Political Law Cases

Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
POLITICAL
LAW
REVIEW
First Semester Cases
Political Law Review
The Philippine Constitution

General Considerations
Table of Contents
3
National Territory and the Archipelagic Doctrine 5

State Immunity
General Principles and State Policies
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 13

Delegation of Powers
15
Legislative Department
17
Membership, Election and Qualifications 17

Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications 30
Discipline of Members
31
Legislative Function
32
Executive Department
36
Election, Immunity, Privileges and Inhibitions

Powers and Functions
Judicial Department
39
53
Constitutional Commissions
Bill of Rights
36
59
62
Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights 62

Due Process
68
Equal Protection Clause
70
Searches and Seizure
73
Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data

Freedom of Expression
85
Freedom of Religion
100
Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement

Right to Information
103
Right of Association
105
Eminent Domain
79
101
106
Rights of Suspects 112

Rights of the Accused
113
Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Data and Kalikasan
116
Self-Incrimination 120
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Double Jeopardy
121
Ex-Post Fact Laws 124

Citizenship 127
Law on Public Officers
The Civil Service
135
135
Accountability of Public Officers

Administrative Law
142
148
Election Law 149

Local Governments
155
National Economy and Patrimony
170
Public International Law 180
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL (MPH) v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION
(MHC), COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OGCC
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, BELLOSILLO, J.
Sec. 10(2), Art. XII of the Constitution, which gives preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement.
Facts:
GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel (MPH), a Filipino corporation and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, the latter giving a higher bid than the former. MPH
argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership
of the business of the hotel which is owned by GSIS, a gocc, the hotel
business of GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock
of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution was violated.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable when the Constitution mandates that in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when the Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural
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heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage.
Moreover, the term qualified Filipinos as used in the Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. Where a
foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And
if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm, the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN v. Comelec, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO & CARMEN
PEDROSA, as founding members of PIRMA
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
Facts:
Jesus Delfin filed with a petition with Comelec to amend the
Constitution so as to lift the term limits of elective officials via People's
Initiative. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and others opposed the petition
on the ground that the constitutional provision on peoples initiative can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been
passed. They also argued that RA No. 6735, which was relied upon by Delfin,
contained no provision regarding amendments to the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 6735 which intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is inadequate to cover that
system.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or
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legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment
by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section
2 of Article XVII. Moreover, RA No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting
in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS v. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, CARPIO, J.
An amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
Facts:
Raul Lambino commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the
Comelec to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Sec
5(b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735, alleging that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its
registered voters.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lambinos initiative petition complies with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The framers intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such
proposal. The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. Two essential elements must be present: (1) The
people must author and sign the entire proposal; and (2) It must be embodied
in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face
of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state such
fact. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories
had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible to prove.
In this case, Lambino merely submitted a copy of a signature sheet
which merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
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Bicameral-Presidential
to
the
Unicameral-Parliamentary
system
of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly,
the signature sheet is not the petition that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
NATIONAL TERRITORY AND THE ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et al. v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.
G.R. o. 187167 August 16, 2011, Carpio, J.
Facts:
RA No. 3046 was passed, demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic state. In 2009, Congress amended the law by
enacting RA No. 9522, prompted by the need to make RA No. 3046 compliant
with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA No. 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No 9522 on several
grounds: first, it reduces Philippine maritime territory and logically, the reach
of the Philippine states sovereign power; second, RA 9522 opens the
countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security; third,
RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen; and fourth, the law fails to reference either the Treaty of Paris or
Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 9522 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights
over maritime zones, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines
laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. UNCLOS III and its
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ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as
petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Petitioners assertion of loss of
about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total
maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles. Far from surrendering the
Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision
to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands under
the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
Moreover, whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under
Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, as affirmed by UNCLOS III. The enactment of
UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental
shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.
STATE IMMUNITY
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE
GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P.
DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN v. HON.
AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012 Bersamin, J.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Facts:
UP entered into an agreement with Stern Builders for the construction
and renovation of a building in UPLB. Stern submitted three progress billings
and UP paid two of them. The third was not paid by UP. Stern Builders filed a
case where the RTC decided in favor of Stern Builders. UP however, failed to
file a timely notice of appeal. The motion for writ of execution of Stern
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Builders was granted. The sheriff served notices of garnishment on UPs
depository banks.
Issue:
Whether or not the funds of UP can be subject to garnishment.
Ruling:
No. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in
character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made
the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the
UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. A
marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
UP was correct in saying that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the
judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including attorneys fees)
was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to
cover the liability.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet et al
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears to prohibit
only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties.
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to Indonesia
when it ran aground the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift, US 7 th Fleet Commander expressed regret for
the incident in a press statement. Three months later, the US Navy-led
salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
the coral reef. The petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials, claiming that the grounding and
salvaging operations caused and continue to cause environmental damage of
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such magnitude as to affect several provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao.
They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident. Only the Philippine respondents filed a comment to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued without its
consent. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while
they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010, Del Castillo, J.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization of people who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans-genders. It filed a petition for registration
with the Comelec as a party-list. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral
grounds as the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
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petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, even citing
passages from the Bible and Koran. In its petition with the Supreme Court,
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. It also claimed that the assailed
Comelec Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom
of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlads application as a party-list should be
granted
Ruling:
Yes. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Rather than relying on religious belief,
the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the Comelec is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
The Court also discussed Ang Ladlads invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (The Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) as a binding principle of international
law. The Court said that it was not prepared to declare that the Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms obligatory on the Philippines, because they are not
reflective of the current state of international law and do not find basis in any
of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any
objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law
to ascertain their true status. Using even the most liberal of lenses,
these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of
which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juris.
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, et al. v. HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, et al.
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, Mendoza, J.
While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
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Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health
Law (RH Law), because, among others, it violates the right to life of the
unborn. Notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception;
Issue:
Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
Ruling:
No. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. The
clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH
Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
However, the section of the RH-IRR allows contraceptives and
recognizes as abortifacient only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. This cannot
be done. Evidently, with the addition of the word primarily, in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: The State shall
protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them. Contrary to the OSGs position, these provisions
are self-executing. At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress
cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion
of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies
by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first
be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non11 | P a g e

abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can
be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are
"safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
NB: We recommend reading the full text of this case as it involves many
issues aside from general principles and state policies.
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely:
JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
RA No. 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State
extends its protection.
Facts:
Jesus (Petitioner) and Rosalie were married and have three children.
Their relationship broke down when Rosalie discovered that her husband was
having an affair. A series of fights left Rosalie physically and emotionally
wounded. Petitioner also beat up their eldest daughter whom he blamed for
squealing on him. Rosalie filed a petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order against petitioner pursuant to RA 9262 (Anti Violence
Against Women and Children Act). Jesus then questioned the constitutionality
of RA 9262 on equal protection grounds, claiming that it discriminates against
men.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. RA 9262 is based on a valid classification and, as such, did not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
Petitioner argued that by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments,
instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence
to the avowed policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-1011-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator.
The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation
in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
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parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in
a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner
is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, Mendoza, J.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties.
Facts:
David Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios were
married. Two years later, Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, alleging that the marriage was one made in jest as they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state, thus null and void.
Fringer did not attend any proceedings. The RTC declared the marriage null
and void as the marriage was to enable Albios to obtain American citizenship
for $2,000. It ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from inception.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Fringer and Albios made in jest
is void.
Ruling:
No. There was real consent between the parties. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only
13 | P a g e

further trivialize this inviolable institution. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed
to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation. No less than
our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., et al.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The Congressional Pork Barrel violates the principles of separation of
powers and checks and balances.
Facts:
The Pork Barrel System is the collective body of rules and practices
that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations
of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its
members. The Pork Barrel System involves two kinds of lump-sum
discretionary funds: (1) The Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively
control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various postenactment measures and/or practices; and (2) The Presidential Pork Barrel
which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization.
Petitioners consider the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF),
as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is,
inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to
wield a collective power. They argued that the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles/constitutional provisions on
separation of powers and checks and balances, among others.
Issue:
Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system violates the
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances.
Ruling:
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Yes. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in
the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. Hence, the
Legislative branch of government should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget.
In this case, legislators have been consistently accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Legislators have also been
accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Clearly, these post-enactment measures are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
It is jurisprudential that from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Thus, the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, are
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional
The pork barrel system also impairs the Presidents item veto-power,
because the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the
entire PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
ROMARICO J. MENDOZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011, Brion, J.
To amplify the scope of a law would be tantamount to judicial
legislation abjured by the principle of separation of powers.
Facts:
Romarico Mendoza was convicted for violating the Social Security Act
of 1997 as he failed to remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees.
He filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that during his appeal, he had
already remitted the contributions; that during the pendency of his case
before the Supreme Court, President Arroyo signed into law RA 9903 which
mandated the withdrawal of all pending case against employers who would
remit their contributