegality be waived.
ARTICLE 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other,
except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements; or
(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article
191. (Underscoring supplied)
The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to
common law relationships. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon.
Fortun, etc., et al.:11
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void
for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a
husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and
left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from
whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the
stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause,
object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling
property to each other subject to certain exceptions.1wphi1 Similarly,
donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so
because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic
policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution
of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply
to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage,
otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by
public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the
parties. . . .12 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his
common- law-wife-herein petitioner, it was null and void.
Petitioners argument that a trust relationship was created between
Goyanko as trustee and her as beneficiary as provided in Articles 1448 and
1450 of the Civil Code which read:
ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the

trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom
the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying
the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one
person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the
lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by
operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for
whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel a
conveyance thereof to him.
does not persuade.
For petitioners testimony that it was she who provided the purchase price
is uncorroborated. That she may have been considered the breadwinner of
the family and that there was proof that she earned a living do not
conclusively clinch her claim.
As to the change of theory by respondents from forgery of their fathers
signature in the deed of sale to sale contrary to public policy, it too does
not persuade. Generally, a party in a litigation is not permitted to freely
and substantially change the theory of his case so as not to put the other
party to undue disadvantage by not accurately and timely apprising him of
what he is up against,13 and to ensure that the latter is given the
opportunity during trial to refute all allegations against him by presenting
evidence to the contrary. In the present case, petitioner cannot be said to
have been put to undue disadvantage and to have been denied the chance
to refute all the allegations against her. For the nullification of the sale is
anchored on its illegality per se, it being violative of the above-cited Articles
1352, 1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-39670

March 20, 1934

In the matter of the intestate estate of the deceased Crispulo Javillo.

ROSARIO OAS, oppositor-appellant,
vs.
CONSOLACION JAVILLO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees.
Pedro Malveda for appellant.
Santiago Abella for appellees.
GODDARD, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Capiz
approving a project of partition of the property belonging to the estate of
the deceased Crispulo Javillo valued at P16,000 more or less.
Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927, in the municipality
of Sigma, Province of Capiz, Philippine Islands. On the 25th day of July,
1927, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of that province
praying that an administrator of this estate be appointed, and after hearing
Santiago Andrada was named administrator. He submitted two projects of
partition. The first was disapproved by the lower court and from that order
some of the heirs appealed to this court which appeal was dismissed. 1The
second project of partition dated September 9, 1931, is the one now on
appeal in this case.
Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages. The first, with Ramona Levis. To
this marriage five children were born, to wit, Consolacion, Mercedes,
Caridad, Soledad and Jose Javillo, the appellees in this case. After the death
of Ramona Levis, Crispulo Javillo married Rosario Oas. To this marriage
four children were born, to wit, Joaquin, Ana, Bernardo and Porillana.
Rosario Oas the appellant in this case.
The parties entered into the following agreement as to the property
acquired during the first and second marriages:
CONVENIO: Ambas partes convienen que 109 terrenos designados como
parcelas 1., 2., 3., 4.., 5., 6., 7., 8., 9.., 10., 11. del inventario
de los commisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones obrantes a folios 40 al
43 del expediente han sido encontrados durante la vida marital de
Crispulo Javillo con su primera esposa, madre de Consolacion,
Mercedes, Caridad, Soledad y Jose Javillo; y que las parcelas 12., 13.,
14., 15., 16., 17., 18., 19., 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 y
31 de dicho inventario fueron comprados o encontrados durante la vida
marital de Crispulo Javillo con Rosario Oas. Que durante el primer
matrimonio fueron adquiridos cinco carabaos y el resto de los carabaos
asi como los vacunos fueron encontrados durante el matrimonio de
Crispulo Javillo con Rosario Oas.
The appellant alleges that the lower court committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that all the properties acquired during
the second marriage of Crispulo Javillo with Rosario Oas were acquired
with the products of the properties of the first marriage of said Crispulo
Javillo with Ramona Levis, and in approving the manner of distributing
the estates among the heirs of the first and second marriages, as
indicated in the project of partition now in question.
II. The lower court erred in approving the second project of partition
dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same did not
include all the properties of the deceased Crispulo Javillo.
The first assignment of error is well taken. Crispulo Javillo lived for about
twenty years after his second marriage and during that marriage acquired
twenty parcels of land. Only eleven parcels were acquired during the first
marriage. It would take a person with a very vivid imagination to believe
that the product of eleven parcels of land acquired during the first
marriage supplied all of the capital used in acquiring the twenty parcels of
the second marriage. Such a claim is preposterous.
Some Spanish commentators have suggested that upon the death of the
husband or wife, the community continues between the survivor and
the heirs of the deceased until partition has actually taken place, and
that the latter are entitled to share in its acquisitions during its
continuance. . . . But this view was never generally accepted by the
Spanish jurists, and an examination of the provisions of the Civil Code
makes it clear that the authors of that body of laws did not contemplate
any such extension of the life of the community. Gutierrez adopting the
views of Matienzo says:
"The community partnership being as permanent as the state that
produces it, there can be no doubt that the same causes influence it as
marriage. The first of them is death. Some have believed that the
community might continue to exist between the surviving spouse and
the heirs of the deceased husband or wife; but, in the opinion of
Matienzo, which appears to us to be well-founded, there are reasons for
believing otherwise, to wit: (1) When the marriage is dissolved, the
cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principles of an
ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is
governed by special rules. (2) In the absence of the reasons that induced
the legislator to establish it, the provisions of law governing the subject
should cease to have any effect for the community of property is
admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to the
mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a
recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of
which terminates by the death of one of the partners. (3) The
partnership having been created by law, it has no object and it is unsafe

to extend it on pretext of tacit consent." (Gutierrez, 3rd ed., vol. 1. p.

579.)
Manresa, discussing the status of the community (sociedad) after
dissolution of the conjugal relations makes the following comment:
". . . The community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or
annulled, or when during the marriage, an agreement is entered into to
divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists therefore
so long as the spouses are legally united; the important thing is not
exactly the bond, the tie formed by the marriage, but, the existence in
the eyes of the law of the life in common. It is this life in common that
creates common necessities and represents common efforts, the result
of which should be that both partners should share in the profits.
"When, for any cause, the conjugal partnership established upon the
basis of the system of community property is dissolved, all the
provisions of articles 1401 to 1416, based upon the existence of that
partnership, cease to apply.
"Consequently, whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the
dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death, or by
either of the spouse on termination of the partnership for other reasons
and when this latter no longer exists, whether the acquisition be made
by his or her labor or industry, or whether by onerous or by lucrative
title, it forms a a part of his or her own capital, in which the other
consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share. The fruits, as an
accessory, follow the property; the buildings, the soil; the plantings, the
land all according to the general rules of accession." (Nable Jose vs.
Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713, 717-719.)1vvphi1.ne+
. . . it may fairly be deduced that prior to the liquidation, the interest of
the wife, and in case of her death, of her heirs, is an interest inchoate, a
mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets
in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. . . . Nable
Jose vs. Nable Jose, supra.)
In this case it does not appear that there was a liquidation of the
partnership property of the first marriage nor does it appear that they
asked for such a liquidation.
The project of partition approved by the lower court is based on the abovementioned absurd claim and furthermore is not in conformity to law. Onehalf of all the conjugal property of both marriages corresponds to the
deceased Crispulo Javillo and must be divided share and share alike among
all the children of both marriages. One-half of the conjugal property
pertaining to the first marriage should be divided share and share alike
among the five children of that marriage. One-half of the conjugal property
of the second marriage must be adjudicated to the widow Rosario Oas
and furthermore she has a right of usufruct over the property of her
deceased husband equal to one-ninth of the two thirds of that property
which constitutes the legitime of the children of both marriages which is
two-twenty-sevenths of the property corresponding to her husband. This
usufruct should be taken from the property pertaining to the second
marriage.
The property corresponding to the first marriage consists of parcels 1 to 11,
inclusive, and 5 carabaos. The property of the second marriage consists of
parcels 12 to 31, inclusive, and the remainder of the carabaos and large
cattle mentioned in the agreement copied above.
If it is true as alleged by the appellant that there are houses on any of these
parcels of land, it is to be presumed that they were included in the
valuation made by the committee on claims and appraisal and therefore
they would belong to the person to whom the land, upon which they are
built, is adjudicated.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and this case is remanded for
further proceedings in conformity with this decision without
pronouncements as to costs.

.R. No. L-32820-21 January 30, 1976

DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children, named
REGINO, CRISPINA, CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO, SENDON
MARCIANO and HERMOGENES, all surnamed DELIZO y
OCAMPO,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
URBANA DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO
DELIZO and the Heirs of FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO
SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA, EUPROCINA, AUREA, EDITA and FE all surnamed
DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE VDA. DE DELIZO, respondents-appellees.
Leandro C. Sevilla for petitioners-appellants.
Romeo J. Callejo respondents-appellees.
ANTONIO, J.:
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership
properties of two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was
with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from April 20, 1891 until Rows death on
December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18) years; and the second, with
Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, or

from October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the
age of ninety (90) years. The action for partition was instituted on April 15,
1957 by a daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo
and Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another son, who
died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea,
Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were
represented by their mother, Rosenda Genove) all against their father,
Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine (9)
children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino, Crispina,
Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all
surnamed Delizo.
The aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the
properties described in the complaint were those of the second marriage.
On May 3, 1957, Nicolas Delizo died and was substituted by his children in
the second m as party defendants. In the meantime, Special Proceedings
No. 1058 (Intestate Estate of the late Nicolas Delizo) was filed by Dorotea
de Ocampo on June 3, 1957. Thereafter, or on August 23, 1971, Severino
De died intestate and is now represented by his children, namely, Federico,
Severina, Angelina, Segundina and Brigida, all surnamed Delizo. Involved
are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are sixty-six
(66) hectares of agricultural lands in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; fifty-eight
(58) hectares of riceland in Muoz of the same province; and a square
meter lot at 1056-M P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila. The properties are
specifically described as follows:
(1) Lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 389, 390, and 407 of the San Jose Cadastre
situation in Rizal, San Jose with a combined area of about sixty-six (66)
hectares covered by OCT No. 6176-N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas
Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. F or 11);
(2) Lot No. 1915 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 1,056
square meters and covered by OCT No. 5783 in the name of Nicolas Delizo,
married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. G or 12);
(3) Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 3,366 square
meters and covered by OCT No. 5622, N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas
Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. H. or 13);
(4) A parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija containing an area of 13.2948
hectares and covered by TCT No. 2985-N.E. (Exh. I. or 13-A);
(5) An agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares situated in sitio
Rangayan, Muoz and covered by TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);
(6) A parcel of land in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about
14.0354 hectares and covered by TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10);
(7) A cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500
square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 5476;
(8) Riceland in Barrio San Andres, Muoz of about 5,083 square meters and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 7083;
(9) Riceland in Barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of
about 17.4755 hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 812;
(10) Lot No. 847-a riceland in Barrio Bayan, Muoz, with an area of about
13.0902 hectares and covered by TCT No. 3585 issued in the name of
Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo on April 25,1929 (Exhs. L or
15 & 15-A);
(11) A camarin of strong materials, with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, about eight (8) meters by twelve
(12) meters; (12) A residential house and lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose,
Nueva Ecija;
(13) Lot No. 1790 of San Jose Cadastre of about 2,840 square meters and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 in the names of spouses
Silvestre Batara and Maria Soriano issued on November 16, 1927 (Exh. M
or 16), superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-29524 issued in
the name of Juan T. Gualberto on May 25,1959 (Exh. N or 17) claimed by
the heirs of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo pursuant to deed of
sale (Exh. N1);
(14) An urban lot and coconut plantation in San Fabian, Pangasinan;
(15) A lot and residential house consisting Of a two-door accessoria at No.
1056-58 (formerly 562) P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila;
(16) A sawmill with accessories, bulldozers, etc. in San Jose, Nueva Ecija
(bulldozer is now in Gordon, Isabels in the possession of Regino Delizo and
Basilio Delizo); and
(17) Several heads of carabaos. After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment on April 27, 1964, distributing the aforesaid properties as
follows: (a) onehalf () pro indiviso to the three (3) children of the first
marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the
deceased Francisco Delizo, viz.: Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina,
Aurea, Edita, and Fe (b) one-fourth () pro indiviso to the surviving spouse,
Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) one-fourth () pro in equal shares to the
children of both marriages, nine (9) of whom were begotten during the
second marriage, or into thirteen (13) parts.
From said judgment. petitioners-appellants appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On August 12, 1970, the Appellate Court rendered judgment,
affirming with modifications the trial court's decision. The facts as found by
the Appellate Court are as follows:

As regards the Caanawan lands situated in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva

Ecija, comprising some 66 hectares, defendants capitalize on the
undisputed fact that Original Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11)
issued on August 21, 1924, covering these lands is in the name of
Nicolas Delizo, ma to Dorotea de Ocampo. Defendants further point
out that the testimonies of defendant Dorotea de Ocampo and
octogenarian Moises Patricio prove that these lands were acquired
during the second marriage.
However, the fact that the disputed lands situated in Caanawan were
registered in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de
Ocampo's no proof that the property is owned by the second conjugal
partnership. The phrase 'married to' is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Nicolas Delizo (Gonzales vs. Miller, 69 Phil. 340; De Jesus vs.
Padilla, CA-G.R. No. 12191-R, April 19, 1955; Muoz & Tan Go Inc. vs.
Santos CA-G.R. No. "27759-R, October 3, 1963; Pratts vs. Sheriff of
Rizal, 53 Phil. 51, 53). Neither is the testimony of Dorotea de Ocampo
that the said lands were acquired by her and her spouse, altogether
clear and persuasive. For while the admitted fact is that she and
Nicolas Delizo were married in 1911, she declared on the witness stand
that the aforesaid properties were given by Pedro Salvador to her and
her spouse in 1908 (t.s.n., p. 288, March 8, 1963), thereby leading the
trial court to infer an admission that these lands were acquired during
the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo. It may likewise be noted that as per
her testimony, she and her father arrived in Caanawan, San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, when Rosa Villasfer was still alive. That would be
sometime before 1911. But she admitted that her father then was not
able to acquire lands from Pedro Salvador, their grantor, because he
had no more lands to distribute to settlers. Accordingly, it is farfetched
that after Rosa's death and the subsequent marriage of Nicolas Delizo
to Dorotea de Ocampo, Pedro Salvador would still have those 67
hectares which defendants claimed were acquired by the spouses
Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo by grant from Pedro Salvador
(t.s.n., pp. 459-46, March 15, 1963).
Moises Patricio tried to confirm the widow, declaring that Nicolas
Delizo was married to defendant Dorotea de Ocampo, when he was
given lands in Caanawan by Pedro Salvador (t.s.n., p. 493, June 7,
1963). However, he placed the acquisition sometime during the
founding of Barrio Sto. Tomas, San Jose, Nueva Ecija (Id., p. 492) which
took place some four years after the Spanish-Filipino revolution of
1896 (t.s.n., pp. 548-549, June 21, 1963), or approximately 1900.
Therefore, it could not be Dorotea de Ocampo, but Rosa Villasfer, who
was admittedly still alive and the wife of Nicolas Delizo at the time of
the acquisition.
Ranged against these unreliable testimonies for the defendants, is the
testimony of Lorenzo Delizo, who being a brother of deceased Nicolas
Delizo, stands in equal relationship to the plaintiffs, who were Nicolas'
children by the first marriage, and the defendants, who were children
of Nicolas in his second marriage. His testimony therefore carries great
weight. This witness averred that 16 hectares were acquired as
homestead by his deceased brother, Nicolas Delizo, from Pedro
Salvador and Mauricio Salvador who were then 'cabecillas' distributing
lands to homesteaders in 1905 (t.s.n., p. 12, January 20, 1961); that
Nicolas acquired by sale the 16-hectare homestead of Nicolas Dacquel
in 1906, another 16- hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin in 1907
and the 16-hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua in 1908 (id., pp. 1415). Lorenzo's declarations are supported by the testimonies of (1)
Urbana Delizo, a daughter of Nicolas by his first marriage and who was
already 17 when her mother, Rosa Villasfer, died in 1909 (id., p. 19); (2)
Sabiniano Villanueva, a son of one of Nicolas' tenants on the
controverted Caanawan lands (id., pp. 93-168) and (3) Raymundo
Eugenio, a former clerk in the municipal treasurer's office who u to
collect taxes on the land belonging to Nicolas and later became
municipal "president of San Jose, Nueva Ecija (t.s.n., pp. 367-368, Jan.
31, 1964), although these Caanawan lands cannot be traced back to TD
431, Exhibit P-9 issued in 1906, cited by appellants (see notations at
bottom of reverse side of alleged succeeding TDs) aside from the fact
that the notations on the reverse side thereof are suspicious (see years
when tax commenced and when issued) and the discrepancy between
areas (8 Ha. in Exhibit P-9 and 57 Ha. for lots 210 and 211).
Accordingly, we find with the trial court that the Caanawan lands,
comprising lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 390, 398 and 407.1-under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11) were acquired during the
existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and
there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to
said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. So with the lot and
house at 562 P. Campa St., Sampaloc, Manila, known as Lot 47, Block
83 covered by TCT No. 9616-Manila which was ceded during the
second marriage in payment of, or substitution for, the Caanawan
property, because the Asiatic Petroleum Company to which it had been
mortgaged as bond for Juan Par as agent foreclosed the mortgage,
when the agent defaulted in his obligation to the company, Exhibits 6,
7 & 19 (Art. 153 [formerly, 140], par. 1, new Civil Code).
However, with regard to the other properties in question, like lot No.
498 of the San Jose Cadastre, under Original certificate of Title No.
5622, likewise issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea

de Ocampo'; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija under TCT No.
2985 (Exh. I or 13)' and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in
Sitio Rangayan, Muoz Nueva Ecija under TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);
another parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about
14.0354 hectares under TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a coin land in
barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square me '
quarters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in barrio San
Andres, Muoz Nueva Ecija, of about 5,083 square meters under Tax
Dec. 7083; another riceland in Rangayan, Muoz, of about 17.4755
hectares under Tax Dec. No. 812; a riceland, lot No. 847, of about
13.0902 hectares covered by TCT No. 3585 issued on April 29, 1929 in
the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'(Exh. L or
1.5)-, a camarin of strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, about 8 meters by 12 meters; a residential lot at
Sanches Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; lot No. 1790 of the San Jose
Cadastre consisting of 2,840 square meters, more or less, under
Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 in another name but claimed by
the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar cane mill in San Jose,
Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and
496 of the San Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants although
adjudicated in the name of Marcelo Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso,
respectively; lot No. 494-A, of the San Jose Cadastre, adjudicated in the
name of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo (RA, pp. 96-97),-there
is no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of
the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment as follows:
But the trial court held that because there was no liquidation of the
conjugal partnership property of the first marriage, upon the death of
the first wife, 'the conjugal partnership was converted into one of coownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage
.... Hence, all the fruits or increase of the properties acquired thereafter
shall belong to such co-ownership.' We cannot agree with this legal
conclusion. One-half of the conjugal properties of the first marriage
constituted the separate property of the husband at the formation of
the second conjugal partnership upon his remarriage in October 1911
(Art. 145, NCC). Moreover, the fruits of the Caanawan property were
acquired through the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
Ocampo; and indeed, two witnesses for the plaintiffs admitted that at
the time of the death of Rosa Villasfer, only about 20 hectares of the
Caanawan property had been cleared and cultivated (pp. 22-23; 113,
117, 383-4, t.s.n.). This property was practically virgin land, and the rest
thereof or about 47 hectares were therefore cleared and cultivated only
during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. This is
impliedly admitted in plaintiffs' complaint that 'from the time of death
of the said Rosa Villasfer, the defendants ... have WORKED upon, TILLED
and CULTIVATED, or otherwise offered in tenancy the whole of the
agricultural lands described' (par. 2). The Caanawan property left to
itself could not produce any fruits for they did not have any permanent
improvements thereon. What was produced according to the evidence
was palay, and the production of palay requires tilling, cultivation,
seedlings, gathering, preservation and marketing. It was thru the labor
and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo that the
Caanawan property was able to produce fruits. Whatever it produced
thru the labor and industry of the spouses belongs to their conjugal
partnership. While it is true that to the owner of the land belongs the
fruits, whether natural, industrial or civil (Art. 441, NCC formerly Art.
354, Spanish Civil Code), this does not mean that all that is produced
belongs to the owner of the land. The owner, according to Art. 443, NCC
(formerly Art. 356, Spanish Civil Code) who receives the fruits, has the
obligation to pay the expenses made by a person in their production,
gathering and preservation. When Dorotea Ocampo admitted that the
Muoz property was purchased partly with the fruits of the Caanawan
property, she was referring to the gross production, not deducting
therefrom what could have pertained to the person who produced the
fruits. So it seems "that if we are to determine with mathematical
certainty what portion of the Muoz property and other properties
acquired during the second marriage should pertain to the first marriage
as corn spending to the value of its share in the fruits of the Caanawan
property, and what should belong to the second marriage as
corresponding to the value of the labor and industry of the spouses
Delizo and Ocampo, we have to find how much was produced during the
second marriage and determine what will be the share of the owner of
the land what will correspond to the one who produced the fruits. The
burden of proof lies upon the plaintiffs under the rules of evidence. But,
of course, this is an impossibility. For no records have been kept and it is
not in accordance with the Filipino customs for the surviving spousewhether he remarries or not-to keep the record of the produce of the
properties left by the deceased spouse. tradition thereto, according to
Dorotea Ocampo, part of the price used in the purchase of Muoz
property was the proceeds of a loan which, together with the properties
purchased with it, belongs to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo
and Dorotea Ocampo. Under these circumstances, it would be
impossible to determine with mathematical precision what portion of
the properties acquired during the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo
should belong to the second conjugal partnership and what portion

should belong to the heirs of the first conjugal partnership, one half of
which pertains to the husband. However, considering that
1. At the time of the dissolution of the first marriage or about five years
after acquisition, according to plaintiffs' evidence, only about 20
hectares of the Caanawan property had been cultivated, the remaining
47 hectares were therefore cleared and improved during the second
marriage thru the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and
Dorotea Ocampo for 46 years (1911-1967). These improvements were
made in good faith considering that Nicolas Delizo administered the
properties of the first marriage. The second marriage is entitled to
reimbursement for the increase in value of these 47 hectares (Art. 516,
NCC Even the Muoz property acquired during the second marriage had
to be improved by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo.
2. The one-half of the fruits of the Caanawan property which should
pertain to the heirs of Rosa Villasfer refers only to one-half o f the net
after deducting the expenses of clearing the land, cultivating, gathering
and preservation. Forty-seven hectares of the Caanawan property were
cleared and cultivated only during the second marriage. Even under a
liberal apportionment of the produce, the heirs of the second marriage
could not be entitled to more than 30% of the produce.
3. Part of the price used in the purchase of the properties acquired
during the second marriage were the proceeds of a loan. This is conjugal
property of the "second marriage (Palanca vs. Smith, Bell and Co., 9 Phil.
131,133; Castillo Jr. vs. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102, 106-7).
4. The improvements on 47 hectares of the Caanawan property and on
the Muoz property were made at the expense of the second conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo, and thru their labor
and industry which lasted for 46 years, whereas the first conjugal
partnership had the Caanawan property for less than 6 years.
Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances and equities of the
case, an adjudication of 20% of all the properties acquired during the
second marriage, including the Muoz property, to the children of the
first marriage, and 80% to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and
Dorotea Ocampo is fair and equitable. So the properties of the estate
should be partitioned thus:
One-half of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at 562 P.
Campa Street, Manila, covered by TCT No. 9616 as the share of Rosa
Villasfer in the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa
Villasfer or 1/6 thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all
the other properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. To Nicolas
Delizo should be adjudicated one-half of the Caanawan property and the
house and lot on P. Campa, but in view of the death of Nicolas Delizo his
share descends to all the children, both of the first and second
marriages and the surviving spouse, Dorotea Ocampo, and should
therefore be divided by the number of children plus one or 1/26 thereof
for each heir. tightly per cent of all the properties acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo constitute the conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; one-half thereof is
the share of Nicolas Delizo, to be divided among his heirs in accordance
with the preceding statement, or 2/65 thereof for each heir; the other
half constitutes the share of Dorotea Ocampo in the conjugal
partnership, or 2/5 thereof.
WHEREFORE, paragraph 1 of the judgment appealed from is hereby
modified as follows:
1. Declaring that (a) of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at
562 P. Campa Street, Manila covered by TCT No. 9616-8139 (1/6 + 1/26)
thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the children of Nicolas Delizo
"of the first marriage, namely: Urbana, Severino and the late Francisco
Delizo (the last represented by his children Rancivillano Soltrifilo
Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita and Fe and 1/26 thereof pro indiviso
shall pertain to each of the children of the second marriage and their
mother Dorotea Ocampo; (a) of all other properties required during the
second marriage-19/195 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the
three children by the first marriage, 2/65 thereof pro indiviso shall
pertain to each of the nine children of the second marriage, while 28/65
thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to the widow Dorotea Ocampo. The
rest of the judgment particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 are affirmed;
without pronouncement as to costs in both instances.
From this adverse judgment, petitioners-appellants interposed the present
petition for review. The thrust of petitioners- appellants' petition is that the
Appellate Court acted under a misapprehension of the facts or decided the
legal issues in a way which is not in consonance with law and with the
applicable decisions of this Court, (a) since, the 67-hectare Caanawan
properties could not have been properties of the first marriage because
they were then public lands being homesteads, and while the first conjugal
partnership may have had possessory rights over said properties, it was
only during the second marriage that the requirements of the public land
law were complied with, resulting in the confirmation, registration and
issuance of the Torrens Title over said properties to Nicolas Delizo and his
second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo; (b) apart from the fact that the legal
presumption that all properties of the marriage belong to the conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo were not sufficiently
rebutted, these properties were actually. In the adverse possession under
claim of title of petitioners-appellants continuously for a period of 47 years
(1911 to 1957), and consequently, the claim of respondents-appellees for

partition should have been considered barred by acquisitive and extinctive

prescription, laches and estoppel; d (c) in any event, there being serious
doubts as to whether. said properties belong to the first marriage, it would
have been more equitable if the said partnership properties were divided
between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
and the capital of the spouses,-pursuant to Article 189 of the Civil Code.
From the findings of the Appellate Court that sixty-six (66) hectares of the
Caanawan properties w ere acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads
during the period of the first marriage, thus: sixteen (16) hectares as a
homestead from the Government in 1905; and the 16-hectare homestead
of Nicolas Dacquel, the 16-hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin, and the
16-hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua by purchase in 1%6, .1907 and
1908, respectively, it does not necessarily follow that they should be
considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being
homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown
that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a
patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in
1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer.
Under Act 926, 1 which was then the applicable law, the right of the
homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has
complied with all the requirements of the law. One of the most important
requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two
credible witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the
term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the application
aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been
alienated or encumbered ... (Section 3 of Act 926, italics supplied). Prior to
the fulfillment of such requirement, the- applicant has no complete
equitable estate over the homestead which he can sell and convey,
mortgage for lease. 2 Until a homestead right is established and registered
under Section 3 of Act 926, there is only an inchoate right to the property
and it has not ceased to be a part of the public domain and, therefore, not
susceptible to alienation as such.3 Conversely, when a "homesteader has
complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent
for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein
and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof." 4The decisive factor,
therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by
way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage,
is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the
time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the
acquisition of such right to the patent. 5
As testified to by Lorenzo Delizo, his brother, Nicolas Delizo, and the
latter's wife, Rosa Villasfer, arrived in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, from Barrio Ungag, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, during the year 1905. It was
during that same year that Pedro Salvador and Mauricio Salvador, who
were then the cabecillas were distributing lands to homesteaders in Barrio
Caanawan. Nicolas Dacquel, Mariano Antolin and Francisco Pascua must
have received their respective homesteads from the same officers of the
government that same year, considering that their respective homesteads
are all adjacent to the homestead of Nicolas Delizo and according to the
evidence, this was the time when the homesteads in that barrio were
parceled out to the new settlers. Indeed, the Homestead Act was then of
recent vintage, having been enacted by the Philippine Commission by
authority of the United States Government, only on October 7, 1903.
Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his
homestead for barely a year when he transferred his rights in 1906,
Mariano Antolin for about two years with respect to his homestead in
1907, and Francisco Pascua for about three years in 1908 as regards to his
homestead, at the time of their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it
is, therefore, obvious that not one of them could have complied with the
requirements of Act No. 926 to entitle any one of them to the issuance of a
homestead patent before they sold or assigned their rights to Nicolas
Delizo. The law was quite specific, that "No certificate shall be given or
patent issued for the land applied for until the motion of five year. From
the date of the filing of the application and if, at the expiration of such time
or at any time within three years thereafter, the person filing such
application shall prove by two credible witnesses that he has resided upon
and cultivate the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding
the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no
part of said land has been I alienated or encumbered, and that he has
borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States and that of
the Philippine Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of ten pesos, Philippine
currency to such officer as may be designated by law as local land officer,
or in case there be no such officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Lands,
he shall be entitled to a patent." (Section 3, Act No. 926, italics supplied).
Having neither legal nor equitable title thereon, what was transferred by
them to Nicolas Delizo were, therefore, not rights of ownership, but
inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public
domain. Similarly, having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas
Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the
five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909.
Buttressing the conclusion that Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his
rights to the four homesteads before 1909 is the specific limitation
imposed by section 3 of Act No. 926 which provides that "No person who is
the owner of more than sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has
had the benefits of any gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land

since the acquisition of the Islands by the United States, shall be entitled to
the benefits of this chapter."
The foregoing sufficiently show that the Appellate Court erred in, holding
that the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of
Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty
(20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period
from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said
properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to
which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with
during the existence of each conjugal partnership.
II
In connection with the other properties, such as Lot No. 498 of the San Jose
Cadastre, under Original Certificate of Title No. 5622; a parcel of land in San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13),
and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in Sitio Rangayan, Muoz
Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); a
parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354
hectares, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a
cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square
meters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in Rangayan, Muoz of
about 17.4755 hectares, under Tax Declaration No. 812; a riceland, Lot No.
847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3585, issued on April 29, 1929 in the name of "Nicolas Delizo, married to
Dorotea de Ocampo" (Exh. L or 15); a camarin of strong materials with
galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija; a residential lot at Sanchez
Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; Lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre,
consisting of about 2,840 square meters, more or less, under Original
Certificate of Title No. 8131 "in another name but claimed by the heirs
under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar mill in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and
several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and 496 of the San Jose
Cadastre, possessed by defendants although adjudicated in the name of
Marcelo Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso respectively; and another lot, Lot No.
494A of the San Jose Cadastre adjudicated in the ' C, name of Nicolas
Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo, the Appellate Court decision
penned by Justice Arsenio Solidum held that "there is no controversy that
these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of
Nicolas Delizo"
The same opinion, however, held that since these properties were acquired
from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the
result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during
the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership,
while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first
marriage. The two concurring Appellate Justices, although of the view that
the legal presumption that those properties acquired during the regime of
the second conjugal partnership belong to said partnership has not been
rebutted by respondents-appellees and, therefore, would hold that such
after-acquired properties should belong to the second conjugal
partnership, concurred nevertheless in the result aforesaid, in order to
reach a judgment in the case. It would have been facile to hold that those
after-acquired properties belong to the second conjugal partnership in
view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old
Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). 6 There are, however,
important considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is the
established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands contributed
considerably to the acquisition of these properties, and We have held that
the children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should share in the
Caanawan properties. To deny the respondents-appellees a share in such
properties would have exacerbated discord instead of enhancing family
solidarity and understanding.
Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or
the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical
precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between
the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
partnership. 7 Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should
be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32 of the total mass of properties, and the first
conjugal partnership. to 18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro indivision. The share of
the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net
remainder 8 of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second
marriages, which would amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This
should be distributed in equal shares to his children of both
marriages, 9 with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate
child. 10 The widow. Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half () of the
net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and to her share as heir
of her deceased husband which amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus
1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The share of the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would
be 9/64 thereof. The foregoing is recapitulated as follows:
Share of Rosa Villasfer, lst wife 9/64 of whole estate to be
divided among three (3)
children
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo, 23/64 of whole estate plus her
2nd wife share in Nicolas
Delizo s estate.
Share of Nicolas Delizo, husband 32/64 of whole estate to be
divided into thirteen
(13) equal parts.

Whole Estate 64/64

Computation of Sharing
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664]
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] - Share of each child of
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] lst marriage
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664] - Share of each child of
1/26 = 64/1664] 2nd marriage
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
23/64 + 1/26 = 662/1664 - Share of Dorotea Ocampo.
32/64 + 13/26= 1664/1664 - Whole Estate
In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into
account the fact that the respondents-appellees are in possession of the
Muoz lands, while the petitioners-appellants have been in possession of
the Caanawan properties as well as the house and lot at 562 P. Campa
Street. Sampaloc, Manila, as directed in the trial court's order of April 23,
1958 record on Appeal, pp. 76-77). Should it be convenient for the parties,
their respective shares should be taken from the properties presently
under their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions. it is unnecessary to resolve the
other legal questions raised in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
modified as herein indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they
are hereby, remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with this judgment. No costs.

G.R. No. 180572

June 18, 2012

SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B.

ABRENICA Petitioners,
vs.
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M.
TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 1694201 decided by this
Court on 22 September 2006. For brevity, we quote the relevant facts
narrated in that case:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual
respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law
Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm").
In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was SEC Case No. 05-98-5959,
for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With
Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where
they alleged that petitioner refused to return partnership funds
representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas.
The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also for Accounting and Return
and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents sought to recover
from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm
and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997.
The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799,
which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the
SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23, 2004,
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, held that:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
1. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full
accounting of the amounts he received as profits from the sale and
resale of the Lemery property in the amount of P 4,524,000.00;
2. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law
firm the said amount of P4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum
from the time he received the same and converted the same to his
own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959

3. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his
cash advance in the amount of P25,000.00 with interest of 12% per
annum from the date this decision becomes final; and
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On
December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid the
required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions in
intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to
appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.
On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's
Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07SC2 prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as the correct mode of
appeal from the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to
Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents motion
for execution.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to
show cause why it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in view of
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said Order.
Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the motion.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed Resolution
dated June 29, 2005 x x x.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in

its August 23, 2005 Resolution.
Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on
the ground that the appeal filed by petitioner was the wrong remedy. For
that reason, we held as follows:3
Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even
if these were timely filed. In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General
Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a
petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision because the
proper mode of appeal should have been a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. x x x.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. "Public interest

demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case
that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay
the administration of justice." In the instant case, the trial court's decision
became final and executory on January 3, 2005. Respondents had already
acquired a vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which
should not be disturbed any longer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated June 29, 2005 and August 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 denying
admission of petitioners Petition for Review are AFFIRMED.
Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April 2007,
G.R. No. 169420 became final and executory.4
Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No.
169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The Petition for Annulment of
Judgment assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-0142948 and Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for
Annulment, Petitioners raised the following grounds:
I. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and
respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to
substantiate [their] respective claims.
II. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and
respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their
respective position[s].
III. The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction
entered into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar
was a personal transaction and not a law partnership transaction.
IV. The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the
respondents are credible.

1. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the

amounts he received under the retainer agreement between the law
firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the
amount ofP 320,000.00.

V. The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot
involved was P 3 million and not P 8 million.

2. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount
received by him under the Retainer Agreement with Atlanta Industries,
Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of P 320,000.00 plus
interests of 12% per annum from June 1998 until fully paid;

VII. The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners
permissive counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured
by respondents.

VI. The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement
with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction.

VIII. The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but
more importantly it acted without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction. 5
We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15
October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with the
filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as
a co-petitioner.
On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution6 dismissing the Petition. First,
it reasoned that the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioners.7 Considering that the dismissal of
the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy under Rule 47
was no longer available.
Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on
the merits of the case and the appreciation by the trial court of the
evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for
annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a
special commercial court did not mean that the latter had no jurisdiction
over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event, petitioners
could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, but they did not do so.

ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the persons of the parties, what petitioner is truly
complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of jurisdiction,
not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter (as in this case), the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the
errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal
(Republic vs. "G" Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration12 on
28 August 2007.
While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007,
petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion13 with Branch 226,
alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children
and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still
had to determine the manner of distribution of the firms assets and the
value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had to
determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal was the correct
remedy.

Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for
Annulment of Judgment with the CA dated 25 May 20079 docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of extrinsic fraud
into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R. SP
No. 98679. The following were the grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:

On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim14 also with
Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she15 and her
stepchildren16 owned a number of the personal properties sought to be
levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles
as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property.
She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the
furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated
combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000) were exempt
from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate
remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.

A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the

Consolidated Decision x x x based on the following badges of fraud and/or
glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:

Accordingly, the RTC scheduled17 a hearing on the motion. On 17 October

2007, however, petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his motion on
account of ongoing negotiations with respondents.18

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2

May 2007, but the CA had by then already issued the 26 April 2007
Resolution dismissing the Petition.
On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679
became final and executory.8

I. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners

and respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to
substantiate their respective claims, as it relied purely on the gist
of what its personnel did as regards the transcript of stenographic
notes the latter [sic] in collusion with the respondents.

Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan,

witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of
Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of the
property covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable
settlement of the money judgment.19

II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners
and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their
respective positions by relying totally on what was presented to it by its
personnel who drafted the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the
respondents.

Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the

second assailed Resolution20 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for filing
was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in
the motion were merely recycled and rehashed propositions, which had
already been dispensed with.

III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate
transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and
Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership
transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of
the respondents are credible as against the petitioner Erlando Abrenica
and his witnesses for the same reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.
V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price
for the lot involved was P 3 million and not P 8 million for the same
reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners retainer
agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership
transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said
petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to the various personal
loans secured by respondents also for the same reasons as the above.
B. As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full
knowledge of its incapacity[,] rendered/promulgated the assailed
Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction.10(Underscoring in the original.)
On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution11 dismissing
the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719, which held the Petition to be
insufficient in form and substance. It noted the following:
x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained
the prayer for the annulment of the subject consolidated Decision
premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as the present
annulment of judgment case.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only

in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate
remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section
2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo
vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid

Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and
30 October 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that
there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by the RTC. That
issue arose from the Order21 given by the trial court to petitioner Erlando
to explain why it should take cognizance of the Notice of Appeal when the
proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the
dismissal of their appeal despite this Courts explanation in G.R. No.
169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly
dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order
issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and insisted that the
remedy they had undertaken was correct.
Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation
of the merits of the case. They raise in the present Petition the grounds
they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of Judgment (including
the Amended Petition) quoted above.
Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also
violated when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings in
the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of property
was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of
the RTC of Quezon City.
Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed
on time, since 27 August 2007 was a holiday. Therefore, they had until 28
August 2007 to file their motion.
Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3
January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the sum of P 5 million for the
property covered by TCT No. 216818.
On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners
filed a Complaint22 with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein respondents and
Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK and was raffled to

Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City.23 Petitioners sought the

nullification of the sheriffs sale on execution of the Decision in the
consolidated cases rendered by Branch 226, as well as the payment of
damages. They alleged that the process of the execution sale was
conducted irregularly, unlawfully, and in violation of their right to due
process.
On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents and/or their agents, and the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No. 216818.24
The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted
respondents to file a Motion25 before us to cite for contempt petitioner
spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was on
the ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the
Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City, while the
present case was also still pending.
Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226
an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.26 That Motion was
granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution27 issued on 10 November
2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for
Certiorari28 under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before the CA docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (T.R.O.)29 after Sheriff
De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five days from
receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the CA
has not resolved the issue raised in the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Our Ruling
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly
denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the
annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for
Reconsideration.
We DENY petitioners claims.
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not
to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court
in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to
them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of
judgment was no longer available to them, because they had already filed
an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was
dismissed.
It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory
through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner Erlando (1)
filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a Petition for
Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC
of the issues still pending before the trial court.
In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,30 we said:
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is
equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due
process was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her Affidavit of
Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his
Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that thirdparty claim, he subsequently filed two Motions withdrawing his Urgent
Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her
third-party claim or any other remedy available to her. Her failure to act
gives this Court the impression that she was no longer interested in her
case. Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate
her claim.
Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first
married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They
had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica
Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April
1990).
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got
married on 28 May 1998.31 In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she
represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in
particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table
were owned by the latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were
already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel,
parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special
power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her
claim cannot be sustained.
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in
1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818
formed part of the absolute community regime.1wphi1 However, Art. 92,
par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the
property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of

that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to
the second marriage.
We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.
Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty.
Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum shopping when the latter filed
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case was
still pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon,32 we explained
forum shopping in this wise:
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that
there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files
another before the Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately
splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular
remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open," or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another
court after failing to obtain the same from the original court.
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings
undertaken by the sheriff in executing the judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q0142948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case questions the
merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959.
These cases have different causes of action. Thus, it cannot be said that
petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the
Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007 issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 2904

January 11, 1907

LUIS LIM, administrator, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ISABEL GARCIA, widow of Hilario Lim, defendant-appellee.
Marshall Dawson for appellant.
F. W. Redding for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
distributing the estate of Hilario Lim, deceased, on the consolidated
petition of Luis Lim, administrator, the children of Hilario Lim, deceased,
and the defendant Isabel Garcia, his widow.
Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow and
nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos.
The trial court was of opinion that the entire estate as shown in the
inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property, except a
house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000
pesos which, it was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the said
Hilario Lim, and except, furthermore, 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by
said Lim for a certain lot which it was also admitted had been brought by
him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the administration
of his estate, together with the improvements made thereon during the
period of coverture.
Counsel for the administrator, and for the surviving children, contends that
none of the said property should be treated as the property of the conjugal
partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim, brought to
the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the
intestate estate, and the defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the
conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time
thereafter.
The trial court was of opinion that the evidence offered in support of this
contention was no sufficient to overcome the presumption established in
article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that all the estate of the
married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property (bienes
gananciales) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate
estate of the husband or the wife, and we think after a careful examination
of the record that this finding must be sustained.
The setting aside of 700 pesos (which appears to have been taken as the
value of the lot sold during the administration) as the separate property of
the husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of the
balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings
thereon, as conjugal partnership property, it appearing from the record
that these buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership
funds, was in entire accordance with the provisions of article 1404, which
provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land belonging to
one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership
property, after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof."

G.R. No. L-3629

September 28, 1907

MATEA E. RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SUSANA DE LA CRUZ, ESCOLASTICO DE LA CRUZ, AND PROCESA DE LA
CRUZ, defendants-appellees.
Chicote and Miranda, for appellant.
Leoncio Imperial and Carlos Imperial, for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 21st day of August, 1905, the plaintiff, through her attorneys, filed
an amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Albay for the purpose of recovering from the defendant certain pieces or
parcels of land described in the complaint, alleging: That she was the
owner of the said lands; that she had acquired said lands during her first
marriage from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez; that Hilarion de la
Cruz was her second husband and that she had permission from him to
commence this action in her own name against the said defendant; that
she had been in possession of said lands and enjoyed the fruits of the
same, from the month of May, 1882, until the month of February, 1905;
that the said Hilarion de la Cruz had no interest or right in said property;
that on or about the 20th of February 1905, the defendants in the cause
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay
against the said Hilarion de la Cruz for the partition of the lands described
in the present cause; that on the 29th day of March, 1905, the judge of the
said court adjudged in favor of the defendant Susana de la Cruz in this
action the ownership and possession of the lands described under letter
"B" in the complaint in this cause adjudging and decreeing the ownership
and possession of lands described in letter "A" in this complaint to
Escolastico de la Cruz; that the plaintiff in this cause was not made a party
in the action for partition between the present defendants and the said
Hilarion de la Cruz.
To this petition the defendants filed a special denial, denying certain parts
of the facts set out in the complaint and admitting certain other of the
facts alleged in said complaint. As a special defense the defendants set up
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay of the
29th of March, 1905.
The issue thus formed was duly submitted to the lower court, and after
hearing the evidence the lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff, dismissing the said cause with costs to
the plaintiff. The lower court found as a fact from the evidence adduced
during the trial that the lands described in the complaint were acquired by
Hilarion de la Cruz, the father of the present defendants, "during his
married life with his first wife, Andrea de Leon," and that said lands were
not inherited by the present defendant from her father, Alejo Rodriguez.
From this decision the plaintiff appealed to this court, alleging that the
lower court committed errors, in substance as follows:

The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for the
appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in refusing to order the
inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels of
land, held in the name of the appellee and claimed as her separate estate.
It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were conveyed
to the appellee during the coverture by the said Hilario Lim either as a gift
or for valuable consideration, and that in either in event such conveyance
was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code.

1. That the lower court erred in considering the fact that the said Matea E.
Rodriguez did not intervene in said action for partition between the said
Hilarion de la Cruz and his children of the first marriage as sufficient to
show that she had no interest in the lands in question.

It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not
acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and that they
were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for certain
property inherited by her from her father's estate during the coverture,
and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions of
paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property acquired by
exchange for other property belonging separately to one of the married
couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for which it is
exchanged.

3. That the court erred in finding from the evidence that the said Hilarion
de la Cruz has acquired said lands during the existence of his marriage
relation with the said Andrea de Leon, his first wife, and that said lands
were not inherited by the present plaintiff from her deceased father.

The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there is
nothing in the record which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of
her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption
that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate
(paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character. For the
purpose of this decision, however, it is not necessary to determine the
precise character of the estate of the appellee in this property because
there can be no double that it was her separate estate, and whether dowry
or paraphernalia, the trial court properly excluded it from the inventory of
the property of the deceased which was to be distributed among his
legitimate heirs.
No error was assigned by either party touching the amount of the
usufructuary interest in the estate of her husband allowed to the widow by
the trial court, and we can not, therefore, review the action of the trial
court in this connection.
The judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twelve
days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter the record remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.

2. That the court erred in declaring that the said Hilarion de la Cruz was the
owner of the lands in question, for simple fact that he had been
administering said lands during the entire period of his marriage with the
present plaintiff.

With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that for the reason that the said Matea E. Rodriguez
had not been made a party in the action for partition between the present
defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz, her interest in said lands was in
no way prejudiced by the decision of the court in that cause.
Section 277 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil Actions provides, among
other things, that proceedings in a cause against one person can not affect
the rights of another.
It is admitted by the parties in the present action that the said Matea E.
Rodriguez was not made a party in the former action for the partition
between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz, neither is
it shown that she had any knowledge or information concerning the
existence or pendency of said action.,
With reference of the second assignment of error above noted, it is
admitted that soon after the marriage of the said Hilarion de la Cruz with
the present plaintiff he commenced to administer the property in question.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from
administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and certainly
it can not be concluded that the property which he administers for his wife
is his for the mere reason that he has administered the same for a long
time.
Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the
ownership of her property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is
true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the management of the

property, unless she was delivered the same to her husband by means of a
public document, providing that he may administer said property; but it
can not be claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted her husband
to administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced
by a public document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the
same has become the property of her husband. No such claim was made in
the court below on behalf of the defendants. Their claim was that the said
Hilarion de la Cruz had acquired said property during the existence of his
marriage with his first wife, Andrea de Leon.
With reference to the third assignment of error above noted, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, after an examination of the evidence adduced during
the trial of said cause, that the said lands in question were acquired by
Matea E. Rodriguez by inheritance during the existence of her first
marriage, from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez.
Therefore, from all the foregoing facts, we are of the opinion that the
judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and it is hereby ordered
that the said cause be remanded to the lower court with direction that a
judgment be entered declaring that the said plaintiffs, Matea E. Rodriguez,
is the owner and is entitled to the possession, as against the said
defendants, of the lands described i the amended complaint presented in
this cause.
Without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
[G.R. No. 41278. May 5, 1934.]
PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST CO., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondent-Appellee.
Gibbs & McDonough and Roman Ozaeta for Appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Pea for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACTS; TRUST. D. A., a married woman, without permission of
her husband, conveyed in trust to the Peoples Bank and Trust Co. her
paraphernal property consisting of lands and buildings the administration
of which she had not conferred upon her husband, for the following
purposes: So that the lands would be subdivided into small lots; that such
lots would be sold either for cash or by installment; that the trustee would
redeem the mortgage constituted on the property with funds a loan of
P10,000 with which to redeem the mortgage in question; and that the said
trustee would collect the rents due on the property during the time the lots
remained unsold. Held: That under the deed of trust in question the
grantor did not part with nor alienate the rents to be derived from the said
property in favor of the trustee, and therefore, the instrument thus
executed is susceptible of registration.
2. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY NOT DELIVERED TO THE HUSBAND BEFORE A
NOTARY; MANAGEMENT. Pursuant to the provisions of article 1384 of
the Civil Code, the wife has the management of the paraphernal property
which has not been delivered to her husband before a notary.
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE WIFE TO DELEGATE MANAGEMENT. Inasmuch
as the wife has the management of her paraphernal property which has
not been delivered to her husband, in accordance with article 1384 of the
Civil Code, there is no question that she has the right to collect the rents
thereof and that she may delegate such power to another person. To deny
her such power would be tantamount to converting her from an
administratrix into a mere collector of rents.
4. FRUITS OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY; MANAGEMENT. - Pursuant to the
provisions of articles 1385 and 1401 (3) of the Civil Code, the husband has
the management of the fruits of paraphernal property on the ground that
they belong to the conjugal partnership of which he is the administrator.
However, inasmuch as under article 1384 of the same Code the wife has
the management of her paraphernal property which she has not delivered
to her husband before a notary, it follows that while the fruits thereof
remain unliquidated they should continue under her management on the
ground that they answer for the necessary and indispensable expenses for
their administration and preservation. Not till then does the husband have
the right to claim them for the conjugal partnership of which he is the
exclusive legal administrator.
5. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY; PROHIBITION OF ARTICLE 1387 OF THE CIVIL
CODE. Failure to comply with the requisite prescribed in article 1387 of
the Civil Code, which was in force before the promulgation of Act No. 3922
of the Philippine Legislature, does not render the contract, executed by the
wife without permission of her husband, null and void ab initio but merely
voidable, and the right of action which may arise under such circumstances
exclusively belongs to the husband or his heirs. Wherefore, even granting
that such public instrument is defective, it is, nevertheless, susceptible of
registration.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the Peoples Bank and Trust Co. from the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, denying the
registration of a certain instrument entitled "Agreement and Declaration of
Trust."

The undisputed facts of the case may be summarized as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On October 26, 1933, Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval who
resides in Palawan and from whom she lives separate and apart, executed
an instrument entitled "Agreement and Declaration of Trust" in favor of the
Peoples Bank and Trust Co. whereby she conveyed in trust her paraphernal
property consisting of three (3) parcels of land together with two (2)
buildings thereon, situated at Nos. 1989 and 1993 Juan Luna, Manila,
particularly described in transfer certificate of title No. 21661 issued in her
name. The said trust was constituted in order that the lands would be
subdivided into small lots; that said lots would be sold either for cash or by
installments; that the trustee would redeem the mortgage constituted on
said property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof; that the
trustee would grant a loan of P10,000 with which to redeem the mortgage
in question; and that the said trustee would collect the rents to be derived
from said property while the lots remained unsold.
The instrument was presented to the register of deeds for the City of
Manila for registration, which was denied by the said official. Whereupon
the Peoples Bank and Trust Co. brought the matter in consulta before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, which on January 5, 1934, sustained the
action of the register of deeds and denied the registration applied for.
The trial court based its decision on the alleged ground that according to
the terms of the contract the trustee was authorized to collect the fruits of
the paraphernal property while the lots remained unsold or unalienated to
other persons in the manner above stated, and, inasmuch as under the
provisions of articles 1385 and 1401 (3) of the Civil Code such fruits are
considered conjugal partnership property, the management of which
corresponds to the husband, in accordance with article 1412 of the said
Code, and said husband did not intervene in nor give his consent to the
instrument in question, the same is null and void and, therefore, not
susceptible of registration.
The appellant contends that pursuant to the provisions of article 1387 of
the Civil Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3922 of the Philippine
Legislature, the grantor Dominga Angeles did not need marital consent
thereto and, therefore, the instrument is valid and susceptible of
registration.
The question raised in this appeal does not require interpretation nor
application of the provisions of Act No. 3922, amending article 1387 of the
Civil Code. For the purposes of this decision it is taken for granted that, in
accordance with the provisions of articles 1385 and 1401 (3) of the Civil
Code, the fruits of the paraphernal property, which had been conveyed in
trust, belong to the conjugal partnership, the management of which
corresponds exclusively to the husband of the grantor (article 1412).
It should be borne in mind that according to the deed of trust the grantor
neither parts with nor conveys the rents of her paraphernal property in
favor of the trustee but merely authorizes it to collect them during the time
the lots remain unsold. The authority thus conferred only constitutes a
mere act of administration which article 1384 expressly vests upon the
grantor, in the instant case involving paraphernal property which she has
not delivered to her husband before a notary, for the purpose of conferring
its management upon him. The article in question reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1384. The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal
property unless she has delivered the same to her husband before a
notary, for the purpose of conferring its management upon him.
"In such cases it shall be the duty of the husband to execute a mortgage for
the value of any personality which may be so delivered to him or otherwise
secure it in the manner prescribed with respect to dowry property."cralaw
virtua1aw library
If the grantor is the legal administratrix of the property in question, there
can be no question that she has the right to collect the fruits thereof and
that she may, as she has done in this case, delegate such power to other
persons. To deny her such right would be tantamount to converting her
from administratrix thereof into a mere collector of rents.
To the wife belongs the management of the fruits of her paraphernal
property, which has not been delivered to her husband under the
formalities prescribed by the law, while such fruits remain unliquidated, on
the ground that they answer for the necessary and indispensable expenses
incurred in the administration and preservation of the property. Not till
then does the husband acquire the right to claim them for the conjugal
partnership of which he is the sole administrator. Applying this principle to
the case under consideration, it becomes evident that the grantors
husband cannot claim the fruits in question for their conjugal partnership
until a liquidation thereof has been made by her.
On the other hand, failure to comply with the requisite prescribed in article
1387 does not render the contract null and void ab initio but merely

voidable, and the right of action which may arise under such circumstances
exclusively belongs to the husband or his heirs. Wherefore, even granting
that such public instrument is defective, it is, nevertheless, susceptible of
registration.
What we have heretofore stated finds support in the following
commentaries of Manresa:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Fortunately there is already a decision of the Supreme Court to that
effect. The doctrine is sufficiently explicit. A married woman, actually living
separate from her husband, leases her paraphernal property, collects rents
and appoints administrators thereof, without marital consent. The husband
claims that such acts demand his permission as an indispensable requisite.
The trial court absolves the wife and, upon appeal, it is held, on November
8, 1898, that the management of paraphernal property conferred upon the
wife by article 1384 of the Civil Code carries with it the power to enter into
contracts regarding the same, subject only to the limitation contained in
article 1387, the wife personally defraying the expenses incurred therein as
a consequence, without prejudice to the liabilities to which such property is
subject, in accordance with the provisions of article 1385.
"Later, the decision of October 16, 1918, held that the management of the
paraphernal property by the wife should be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of article 1384 of the Civil Code, which only differs from the
former law in that for such acts and contracts executed in connection with
said management the wife does not need marital consent. This
management should not be understood as limited by the law merely to
gathering fruits and collecting rents and interest thereon and delivering
them to the husband, for that would be tantamount to converting the wife
from an administratrix into a mere collector of rents of the paraphernal
property, which is one of the manifold acts embraced by the
administration, and which, on the other hand, is compatible with the
provisions of article 1385.
"Finally, the decision of January 14, 1928, ratifies this same doctrine and
holds that the prohibition contained in article 1387 cannot, from its very
nature, be interpreted except in a restrictive manner, by reason of which
the wife may legally perform every act not intended to alienate, mortgage
or otherwise encumber her paraphernal property, she being authorized to
execute contracts arising from the administration of an estate, and
consequently to obtain loans, without marital consent, for the benefit of
said property.
"From the foregoing, we may conclude that, although the Civil Code has
not solved this question at issue explicitly and definitely, the most logical
interpretation that can be given to article 1384, in connection with article
1387, is that which grants the wife complete freedom in the management
of her paraphernal property and renders marital consent as unnecessary,
except for acts expressly stated in articles 1387, 995 and 1053. The
exceptions contained in articles 61 and 1263, although vague and broad in
scope, agree with this solution inasmuch as in the last analysis they admit
of cases in which a married woman does not need marital consent. Such
broadness leaves enough ground to suppose that the aforesaid cases
include the management granted the wife by article 1384.
x
x
x
"The consent of the husband has the same meaning in article 1387 as in all
the other articles of the Code which demand this requisite. It does not
merely fill up any defect in the capacity of a woman to contract and bind
herself. It is a very personal power granted the head of the family to
maintain good order therein, as affirmed by the Registry Office, or to avoid
loss or damages that the conjugal partnership might suffer without such
intervention, as affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Resolution of January 24,
1898, and decisions of June 27, 1866, and January 30, 1872.)
"Lack of marital consent does not render the act null and void but merely
voidable at the instance of the husband or of his heirs. Hence the
admission for registration nowadays of contracts executed by the wife
without such requisite, stating such circumstance therein, as we have
declared at the end of the commentary on article 65, second edition of this
work. (Resolutions of November 23, 1892, August 22, 1894, and March 31,
1898.)" (Manresa, vol. IX, pp. 433, 434, 448, Fourth Edition.)
x

"Article 62 declares null and void the acts executed by the wife without the
consent of her husband in cases where such consent is a necessary
requisite. However, according to the legal provision just considered, only
the husband and his heirs may avoid such acts, which is but logical and
natural, considering the spirit of the legal provision in question. From the
foregoing and applying the Civil Marriage Law and the former laws which
accepted the same doctrine, the Supreme Court, in its decisions of June 27,
1866, January 30, 1872, and November 14, 1862, held that acts performed
by a married woman without permission of her husband are not null and
void but merely voidable, at the instance of the husband or his heirs, on
the ground that the legal prohibition in question was not established in
favor of third persons but with a different end or purpose, that is, in favor
of the husband whom the law wants to protect from possible damages to
the conjugal partnership of which he is the head.

"After the Civil Code went into effect, the General Registry Office accepted
the same doctrine and even considered acts and contracts, executed by a
married woman without permission of her husband, susceptible of
registration as long as such circumstance was stated in the record, to serve
as notice to third persons who might later contract with regard to the same
property. (Resolutions of November 23, 1892 and August 22, 1894.) It
would seem that this doctrine is contradicted by those established on
January 24, 1898, March 29, 1901, and April 21, 1908, but the principal
question raised in the first case was whether or not the husband could
authorize a third person to give such consent, while in the second and third
cases no statement was made to the effect that the contracts was not
registerable, nor much less null and void, but that the deed was not
extended by the notary, who instituted the appeal, in accordance with the
provisions of the law. On March 31, 1898, the General Registry Office
reiterated its views in favor of registration notwithstanding the lack of the
requisite of marital consent."cralaw virtua1aw library
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the register
of deeds for the City of Manila is hereby ordered to register the instrument
in question, upon payment of the corresponding legal fees, without special
pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered

G.R. No. L-23352

December 31, 1925

THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD., INC., plaintiffappellee,

vs.
JUAN M. POIZAT, ET AL., defendants.
GABRIELA ANDREA DE COSTER, appellant.
Antonio M. Opisso for appellant.
Eusebio Orense and Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for appellee.
STATEMENT
August 25, 1905, the appellant, with his consent executed to and in favor
of her husband, Juan M. Poizat, a general power of attorney, which among
other things, authorized him to do in her name, place and stead, and
making use of her rights and actions, the following things:
To loan or borrow any amount in cash or fungible conditions he may
deem convenient collecting or paying the principal or interest, for the
time, and under the principal of the interest, when they respectively
should or private documents, and making there transactions with or
without mortgage, pledge or personal securities.
November 2, 1912, Juan M. Poizat applied for and obtained from the
plaintiff a credit for the sum of 10,000 Pounds Sterling to be drawn on the"
Banco Espanol del Rio de la Plata" in London not later than January, 1913.
Later, to secure the payment of the loan, he executed a mortgage upon the
real property of his wife, the material portions of which are as follows:
This indenture entered into the City of Manila, P.I., by and between Juan
M. Poizat, merchant, of legal age, married and residing in the City of
Manila, in his own behalf and in his capacity also as attorney in fact of
his wife Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster by virtue of the authority
vested in him by the power of attorney duly executed and acknowledge
in this City of Manila, etc.
First. That in the name of Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster, wife of Don
Juan M. Poizat, there is registered on page 89 (back) of Book 3, Urban
Property consisting of a house and six adjacent warehouse, all of strong
material and constructed upon her own land, said property being Nos. 5,
3, and 1 of Calle Urbiztondo, and No. 13 of Calle Barraca in the District of
Binondo in the City of Manila, etc.
Second. That the marriage of Don Juan M. Poizat and Dona Gabriela
Andrea de Coster being subsisting and undissolved, and with the object
of constructing a new building over the land hereinabove described, the
aforesaid house with the six warehouse thereon constructed were
demolished and in their stead a building was erected, by permission of
the Department of Engineering and Public Works of this City issued
November 10, 1902, said building being of strong material which,
together with the land, now forms only one piece of real estate, etc;
which property must be the subject of a new description in which it
must appear that the land belongs in fee simple and in full ownership as
paraphernal property to the said Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster and
the new building thereon constructed to the conjugal partnership of Don
Juan M. Poizat and the said Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster, etc.
Third. That the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd.,
having granted to Don Juan M. Poizat a credit of Ten Thousand Pounds
Sterling with a mortgage upon the real property above described, etc.
(a) That the Philippine sugar Estated Development Company, Ltd. hereby
grants Don Juan M. Poizat a credit in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pounds sterling which the said Mr. Poizat may use within the entire
month of January of the coming year, 1913, upon the bank established
in the City of London, England, known as 'Banco Espanol del Rio de la
Plata, which shall be duly advised, so as to place upon the credit of Mr.
Poizat the said amount of Ten Thousand Pounds Sterling, after executing
the necessary receipts therefore.

(c) That Don Juan M. Poizat personally binds himself and also binds his
principal Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster to pay the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., for the said amount of Ten
Thousand Pounds Sterling at the yearly interest of 9 per cent which shall
be paid at the end of each quarter, etc.
(d) Don Juan M. Poizat also binds himself personally and his principal
Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster to return to the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., the amount of Ten Thousand Pounds
Sterling within four years from the date that the said Mr. Poizat shall
receive the aforesaid sum as evidenced by the receipt that he shall issue
to the 'BAnco Espanol del Rio de la Plata.'
(e) As security for the payment of the said credit, in the case Mr. Poizat
should receive the money, together with its interest hereby constitutes
a voluntary especial mortgage upon the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., f the urban property above described, etc.
(f) Don Juan M. Poizat in the capacity above mentioned binds himself,
should he receive the amount of the credit, and while he may not return
the said amount of Ten thousand Pounds Sterling to the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., to insure against fire the
mortgaged property in an amount not less than One hundred Thousand
Pesos, etc.
Fourth. Don Buenaventura Campa in the capacity that he holds hereby
accepts this indenture in the form, manner, and condition executed by
Don Juan M. Poizat by himself personally and in representation of his
wife Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster, in favor of the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd.,
In witness whereof, we have signed these presents in Manila, this
November 2, 1912.
(Sgd.) JUAN M. POIZAT
THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD.
The President
BUENAVENTURA CAMPA

was tainted with fraud, and that she first knew and learned of such things
on the 11th of September, 1924. That J. M. Poizat was not authorized to
bind her property to secure the payment of his personal debts. That the
plaintiff knew that the agent of the defendant was not authorized to bind
her or her property. That the mortgage was executed to secure a loan of
10,000 Pounds which was not made to this defendant or for her benefit,
but was made to him personally and for the personal use and benefit of J.
M. Poizat.
Among other things, the mortgage in question, marked Exhibit B, was
introduced in evidence, and made a part of the record.
All of such objections to the confirmation of the sale were overruled, from
which Gabriela Andrea de Coster appealed and assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in finding that Juan M. Poizat was, under the
power of attorney which he had from Gabriela Andrea de Coster,
authorized to mortgage her paraphernal property as security for a loan
made to him personally by the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., to him;
II. The lower court erred in not finding that under the power of attorney,
Juan M. Poizat had no authority to make Gabriela Andrea de Coster
jointly liable with him for a loan of 10,000 pound made by the Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Co., Ltd., to him;
III. The lower court erred in not finding that the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., had knowledge and notice of the lack of
authority of Don Juan M. Poizat to execute the mortgage deed Exhibit A
of the plaintiff;
IV. The lower court erred in holding that Gabriela Andrea de Coster was
duly summoned in this case; and in holding that Attorney Jose Galan y
Blanco could lawfully represent her or could, without proof of express
authority, confess judgment against Gabriela Andrea de Coster;
V. The court erred in holding that the judgment in this case has become
final and res judicata;
VI. The court erred in approving the judicial sale made by the sheriff at
an inadequate price;

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd.) MANUEL SAPSANO
JOSE SANTOS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
CITY OF MANILA

JOHNS, J.:

In the City of Manila P.I., this November 2, 1912, before me Enrique

Barrera y Caldes, a Notary Public for said city, personally appeared
before me Don Juan M. Poizat and Don Buenaventura Campa, whom i
know to be the persons who executed the foregoing document and
acknowledged same before me as an act of their free will and deed; the
first exhibited to me his certificate of registry No. 14237, issued in
Manila, February 6, 1912, the second did not exhibit any cedula, being
over sixty years old; this document bears No. 495, entered on page 80 of
my Notarial registry.

For the reasons stated in the decision of this court in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. De Coster, the alleged service of the summons in the
foreclosure suit upon the appellant was null and void. In fact, it was made
on J. M. Poizat only, and there is no claim or pretense that any service of
summons was ever made upon her. After service was made upon him, the
attorneys in question entered their appearance for all of the defendants in
the action, including the appellant upon whom no service was ever made,
and file an answer for them. Later, in open court, it was agreed that
judgment should be entered for the plaintiff as prayed for in its complaint.

Before me:
(Sgd.) Dr. ENRIQUE BARRERA Y CALDES
[NOTARIAL SEAL]
Notary Public
Up to the 31st of December , 1912
For failure to pay the loan, on November 12, 1923, the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendants to foreclose the mortgage. In this action, the
summons was served upon the defendant Juan M. Poizat only, who
employed the services of Antonio A. Sanz to represent the defendants. The
attorneys filed a general appearance for all of them, and later an answer in
the nature of a general denial.
February 18, 1924, when the case was called for trial, Jose Galan y Blanco
in open court admitted all of the allegations made in the compliant, and
consented that judgment should be rendered as prayed for . Later, Juan M.
Poizat personally, for himself and his codefendants, file an exception to the
judgment and moved for a new trial, which was denied March 31, 1924.
August 22, 1924, execution was issued directing the sale of the mortgaged
property to satisfy the judgment.itc@alf
September 18, 1924, the property, which had an assessed value of
P342,685, was sold to the plaintiff for the sum of P100,000.
September 23, 1924, and for the first time, the appellant personally
appeared by her present attorney, and objected to the confirmation of the
sale, among other things, upon illegally executed, and is null and void,
because the agent of this defendant was not authorized to execute it. That
there was no consideration. That the plaintiff, with full knowledge that J.
M. Poizat was acting beyond the scope of his authority, filed this action to
subject the property of this defendant to the payment of the debt which,
as to appellant, was not a valid contract. That the judgment was rendered
by confession when the plaintiff and J. M. Poizat knew that Poizat was not
authorized to confess judgment, and that the proceeding was a
constructive fraud. That at the time the action was filed and the judgment
rendered, this defendant was absent from the Philippine Islands, and had
no knowledge of the execution of the mortgage. That after the judgment of
foreclosure became final and order of the sale of the property was made,
that this defendant for the first time learned that he mortgage contract

VII. The lower court erred in not declaring these proceedings, the
judgment and the sale null and void.

The appellant contends that the appearance made by the attorneys for her
was collusive and fraudulent, and that it was made without her authority,
and there maybe some truth in that contention. It is very apparent that t
the attorneys made no effort to protect or defend her legal rights, but
under our view of the case, that question is not material to this decision.
The storm center of this case is the legal force and effect of the real
mortgage in question , by whom and for whom it was executed, and upon
whom is it binding, and whether or not it is null and void as to the
appellant.
It is admitted that the appellant gave her husband, J. M. Poizat, the power
of attorney in question, and that it is in writing and speaks for itself. If the
mortgage was legally executed by her attorney in fact for her and in her
name as her act and deed, it would be legal and binding upon her and her
property. If not so executed, it is null and void.
It appears upon the face of the instrument that J. M. Poizat as the husband
of the wife, was personally a party to the mortgage, and that he was the
only persona who signed the mortgage. and the he was the only person
who signed the mortgage. It does not appear from his signature that he
signed it for his wife or as her agent or attorney in fact, and there is
nothing in his signature that would indicate that in the signing of it by him,
he intended that his signature should bind his wife. It also appears from the
acknowledgment of the instrument that he executed it as his personal act
and deed only, and there is nothing to show that he acknowledge it as the
agent or attorney in fact of his wife, or as her act and deed.
The mortgage recites that it was entered into by and between Juan M.
Poizat in his own behalf and as attorney in fact of his wife. That the record
title of the mortgaged property is registered in the name of his wife, Dona
Gabriela Andrea de Coster. That they were legally married, and that the
marriage between them has never been dissolved. That with the object of
constructing a new building on the land. the six warehouses thereon were
demolished, and that a new building was erected. That the property is the
subject of a new registration in which it must be made to appear that the
land belongs in fee simple and in full ownership as the paraphernal
property of the wife, and that the new building thereon is the property of
the conjugal partnership. "That the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., having granted to Don Juan M. Poizat a credit of 10,000

Pounds Sterling with the mortgage upon the real property above
described," that the Development Company "hereby grants Don Juan M.
Poizat a credit in the amount of 10,000 Pounds Sterling which the said Mr.
Poizat may use, etc." That should he personally or on behalf of his wife use
the credit he acknowledges, that he and his principal are indebted to the
Development Company in the sum of 10,000 Pounds Sterling which "they
deem to have received as a loan from the said commercial entity." That he
binds himself and his wife to pay that amount with a yearly interest of 9
per cent, payable quarterly. That as security for the payment of said credit
in the case Mr. Poizat should receive the money at any time, with its
interest, "the said Mr. Poizat in the dual capacity that above mentioned
binds himself, should he receive the amount of the credit."
It thus appears that at the time the power of attorney and the mortgage
were executed, Don Juan M. Poizat and Gabriela Andrea de Coster were
husband and wife, and that the real property upon which the mortgage
was her sole property before her marriage, and that it was her paraphernal
property at the time the mortgage was executed, and that the new building
constructed on the land was the property of the conjugal partnership.
The instrument further recites that the Development Company "hereby
grants Don Juan M. Poizat a credit in the amount of 10,000 Pounds Sterling
which the said Mr. Poizat may use within the entire month of January of
the coming year, 1913." In other words, it appears upon the face of the
mortgage that the loan was made to the husband with authority to use the
money for his sole use and benefit. With or without a power of attorney,
the signature of the husband would be necessary to make the instrument a
valid mortgage upon the property of the wife, even though she personally
signed the mortgage.
It is contended that the instrument upon its face shows that its purpose
and intent was to bind the wife. But it also shows upon its face that the
credit was granted to Don Juan M. Poizat which he might use within the
"entire month of January."
Any authority which he had to bind his wife should be confined and limited
to his power of attorney.
Giving to it the very broadest construction, he would not have any
authority to mortgage her property, unless the mortgage was executed for
her "and in her name, place or stead," and as her act and deed. The
mortgage in question was not so executed. it was signed by Don Juan M.
Poizat in his own name, his own proper person, and by him only, and it was
acknowledge by him in his personal capacity, and there is nothing in either
the signature or acknowledgment which shows or tends to show that it was
executed for or on behalf of his wife or "in her name, place or stead."
It is contended that the instrument shows upon its face that it was
intended to make the wife liable for his debt, and to mortgage her property
to secure its payment, and that his personal signature should legally be
construed as the joined or dual signature of both the husband and that of
the wife as her agent. That is to say, construing the recitals in the mortgage
and the instrument as a whole, his lone personal signature should be
construed in a double capacity and binding equally and alike both upon the
husband and the wife. No authority has been cited, and none will ever be
found to sustain such a construction.
As the husband of the wife, his signature was necessary to make the
mortgage valid. In other words, to make it valid, it should have been signed
by the husband in his own proper person and by him as attorney in fact for
his wife, and it should have been executed by both husband and wife, and
should have been so acknowledged.
There is no principle of law by which a person can become liable on a real
mortgage which she never executed either in person or by attorney in fact.
It should be noted that this is a mortgage upon real property, the title to
which cannot be divested except by sale on execution or the formalities of
a will or deed. For such reasons, the law requires that a power of attorney
to mortgage or sell real property should be executed with all of the
formalities required in a deed. For the same reason that the personal
signature of Poizat, standing alone, would not convey the title of his wife in
her own real property, such a signature would not bind her as a mortgagor
in real property, the title to which was in her name.
We make this broad assertion that upon the facts shown in the record, no
authority will ever be found to hold the wife liable on a mortgage of her
real property which was executed in the form and manner in which the
mortgage in question was executed. The real question involved is fully
discussed in Mechem on Agency, volume 1, page 784, in which the author
says:
It is to be observed that the question here is not how but how such an
authority is to be executed. it is assumed that the agent was
authorized to bind his principal, but the question is, has he done so.

instrument to be his, and the seal purports to be his seal, the deed will
bind the agent if any one and not the principal.
SEC. 1101. Whose deed is a given deed. How question determined.
In determining whether a given deed is the deed of the principal, regard
may be had First, to the party named as grantor. Is the deed stated to be
made by the principal or by some other person? Secondly, to the
granting clause. Is the principal or the agent the person who purports to
make the grant? Thirdly, to the covenants, if any. Are these the
covenants of the principal? Fourthly, to the testimonium clause. Who is
it who is to set his name and seal in testimony of the grant? Is it the
principal or the agent? And Fifthly, to the signature and seal. Whose
signature and seal are these? Are they those of the principal or of the
agent?
If upon such an analysis the deed does not upon its face purport to be
the deed of the principal, made, signed, sealed and delivered in his
name and his deed, it cannot take effect as such.
SEC. 1102. Not enough to make deed the principal's that the agent is
described as such. It is not enough merely that not acted in the name
of the principal. Nor is it ordinarily sufficient that he describes himself in
the deed as acting by virtue of a power of attorney or otherwise, or for
or in behalf, or as attorney, of the principal, or as a committee, or as
trustee of a corporation, etc.; for these expressions are usually
butdescriptio personae, and if, in fact, he has acted of action thereon
accrue to and against him personally and not to or against the principal,
despite these recital.
SEC. 1103. Not principal's deed where agent appears as grantor and
signer. Neither can the deed ordinarily be deemed to be the deed of
the principal where the agent is the one who is named as the grantor or
maker, and he is also the one who signs and seals it. . . .
SEC. 1108. . . . But however clearly the body of the deed may show an
intent that it shall be the act of he principal, yet unless its executed by
his attorney for him, it is not his deed, but the deed of the attorney or of
no one. The most usual and approved form of executing a deed by
attorney is by his writing the name of the principal and adding by A B his
attorney or by his attorney A B.'
That is good law. Applying it to the facts, under his power of attorney, Juan
M. Poizat may have had authority to borrow money and mortgage the real
property of his wife, but the law specifies how and in what manner it must
be done, and the stubborn fact remains that, as to the transaction in
question, that power was never exercised. The mortgage in question was
executed by him and him only, and for such reason, it is not binding upon
the wife, and as to her, it is null and void.
It follows that the whole decree against her and her paraphernal property
and the sale of that property to satisfy the mortgage are null and void, and
that any title she may have had in or to her paraphernal property remains
and is now vested in the wife as fully and as absolutely as if the mortgage
had never been executed, the decree rendered or the property sold. As to
Don Juan M. Poizat, the decree is valid and binding, and remains in full
force and effect.
It is an undisputed fact, which appears in the mortgage itself, that the land
in question was the paraphernal property of the wife, but after the
marriage the old buildings on the property were torn down and a new
building constructed and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it
must be presumed that the new building is conjugal property of the
husband and wife. As such, it is subject of the debts of the conjugal
partnership for the payment or security of which the husband has the
power to mortgage or otherwise encumber the property .
It is very probable that his particular question was not fully presented to or
considered by the lower court.
The mortgage as to the paraphernal property of the wife is declared null
and void ab initio, and as to her personally, the decree is declared null and
void, and as to her paraphernal property, the sale is set aside and vacated,
and held for naught, leaving it free and clear from the mortgage, decree
and sale, and in the same condition as if the mortgage had never been
executed, with costs in favor of the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 143297

February 11, 2003

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and

ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
DECISION

That is the question here.

PUNO, J.:

Upon that point, there is a full discussion in the following sections, and
numerous authorities are cited:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053, entitled "Romeo V. Miat vs.
Spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro, Moises B. Miat and Alexander V.
Miat," dated November 29, 1999.1

SEC. 1093. Deed by agent must purport to be made and sealed in the
name of the principal. It is a general rule in the law of agency that in
order to bind the principal by a deed executed by an agent, the deed
must upon its grace purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name
of the principal. If, on the contrary, though the agent describes name,
the words of grant, covenant and the like, purport upon the face of the

The evidence shows that the spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought
two (2) parcels of land during their coverture. The first is located at Wawa
La Huerta, Airport Village, Paraaque, Metro Manila2 and covered by TCT
No. S-33535.3 The second is located at Paco, Manila,4 and covered by TCT

No. 163863.5 Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two (2) children:
Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Paraaque
and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander.6 However,
when Moises returned in 1984, he renegotiated the agreement with
Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Paraaque property for himself but
would leave the Paco property to his two (2) sons. They agreed.7
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on
installment basis on May 17, 1977.8 However, it was only on December 14,
1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance.9 He secured the title over the
property in his name as a widower.10 According to Romeo, Moises violated
the agreement that their (Romeos and Alexanders) names would be
registered in the title once the balance was paid.11 Upon demand, Moises
gave the owners duplicate of the Paco property title to Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty taxes
and fire insurance premiums.12 In early August 1985, Alexander and his first
wife left the house for personal reasons. In April 1988, Alexander agreed to
sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property for P42,750.00.13 He received
a partial payment ofP6,000.00 from Romeo.14 Nonetheless, he never
executed a deed of assignment in favor of Romeo, as he "had lots of work
to do and had no time and x x x there [wa]s nothing to worry [as] the title
[wa]s in [Romeos] possession."15
In February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his wedding, Mrs.
Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that she had given
Moises P30,000.00 as downpayment for the sale by Moises of the Paco
property to her son Virgilio.16
On December 1, 1988, Romeo was brought by petitioner Virgilio Castro to
the chambers of Judge Anunciacion of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila where the status of the Paco property was discussed.17 On
December 16, 1988, he received a letter from petitioner Castros lawyer
asking for a conference. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had
been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December
5, 198818 for ninety-five thousand (P95,000.00) pesos.19
Ceferino Miat, brother of petitioner Moises,20 testified that even before the
death of Concordia21 there was already an agreement that the Paco
property would go to Romeo and Alexander.22 This was reiterated at the
deathbed of Concordia.23 When Moises returned to Manila for good, the
agreement was reiterated24 in front of the extended Miat family
members.25 Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally26 divided the Paco
property between themselves.27 Later, however, Alexander sold his share
to Romeo.28 Alexander was given P6,000.00 as downpayment. This was
corroborated by Pedro Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Miranda worked with
Moises at the Bayview Hotel and the Hotel Filipinas.29 His wife is the cousin
of Romeo and Alexander.30 Virgilio is the brother of Moises.
Moises confirmed that he and his wife Concordia bought the Paco property
on installment from the Fraval Realty, Inc. There was still a balance
of P12,000.00 on the lot at the time of his wifes death.31 He paid P3,500.00
in 198132 and P8,500.00 in 1984.33 He registered the title in his name.
Romeo then borrowed the title as he was going to mortgage it to his friend
Lorenzo.34
Later, Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged
for P30,000.00 the Paco property to the parents of petitioner Virgilio
Castro.35 He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to sell
the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. He
accompanied his children to the Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a
judge and a lawyer. Also present in the meeting were petitioner Virgilio
Castro and his parents. After the conference, he proceeded to sell the
property to the petitioners-spouses Castro.36
Alexander testified that after the sale, his father got one-third (1/3) of the
proceeds while he received two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get a single
centavo but was given the right to till their Nueva Ecija property.37 From his
share of the proceeds, Alexander intended to return to Romeo
the P6,000.00 given him earlier by the latter. He considered the money to
be a personal debt due Romeo, not Romeos downpayment of his share in
the Paco property.38
The buyer of the property, petitioner Virgilio P. Castro, testified that he
informed Romeo that his father Moises was selling the Paco property.
Romeo replied: "Bahala siya."39 The second time he informed Romeo about
the pending sale was when he brought Romeo, Alexander and Moises to
Judge Anunciacion to "consult him [as to] who has [the] right over the
[Paco] property."40 He further declared that he "went to the Metropolitan
Trial Court because [he] wanted to be sure whether [he] could buy the
property."41 During the meeting, he was told by Romeo that the Paco
property was already given to him (Romeo) by Moises. He admitted
knowing that the title to the Paco property was in the possession of
Romeo.42 However, he proceeded with the sale. Moises assured him that
he would be able to get the title from Romeo.43
These events precipitated the case at bar. Romeo filed an action to nullify
the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to compel Moises and
Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco
property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to
make them pay damages.44
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,45 which in its
dispositive portion states as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders the

following: 1) Defendant Alexander V. Miat to execute a deed of sale of his
share in the property upon payment by plaintiff Romeo of the balance of
the purchase price in the sum of P36,750.00; 2) Plaintiff Romeo V. Miat to
recognize as valid the sale of defendant Moises share in the house and lot
located at No. 1495-C Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; 3) the dismissal of
defendants counter-claim; and 4) defendants to pay the costs of suit."
Both parties appealed to Court of Appeals. On November 29, 1999, the
appellate Court modified the Decision as follows:46
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) The deed of sale entered into between defendants-appellants Moises
Miat and spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro is hereby NULLIFIED.
(2) Defendant-appellants Moises Miat and Alexander Miat are ordered
to execute a deed of conveyance over the Paco property with TCT No.
16383 (sic) in favor of plaintiff-appellant Romeo Miat, upon payment by
Romeo Miat of the balance of the purchase price in the sum
of P36,750.00.
(3) Defendants-appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff-appellant attorneys fees in the amount of P30,000.00 and to
pay the costs of suit."
Reconsideration was denied on May 17, 2000.
Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following errors:
"THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DID
PETITIONERS AN INJUSTICE IN MODIFYING OR REVERSING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED MARCH 17, 1993 WHICH ORDERED
RESPONDENT ROMEO MIAT TO RECOGNIZE AS VALID THE DEED OF SALE
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PETITIONERS MOISES MIAT AND SPS. VIRGILIO
AND MICHELLE CASTRO PERTAINING TO PETITIONER MOISES MIATS
SHARE IN THE HOUSE AND LOT LOCATED IN PACO, MANILA, WHEN IT
DECLARED SAID DEED OF SALE NULLIFIED.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING OR
UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION ORDERING ALEXANDER MIAT
AND INCLUDING MOISES MIAT TO EXECUTE A DEED OF CONVEYANCE OVER
THE PACO PROPERTY WITH TCT NO. 16383 IN FAVOR OF ROMEO MIAT
UPON PAYMENT BY THE LATTER OF THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
IN THE SUM OF P36,750.00.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FURTHER
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENT, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY,
ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,000.00 AND AFFIRMING THE
COURT A QUOS ORDER FOR THE PETITIONERS TO PAY THE COST OF
SUIT."47
The issues can be simplified thus:
1. Whether the Paco property is conjugal or capital;
2. Whether there was a valid oral partition covering the said property;
and
3. Whether the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith.
I
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital property of
Moises. They allege that the spouses Moises and Concordia purchased the
property on installment basis in 1977 but stress that it was Moises who
paid the balance of twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos in 1984. At that
time, Concordia had long been dead. She died in 1978.
We disagree.
Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply.
Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code48 provides as follows:
"The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses; x x x."
The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title
during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal
property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear.491a\^/phi1.net
Petitioners reliance on Lorenzo vs. Nicolas50 is misplaced. That case
involved two (2) parcels of land that Magdalena Clemente purchased on
installment and started paying for when she was not yet married to Manuel
Lorenzo. When she married Manuel Lorenzo she continued to pay the
installments in her own name. Upon completion of payment, the deed of
final conveyance was executed in her sole favor and the land was
registered in the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente. The Court ruled
that the two (2) parcels of land were the paraphernal properties of
Magdalena Clemente, thus:

"x x x the fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime
of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of Magdalena
Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel no. 6 was
made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive
shows that the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena
Clemente."51 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during
their marriage Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to
be considered as conjugal.
Likewise, Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals52 cited by the petitioners is
inapropos. In said case, Daniel Jovellanos, while he was still married to his
first wife, Leonor Dizon, entered into a "contract of lease and conditional
sale" with Philamlife. He continued paying the rental after the death of his
first wife and during the subsistence of his marriage with his second wife,
Anette Jovellanos. He completed the payment during the existence of his
second marriage. The Court ruled that the property belonged to the
conjugal partnership with the second wife as Daniel Jovellanos "acquired
ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence,
although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2,
1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that the Philamlife executed the deed
of absolute sale thereof in his favor. x x x Since as early as 1967, he was
already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his second wife."53 In the case at
bar, Moises and Concordia executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. The
contract is one of sale the title passed to them upon delivery of the Paco
property.54 In fine, title was gained during the conjugal partnership.
II
The next issue is whether the oral partition between Moises and his sons,
Romeo and Alexander, involving the said property is valid. In ruling in favor
of its validity which we affirm, the appellate court relied on a portion of
Moises letter to Romeo, which reads as follows:55
"KAYA PAG-USAPAN LANG NINYONG MABUTI ANG ANONG BALAK AT
GUSTO NINYONG PAGHATI SA BAHAY, AT YAN AY PAGPAPASIYAHAN KO
KONG (sic) MAKAKABUTI SA INYONG DALAWA. AT WALA AKONG HIGIT NA
PAPABURAN SA INYONG DALAWA PAREHO KAYONG MAHAL SA AKIN,
HINDI AKO TULAD SA IBANG MAGULANG NA HINDI PAREHO ANG
PAGTINGIN SA MGA ANAK. ANG BAHAY56 AY PARA SA INYONG DALAWA,
LALO NA NGAYONG MAY ASAWA NA KAYONG PAREHO. x x x" [All caps in
the original]
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that before Concordia died,
there was an agreement that the Paraaque property would go to Moises
while the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila
for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat family
members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco property
between them. Later, Alexander sold his share to Romeo.
This agreement was attested to by the extended Miat Family members in a
document marked as Exhibit "D," which reads as follows:57
"Pebrero 18, 1989
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA MGA KINAUUKULAN,
Kami, na nakalagda sa ibaba, ay nanunumpa sa harapan ng Punong
Barangay, na si G. REYNALDO P. WONG:
Na kami ay mga saksi sa kasunduan nina G. MOISES B. MIAT, asawa ng
yumao na, na si Gng. CONCORDIA VALENZUELA MIAT, at mga anak nitong
sina G. ROMEO V. MIAT at G. ALEXANDER V. MIAT:
Na ang kasunduan ay ang mga sumusunod:
1. Na ang pag-aaring lupa (132 sq. m.) ng mag-asawa (MOISES at
CONCORDIA) sa Airport Village sa Paraaque, Metro Manila ay
mapupunta kay G. MOISES B. MIAT;
2. Na ang pag-aaring lupa at bahay (70 sq. m.) ng mag-asawa ring
nabanggit ay sa magkapatid na ROMEO at ALEXANDER mapupunta at ito
ay nasa address na 1495-C FABIE, PACO, MANILA.
MGA SUMUMPA:58
(Sgd.)
1) Ceferino B. Miat
(kapatid ni Moises)

(Sgd.)
6) Lorenzo C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Concordia)

(Sgd.)
2) Avelina J. Miat
(asawa ni Ceferino)

(Sgd.)
7) Patricio C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Concordia)

(Sgd.)
4) Aurea Miat-Joson
(kapatid ni Moises)

(Sgd.)
9) Elsa P. Miranda

(Sgd.)
5) Jose A. Joson
(asawa ni Aurea)
(Sgd.)
REYNALDO P. WONG
Kapitan ng Barangay
Sta. Maria, Licab, N.E."(emphasis supplied)
The consideration for the grant to Romeo and Alexander of the Paco
property was best expressed by Moises himself in his letter to Romeo,
which reads as follows:
"Labis akong nagpapasalamat at nauunawaan ninyo ang mga pagkakamali
ko at mga kasalanan kong nagawa sa inyong mag-iina, huwag kayong magalala at lahat nang naipundar namin nang (sic) inyong nanay ay sa inyong
dalawang magkapatid mapupunta."59
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not
covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly,
Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly,
Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified
regarding the sale of Alexanders share to Romeo, were intensely
questioned by petitioners counsel.601awphi1.nt
In the recent case of Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals, we held:61
"[N]o law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered
in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for
its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed
with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for
the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in
a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective
as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, noncompliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the
acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of
Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition
among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property,
considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other
but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an
heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. x x x."
III
The appellate court also correctly held that the petitioners-spouses Castro
were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
property and pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or
before any notice of some other persons claim on or interest in it. The rule
is settled that a buyer of real property, which is in the possession of
persons other than the seller, must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession.1a\^/phi1.net Otherwise, without such
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith.62
This finding of the appellate court that the Castro spouses were not buyers
in good faith is supported by evidence. Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted
in his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco
property to them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who had
the right to the property Moises or Romeo. As well pointed out by the
appellate court:
"In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the
adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they
are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked
with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with
Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of
Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo
told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property
by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he
knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he
is the owner of the property.
xxxxxxxxx
"Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the
property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of
another persons possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully
pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value."63
It is abundantly clear that the petitioners-spouses Castro did not buy the
Paco property in good faith. They have no right to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053 is
affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO
VASQUEZ, respondents.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Officers for petitioner.
Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. No. 63474,
promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON, plaintiffappellee, versus AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ,
defendant-appellants," upholding the validity of three (3) documents
questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which declared them as null and
void; and of its resolution, dated September 30, 1980, denying therein
appellee's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the
only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina.
Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate
being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1,
1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of
three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These
documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez
what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these
documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and
Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises Jocson,
as the party assailing its validity, but rather by herein respondents, are the
following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3 (pp. 12-13,
Records) for the defendant in the court a quo, dated July 27, 1968. By
this document Emilio Jocson sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six (6)
parcels of land, all located at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten thousand
P10,000.00 pesos. On the same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged
receipt of the purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000)
salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob at ang
pagkakatanggap ay aking hayagang inaamin sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na
gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez, at naninirahan
sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat at
walang ano mang pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa na
nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa nabanggit na Agustina
Jocson, at sa kaniyang tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din nais
kong banggitin na kahit na may kamurahan ang ginawa kong pagbibile
ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod,
madamayin at ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa ko pang anak na
lalaki. Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay gagamitin ko sa
aking katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang
mahahalagang pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi labag sa ano
mang batas o kautusan, sapagkat ang aking pinagbile ay akin at nasa
aking pangalan. Ang mga lupang nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang asawa
ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman at iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng
dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa umiiral na batas (p. 13, Records.)
2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968, marked as
Exhibit 4 (p. 14, Records). On the face of this document, Emilio Jocson
purportedly sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills and a camarin (camalig)
located at Naic, Cavite. As in the first document, Moises Jocson
acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00) salaping
Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na
Agustina Jocson .... Na ang halagang ibinayad sa akin ay may kamurahan
ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa malaking pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at
pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga nabanggit na pagaari kahit na hindi
malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale,
"dated March 9, 1969, marked as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby
Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, without the participation
and intervention of Moises Jocson, extrajudicially partitioned the
unsettled estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into three
parts, one-third (1/3) each for the heirs of Alejandra Poblete, namely:
Emilio Jocson, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same
instrument, Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to Agustin for the sum

of EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As in the preceding documents,

Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight thousand
(P8,000.00) pesos, which I, the herein Emilio Jocson had received from
my daughter Agustina Jocson, do hereby sell, cede, convey and transfer,
unto the said Agustina Jocson, her heirs and assigns, administrators and
successors in interests, in the nature of absolute and irrevocable sale, all
my rights, interest, shares and participation, which is equivalent to one
third (1/3) share in the properties herein mentioned and described the
one third being adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and the other third
(1/3) portion being the share of Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3 and 4
were registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite on July
29, 1968 and the transfer certificates of title covering the properties
therein in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were
cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the name of Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not registered with the Office of the Register
of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27,
Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite
(docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice amended. In his
Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein
petitioner assailed the above documents, as aforementioned, for being null
and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his complaint
for the reason that the nature of his causes of action is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants, through
fraud, deceit, undue pressure and influence and other illegal
machinations, were able to induce, led, and procured their father ... to
sign [the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated price of P10,000.00,
which is a consideration that is shocking to the conscience of ordinary
man and despite the fact that said defendants have no work or
livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is null and void, also, because it
is fictitious, simulated and fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record
on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
12. [With regards the second and third document, that they] are null
and void because the consent of the father, Emilio Jocson, was
obtained with fraud, deceit, undue pressure, misrepresentation and
unlawful machinations and trickeries committed by the defendant on
him; and that the said contracts are simulated, fabricated and
fictitious, having been made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from
participating and with the dishonest and selfish motive on the part of
the defendants to defraud him of his legitimate share on said
properties [subject matter thereof]; and that without any other
business or employment or any other source of income, defendants
who were just employed in the management and administration of the
business of their parents, would not have the sufficient and ample
means to purchase the said properties except by getting the earnings of
the business or by simulated consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on
Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and
daughter who are living under the same roof, especially so when the father
has no need of money as the properties supposedly sold were all incomeproducing. Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in
Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson
and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell (pp.
53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner
questions not the extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his father to
Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-81,
Record on Appeal). It declared that the considerations mentioned in the
documents were merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no
showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the prices
were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of consideration at
all; and 3) the improbability of the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining
between the parties; and that the real intention of the parties were
donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the
estate of his parents. It further declared the properties mentioned in
Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, because they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties subject
matter of all the documents be registered in the name of herein petitioners
and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a
decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's and ruled
that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the appellee's
complaint for annulment, which is indisputably based on fraud, and
undue influence, is now barred by prescription, pursuant to the settled
rule that an action for annulment of a contract based on fraud must be
filed within four (4) years, from the discovery of the fraud, ... which in
legal contemplation is deemed to be the date of the registration of said

document with the Register of Deeds ... and the records admittedly
show that both Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968,
while on the other hand, the appellee's complaint was filed on June 20,
1973, clearly beyond the aforesaid four-year prescriptive period
provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are decisively not
simulated or fictitious contracts, since Emilio Jocson actually and really
intended them to be effective and binding against him, as to divest him
of the full dominion and ownership over the properties subject of said
assailed contracts, as in fact all his titles over the same were all
cancelled and new ones issued to appellant Agustina Jocson-Vasquez ...;
3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and subsisting, and the
partition with sale therein made by and between Emilio Jocson and
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, affecting the 2/3 portion of the subject
properties described therein have all been made in accordance with
Article 996 of the New Civil Code on intestate succession, and the
appellee's (herein petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced
(pp. 41-42, Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following assignments
of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY
PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND
NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING
SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW,
MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING AS INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN
QUESTION AND IN REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be jointly
discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action
were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract
tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud,
is voidable; and the action for annulment must be brought within four
years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil
Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under present
jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time
the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De
Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4
were registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint only
on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these
documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the
questioned documents, We would have sustained the above
pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he further
assailed the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they were without
consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact
merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause
produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a simulated price is
void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for the declaration
of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v.
Galvan, No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons
saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3
and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is imprescriptible.
II.
For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic. The
burden of proof in showing that contracts lack consideration rests on he
who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes more stringent where the
documents themselves show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the
price, and more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case at
bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion
that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents
are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other
source of income other than what she derives from helping in the
management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and which
was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted by his own
witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were
engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n., January 14,
1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife testified that they did not
know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other business (p. 40,
t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business
of buying and selling palay and rice even before her marriage to Ernesto
Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n.,

March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a
contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that
petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged
inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no showing that the prices
were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties alleged
by petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that
the total assessed value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was
P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price
paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the 1/3
share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife,
Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the market value and the
purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may
not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to
her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into consideration
(Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA
332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of sale,
except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really
intended a donation or some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil Code)
and there is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio
Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father
and his daughter is purely speculative which has no relevance to a contract
where all the essential requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly
present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and
4, that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that
since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete,"
the certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9,
Records) were enough proof to show that the properties covered therein
were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23
SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the
spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they
repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that
... . As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor
of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano [62
Phil. 629, 639], it was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is
sufficient to prove that the Property was acquired during the marriage in
order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent
case ofMaramba vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA
474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property
acquired during the marriage," and then concluded that since "there is
no showing as to when the property in question was acquired...the fact
that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in
the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock
were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the
husband alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to said
spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36
SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93
SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the
disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson
and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is
no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties
under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor
but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the
latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their
face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered
owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra

Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v.
Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA
1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146
SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not
negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not inconsistent with
the above pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed
conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage
of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse
party having presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vsReyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient
proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired during his
parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the properties, though
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in
view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not
exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the
exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which
are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the
exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on
petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband
SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY
MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO
FRANCISCO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate
court's decision 1 promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court which ruled, 2 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the
plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the
properties described in paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of
P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco
(Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita
Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio
by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and
Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential
house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St.,
Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house
and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that
these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him
unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents
succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney
which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment
of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement.
Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties
in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that
said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he
has the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate

court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158,
UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE,
TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED
BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124
OF THE FAMILY CODE. 3
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue "whether or not Article 116
of the Family Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same
Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the
appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's
ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal
but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 158 5 and 160 6 of the New Civil Code have been repealed
by the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code
which was expressly repealed by Article 254 7 (not Article 253 as alleged by
petitioner in her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we
cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested
rights pursuant to Article 256 8 in relation to Article 105 9 (second
paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and
160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise
affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said
provisions were in force. 10 Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the
cited articles were in effect survive their repeal. 11 We shall therefore
resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she
should administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On
the other hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in
controversy claimed by petitioner as "conjugal" are capital properties of
Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter either through
inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover,
they stress that Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner's
allegation.
We find petitioner's contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party
who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. 12Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 13 The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element.
Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to
when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. 14 Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.15
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her
marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner
failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from
his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought
into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only
as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his
second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his
own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 16 of the New
Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. 17 Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired
gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. 18 Hence, even if it be
assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place
during his second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property"
because it was acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title." 19
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents
aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their
father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that
the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim,
petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment,
with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked
the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.

It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way

prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage.
And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of
the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the
appellate court aptly noted:
. . . . And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the
licensee of the sari-sari store (Exhibit "F-3"; Exhibit "G", pp. 44-47,
Record) or is the supposed applicant for a building permit does not
establish that these improvements were acquired during her marriage
with Eusebio Francisco, especially so when her exhibits ("D-1", "E", "E-I",
"T", "T-1", "T-2", "U", "U-l" and "U-2"; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN,
January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as
they all described Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures
(Article 1431, New Civil Code;Section 4. Rule 129, Revised Rules on
Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the
land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of
evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the
expense of their partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New Civil
Code). Normally, this absence of evidence on the source of funding will
call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New
Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this
particular case again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was
erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841;
9 Manresa; cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1,
1983 Edition, page
421). 20
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents
assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In
contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property in as much as the
title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to
Teresita Francisco."
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner
anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in
the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof
that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition
of title and registration thereof are two different acts. 21 It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. 22 The phrase "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco. 23
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be
said to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower court's ruling
that the properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it
follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets
are exclusively his capital. 24 Even assuming for the sake of argument that
the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch
as Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner,
Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so
as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped
due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated
when petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional
quarrels, did not render him, in the Court's view, incapacitated to perform
acts of administration over his own properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

imprudence5against Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Branch IV, Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the
charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay civil indemnity of SixtyTwo Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos
(P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
moral damages. On appeal, the RTC6 affirmed the decision of the
MTCC7 and it became final and executory.8
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Ronnie
requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on Lot No.
234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One Thousand
Four Hundred Forty (1,440) square meters (sq m), under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of "ELENITA M. DEWARA,
of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod
City," to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. The City
Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently
sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no
interested buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of
sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the
decision against Eduardo.9Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a
Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of
TCT No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses.10
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and
cancellation of title of the lot in the name of Elenita were done while
Elenita was working in California.11 Thus, Elenita, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale
and for damages against respondent spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile
Alvero before the RTC of Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the levy on
execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said property was her
paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the
personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of
the property, she received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the
annulment of the sale and the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in
the name of respondent spouses.12
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was
the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that
the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that
the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time
of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the
jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and
that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution
of the property.13
On September 2, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and
against the [respondents]:
1. The levy on execution on Lot No. 234-C of the Bacolod Cadastre
covered by TCT No. 80054 in the name of [petitioner] Elenita M.
Dewara, the public auction of the property, and the consolidation of the
title and issuance of new TCT No. 167403 in the name of [respondent]
Ronnie Lamela, are hereby declared null and void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Bacolod City is ordered to cancel TCT No.
167403 in the name of [respondent] Ronnie Lamela and TCT No. 80054
be reinstated or a new one issued in the name of [petitioner] Elenita M.
Dewara;
3. There is no pronouncement on damages with cost de officio.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.14
G.R. No. 179010

April 11, 2011

ELENITA M. DEWARA, epresented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FERDINAND

MAGALLANES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES RONNIE AND GINA LAMELA and STENILE ALVERO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated November 6, 2006 and the
Resolution2 dated July 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64936, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated September 2,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in Civil Case
No. 93-7942.
The Facts
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara
(Elenita) were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the
Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were
separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States
of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the
name of Elenita,4 hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a
criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless

The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at
this conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based
on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather, Exequiel
Magallanes, originally owned Lot No. 234-C. Upon his demise, his children,
Jesus (Elenitas father), Salud, and Concepcion, inherited the property, each
entitled to a share equal to one-third (1/3) of the total area of the land.
They were issued a new title (TCT No. T-17541) for the property. On July 6,
1966, petitioners aunt, Salud, executed a waiver of rights duly registered
with the Office of the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76392, thereby
waiving her rights and participation over her 1/3 share of the property in
favor of her siblings, Jesus and Concepcion. The two siblings then became
the owners of the property, each owning one-half (1/2) of the property.
Jesus subsequently sold his share to his daughter, Elenita, for the sum of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), based on the deed of sale dated March
26, 1975. The deed of sale was duly registered with the Register of Deeds
under Entry No. 76393. Concepcion also sold her share to her niece,
Elenita, for the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), based on the
deed of sale dated April 29, 1975, which was duly registered with the
Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76394. By virtue of the sale transactions,
TCT No. T-17541 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. T-80054, was
issued in the name of Elenita.15
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by her father
and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot. Second, the
minimal and inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for

the purpose of helping her expand her capital in her business at the time.
Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and was therefore gratuitous in
character.16
Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of Elenita,
the RTC ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him,
could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.17
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 54,
dated September 2, 1999, in Civil Case No. 93-7942 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new Decision is entered DISMISSING the complaint
for lack of merit. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental [which] is hereby
ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-80054 or any transfer
certificate of title covering Lot No. 234-C issued in the name of Elenita M.
Dewara, and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167403 or issue a
new transfer certificate of title covering Lot No. 234-C in the name of
Ronnie Lamela. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.18
In reversing the decision of the RTC, the CA elucidated that the gross
inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that
it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
donation or some other act or contract. Except for the assertions of Elenita,
there was nothing in the records that would indicate a defect in Jesus and
Concepcion Magallanes consent to the sale.19 The CA ruled that Elenita
and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their marriage
through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership
of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged
against Eduardo.20
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
The answer to this question will define whether the property may be
subject to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged
against Eduardo in the criminal case for serious physical injuries, which
judgment had already attained finality.
The Ruling of the Court
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.21 Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone
does not destroy this presumption.22 The separation-in-fact between the
husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.23 Moreover, the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.24
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses
Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their
marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since
they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did
not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus,
the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the
lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal property
may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of
the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.25
Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her
father and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged
gross disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince
this Court of the paraphernal character of the property. Elenita proffered
no evidence of the market value or assessed value of the subject property
in 1975. Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not sufficiently proven
that the prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the
Court to reach a conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a
donation rather than a sale.
Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of
sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties
really intended a donation or some other act or contract.26 The records are
bereft of proof that the consent of petitioners father and her aunt were
vitiated or that, in reality, they intended the sale to be a donation or some
other contract. Inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the
transaction as one of sale; the price must be grossly inadequate or
shocking to the conscience, such that the mind would revolt at it and such
that a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly consent to it.27
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that
it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and

obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be

shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations
should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines
and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a
rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be
insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the
partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the Civil Code have been covered.
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the
serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even
though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita,
she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she may not be
compelled to answer for Eduardos liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal
partnership property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no
property in his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of
Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced
against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the
responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have been
covered. This remedy is provided for under Article 163 of the Civil Code,
viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership.1wphi1
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be
charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before the marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes abovementioned.28
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations which the conjugal
partnership may be held answerable, viz.:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for
the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the
partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major
repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of
both the husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the
spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional,
vocational or other course.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the
conjugal partnership may be held to answer for the liability adjudged
against Eduardo.
Finally, the indemnity imposed against Eduardo shall earn an interest at the
rate of twelve percent per annum, in accordance with our ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.29
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 6,
2006 and the Resolution dated July 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 64936 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision
dated September 2, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Civil
Case No. 93-7942 is hereby REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATION that the
conjugal properties of spouses Elenita Dewara and Eduardo Dewara shall
be held to answer for the judgment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P72,598.70), plus an
interest rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of finality of
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No.
7155, after complying with the provisions of Article 161 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., defendant-appellant.
Alfredo L. Benipayo for plaintiffs-appellee Rafael Zulueta and Carolina
Zulueta.
Justo L. Albert for plaintiff-appellee Telly Albert Zulueta.
V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa and
Lozada for defendant-appellant.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration of the decision
of this Court promulgated on February 29, 1972. Plaintiffs maintain that
the decision appealed from should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in
turn, prays that the decision of this Court be "set aside ... with or without a
new trial, ... and that the complaint be dismissed, with costs; or, in the
alternative, that the amount of the award embodied therein be
considerably reduced." .
Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration, the defendant
filed a "petition to annul proceedings and/or to order the dismissal of
plaintiffs-appellees' complaint" upon the ground that "appellees' complaint
actually seeks the recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual damages, because,
for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the lower court, the
unspecified sums representing items of alleged damages, may not be
considered, under the settled doctrines of this Honorable Court," and "the
jurisdiction of courts of first instance when the complaint in the present
case was filed on Sept. 30, 1965" was limited to cases "in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy
amounts to more than ten thousand pesos" and "the mere fact that the
complaint also prays for unspecified moral damages and attorney's fees,
does not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the lower court."
We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not true that "the
unspecified sums representing items or other alleged damages, may not be
considered" for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the court
"under the settled doctrines of this Honorable Court." In fact, not a
single case has been cited in support of this allegation.
Secondly, it has been held that a clam for moral damages is one not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation. 1 In fact, Article 2217 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines explicitly provides that "(t)hough incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence, "(n)o proof
pecuniary loss necessary" pursuant to Article 2216 of the same Code
"in order that moral ... damages may be adjudicated." And "(t)he
assessment of such damages ... is left to the discretion of the court" - said
article adds - "according to the circumstances of each case." Appellees'
complaint is, therefore, within the original jurisdiction of courts of first
instance, which includes "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." 2
Thirdly, in its answer to plaintiffs' original and amended complainants,
defendant had set up a counterclaim in the aggregate sum of P12,000,
which is, also, within the original jurisdiction of said courts, thereby curing
the alleged defect if any, in plaintiffs' complaint. 3
We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as to the amount
the appellant sues to recover because the counterclaim interposed
establishes the jurisdiction of the District Court. Merchants' Heat & Light
Co. v. James B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed. 488; O.
J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 F. 343 (C.C.A. 2), certiorari denied
216 U.S. 620, 30 S Ct. 575, 54 L. Ed. 641. ... . 4
... courts have said that "when the jurisdictional amount is in question,
the tendering of a counterclaim in an amount which in itself, or added to
the amount claimed in the petition, makes up a sum equal to the
amount necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is
established, whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's complaint."
American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler (D.C.) 227 F. 321, 324. 5
Thus, in Ago v. Buslon, 6 We held:
... . Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00 was, also, within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the latter courts, and there are
ample precedents to the effect that "although the original claim involves
less than the jurisdictional amount, ... jurisdiction can be sustained if the
counterclaim (of the compulsory type)" such as the one set up by
petitioner herein, based upon the damages allegedly suffered by him in
consequence of the filing of said complaint "exceeds the jurisdictional
amount." (Moore Federal Practice, 2nd ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41;
Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97;
Home Life Ins. Co. vs. Sipp., 11 Fed. [2d]474; American Sheet & Tin Plate
Co. vs. Winzeler [D.C.], 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs. People's Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 41 P. 2d. 537, 2 Cal. 2d. 446; Emery vs. Pacific Employees Ins.
Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8 Cal. 2d. 663).
Needless to say, having not only failed to question the jurisdiction of the
trial court either in that court or in this Court, before the rendition of the
latter's decision, and even subsequently thereto, by filing the

aforementioned motion for reconsideration and seeking the reliefs therein

prayed for but, also, urged both courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
merits of the case, defendant is now estopped from impugning said
jurisdiction. 7
Before taking up the specific questions raised in defendant's motion for
reconsideration, it should be noted that the same is mainly predicated
upon the premise that plaintiffs' version is inherently incredible, and that
this Court should accept the theory of the defense to the effect that
petitioner was off-loaded because of a bomb-scare allegedly arising from
his delay in boarding the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open his bags
for inspection. We need not repeat here the reasons given in Our decision
for rejecting defendant's contention and not disturbing the findings of fact
of His Honor, the Trial Judge, who had the decided advantage denied to
Us of observing the behaviour of the witnesses in the course of the trial
and found those of the plaintiffs worthy of credence, not the evidence for
the defense.
It may not be amiss however, to stress the fact that, in his written
report, made in transit from Wake to Manila or immediately after the
occurrence and before the legal implications or consequences thereof
could have been the object of mature deliberation, so that it could, in a
way, be considered as part of the res gestae Capt. Zentner stated that
Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and "belligerent attitude,"
thereby belying the story of the defense about said alleged bomb-scare,
and confirming the view that said agent of the defendant had acted out of
resentment because his ego had been hurt by Mr. Zulueta's adamant
refusal to be bullied by him. Indeed, had there been an iota of truth in said
story of the defense, Capt. Zentner would have caused every one of the
passengers to be frisked or searched and the luggage of all of them
examined as it is done now before resuming the flight from Wake
Island. His failure to do so merely makes the artificious nature of
defendant's version more manifest. Indeed, the fact that Mrs. Zulueta and
Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows beyond doubt that Mr.
Zulueta could not possibly have intended to blow it up.
The defense tries to explain its failure to introduce any evidence to
contradict the testimony of Mr. Zulueta as to why he had gone to the
beach and what he did there, alleging that, in the very nature of things,
nobody else could have witnessed it. Moreover, the defense insists, inter
alia, that the testimony of Mr. Zulueta is inherently incredible because he
had no idea as to how many toilets the plane had; it could not have taken
him an hour to relieve himself in the beach; there were eight (8)
commodes at the terminal toilet for men ; if he felt the need of relieving
himself, he would have seen to it that the soldiers did not beat him to the
terminal toilets; he did not tell anybody about the reason for going to the
beach, until after the plane had taken off from Wake.
We find this pretense devoid of merit. Although Mr. Zulueta had to look for
a secluded place in the beach to relieve himself, beyond the view of others,
defendant's airport manager, whom Mr. Zulueta informed about it,soon
after the departure of the plane, could have forthwith checked the veracity
of Mr. Zulueta's statement by asking him to indicate the specific place
where he had been in the beach and then proceeding thereto for purposes
of verification.
Then, again, the passenger of a plane seldom knows how many toilets it
has. As a general rule, his knowledge is limited to the toilets for the class
first class or tourist class in which he is. Then, too, it takes several
minutes for the passengers of big aircrafts, like those flying from the U.S. to
the Philippines, to deplane. Besides, the speed with which a given
passenger may do so depends, largely, upon the location of his seat in
relation to the exit door. He cannot go over the heads of those nearer than
he thereto. Again, Mr. Zulueta may have stayed in the toilet terminal for
some time, expecting one of the commodes therein to be vacated soon
enough, before deciding to go elsewhere to look for a place suitable to his
purpose. But he had to walk, first, from the plane to the terminal building
and, then, after vainly waiting therein for a while, cover a distance of about
400 yards therefrom to the beach, and seek there a place not visible by the
people in the plane and in the terminal, inasmuch as the terrain at Wake
Island is flat. What is more, he must have had to takeoff part, at least, of
his clothing, because, without the facilities of a toilet, he had to wash
himself and, then, dry himself up before he could be properly attired and
walk back the 400 yards that separated him from the terminal building
and/or the plane. Considering, in addition to the foregoing, the fact that he
was not feeling well, at that time, We are not prepared to hold that it could
not have taken him around an hour to perform the acts narrated by him.
But, why asks the defendant did he not reveal the same before the
plane took off? The record shows that, even before Mr. Zulueta had
reached the ramp leading to the plane, Capt. Zentner was already
demonstrating at him in an intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude
("What do you think you are?), thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer
back in the same vein. As a consequence, there immediately ensued an
altercation in the course of which each apparently tried to show that he
could not be cowed by the other. Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to
off-load all of the Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss
Zulueta, as well as their luggage, their overcoats and other effects
handcarried by them; but, Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed
to continue the trip. Meanwhile, it had taken time to locate his four (4)
pieces of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three (3) of them were found,
and the fourth eventually remained in the plane. In short, the issue

between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta had been limited to determining
whether the latter would allow himself to be browbeaten by the former. In
the heat of the altercation, nobody had inquired about the cause of Mr.
Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart from the fact that it was
rather embarrassing for him to explain, in the presence and within the
hearing of the passengers and the crew, then assembled around them, why
he had gone to the beach and why it had taken him some time to answer
there a call of nature, instead of doing so in the terminal building.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration assails: (1) the amount of damages
awarded as excessive; (2) the propriety of accepting as credible plaintiffs'
theory; (3) plaintiffs' right to recover either moral or exemplary damages;
(4) plaintiffs' right to recover attorney's fees; and (5) the non-enforcement
of the compromise agreement between the defendant and plaintiff's wife,
Mrs. Zulueta. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
contests the decision of this Court reducing the amount of damages
awarded by the trial court to approximately one-half thereof, upon the
ground, not only that, contrary to the findings of this Court, in said
decision, plaintiff had not contributed to the aggravation of his altercation
or incident with Capt. Zentner by reacting to his provocation with extreme
belligerency thereby allowing himself to be dragged down to the level on
which said agent of the defendant had placed himself, but, also, because
the purchasing power of our local currency is now much lower than when
the trial court rendered its appealed decision, over five (5) years ago, on
July 5, 1967, which is an undeniable and undisputed fact. Precisely, for this
reason, defendant's characterization as exorbitant of the aggregate award
of over P700,000 by way of damages, apart from attorney's fees in the sum
of P75,000, is untenable. Indeed, said award is now barely equivalent to
around 100,000 U. S. dollars.
It further support of its contention, defendant cites the damages awarded
in previous cases to passengers of airlines, 8 as well as in several criminal
cases, and some cases for libel and slander. None of these cases is,
however, in point. Said cases against airlines referred to passengers who
were merely constrained to take a tourist class accommodation, despite
the fact that they had first class tickets, and that although, in one of such
cases, there was proof that the airline involved had acted as it did to give
preference to a "white" passenger, this motive was not disclosed until the
trial in court. In the case at bar, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta was "off-loaded" at
Wake Island, for having dared to retort to defendant's agent in a tone and
manner matching, if not befitting his intemperate language and arrogant
attitude. As a consequence, Capt. Zentner's attempt to humiliate Rafael
Zulueta had boomeranged against him (Zentner), in the presence of the
other passengers and the crew. It was, also, in their presence that
defendant's agent had referred to the plaintiffs as "monkeys," a racial
insult not made openly and publicly in the abovementioned previous cases
against airlines.
In other words, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, not to protect the safety of the
aircraft and its passengers, but to retaliate and punish him for the
embarrassment and loss of face thus suffered by defendant's agent. This
vindictive motive is made more manifest by the note delivered to Mr.
Zulueta by defendant's airport manager at Wake Island, Mr. Sitton, stating
that the former's stay therein would be "for a minimum of one week,"
during which he would be charged $13.30 per day. This reference to a
"minimum of one week" revealed the intention to keep him there stranded
that long, for no other plane, headed for Manila, was expected within said
period of time, although Mr. Zulueta managed to board, days later, a plane
that brought him to Hawaii, whence he flew back to the Philippines, via
Japan.
Neither may criminal cases, nor the cases for libel and slander cited in the
defendant's motion for reconsideration, be equated with the present case.
Indeed, in ordinary criminal cases, the award for damages is, in actual
practice, of purely academic value, for the convicts generally belong to the
poorest class of society. There is, moreover, a fundamental difference
between said cases and the one at bar. The Zuluetas had a contract of
carriage with the defendant, as a common carrier, pursuant to which the
latter was bound, for a substantial monetary considerationpaid by the
former, not merely to transport them to Manila, but, also, to do so with
"extraordinary diligence" or "utmost diligence." 9 The responsibility of the
common carrier, under said contract, as regards the passenger's safety, is
of such a nature, affecting as it does public interest, that it "cannot
be dispensed with" or even "lessened by stipulation, by the posting of
notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise." 10 In the present case, the
defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to transport Mr.
Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him,
to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible
inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island, in the expectation that
he would be stranded there for a "minimum of one week" and, in addition
thereto, charged therefor $13.30 a day.
It is urged by the defendant that exemplary damages are not recoverable in
quasi-delicts, pursuant to Article 2231 of our Civil Code, except when the
defendant has acted with "gross negligence," and that there is no specific
finding that it had so acted. It is obvious, however, that in off-loading
plaintiff at Wake Island, under the circumstances heretofore adverted to,
defendant's agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident bad
faith. If "gross negligence" warrants the award of exemplary damages, with
more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is

deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. Thus, in Lopez v.

PANAM, 11 We held:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant
having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier,
may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages (Articles
2229, 2232, New Civil Code.)
Similarly, in NWA v. Cuenca, 12 this Court declared that an award for
exemplary damages was justified by the fact that the airline's "agent had
acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner" in compelling Cuenca,
upon arrival at Okinawa, to transfer, over his objection, from the first class,
where he was accommodated from Manila to Okinawa, to the tourist class,
in his trip to Japan, "under threat of otherwise leaving him in Okinawa,"
despite the fact that he had paid in full the first class fare and was issued in
Manila a first class ticket.
Defendant cites Rotea v. Halili, 13 in support of the proposition that a
principal is not liable for exemplary damages owing to acts of his agent
unless the former has participated in said acts or ratified the same. Said
case involved, however, the subsidiary civil liability of an employer arising
from criminal acts of his employee, and "exemplary damages ... may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances." 14 Accordingly, the Rotea case is not in point, for the case
at bar involves a breach of contract, as well as a quasi-delict.
Neither may the case of Palisoc v. Brillantes, 15 invoked by the defendant,
be equated with the case at bar. The Palisoc case dealt with the liability of
school officials for damages arising from the death of a student (Palisoc)
due to fist blows given by another student (Daffon), in the course of a
quarrel between them, while in a laboratory room of the Manila Technical
Institute. In an action for damages, the head thereof and the teacher in
charge of said laboratory were held jointly and severally liable with the
student who caused said death, for failure of the school to provide
"adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises," to protect them "from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties." Such liability was predicated upon Article 2180
of our Civil Code, the pertinent part of which reads:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, the amount of damages warded in the Palisoc case is not and
cannot serve as the measure of the damages recoverable in the present
case, the latter having been caused directly and intentionally by an
employee or agent of the defendant, whereas the student who killed the
young Palisoc was in no wise an agent of the school. Moreover, upon her
arrival in the Philippines, Mrs. Zulueta reported her husband's predicament
to defendant's local manager and asked him to forthwith have him (Mr.
Zulueta) brought to Manila, which defendant's aforementioned manager
refused to do, thereby impliedly ratifying the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta at
Wake Island.
It is next urged that, under the contract of carriage with the defendant, Mr.
Zulueta was bound to be present at the time scheduled for the departure
of defendant's plane and that he had, consequently, violated said contract
when he did not show up at such time. This argument might have had
some weight had defendant's plane taken off before Mr. Zulueta had
shown up. But the fact is that he was ready, willing and able to board the
plane about two hours before it actually took off, and that he was
deliberately and maliciously off-loaded on account of his altercation with
Capt. Zentner. It should, also, be noted that, although Mr. Zulueta was
delayed some 20 to 30 minutes, the arrival or departure of planes is often
delayed for much longer periods of time. Followed to its logical conclusion,
the argument adduced by the defense suggests that airlines should be held
liable for damages due to the inconvenience and anxiety, aside from actual
damages, suffered by many passengers either in their haste to arrive at the
airport on scheduled time just to find that their plane will not take off until
later, or by reason of the late arrival of the aircraft at its destination.
PANAM impugns the award of attorney's fees upon the ground that no
penalty should be imposed upon the right to litigate; that, by law, it may be
awarded only in exceptional cases; that the claim for attorney's fees has
not been proven; and that said defendant was justified in resisting
plaintiff's claim "because it was patently exorbitant."
Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed apart from
plaintiff's claim for actual damages, the amount of which is not contested,
plaintiffs did not ask any specific sum by way of exemplary and moral
damages, as well as attorney's fees, and left the amount thereof to the
"sound discretion" of the lower court. This, precisely, is the reason why
PANAM, now, alleges without justification that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case.
Moreover, Article 2208 of our Civil Code expressly authorizes the award of
attorney's fees "when exemplary damages are awarded," as they are in

this case as well as "in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees ... be recovered," and We so deem it just and
equitable in the present case, considering the "exceptional" circumstances
obtaining therein, particularly the bad faith with which defendant's agent
had acted, the place where and the conditions under which Rafael Zulueta
was left at Wake Island, the absolute refusal of defendant's manager in
Manila to take any step whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zulueta's predicament
at Wake and have him brought to Manila which, under their contract of
carriage, was defendant's obligation to discharge with "extra-ordinary" or
"utmost" diligence and, the "racial" factor that had, likewise, tainted the
decision of defendant's agent, Capt. Zentner, to off-load him at Wake
Island.

and the ordinary habits of life." 20 In fact Manresa maintains21 that they are
deemed conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not
established, even if the purchase had been made by the wife. 22 And this is
the rule obtaining in the Philippines. Even property registered, under the
Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife
only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless there is competent proof to the contrary. 23

As regards the evidence necessary to justify the sum of P75,000 awarded

as attorney's fees in this case, suffice it to say that the quantity and quality
of the services rendered by plaintiffs' counsel appearing on record, apart
from the nature of the case and the amount involved therein, as well as his
prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the legal profession
in the Philippines, of which judicial cognizance may be taken, amply justify
said award, which is a little over 10% of the damages (P700,000) collectible
by plaintiffs herein. Indeed, the attorney's fees in this case is proportionally
much less than that adjudged in Lopez v. PANAM 16 in which the judgment
rendered for attorney's fees (P50,000) was almost 20% of the damages
(P275,000) recovered by the plaintiffs therein.

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered,
in which relying upon Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that
"(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's
consent, except in cases provided by law," and it is not claimed that this is
one of such cases We denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for the
dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned - she having settled all her
differences with the defendant, which appears to have paid her the sum of
P50,000 therefor - "without prejudice to this sum being deducted from the
award made in said decision." Defendant now alleges that this is
tantamount to holding that said compromise agreement is both effective
and ineffective.
This, of course, is not true. The payment is effective, insofar as it is
deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount
due) from the defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with
Mrs. Zulueta. What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as
the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the
dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in
support thereof Article 113 of said Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband
must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have
in fact been separated for at least one year." This provision, We held,
however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in
interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in
interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of
the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into
the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the
latter, under the contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to
which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly,
belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident
of the humiliation to which her husband had been subjected. The Court
ordered that said sum of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be
deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the
simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as
provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as
part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which might
have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely
be inane to sentence the defendant to pay the P700,000 due to the
plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the
defendant.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public
policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal
partnership, before the dissolution thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any
property by gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from
her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within
the fourth degree. 18
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by
compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly
does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are
plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the
rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the
compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the
law 19 seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the
misunderstanding that had arisen between such spouses during the
litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them.
It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the
plaintiffs, that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay
the plane tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs.
Zulueta was for her personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no
individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs.
The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of
said proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the
common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the
conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
"(t)hat things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature

PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not
among those forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article
153 of the Civil Code, reading:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the

spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
each spouse.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a
breach of plaintiffs' contract of carriage with the defendant, for which
plaintiffs paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal
partnership, We hold that said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said
Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired byonerous title during
the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article 148 of our Civil
Code, according to which:
ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with
other property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.
The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these
provisions or of the other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of
Book I of the Civil Code, which chapter is entitled "Paraphernal Property."
What is more, if "(t)hat which is acquired by right of redemption or by
exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses," and
"(t)hat which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband," 24belong exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows
necessarily that that which is acquired with money of the conjugal
partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. The rulings in Maramba
v. Lozano 25 and Perez v. Lantin, 26 cited in defendant's motion for
reconsideration, are, in effect, adverse thereto. In both cases, it was merely
held that the presumption under Article 160 of our Civil Code to the
effect that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
partnership does not apply unless it is shown that it was acquired during
marriage. In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly
entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were
incurred, during marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from said contract,
including those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta.
The fact that such breach of contract was coupled, also, with a quasi-delict
constitutes an aggravating circumstance and can not possibly have the
effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such property rights.
Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does
not make the property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption
pertained to the wife. In the absence, however, of proof that such right of
redemption pertains to the wife and there is no proof that the contract
of carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefor belongs to Mrs.
Zulueta the property involved, or the rights arising therefrom, must be
presumed, therefore, to form part of the conjugal partnership.
It is true that in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 it was held that the
"patrimonial and moral damages" awarded to a young and beautiful
woman by reason of a scar in consequence of an injury resulting from an
automobile accident which disfigured her face and fractured her left leg,
as well as caused a permanent deformity, are her paraphernal property.
Defendant cites, also, in support of its contention the following passage
from Colin y Capitant:
No esta resuelta expresamente en la legislacion espaola la cuestion de
si las indemnizaciones debidas por accidentes del trabaho tienen la
consideracion de gananciales, o son bienes particulares de los conyuges.
Inclinan a la solucion de que estas indemnizaciones deben ser
consideradas como gananciales, el hecho de que la sociedad pierde la
capacidad de trabajocon el accidente, que a ella le pertenece, puesto que
de la sociedad son losfrutos de ese trabajo; en cambio, la consideracion
de que igual manera que losbienes que sustituyen a los que cada
conyuge lleva al matrimonio como propiostienen el caracter de propios,
hace pensar que las indemnizaciones que vengana suplir la capacidad de
trabajo aportada por cada conyuge a la sociedad, debenser
juridicamente reputadas como bienes propios del conyuge que haya

sufrido elaccidente. Asi se llega a la misma solucion aportada por la

jurisprudencia francesca. 28
This opinion is, however, undecisive, to say the least. It should be noted
that Colin y Capitant were commenting on the French Civil Code; that their
comment referred to indemnities due in consequence of "accidentes del
trabajo "resulting in physical injuries sustained by one of the spouses
(which Mrs. Zulueta has not suffered); and that said commentators admit
that the question whether or not said damages are paraphernal property
or belong to the conjugal partnership is not settled under the Spanish
law. 29 Besides, the French law and jurisprudence to which the
comments of Planiol and Ripert, likewise, refer are inapposite to the
question under consideration, becausethey differ basically from the
Spanish law in the treatment of the property relations between husband
and wife. Indeed, our Civil Code, like the Spanish Civil Code, favors the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. Accordingly, the former provides
that, "(i)n the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains ... shall
govern the property relations between" the spouses. 30 Hence, "(a)ll
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife." 31
No similar rules are found in the French Civil Code. What is more, under the
provisions thereof, the conjugal partnership exists only when so stipulated
in the "capitulaciones matrimoniales" or by way of exception. In the
language of Manresa
Prescindimos de los preceptos de los Condigos de Francia, Italia,
Holanda, Portugal, Alemania y Suiza, porsue solo excepcionalmente,
o cuando asi se pacta en las capitulaciones, admiten el sistema de
gananciales. 32
Again, Colin y Capitant, as well as the Lilius case, refer to damages
recovered for physical injuries suffered by the wife. In the case at bar, the
party mainly injured, although not physically, is the husband.
Accordingly, the other Philippine cases 33 and those from Louisiana
whose civil law is based upon the French Civil Code cited by the
defendant, which similarly refer to moral damages due to physical injuries
suffered by the wife, are, likewise, inapplicable to the case at bar.
We find, therefore, no plausible reason to disturb the views expressed in
Our decision promulgated on February 29, 1972.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration above-referred to should be,
as they are hereby denied.

G.R. No. L-31618 August 17, 1983

EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-31625 August 17, 1983
JULIA R. DE REYES, petitioner,
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Conrado B. Enriquez and Elpidio G. Navarro for petitioners.
Pacifico M. Castro for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Questioned in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari is the
decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch. The dispositive portion of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, (a) the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed; (b) the
deed of sale executed by appellee Julia de Reyes on March 3, 1961 in
favor of appellees Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. Mendoza, covering
lots 5 and 6, Block No. 132 of Subdivision Plan Psd. 14841, situated at
Retiro Street, Quezon City, is hereby declared null and void with respect
to one- half share of appellant therein; (c) the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT Nos. 5611 0 and 56111,
now covering said lots, and to issue, in lieu thereof, certificates of title in
favor of appellant Ponciano S. Reyes for one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso and
the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia Mendoza for one-half (1/2)
also pro-indiviso; (d) the appellees Mendozas are hereby ordered to pay
unto the appellant the accrued rentals of style properties in litigation
due to the share corresponding to said appellant, at the rate of P350.00
a month from March 3, 1961 until the finality of this decision, with legal
interest thereon; and (e) said appellees are likewise ordered to pay unto
the appellant the amount of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS as
attorney's fees, plus the costs in both instances.
This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano S. Reyes with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. Q-6905, for
the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land with their
improvements, executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the
spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees.
Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of

himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by
herself" and without his knowledge or consent.
Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their
answer that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de
Reyes and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for
adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes,
supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions.
In its decision, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint
and declared the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal
properties of petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly
dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the
Mendozas are innocent purchasers.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a
quo.
The petitioners filed separate petitions for review on certiorari. Efren V.
Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza raised the following assignments of
errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED NOT MERELY IN GIVING CREDENCE, BUT IN
FACT IN CONSIDERING AT ALL, PROOF OF THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL
CHARACTER OF THE PROPERTIES l-, QUESTION, AND IN NOT INVOKING THE
DOCTRINE -E OF ESTOPPEL TO RULE OUT ANY AND ALL SUCH PROOF
ALTOGETHER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF BAD
FAITH IN PURCHASING THE PROPERTIES LITIGATED FOR WITHOUT
EVIDENCE OF SUCH FACT BEING PRESENTED AND, ON THE STRENGTH
MERELY OF A SIMPLE PRESUMPTION UNWARRANTEDLY DRAWN FROM
ONE OF ITS OWN OBSCURE AND HARDLY AUTHORITATIVE RULINGS, AND
AGAINST ABUNDANT, POSITIVE AND UNCONTRADICTED PROOF OF GOOD
FAITH.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED UPON EQUITABLE GROUNDS IN, IN EFFECT,
GIVING JUDICIAL FLAT To THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT OR BENEFIT OF ONE
PERSON AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER OR OTHERS.
On the other hand, Julia R. De Reyes made the following assignments of
errors in her petition for review.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION ARE THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE RESPONDENT
PONCIANO S. REYES AND THE PETITIONER IN SPITE OF THE
CATEGORICAL JUDICIAL DECLARATION AND ADMISSION BY SAID
RESPONDENT THAT THE SAID PROPERTIES ARE THE EXCLUSIVE AND
PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF HIS WIFE, THE PETITIONER HEREIN.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS ON THE
MATTER IN THE SENSE, PARTICULARLY, THAT THE ACT AND
DECLARATION OF A PARTY AGAINST HIS INTERESTS CAN NOT BE
CONTRADICTED BY HIM, AND IN SO DOING THE DECISION AMOUNTED
TO SANCTIONING A PERJURED TESTIMONY.
On the first issue regarding the alleged paraphernal character of the
disputed properties, we find that the records sustain the findings of the
Court of Appeals
The fact are:
xxx xxx xxx
... Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes-to be herein referred to as
Ponciano and Julia alone for brevity-were married in 1915. The
properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, Block No. 132, situated
at Retiro Street, Quezon City-plus the buildings erected thereon, were
bought from J. M. Tuason & Co., represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
to be herein mentioned as "Araneta"-February, 1947 on installment
basis. (Testimony of Julia, t.s.n., p. 74, February 15, 1963). The first
installment on Lot No. 5 was P69.96 and on Lot No. 6 was P102.00 (Exh.
'H' and uncontradicted testimony of Ponciano, t.s.n., p. 4, July 20, 1964).
The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the installments
to Araneta due to lack of money (t.s.n., pp. 5-7, July 20, 1964) so they
had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporationherein after referred to as RFC for short. Thus, on November 26, 1948,
they jointly obtained a loan of P12,000.00 from the RFC for the following
exclusive purposes only: 'to complete the construction of one-storey
residential building on 9th Street, La Loma Quezon City; and to pay the
balance of the price of the lot offered as security' which is Lot 5, (Deed
of Mortgage, Exh. 'A') l'). Out of this loan, the amount of P5,292.00 was
paid to Araneta as price of Lot 5. The corresponding deed of absolute
sale thereof was executed by Araneta on November 27, 1948 (Exh. 'A').
On October 2, 1952, the spouses secured an additional loan of P8,000.00
from the RFC 'to pay the balance of the lot herein offered (Lot No. 6) as
additional security, and to defray the expenses incurred in the repairs of
the building' as the deed of mortgage so recites (Exh. 'B- l'). From the
amount of this loan, the sum of P7,719.60, as price of Lot No. 6, was
paid and the deed of absolute sale was forthwith executed by Araneta
(Exh. 'B'). In the deed of sale, the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her

signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under
the phrase: 'with my marital consent.

from the Philippine National Bank. The mortgage contracts, however, show
that the properties were paid out of the loan from RFC.

As a result of these sales, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 8550 (Exh.

'F') and 19998 (Exh. 'G') were issued for Lots 5 and 6, respectively, by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in the name of "JULIA REYES married
to PONCIANO REYES." The mortgage contracts (Exhs. 'A-1' and 'B-1')
executed by the spouses in favor of the RFC were duly registered and
annotated on the said transfer Certificates of Title (Exhs. 'F' and 'G').

As a matter of fact, Mrs. Reyes' testimony about a loan from Mrs. Rosa
Borja, the sale of a lot in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija given by her mother, and the
loan from PNB only emphasize the conjugal nature of the disputed
properties because she stated that these sums were also used to put up
their gravel and sand business, a poultry farm, and a banana plantation
plus a jeepney transportation line although according to her, every
business venture handled by her husband failed. The two were establishing
businesses and buying properties together as husband and wife, in happier
times.

As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later a camarin
on the two lots. The camarin was leased as a school building to the
Quezon City Elementary School of La Loma for the period of two years
(1950-51) at P500.00 a month. When the school was transferred to
another place, the camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to Mr. and
Mrs. Mendoza, appellees, for ten years at P600.00 a month for the first
year and P700.00 for the remaining nine years. The contract of lease was
signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. The
camarin was converted into a movie house and used as such by the
lessees. (Exh. 'G').
In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for the building, the
spouses failed to pay seasonably their obligations to the RFC so, as late
as November 28, 1958, they had to ask for an extension of 5 years from
the Development Bank of the Philippines or DBP, as successor of the
RFC, for the payment of an outstanding balance of P7,876.13 (Exh. 'D').
On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in
Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question, together
with their improvements to appellees Mendozas for the sum of
P80,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano (Exh. 'I'Mendoza). At the same time the spouses were living separately and
were not in speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 561 10 and 56111 were subsequently issued in the name of
the Mendozas.
The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
xxx xxx xxx
The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be
overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal
Article 160 provides:
ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
The presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de
Ilano (63 Phil. 629, 639), "it is sufficient to prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 SCRA 494, 504) we
stated, "proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage
suffices to render the statutory presumption operative."
There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous
title during the marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build
the improvements at the expense of the common fund?
The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses
from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil
Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.
As stated in Castillo, Jr. vs. Pasco (1 1 SCRA 102, 107):
... The position thus taken by appellants is meritorous, for the reason
that the deeds show the loans to have been made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto
and by Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, to both spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco, as joint borrowers. The loans thus became
obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses and the
money loaned is logically conjugal property.
Citing Palanca v. Smith Bell & Co. (9 Phil. 13 1) interpreting Par. 3, Article
1401 of the old Civil Code, the Court inCastillo v. Pasco stated:
If money borrowed by the husband alone on the security of his wife's
property is conjugal in character, a fortiori should it be conjugal when
borrowed by both spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan
becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one
primarily bound for its repayment.
To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal character of
the property, the petitioners have only the testimony of Julia de Reyes to
offer.
Mrs. Reyes testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment
basis and that the first payment of a little less than P2,000.00 came from
her personal funds: The receipt issued by Araneta, however, shows that the
first installment on one lot was only P69.96 and on the other lot, P102.00.
Mrs. Reyes also testified that she paid the entire purchase price and the
construction of the buildings from her personal funds and money borrowed

The Court of Appeals ruled upon the testimony of Julia De Reyes as follows:
Julia's testimony that she had sold her Cabiao property to Rosa Borja is
not supported by the deed of sale (Exh. 'I') which shows that the
property was sold to Encarnacion Goco and Mariano Robles. Again, her
claim that said Cabiao property was donated to her by her mother is
negated by the deeds of sale (Exhs. 'J' and 'K') which show that said
property was donated to her and her two brothers, Pablo and Jose del
Rosario, who afterwards sold their participation thereof to the spouses,
Ponciano and Julia.
Her claim of exclusive ownership is further belied by the Income Tax
Returns (Exhs. 'N' to 'N'- 3') which she herself prepared and filed in
behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that
the rentals paid by her co-appellees were income of the conjugal
partnership; and by the Income Tax Returns (Exhs. 'O' to '0-4') also filed
by her for the conjugal partnership, were she made to appear the
properties in question as capital assets of the conjugal partnership. It
should be noted that Julia did not care to deny the truth of said
statements. Neither did she endeavor to offer any explanation for such
damaging averments.
Petitioners also raised the issue of estoppel in their assignments of errors.
They alleged:
Even so, petitioners would have small legal cause to dispute the
respondent Court's giving credence to the husband's pretensions did
there not also exist in the record plain and indisputable evidence that he
had on a former occasion both solemnly confirmed the paraphernal
character of the very properties now in question and disclaimed the
existence of any conjugal partnership funds or properties of himself and
his wife. (Petitioner's Brief, L-31616, p. 7).
It turns out that in 1948, Ponciano Reyes was sued in the then Municipal
Court of Manila for ejectment from a leased hotel that he was then
operating. Judgment was rendered against Reyes in favor of the lessors,
the brothers named Gocheco Having failed in a bid to garnish the rentals of
the disputed buildings because the municipal court stated that it had no
jurisdiction to decide the paraphernal or conjugal nature of the properties,
the Gocheco brothers filed Civil Case No. 24772 for revival of judgment
with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
It was in this latter case where Mr. Reyes stated in his special defenses that
he and his wife never had any kind of fund which could be called conjugal
partnership funds, that they acted independently from one another
whenever either one engaged in any business, andThat the herein plaintiff has not limited his action in the present case
against defendant Ponciano S. Reyes as he did in the original case abovementioned, that is, Civil Case No. 7524 of the Manila Municipal Court
which the instant case derived from, but has included the defendant's
wife Julia Reyes, with the only intended purpose and design of going
over and against the paraphernal properties of said Julia Reyes. (par. 4,
Special Defenses, Answer, Exh. II; Petitioner's Brief, L-31618, pp. 9-10).
Article 1437 of the Civil Code on estoppel involving immovable property
provides:
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning
immovable property, one of them is misled by a person with respect to
the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded
from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these
requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of
facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the
facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the
representation.
The principle of estoppel rests on the rule that whenever a party has, by his
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led the other to
believe a particular thing true and to act, upon such belief he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it. (Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 154.)
Estoppel can only be invoked between the person making the
misrepresentation and the person to whom it was addressed. It is essential
that the latter shag have relied upon the misrepresentation and had been
influenced and misled thereby.

There is no showing that the respondent had intentionally and deliberately

led the petitioners Mendozas to believe what was contained in the
pleading, "Exh. 11", and to make them act upon it. As observed by the
respondent, they were not even a party in the case where the said pleadin
was filed. Neither is there any assertion by the Mendozas that the said
pleading was shown to them or that they happened to see it or to have any
knowledge about it before they purchased the properties in question. The
alleged representation was never addressed to the petitioners, much less
made with the intention that they would act upon it. Moreover, there is no
specific and clear reference to the disputed lots as paraphernal in the cited
answer. The petitioners cannot invoke estoppel in these petitions.
May the Mendoza spouses be considered buyers in good faith?
The proof that the petitioners in L-31618 are purchasers in good faith
comes from the testimony of Mrs. Inocencia Mendoza herself. Mrs.
Mendoza testified that Mrs. Julia R. De Reyes assured her that the
properties were paraphernal that her lawyer verified the titles being in the
name of Mrs. Julia R. De Reyes, and that she never dealt with Mr. Ponciano
Reyes when she and her husband were still renting the properties they
later purchased. On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza admitted that she
learned of the RFC mortgage when the lots were about to be purchased.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the
fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses
does not destroy its conjugal nature. (Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 249).
Section 46 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, reiterates the
proviso in Section 70 of the former Land Registration Act that registration
cannot be construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from
any rights incident to the relation of husband and wife. (See also: Marigsa
v. Macabuntoc 17 Phil. 107, 109; Romero de Pratts v. Menzi & Co., Inc., 53
Phil. 51, 54; Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377, 382-384; Vitug v. Montemayor,
91 Phil. 286, 290, 291, citing Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144; Sideco v.
Aznar, 92 Phil. 952, 961-962, citing Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 288; Guinoo v.
Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 235, 238; Silos v. Ramos, 97 Phil. 263,
270, citingCommonwealth v. Sandiko 72 Phil. 258, 260; and Alvarez v.
Espiritu, 14 SCRA 893).
If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the
name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither
does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land
registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its
conjugal nature.
The mortgage contracts (Exhs. "A-1 " and "B-1 ") executed by the spouses
Ponciano S. Reyes and Julia Reyes in favor of RFC were duly registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and seasonably annotated on transfer
certificates of title Nos. 8550 (Exh. "F") and 19998 (Exh. "G"), which were
issued in the name of Julia Reyes "married to Ponciano Reyes". Their dates
of inscription were November 29, 1948 and October 11, 1952, respectively.
On December 10, 1952, the lots and the building were leased by Julia, with
the marital consent of Ponciano to the petitioners Mendozas The contract
of lease was registered in the Registry of Deeds and was annotated in the
transfer certificates of title on May 5, 1952. At that time, the RFC
mortgages were already noted at the back of the transfer certificates of
title. The petitioners, therefore, are unquestionably charged with notice of
the existence and contents of said mortgages, their joint execution by the
spouses Ponciano Reyes and Julia Reyes and the application of the loans to
the payment to Araneta of the purchase price of the lots in question.
Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to the mere lease of the
properties was demanded by the Mendozas allegedly for their own
protection, yet when it came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater
transfer of rights such consent was not required.
The final argument refers to the alleged unjust enrichment by Ponciano
Reyes if the deed of sale is nullified This petitioners admit that the benefit
including that represented by one-half of the purchase price, accrued not
to the respondent but to his wife. Since Mr. Reyes did not receive any part
of the proceeds of the sale and his wife has been aligning herself with the
Mendoza couple, there could be no unjust enrichment as alleged. The
assignments of errors have no merit.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

southern portion, described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto;

the northern, to Federico. 1
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name
from the Capiz Registry of Property, numbered T-1346. He died on April 20,
1973, at the age of 81 years. His wife, Victoria Comorro, predeceased him
dying at age 70 on July 16, 1971. They had no children. 2
Now, it appears that Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children
named Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two borrowed
P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As security therefor they mortgaged to
Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C. In the "Loan Agreement with Real
Estate Mortgage" executed between them and Bernas on October 30, 1975,
they described themselves as the absolute co-owners of Lot 13-C. A relative,
Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness. 3
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977
and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. 4 After the
foreclosure sale, Dorothea and Teodoro executed a deed of Extrajudicial
Partition dated June 21, 1978, in which they adjudicated the same Lot 13-C
unto themselves in equal shares pro-indiviso.: nad
On October 25, 1978 Bernas consolidated his ownership over Lot 13-C, the
mortgagors having failed to redeem the same within the reglementary
period, and had the latter's title (No. T-1346 in the name of Modesto Aranas)
cancelled and another issued in his name, TCT No. T-15121. 5
About a month later, or on November 24, 1978, Consolacion Villanueva and
Raymundo Aranas who, as aforestated, was an instrumental witness in
the deed of mortgage executed by Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas on
October 30, 1975 filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court at Roxas
City against Jesus Bernas and his spouse, Remedios Bernas. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. V-4188, and assigned to Branch 14. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs prayed that the latter's title over Lot 13-C, TCT No.
T-15121, be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. They
grounded their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on or about
November 20, 1978 of two (2) wills, one executed on February 11, 1958 by
Modesto Aranas, and the other, executed on October 29, 1957 by his wife,
Victoria Comorro. Victoria Comorro's will allegedly bequeathed to
Consolacion and Raymundo, and to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas, in equal
shares pro indiviso, all of said Victoria Comorro's "interests, rights and
properties, real and personal . . . as her net share from (the) conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas . . ." Modesto
Aranas' will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro
Aranas (his illegitimate children) all his interests in his conjugal partnership
with Victoria "as well as his own capital property brought by him to (his)
marriage with his said wife." 6
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on certain facts, including the
following:
1) that the property in question was registered before the mortgage in
the name of the late Modesto Aranas, married to Victoria Comorro,
(covered by) TCT No. 1346, issued on March 21, 1953;
2) that the wills above described were probated only after the filing of the
case (No. V-4188);
3) that Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas are not children of
either Modesto Aranas or Victoria Comorro;
4) that the lot in question is not expressly mentioned in the will; and
5) that TCT No. 15121 exists, and was issued in favor of defendant spouses
Jesus Bernas and Remedios Bernas.:-cralaw
Trial ensued after which judgment was rendered adversely to the plaintiffs,
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas. 7 The dispositive part of the
judgment reads as follows: 8
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs as follows:
The plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed and ordering the plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, to pay the defendants the following:
1) THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00) as attorney's fees;
2) FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as actual damages;
3) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral damages;

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 74577 : December 4, 1990.]

192 SCRA 21
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, JESUS BERNAS and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS,
Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners in fee
simple of a parcel of land identified as Lot 13, their ownership being
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3239 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Capiz on June 19, 1924. After they died, their surviving children,
Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves
under a deed of extrajudicial partition executed on May 2, 1952. The

4) Declaring the defendants spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios O. Bernas as

legal owners of Lot No. 13-C and including all the improvements thereon;
5) Declaring the loan agreement with real estate mortgage (Exh. '2') entered
into by Dorothea Aranas Ado married to Reynaldo F. Ado and Teodoro C.
Aranas and Jesus Bernas married to Remedios O. Bernas, over the lot in
question executed on October 30, 1975 before Notary Public Roland D.
Abalajon and the corresponding Certificate of Title No. T-15121 registered
in the name of Jesus Bernas (defendants spouses) as having been
executed and issued in accordance with law, are declared legal and valid;
6) For failure to prove all other counter-claim and damages, the same are
hereby dismissed.
7) To pay costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED."

The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where they

succeeded only in having the award of actual and moral damages deleted,
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court having been otherwise affirmed in
toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, 9 Consolacion Villanueva
appealed to this Court. Her co-plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.
The only question is, what right was acquired by Consolacion Villanueva over
Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria
Camorro's last will and testament giving to her all of said Victoria's "interests,
rights and properties, real and personal . . . as her net share from (the)
conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas . . ." She
is admittedly, not named an heiress in Modesto Aranas' will.: nad
Certain it is that the land itself, Lot 13-C, was not "conjugal partnership
property" of Victoria Comorro and her husband, Modesto Aranas. It was the
latter's exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his parents
Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa, the original owners of the property
registered solely in his name, under TCT T-1346. Whether Modesto
succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his marriage to Victoria
Comorro the record being unfortunately none too clear on the point is
inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as
a matter of law. This is what Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that
to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter alia,
"that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that which
each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title." Thus, even if it be
assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place
during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his
"exclusive property" because acquired by him, "during the marriage, by
lucrative title."
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two (2) years
ahead of her husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of Lot 13-C, who
passed away on April 20, 1973. Victoria never therefore inherited any part
of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or
otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else.
It would seem, however, that there are improvements standing on Lot 13-C,
and it is to these improvements that Consolacion Villanueva's claims are
directed. The question then is, whether or not the improvements are
conjugal property, so that Victoria Comorro may be said to have acquired a
right over them by succession, as voluntary heir of Victoria Comorro.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for utility or adornment,
made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from
the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife,
belong to the conjugal partnership," and buildings "constructed, at the
expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall
be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." 10 Proof, therefore, is
needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and
the source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the character
of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one
spouse separately. No such proof was presented or proferred by
Consolacion Villanueva or any one else. What is certain is that the land on
which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto
Aranas and that where, as here, property is registered in the name of one
spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was
acquired, the presumption is that it belongs exclusively to said spouse. 11 It
is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in
character.
Yet another consideration precludes relief to Consolacion Villanueva and
that is, that when Lot 13-C was mortgaged to Jesus Bernas, the title was free
of any lien, encumbrance or adverse claim presented by or for Consolacion
Villanueva or anybody else, and that when Bernas subsequently
consolidated his ownership over Lot 13-C and obtained title in his name, the
Registry of Deeds contained no record of any lien, encumbrance or adverse
claim affecting the property. Furthermore, Bernas' mode of acquisition of
ownership over the property, i.e., by a mortgage sale, appears in all respects
to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore
be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to Lot 13-C which
cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising and of which
he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and
ventilation.:-cralaw
Finally, it bears stressing that the conclusion of the Intermediate Appellate
Court that the evidence establishes that the property in question was the
exclusive property of one spouse, not conjugal, is a factual one which, absent
any satisfactory showing of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Appellate Court in reaching it, is not reviewable by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject of
this appeal, being in accord with the evidence and applicable law and
jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16857

May 29, 1964

MARCELO CASTILLO, JR., FELICISIMO CASTILLO, ENCARNACION CASTILLO,

AMELIA CASTILLO, JAIME CASTILLO, RONALDO CASTILLO, VICTORIA
CASTILLO, LETICIA CINCO, LEVI CINCO and DANIEL CINCO,petitioners,
vs.
MACARIA PASCO, respondent.
Tomas Yumol for petitioners.
Mariano G. Bustos and Associates for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The legitimate children and descendants of the late Marcelo Castillo, Sr.
pray for the review and reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, in
its Case CA G.R. No. 19377-R, that affirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, declaring that the fishpond in San Roque,
Paombong, Bulacan (covered by TCT No. 9928 of the Registry of Deeds of
said province), was the exclusive paraphernal property of respondent
Macaria Pasco, surviving spouse of the deceased Marcelo Castillo, Sr., and
dismissing the complaint for partition and accounting filed by petitioners in
said Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals found, and the petitioner-appellants do not dispute,
that in October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married
Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous husbands.
Petitioners were children and grandchildren (representing their deceased
parents) of Marcelo Castillo, Sr. by his previous marriage. On April 3, 1933,
Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow married her fourth husband, Luis
San Juan, on June 8, 1934.
On December 22, 1932, Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as co-owners of
the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale (Exh. 1) conveying said
property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for the sum of
P6,000.00 (although the deed recited a higher amount), payable in three
installments: P1,000 upon execution of the deed (Exh. 1) ; P2,000 on
January 25, 1933 without interest; and P3,000 within one year thereafter,
with 11% interest from February 1, 1933, but extendible for another year.
Against the contention of petitioners-appellants that the fishpond thus
bought should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during
coverture, the Court of Appeals declared it to be paraphernalia because it
was purchased with exclusive funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco. She was
admittedly a woman of means even before she married Marcelo Castillo,
Sr. and the latter's principal source of income was only his P80 a month
salary, as provincial treasurer (as found by the Court of First Instance),
besides two small residential lots and fishponds, which were encumbered
and later transferred to his five children by his first wife and whom he was
then supporting in medical and high school. Actually, Marcelo Castillo, Sr.
died without enough assets to pay his debts. .
In point of fact, the Court of Appeals found that the initial payment of
P1,000 for the fishpond now in litigation was made up of P600, that one of
the vendors (Gabriel Gonzales) owed to appellee Pasco, and P400 in cash,
which the latter paid out of the proceeds of the sale of one of her nipa
lands. The second installment of P2,000 appears to have been paid with
the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, to whom the fishpond
was mortgaged by both spouses. Dr. Jacinto later assigned his interest to
Dr. Antonio Pasco. The last payment of P3,000 was derived from a loan
secured by a mortgage (Exh. 2) on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of
Macaria Pasco, and one of which she had inherited from a former husband,
Justo S. Pascual, while the other lot encumbered was assessed in her
exclusive name.
It was also found by the Court of Appeals that upon the death of Marcelo
Castillo, Sr., the loan and mortgage in favor of Dr. Jacinto (later assigned by
him to Dr. Antonio Pasco) was still outstanding. Unable to collect the loan,
Dr. Pasco foreclosed the mortgaged, and the encumbered fishpond was
sold to him; but the sale was subsequently annulled. Later, on September
7, 1949, respondent Macaria Pasco judicially consigned P12,300 on account
of the mortgage debt and its interest, and completed payment by a second
consignation of P752.43 made on April 24, 1950. As the estate of Castillo
had no assets adequate to pay off the claims against it, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the amounts consigned belonged to the widow
Macaria Pasco, respondent herein.1wph1.t
It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the
applicable law in 1932, the property acquired for onerous consideration
during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending
on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article 1396
of said Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
1. ...
2. ...
3. ...
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the
husband.
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:
ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at

the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for
the partnership or for one of the spouses only.
The last clause in Article 1401 (par. 1) indicates that the circumstance of
the sale of the fishpond in question being made by the original owners in
favor of both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and Macaria Pasco, is
indifferent for the determination of whether the property should be
deemed paraphernal or conjugal. As remarked by Manresa in his
Commentaries to the Civil Code, Vol. IX (5th Ed), p. 549, "la ley atiende no a
la persona encuyo nombre o a favor del cual se realize la compra, sino a la
procedenciadel dinero."
As above-noted, the Court of Appeals determined that the initial payment
of P1,000 for the fishpond now disputed was made out of private funds of
Macaria Pasco. Appellants, however, argue that since there is no express
finding that the P600 debt owed by Gabriel Gonzales came exclusively from
private funds of Pasco, they should be presumed conjugal funds, in
accordance with Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889. The argument is
untenable. Since the wife, under Article 1418, can not bind the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the husband, her private transactions
are presumed to be for her own account, and not for the account of the
partnership. The finding of the Court of Appeals is that Gabriel Gonzales
owed this particular indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the
absence of proof that the husband authorized her to use community funds
therefor, the appellate Court's finding can not be disturbed by us. Whether
the evidence adverted to should be credited is for the Court of Appeals to
decide.
Appellants next assail the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the other
two installments of the purchase price should be, like the first one, deemed
to have been paid with exclusive funds of the wife because the money was
raised by loans guaranteed by mortgage on paraphernalia property of the
wife. The position thus taken by appellants is meritorious, for the reason
that the deeds show the loans to have been made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto,
and by Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, to both spouses Marcelo Castillo
and Macaria Pasco, as joint borrowers. The loans thus became obligations
of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned
is logically conjugal property. While the securing mortgage is on the wife's
paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation that the
lenders could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the principal debt
which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the creditors
could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so desired.
In Palanca vs. Smith Bell & Co., 9 Phil. 131., this Court ruled as follows (cas
cit. at p. 133,) .
This P14,000, borrowed by said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the
property of his wife became conjugal property (par. 3, Art. 1401, Civil
Code) and when that same was reinvented in the construction of a
house, the house became e conjugal property and was liable for the
payment of the debts of the husband (Art 1408, Civ. Code).
If money borrowed by the husband alone on the security of his wife's
property is conjugal in character, a fortiorishould it be conjugal when
borrowed by both spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan becomes
an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one primarily bound
for its repayment.
The case of Lim Queco vs. Cartagena, 71 Phil. 162, is clearly distinguishable
from the Palanca case in that in the Lim Queco case the wife
alone borrowed the money from "El Ahorro Insular" although she
guaranteed repayment with a mortgage on her parapherna executed with
her husband's consent. Since the wife does not have the management or
representation of the conjugal partnership where the husband is qualified
therefor, the loan to her constituted a transaction that did not involve the
community, and the creditor could seek repayment exclusively from her
properties. Logically, as this Court then held, the money loaned to the wife,
as well as the property acquired thereby, should be deemed to be the
wife's exclusive property.
The analogy between the case now before us and the Palanca vs. Smith
Bell case is undeniable, and the Palanca ruling applies. We, therefore, find
that the two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price of the fishpond
were paid with conjugal funds, unlike the first installment of P1,000 that
was paid exclusively with money belonging to the wife Macaria Pasco,
appellee herein.
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and
partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion
to the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An
undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the
remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of
spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco (9 Manresa, Com. al Codigo
Civil [5th Ed.], p. 549).
Puesto que la ley atiende no a la persona en cuyo nombre o a favor del
cualse realize la compra sino a la procedencia del dinero, considerando
el hecho como una verdadera substitution o conversion del dinero en
otros objetos, debemos deduce que cuando una finca por ejemplo, se
compra con dinero del marido y de la mujer, o de la mujer y de la
Sociedad, pertenece a aquellos de quienes precede el precio y en la
proporcion entregada por cada cual. Si pues marido y mujer compran

una casa entregando el primero de su capital propio 10,000 pesetas, y la

segunda 5,000, la casa pertenecera a losdos conyuges pro indiviso, en la
proportion de los terceras partes al marido y una tercera a la mujer.
(Manresa. op. cit)
The payment by the widow, after her husband's death, of the mortgage
debt due to Dr. Pasco, the assignee of the original mortgagee, Dr. Nicanor
Jacinto, does not result in increasing her share in the property in question
but in creating a lien in her favor over the undivided share of the conjugal
partnership, for the repayment of the amount she has advanced, should it
be ultimately shown that the money thus delivered to the creditor was
exclusively owned by her.
It follows from the foregoing that, as the fishpond was undivided property
of the widow and the conjugal partnership with her late husband, the heirs
of the latter, appellants herein, were entitled to ask for partition thereof
and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate interest of each party must be
resolved after due hearing, taking into account (a) the widow's one-sixth
direct share; (b) her half of the community property; (e) her successional
rights to a part of the husband's share pursuant to the governing law of
succession when the husband died; and (d) the widow's right to
reimbursement for any amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage
debt as aforesaid. All these details must be settled after proper trial.
WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the original complaint is hereby revoked and
set aside, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this opinion.

G.R. No. L-4085

July 30, 1952

AGAPITO LORENZO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FLORENCIO NICOLAS ET AL., respondents.
Engracio F. Clemena and Senon S. Ceniza for petitioners.
Bustos and De Guzman for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of
Appeals the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the Court reverses the judgement appealed from, with
respects to Parcels Nos. 5 and 6, declares the same to be paraphernal
properties of the deceased Magdalena Clemente; declares the sale
(Exhibit D) made by Magdalena Clemente in favor of the DefendantsAppellants of said Parcel of Land No. 6, on June 26, 1916, binding lawful
and effective; orders the partition by and among the plaintiffs and
defendants of Parcels of Land Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in the proportion of onehalf () for the Plaintiffs and the other half () for the Defendants;
dismisses the complaint, with respect to Parcels of land Nos. 1, 5, 6 and
7, without special pronouncement as to costs; orders the Defendants to
pay to the conjugal partnership one-half of the whole amount paid to
the Bureau of Lands, with legal interest thereon, from the date of the
filing of the complaint, after deducting from said amount the initial
payments made on the said lots Nos. 5 and 6; and further orders the
Plaintiffs to pay to pay the Defendants the sum of P50.00, representing
of the attorneys' fees paid by said Defendants in connection with
parcel No. 2.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the
deceased Gregorio Nicolas, Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the
deceased Carlosa Santamaria, was also at that time a widower. On
January 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted
marriage. Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena
died on January 31, 1934. During their coverture, the two had no
children. In his first marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo left, as heirs,
the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo,
deceased, who had been succeeded by his children, the plaintiffs
Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all surnamed Lorenzo; while
Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased
Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix,
Trinidad, Cecilia and Basilisa, all surnamed Nicolas. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

As to Parcel of land No. 6. This parcel of land which is lot No. 72 of the
Friars Land Subdivision in Guiguinto, Bulacan, was purchased in her own
name by Magdalena Clemente, for her own exclusive benefit on October
17, 1908 (Exhibit 7), prior to her marriage with Manuel Lorenzo. She had
paid the sum of P169.16 on account of the purchase price before her
marriage with Lorenzo and, according to the terms of the contract of the
sale, the balance of P833.32 was payable on installments, namely:
P25.32 on June 1, 1909, and the balance in annual payment of P42.00
each, payable on the first day of June of each year, plus interest of 4%
per annum.
The receipts, evidencing the payments of these installments (Exhibits I-A
to I-M), presented by Plaintiffs themselves, demonstrate that they were
paid in her own name. On August 21, 1928, the deed of final conveyance
was executed in the sole favor of Magdalena Clemente, notwithstanding
the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was then alive. This parcel of land was
registered under the Torrens System, in the exclusive name of

Magdalena Clemente. The real estate tax receipts, covering this

particular parcel, are under the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente.
The presumption of continuity of condition is also in favor of Magdalena
Clemente. The status of the land from the time she acquired it and
before her marriage to Lorenzo, contained until it is otherwise changed,
for it is presumed that a thing once proved to exist continues as long as
is usual with things of that nature. All the acts just mentioned are also
acts of ownership. And again, it is to be presumed that a person is the
owner of a property from exercising acts of ownership over it [Sec. 69 (j)
(dd), Rule 123; Heirs of Junero vs. Lizares, 17 Phil., 112]. These are
presumptions which the plaintiffs should but failed to rebut. And
Manuel Lorenzo, indoubtedly recognizing that Magdalena Clemente had
the right of ownership over the land, did not even as much as care to
place the title to the land in the name of the conjugal partnership, even
after the payment of the installments paid by Magdalena Clemente
during the marriage. However, the evidence is not clear as to the source
of the money with which the payment of the installments was made,
except the advanced payment, which was admittedly paid from her own
purse. "Any useful expenditures made for the benefit of the separate
property of either one of the spouses by means of the advances made
by the partnership or by the industry of the husband or wife, are
partnership property." (Art. 1404, Civil Code). The amount spent for the
payments of installments due during the marriage, or obligations
affecting the separate property of Magdalena Clemente, is certainly a
useful expenditures because it preserves her right to the ownership of
the land, and is, therefore, a credit which belongs to the conjugal
partnership, and must be reimbursed to it by her. (9 Manresa, 606; 5
Sanchez Roman, 840.) In other words, while the ownership of the land
remains with Magdalena Clemente, the conjugal partnership is entitled
to the reimbursement of paid installments. (Ona vs. Regala, 58 Phil.
881.)
The learned trial court sustained plaintiffs pretension on the strength of
Article 1407 of the Civil Code which declares that "all the property of the
spouses shall be deemed partnership property, in the absence of proof
that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife", thereby
establishing a presumption which may be "overcome by the
introduction of competent evidence to the contrary" (Casino vs.
Samaniego, 30 Phil., 135). We hold that the evidence adduced to rebut
this presumption, is not only most competent but also convincing, as has
heretofore been discussed.
As to Parcel of land No. 5. This parcel was also purchased by
Magdalena Clemente from the Bureau of Lands on October 17, 1908
(Exhibit E), for P967.16, of which amount P116.84 had previously been
paid by her, before her marriage to Manuel Lorenzo. According to the
terms of the sale, the balance of P850.32 was payable by installments:
namely, P52.32 on June 1, 1909, and P42.00 annually on June 1, of each
succeeding year. Payments on account of the installments were made by
her, the receipts therefor were issued in her own name by the Bureau of
Lands (Exhibits I-A to I-M). On October 7, 1933 or 4 years after the
death of Manuel Lorenzo, the final, certificate of sale was executed by
the Director of Lands in her favor and in her name. By virtue thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13269 was issued in the sole name of
Magdalena Clemente. The legal principles hereinabove discussed apply
with equal force to this parcel of land No. 5.
On October 12, 1932, parcel of land No. 6, together with lots Nos. 226
and 216 of the Friars Lands Subdivision in Guiguinto, were conveyed in
absolute sale for valuable consideration by Magdalena Clemente in favor
of herein Defendants (Exhibit J). The trial court considered the sale as
having been made in bad faith and consequently annulled the same. In
view of our conclusion, that parcels Nos. 5 and 6 are paraphernal
properties of Magdalena Clemente, further discussion of this assignment
of error would be deemed unnecessary. However, we propose to pass
upon this point in order to settle, once and for all, the validity of the sale
which is precisely one of the basis of Defendant's title to the lands under
litigation. The sale took place about 3 years after Manuel Lorenzo's
death on January 7, 1921 it was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan, and the corresponding T.C.T. No. 17786 was issued in their
favor, Aside from the presumption of good faith, connection with this
transaction (Art. 434, Civil Code), there is no evidence at all showing that
defendants were aware of the flaw in the title of their immediate
transferor, Magdalena Clemente. At the time of the purchase of this
parcel of land, Defendants did not have any notice of the claim or
interest of the herein Plaintiffs over the said property. The price was
paid. During the lifetime of Magdalena Clemente, Plaintiffs did not
dispute at all her exclusive right over said land, and it was only two years
after her death that they filed the claim against the Defendants. Fraud in
the transaction should be proven clearly; it should not solely be
predicated upon a mere presumption arising from the relationship of
the vendor and the vendees. Defendants took possession of the land
completely relying upon the fact that it was the sole property of
Magdalena Clemente. Furthermore, every purchaser of registered land
should take and hold the same free and clear from any and all prior
claims, liens and encumbrances, except those set forth in the decree of
registration and those expressly mentioned in the Land Registration Act
as having been preserved against it. (Sec. 39, Act No. 496; De Jesus vs.
City of Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Anderson & Co. vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 506.) No
such claim, liens or encumbrances are set forth on the certificate of title.

Plaintiffs tried to prove fraud by the presentation of Exhibit 1, the deed

of sale in 1934, in favor of Martina Rodrigo of the parcel of land No. 7.
This deed does not in any way prove fraud in the sale of parcels of land
Nos. 1 and 6, for this deed refers only to parcel No. 7, as to which,
Plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed by the trial court. The
imputation of fraud is belied by the statement in Exhibit J that lot No.
216 was sold to Martina Rodrigo for the purpose only of defraying the
expenses of the last illness of Magdalena Clemente. The court below, by
dismissing the complaint as to parcel No. 7 covered by the deed of sale,
Exhibit J, impliedly recognized the validity of the said deed of sale,
Exhibit J.
It is, therefore, evident that the annullment of the deed of sale, Exhibit J,
by the court a quo, is an error. In view of this conclusion, the query
posed by Defendants, whether in an action for partition, the question of
the nullity of Exhibit J. on the ground of fraud, can be drawn collaterally,
need not to be determined. The same thing may be said with respect to
the question of estoppel by laches raised by the Defendants.
In support of the petition for review the petitioners claim that:
(a) That the Honorable Court of Appeals in declaring parcels of land Nos.
5 and 6 paraphernal properties of the deceased Magdalena Clemente
has committed an error of law.
(b) That the Honorable Court of Appeals has committed an error which
amounts to serious abuse of discretion by declaring that parcels of land
Nos. 5 and 6 were acquired by Magdalena Clemente before her
marriage to Manuel Lorenzo..
(c) That the Honorable Court of Appeals has committed an error which
amounts to a grave abuse of discretion by not declaring the deed of sale
Exhibit "J" null and void.
So the petitioners question only the correctness of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals as to parcels Nos. 5 and 6 held to be paraphernal
properties of the late Magdalena Clemente reversing the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan which held that they were conjugal, The
third assignment of error involves a question of fact.
Upon the presumption that the parcels of land Nos. 5 and 6 continued to
be the exclusive properties of Magdalena Clemente until shown otherwise
and because she had paid the sum of P116.84 for parcel No. 5 and P169.16
for parcel No. 6 before her marriage to the late Manuel Lorenzo, the
ancestor of the petitioners, from whom they claim the deprive their rights
to one-half of the parcels of land, the Court of Appeals is of the opinion
that they were paraphernal properties of the late Magdalena Clemente.
What she had paid during coverture for said parcels of land was declared
conjugal and deemed useful expenditures for which the conjugal
partnership is entitled to reimbursement.
The two parcel of land in question were part of the Friar Lands the
alienation of which is provided for in Act No. 1120.
Section 11 of Act No, 1120 provides:
Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon and
occupant of any portion of said land . . . desire to purchase the land so
occupied by him, he shall be entitled to do so at the actual cost thereof
to the Government, and shall be allowed ten years from the date of
purchase within which to pay for the same in equal annual installments,
if he so desires, all deferred payments to bear interest at the rate of four
per centum per annum.
Section 12 of the same Act partly provides:
. . . When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a
certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed
to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him,
at the prize so fixed, payable as provided in this Act ... and that upon the
payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so
held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued
and become effective in the manner provide in section one hundred and
twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. . . . .
Section 16 thereof in part provides:
In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of
which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of
a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his window shall be
entitled to received a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon
showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the
purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the
giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the
holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the
persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken
had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the
certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all
the requirements of the certificate. . . .
From these provision it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent is
to sell the friar lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and
occupants of the same. In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is
only an agreement to sell it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in
the parcels of land to be sold by the Government. Only do the heirs

succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no widow

survives him. The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the
lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of
Magdalena Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No.
6 was made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still
alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena Clemente.
The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to
one-half of the two parcels of land. But the installments paid during
coverture are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were
paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena Clemente.
Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals
under review is affirmed, without cost.

G.R. No. L-57499 June 22, 1984

MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of First instance of Pangasinan,
Branch I, and CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents.
Fernandez Law Offices for petitioner.
Francisco Pulido for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the Decision, dated October 6,
1980, and the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, dated
November 27, 1980, of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch I, in Civil Case No. 15620 entitled "Corazon DAGUINES vs.
MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas," upholding the sale of a parcel of land in
favor of DAGUINES but not of the conjugal house thereon'
The background facts may be summarized as follows: Petitioner MERCEDES
Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19,
1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small house on the
residential land in question with an area of approximately 891 square
meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After FERNANDO's
father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land.
In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private
respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they
were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27,
1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II, which
judgment has become final.
On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house
thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of P2,000.00. In the document of sale,
FERNANDO described the house as "also inherited by me from my
deceased parents."
Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a
complaint on June 19, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against
MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute
where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on
the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her
industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and
improvements to DAGUINES was null and void because they are conjugal
properties and she had not given her consent to the sale,
In its original judgment, respondent Court principally declared DAGUINES
"as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the one-half () of the
house erected on said land." Upon reconsideration prayed for by
MERCEDES, however, respondent Court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court,
promulgated on October 6, 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) Declaring plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of the land in
question and the 10 coconut trees;
(2) Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff
on April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A) including the 3 coconut trees and other
crops planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas
(vendor) and his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes CalimlimCanullas;
xxx xxx xxx
The issues posed for resolution are (1) whether or not the construction of a
conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave
the land the character of conjugal property; and (2) whether or not the sale
of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid
under the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to
be given to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.
We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the
building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is
indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the
lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the
lot, 1 which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. 2
In his commentary on the corresponding provision in the Spanish Civil Code
(Art. 1404), Manresa stated:
El articulo cambia la doctrine; los edificios construidos durante el
matrimonio en suelo propio de uno de los conjuges son gananciales,
abonandose el valor del suelo al conj uge a quien pertenezca.
It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 3 relied upon by
respondent Judge, it was held that the land belonging to one of the
spouses, upon which the spouses have built a house, becomes conjugal

property only when the conjugal partnership is liquidated and indemnity

paid to the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that
enunciated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678,
691 (1961), where the following was explained:
As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to
conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the
conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest,
to the time immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that
ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to have
become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid
to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time
the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire
the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership
of these properties was, under the 1943 decision, subject to the
suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the
widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the
effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to
retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New
Civil Code) ...
The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not
have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not
given her consent to said sale. 4
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void
for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a
husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left
the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they
derived their support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the
family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. 5
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause,
object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause, produce no effect whatsoever.The cause is unlawful if it is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling
property to each other subject to certain exceptions. 6 Similarly, donations
between spouses during marriage are prohibited. 7 And this is so because if
transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic
policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other, 8 as well as to protect the
institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The
prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated
by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the
parties. That was the ruling in Buenaventura vs. Bautista, also penned by
Justice JBL Reyes (CA) 50 O.G. 3679, and cited in Matabuena vs.
Cervantes. 9 We quote hereunder the pertinent dissertation on this point:
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage,
policy considerations of the most exigent character as wen as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship.
As announced in the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals
decision, Buenaventura vs. Bautista, 50 OG 3679, interpreting a similar
provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the
law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
that Court, 'to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue influence and improper
pressure upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law,
..., then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.
For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for
thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so
that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased'. Moreover, as pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib 32 ad Sabinum,
fr. 1), "It would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest
the conditions of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better."
So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage (Emphasis supplied),
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated October 6, 1980,
and his Resolution of November 27, 1980 on petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, are hereby set aside and the sale of the lot, house and
improvements in question, is hereby declared null and void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48889 May 11, 1989

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MIDPAINTAO L. ADIL, Judge of the Second Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo and SPOUSES PATRICIO CONFESOR and
JOVITA VILLAFUERTE, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in this petition for review on certiorari is the validity of a
promissory note which was executed in consideration of a previous
promissory note the enforcement of which had been barred by
prescription.
On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank
(AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of
P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said
date whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the
account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the obligation remained
outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year
period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the
Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly
acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June
15, 1961. The new promissory note reads as follows
I hereby promise to pay the amount covered by my promissory note on
or before June 15, 1961. Upon my failure to do so, I hereby agree to the
foreclosure of my mortgage. It is understood that if I can secure a
certificate of indebtedness from the government of my back pay I will be
allowed to pay the amount out of it.
Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP
filed a complaint dated September 11, 1970 in the City Court of Iloilo City
against the spouses for the payment of the loan.
After trial on the merits a decision was rendered by the inferior court on
December 27, 1976, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment,
ordering the defendants Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
Confesor to pay the plaintiff Development Bank of the Philippines,
jointly and severally, (a) the sum of P5,760.96 plus additional daily
interest of P l.04 from September 17, 1970, the date Complaint was
filed, until said amount is paid; (b) the sum of P576.00 equivalent to ten
(10%) of the total claim by way of attorney's fees and incidental
expenses plus interest at the legal rate as of September 17,1970, until
fully paid; and (c) the costs of the suit.
Defendants-spouses appealed therefrom to the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo wherein in due course a decision was rendered on April 28, 1978
reversing the appealed decision and dismissing the complaint and counterclaim with costs against the plaintiff.
A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by plaintiff was denied in
an order of August 10, 1978. Hence this petition wherein petitioner alleges
that the decision of respondent judge is contrary to law and runs counter
to decisions of this Court when respondent judge (a) refused to recognize
the law that the right to prescription may be renounced or waived; and (b)
that in signing the second promissory note respondent Patricio Confesor
can bind the conjugal partnership; or otherwise said respondent became
liable in his personal capacity. The petition is impressed with merit. The
right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce
prescription already obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the
future.
Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the
renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the
right acquired.
There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note
of February 10, 1940. However, when respondent Confesor executed the
second promissory note on April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the
amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before June 15,
1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage,
said respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived
his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note.
This Court had ruled in a similar case that
... when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced
by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the
prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable ... . 1
Thus, it has been held
Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt
and promises to pay it after the same has prescribed and with full
knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of
prescription. 2
This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed
but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new
promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory

note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the
debt.
A new express promise to pay a debt barred ... will take the case from
the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the
ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does
not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral
obligation to support a promise, to wit a pre-existing debt which is a
sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this
sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action. 3
... It is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from
an acknowledgement as a legal implication, which is to be regarded as
reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy
(which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the
creditor to recover upon his original contract. 4
However, the court a quo held that in signing the promissory note alone,
respondent Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife, respondent Jovita
Villafuerte, citing Article 166 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spend thrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without, the wife's consent. If she
ay compel her to refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court m
grant the same.
We disagree. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. 5 No doubt, in this
case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable
for this obligation.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition is reversed and set aside
and another decision is hereby rendered reinstating the decision of the City
Court of Iloilo City of December 27, 1976, without pronouncement as to
costs in this instance. This decision is immediately executory and no motion
for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration shall be granted.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25659

October 31, 1969

LUZON SURETY CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
JOSEFA AGUIRRE DE GARCIA, VICENTE GARCIA and the FOURTH DIVISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Tolentino and Garcia and D. R. Cruz for petitioner.
Rodolfo J. Herman for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The crucial question in this petition for the review of a decision of the Court
of Appeals, to be passed upon for the first time, is whether or not a
conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received,
could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband
to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company. The Court of
Appeals held that it could not. Petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc., dissatisfied
with such a judgment, which was an affirmance of a lower court decision,
would have us reverse. We do not see it that way. The Court of Appeals
adjudicated the matter in accordance with law. We affirm what it did.
As noted in the brief of petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc., on October 18,
1960, a suit for injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental against its Provincial Sheriff by respondents-spouses, Josefa
Aguirre de Garcia and Vicente Garcia "to enjoin [such Sheriff] from selling
the sugar allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership, pursuant to a writ
of garnishment issued by virtue of a writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 3893 of the same Court of First Instance ... against the respondent
Vicente Garcia ... ."1
There was a stipulation of facts submitted. There is no question as to one
Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc.,
executing a surety bond in favor of the Philippine National Bank, Victorias
Branch, to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez in
the sum of P9,000.00. On or about the same date, Vicente Garcia, together
with the said Ladislao Chavez and one Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors,
signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly
and severally, to indemnify now petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against
any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and
expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any
time sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon
said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum, computed and
compounded quarterly until fully paid; and to pay 15% of the amount
involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected
therewith for attorney's fees.
It was likewise stipulated that on or about April 27, 1956, the Philippine
National Bank filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, docketed as its Civil Case No. 3893, against Ladislao Chavez and
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest,
attorney's fees, and costs of the suit. On or about August 8, 1957, in turn, a

third-party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon B. Lacson and

Vicente Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement, was instituted by Luzon
Surety Co., Inc.
Then, as set forth by the parties, on September 17, 1958, the lower court
rendered a decision condemning Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co.,
Inc., to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of P4,577.95
representing the principal and accrued interest of the obligation at the rate
of 6% per annum as of January 6, 1956, with a daily interest of P0.7119 on
P4,330.91 from January 6, 1956, until fully paid, plus the sum of P100.00 as
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The same decision likewise ordered
the third party defendants, Ladislao Chavez, Vicente Garcia, and Ramon B.
Lacson, to pay Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the total amount to be paid by it to
the plaintiff Philippine National Bank.
On July 30, 1960, pursuant to the aforesaid decision, the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental issued a writ of execution against Vicente
Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of
P8,839.97. Thereafter, a writ of garnishment was issued by the Provincial
Sheriff of Negros Occidental dated August 9, 1960, levying and garnishing
the sugar quedans of the now respondent-spouses, the Garcias, from their
sugar plantation, registered in the names of both of them.2 The suit for
injunction filed by the Garcia spouses was the result.
As noted, the lower court found in their favor. In its decision of April 30,
1962, it declared that the garnishment in question was contrary to Article
161 of the Civil Code and granted their petition, making the writ of
preliminary injunction permanent. Luzon Surety, Inc. elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals, which, as mentioned at the outset, likewise
reached the same result. Hence this petition for review.
We reiterate what was set forth at the opening of this opinion. There is no
reason for a reversal of the judgment. The decision sought to be reviewed
is in accordance with law.
As explained in the decision now under review: "It is true that the husband
is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of
Art. 163 of the New Civil Code. However, as such administrator the only
obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the
conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the
benefit of the family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that
the husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity
agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Such inference is more emphatic in this case, when
no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor
received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership."3
In the decision before us, the principal error assigned is the above holding
of the Court of Appeals that under Article 161 of the Civil Code no liability
was incurred by the conjugal partnership. While fully conscious of the
express language of Article 161 of the Civil Code, petitioner, in its wellwritten brief submitted by its counsel, would impress on us that in this case
it could not be said that no benefit was received by the conjugal
partnership. It sought to lend some semblance of plausibility to this view
thus: "The present case involves a contract of suretyship entered into by
the husband, the respondent Vicente Garcia, in behalf of a third person. A
transaction based on credit through which, by our given definitions,
respondent Vicente Garcia, by acting as guarantor and making good his
guaranty, acquires the capacity of being trusted, adds to his reputation or
esteem, enhances his standing as a citizen in the community in which he
lives, and earns the confidence of the business community. He can thus
secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal
partnership."4
While not entirely, without basis, such an argument does not carry
conviction. Its acceptance would negate the plain meaning of what is
expressly provided for in Article 161. In the most categorical language, a
conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage
which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this
case. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended
for a third party, one Ladislao Chavez. While the husband by thus signing
the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or
esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community,
such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to
come within the express terms of the provision.
Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It peremptorily calls for
application. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous
terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate
is obeyed. So it is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and
what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.5
Moreover, it would negate the plain object of the additional requirement
in the present Civil Code that a debt contracted by the husband to bind a
conjugal partnership must redound to its benefit. That is still another
provision indicative of the solicitude and tender regard that the law
manifests for the family as a unit. Its interest is paramount; its welfare
uppermost in the minds of the codifiers and legislators.

This particular codal provision in question rightfully emphasizes the

responsibility of the husband as administrator.6 He is supposed to conserve
and, if possible, augment the funds of the conjugal partnership, not
dissipate them. If out of friendship or misplaced generosity on his part the
conjugal partnership would be saddled with financial burden, then the
family stands to suffer. No objection need arise if the obligation thus
contracted by him could be shown to be for the benefit of the wife and the
progeny if any there be. That is but fair and just. Certainly, however, to
make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit.7 The husband, therefore, as is wisely thus
made certain, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and
unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
No useful purpose would be served by petitioner assigning as one of the
errors the observation made by the Court of Appeals as to the husband's
interest in the conjugal property being merely inchoate or a mere
expectancy in view of the conclusion thus reached as to the absence of any
liability on the part of the conjugal partnership. Nor was it error for the
Court of Appeals to refuse to consider a question raised for the first time
on appeal. Now as to the question of jurisdiction of the lower court to
entertain this petition for injunction against the Provincial Sheriff, to which
our attention is invited, neither the Court of Appeals nor the lower court
having been asked to pass upon it. Of course, if raised earlier, it ought to
have been seriously inquired into. We feel, however, that under all the
circumstances of the case, substantial justice would be served if petitioner
be held as precluded from now attempting to interpose such a barrier. The
conclusion that thereby laches had intervened is not unreasonable. Such a
response on our part can be predicated on the authoritative holding
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.8
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of December 17, 1965,
now under review, is affirmed with costs against petitioner Luzon Surety
Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO
MAGSAJO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION
CHING, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted
by the husband alone are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a
surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said
provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the respondent
Court of Appeals in "Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching
vs. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, et. al.," docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 29632, 1 upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the
payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for a clear
understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added security for the
credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980
and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable
with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum
of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled "Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming Mills
and Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon motion of
AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon
AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated May
12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the
issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner
Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.

On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against

petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII,
to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said
conjugal partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents, the lower
court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo
from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with
the sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, 3 questioning the order of the lower court enjoining the sale.
Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on
June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower court 4 from enforcing its Order of June
14, 1982, thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder,
was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was registered
on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner
sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was registered
on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-G.R.
SP No. 14404, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is granted and the
challenged order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil
Case No. 46309 is hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition
insofar as it seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with
Civil Case No. 46309 is, however, denied. No pronouncement is here
made as to costs. . . . 5
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground
that the same had become moot and academic with the consummation of
the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among
others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property
attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in
this case, two (2) of the real properties are actually in the name of
Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits
proceeded. Private respondents presented several witnesses. On the other
hand, petitioners did not present any evidence.
On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring
the sale on execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to the respondent
court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632.
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the assailed decision,
affirming the decision of the regional trial court. It held that:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the New Civil Code
or Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice it to say that the two
provisions are substantially the same. Nevertheless, We agree with the
trial court that the Family Code is the applicable law on the matter . . . . .
..
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that "The conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains . . . ." The burden of proof that the debt
was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar,
respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted
by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the appeal. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto. 6
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
respondent court in a Resolution dated November 28, 1994. 7
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the "respondent
court erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of private respondents is
not liable for the obligation by the respondent-husband."
Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the respondent court are as
follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE OBLIGATION
INCURRED RESPONDENT HUSBAND DID NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACT OF
RESPONDENT HUSBAND IN SECURING THE SUBJECT LOAN IS NOT PART
OF HIS INDUSTRY, BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH HE SUPPORTS HIS
FAMILY.

Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that
actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnership; all that is
necessary, they say, is that the transaction was entered into for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that:
The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the
partnership to be held liable, the husband must have contracted the
debt "for the benefit of the partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership . . . .
There is a difference between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit
of" or "benefited from" (on the one hand) and "for the benefit of (on the
other). The former require that actual benefit must have been realized;
the latter requires only that the transaction should be one which
normally would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of
whether or not actual benefit accrued. 8
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the
terms "redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand;
and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing.
Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are
similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of
personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent court runs
counter to the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez
vs. Lantin, 9 that the husband as head of the family and as administrator of
the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for
the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not
applicable in the case at bar. This Court has, on several instances,
interpreted the term "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmea, 10 Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger,
Inc., 11 Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin 12 and G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 13 cited by the petitioners, we held that:
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage relation, for
and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes
toward the support of his family, are not his personal and private debts,
and the products or income from the wife's own property, which, like
those of her husband's, are liable for the payment of the marriage
expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article 1412, Civil
Code), has a right to embark the partnership in an ordinary commercial
enterprise for gain, and the fact that the wife may not approve of a
venture does not make it a private and personal one of the husband.
(Abella de Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry
or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family,
cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez).
. . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or
profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal
partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless
he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. (G-Tractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity Insurance &
Luzon Insurance Co., 14 Liberty Insurance Corporation
vs. Banuelos, 15 and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De Garcia, 16 cited by the
respondents, we ruled that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of
the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and
expenses of the spouses, but not to the payment of the personal
obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it be proved
that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family."
(Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity
agreement by the husband redounded to the benefit of his family, the
undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him.
(Liberty Insurance)
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article
161 of the new Civil Code is liable only for such "debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial
stability of the conjugal partnership. (Luzon Surety, Inc.)
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the
following conclusions:

(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . .
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person
or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context
of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of
loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it
is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the
three other companion cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo,
Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the husband
contracted the obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the
husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by another for
the latter's business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo
Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's
acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. Philippine
Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
petitioners-appellees this despite the fact that the members of the
said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to
prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is apparent from the facts of
the case is that the judgment debt was contracted by or in the name of
the Corporation Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only
signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and
respondent-appellant's right of recourse against appellee-husband as
surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not
extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of petitionersappellees. . . . . . . 17
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the conjugal
partnership. To support this contention, they cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes'
authoritative opinion in the Luzon Surety Company case:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in my
opinion, the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" used in Article 161 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines in describing the charges and obligations for
which the conjugal partnership is liable do not require that actual profit
or benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership from the husband's
transaction; but it suffices that the transaction should be one that
normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the
ratio behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmea, 34 Phil. 336, that
obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession are
collectible from the conjugal partnership.
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority decision that
the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of a third party. Such opinion
merely registered an exception to what may be construed as a sweeping
statement that in all cases actual profit or benefit must accrue to the
conjugal partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no actual
benefits to the family need be proved in some cases such as in the Javier
case. There, the husband was the principal obligor himself. Thus, said
transaction was found to be "one that would normally produce . . . benefit
for the partnership." In the later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband was
also the principal obligor not merely the surety. This latter case,
therefore, did not create any precedent. It did not also supersede the
Luzon Surety Company case, nor any of the previous accommodation
contract cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the benefit of
third parties.
But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in such kind of
contract of accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when
the guarantee is in favor of the husband's employer.

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family
would reasonably anticipate were the following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be
prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly salary of
P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he
guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate
if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career
would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the
Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It
cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the
husband, 18 we underscored the requirement that: "there must be the
requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that such obligations
are productive of some benefit to the family." Unfortunately, the petition
did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate
existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years;
and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of
stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of
the Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable increase in
the value of stocks) might have been already apparent or could be
anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was entered into.
But would those "benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the
"obligations . . . for the benefit of the conjugal partnership"? Are indirect
and remote probable benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161 of the
Civil Code? The Court of Appeals in denying the motion for reconsideration,
disposed of these questions in the following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit respondents-appellants is
purely a corporate debt granted to PBM, with petitioner-appelleehusband merely signing as surety. While such petitioner-appelleehusband, as such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor
AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code provisions is specifically
restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for
which the husband is liable may not be charged against conjugal
partnership properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit "The
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in question falls
under the exception laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not
agree. The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
sole advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
. . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine
Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is
an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the
"benefits" contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The
"benefits" contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is
that benefit derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar,
the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself,
not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family. The alleged benefit, if
any, continuously harped by respondents-appellants, are not only
incidental but also speculative. 19
We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the odds
involved in guaranteeing a large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the
probable prolongation of employment in PBM and increase in value of its
stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the
benefit" of the surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of
certainty, that the said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to
the conjugal partnership.
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is not
contested by the petitioners) that the provisions of the Family Code is
applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of
the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's
duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the
obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that
redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited." 20
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of
the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey
gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. 21 Thus, when co-respondent
Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely
put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the family home)
and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that
acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondenthusband.

This theory is new as it is novel.

The respondent court correctly observed that:
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession, hence the cited cases ofCobb-Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de
Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger; G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in
the instant case. Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business. 22
We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or
was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not be
taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of suretyship
or guaranty.
This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives are often
asked to stand as surety for their company's loan obligations. This is
especially true if the corporate officials have sufficient property of their
own; otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in order to bind the
conjugal partnerships.

In his separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of

US$25,000.00 but claimed that:
xxx
a. Defendant (respondent) xxx revived that otherwise dormant
construction firm H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION of herein plaintiff which
suffered tremendous setback after the assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino;
b. Working day and night and almost beyond human endurance,
defendant devoted all his efforts and skill, used all his business and
personal connection to be able to revive the construction business of
plaintiff;
c. Little-by-little, starting with small construction business, defendant
was able to obtain various construction jobs using the name H.L.
CARLOS CONSTRUCTION and the income derived therefrom were
deposited in the name of such firm of plaintiff,

The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require
the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that
being a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be
presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership.

d. Defendant xxx was made to believe that the earnings derived from
such construction will be for him and his family since he was the one
working to secure the contract and its completion, he was allowed to
use the facilities of the plaintiff;

Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the
extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.

e. The plaintiff seeing the progress brought about by defendant xxx to

his company proposed a profit sharing scheme to the effect that all
projects amounting to more than P10 million shall be for the account
of plaintiff; lower amount shall be for defendants account but still
using H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION.

Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed
decision should be upheld as we now uphold it. This is, of course, without
prejudice to petitioner's right to enforce the obligation in its favor against
the PBM receiver in accordance with the rehabilitation program and
payment schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities &
Exchange Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146504

April 9, 2002

HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 2000
in CA-G.R. CV No. 54464 which reversed and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, and dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence the complaint for a sum of money and damages
filed by herein petitioner Honorio Carlos against respondent Manuel
Abelardo, his son-in-law, and the latters wife, Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo.
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in
October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo
approached him and requested him to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952
Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila. To
enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and
on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of
a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt
thereof.1 The amount was in full payment of the property.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of
the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation
but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite
settlement of the same.2Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner.3
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of
the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their
obligation.4Thus, on October 13, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, docketed as Civil
Case No. 4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner asked for the payment of
the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its equivalent in Philippine currency plus
legal interest from date of extra-judicial demand.5Petitioner likewise
claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit
from respondent.6
As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from
petitioner.7She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a
staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment of the full amount.8

f. But, to clear account on previous construction contracts that brought

income to H.L.CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, out of which defendant
derived his income, plaintiff gave the amount of US$25,000.00 to
defendant to square off account and to start the arrangement in
paragraph (e) supra;
g. That, the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of
defendant. It was his share of income on contracts obtained by
defendant;
xxx 9
Respondent denied having made death threats to petitioner and by way of
compulsory counterclaim, he asked for moral damages from petitioner for
causing the alienation of his wifes love and affection, attorneys fees and
costs of suit.10
On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of US$25,000.00
or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of its payment, plus
legal interest thereon from August 24, 1994 until fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendant Manuel T. Abelardo to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P500,000.00 representing moral damages and the further
amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals. On November 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by
petitioner to respondent and his wife. The Court of Appeals found that the
amount of US$25,000.00 was respondents share in the profits of H.L.
Carlos Construction. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 4490-V-94
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING the Complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The claim for damages by defendant-appellant is likewise DISMISSED,
also for insufficiency of evidence, because of his failure to present
substantial evidence to prove that plaintiff-appellee caused the
defendant-spouses separation.
Costs against the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration of the above decision having been denied on,
petitioner brought this appeal assigning the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT THE AMOUNT OF US$25,000.00 WAS A LOAN OBTAINED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND HIS WIFE FROM PETITIONER.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE US$25,000.00
WAS GIVEN AS PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SHARE IN THE PROFITS OF H.L.
CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. AND THAT THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT IS A HOAX.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES FOR LACK OF PROOF THEREOF.

We find merit in the petition.

As gleaned from the records, the following facts are undisputed: (1) there
was a check in the amount of US$25,000.00 issued by petitioner; (2) this
amount was received by respondent and his wife and given to a certain
Pura Vallejo for the full payment of a house and lot located at #19952
Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila; (3)
this house and lot became the conjugal dwelling of respondent and his
wife; and (4) respondents wife executed an instrument acknowledging the
loan but which respondent did not sign.
To prove his claim that the amount was in the nature of a loan or an
advance he extended to respondent and his wife, petitioner presented
Bankers Trust Check No. 337 in the amount of US$25,000.00 he issued on
October 31, 1989 to Pura Vallejo.13 He also introduced in evidence an
instrument executed by respondents wife on July 31, 1991 acknowledging
her and her husbands accountability to petitioner for the said amount
which was advanced in payment of a house and lot located at #19952
Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Subdivision, Paranaque.14 A formal
demand letter by counsel for petitioner dated August 24, 1994 sent to and
received by respondent was also on record.15
All these pieces of evidence, taken together with respondents admission
that he and his wife received the subject amount and used the same to
purchase their house and lot, sufficiently prove by a preponderance of
evidence petitioners claim that the amount of US$25,000.00 was really in
the nature of a loan.
Respondent tried to rebut petitioners evidence by claiming that the
US$25,000.00 was not a loan but his share in the profits of H.L. Carlos
Construction. He alleged that he received money from petitioner
amounting to almost P3 million as his share in the profits of the
corporation. To prove this, he presented ten (10) Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) checks allegedly given to him by petitioner.16He argued that if
indeed, he and his wife were indebted to petitioner, the latter could have
easily deducted the amount of the said loan from his share of the profits.
Respondent fails to convince this Court.
All the checks presented by respondent, which he claims to be his share in
the profits of petitioners company, were all in the account of H.L. Carlos
Construction.17 On the other hand, the Bankers Trust Check in the amount
of US$25,000.00 was drawn from the personal account of
petitioner.18Assuming to be true that the checks presented by respondent
were his profits from the corporation, then all the more does this prove
that the amount of US$25,000.00 was not part of such profits because it
was issued by petitioner from his own account. Indeed, if such amount was
respondents share of the profits, then the same should have been issued
under the account of H.L. Carlos Construction.
Moreover, respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to
the profits and income of the corporation. There was no showing that
respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name does
not appear in the Articles of Incorporation as well as the Organizational
Profile of said company either as stockholder or officer.19 Not being a
stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits or income of said
corporation. Neither did respondent prove that he was an employee or an
agent so as to be entitled to salaries or commissions from the corporation.
We quote with favor the disquisition of the trial court on this point:
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of
US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do
not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the
family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the
defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and
defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US
$25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the
corporation and not as a loan. Firstly, defendant-husband does not
appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the
corporation, H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder,
he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof. In the same
manner that as he is not an employee nor an agent of H. L. Carlos
Construction, Inc., he has no right to receive any salary or commission
therefrom. Secondly, the amount advanced for the purchase of the house
and lot came from the personal account of the plaintiff. If, indeed, it was
to be construed as defendant-husbands share in the profits of the
corporation, the checks should come from the corporations account and
not from the plaintiffs personal account, considering that the corporation
has a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and
officers.1wphi1.nt
Even granting that the checks amount to US $3,000.000.00 given by the
plaintiff to the defendant-spouses was their share in the profits of the
corporation, still there is no sufficient evidence to establish that the US
$25,000.00 is to be treated similarly. Defendant-husband in invoking the
defense of compensation argued that if indeed they were indebted to the
plaintiff, the latter could have applied their share in the proceeds or
income of the corporation to the concurrent amount of the alleged loan,

instead of giving the amount of P3,000,000.00 to them. This argument is

untenable. Article 1278 of the Civil Code provides that compensation shall
take place when two persons, in their own right, are debtors and
creditors of each other. As its indicates, compensation is a sort of
balancing between two obligations. In the instant case, the plaintiff and
the defendant-husband are not debtors and creditors of each other. Even
granting that the defendant-husbands claim to the profits of the
corporation is justified, still compensation cannot extinguish his loan
obligation to the plaintiff because under such assumption, the defendant
is dealing with the corporation and not with the plaintiff in his personal
capacity. Hence, compensation cannot take place.
The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in finding that respondents liability was
not proved by preponderance of evidence. On the contrary, the evidence
adduced by petitioner sufficiently established his claim that the
US$25,000.00 he advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121
of the Family Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
xxx
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.
xxx
While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment
executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the
benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot
which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence,
notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of
the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his
wife.
We also find sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner,
contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not
entitled thereto.
Petitioners allegations of verbal and written threats directed against him
by respondent is duly supported by evidence on record. He presented two
witnesses, Irineo Pajarin and Randy Rosal, who testified on separate
incidents where threats were made by respondent against petitioner.
Randy Rosal, driver of petitioner, declared that around three o clock in the
afternoon of September 15, 1991, he was sent by respondents wife on an
errand to deliver the acknowledgment letter to respondent for him to sign.
Respondent did not sign the acknowledgment and instead, wrote a letter
addressed to petitioner threatening him. He narrated what took place
thereafter:
xxx
Q
When you were requested by Ma. Theresa C. Abelardo to bring a
letter to herein defendant Manuel Abelardo for him to sign the same, do
you know whether that letter was actually signed by Manuel Abelardo?
A
No, sir.
xxx
Q
And what happened when Manuel Abelardo refused to sign that
letter coming from the other defendant?
A
He made me wait and he prepared a letter to Mr. Honorio Carlos,
sir.
xxx
Q
Where were you at the time when this defendant Manuel
Abelardo prepared this letter?
A
In his house, sir.
Q
And where did he actually prepare that letter?
A
At the dining table, sir.
Q
How far were you from Manuel Abelardo from the dining table at
the time when he was preparing a letter.
A
Around 1 meter, sir.
Q
And do you know where in, what particular paper did Mr. Abelardo
prepare or write this letter?
A
He wrote it in a Manila envelope, sir.
xxx
Q
What happened after Manuel Abelardo prepared this letter in a
Manila envelope?
A
He got a small envelope and placed there the name of Mr. Carlos
as the addressee, sir.
xxx
Q
After preparing this letter on a Manila envelope and then getting
another envelope and writing on it the address of herein plaintiff, what
did the defendant Manuel Abelardo do, if any?
A
He instructed me to mail the letter which he prepared, sir.
xxx

Q
And did you actually accede to the request of herein defendant
Manuel Abelardo for you to mail that letter to Engr. Carlos?
A
I got the envelope but I did not mail it, sir.
xxx
Q
May we know from you the reason why you did not mail said
letter?
A
Because Engr. Carlos might become frightened, sir.
Q
What did you do with that letter, although you did not mail it?
A
I kept it, sir.
xxx
Q
And what did you do next after keeping the letter for several days?
A
I gave the letter personally to Engr. Carlos, sir.
Q
What prompted you to give that letter to Engr. Carlos instead of
mailing it?
A
So that Engr. Carlos can prepare, sir.
x

x20

This incident was duly entered and recorded in the Police Blotter on
October 7, 1991 by a certain Sgt. Casile of the Valenzuela Police Station.21 A
photocopy of this written threat was also attached to the Police Report and
presented in evidence.22
Another witness, Irineo Pajarin, recounted an incident which occurred in
the afternoon of May 25, 1994, to wit:
xxx
Q
Now Mr. Witness, on May 25, 1994 at around 2:30 in the
afternoon do you recall where you were on that particular date and
time?
A
I was at B.F. Homes, Paranaque, sir.
Q
What were you doing at that time?
A
I was waiting for Sargie Cornista, sir.
xxx
Q
Will you please narrate to this Honorable Court that unusual
incident?
A
Manuel Abelardo passed by and when he saw me he called me. I
approached him while he was then on board his car and asked me who
was my companion, sir.
Q
And what was your answer to him?
A
I told him it was Sargie, sir.
Q
And what was his reply if any?
A
He again asked me if I have in my company one of his children, sir.
Q
What was your reply?
A
I answered none, sir.
Q
Incidentally Mr. Witness, where or in what particular place did this
conversation between you and Manuel T. Abelardo take place?
A
Parking Area of Academy I, Gov. Santos corner Aguirre St., sir.
Q
Now, what else happened after you talk[ed] with this Manuel T.
Abelardo?
A
He said I may be fooling him because he said I once fooled him
when I ran away with his children which he is going to take back, sir.
Q
And what was your reply to that?
A
I answered I did not do that and he said that once he discovered
that I did it he would box me, sir.
Q
What else if any did he tell you at that time?
A
He asked me who instructed me, sir.
Q
Instructed you about what?
A
To run away with the children, sir.
Q
And what was your reply?
A
None, he was the one who said "was it your Ate Puppet?" But I did
not answer, sir.
Q
What happened next when you failed to answer?
A
"Or my father in law?"
Q
And when he said his father in law to whom was he referring at
that time?
A
Mr. Honorio Carlos, sir.
Q
After mentioning the name of his father-in-law Mr. Honorio Carlos
what happened next?
A
He told me "Sabihin mo sa biyenan ko babarilin ko siya pag nakita
ko siya."
Q
Where was Manuel Abelardo at that particular time when he told
this threatening remark against Honorio Carlos?
A
He was inside his car in Aguirre St., sir.
Q
How about you where were you approximately at that particular
time when he narrated that message to you threatening the herein
plaintiff?
A
I was outside looking in his vehicle at Aguirre St., sir.
xxx
Q
And what was your reply or reaction when he made this
threatening remarks?
A
None, because he left. I was left behind, sir.23

her father-in-law (father of respondent).26The letter recounted the

instances when threats were made by her husband against petitioner,
particularly, the incident reported by Pajarin and the threats made by
respondent through the telephone.27
All these circumstances sufficiently establish that threats were directed by
respondent against petitioner justifying the award of moral damages in
favor of petitioner. However, the Court finds the amount of P500,000.00 as
moral damages too exorbitant under the circumstances and the same is
reduced to P50,000.00. The exemplary damages and attorneys fees are
likewise reduced to P20,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA GR-CV No. 54464 is MODIFIED in that respondent is
ordered to pay petitioner the amounts of (1) US$25,000 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency at the time of payment, plus legal interest from August
4, 1994, until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P20,000.00
as exemplary damages; and (4) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160347

November 29, 2006

ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN,
VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and
QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision1 and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision
rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter
referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan
to Quirino A. de Guzman.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
[Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well
as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity),
with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%)
respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased,
from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed
by [the spouses Carandang]. Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again
increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, [the spouses
Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. They subscribed
to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock.
[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were
paid by him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital stock increase
and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase or a total
ofP336,375. Thus, on March 31, 1992, [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to
[the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said total amount.
[The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a
pre-incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang]
and [de Guzman], whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for [Arcadio
Carandangs] technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his
skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore,
there is no indebtedness on their part [sic].
On June 5, 1992, [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover
the P336,375 together with damages. After trial on the merits, the trial
court disposed of the case in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of [de Guzman]. Accordingly, [the spouses Carandang] are ordered to
jointly and severally pay [de Guzman], to wit:
(1) P336,375.00 representing [the spouses Carandangs] loan to de
Guzman;
(2) interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum from June 5, 1992 when this complaint was filed until the
principal amount shall have been fully paid;
(3) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
(4) Costs of suit.
The spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the same in the 22 April 2003 assailed Decision:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.2

This testimony was in part corroborated by an entry dated May 28, 1994 in
the Police Blotter of the Paranaque Police Station narrating the
aforementioned incident.24

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Carandang was

similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in the 6 October 2003 assailed
Resolution:

The testimonies of these witnesses on the two separate incidents of threat

are positive, direct and straightforward. Petitioner also declared on the
witness stand that on several occasions, he received telephone calls from
respondent cursing and threatening him.25These incidents of threat were
also evidenced by a letter written by respondents wife and addressed to

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED and our Decision of April 22, 2003, which is based on applicable
law and jurisprudence on the matter is hereby AFFIRMED and
REITERATED.3

The spouses Carandang then filed before this Court the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari, bringing forth the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SECTION 16,
RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN ITS FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ALLEGED LOAN FOR WHICH PETITIONERS
ARE LIABLE, CONTRARY TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF BOOK IV, TITLE XI, OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE PERTAINING TO LOANS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO DISCHARGE THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY SECTIONS 2 AND 7, RULE 3
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE PURPORTED LIABILITY OF PETITIONERS ARE JOINT
AND SOLIDARY, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. 4
Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been
rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to
comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of
the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or representatives
to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party,
or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The spouses Carandang posits that such failure to comply with the above
rule renders void the decision of the RTC, in adherence to the following
pronouncements in Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals5 and Ferreria v.
Vda. de Gonzales6 :
Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives and
no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal
representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the
deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever been effected,
the trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and
the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of
the heirs upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding.7
In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal
representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal
representative appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased;
neither had the complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal
representative of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be
substituted for the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution was
effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant
for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision
binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of the estate of
her deceased mother.8
However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by
law and is not subject to the discretion of the parties,9 jurisdiction over the
person of the parties to the case may be waived either expressly or
impliedly.10 Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary
appearance or a failure to object.11
In the cases cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had been
no valid substitution by the heirs of the deceased party, and therefore the
judgment cannot be made binding upon them. In the case at bar, not only
do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the

court over their persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such
jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their
participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit
espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The
heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the
RTC.
Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a
personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby
waive it by silence.
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal
substitution of heirs. The underlying principle therefor is not really because
substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but because noncompliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due
process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are
substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.12 Such violation of
due process can only be asserted by the persons whose rights are claimed
to have been violated, namely the heirs to whom the adverse judgment is
sought to be enforced.
Care should, however, be taken in applying the foregoing conclusions. In
People v. Florendo,13 where we likewise held that the proceedings that
took place after the death of the party are void, we gave another reason
for such nullity: "the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the
attorneys for the deceased upon the death of the latter, the principal x x
x." Nevertheless, the case at bar had already been submitted for decision
before the RTC on 4 June 1998, several months before the passing away of
de Guzman on 19 February 1999. Hence, no further proceedings requiring
the appearance of de Guzmans counsel were conducted before the
promulgation of the RTC Decision. Consequently, de Guzmans counsel
cannot be said to have no authority to appear in trial, as trial had already
ceased upon the death of de Guzman.
In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs
to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before
the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the
appearance of de Guzmans counsel.
Before proceeding with the substantive aspects of the case, however, there
is still one more procedural issue to tackle, the fourth issue presented by
the spouses Carandang on the non-inclusion in the complaint of an
indispensable party.
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state
a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an
indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff
The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks used to
pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de
Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party. Being
such, the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a
party-plaintiff should cause the dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is
not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action."14
The Court of Appeals held:
We disagree. The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and
Milagros de Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of
their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the Family Code
the husband alone may institute an action for the recovery or protection of
the spouses conjugal property.
Thus, in Docena v. Lapesura [355 SCRA 658], the Supreme Court held that
"x x x Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is
not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband
may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being
joined by the wife. x x x Under the Family Code, the administration of the
conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However,
unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require
that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of
the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code.
x x x."
The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange the
terms "real party in interest" and "indispensable party." A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.15 On the other
hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action,16 in contrast to a necessary party,
which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a
party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for
a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action.17
The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that "(i)f a suit is not brought in
the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may
be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action."18However, what dismissal on this ground entails is an examination
of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of

the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are
actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions
concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions
concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary
parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of
parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage
settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their
property relations.19
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.20Credits
are personal properties,21 acquired during the time the loan or other credit
transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the
marriage are presumed to be conjugal property.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the
spouses Carandang are liable, such credits are presumed to be conjugal
property. There being no evidence to the contrary, such presumption
subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific
partnership property,22 is certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was
allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted.
So now we come to the discussion concerning indispensable and necessary
parties. When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action
should likewise be dismissed.23 The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.24 On
the other hand, the non-joinder of necessary parties do not result in the
dismissal of the case. Instead, Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides for the consequences of such non-joinder:
Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. Whenever in any
pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the
pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious,
it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over
his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable
cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would
not warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This is an exception to Section
3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply
with an order of the court, as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically provides for the
effect of such non-inclusion: it shall not prevent the court from proceeding
in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise
provides that the non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
the action.
Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of
parties: the pro-forma parties, which are those who are required to be
joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided
by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule.25 An example is
provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it
superceded:
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner
is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property."
Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to
finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners stock subscriptions, and
with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal
funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of
the alleged credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent
cases of Baloloy v. Hular28 and Adlawan v. Adlawan,29 we held that, in a coownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned
property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of
his co-owners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of
Appeals,30 we also held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides
that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all
kinds of action for the recovery of possession.31
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the coowners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the coowned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit
of all co-owners.32
We therefore hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party
in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses
Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and
dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
Whether or not respondents were able to prove the loan sought to be
collected from petitioners
In the second and third issues presented by the spouses Carandang, they
claim that the de Guzmans failed to prove the alleged loan for which the
spouses Carandang were held liable. As previously stated, spouses Quirino
and Milagros de Guzman paid for the stock subscriptions of the spouses
Carandang, amounting to P336,375.00. The de Guzmans claim that these
payments were in the form of loans and/or advances and it was agreed
upon between the late Quirino de Guzman, Sr. and the spouses Carandang
that the latter would repay him. Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that
there was an oral pre-incorporation agreement wherein it was agreed that
Arcardio Carandang would always maintain his 46% equity participation in
the corporation even if the capital structures were increased, and that
Quirino de Guzman would personally pay the equity shares/stock
subscriptions of Arcardio Carandang with no cost to the latter.
On this main issue, the Court of Appeals held:

Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as provided by law.

[The spouses Carandang] aver in its ninth assigned error that [the de
Guzmans] failed to prove by preponderance of evidence, either the
existence of the purported loan or the non-payment thereof.

Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither

indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a
husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of
his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such
property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party.

Simply put, preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a

whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. The concept of
preponderance of evidence refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or
more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; it means
probability of truth.

In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary,

the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such nonjoinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action
to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in
that case was not a jurisdictional defect.26The non-joinder of a spouse does
not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be
cured by amendment.27

[The spouses Carandang] admitted that it was indeed [the de Guzmans]

who paid their stock subscriptions and their reason for not reimbursing the
latter is the alleged pre-incorporation agreement, to which they offer no
clear proof as to its existence.

Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also

indispensable or necessary parties, the rules concerning indispensable or
necessary parties, as the case may be, should be applied. Thus, dismissal is
warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an
indispensable party.
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits
allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an
indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party,
dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is
not warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in the
complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative
allegation. Thus, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative
allegations in the complaints and the defendant or respondent has to
prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and
counterclaims.33
The spouses Carandang, however, insist that the de Guzmans have not
proven the loan itself, having presented evidence only of the payment in
favor of the Carandangs. They claim:
It is an undeniable fact that payment is not equivalent to a loan. For
instance, if Mr. "A" decides to pay for Mr. "Bs" obligation, that payment by
Mr. "A" cannot, by any stretch of imagination, possibly mean that there is
now a loan by Mr. "B" to Mr. "A". There is a possibility that such payment
by Mr. "A" is purely out of generosity or that there is a mutual agreement
between them. As applied to the instant case, that mutual agreement is
the pre-incorporation agreement (supra) existing between Mr. de Guzman

and the petitioners --- to the effect that the former shall be responsible for
paying stock subscriptions of the latter. Thus, when Mr. de Guzman paid
for the stock subscriptions of the petitioners, there was no loan to speak
of, but only a compliance with the pre-incorporation agreement.34

Petitioners claim that the late Quirino A. de Guzman, Sr. had admitted the
existence of the pre-incorporation agreement by virtue of paragraphs 13
and 14 of their Answer and paragraph 4 of private respondents Reply.

The spouses Carandang are mistaken. If indeed a Mr. "A" decides to pay for
a Mr. "Bs" obligation, the presumption is that Mr. "B" is indebted to Mr.
"A" for such amount that has been paid. This is pursuant to Articles 1236
and 1237 of the Civil Code, which provide:

13. Sometime in November, 1973 or thereabout, herein plaintiff invited

defendant Arcadio M. Carandang to a joint venture by pooling together
their technical expertise, equipments, financial resources and franchise.
Plaintiff proposed to defendant and mutually agreed on the following:

Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by

a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has
paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to
the debtor.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the debtor without the knowledge or
against the will of the latter, cannot compel the creditor to subrogate him
in his rights, such as those arising from a mortgage, guarantee, or penalty.
Articles 1236 and 1237 are clear that, even in cases where the debtor has
no knowledge of payment by a third person, and even in cases where the
third person paid against the will of the debtor, such payment would
produce a debt in favor of the paying third person. In fact, the only
consequences for the failure to inform or get the consent of the debtor are
the following: (1) the third person can recover only insofar as the payment
has been beneficial to the debtor; and (2) the third person is not
subrogated to the rights of the creditor, such as those arising from a
mortgage, guarantee or penalty.35
We say, however, that this is merely a presumption. By virtue of the
parties freedom to contract, the parties could stipulate otherwise and
thus, as suggested by the spouses Carandang, there is indeed a possibility
that such payment by Mr. "A" was purely out of generosity or that there
was a mutual agreement between them. But such mutual agreement,
being an exception to presumed course of events as laid down by Articles
1236 and 1237, must be adequately proven.
The de Guzmans have successfully proven their payment of the spouses
Carandangs stock subscriptions. These payments were, in fact, admitted
by the spouses Carandang. Consequently, it is now up to the spouses
Carandang to prove the existence of the pre-incorporation agreement that
was their defense to the purported loan.
Unfortunately for the spouses Carandang, the only testimony which
touched on the existence and substance of the pre-incorporation
agreement, that of petitioner Arcardio Carandang, was stricken off the
record because he did not submit himself to a cross-examination of the
opposing party. On the other hand, the testimonies of Romeo
Saavedra,36 Roberto S. Carandang,37 Gertrudes Z. Esteban,38 Ceferino
Basilio,39 and Ma. Luisa Carandang40touched on matters other than the
existence and substance of the pre-incorporation agreement. So aside from
the fact that these witnesses had no personal knowledge as to the alleged
existence of the pre-incorporation agreement, the testimonies of these
witnesses did not even mention the existence of a pre-incorporation
agreement.
Worse, the testimonies of petitioners Arcadio Carandang and Ma. Luisa
Carandang even contradicted the existence of a pre-incorporation
agreement because when they were asked by their counsel regarding the
matter of the check payments made by the late Quirino A. de Guzman, Sr.
in their behalf, they said that they had already paid for it thereby negating
their own defense that there was a pre-incorporation agreement excusing
themselves from paying Mr. de Guzman the amounts he advanced or
loaned to them. This basic and irrefutable fact can be gleaned from their
testimonies which the private respondents are quoting for easy reference:
a. With respect to the testimony of Ma. Luisa Carandang
Q: Now, can you tell this Honorable Court how do you feel with respect to
the Complaint of the plaintiff in this case charging you that you paid for this
year and asking enough to paid (sic) your tax?
A: We have paid already, so, we are not liable for anything payment (sic).41
b. With respect to the testimony of Arcadio Carandang
"Q: How much?
A: P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 per month.
Q: The plaintiff also claimed thru witness Edgar Ragasa, that there were
receipts issued for the payment of your shares; which receipts were
marked as Exhibits "G" to "L" (Plaintiff).

Paragraphs 13 and 14 of petitioners Answer dated 7 July 1992 state in full:

1. That they would organize a corporation known as Mabuhay

Broadcasting Systems, Inc.
2. Considering the technical expertise and talent of defendant Arcadio
M. Carandang and his new equipments he bought, and his skill in
repairing and modifying radio/communication equipments into high
proficiency, said defendant would have an equity participation in the
corporation of 46%, and plaintiff 54% because of his financial resources
and franchise.
3. That defendant would always maintain his 46% equity participation
in the corporation even if the capital structures are increased, and that
plaintiff would personally pay the equity shares/stock subscriptions of
defendant with no cost to the latter.
4. That because of defendants expertise in the trade including the
marketing aspects, he would be the President and General Manager,
and plaintiff the Chairman of the Board.
5. That considering their past and trustworthy relations, they would
maintain such relations in the joint venture without any mental
reservation for their common benefit and success of the business.
14. Having mutually agreed on the above arrangements, the single
proprietorship of plaintiff was immediately spun-off into a corporation
now known as Mabuhay Broadcasting System, Inc. The incorporators
are plaintiff and his family members/nominees controlling jointly 54%
of the stocks and defendant Arcadio M. Carandang controlling singly
46% as previously agreed.43
Meanwhile, paragraphs 3 and 4 of private respondents Reply dated 29 July
1992 state in full:
3. Plaintiffs admits the allegation in paragraph 13.1 of the Answer only
insofar the plaintiff and defendant Arcadio M. Carandang organized a
corporation known as Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems, Inc. Plaintiff
specifically denies the other allegations in paragraph 13 of the Answer, the
same being devoid of any legal or factual bases. The truth of the matter is
that defendant Arcadio M. Carandang was not able to pay plaintiff the
agreed amount of the lease for a number of months forcing the plaintiff to
terminate lease. Additionally, the records would show that it was the
defendant Arcadio M. Carandang who proposed a joint venture with the
plaintiff.
It appears that plaintiff agreed to the formation of the corporation
principally because of a directive of then President Marcos indicating the
need to broaden the ownership of radio broadcasting stations. The plaintiff
owned the franchise, the radio transmitter, the antenna tower, the
building containing the radio transmitter and other equipment. Verily, he
would be placed in a great disadvantage if he would still have to personally
pay for the shares of defendant Arcadio M. Carandang.
4. Plaintiff admits the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Answer.44
In effect, the spouses Carandang are relying on the fact that Quirino de
Guzman stated that he admitted paragraph 14 of the Answer, which
incidentally contained the opening clause "(h)aving mutually agreed on the
above arrangements, x x x."
Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous. This purported
admission by Quirino de Guzman reeks of ambiguity, as the clause
"(h)aving mutually agreed on the above arrangements," seems to be a
mere introduction to the statement that the single proprietorship of
Quirino de Guzman had been converted into a corporation. If Quirino de
Guzman had meant to admit paragraph 13.3, he could have easily said so,
as he did the other paragraphs he categorically admitted. Instead, Quirino
de Guzman expressly stated the opposite: that "(p)laintiff specifically
denies the other allegations of paragraph 13 of the Answer."45 The Reply
furthermore states that the only portion of paragraph 13 which Quirino de
Guzman had admitted is paragraph 13.1, and only insofar as it said that
Quirino de Guzman and Arcardio Carandang organized Mabuhay
Broadcasting Systems, Inc.46

Im showing to you these receipts so marked by the plaintiff as their

exhibits which were issued in the name of Ma. Luisa Carandang, your wife;
and also, Arcadio M. Carandang. Will you please go over this Official
Receipt and state for the records, who made for the payment stated in
these receipts in your name?

All the foregoing considered, we hold that Quirino de Guzman had not
admitted the alleged pre-incorporation agreement. As there was no
admission, and as the testimony of Arcardio Carandang was stricken off the
record, we are constrained to rule that there was no pre-incorporation
agreement rendering Quirino de Guzman liable for the spouses
Carandangs stock subscription. The payment by the spouses de Guzman of
the stock subscriptions of the spouses Carandang are therefore by way of
loan which the spouses Carandang are liable to pay.1wphi1

A: I paid for those shares."42

Whether or not the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and solidary

There being no testimony or documentary evidence proving the existence

of the pre-incorporation agreement, the spouses Carandang are forced to
rely upon an alleged admission by the original plaintiff of the existence of
the pre-incorporation agreement.

Finally, the Court of Appeals also upheld the RTC Decision insofar as it
decreed a solidary liability. According to the Court of Appeals:

With regards (sic) the tenth assigned error, [the spouses Carandang]
contend that:

property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in

the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.

"There is absolutely no evidence, testimonial or documentary, showing

that the purported obligation of [the spouses Carandang] is joint and
solidary. x x x

Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of

the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the
proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the
property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.1avvphi1

"Furthermore, the purported obligation of [the spouses Carandang] does

not at all qualify as one of the obligations required by law to be solidary x x
x."
It is apparent from the facts of the case that [the spouses Carandang] were
married way before the effectivity of the Family Code hence; their property
regime is conjugal partnership under the Civil Code.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership,
which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are
sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are
being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors, such that the concept of joint
and solidary liability, as between them, does not apply.47
The Court of Appeals is correct insofar as it held that when the spouses are
sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are
being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors. Hence, either of them may be
sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although
the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property. Thus,
in the case cited by the Court of Appeals, Alipio v. Court of Appeals,48 the
two sets of defendant-spouses therein were held liable for P25,300.00
each, chargeable to their respective conjugal partnerships.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment
rendered against the spouses Carandang, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATION: The spouses Carandang are ORDERED to pay the
following amounts from their conjugal partnership properties:
(1) P336,375.00 representing the spouses Carandangs loan to
Quirino de Guzman; and
(2) Interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from 5 June 1992 when the complaint
was filed until the principal amount can be fully paid; and
(3) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
No costs.

In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause
of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property
on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.4]
The Trial Courts Ruling
On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision5 in favor of
petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the loan
documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the
execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from
PNB, and was not aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August
1978 that she and her family should vacate the mortgaged property
because of the expiration of the redemption period. Under the Civil Code,
the effective law at the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without Aguetes consent.
Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract
her husband entered into without her consent, especially in the present
case where her consent is required. The trial court, however, ruled that its
decision is without prejudice to the right of action of PNB to recover the
amount of the loan and its interests from Ros.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit "C")
and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings conducted thereon
NULL and VOID;
2. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of the City of Laoag to
cancel TCT No. T-15276 in the name of defendant PNB and
revert the same in the name of plaintiffs spouses Joe Ros and
Estrella Aguete;

SO ORDERED.

3. ORDERING defendant to vacate and turnover the possession

of the premises of the property in suit to the plaintiffs; and

G.R. No. 170166

4. ORDERING defendant to pay plaintiffs attorneys fee and

litigation expenses in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS.

April 6, 2011

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 170166 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 17 October 2005 by the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845. The appellate court granted the
appeal filed by the Philippine National Bank Laoag Branch (PNB). The
appellate court reversed the 29 June 2001 Decision of Branch 15 of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City (trial court) in Civil Case No. 7803.
The trial court declared the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by
spouses Jose A. Ros3 (Ros) and Estrella Aguete (Aguete) (collectively,
petitioners), as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings, void. Aside
from payment of attorneys fees, the trial court also ordered PNB to vacate
the subject property to give way to petitioners possession.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court
of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803.
The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Laoag City.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros
obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14,
1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real
estate mortgage involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral
Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,
Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6]
PNB filed its Notice of Appeal7 of the trial courts decision on 13 September
2001 and paid the corresponding fees. Petitioners filed on the same date a
motion for execution pending appeal,8 which PNB opposed.9 In their
comment to the opposition10 filed on 10 October 2001, petitioners stated
that at the hearing of the motion on 3 October 2001, PNBs lay
representative had no objection to the execution of judgment pending
appeal. Petitioners claimed that the house on the subject lot is dilapidated,
a danger to life and limb, and should be demolished. Petitioners added that
they obliged themselves to make the house habitable at a cost of not
less P50,000.00. The repair cost would accrue to PNBs benefit should the
appellate court reverse the trial court. PNB continued to oppose
petitioners motion.11
In an Order12 dated 8 May 2002, the trial court found petitioners motion
for execution pending appeal improper because petitioners have made it
clear that they were willing to wait for the appellate courts decision.
However, as a court of justice and equity, the trial court allowed
petitioners to occupy the subject property with the condition that
petitioners would voluntarily vacate the premises and waive recovery of
improvements introduced should PNB prevail on appeal.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision13 and
granted PNBs appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial courts
decision, and dismissed petitioners complaint.
The appellate court stated that the trial court concluded forgery without
adequate proof; thus it was improper for the trial court to rely solely on
Aguetes testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were
forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on
the documents knowingly and with her full consent.
Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros loan, the
appellate court ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the
loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the
case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the familys
business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal
partnership.
Petitioners filed the present petition for review before this Court on 9
December 2005.

The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not giving weight to the findings
and conclusions of the trial court, and in reversing and setting aside such
findings and conclusions without stating specific contrary evidence;
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate
mortgage valid;
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring, without basis, that
the loan contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine
National Bank Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family, aside from
the fact that such had not been raised by respondent in its appeal.14]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.
The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The
subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of
gains. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for
the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the
partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major
repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of
both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the
spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional,
vocational or other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give
her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
marriage may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and
Aguetes marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954,
while the subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no doubt
that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for
P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete,
as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros mortgage to PNB of the
subject property. On the other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented
to the loan and also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan
documents.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband
do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows
Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the subject property. However,
the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding
that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the
conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to
Ros encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary
public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in

evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment

being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved.18 The execution of a document that has been ratified before a
notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged
signer.19 PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners omission to
present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was
fatal to petitioners cause.20Petitioners did not present any corroborating
witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare
that Aguetes signatures were really forged.
A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and
convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
Absent such, the presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to
overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on
the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same.21]
Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before
the courts with unclean hands.1avvphi1 In their memorandum before the
trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguetes
signatures.
Joe A. Ros in legal effect admitted in the complaint that the signatures of
his wife in the questioned documents are forged, incriminating himself to
criminal prosecution. If he were alive today, he would be prosecuted for
forgery. This strengthens the testimony of his wife that her signatures on
the questioned documents are not hers.
In filing the complaint, it must have been a remorse of conscience for
having wronged his family; in forging the signature of his wife on the
questioned documents; in squandering the P115,000.00 loan from the
bank for himself, resulting in the foreclosure of the conjugal property;
eviction of his family therefrom; and, exposure to public contempt,
embarassment and ridicule.22]
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco."23 In
her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but
claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of
loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the
money."24 Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family
cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.25
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.26]
For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983

EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V.
FELIPE, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA ALMOSARA, SOFIA ALDON,
SALVADOR ALDON, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Romulo D. San Juan for petitioner.
Gerundino Castillejo for private respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought
several pieces of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the
lands were divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto
Public Land Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and
Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her
husband, Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena
and their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2372 alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners
of Lots 1370, 1371 and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged the same to
the defendants; and an offer to redeem the mortgage had been refused so
they filed the complaint in order to recover the three parcels of land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs
by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial court sustained the
claim of the defendants and rendered the following judgment:
a. declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the property
subject of the present litigation;
b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be without merit and
is therefore hereby ordered dismissed;
c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of
P2,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the following judgment:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby RENDERED, ordering the
defendants-appellees to surrender the lots in question as well as the
plaintiffs'-appellants' muniments of title thereof to said plaintiffsappellants, to make an accounting of the produce derived from the
lands including expenses incurred since 1951, and to solidarity turn over
to the plaintiffs-appellants the NET monetary value of the profits, after
deducting the sum of P1,800.00. No attorney's fees nor moral damages
are awarded for lack of any legal justification therefor. No. costs.
The ratio of the judgment is stated in the following paragraphs of the
decision penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras with the concurrence of
Justices Venicio Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa:
One of the principal issues in the case involves the nature of the
aforementioned conveyance or transaction, with appellants claiming the
same to be an oral contract of mortgage or antichresis, the redemption
of which could be done anytime upon repayment of the P1,800.00
involved (incidentally the only thing written about the transaction is the
aforementioned receipt re the P1,800). Upon the other hand, appellees
claim that the transaction was one of sale, accordingly, redemption was
improper. The appellees claim that plaintiffs never conveyed the
property because of a loan or mortgage or antichresis and that what
really transpired was the execution of a contract of sale thru a private
document designated as a 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' (Exhibit 1), the
execution having been made by Gimena Almosara in favor of appellee
Hermogena V. Felipe.
After a study of this case, we have come to the conclusion that the
appellants are entitled to recover the ownership of the lots in question.
We so hold because although Exh. 1 concerning the sale made in 1951 of
the disputed lots is, in Our opinion, not a forgery the fact is that the sale
made by Gimena Almosara is invalid, having been executed without the
needed consent of her husband, the lots being conjugal. Appellees'
argument that this was an issue not raised in the pleadings is baseless,
considering the fact that the complaint alleges that the parcels 'were
purchased by plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late husband Maximo
Aldon' (the lots having been purchased during the existence of the
marriage, the same are presumed conjugal) and inferentially, by force of
law, could not, be disposed of by a wife without her husband's consent.
The defendants are now the appellants in this petition for review. They
invoke several grounds in seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. One of the grounds is factual in nature; petitioners claim that
"respondent Court of Appeals has found as a fact that the 'Deed of
Purchase and Sale' executed by respondent Gimena Almosara is not a
forgery and therefore its authenticity and due execution is already beyond
question." We cannot consider this ground because as a rule only

questions of law are reviewed in proceedings under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court subject to well-defined exceptions not present in the instant case.
The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect of a sale of
lands belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the
consent of the husband.
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules: The husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject
to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166,
Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent, except in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.)
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered
by the phrase "except in cases provided by law." The Court of Appeals
described the sale as "invalid" - a term which is imprecise when used in
relation to contracts because the Civil Code uses specific names in
designating defective contracts, namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et
seq.), voidable(Arts. 1390 et seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.),
and void or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.)
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what
category? The answer: it is a voidable contract.
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are
"[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the
contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena had no capacity to give
consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not
even to the husband alone but to both spouses.
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is
supported by the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband
without the consent of the wife when such consent is required, are
annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.)
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the essential
elements are untainted but Gimena's consent was tainted. Neither can the
contract be classified as unenforceable because it does not fit any of those
described in Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be
void or inexistent because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of
the Civil Code. By process of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable
contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband
only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in
the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could
not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the
annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they
merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of
Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage, she could not do
thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of
Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar
as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the
lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is
two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only
in 1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the
meantime, Maximo Aldon died.
Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the
lands by acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and
Salvador Aldon barred by the statute of limitations?
Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement
of the Court of Appeals:
We would like to state further that appellees [petitioners herein] could
not have acquired ownership of the lots by prescription in view of what
we regard as their bad faith. This bad faith is revealed by testimony to
the effect that defendant-appellee Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees
Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe) attempted in December
1970 to have Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made document
purporting to self the disputed lots to the appellees. This actuation
clearly indicated that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to
them, otherwise, why were they interested in a document of sale in
their favor? Again why did Vicente V. Felipe tell Gimena that the
purpose of the document was to obtain Gimena's consent to the
construction of an irrigation pump on the lots in question? The only
possible reason for purporting to obtain such consent is that the
appellees knew the lots were not theirs. Why was there an attempted
improvement (the irrigation tank) only in 1970? Why was the
declaration of property made only in 1974? Why were no attempts
made to obtain the husband's signature, despite the fact that Gimena
and Hermogena were close relatives? An these indicate the bad faith of
the appellees. Now then, even if we were to consider appellees'
possession in bad faith as a possession in the concept of owners, this
possession at the earliest started in 1951, hence the period for

extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed when the
present action was instituted on April 26, 1976.

property had been leased by Payumo to Pentel with an option to buy for
P350,000.00.

As to the second question, the children's cause of action accrued from the
death of their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it
(Art. 1141, Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within the
period.

On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued an order granting
Tinitigan "authority to sell the house and lot at No. 205 Loring St., Pasay
City covered by TCT No. 15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino
citizen, for P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.,).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified.

Judgment is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador Aldon their shares of
the lands as stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners as
possessors in bad faith shall make an accounting of the fruits
corresponding to the share aforementioned from 1959 and solidarity pay
their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon; costs against the petitioners.

An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by Payumo and children

alleging among others that the sale would result in substantial and
tremendous losses because the property sought to be sold is a suitable
condominium and/or hotel site and would, therefore, command a higher
price (pp. 56-57, rec.).

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980

TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA TINITIGAN and SEVERINO
TINITIGAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45574. October 30, 1980.*
PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC. and TEOFISTA PAYURAN
TINITIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, CHIU CHIN
SIONG and SEVERINO TINITIGAN SR., respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as
L-45418 and L-45574 respectively, affirming the order of respondent Judge
Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II in
Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975. On March 25, 1975,
petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista
Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran for short) entered into a contract of lease of a
residential house whereby for a term of four years Payumo shall lease to
Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of P1,500.00 per month with
option to buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.00 [pp.
13-16, rec].
On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren, Elsa, and Severino
Jr., all surnamed Tinitigan, leased to United Electronics Corporation a
factory building together with the portion of land on which it is erected
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated in Banwag,
Paraaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418).
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (Tinitigan for
short), husband of Payumo and private responded herein, was not secured.
Consequently, on May 22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner
and shareholder of Molave Development Corporation which is a family
corporation filed a complaint captioned "Annulment of Ownership and
Contract of witness Pre-Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Pasig, 7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.). This case docketed Civil Case
No. 21277 and which was assigned to Branch II presided by the Honorable
Judge Pedro C. Navarro principally sought to annul the contract of lease
executed by Payumo in favor of United Electronics Corporation The
property involved in this contract is entirely different from that leased to
Pentel with option to buy.
The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of court granted by
order of August 20, 1975, to include in the prayer the following:
... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from
encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave
Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan
Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ...
In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined petitioner from doing
any "act to dispose, mortgage or otherwise encumber the properties
described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the case for
hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 5, 1975.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the factory building and the land on which it
is erected covered by TCT No. 160998 (p. 151, rec.).
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of the contract of
lease of lot covered by TCT 160998 which was the main object of the
complaint was settled amicably. Severino Tinitigan Sr., however, on
September 17, 1975, filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale of a
two-storey residential house and a lot which are conjugal properties
located at 205 Loring St., Pasay City, covered by TCT No. 15923 (pp. 28-34,
rec.). The house is tenanted by Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin Lim for short)
who is President and General Manager of Pentel. Tinitigan contends that
the proposed sale of the property for P300,000.00 to Quintin who was
given priority right to purchase, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal
obligations that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 and to
forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal property. Earlier, the same

On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for reconsideration
of the September 29, 1975 order was filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, the
wife Payumo filed against her husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal
separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4459-P before Branch XXVIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
Pasay City presided by the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21,
rec.).
On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that "the parties had
agreed to the continuation of the administration of said conjugal
properties by plaintiff (wife) Teofista P. Tinitigan," appointed her
administrative of the conjugal properties subject to the following
conditions:
1) that all and any disposition and/or encumbrance of the real estate
belonging to the conjugal partnership shall be subject to the approval
of the court;
2) that all rentals accruing from the properties in Angeles Civil shall be
collected by the defendant Severino Tinitigan for his subsistence and
support; and
3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring St., Pasay City,
shall be subject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II, Pasig, Rizal" [P. 22, rec.].
In Civil Case No. 21277 however, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, presided by
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the September 29, 1975 order for lack of merit. Further,
the court stated that "the defendants (petitioners) have not even shown
that there are offers from other sources willing to buy the property for
more than P300.000.00 (p. 92, rec.)
On November 22, 1975, a notice of appeal was filed by petitioners Payumo
and children appealing the order of November 3, 1975, it being allegedly
final in nature in so far as the disposition of the Pasay property is
concerned and there being no further issue left between the parties (pp.
72-73, rec.).
By a deed of absolute sale dated January 16, 1976 (pp. 38-44, rec.). the
husband Tinitigan apparently sold for P315,000.00 the Pasay property not
to Quintin Lim as contained in the order of the court in Civil Case No.
21277, but to herein private respondent Chiu Chin Siong (Chiu for short)
who obtained a title thereto. Pursuantly, TCT No. 20031 was issued
cancelling TCT No. 15923.
On February 23, 1976, a motion for the approval of the sale to Chiu was
filed by respondent Tinitigan in the CFI of Rizal, Branch 11 (pp. 203-205,
rec.).
On March 3, 1976, the said court issued an order approving the sale
executed by Severino Tinitigan Sr. in favor of Chiu covering the parcel of
land at 206 Loring St., San Rafael District, Pasay City, for and in
consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P315,000.00) [pp. 206-207, rec.).
In a decision dated April 8, 1976, the same court denied the appeal filed by
petitioners Payumo and children on the ground that the order appealed
from is merely interlocutory and cannot, therefore, be the subject of
appeal. Furthermore, it stated that "the sale in favor of Chiu Chin Siong is a
right pertaining to the plaintiff under Article 171 of the Civil Code and the
exercise cise of said right is justifiable to relieve the rest of the conjugal
properties from mortgage obligations which are in danger of foreclosure"
(p. 90, rec.).
On May 17, 1976, Payumo and children filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against respondents Tinitigan and the Honorable
Pedro C. Navarro in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 05387
assuming the orders of respondent Judge and praying that a restraining
order be issued immediately enjoining respondent Severino Tinitigan Sr.
from selling or disposing of the disputed property and if already sold to
declare the sale null and void. Petitioners likewise prayed that the order of
the lower court dismissing the appeal based on the grounds aforestated be
declared a nullity and that the appeal be given due course (pp. 45-49, rec.).
On June 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the
orders of respondent Judge, particularly, the orders of September 29, 1975
approving the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City, to quote:
The ground for opposition to the sale is a claim that the property is a
'choice lot' within 'the tourist belt and its potentials for a hotel or
condominium site is very promising' (Ibid. p. 4). It does sound good but
too abstruse to meet the immediate need for the liquidation of a big
conjugal liability and to avoid foreclosure and loss of the properties

mortgaged. Besides the sale to liquidate the conjugal liability finds

support from the provisions of Articles 161 and 171 of the Civil Code.
We also see from the record before us that petitioner Teofista P.
Tinitigan has filed a complaint for legal separation and dissolution of
the conjugal partnership in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXVIII in Pasay City, under Civil Case No. 4459-P. Private respondent
agreed to the appointment of petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan as
administrative on certain conditions, which was approved by the Court
(Ibid., p. 30). One of these is that the disposition of the property in
question shall be subject to the decision of the CFI of Rizal, Brapeh II in
Pasig (Ibid., p. 30). As stated above, respondent Judge, presiding over
Branch II of the CFI of Rizal appellant proved the sale of the conjugal
property in question to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid.,
pp- 17-19). ...
But the petitioners would, nevertheless compel us to allow their
appeal from the order dated September 29, 1975 approving the sale of
the conjugal property in Pasay City in order to liquidate certiorari
conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 17) on the ground that the order dated
November 3, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order
dated September 29, 1975 is already final (Ibid., p. 4, par. 14). But the
respondent Judge hold the questioned order as merely interlocutory
(Ibid., p. 57). We sustain the respondent Judge. ... The fact that what
was resolved by the respondent Court was a mere motion for judicial
authority to sell conjugal property to liquidate certiorari conjugal
obligations (Ibid., p. 8) indicates that the order granting the motion
(Ibid., p. 17) is interlocutory. The rationale underlying the rule that an
interlocutory order is not appealable is basically the avoidance of
multiplicity of appeals in a single case which could considerably delay
the final disposition of the case (People vs. Rodriguez 24 SCRA 163,
167) [pp. 93-97, rec.).
Thereafter, on July 19, 1976, private respondent Chiu filed before the City
Court, Branch III, at Pasay City, presided by judge Pablo M. Malvar, a
compliant for unlawful detainer seeking an order to compel defendant
therein, Quintin C. Lim to vacate the premises in question (pp. 331-335,
rec.).
On July 26, 1976, Quintin C. Lim filed his answer with motion to dismiss
denying that he 'was the lessee of the properly and moving to dismiss the
detainer action for lack of jurisdiction, the issue of ownership not being
capable of decision without resolving the issue of ownership pending in
other courts (pp. 346-352, rec.).
On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L-45418 was filed
with this Court by Payumo and her three children praying for the issuance
of a writ of certiorari directed to the Court of Appeals, and commanding it
to send to this Court for review and determination the records and
proceedings of Civil Case No. 21277 assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig,
Branch II, presided by respondent Judge Navarro. The main allegations of
the petition are: lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court since it
did not have judicial authority to authorize the sale of the conjugal
property in Civil Case No. 21277 considering that the complaint in the said
case referred to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized to
be sold; and abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal since the order
authorizing the sale of the Loring property was not merely interlocutory
but one that was final and appealable.
On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this Court, this time
by Pentel and Payuran, against respondents Court of Appeals. Honorable
Pedro C. Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr. The petition,
docketed as L-45574, seeks to review on certiorari the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976 and order of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975 on the
ground that the said decision and order are void.
Petitioners assigr. the following errors as grounds for the allowance of writ,
to wit:
(1) The questioned order authorizing Severino Tinitigan Sr., to sell the
property in question is void because
(a) Tinitigan Sr. had no authority to sell the premises, they being under
the administration of Payuran;
(b) Respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises
and could not grant Tinitigan authority to sell them;
(c) The sale of the property was expressly authorized in favor of
Quintin Lim, not respondent Chiu;
(d) Pentel, whose President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had
the option to buy the premises; and
(2) The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying Payuran's
petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the property here involved.
On February 23, 1977, this Court, after deliberating on the petition filed in
case G.R. No. L-45574 resolved without giving due course thereto to
require the respondents to comment and to take up L-45574 with L-45418
since both involve the same Court of Appeals decision (p. 107, rec.).
During the pendency of these petitions, the Pasay Court in the legal
separation case (Civil Case No. 4459-P), issued an order dated August 29,
1977 dissolving the conjugal partnership between Tinitigan and Payumo
and approving the partition of their properties pursuant to an agreement

(pp. 319-325, rec.). The Loring property was adjudicated in favor of the
wife Payuran.
In consequence, defendant-respondent filed a motion to exclude TCT
15923 from the list of properties that should belong to Payumo (pp. 208210, rec.). An amended motion was subsequently filed on October 25, 1977
praying that the order of August 29, 1977 be amended in such a way that
the award of the Loring property be conditioned upon the final outcome of
the cases pending before this Court (pp. 326-328, rec.).
Pursuant to said motion, the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City issued an
order dated November 22, 1977 in part stating that the "award of the
Loring St., Pasay City property under TCT No. 15923 in favor of the plaintiff
in the order of the court dated August 29, 1977 is understood to the
subject to the outcome of the cases now pending before the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-45418 and G.R. No. L-45574" (pp. 329-330, rec.).
Notwithstanding these proceedings, the City Court of Pasay, Branch III in
the unlawful detainer case, presided by Judge Malvar, issued a decision
dated January 18, 1978 ordering the defendant Quintin Lim and all persons
claiming under him to vacate the premises in question and to pay the
corresponding rentals thereof to the plaintiff Chiu at the rate of P1,500.00
per month from January 16, 1976, until the defendant and all persons
claiming under him actually vacate the said premises (pp. 367-371, rec.).
For this reason, Payuran, on February 14, 1978, filed a motion for leave to
apply for a writ of injunction to enjoin execution of the decision of Judge
Malvar in the unlawful detainer case and to prohibit further proceedings
therein (pp. 259-273, rec.).
This Court, on February 22, 1978, issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Malvar from conducting further proceedings and from
executing the decision dated January 18, 1978 (pp. 372-374, rec.).
The issues in both L-45418 and L-45574 related primarily to the question of
validity of the challenged order dated September 29, 1975 issued by
respondent Judge Navarro of the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, in Pasig and the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
WE pursue our discussion on the merits of the case as predicated on
grounds raised in the assignment of errors.
Petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Loring
property is void; firstly, because Tinitigan had no authority to sell the
premises, they being under the administration of Payuran. This contention
is without legal basis. Article 165 of the New Civil Code decrees that "the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership." This is the
general rule. Although Article 168 of the same Code provides that "the wife
may by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument,
administer the conjugal partnership property" and scattered provisions in
the Code likewise speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial
decree, the said provisions are not applicable in the instant case. The
judicial decree dated October 29, 1975 appointing Payumo as
administrative of the conjugal partnership cannot be treated as an
exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal, Branch II had
granted Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Besides, the
appointment of Payumo as administrative was not absolute as it was made
subject to certain conditions agreed upon by the parties. Although the
claim by Payumo that she was actually administering their conjugal
properties even prior to this controversy may have some color of truth in
it; legally, however, such fact is not enough to make her administratix of
the conjugal partnership for absent a public instrument or a judicial decree,
administration still pertains to the husband as explicitly set forth in Article
165 (supra).
As held in the case of Ysasi vs. Fernandez (23 SCRA 1079, 1083 [June 25,
1968]).
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a
right clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole
administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint
administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession
against the wife who has taken over the administration without his
consent. And the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to
deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full
and complete accounting of such properties.
Necessarily, the conclusion is that Tinitigan Sr. had not ceased being the
administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for
judicial approval of sale was granted. Being administrator, however, does
not give him outright authority to alienate or encumber conjugal assets.
This kind of transactions requires the express or implied consent of the
wife subject to certain exceptions. Thus, Article 166 of the New Civil Code
provides
Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her conscience the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnership before the effective date of this Code (Emphasis supplied).
This was precisely the reason why respondent Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial
approval of sale of the Loring property. The filing of the said motion was, in
fact, directed by a legal provision since it became almost impossible for

private respondent to obtain his wife's consent to the sale which

transaction has not proven to be fraudulent. As the evidence warrants, the
sale was necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which might
endanger the family's economic standing. Actually, this is one instance
where the wife's consent is not required and impliedly, no judicial
intervention is necessary. According to Article 171 of the New Civil Code,
"the husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership for the purposes
specified in Articles 161 and 162." In general, these articles deal with the
obligation of the conjugal partnership. Specifically, Article 161, paragraph 1
provides that "the conjugal partnerships shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose,
in the case where she may legally bind the partnership."
It must be noted that Payumo did not dispute the existence of these
conjugal liabilities. What she questioned, in reality, was the propriety of
the sale of the disputed property, which, according to petitioners, has
bright prospects of development and market value appreciation in the
future. It was a 'choice lot' as termed by them. Nevertheless, the sale was
the surest and the most practical means resorted to by respondent
Tinitigan Sr. to save them from a serious financial setback. This
consideration cannot be sidestepped by speculative allegations. Moreover,
petitioners offer no acceptable and practical solution to remedy this
contingency.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order is void because
respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and
could not grant Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell them. They would seem to
capitalize on the fact that the complaint in Civil Case No. 21277 particularly
mentioned only the lot covered by TCT No. 160998 leased to United
Electronics Corporation. Petitioners failed to note, however, that in the
amended complaint, respondents prayed among others "to restrain the
defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing
properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in
the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect,
brings the Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the
court which issued the order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but
proper. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the said motion to seek
judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent amounts to compliance
with legal requirement delineated in Article 166, supra. The issuance of the
order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a validly
acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched principle that
"jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined
by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein - a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial.
Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we
to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction be
properly involved or called into activity by the firing of a petition, complaint
or other appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter. None of the parties to the litigation can
enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed. That power is a
matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may
change" (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1970 ed., pp. 3738).
In addition, records further disclose that the action for legal separation and
dissolution of conjugal partnership was filed almost right after the order of
September 29, 1975 in Civil Case No. 21277 was issued. As can be gleaned
from the facts, the filing of Civil Case No. 4459-P was apparently a tactical
maneuver intended to frustrate the order of September 29, 1975 issued by
respondent Judge Navarro granting Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring
property. Aptly, however, the order of October 29, 1975 made the
appointment of Payumo as administrative subject to the condition "that
the disposition of the property located at Loring St., Pasay City shall be
subeject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch II,
Pasig, Rizal." There can be no clearer indication of the validity of the
questioned order, as far as jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter court's
own recognition of the jurisdiction priorly acquired by the court issuing it.
The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction once acquired continues until the
case is finally terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs. Central Surety
and Ins. Co., 25 SCRA 641[1968]). "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon
the state of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction
once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the
subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first innocence,
will not operate to oust jurisdiction almdy attached" (Ramos vs. Central
Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583 [1971]).
Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of petitioner that it is the
Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should
have assumed jurisdiction over the disputed property upon the filing of the
complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership To
permit this would result in the disregard of the order of September 29,
1975 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not
even the court whose jurisdiction is being invoked sanctions this seeming
attempt to contravene sound doctrines and long-standing principles.

Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order appellant proving the
sale of the Loring property on the ground that the sale was expressly
authorized in favor of Quintin Lim and not respondent Chiu. Obviously, this
is but a collateral issue. It is noteworthy that the motion was filed in order
to secure judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent as Payumo
would not grant the same. The order, therefore, was not intended to vest
Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring property but rather it
was intended to grant Tinitigan Sr. authorized to sell the same. To construe
otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the motion was filed. The
fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely incidental, it having
been made pursuant to the desire of respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on
the former's interest over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin
Lim, however, did not manifest his ability and willingness to buy the
property. He had practically every opportunity prior to the sale in favor of
Chiu to exercise his pre-emptive right but he failed to exercise the same for
one reason or another. The urgency of the need to settle pressing conjugal
obligations prompted respondent Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who
could immediately pay for the property Chiu, to whom the property was
subsequently offered, immediately paid the full amount of P315,000.00
upon the court's approval of the sale in his favor on March 3, 1976. This
March 3, 1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September 29, 1975.
Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on purely circumstantial
ground that Pentel whose President and General Manager is Quintin
Lim, had the option to buy the premises. While this may be so, petitioners
seem to have neglected that the contract of lease between Payumo and
Pentel with option to buy has been entered into in violation of Civil Code
provisions. A close scrutiny of the facts would reveal that Payumo has
contravened the law by encumbering the disputed property as well as
other conjugal properties without her husband's consent. Article 172 of the
new Civil Code provides that "the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by
law." Granting arguendo that she is the administrative still her act of
leasing the lots covered by TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is
unjustified, being violative of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states
that "the wife who is appellant pointed as an administrative of the
husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's property or
that of the conjugal partnership without judicial authority." Consequently,
Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as a source of right
or valid defense. True, the contract may bind persons parties to the same
but it cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely because he is aware
of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof (Manila Port
Service vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the "res inter
alios acta nobis nocet, nec prodest," which means that a transaction
between two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third
person.
Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of
law in denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the
Loring property. This argument, however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as
when as the evidence presented by both parties leave no other recourse
for the respondent Court of Appeals except to apply the pertinent legal
provisions respecting the matter. Whether the order authorizing the sale of
the Loring property is interlocutory or not, becomes of no moment in view
of the conclusion aforesaid.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE PETITIONS IN THESE TWO
CASES ARE HEREBY DENIED AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DATED JUNE 1, 1976 AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONERS IN BOTH CASES.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband
and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and
void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter
case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for
review of the Decision 1 dated January 30, 1996 and the Resolution 2 dated
May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
41758, affirming the Decision of the lower court and denying
reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended
Complainant 3 against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration
of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due

course, the trial court rendered a Decision 4 dated September 9, 1992,

disposing as follow: 5
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against
the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1,
1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement" dated March 16,
1990 (Exh. "B") as null void and of no effect;
2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of
plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants
Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE THOUSAND (P9,000.00)
PESOS corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs
to Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff
in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing
one-half of the amount of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs
on Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests
thereon computed from the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances
of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as follow: 6
WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is
hereby AFFIRMED by this Court. No costs considering plaintiff-appellee's
failure to file her brief despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed
Resolution: 7
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for
reconsideration of Our decision in this case of January 30, 1996, to be a
mere rehash of the same issues which we have already passed upon in
the said decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb the
same, this Court RESOLVED to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent
and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their
residence and the lot on which it stood. The circumstances of this sale are
set forth in the Decision of Respondent Court, which quoted from the
Decision of the trial court as follows: 8
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married
spouses. They were married on December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City,
before a judge. This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also admitted by defendant
Judie Corpuz when he testified in court (tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although
the latter says that they were married in 1967. The couple have three
children, namely: Junie 18 years old, Harriet 17 years of age, and
Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age in August, 1990
when her mother testified in court.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with
plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located
in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, and
particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel
Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a
total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in
installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee
fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn p. 6, February 14,
1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold
one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the
defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have
since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon
(tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus adjoining neighbors of the
Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was
trying to look for work abroad, in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she
became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to
go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila however, coming back to
Koronadal, South Cotabato, . . . on March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's departure
for Manila to look for work in the Middle East was with the consent of
her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; p. 10 Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom
went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his
place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a
cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King's College,
Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working
as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her
brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was going
to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6,
1991.)

Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father

intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of
their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother
informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead
gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would
advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).
4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie
Corpuz pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion of Lot
9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant
Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as "Deed of Transfer of
Rights" (Exh. "A") the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the
house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which
P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's
children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness.
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to cure
whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot
transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another
agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. "3"), this time
with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner
from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot
(Exh. "2"), who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00.
Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale (Exh. "3-A"). The
new sale (Exh. "3") describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is
Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple
Gilda and Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found
her children staying with other households. Only Junie was staying in
their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her
children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere
to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a
wife already.
6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was
complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband
Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General
Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn.
p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990). The case was docketed by the barangay
authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for "trespassing". On March 16,
1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable
settlement". In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely:
Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and
Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without
any charge, on or before April 7, 1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff
to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question her
signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred however to the
Office-In-Charge at the time, a certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn
told her that he could not do anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17,
1990).
This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified
did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the annulment
of the settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had
approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26, 1990). We thus conclude that Mrs.
Corpuz really approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of
the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed put in
her house and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement
with a motion for the execution of the amicable settlement, filing the
same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
proceedings [are] still pending before the said court, with the filing of
the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent P600.00 for
the preparation of the Deed of Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as
the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having assumed the
remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. "3"); P100.00
for the preparation of Exhibit "3"; a total of P759.62 basic tax and special
education fund on the lot; P127.50 as the total documentary stamp tax
on the various documents; P535.72 for the capital gains tax; P22.50 as
transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00; certification fee of P5.00. These
expenses particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the transfer
of the title to the spouses Guiangs were incurred for the whole Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409.
Ruling of Respondent Court
Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that
any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal propety
without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article
124 of the Family Code. It also rejected petitioners' contention that the
"amicable sttlement" ratified said sale, citingArticle 1409 of the Code which
expressly bars ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly
those "prohibited or declared void by law."

Hence, this petition. 9

The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the
following errors: 10
I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly
executed.
II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not declairing as voidable
contract under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the impugned Deed of
Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution of the
"amicable settlement" by the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the
findings of the Court a quo which recognized as lawful and valid the
ownership and possession of private respondent over the remaining one
half (1/2) portion of the properly.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale
(Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such contract was
ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable
sttlement with them.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly
executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely
rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even
though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action
in court. They are susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to
contracts visited by vices of consent,i.e., contracts which were entered into
by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private
respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was
totally inexistent or absent. Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified
thus:11
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma'am.
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem which
arose concerning the ownership of your residential house at Callejo
Subdivision?
A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which arose
regarding my residential house and lot because it was sold by my
husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article
124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the teo lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip
properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) (Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial
court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in
this wise: 12

The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It

becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the
Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnershit without the wife's consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is
merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the
said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or
her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during [the]
marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over
to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance
made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the
husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred
to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document
embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that
barangay authorities made her sign said document through
misrepresentation and
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of
the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will
be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into
without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object,
and (3) consent, 14 the last element being indubitably absent in the case at
bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that
it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the "amicable
settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have
resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. The trial court
correctly held: 15
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the
Deed to Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A") cannot be ratified, even by an
"amicable settlement". The participation by some barangay authorities
in the "amicable settlement" cannot otherwise validate an invalid act.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B")
entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent spouses Guiang is a
contract. It is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh.
"A"). By express provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the
legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of Rights (Exh. "A")
and the "amicable settlement" (Exh. "3") are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. 16
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer
that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence
of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent,
after which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that
private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138497

January 16, 2002

IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the
decision2 of the Court of Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari

assailing the trial court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
case against her inclusion as party defendant therein.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia
Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition
Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec. Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent
alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married
to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four
legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and
using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of
the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez,
after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and
cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
"It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio,
during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune
consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses,
apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank
accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their
dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely
through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of
defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from
petitioner Relucio.
"In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and
husband, he excluded the private respondent and their four children
from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the
income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not
place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed
away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He placed
substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of
petitioner Relucio.1wphi1.nt
"It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant
Lopez abandoned the private-respondent, he has sold, disposed of,
alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away
properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership
with the private-respondent and either spent the proceeds thereof for
his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two illegitimate
children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the
reach of the private-respondent and their four children.
"On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by
herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause
of action against her.
"An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent
Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because
some of the subject properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
"Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Order of the respondent Judge dated February
10, 1994 but the same was likewise denied in the Order dated May 31,
1994."3
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss.4
On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the
petition.5 On June 26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.6 However, on April 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.7
Hence, this appeal.8

(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation

of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages.11
A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon
if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.12
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than
that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite
or uncertain.13
Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special
Proceedings M-3630, we assays its allegations.
In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent Angelina Mejia
Lopez summarized the causes of action alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against
petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property
arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete
stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only
to spouses, to wit:
"If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply
with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property,
or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property xxx"
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between
them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that
Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is
against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner
and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of
the three elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent
husband."14 The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an
incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent
Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on
this ground.
Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J.
Lopez' share in the co-owned property "acquired during his illicit
relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]"15 and for the "dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the
[respondent]."
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez'
share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the
issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and
petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J.
Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share
alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the
trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.16 Such cause of action,
however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a
stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina
M. Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife against her
husband."17 References to petitioner in the common and specific
allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts
and circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J.
Lopez.

The Issues

Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is

against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.

1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole

administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her
husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against
petitioner.

To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have
the character of an action for interference with marital or family relations
under the Civil Code.

2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the

proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy.9

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit."18 In this case, petitioner would not be affected by
any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the
proceedings below. "A cause of action is an act or omission of one party
the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other."10 The elements of
a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable

party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special
Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can
issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his
conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and
their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with
respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and
enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.

Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A

necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or
for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action.20 In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent
would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to
account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give
support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the coownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of
the Court of Appeals.21 The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as against
petitioner.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147978

January 23, 2002

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner,

vs.
NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly
dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A.
Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed by
respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto
Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in
its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as
well as that in Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the two
properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker,
Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses.1 Petitioner made a
visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate broker and was shown
the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans,
and vicinity maps relating to the properties.2 Thereafter, petitioner met
with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a
definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with
the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in
the presence of the real estate broker.3After some bargaining, petitioner
and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the
Taytay property and P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property4 to be paid on
installment basis with downpayments ofP100,000.00 and P200,000.00,
respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as
follows5:
Taytay Property

Makati Property

P200,000.00

P300,000.00

12th
month

700,000.00

1,600,000.00

18th
month

500,000.00

6th month

This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by

Edilberto.6 When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the
properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to
the sale.7 The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter
prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real estate broker
and Edilberto met in the latter's office for the formal signing of the
typewritten Contracts to Sell.8 After Edilberto signed the contracts,
petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807
dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated
April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate broker and
an employee in Edilberto's office.9 The contracts were given to Edilberto for
the formal affixing of his wife's signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma,
requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts.10 To
accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met
with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in
Makati.11 During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the
contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to
meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.12
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate
broker at Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she
was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were
backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full
amount of the consideration.13 Petitioner reminded respondent spouses

that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma's
refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma
refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for
specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to compel
respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
A Motion to Dismiss14 was filed by respondents which was denied by the
trial court in its Resolution of July 21, 1992.15
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim,
alleging that it was an agreement between herein petitioner and
respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject properties was
still subject to the approval and conformity of his wife Norma
Camaisa.16 Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent to the sale,
her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner.17 The checks
issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and she accepted
the same without any objection.18 Respondent further claimed that the
acceptance of the checks returned to petitioner signified her assent to the
cancellation of the sale of the subject properties.19 Respondent Norma
denied that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the
subject properties and that she gave her consent and conformity to the
same.20
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment21 asserting that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties
considering that the wife's written consent was not obtained in the
contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to respondents;
hence, the contract was null and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing
the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the
court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the
consent of the wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not
been shown to be incapacitated. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT Nos.
(464860) S-8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds
at Makati and on TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971 of the Registry of
Rizal.
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses
Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as
Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as
Attorney's Fees.
Costs against plaintiff.22
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On November
29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court but
deleted the award of P50,000.00 as damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts
were conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is
necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma
Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact,
the downpayment was returned by respondent spouses and was accepted
by petitioner. The Court of Appeals also stressed that the authority of the
court to allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the
consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases where the said
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property.
Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN
RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS ON THE TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS
TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE
LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS.
CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICE,
OBJECT AND TERMS OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY
SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND
WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX "G" IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR
MINOR PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF
TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF
NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED TO
THEIR INCLUSION;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT OF SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT
IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403,
1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GOVERNED
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.23

The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary
judgment in favor of respondent spouses there being a genuine issue of
fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the contracts to sell
between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of
fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the
court upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of a case, there
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that
there are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and that
therefore the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.24 A
perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no
genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels
of land between petitioner and respondent spouses; that petitioner and
respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and
the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the
latter; and that respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. The
issue thus posed for resolution in the trial court was whether or not the
contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were already
perfected such that the latter could no longer back out of the agreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband
as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence,
for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and
wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to
the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly,
petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell.
Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale
of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction
is not consent.25
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to
affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under
Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges
that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is
being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such
authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it
should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted
to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.26
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma
was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of
such showing of the wife's incapacity, court authorization cannot be
sought.
Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper
considering that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The
only issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the contract to sell
involving conjugal properties was valid without the written consent of the
wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated November 29, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159889

June 5, 2008

WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,

vs.
FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the modification of the

Decision1 dated December 17, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 68383, which had affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated July 19, 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No.
4460. The RTC annulled the sale made by respondent Florentino Chiong in
favor of petitioners Walter and Aurora Villanueva conveying a portion of a
parcel of land which respondents acquired during their marriage.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in
January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their
marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)2325,3 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime
in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to
petitioners forP8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino
allowed petitioners to occupy4 the lot and build a store, a shop, and a
house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December
13, 1986,5 petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed
of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint6 for Quieting of Title
with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4383. On February 12, 1992,
petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint7 for Specific Performance with
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4460. Upon proper motion, the RTC
consolidated these two cases.8
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale9 in favor of petitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of
absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot
and remove all improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil
Case No. 4460, but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the
consideration of the sale with interest from May 13, 1992.10 The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
For Civil Case No. 4383, (a) annulling the Deed of Sale executed by
Florentino Chiong in favor of Walter Villanueva, dated May 13, 1992
(Exhibit "2"); ordering defendant Walter Villanueva to vacate the entire
land in question and to remove all buildings therein, subject to
[i]ndemnity of whatever damages he may incur by virtue of the removal
of such buildings, within a period of 60 days from the finality of this
decision; award of damages is hereby denied for lack of proof.
In Civil Case No. 4460, complaint is hereby dismissed, but defendant
Florentino Chiong, having received the amount of P8,000.00 as
consideration of the sale of the land subject of the controversy, the sale
being annulled by this Court, is ordered to return the said amount to
[the] spouses Villanueva, with interest to be computed from the date of
the annulled deed of sale, until the same is fully paid, within the period
of 60 days from finality of this judgment. Until such amount is returned,
together with the interest, [the] spouses Villanueva may continue to
occupy the premises in question.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated July
19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners sought reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors as issues for our resolution:
I.
THAT THE COURT A QUO AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ... GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IN
QUESTION BELONGED SOLELY TO RESPONDENT FLORENTINO CHIONG
AND ULTIMATELY TO THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.
II.
THAT THE LOWER COURT AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE
DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT FLORENTINO CHIONG IN
FAVOR OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.13
Simply put, the basic issues are: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property
of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by
Florentino without Elisera's consent valid?
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the
lot is conjugal property. They claim that the lot belongs exclusively to
Florentino because respondents were already separated in fact at the time
of sale and that the share of Elisera, which pertains to the eastern part of
Lot No. 997-D-1, had previously been sold to Spouses Jesus Y. Castro and
Aida Cuenca. They also aver that while there was no formal liquidation of
respondents' properties, their separation in fact resulted in its actual
liquidation. Further, assuming arguendo that the lot is still conjugal, the

transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share

over it.
Elisera, for her part, counters that the sale of the lot to petitioners without
her knowledge, consent or authority, was void because the lot is conjugal
property. She adds that the sale was neither authorized by any competent
court nor did it redound to her or their children's benefit. As proof of the
lot's conjugal nature, she presented a transfer certificate of title, a real
property tax declaration, and a Memorandum of Agreement14 dated
November 19, 1979 which she and her husband had executed for the
administration of their conjugal properties.15
Anent the first issue, petitioners' contention that the lot belongs
exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife,
Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of
merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature
of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 17816 of the
Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature.
Likewise, under Article 16017 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's
supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption
when taken against all the evidence for respondents.
On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the
lot was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since
it was registered "in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age,
married to Elisera Chiong ."18 But Elisera also presented a real property
tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In
addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum
of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal
property.19 Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by
Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he
declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.20
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is
not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v.
Agbayani,21 citing Villaranda v. Villaranda,22 we held that without the wife's
consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but
merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code 23 provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnership before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years
from the transaction questioned,ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is
necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the
requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold
the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992.
Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's
instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely
questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991,
perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the property is still
conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had
one-half share over the lot. Petitioners' stance lacks merit. In Heirs of
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares 24 citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.,25 a case
involving the annulment of sale executed by the husband without the
consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its
entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal
property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was
declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of
the whole transaction is the same. Thus:
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the
contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's
consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit
such annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife,
such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the
legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B.
L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First
Instance correctly stated, "[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article
173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas
Sioca, 45 Phil. 430," in which cases annulment was held to refer only to
the extent of the one-half interest of the wife .26

Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been

given is proper.27 Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore
to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the
contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases
provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for
damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and
to restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their
original situation before the contract was entered into.28
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return
to respondents the land with its fruits29and respondent Florentino should
return to petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of
the land, together with interest thereon.
On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into consideration that
petitioners have been using the land and have derived benefit from it just
as respondent Florentino has used the price of the land in the sum
of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a
reasonable amount or legal interest for the use of the money then
petitioners should also be required to pay a reasonable amount for the use
of the land.30 Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, it
would be equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each other.
Hence, the award of the trial court for the payment of interest should be
deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated December 17, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 68383
affirming the Joint Decision dated July 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
of Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4460 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The order for the payment of interest is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183984

April 13, 2011

ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008
Decision2 and the 4 August 2008 Resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals Decision, are as follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores
(petitioner) amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3%
compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment.
To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the
Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico
(Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory
Note5 and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a
Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 (RTC,
Branch 33) and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The
RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the
consent and authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed
was executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated 4 November 1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from
recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action against
her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
personal action which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January
2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42)
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and docketed as Civil Case No. 04110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that it only
amounted to P340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was not a
party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enricos
signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds

of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision

of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005, respondents also filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the motion
to dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res judicata will not apply to
rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of the same subject
matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in
issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
In its Order9 dated 8 February 2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied
respondents motion. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33
expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no
longer recover the loan petitioner extended to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before
the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005
and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the rule admits of exceptions.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42 acted with grave abuse
of discretion in denying respondents motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one
is available ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of Appeals
ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor
has a single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit
with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative
remedies: either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action
to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay
her obligation and he could not split the single cause of action by filing
separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a
petition for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover the
amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money
on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a
mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has
the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money
or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.11 An
election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be
multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to
another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the
residence of the parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by
itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he
waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.14 The Court
explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor
may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt
or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue
either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of
action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave
open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution,
even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property,
an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant,
other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his
cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit
of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right
of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result
not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques,
24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin, 25
Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being

sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and
then again in the place where the property lies.15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be authorized plural
redress for a single breach of contract at so much costs to the court and
with so much vexation and oppressiveness to the debtor.16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into
consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without Enricos consent. The
RTC, Branch 33 stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who has
the burden of proving his cause of action. On the other hand, said
circumstances tend to support the claim of defendant Edna Lindo that her
husband did not consent to the mortgage of their conjugal property and
that the loan application was her personal decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by
defendant Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of her husband Enrico
Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of
the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover
the P400,000 loan plus interest which he extended to defendant Edna
Lindo. He can institute a personal action against the defendant for the
amount due which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides at the
election of the plaintiff in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no jurisdiction to try such personal
action.17
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan.
She claimed, however, that her husband did not give his consent and that
he was not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the RTC, Branch 33 held that
petitioner could still recover the amount due from Edna through a personal
action over which it had no jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 of
San Pedro Laguna (RTC, Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the Real
Estate Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without the consent of her
husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their
conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be
consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real
estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the husband, is
necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed
on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of attorney dated
November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to October 31, 1995 to
validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however
subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a
mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not
thereby rendered null and void. That obligation matures and becomes
demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. Under the
foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the
mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness
which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed
remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the
amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed
of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or consent
of petitioners spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal
contract of loan however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real
estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Ednas liability is not affected by the
illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or

authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both

offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership
property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies
to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of
the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that "the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was
executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a
binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions
of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and
executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of
Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these
courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing
petitioners avenue for recovery of the loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may
institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies
are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection
suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt.21 In that case,
however, this Courtpro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held
liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the
loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."23 The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions:
(1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2)
that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.241avvphi1
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent
one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or
consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case considering that
Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not
been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously
at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the
RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief
before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC,
Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled
that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that
it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have
against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust
enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural
rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision,
found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only
amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich
herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she
questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an
opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim
as to the amount of her indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed with the
trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987

PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE
SANTERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR,
RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and REYNALDO
EVARISTO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
PABLO SANTERO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the respondent
court granting the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents. Said
order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982 filed by Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero, thru their
guardian, Anselma Diaz, the Opposition thereto dated July 8, 1982 filed
by the oppositors, the Reply to Opposition dated July 12, 1982 filed by
movant Anselma Diaz and the Rejoinder dated July 26, 1982 filed by the
oppositors, the Court was constrained to examine the Motion For
Allowance filed by the herein movant last year wherein the ground cited
was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and
medical necessities, which was granted and said minors were given an
allowance prayed for in their motion.
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz
only followed the precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion
last year to be spent for the school expenses of her wards. In their
opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance
is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so that
they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the
administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance
because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be
adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator
derives the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.
In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted some of her
children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of
funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested
allowances. She cited Article 290 of the Civil Code providing that:
Support is everything that is indispensable for substance, dwelling,
clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of
the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be
supported until he completes his education or training for some trade
or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.'
citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of
the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the Court,
such allowance as provided by law.'
From the foregoing discussion alone, the Court cannot deviate from its
duty to give the allowance sought by the wards, the fact that they need
further education which should have been provided to them if their
deceased father were alive.
On the allegation that the funds from which the allowance would be
derived are trust funds, the Court, time and again had emphasized that
the estate of the Santeros is quite big and the amount to be released for
allowances is indeed insignificant and which can easily be replaced from
its general fund if the so-called trust fund is adjudicated to the
oppositors.
WHEREFORE, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed
Santero are hereby granted an allowance of two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos each for tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any
available funds in the hands of the administrator who is ordered to
reimburse to them the said amount after this order shall have become
final to enable the oppositors to file their appeal by certiorari if they so
desire within the reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
Bacoor, Cavite, July 28, 1982.
ILDEFONSO M. BLEZA

Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private

respondents filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985
with the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all
surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz
praying that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C.
Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children
of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero. The
respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but
oppositors (petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsider said Order.
On September 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by respondent
Court directing Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as
to the additional three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in the motion.
In compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating
among others that in her previous motions, only the last four minor
children as represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the
motion for support and her first three (3) children who were then of age
should have been included since all her children have the right to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero under Art. 188, of the New Civil Code.
On October 15, 1985, petitioners herein filed their Motion
to Admit Supplemental Petition opposing the inclusion of three (3) more
heirs. We denied that "Motion for Extension of Time to file their
Supplemental Petition" as per Our Resolution dated October 23, 1985.
On November 11, 1985, another Order was issued by the respondent court
directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the
three additional recipients or children of Anselma Diaz apparently based on
the oppositors' (petitioners herein) "Urgent Motion to Direct the
Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants."
The issues now being raised in this present Petition are:
1. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-P2,000.00 each
despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully
employed with the exception of Miguel.
2. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in
granting the allowance based on the allegations of the said respondents
that the abovenamed wards are still schooling and they are in actual
need of money to defray their school expenses for 1982-83 when the
truth is that they are no longer schooling.
3. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in
granting the motion for allowance without conducting a hearing
thereon, to determine the truth of allegations of the private
respondents.
Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any
allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully
employed and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on
the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and
other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term
1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority age so that
they are no longer under guardianship. They further allege that the
administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds
to cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the
administrator constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will
be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds
now held by the administrator are derived.
In this connection, the question of whether the private respondents are
entitled to allowance or not concerns only the intestate estate of the late
Pablo Santero and not the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti, parents of their late legitimate son Pablo Santero. The reason for
this is Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that "An illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child." The question of whether
or not the petitioners and private respondents are entitled to inherit by
right of representation from their grandparents more particularly from
Simona Pamuti was settled by Us in the related case of "Anselma Diaz, et
al. vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin" (G.R. No. 66574-R) wherein We held that in
view of the barrier present in said Art. 992, petitioners and private
respondents are excluded from the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.
The present petition obviously lacks merit.

Executive Judge
(pp. 35-36, Rollo)
It appears from the records that petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales,
Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late
Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven
children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets
of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither
of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn,
who died on November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual
Santero who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in
1976.

The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of
Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according tothe social
position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be
supported until he completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to
the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but

from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or
married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining
factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court
limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive
law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive
support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the
same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are
the mothers of the children here).
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent
Court without hearing. The record shows that the "Motion for Allowance"
dated June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing (p. 2, Annex "A")
addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and setting the hearing
thereof on July 8, 1982 at 9:00 in the morning. Apparently a copy of said
motion was duly received by the lawyer, Atty. Beltran as he filed an
opposition thereto on the same date of hearing of the motion.
Furthermore even the instant petition admits that the wards, (petitioners
and private respondents as represented by their respective guardians)
"have been granted allowances for school expenses for about 8 years
now." The respondent court in granting the motion for allowance merely
"followed the precedentof the court which granted a similar motion last
year." (Annex "F") However in previous years (1979-1981) the "wards"
(petitioners and private respondents) only received P1,500.00 each
depending upon the availability of funds as granted by the court in several
orders. (Annex 1 to Annex 4).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant
Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157537

September 7, 2011

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR,
SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA,
CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented
by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the
surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of
the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been
allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the
deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not
prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total
area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go,
Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio,
Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,1 whereby he affirmed
under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he,
who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of
Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.2On December 28, 1999,
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a
portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L.
Servacio (Servacio) for 5,686,768.00.3 On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property,4 but Servacio refused to heed their
demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute,5 they
sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern
Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.6
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.7
On October 3, 2002,8 the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio,
Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely:
Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as
vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was
acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was
conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained

exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s

renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.9
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property,
holding that: "xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will
not be allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to
state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the
legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid."10Quoting Tolentinos commentary
on the matter as authority,11 the RTC opined:
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says"
[sic]
"Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the spouses, in
case it is necessary to sell any portion of the community property in order
to pay outstanding obligation of the partnership, such sale must be made
in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for
the sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property affected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belongs to the
vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition. Pending the
liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited only to the
contingent share or interest of the vendor in the particular property
involved, but not to the corpus of the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation,
mortgage or disposal of the conjugal property without the required
formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity
so long as they do not exceed the portion which, after liquidation and
partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse who made the contract."
[underlining supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the
provisions of the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the alienation by
the surviving spouse of the community property that jurisprudence
remains the same - that the alienation made by the surviving spouse of a
portion of the community property is not wholly void ab initio despite
Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of what will
be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because
why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the
community property that will eventually be his/her share in the final
partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be
absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the
17,140 square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what
vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually get as their share
in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration13 prompted the
petitioners to appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable
law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being
made without prior liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito
both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the
want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid,
because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally
allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice
any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale
disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.14
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon
the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the
subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code,
viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements
that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property

relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of

supplementary application.

to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this

result, viz:

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of

gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis
supplied]

xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would
pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If
it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal
assets then the whole transaction is null and void.1wphi1 But if it turns
out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the
husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the
estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and
that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined
only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal
made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held
that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving
spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of
the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husbands
share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property
that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the
benefit of the husbands other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs
shall not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v.
Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)25

It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after

the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in
Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations
Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of
the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains
must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There
being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation
was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,15 and an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation.16 The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to
wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title
to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the
property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until
then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas
share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence,
Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.19Consequently, the sale by
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other coowners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners
were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a coowner of Martas share.20 This result conforms to the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it
is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum
valere potest).21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is
"without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to
declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the
rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and
Rito in the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,22 the respondents aver that each of the heirs
had already received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale,
and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and
owned by them. However, they did not present any public document on
the allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in
Martas estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had
already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition
among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent
of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners
might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse
to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as
instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,23 to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or
for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the
third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated
their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].1avvphi1
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as
well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is
an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx24
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM

the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8190

May 28, 1958

GONZALO GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CONSOLACION MANZANO, defendant-appellee.
Fernandez and Benedicto and Primo L. Agsaoay for appellant.
Diokno and Sison and De Santos, Herrera and Delfino for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an action filed by husband Gonzalo Garcia against his wife
Consolacion Manzano for the judicial declaration of the separation of their
conjugal partnership property (Civil Case No. 23099, Court of First Instance
of Manila).
Plaintiff Gonzalo Garcia alleged in his complaint that he and defendant are
husband and wife but they have been living separately from each other
since 1948, all attempts at reconciliation between them having failed; that
plaintiff, a duly licensed doctor of veterinary science, used to be employed
in the slaughter-house of the City of Manila, while defendant, with
plaintiff's knowledge and consent, engaged in the business of slaughtering
large cattle and selling the fresh meat in the city; that as a result of their
joint efforts, plaintiff and defendant acquired and accumulated real and
personal properties; that upon the separation of the spouses, the
defendant assumed the complete management and administration of the
conjugal partnership property, has been enjoying said property as well as
its accessions and fruits to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiff, and has
even fictitiously transferred or alienated a majority of said property in favor
of third persons; that since defendant assumed the management and
administration of the conjugal partnership property, she has neglected to
file any income tax returns; at defendant has failed and refused to turn
over and deliver to plaintiff his rightful share and participation in the
conjugal partnership property and its fruits. Wherefore, plaintiff prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render a complete
accounting of the conjugal partnership property and its fruits, that judicial
pronouncement be made ordering the separation of the conjugal
partnership property of the spouses, and that the rightful share therein of
each of them be adjudicated pursuant to law.
Upon receipt copy of the complaint and summons, defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action because "it does not allege any of the grounds recognized by Article
191 of the new Civil Code for decreeing a judicial separation of properties".
Plaintiff vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that he is
entitled to some relief, legal or equitable, under the allegations of his
complaint, and that Article 191 of the new Civil Code may also be availed of
by the husband where the administration of the conjugal partnership
property has been forcibly taken from him by his wife and she abuses the
management thereof. Acting on the motion to dismiss, the lower court
held that plaintiff's complaint is not included under the provisions of
Articles 190 and 191 of the new Civil Code providing for judicial separation
of the conjugal partnership property, and that the husband being the legal
administrator of the partnership, he "continuo consuficientes remedios
legales para asegurar y reafirmar su autoridad en cuanto al manejo de log
bienes gan anciales dentro de la sociedad conyugal," and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, his present appeal.
We agree with the court below that the complaint does not establish a
case for separation of property. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
regime of separation and not in harmony with the unity of the family and
the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the Civil Codes
(both old and new) require that separation of property shall not prevail
unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is
solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the
marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code); and in the
latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in
Article 191 of the new Civil Code:
ART. 191. The husband or the wife way ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the
petitioner; has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.
In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership property of the husband, or in case of
abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also
be ordered by the court according to the provisions of articles
167 and 173, No. 3.
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment
which has been entered against the guilty or absent spouse.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as
well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any
petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at
the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court
shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other
third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of

Arts 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in Arts. 498 to 501 shall
be applicable.
This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of the Code's
restrictive policy. The appellant recognizes that his case does not come
within the purview of the first paragraph of the Article quoted; but
vigorously contends that the provisions of the second paragraph, like those
of Articles 167 and 178, should be interpreted as applicable, mutatis
matandis, to the husband, even if the letter of the statute refers to the
wife exclusively.
ART. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the
conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on
petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or
administration by the wife, or separation of property.
ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal
partnership, except that:
(1) In the spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
live therein without just cause, shall not have a right to be
supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the
other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
necessary;
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause
for at least one year, she may petition the court for a
receivership or administration by her of the conjugal
partnership property, or separation of property.
In support of his thesis, appellant argues that in case of mismanagement
and maladministration by the wife, the husband should be entitled to the
same relief as the wife, otherwise there would be a void in the law. This
contention ignores the philosophy underlying the provisions in question.
The wife is granted a remedy against the mismanagement or
maladministration of the husband because by express provision of law, it is
the husband who has the administration of the conjugal partnership.
ART. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
ART. 172. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law.
In the system established by the Code the wife does not administer the
conjugal partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree
of court and under its supervision (Arts. 168, 196) "with such limitations as
they (the courts) may deem advisable" (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196).
Legally, therefore, the wife can not mismanage the conjugal partnership
property or affairs, unless the husband or the courts tolerate it. In the
event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case of
judicial authorization to have the wife manage the partnership, since such
a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial
separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and
resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of
the affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of
possession and control of the conjugal property against his wife (Perkins vs.
Perkins, 57 Phil., 205) and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required
by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any
unauthorized alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for
that purpose. For this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate
exclusively the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal
administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband
because normally only the latter can commit such abuses.
Appellant avers that even if separation of property is not available, the
allegations of his complaint entitle him to accounting and other relief.
Unfortunately, the complaint not only expressly pleads the nature of the
action as one for separation of property, but its allegations clearly proceed
on the theory that the plaintiff is entitled to such separation. Thus, the
averments regarding fictitious or fraudulent transfers are incompatible
with an action between wife and husband alone, for it is elementary that
the legality of sigh transfers can not be passed upon without giving the
transferees an opportunity to be heard. .
Everything considered, we believe that the action of the court a quo in
dismissing the action in view of the impropriety of the principal remedy
sought, but without prejudice to proper proceedings, would better suit the
interests of equity and justice, facilitating the clarification and
simplification of the issues involved.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO
and CONSING), respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with
three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the
herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter,
Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are not parties
of these case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier
action for support, also against him and docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983,
Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and
considerations, this court hereby holds that the plaintiff Prima Partosa
was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang, alias Consing, and,
therefore, is entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and the
defendant is hereby ordered to give a monthly support of P500.00 to
the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or before the 5th day of every
month, and to give to the plaintiff the amount of P40,000.00 for the
construction of the house in Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental where she
may live separately from the defendant being entitled under the law to
separate maintenance being the innocent spouse and to pay the
amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in arrears and
to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of
attorney's fees.
As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for
support but none of the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling
of the trial court in the complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action
and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to
this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review
on certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February
17, 1988, where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose
and Prima and the obligation of the former to support her and her
daughter.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of
conjugal property.
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the
judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code; and b) no such separation was
decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.
The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can
longer be reviewed at this time because it has a long since become final
and executory. As the decretal portion clearly made no disposition of Civil
Case No. 51, that case should be considered impliedly dismissed. The
petitioner should have called the attention of the trial court to the
omission so that the proper rectification could be made on time. Not
having done so, she is now concluded by the said decision, which can no
longer be corrected at this late hour.
We deal first with the second ground.
While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues
that a disposition of the case was nonetheless made in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision reading as follows:
It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are
considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to
separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil
Code, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did
not feel it was necessary for her to appeal, particularly since the order
embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only when the
respondent court observed that there was no dispositive portion regarding
that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it necessary to come
to this Court for relief.
The petitioner has a point.
The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar
as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The petitioner's
counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate steps for the
rectification for the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text of the
decision could have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness
could have avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue.
Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to
prevail over considerations of substantive justive. After all, the technical

defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is
an ambiguity caused by an omission or a mistake in the dispositive portion
of the decision, this Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment
even after the judgment have become final. 2 In doing so, the Court may
resort to the pleading filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision. 3
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property, holding that the petitioner and the private
respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the
petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were
registered in the name of the apparent dummy.
There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the
decision of the trial court was a ruling based upon such findings and so
should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. The respondent
court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing
Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over substance.
In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings,
we hereby make such modification.
And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of
abondonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the
petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where
she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It held
that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under
Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only
remedy availabe to the petitioner was legal separation under Article 175 of
the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property
would be terminated.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement
between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live
with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to
visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And
even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942,
when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her.
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without
judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at
least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or
separation of property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the
Family Code, which states:
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse
may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, of for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the
court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to martial, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when he or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months
or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or
her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the
other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although
able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is
clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already
rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home
in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that
she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning
1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in

1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the

petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal
by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by
Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply
with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart form refusing
to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has
freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children
by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter
that prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for
separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even
denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established
any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as
dutiful husband.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family
Code, providing as follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in
fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case
before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we
held in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals: 7
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate
court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question
according to the law prevailing at the term of such disposition, and not
according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed
judgement. The court will therefore reverse a judgement which was
correct at the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there
has been an intermediate change in the law which renders such
judgement erroneous at the time the case was finally disposed of on
appeal.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on
the finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private
respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should
now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that
they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and
half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must
include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as
may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital
flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an
accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his
promise to their of his eternal love and care.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor
the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the
petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between
them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial
court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said
conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally
registered in the name of the persons.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19565

January 30, 1968

ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Estacion and Paltriguera for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel O. Soriano and Pio G. Villoso for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, alleging in essence that her
husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her
but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and
praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during
the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees,
and costs.
The court a quo forthwith issued an order allowing the plaintiff the amount
prayed for as alimony pendente lite, which however, upon defendant's
motion, was reduced to P2,000.
On June 1, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment ordering separation and
division of the conjugal assets, and directing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as attorney's fees, with legal interest from the
date of the original complaint, that is, from July 22, 1958, until fully paid,
plus costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to us, "it appearing that the total value of
the conjugal assets is over P500,000".

The basic facts are not controverted. The plaintiff and the defendant were
married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. Six children were born to
them, namely, Zenia (1939), Ronnie (1942), Victoria (1944), Jessie 1945),
Bella (1946), and Felipe (1948). During their coverture they acquired seven
parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, all assessed at P45,429, and three
parcels of the Silay Cadastre, all assessed at P43,580. All these parcels are
registered in their names. The hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a
net profit of P3,390.49.
They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets valued
as of December 31, 1956 at P496,006.92, from which they obtained for
that year a net profit of P75,655.78. The net gain of the Philippine
Texboard Factory, the principal business of the spouses, was P90,454.48 for
the year 1957. As of December 31, 1959, the total assets of the various
enterprises of the conjugal partnership were valued at P1,021,407.68, not
including those of the Top Service Inc., of which firm the defendant has
been the president since its organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up
capital of P50,000, P10,000 of which was contributed by him. This
corporation was the Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, the Golden
Acres Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Pias, Rizal, and a
lot and building located at M. H. del Pilar, Manila purchased for P285,000,
an amount borrowed from the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company.
The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to secure which
they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory, the Silay hacienda, their
conjugal house, and all their parcels of land located in Bacolod City.
The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine errors the
defendant imputes to the court a quo, namely,
1. In finding that the only visit, from May 15, 1955 to the rendition of
the decision, made by the defendant to the conjugal abode to see his
wife was on June 15, 1955;
2. In finding that the letter exh. 3 was written by one Nenita Hernandez
and that she and the defendant are living as husband and wife;
3. In finding that since 1951 the relations between the plaintiff and the
defendant were far from cordial, and that it was from 1948 that the
former has been receiving an allowance from the latter;
4. In finding that the defendant has abandoned the plaintiff;
5. In finding that the defendant since 1956 has not discussed with his
wife the business activities of the partnership, and that this silence
constituted "abuse of administration of the conjugal partnerships";
6. In declaring that the defendant mortgaged the conjugal assets
without the knowledge of the plaintiff and thru false pretences to
which the latter was prey;
7. In allowing the plaintiff, on the one hand, to testify on facts not
actually known by her, and, on the other hand, in not allowing the
defendant to establish his special defenses;
8. In ordering separation of the conjugal partnership properties; and
9. In sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff attorney's fees in
the amount of P20,000, with interest at the legal rate.1wph1.t
Two issues of law as well emerge, requiring resolution petition: (1) Did the
separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in
law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
(2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the
state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the
matrimonial assets?
The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendant started
living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City,
sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan,
instead of in the conjugal home at 2nd Street, Bacolod City. Since 1955 the
defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although in the said year
he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations. After
1955 up to the time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the
conjugal abode, and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied
communication with him. He has abandoned her and their children, to live
in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. In 1949 she began to
suspect the existence of illicit relations between her husband and Nenita.
This suspicion was confirmed in 1951 when she found an unsigned note in
a pocket of one of her husband's polo shirt which was written by Nenita
and in which she asked "Bering" to meet her near the church. She
confronted her husband who forthwith tore the note even as he admitted
his amorous liaison with Nenita. He then allayed her fears by vowing to
forsake his mistress. Subsequently, in November 1951, she found in the
iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, also written by Nenita. In this
letter the sender (who signed as "D") apologized for her conduct, and
expressed the hope that the addressee ("Darling") could join her in Baguio
as she was alone in the Patria Inn and lonely in "a place for
honeymooners". Immediately after her husband departed for Manila the
following morning, the plaintiff enplaned for Baguio, where she learned
that Nenita had actually stayed at the Patria Inn, but had already left for
Manila before her arrival. Later she met her husband in the house of a
relative in Manila from whence they proceeded to the Avenue Hotel where
she again confronted him about Nenita. He denied having further relations
with this woman.

Celia Baez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was employed as a
cook in the home of the spouses from May 15, 1955 to August 15, 1958,
and that during the entire period of her employment she saw the
defendant in the place only once. This declaration is contradicted,
however, by the plaintiff herself who testified that in 1955 the defendant
"used to have a short visit there," which statement implies more than one
visit.
The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and
children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the action,
he started to live separately from his wife. When he transferred his living
quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his intention was not, as
it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her a
lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He
decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could
not concentrate on his work as she always quarreled with him, while in
Mandalagan he could pass the nights in peace. Since 1953 he stayed in
Manila for some duration of time to manage their expanding business and
look for market outlets for their texboard products. Even the plaintiff
admitted in both her original and amended complaints that "sometime in
1953, because of the expanding business of the herein parties, the
defendant established an office in the City of Manila, wherein some of the
goods, effects and merchandise manufactured or produced in the business
enterprises of the parties were sold or disposed of". From the time he
started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint,
the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his laundry. This
latter declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife
and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to
give them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission in her
original and amended complaints as well as in open court that during the
entire period of their estrangement, he was giving her around P500 a
month for support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw
allowances from his office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a
month. He financed the education of their children, two of whom were
studying in Manila at the time of the trial and were not living with the
plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family,
particularly the children. His wife was always in bad need of money
because she played mahjong, an accusation which she did not traverse,
explaining that she played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the
infidelities of her husband.
Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard Factory,
corroborated the testimony of the defendant on the matter of the support
the latter gave to his family, by declaring in court that since the start of his
employment in 1950 as assistant general manager, the plaintiff has been
drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly, which amount was
given personally by the defendant or, in his absence, by the witness
himself.
The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila. He
came to know Nenita Hernandez when she was barely 12 years old, but
had lost track of her thereafter. His constant presence in Manila was
required by the pressing demands of an expanding business. He denied
having destroyed the alleged note which the plaintiff claimed to have come
from Nenita, nor having seen, previous to the trial, the letter exh. C. The
allegation of his wife that he had a concubine is based on mere suspicion.
He had always been faithful to his wife, and not for a single instance had he
been caught or surprised by her with another woman.
On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, the plaintiff declared that the
defendant refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their various
business concerns. Although she did not allege, much less prove, that her
husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred nevertheless
that her husband might squander and dispose of the conjugal assets in
favor of his concubine. Hence, the urgency of separation of property.
The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is that he has
applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his time, to the
management, maintenance and expansion of their business concerns, even
as his wife threw money away at the mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his
endeavors is that from a single cargo truck which he himself drove at the
time of their marriage, he had built up one business after another, the
Speedway Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press,
the Philippine Texboard Factory, and miscellaneous other business
enterprises worth over a million pesos; that all that the spouses now own
have been acquired through his diligence, intelligence and industry; that he
has steadily expanded the income and assets of said business enterprises
from year to year, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, as proved
by his balance sheet and profit and loss statements for the year 1958 and
1959 (exhibits 1 and 2); and that out of the income of their enterprises he
had purchased additional equipment and machineries and has partially
paid their indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The
evidence presented by her to prove concubinage on the part of the
defendant, while pertinent and material in the determination of the merits
of a petition for legal separation, must in this case be regarded merely as
an attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had abandoned her,

which abandonment, if it constitutes abandonment in law, would justify

separation of the conjugal assets under the applicable provisions of article
178 of the new Civil Code which read: "The separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal
partnership, except that . . . if the husband has abandoned the wife
without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a
receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property,
or separation of property". In addition to abandonment as a ground, the
plaintiff also invokes article 167 of the new Civil Code in support of her
prayer for division of the matrimonial assets. This article provides that "In
case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband, the courts, on the petition of the wife, may
provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of
property". It behooves us, therefore, to inquire, in the case at bar, whether
there has been abandonment, in the legal sense, by the defendant of the
plaintiff, and/or whether the defendant has abused his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property, so as to justify the
plaintiff's plea for separation of property.
We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our considered
view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of
such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as
to warrant division of the conjugal assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she
has been abandoned by the husband for at least one year are the same as
those granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of
administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies,
under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere
separation. 1 The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement
but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Although an all-embracing definition of the term "abandonment " is yet to
be spelled out in explicit words, we nevertheless can determine its
meaning from the context of the Law as well as from its ordinary usage.
The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be established in relation
to the alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been
abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership, administration by her, or
separation of property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal
assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's
continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a
ready and steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is
not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite
his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his
wife.
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to
forsake or renounce utterly. 2 The dictionaries trace this word to the root
idea of "putting under a bar". The emphasis is on the finality and the
publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never
again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. 3 When referring to
desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined as "the act of
a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake her
entirely, never to return to her, and never to resume his marital duties
towards her, or to claim his marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the
wife destitute of the common necessaries of life, or would leave her
destitute but for the charity of others." 4 The word "abandonment", when
referring to the act of one consort of leaving the other, is "the act of the
husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort wilfully, and with an
intention of causing per perpetual separation." 5 Giving to the word
"abandoned", as used in article 178, the meaning drawn from the
definitions above reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation.
Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not
intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record conclusively
shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence
from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the complainant, although
she minimized the amount of support given, saying that it was only P500
monthly. There is good reason to believe, however, that she and the
children received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his
wife and children continued to draw from his office more than P500
monthly was substantially corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose
declarations were not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no
showing that the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the
contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently
played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and
children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal
abode and resume his marital duties and rights. In People v. Schelske, 6 it
was held that where a husband, after leaving his wife, continued to make
small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child,
he was not guilty of their "abandonment", which is an act of separation
with intent that it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their support
negatived such intent. In re Hoss' Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father
did not abandon his family where the evidence disclosed that he almost

always did give his wife part of his earnings during the period of their
separation and that he gradually paid some old rental and grocery bills.
With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a concubine,
we believe, contrary to the findings of the court a quo, that the evidence
on record fails to preponderate in favor of the plaintiff's thesis. The proof
that Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the defendant and that they
were living as husband and wife in Manila, is altogether too indefinite.
Aside from the uncorroborated statement of the plaintiff that she knew
that Nenita Hernandez was her husband's concubine, without
demonstrating by credible evidence the existence of illicit relations
between Nenita and the defendant, the only evidence on record offered to
link the defendant to his alleged mistress is exh. C. The plaintiff however
failed to connect authorship of the said letter with Nenita, on the face
whereof the sender merely signed as "D" and the addressee was one
unidentified "Darling". The plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination,
hereunder quoted, underscores such failure:
Q. You personally never received any letter from Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you received on any time until today from 1949 from
Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you written to her any letter yourself until now?
A. Why should I write a letter to her.
Q. In that case, Mrs. De la Cruz, you are not familiar with the
handwriting of Nenita. Is that right?
A. I can say that Nenita writes very well.
Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very well or not but, my
question is this: In view of the fact that you have never received a
letter from Nenita, you have ot sent any letter to her, you are not
familiar with her handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?
A. Yes.
Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the conjugal
partnership property, the record presents a different picture. There is
absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal
assets. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal,
the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over
a million pesos.
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the
husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of
the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of administration.
For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or
acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts
injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient
or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of
the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate
acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. 7
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing
more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the
husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal,
industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously
gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not
disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of property. This
decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his wife;
however, the remedies granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not
to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to
protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want.
Therefore, a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of
the husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a
cause of action.1wph1.t
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in
ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic policy of the
law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of
the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation
as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual
affection and help expected of the spouses, the Civil Code (both
old and new) requires that separation of property shall not
prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements
before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree
during the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil
Code, Article 1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it may
only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Article 191
of the new Civil Code. 8
Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets where
there has been no real abandonment, the separation not being wanton and
absolute, may altogether slam shut the door for possible reconciliation.
The estranged spouses may drift irreversibly further apart; the already
broken family solidarity may be irretrievably shattered; and any flickering
hope for a new life together may be completely and finally extinguished.
The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed to the wife in
1958, long before the devaluation of the Philippine peso in 1962, should be
increased to P3,000.

On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because the defendant,
by leaving the conjugal abode, has given cause for the plaintiff to seek
redress in the courts, and ask for adequate support, an award of attorney's
fees to the plaintiff must be made. Ample authority for such award is found
in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article 2208 of the new Civil Code which
empower courts to grant counsel's fees "in actions for legal support" and in
cases "where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . .
should be recovered." However, an award of P10,000, in our opinion, is,
under the environmental circumstances, sufficient.
This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the plaintiff and the
defendant that the law enjoins husband and wife to live together, and,
secondly, exhort them to avail of mutually, earnestly and steadfastly
all opportunities for reconciliation to the end that their marital differences
may be happily resolved, and conjugal harmony may return and, on the
basis of mutual respect and understanding, endure.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees separation of the
conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our
observations, however, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in
the concept of support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall
have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the
meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the court a quo as
circumstances warrant. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is
reduced to P10,000, without interest. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-20379

June 22, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL

PARTNERSHIP OF JOSE BERMAS, SR. and PILAR MANUEL BERMAS and
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY, JOSE BERMAS, SR. and PILAR MANUEL
BERMAS, petitioners-appellants.
Virginia. M. Ramos for petitioners-appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:

doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between the different

(conjugal) partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the
property belonging to the respective spouses," as provided in Article 189 of
the aforementioned Code (Article 1431 of the Spanish Civil Code). Hence it
is essential that said children by previous marriage be personally notified of
the instant proceedings, and that, for this purpose, their names and
addresses, as well as the addresses of the children of herein petitioners, be
furnished by them.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Zamboanga City denying the petition of appellants Jose Bermas, Sr. and
Pilar Manuel Bermas for the voluntary dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and the establishment between them of the regime of
separation of property as set forth in the deed, Exhibit Q.

WHEREFORE, the decision from is hereby set aside, and the case remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings in conformity with this decision.
It is so ordered.

The same is entitled "Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership

and Separation of Property." It was executed by the petitioners on May 31,
1962. It states that they are and have been legally married since December
24, 1932; that they have two children, namely, Manuel T. and Ruben J.
Bermas, both of age and married; that, during their marriage, petitioners
have acquired twelve (12) parcels of land and two (2) buildings, described
in Exhibit Q; that believing that it will redound to their mutual advantage,
benefit and gain, and preserve peace and harmony in the family, as well as
prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in
the future, particularly because petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. has two (2) sets
of children, one by a former marriage, and another by his present wife, the
other petitioner, said petitioners have mutually agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership, and to the establishment of a separation of
properties in the manner specified in the contract. Thereupon, the same
proceeds to enumerate the properties that shall belong exclusively to Pilar
Manuel Bermas and those that shall belong in fee simple to Jose Bermas.
Sr. The contract, likewise, contains a stipulation concerning the income
derived from rentals, as well as a quitclaim by each party in favor of the
other, and provides that, thereafter, any property acquired by any or both
of the patties shall pertain to him or her exclusively, or to both as coowners, as the case may be.

G.R. No. L-23482

Soon after the execution of this contract, or on June 11, 1962, the
petitioners filed with said court the aforementioned petition, alleging
therein that they are married as above stated; that they have the two (2)
children abovementioned; that petitioners have executed the
aforementioned agreement; that a voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is allowed, under Article 191 of the Civil
Code, subject to judicial approval; that petitioners and their conjugal
partnership have no outstanding debts or obligations; and that the
dissolution of said conjugal partnership and the separation of property
agreed upon between the petitioners would not prejudice any creditor or
third person. Premised upon these allegations, petitioners prayed for the
dissolution of said conjugal partnership and the approval of said agreement
for separation of properties between them.

These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259) involving the same
parties pose a common fundamental issue the resolution of which will
necessarily and inescapably resolve all the other issues. Thus their joinder
in this decision.

Upon the filing of the petition, the court issued an order setting it for
hearing on July 7, 1962, and caused a notice to that effect to be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga City, once a week, for
three (3) consecutive weeks. After said hearing, the court rendered the
appealed decision, denying the petition upon the ground that, under
Article 192 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a conjugal partnership shall
only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered, and this cannot
take place, pursuant to Article 191 of the same Code, except upon civil
interdiction declaration of absence or abandonment. Hence, this appeal by
the petitioners who maintain that, with judicial approval, a conjugal
partnership may also be dissolved, upon agreement of the spouses. Indeed,
the fourth paragraph of said Article 191 reads:
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife as well as of the conjugal
partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take
such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
It should be noted this connection, that, although petitioner Jose Bermas,
Sr. admittedly has children by a previous marriage, their names have not
been given in either Exhibit Q or the petition for the approval thereof,
despite the fact that his children with his co-petitioner have been named in
both. Consequently, said children by first marriage of petitioner Jose
Bermas, Sr. do not appear to have been notified personally of the filing of
the petition and of the date of the hearing thereof. In fact, no similar notice
appears to have been given to the children of the petitioners herein,
although the danger of substantial injury to rights would seem to be
remote.
The situation as regards the children by first marriage is, however,
materially different. Indeed, the contract, Exhibit Q, purports to dissolve
and, hence, liquidate the conjugal partnership between the petitioners.
But, this liquidation should not and cannot be effected without a
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his
first wife, in which the children by first marriage certainly have an interest
(Onas v. Javillo, 59 Phil. 733, 737). At any rate, said Exhibit Q could
adversely affect the rights of said children by first marriage, for, "in case of

August 30, 1968

ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner,

vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-23767

August 30, 1968

CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-24259

August 30, 1968

ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent-appellant Carmen
San Jose-Lacson.
Norberto Quisumbing for petitioner-appellee Alfonso Lacson.
CASTRO, J.:

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner spouse) and
Carmen San Jose-Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the respondent spouse)
were married on February 14, 1953. To them were born four children, all
alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa
Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She
filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as
the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and
herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys,
succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the
children, support, and separation of property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a
joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (hereinafter referred to as
the CFI).
The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying their
amicable settlement, read as follows:
3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when petitioner
Carmen San Jose-Lacson left their conjugal home at the Santa Clara
Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to reside in
Manila.
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as required by Article
191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines the particular terms and
conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows:
(a) There will be separation of property petitioner Carmen San
Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and all claims for a share in property
that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since they have
acquired no property of any consequence.
(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer
and enjoy such separate estate as they may acquire without the
consent of the other and all earnings from any profession, business or
industry as may be derived by each petitioner shall belong to that
petitioner exclusively.
(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria
Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody
of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded
to petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson.
(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San JoseLacson a monthly allowance of P300.00 for the support of the
children in her custody.

(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the

children in the custody of the other at their respective residences
and, during the summer months, the two children in the custody of
each petitioner shall be given to the other except that, for this year's
summer months, all four children shall be delivered to and remain
with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until June 15, 1963 on
which date, she shall return the two elder children Enrique and Maria
Teresa to petitioner Alfonso Lacson this judgment of course being
subject to enforcement by execution writ and contempt.
5. Petitioners have no creditors.
WHEREFORE, they respectfully pray that notice of this petition be given
to creditors and third parties pursuant to Article 191 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and thereafter that the Court enter its judicial approval
of the foregoing agreement for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and for separation of property, except that the Court shall
immediately approve the terms set out in paragraph 4 above and
embody the same in a judgment immediately binding on the parties
hereto to the end that any non-compliance or violation of its terms by
one party shall entitle the other to enforcement by execution writ and
contempt even though the proceedings as to creditors have not been
terminated.".
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law," the CFI
(Judge Jose F. Fernandez, presiding) issued an order on April 27, 1963,
rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to as the compromise judgment)
approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. In
compliance with paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of
the compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse delivered all the four
children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for their support.
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein
she alleged that she "entered into and signed the ... Joint Petition as the
only means by which she could have immediate custody of the ... minor
children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she
"be considered relieved of the ... agreement pertaining to the custody and
visitation of her minor children ... and that since all the children are now in
her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite." On
May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and moved to
dismiss the complaint based, among other things, on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC on May 28, 1963, issued an order which
sustained the petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment and lis
pendens, and dismissed the case. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32608-R) wherein she raised, among others, the
issue of validity or legality of the compromise agreement in connection
only with the custody of their minor children. On October 14, 1964 the
Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L23767), since "no hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below
no evidence, testimonial or documentary, presented only a question of
law pends resolution in the appeal." .
The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion dated May 15, 1963 for
reconsideration of the compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963
rendered in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, wherein she also alleged,
among others, that she entered into the joint petition as the only means by
which she could have immediate custody of her minor children, and
thereafter prayed the CFI to reconsider its judgment pertaining to the
custody and visitation of her minor children and to relieve her from the
said agreement. The petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and, on
June 1, 1963, filed a motion for execution of the compromise judgment and
a charge for contempt. The CFI (Judge Jose R. Querubin, presiding), in its
order dated June 22, 1963, denied the respondent spouse's motion for
reconsideration, granted the petitioner spouse's motion for execution, and
ordered that upon "failure on the part of Carmen San Jose-Lacson to
deliver the said children [i.e., to return the two older children Enrique and
Maria Teresa in accordance with her agreement with Alfonso Lacson] to
the special sheriff on or before June 29, 1963, she may be held for
contempt pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 sections 9 and 10, and Rule
64 section 7 of the (old) Rules of Court." From the aforesaid compromise
judgment dated April 27, 1963 and execution order dated June 22, 1963,
the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CAG.R. No. 32798-R) wherein she likewise questioned the validity or legality
of her agreement with the petitioner spouse respecting custody of their
children. On February 11, 1965 the Court of Appeals also certified the said
appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24259), since "no evidence of any
kind was introduced before the trial court and ... appellant did not
specifically ask to be allowed to present evidence on her behalf." .
The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32384R), now the subject of an appeal by
certiorari to this Court (G.R. No. L-23482). In her petition for certiorari
dated June 27, 1963, she averred that the CFI (thru Judge Querubin)
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the immediate execution of the compromise judgment in its order
of June 22, 1963, thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. She
prayed for (1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
respondents therein and any person acting under them from enforcing, by
contempt proceedings and other means, the writ of execution issued
pursuant to the order of the respondent Judge Querubin dated June 22,
1963 in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, (2) the setting aside, after

hearing, of the compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 and the order
dated June 22, 1963, and (3) the awarding of the custody of Enrique and
Maria Teresa to her, their mother. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals
issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement
of the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of the compromise
judgment rendered in special proceeding 6978. The petitioner spouse filed
an urgent motion dated July 5, 1963 for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction ex parte which urgent motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 9, 1963. The petitioner spouse
likewise filed his answer. After hearing, the Court of Appeals on May 11,
1964 promulgated in said certiorari case (CA-G.R. No. 32384-R) its decision
granting the petition for certiorari and declaring null and void both (a) the
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 in so far as it relates to the
custody and right of visitation over the two children, Enrique and Teresa,
and (b) the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of said judgment. The
petitioner spouse moved to reconsider, but his motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 31, 1964.
From the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31,
1964, the petitioner spouse interposed an appeal to this Court, as
abovestated, and assigned the following errors:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru certiorari the lower
court's order of execution of the compromise judgment.
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the certiorari case the issue
of the legality of the compromise judgment which is involved in two
appeals, instead of the issue of grave abuse of discretion in ordering its
execution.
(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the compromise agreement
upon which the judgment is based violates article 363 of the Civil
Code. 1wph1.t
As heretofore adverted, the aforecited three appeals converge on one focal
issue: whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and
the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable
to law.
We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI
grounded on the said agreement are valid with respect to the separation of
property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand.
Thus the new Civil Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190, emphasis
supplied)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All
the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such
creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other
third persons. (Art. 191, par. 4, emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their
separation of property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It
does not appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said
arrangements.
It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at
least five years - the wife's residence being in Manila, and the husband's in
the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy
separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their
financial and proprietary interests is manifest.
Besides, this Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together, as
[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights
to, the other. .. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouse to live under the same roof; and
the experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de
Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).
However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this Court does
not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of
the spouses, which again in the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo,
supra is a "state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all
concerned." We would like to douse the momentary seething emotions of
couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility brought
about by "mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion" without more would be minded to separate from each
other. In this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support (art. 109, new Civil Code). There is, therefore, virtue in making it as

difficult as possible for married couples impelled by no better cause than

their whims and caprices to abandon each other's company.
'... For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve
the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great
severity upon individuals, yet it must be carefully remembered that the
general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility.
When people understand that they must live together, except for a
very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off;
they become good husbands and good wives from the necessity of
remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in
teaching the duties which it imposes ..." (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con.,
35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.) (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, Id., pp.
58-59).

mere insinuations; they must be confronted with facts before they can
properly adjudicate.
It might be argued and correctly that since five years have elapsed
since the filing of these cases in 1963, the ages of the four children should
now be as follows: Enrique 11, Maria Teresa 10, Gerrard 9, and
Ramon 5. Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the custody of
Enrique and Maria Teresa to the petitioner spouse has become moot and
academic. The passage of time has removed the prop which supports the
respondent spouse's position.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's agreement
regarding the custody of the children. 1wph1.t
Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
Every child:

We now come to the question of the custody and support of the children.

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first acquired jurisdiction over
the matter of custody and support of the children. The complaint docketed
as civil case E-00030 in the JDRC was filed by the respondent spouse on
March 12, 1963, whereas the joint petition of the parties docketed as
special proceeding 6978 in the CFI was filed on April 27, 1963. However,
when the respondent spouse signed the joint petition on the same matter
of custody and support of the children and filed the same with the CFI of
Negros Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC. The
petitioner spouse who could have raised the issue of lis pendens in
abatement of the case filed in the CFI, but did not do so - had the right,
therefore, to cite the decision of the CFI and to ask for the dismissal of the
action filed by the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens. And the JDRC acted correctly and justifiably in
dismissing the case for custody and support of the children based on those
grounds. For it is no defense against the dismissal of the action that the
case before the CFI was filed later than the action before the JDRC,
considering:.

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

... [T]hat the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a

complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide only that
there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. 1
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in
depriving the mother, the respondent spouse, of the custody of the two
older children (both then below the age of 7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article
363 that "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years
of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The
rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission
thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
"compelling reasons" for the good of the child: those cases must
indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the
(relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for
her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the
Code Commission, p. 12).
The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, coupled with the
observations made by the Code Commission in respect to the said legal
provision, underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no
uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven
years, unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as
determined by a court.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of
the two older children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the
father, in effect sought to separate them from their mother. To that extent
therefore, it was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the
Civil Code.
Neither does the said award of custody fall within the exception because
the record is bereft of any compelling reason to support the lower court's
order depriving the wife of her minor children's company. True, the CFI
stated in its order dated June 22, 1963, denying the respondent spouse's
motion for reconsideration of its order dated April 27, 1963, that .
... If the parties have agreed to file a joint petition, it was because they
wanted to avoid the exposure of the bitter truths which serve as
succulent morsel for scandal mongers and idle gossipers and to save
their children from embarrassment and inferiority complex which may
inevitably stain their lives. ..
If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the minor children
to the Court for incorporation in the final judgment, they purposely
suppressed the "compelling reasons for such measure" from appearing in
the public records. This is for the sake and for the welfare of the minor
children.".
But the foregoing statement is at best a mere hint that there were
compelling reasons. The lower court's order is eloquently silent on what
these compelling reasons are. Needless to state, courts cannot proceed on

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral
and intellectual development.
It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every child rights
which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less
the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to
the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the
parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine
in whose custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him
by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter,
becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such
evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the
mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not a
sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian
of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is now eleven
years of age and should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live
with. This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
which, states, inter alia:
... When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart
from each other, and the question as to the care, custody, and control
of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the
court, upon hearing testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the
care, custody and control of each such child as will be for its best
interestpermitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live
with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit
to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty... (Emphasis supplied).
One last point regarding the matter of support for the children assuming
that the custody of any or more of the children will be finally awarded to
the mother. Although the spouses have agreed upon the monthly support
of P150 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each child, still this Court
must speak out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. We, take
judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady
skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and services, not to
mention the fact that all the children are already of school age. We believe,
therefore, that the CFI may increase this amount of P150 according to the
needs of each child.
With the view that we take of this case, we find it unnecessary to pass
upon the other errors assigned in the three appeals.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated
July 31, 1964 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject matter of
G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of G.R. L-23767) are
affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in accordance with this
decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. NO. 155409

June 8, 2007

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,

vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1dated August 30, 2002 promulgated
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which affirmed the
Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January 2, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, and
the RTC Orders dated January 21, 2002 and February 7, 2002 (ORDERS) in
Civil Case No. 656.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had
a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son.

However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latters paramour. Consequently, both
the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime
charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum
penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days,
medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case
No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the following terms, to wit:
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains, the parties
agree to the following:
a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of
the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their
common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the
parties.
The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at P1,318,043.36, shall
be withdrawn and divided equally by the parties;
b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to
her while the bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be
paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full
settlement thereof.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the
owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a building thereon;
c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki
shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the
defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant
the sum of P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation of
other conjugal properties that have not been mentioned;
xxxx
The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailedJudgment On Compromise Agreement,
which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.2
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002,
praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the
Compromise Agreement.
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002,
denied the aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order, but the same was denied in the assailed Order dated February 7,
2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed grave
error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1)
in upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement dated January 11,
2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated February 7, 2002 that the
Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off period; (3) when
it denied petitioners Motion to Repudiate Compromise Agreement and to
Reconsider Its Judgment on Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it
conducted the proceedings without the appearance and participation of
the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor.4
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA
held that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does
not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property,
especially considering that she had only been sentenced with the penalty
of prision correccional, a penalty that does not carry the accessory penalty
of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and
63 of the Family Code, which pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage
and the effects of legal separation, respectively, do not apply, considering,
too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by
the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be
decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the
Family Code; that, although adultery is a ground for legal separation,
nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no
petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent;
that the spouses voluntarily separated their property through their
Compromise Agreement with court approval under Article 134 of the
Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which embodies the

voluntary separation of property, is valid and binding in all respects

because it had been voluntarily entered into by the parties; that,
furthermore, even if it were true that the petitioner was not duly informed
by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the Compromise
Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the
lawyer binds his client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to gross
negligence or deprivation of due process on the part of his client; that
these exceptions are not present in the instant case; that the Compromise
Agreement was plainly worded and written in simple language, which a
person of ordinary intelligence can discern the consequences thereof,
hence, petitioners claim that his consent was vitiated is highly incredible;
that the Compromise Agreement was made during the existence of the
marriage of the parties since it was submitted during the pendency of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; that the application of Article
2035 of the Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling-off period under
Article 58 of the Family Code has no bearing on the validity of the
Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise Agreement is not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy; that this
agreement may not be later disowned simply because of a change of mind;
that the presence of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not indispensable
to the execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the
purpose of his presence is to curtail any collusion between the parties and
to see to it that evidence is not fabricated, and, with this in mind, nothing
in the Compromise Agreement touches on the very merits of the case of
declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible
collusion; and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an
agreement between the parties to separate their conjugal properties
partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR
ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE
CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND
LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL
SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER
CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM
SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF
ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL
INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have
been given judicial imprimatur since it is against law and public policy; that
the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no
appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the respondent, having
been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the
conjugal property.
The Petition must fail.
The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of
property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void
because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was
convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal
property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner
argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child
under Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse
convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because
the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code and argues
that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise
Agreement is therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are
inapplicable to the instant case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article9 shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit
of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.

where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance

of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of
legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity
of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.

special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said

imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise
Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of
gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage
or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by
Article 2035.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount

to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in
the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not
impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The
questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity
of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this
voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of
the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest
pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
Second. Petitioners claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were
void in the absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or
solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is
also void. The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement
involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had no
relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. Nor did
the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties.
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x
xxxx
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in action for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails
to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or
the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.10 While the appearances of the
Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of
the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the
Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the findings of the
CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings
of legal separation and annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to
curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion between the parties and to
see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not fabricated. In the
instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General
and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the
subject compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the case of
declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible
collusion between the parties. At the risk of being repetiti[ve], the
compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the
petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties
partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of
declaration of nullity of marriage.11
Third. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be
read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual

Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and
judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise
agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise
Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed
by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement
is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the
petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said
to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court held:
[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is
based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of
his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result
in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation
of one's property through a technicality." x x x x13
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement
is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of
gains.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26462

June 9, 1969

TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in her
capacity as Special Administratrix in the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY ELIGIR,
ERNESTO YAPTINCHAY, ANTONIO YAPTINCHAY, ASUNCION YAPTINCHAY,
JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA Y. MONZON, ISABEL Y. VALERIANO,
REMEDIOS Y. YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y. ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and
JOHN DOE,respondents.
V. E. del Rosario and Associates for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or
not this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers should stake down
as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the respondent judge's order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873
(Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special
Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property hereinafter described, and to
refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with the
latter's possession thereof, such order having been amended by said
respondent judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn enjoining
defendants in said case (private respondents herein) and/or their duly
authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing, or otherwise
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the
termination of said case. We granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for and directed respondents to return the possession of
the North Forbes Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-bond.
The controlling facts are the following:
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as
Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in
the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P. Petitioner there alleged that the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and
publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at
1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel
Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased who died without a will left an
estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines,
Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000;
that to petitioner's knowledge and information, the deceased left three
daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion
Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted
away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the
deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was
averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special

administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the deceased

pending appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent
necessity.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order
appointing herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix of
the state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by
Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y.
Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon
the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the
decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the
latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof;
and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of
years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want
of integrity. At the same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the
appointment of Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special
administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse,
as regular administratrix.
To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July
19, 1965, set aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner Teresita
C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.
On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted
counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special
administratrix upon a P50,000-bond.1awphil.nt
On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary
inventory of the assets of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay.
Included amongst these was "[a] bungalow residential house with
swimming pool, situated at Park corner Talisay Road, North Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this opinion.
It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special
administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay made her
second move. That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in
another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly
formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and
for damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing
on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary
injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an
order of August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants therein
(private respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the
properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's
(herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the
house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the
action, opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary
injunction, mainly upon these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction
over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was
already vested in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch in
the special proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special Proceedings No.
1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation case was filed to oust said probate
court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this, the second
case (Civil Case 8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy
of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected thereby
being doubtful and still in dispute.
Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the
court for a writ of preliminary injunction to direct plaintiff (petitioner here)
and all others in her behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any
manner whatsoever defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst
others of the North Forbes Park house and to order the removal from the
premises of said North Forbes Park house of the guards, agents and
employees installed therein by plaintiff; to enjoin plaintiff and her agents
from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered
in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from
disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of
administration over the assets registered in the name of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death.
Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case
8873, the pertinent portion of which reads: "From the pleadings as well
as the evidence already submitted and representations made to the
court during the arguments, it appears that one of the properties in
dispute is the property located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay
Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death
of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was still under construction and it
also appears that after his death said property was among the
properties of the deceased placed under the administration of the
special administratrix, the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay. Information
has been given that in the evening of August 14, 1965, the plaintiff was
able to dispossess the special administratrix from the premises in
question and that since then she had been in custody of said house.
While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and
counter-application for provisional relief, the Court believes that for the
protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is
really under the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by
virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the

deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect
to the Forbes Park property and the restraining order issued by this
Court is lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist
from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction is requiring the plaintiff,
her representatives and agents or other persons acting in her behalf to
deliver the possession of the property located at the corner of Park Road
and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal to the Special
Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and to refrain from disturbing
interfering in any manner whatsoever defendant's possession thereof.
Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966,
which in part recites:
Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation
of an alleged partnership between the plaintiff and the deceased Isidro
Yaptinchay and considering further that said house in North Forbes Park
is included among the properties in dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its
Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the defendants and/or their duly
authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing or
otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever
pending the termination of this case.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned
by respondent judge's order of August 8, 1966, which recites that:
Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took
actual or physical possession of the said properties which were formerly
held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her
appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied.2
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present
proceedings in this Court.
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes
Park property at the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay, grave abuse of
discretion attended respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ
transferring possession of said property to respondent Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that
injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of
possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose
title thereto has not been clearly established. 3 With this as guidepost,
petitioner would have been correct if she were lawfully in possession of the
house in controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the injunctive writ was
issued) was commenced in the Pasig court, and if respondent special
administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were
without right thereto. But the situation here is not as petitioner pictures it
to be. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of
Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal partnership of said deceased
and his legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were brought under the
jurisdiction of the probate court, properly to be placed under
administration. 5 One such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. 6
With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions.
In the verified petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the
construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by
petitioner and the deceased, petitioner even contributing her own
exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an allegation in
petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for reconsideration or for
clarification/amendment of the herein controverted order of June 15, 1966
in Civil Case 8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay
dated August 3, 1965, she spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and
personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts and capital, among
which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes Park." 9 All of which
contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated October 25, 1965
also verified in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired
through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the
house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10
But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of
complete or even partial ownership of the house. They maintain that the
construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid
with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the
construction thereof. 11
It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the
fact that after the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the Forbes Park house "was
among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of"
respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, that respondent judge issued the
injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained of. Worth repeating at
this point is that respondent judge, in his order of August 8, 1966, declared
that defendants (private respondents herein), "principally Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession", amongst others, of the
North Forbes Park house "by virtue of her appointment and under
her authority, as Special Administratrix."

On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed
for below.
2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction
rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which
appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. 12
A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this
case obtaining will not permit us to tag the disputed order of June 15, 1966
with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of
the allegation that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive
property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she had
contracted during the period when said house was under construction. But
evidence is wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction
work. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented
by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained
from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the construction of
the North Forbes Park home. And this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of
petitioner's memorandum before this Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C.
Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof, which states in its paragraph 4 that she
obtained various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own exclusive
account" and that the proceeds thereof "were also used by affiant both for
her business and for the construction, completion and furnishing of the
said house at North Forbes Park", and which cites her seven promissory
notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices 1 to 7 of said affidavit. Not one
of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the
construction of the North Forbes Park house. On the contrary, there is
Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose
of the loan for "Fishpond development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the
same purpose; Appendix 5 for P50,000, "To augment working capital in
buying & selling of appliances & gift items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000,
"For Agricultural Development". In plain terms, the fact alone of
petitioner's indebtedness to the Republic Bank does not establish that said
house was built with her own funds.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the
North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be
permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been
constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal
partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with
respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be
under the control of the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the
provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says
that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the
existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder
may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such condition is that there must be a
clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to
co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in
controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would
make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For,
the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial
protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or
future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. 16
At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be
better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in
the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then,
her acts would be subject to the control of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein
petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set
aside.

resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its
passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married
to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant,
Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of
husband and wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
(4) In Civil Case No. SP-867 ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and
Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the
sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint until fully
paid and costs of suit;
(5) In Civil Case No. SP-872, ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and
Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay the respective heirs of the
deceased Josefa P. Leus, Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario Aonuevo
and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00 for the life of each of
said deceased, with legal interest from date of complaint, and costs of
suit. (pp. 47-48, Rello).
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the
decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly
and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. The lower court
based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which
reads:
When a man and woman driving together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which, as
previously stated, certified the same to Us, the question raised being
purely legal as may be seen from the lone assigned error as follows:
The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo
liable 'for damages resulting from the death and physical injuries
suffered by the passengers' of the jeepney registered in the name of
Eugenio Jose, on the erroneous theory that Eugenio Jose and Rosalia
Arroyo, having lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit
of marriage, are co- owners of said jeepney. (p. 2, Appellant's Brief).
The issues thus to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether or not Article 144
of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a
common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry, and (2) whether or not
Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly
and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same.
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership
contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. (Camporedondo vs. Aznar, L-11483, February 4, 1958, 102 Phil.
1055, 1068; Osmea vs. Rodriguez, 54 OG 5526; Malajacan vs. Rubi, 42 OG
5576). Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the
aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the
jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages
arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers
of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither
be liable for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our
jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its
operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. (De Peralta
vs. Mangusang, L-18110, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 598; Tamayo vs. Aquino, L12634 and L-12720, May 29, 1959; Roque vs. Malibay Transit, L-8561,
November 18,1955; Montoya vs. Ignacio, L-5868, December 29, 1953).

Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared

free from any liability for damages and the appealed decision is hereby
modified accordingly. No costs.

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979

G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and

appellees,
vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and
ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants and appellants.
Luis Viscocho and Francisco E. Rodrigo, Jr. for appellants.

BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA

LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed
CONSUEGRA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE,
COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO DIAZ,respondentsappellees.

Victoriano O. Javier and Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Bernardino O. Almeda for petitioners-appellants.

This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground
that the questions raised in the appeal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law.

Binag and Arevalo, Jr. for respondent-appellee Government Service

Insurance System.

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger
jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the
Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which

ZALDIVAR, J.:

Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents-appellees.

Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special
Proceeding No. 1720.
The pertinent facts, culled from the stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, are the following:
The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was employed as a shop
foreman of the office of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao del
Norte. In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, the first with
herein respondent Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish church of San
Nicolas de Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937, out of which
marriage were born two children, namely, Jose Consuegra, Jr. and Pedro
Consuegra, but both predeceased their father; and the second, which was
contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with herein
petitioner Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957 in the same parish and
municipality, out of which marriage were born seven children, namely,
Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida and Luz, all surnamed
Consuegra.
Being a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for
short) when Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, the proceeds of his
life insurance under policy No. 601801 were paid by the GSIS to petitioner
Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the
policy. Having been in the service of the government for 22.5028 years,
Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the sum of
P6,304.47 pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 as
amended by Republic Acts 1616 and 3836. Consuegra did not designate
any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due
to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a
claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to
her as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased did
not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance
benefits. Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar
claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life
insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive
the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. Resolving
the conflicting claims, the GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose
Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is
entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the
one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their
seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the remaining onehalf, or 8/16, each of them to receive an equal share of 1/16.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling and apportionment made by the GSIS,
Basilia Berdin and her children1 filed on October 10, 1966 a petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of
Surigao, naming as respondents the GSIS, the Commissioner of Public
Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del Norte, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and Rosario Diaz, praying that they
(petitioners therein) be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries
of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra, and that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the implementation of the
adjudication made by the GSIS. On October 26, 1966, the trial court issued
an order requiring therein respondents to file their respective answers, but
refrained from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On
February 11, 1967, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts, prayed that
the same be admitted and approved and that judgment be rendered on the
basis of the stipulation of facts. On March 7, 1967, the court below
rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
This Court, in conformity with the foregoing stipulation of facts,
likewise is in full accord with the parties with respect to the authority
cited by them in support of said stipulation and which is herein-below
cited for purposes of this judgment, to wit:
"When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in
holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said
wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be
entitled to one half of the estate. Lao & Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739;
Estrella vs. Laong Masa, Inc., (CA) 39 OG 79; Pisalbon vs. Bejec, 74 Phil.
88.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above premises, this Court is of the
opinion that the foregoing stipulation of facts is in order and in
accordance with law and the same is hereby approved. Judgment,
therefore, is hereby rendered declaring the petitioner Basilia Berdin
Vda. de Consuegra and her co-petitioners Juliana, Pacita, Maria
Lourdes, Jose, Jr., Rodrigo, Lenida and Luis, all surnamed Consuegra,
beneficiary and entitled to one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefit in
the amount of Six Thousand Three Hundred Four Pesos and FourtySeven Centavos (P6,304.47) due to the deceased Jose Consuegra from
the Government Service Insurance System or the amount of
P3,152.235 to be divided equally among them in the proportional
amount of 1/16 each. Likewise, the respondent Rosario Diaz Vda. de
Consuegra is hereby declared beneficiary and entitled to the other half
of the retirement benefit of the late Jose Consuegra or the amount of
P3,152.235. The case with respect to the Highway District Engineer of
Surigao del Norte is hereby ordered dismissed.
Hence the present appeal by herein petitioners-appellants, Basilia Berdin
and her children.

It is the contention of appellants that the lower court erred in not holding
that the designated beneficiaries in the life insurance of the late Jose
Consuegra are also the exclusive beneficiaries in the retirement insurance
of said deceased. In other words, it is the submission of appellants that
because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate the beneficiaries
in his retirement insurance, the appellants who were the beneficiaries
named in the life insurance should automatically be considered the
beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits, to the exclusion
of respondent Rosario Diaz. From the arguments adduced by appellants in
their brief We gather that it is their stand that the system of life insurance
and the system of retirement insurance, that are provided for in
Commonwealth Act 186 as amended, are simply complementary to each
other, or that one is a part or an extension of the other, such that whoever
is named the beneficiary in the life insurance is also the beneficiary in the
retirement insurance when no such beneficiary is named in the retirement
insurance.
The contention of appellants is untenable.
It should be noted that the law creating the Government Service Insurance
System is Commonwealth Act 186 which was enacted by the National
Assembly on November 14, 1936. As originally approved, Commonwealth
Act 186 provided for the compulsory membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of all regularly and permanently appointed
officials and employees of the government, considering as automatically
insured on life all such officials and employees, and issuing to them the
corresponding membership policy under the terms and conditions as
provided in the Act.2
Originally, Commonwealth Act 186 provided for life insurance only.
Commonwealth Act 186 was amended by Republic Act 660 which was
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on June 16, 1951, and, among
others, the amendatory Act provided that aside from the system of life
insurance under the Government Service Insurance System there was also
established the system of retirement insurance. Thus, We will note in
Republic Act 660 that there is a chapter on life insurance and another
chapter on retirement insurance. 3 Under the chapter on life insurance are
sections 8, 9 and 10 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended; and under
the chapter on retirement insurance are sections 11, 12, 13 and 13-A. On
May 31, 1957, Republic Act 1616 was enacted by Congress, amending
section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by Republic Act 660, by
adding thereto two new subsections, designated as subsections (b) and (c).
This subsection (c) of section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by
Republic Acts 660, 1616 and 3096, was again amended by Republic Act
3836 which was enacted on June 22, 1963.lwph1.t The pertinent
provisions of subsection (c) of Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
thus amended and reamended, read as follows:
(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who
has rendered at least twenty years of service. The benefit shall, in
addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and
the payment of the corresponding employer's premiums described in
subsection (a) of Section 5 hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity
equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on
the highest rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four
months; Provided, That the retiring officer or employee has been in the
service of the said employer or office for at least four years,
immediately preceding his retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
The gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is
hereby authorized to provide the necessary appropriation to pay the
same from any unexpended items of appropriations.
Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this
subsection shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation
and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may
have to their credit at the time of retirement.
Jose Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, and so at the time of his
death he had acquired rights under the above-quoted provisions of
subsection (c) of Section 12 of Com. Act 186, as finally amended by Rep.
Act 3836 on June 22, 1963. When Consuegra died on September 26, 1965,
he had to his credit 22.5028 years of service in the government, and
pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of subsection (c) of Section 12 of
Com. Act 186, as amended, on the basis of the highest rate of salary
received by him which was P282.83 per month, he was entitled to receive
retirement insurance benefits in the amount of P6,304.47. This is the
retirement benefits that are the subject of dispute between the appellants,
on the one hand, and the appellee Rosario Diaz, on the other, in the
present case. The question posed is: to whom should this retirement
insurance benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid, because he did not, or failed
to, designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance?
If Consuegra had 22.5028 years of service in the government when he died
on September 26, 1965, it follows that he started in the government
service sometime during the early part of 1943, or before 1943. In 1943
Com. Act 186 was not yet amended, and the only benefits then provided
for in said Com. Act 186 were those that proceed from a life insurance.
Upon entering the government service Consuegra became a compulsory
member of the GSIS, being automatically insured on his life, pursuant to
the provisions of Com. Act 186 which was in force at the time. During 1943
the operation of the Government Service Insurance System was suspended

because of the war, and the operation was resumed sometime in 1946.
When Consuegra designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could
not have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the
beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on
retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when Com. Act 186
was amended by Rep. Act 660 on June 16, 1951. Hence, it cannot be said
that because herein appellants were designated beneficiaries in
Consuegra's life insurance they automatically became the beneficiaries also
of his retirement insurance. Rep. Act 660 added to Com. Act 186 provisions
regarding retirement insurance, which are Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Com.
Act 186, as amended. Subsection (b) of Section 11 of Com. Act 186, as
amended by Rep. Act 660, provides as follows:
(b) Survivors benefit. Upon death before he becomes eligible for
retirement, his beneficiaries as recorded in the application for
retirement annuity filed with the System shall be paid his own
premiums with interest of three per centum per annum, compounded
monthly. If on his death he is eligible for retirement, then the
automatic retirement annuity or the annuity chosen by him previously
shall be paid accordingly.
The above-quoted provisions of subsection (b) of Section 11 of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, clearly indicate that
there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement
insurance benefits when he becomes a member of the GSIS, and he should
state in his application the beneficiary of his retirement insurance. Hence,
the beneficiary named in the life insurance does not automatically become
the beneficiary in the retirement insurance unless the same beneficiary in
the life insurance is so designated in the application for retirement
insurance.
Section 24 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660,
provides for a life insurance fund and for a retirement insurance fund.
There was no such provision in Com. Act 186 before it was amended by
Rep. Act 660. Thus, subsections (a) and (b) of Section 24 of Commonwealth
Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, partly read as follows:
(a) Life insurance fund. This shall consist of all premiums for life
insurance benefit and/or earnings and savings therefrom. It shall meet
death claims as they may arise or such equities as any member may be
entitled to, under the conditions of his policy, and shall maintain the
required reserves to the end of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the life
insurance contracts issued by the System ...
(b) Retirement insurance fund. This shall consist of all contributions
for retirement insurance benefit and of earnings and savings
therefrom. It shall meet annuity payments and establish the required
reserves to the end of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the contracts
issued by the System. ...
Thus, We see that the GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of
benefits to its members one is the life insurance and the other is the
retirement insurance. These two distinct systems of benefits are paid out
from two distinct and separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to
whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case
of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act (Act 2427, as
amended), the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not
necessarily be a heir of the insured. The insured in a life insurance may
designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the
provisions of the Civil Code.4 And in the absence of any beneficiary named
in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the
estate of the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee
to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the
government for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the
age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement
insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the
proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee dies before
retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of
his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate
and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of
a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.
It is Our view, therefore, that the respondent GSIS had correctly acted
when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose
Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario
Diaz, on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children
by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it
confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the
second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in
good faith. The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in
the case of Lao, et al. vs. Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the
stipulation of facts and in the decision appealed from.5 In the recent case
of Gomez vs. Lipana, L-23214, June 30, 1970, 6 this Court, in construing the
rights of two women who were married to the same man a situation
more or less similar to the case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee
Rosario Diaz held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to

share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property
here in dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners-appellants. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984

MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY
assisted by Ofrecinio Santos; and LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE SPOUSES BEATO C.
MACAYRA and ALACOPUE MONDAY, respondents.
Jose B. Guyo for petitioners.
Epifanio Estrellado for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties
acquired in 1912 principally through the efforts of the man she was living
with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.
The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the Court of
Appeals as follows:
The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both
deceased) lived together as husband and wife in Banganga, Davao; that
out of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein
plaintiffs, namely: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and
George, all surnamed Maxey; that during the period of their (Melbourne
and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late
Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of land described under Par. 4 of
the com;plaint as evidenced by the documents of sale marked as
Exhibits 4-a and 5-1 (same as Exhibits Facts), Melbourne Maxey, through
his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the
defendants-spouses in 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which
fact of sale was not controverted by the perties (Par. 1, /stipulation of
Facts); that since thereof, the defendants-spouses have taken
immediate possession thereof continuously up to the present.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the
Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the
documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover
possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses,
alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime
and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the of the
said lands in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death of
their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne
Maxey, without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to
know of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of
the complaint and assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are
the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties 'm question
having purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne
Maxey during his lifetime in 1953, based upon the reasonable belief that
the latter is the me and exclusive owner of the said parcels of land and
that since then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively
and continuously in concept of owners. Defendants - spouses further
counter for damages and attorney's fees and in the alternative, for the
value of the improvements they have introduced in the premises.
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903.
Their children claim that their parents were united in 1903 in a marriage
performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court and the appellate
court rejected this claim of a "military fashion" marriage.
The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed by
Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son,
all the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired.
The father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899 American
occupation forces who afterwards held high positions in the provincial
government and in the Philippine public schools system.
As earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed
properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church
marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church
wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the
respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband
and wife, justice demands that the woman should be entitled to the share
of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or
only for man's comfort and passion." The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
Evidence, testimonial and document considered the Court hereby
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant
declaring that:
1. Declaring the abovementioned sales as null and void;
2. Ordering defendant-spouses to return the said lands, and to pay for
the value of the use of the same at the rate of P1,000.00 a year from
1953 until delivered, together with interests corresponding thereto at
the legal rate;
3. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff actual damages in the
sum of P500.00 and attorney fees in the sum of P3,000.00.
Defendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive
properties of the late Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of the
trial court, decease valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that the appellants
are the absolute owners of the properties in question.
The appellate decision sustained the following arguments of the
respondent spouses:
Plaintiffs' evidence is completely devoid of any showing that these
properties in question were acquired through the joint efforts of
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales. Indeed, if at all, plaintiffs'
evidence tend to establish the fact that Melbourne Maxey by virtue of
his positions as Deputy Governor of Zamboanga (p. 36, t.s.n. de la
Victoria) School Supervisor in the East Coast of Davao (p. 36, t.s.n., Id.)
was more than in a position to purchase these properties by his own
efforts, his own earnings and without the help of Regina Morales. On
the other hand, we have the declaration of Juana A. Morales, a widow of
68 years of age when she testified, the sister-in-law of Regina Morales
Juana A. Morales confirmed the fact that Melbourne Maxey held the
positions of teacher, provincial treasurer, deputy governor, district
supervisor and lastly superintendent of schools, respectively (p. 203,
t.s.n., de la Victoria). But more important is her declaration that her
sister-in-law Regina Morales had no property of her own whence she
could have derived any income nor was Regina gainfully employed. (pp.
203-204, t.s.n., Id.) It must be remembered that the showing must be
CLEAR that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of these
properties. Here the evidence is not only NOT CLEAR, indeed, there is no
evidence at all that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of the
properties in question. In the case of Aznar, et al vs. Garcia, et al,
supra, the Supreme Court had before it the common-law wife's own
testimony claiming that the properties in controversy were the
product of their joint industry. Her assertions however, were completely
brushed aside because aside from her claim that she took a hand in the
management and/or acquisition of the same, "there appears no
evidence to prove her alleged contribution or participation in the,
acquisition of the properties involved therein." (Id. p. 1069). In the case
at bar, besides the absence of any evidence showing that Regina
Morales contributed by her efforts to the acquisition of these properties
in controversy, both plaintiffs and defendants' evidence show that it was
through Melbourne Maxey's efforts alone that these properties were
acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means at all to have
contributed in any manner to all its acquisition.
The petitioners raise the following issues in this petition:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LATE
SPOUSES MELBOURNE MAXEY AND REGINA MORALES WERE MARRIED
ONLY IN 1919, BECAUSE THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY MARRIED AS EARLY
AS 1903.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LIKEWISE, ERRED IN DECLARING THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF THE LATE
MELBOURNE MAXEY, TO THE EXCLUSION OF HIS WIFE REGINA
MORALES, BECAUSE THE MENTIONED PROPERTIES WERE ACTUALLY
ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY OF BOTH OF THEM
AND THEREFORE, THESE PROPERTIES ARE COMMON PROPERTIES.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN UNREASONABLY GIVING
THE TERM "JOINT EFFORTS" NOT ONLY A VERY, VERY LIMITED MEANING
BUT A CONCEPT WHICH IS ENTIRELY ABSURD AND UNREALISTIC
BECAUSE IN CONSTRUING THE TERM, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN INTERPRETATION WHICH IS MOST CONSISTENT
WITH COMMON PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS AS WELL AS IN ACCORD WITH
THE BEST TRADITION OF THE FILIPINO WAY OF LIFE.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the
argument that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized
"military fashion" marriages as legal. Maxey and Morales were legally

married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act

No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months
thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903
and legitimized in 1919 through a marriage performed according to law.
The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no provision
in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would
recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called
"Military fashion" ceremony or arrangement.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were married only in 1919. This is a
finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of the case. There is no
showing that this factual finding is totally devoid of or unsupported by
evidentiary basis or that it is inconsistent with the evidence of record.
The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals'
finding that the parcels of land in question were exclusive properties of the
late Melbourne Maxey.
The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne
Maxey and Regina Morales took place only in February 17, 1919, still the
properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the two because
the acquisition of the said properties was through their joint efforts and
industry. The second and third errors mentioned by the petitioners are
grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation given by the Court of
Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts". The petitioners suggest that their
mother's efforts in performing her role as mother to them and as wife to
their father were more than sufficient contribution to constitute the
parcels of land in question as common properties acquired through the
joint efforts to their parents.
The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the
Civil Code is not applicable to the properties in question citing the case
of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on non-retroactivity of codal
provisions where vested rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And,
assuming that Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable, the Court of
Appeals held that the disputed properties were exclusively those of the
petitioner's father because these were not acquired through the joint
efforts of their parents. This conclusion stems from the interpretation given
by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to mean "monetary
contribution". According to the Court
... This view with which this ponente personally wholeheartedly agrees
for some time now has been advocated by sympathizers of equal rights
for women, notably in the Commission on the Status of Women of the
United Nations. In our very own country there is strong advocacy for the
passage of a presidential decree providing that "the labors of a spouse in
managing the affairs of the household shall be credited
with compensation." Unfortunately, until the happy day when such a
proposal shall have materialized into law, Courts are bound by existing
statutes and jurisprudence, which rigidly interpret the phrase "joint
efforts" as monetary contributions of the man and woman living
together without benefit of marriage, and to date, the drudgery of a
woman's lifetime dedication to the management of the household
goes unremunerated, and has no monetary value. Thus, in the case
of Aznar vs. Garcia (supra) the Supreme Court held that the man and the
woman have an equal interest in the properties acquired during the
union and each would be entitled to participate therein if said
properties were the product of their joint effort. In the same case it was
stated that aside` from the observation of the trial court that the
appellee was an illiterate woman, there appears no evidence to prove
appellee's contribution (in terms of pesos and centavos) or participation
in the acquisition of the properties involved; therefore, following the
aforecited ruling of the Court, appellee's claim for one-half (1/2) of the
properties cannot be granted.
In so concluding, the respondent Court of Appeals accepted the private
respondents' argument that it was unlikely for the petitioners' mother to
have materially contributed in the acquisition of the questioned properties
since she had no property of her own nor was she gainfully engaged in any
business or profession from which she could derive income unlike their
father who held the positions of teacher deputy governor, district
supervisor, and superintendent of schools.
We are constrained to adopt a contrary view. Considerations of justice
dictate the retroactive application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the
case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which provides
that changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by the Code
which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect, the Code Commission
stated:
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The question of how far the new Civil Code should be made applicable
to past acts and events is attended with the utmost difficulty. It is easy
enough to understand the abstract principle that laws
have no retroactive effect because vested or acquired rights should be
respected. But what are vested or acquired rights? The Commission did
not venture to formulate a definition of a vested or acquired right seeing
that the problem is extremely committed.
What constitutes a vested or acquired right well be determined by the
courts as each particular issue is submitted to them, by applying the
transitional provisions set forth, and in case of doubt, by observing Art. 9

governing the silence or obscurity of the law. In this manner, the

Commission is confident that the judiciary with its and high sense of
justice will be able to decide in what cases the old Civil Code would
apply and in what cases the new one should be binding This course has
been preferred by the Commission, which did not presume to be able to
foresee and adequately provide for each and every question that may
arise. (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 165-166).
Similarly, with respect to Article 2253 which provides inter alia that if a
right should be declared for the first tune in the Code, it shall be effective
at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have
been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the
same origin, the Code Commission commented:
... But the second sentence gives a retroactive effect to newly created
rights provided they do not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired
right. The retroactive character of the new right is the result of the
exercise of the sovereign power of legislation, when the lawmaking body
is persuaded that the new right is called for by considerations of justice
and public policy. But such new right most not encroach upon a vested
right. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 167).
The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the
opinion of the Court of Appeals that vested rights were prejudiced. We do
not think so.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the
formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not
legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in
properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during
cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al.
vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94
Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca,
91 Phil. 135.)
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law
established through judicial precedents but with the modification that the
property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man
who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship
belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.
This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and
abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except
for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and
children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a
living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply.
This article is particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law"
relationship was legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the
properties were sold.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and
existing, the normal and customary gender roles of Filipino men and
women. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to
that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running the
household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the
household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally
married at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles. It
is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not
contribute to filling that purse with funds. As pointed out by Dean Irene R.
Cortes of the University of the Philippines, "in the Filipino family, the wife
holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance
in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . And the
famous statement attributed to Governor General Leonard Wood is
repeated: In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Cortes,
"Womens Rights Under the New Constitution". WOMAN AND THE LAW,
U.P. Law Center, p. 10.)
The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned
in Yaptinchay vs. Torres (28 SCRA 489) must include not only the earnings
of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her
contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for
the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources,
freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the
traditional duties of a housewife.
Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is
"Yes" because there is no showing that vested rights would be impaired or
prejudiced through its application.
A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed
and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; an
immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished
from an expectant or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711; Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot be
said of the "exclusive" right of Melbourne Maxey over the properties in
question when the present Civil Code became effective for standing against
it was the concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a share
thereof. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was
already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the
private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned
properties are concerned as this was still open to controversy on account

of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable

law.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and
the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.
Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the
P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should
pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties.
Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand
and return of P650.00 on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside insofar as onehalf of the disputed properties are concerned. The private respondents are
ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina
Morales. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged
error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539.
Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that
should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a
marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on
the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971.
Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22
June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-9212539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of
29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and
Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the
children who are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings
on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50,
51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure
for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio
Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family
home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art.

147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be

governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was
denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52
of the Family Code should be held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties
are psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared
void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse,
the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the
children wish to stay. 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases; 6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit
of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph
of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." 8 Unlike
the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent,
has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly
provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share
in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period
of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or
her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default
thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or

when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife),
only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under
a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52,
in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles
50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article
43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 4014 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is
a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine
that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes
of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and
42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be
made applicablepro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment)
and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on coownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October
1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose
death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two
Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which
affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred
to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pagibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated
as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her
in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in
this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of
death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of

suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the
Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case
in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes
of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate
the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation
of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE. 8

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime
of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous

marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is
a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to

pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to

... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages
and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then
too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household,
or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,

Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the

acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and

maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the
parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned
by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, onehalf of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner
as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of
the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared
void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased.
Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in
a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of
its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. 21

G.R. No. 141501

July 21, 2006

ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA,

TEOFILA RIVERA and CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA* represented by MELCHOR
VILLANUEVA, ANGELINA VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA,
CABANATUAN CITY RURAL BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA
ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 from a decision2 and a resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 touches upon questions
of filiation, presumptions of co-equal acquisition and res judicata.
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the halfsister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and
Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales).
Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed
Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and
half-blood of Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).4 They are
denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor.
They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.5The
remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent
Angelina) and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and
the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva.
From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva
without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one
Amanda Musngi who died on April 20, 1963.6 In the course of their
cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the properties
contested in this case. The disputed properties are:
(a) Lot No. 266-B-1, with an area of 1,787 square meters, more or less,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446 [in the names
of Villanueva and Gonzales], together with the residential house erected
thereon and other improvements;
(b) Lot No. 266-B-3 [included in the coverage of transfer Certificate of
Title No. NT-21446], with an area of 5,353 square meters, more or less,
situated at Poblacion, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(c) [Lot 801-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12201 [in
the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with [an] area of 15.400
hectares, more or less, situated at Llanera, Nueva Ecija;
(d) [Lot 3-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-51899 [in the
names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with an area of 4.0019 hectares,
more or less, situated at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on

the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

(e) [Lot No. 838 covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-17193 [in
the names of Villanueva, Gonzales and one Soledad Alarcon vda. de
Rivera], with an area of 3.8718 hectares, more or less, situated at
Talavera, Nueva Ecija;

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40

of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity
of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract
a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring
the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule
applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are
not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a
case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be
valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary,
that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in
fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court
explained:

(f) [Lot 884-B covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-26670 [in
the name of Gonzales], with an area of 3.5972 hectares, more or less,
situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

(g) Subdivision lots situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by

Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 106813 to 106931, inclusive, although
the land covered by TCT No. NT-106827 was already sold to one
Pastor Barlaan;
(h) Shares of stocks, tractor, jewelries and other chattels, with an
approximate value of at least P100,000; and
(i) Savings deposit with the [Philippine] National Bank, in the amount
of P118,722.61.7
Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will.
On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale,8 that is, an extrajudicial settlement of
Gonzales' estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In
this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his
interests in the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of
Gonzales' estate and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 37. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. SD-857 (SD-857). In dismissing the complaint,
the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva
and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and
therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.9
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners appealed to the CA
which affirmed it. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent
Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter despite the RTC's ruling in
another case, Special Proceedings No. SD-144 (SD-144), entitled In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Pacita C. Gonzales, Epifanio C.
Rivera, petitioner, v. Romualdo Villanueva, oppositor, in which the trial
court appointed Epifanio Rivera as administrator of Gonzales' estate.10
They argue that the trial court's decision in SD-144, to the effect that
respondent Angelina was neither the adopted nor the illegitimate daughter

of Gonzales, should have operated as res judicata on the matter of

respondent Angelina's status.
The first issue here is whether or not the findings regarding respondent
Angelina's filiation in SD-144 are conclusive on SD-857 and therefore res
judicata. The second is the determination of her real status in relation to
Gonzales. Finally, there is the question of whether or not the real
properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally owned by
them.
We resolve the first issue in the negative. Res judicata literally means "a
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment." It sets forth the rule that an existing final judgment
or decree rendered on the merits and without fraud or collusion by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or
suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
the points and matters in issue in the first suit.11
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits and
(4) there, must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.12
A number of factors militate against the existence of res judicata. First, the
parties in the two cases are different. Epifanio C. Rivera, who incidentally is
not a party in this petition, filed SD-144 seeking letters of administration
over his dead sister's estate. Villanueva was his lone opponent. On the
other hand, although both Villanueva and respondent Angelina were
parties in SD-857, Epifanio Rivera was not. Petitioners never alleged that
Epifanio represented their interests, and vice versa.
Furthermore, in SD-144, the trial court never actually acquired jurisdiction
over respondent Angelina's person. She was not even a party there, given
that Villanueva did not represent her interest when he opposed Epifanio
Rivera's petition.
Finally and most significantly, there was no identity of cause of action
between the two suits. By their very nature, they were entirely distinct
from each other. SD-144 was a special proceeding while SD-857 was an
ordinary civil case. The former was concerned with the issuance of letters
of administration in favor of Epifanio Rivera while the latter was for
partition and annulment of titles, and damages.
Clearly, then, there was no res judicata. Nevertheless, this still begged the
question of whether or not it was proven, as the CA held, that respondent
Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent Gonzales. On this
issue, we find merit in the petition.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the
illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
According to the assailed decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses
that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina Villanueva while
municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her
father."13 The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina
was Gonzales' illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that
respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and
Gonzales.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.15 However, one
of the exceptions to this rule is when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts.16 We believe this to be just such an instance.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,17 Marissa Benitez-Badua, in
attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez,
submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax
returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and
her school records. She also testified that she had been reared and
continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged
parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua's
supposed father were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence
indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-Badua
was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any
children even after ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and
gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption,
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the
legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document. (emphasis ours)18
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.19 It is not conclusive evidence
of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested

parties.20 Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in
view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are
bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are
simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent
Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both
claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both
claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together
childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and
this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent
Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted.
Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only
36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause21 at the time
of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente
Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva
for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter,
nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the
extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8,
1980 was invalid.
Finally, we come to the question of whether or not the properties acquired
by Gonzales and Villanueva during their cohabitation were equally owned
by them. According to the trial court in SD-857,22 Gonzales and Villanueva
lived together without the benefit of marriage and therefore their property
relations were governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
However, the contending parties agreed that the relationship of Villanueva
and Gonzales was adulterous, at least until the death of Amanda Musngi,
Villanueva's legal wife, on April 20, 1963. In their appeal brief, petitioners
made the following admission:
From 1927 until her death, Pacita [Gonzales] lived together with
defendant Romualdo Villanueva ("Romualdo") as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. Earlier, or sometime in 1913 or 1914,
Romualdo was married to Amanda Musngi (or "Amanda"). Amanda
died on April 20, 1963.23(emphasis supplied)
Respondent Angelina, in her memorandum in SD-857, actually agreed with
petitioners on the nature of Villanueva's relationship with Gonzales:24
While Romualdo Villanueva claimed that he and Pacita C. Gonzales lived
as husband and wife and that they were married, it turned out that he
was not legally married to the latter, for then, his marriage in the year
1927, was still subsisting with one Amanda Musngi. (emphasis
supplied)
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963
was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not
governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple
living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting
married.25 According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose,26 no coownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay
v. Palang,27 we expounded on this doctrine by declaring that in such a
relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
In Agapay, Miguel Palang and his paramour Erlinda Agapay bought a parcel
of riceland in Pangasinan which they registered in their names. However,
because Agapay failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the riceland, she could not rightfully claim co-ownership
over the same.
Here, the records show only four properties acquired by Villanueva and
Gonzales between 1927 and 1963 which they registered in both their
names.28 Following Agapay, these can only be apportioned according to
the actual contributions of each. Unfortunately, the records are devoid of
any evidence that Gonzales contributed anything to the acquisition of
these properties. Petitioners merely asserted that she acquired these
properties through her own industry29 without a shred of evidence to
support the allegation. On the other hand, it was clearly demonstrated that
Villanueva was the municipal treasurer of Talavera for many years and
therefore the lone breadwinner. In accordance with Agapay, none of these
four parcels of land should accrue to petitioners.
There is only one parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. NT-26670,30 registered solely in Gonzales' name, which was
acquired between 1927 and 1963.31 This fact of registration created a
conclusiveness of title in favor of the person in whose name it was
registered.32 In SD-857, although Villanueva sought to prove that he alone
had purchased the properties and that only he could have done so during
the period of cohabitation (since he was the sole breadwinner), he never
actually challenged the validity of the registration in her name. Thus the

efficacy of the title in Gonzales' name remained unrebutted. As Gonzales'

sole property, this should accrue entirely to her heirs.

deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was

spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.

The only property acquired after Musngi's death in 1963 and registered in
the names of both Villanueva and Gonzales was Lot 3-A covered by TCT No.
NT-51899.33 This was governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Half of it should pertain to Gonzales' heirs and
the other half, to Villanueva.

On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for
failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 189.13

The rest of the properties registered solely in Gonzales' name were also
acquired after the death of Amanda Musngi in 1963. The records show that
the subdivision lots situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija covered by TCTs Nos.
106813 to 106931 were acquired in 1971.34 These properties were
governed by co-ownership under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Again, half
should accrue to Gonzales' heirs and the other half, to Villanueva.
Significantly, the trial court in SD-857 did not establish the exact
relationship between petitioners and Gonzales, a relationship defendants
therein (now respondents) vigorously denied. In view of this, there is a
need to remand the case to the court of origin for the proper
determination and identification of Gonzales' heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 are reversed and set aside,
and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with
sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination
and identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition
of her estate.
SO ORDERED.

On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the May
21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent
was allowed to present evidence ex parte.15 Petitioner filed another motion
for reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision16 was rendered in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C
and D and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the
plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the
latter actually contributed to its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal
properties listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid
personal properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff;
and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.17

G.R. No. 150611

June 10, 2003

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94,
BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.1
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,2 but separated de facto from
her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque,
sometime in July 1987.3 After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit
as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos
father.4 Their cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made
a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers."5 Gina, on the
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer
in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives
turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict
with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end
up their 9-year cohabitation.6
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from
her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also,
from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to
acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household
effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared
the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their
house, be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her
savings account with First Allied Development Bank.7 Her Pass Book shows
that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.8 She further
stated that she had a total of P35,465.009 share in the joint account deposit
which she and the petitioner maintained with the same bank.10 Gina
declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction
materials, appliances and other personal properties.11
In his answer12 to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for
the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager
income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction
of said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she
was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his
fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration
each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in
1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because her
earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her
parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved
a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint account

On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however,

the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of
basis.18 The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which
declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of
the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the
new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants
non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex
parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED
ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE
PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX
PARTE.19
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in
allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether
or not the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of
the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex
parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.20 The
remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration 21 showing
that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact that the
defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which
contains his defenses is already on record.23
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is
not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent
to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own
risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a
lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file
answer,24 the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative
defenses,25 and several other motions.26 If it were true that petitioner did
not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file
a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for
extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or
14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed
a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may
result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should
be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.27
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is
not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is
nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal

proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such

representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of
its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.28
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof,
rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may
be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file
a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the
same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was
required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1,
1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be
given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the
party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.29
Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and
Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the
latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 14830 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances
of the same married man. Under this regime, "only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ..."31 Proof of actual
contribution is required.32
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code.33 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was
no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition
of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.34
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,35 and Tumlos v. Fernandez,36 which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to
a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were
parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also inAdriano v. Court of
Appeals,37 we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled
in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponents defense.38 This applies with more
vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by
the plaintiff warrant such relief.39 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.40
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that
she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However,
nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts41in her name for the purchase of
construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in
the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the
disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First
Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties
contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient
proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the
parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner.
Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of
the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership
over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her
proven contribution in the construction thereof. Anent the personal
properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount
of P55,687.50.

As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the

Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private
respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in
the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal
properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse
the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house
shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029
February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,
1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled
to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph
2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions
for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from
the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not
state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that
he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion
for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed
their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of
Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping
statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family
Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for

reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the
latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile
of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December
1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,

Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case,
it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the
said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect
on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia SempioDiy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we
held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and

reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as
the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006
Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were
childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at
the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States
of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an
answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her
marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there
were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was
set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder
was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the
ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was
able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court
ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations in
the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case
of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and
the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code.
The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she
obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects
under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office

of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and
modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects
under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court

Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does
not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition,
it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the
Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated,
shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and
129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters.

The petition has merit.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for
the enforcement of the judgment.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way

prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties
already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable
marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless
the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations
of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute
the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not
the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall
be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.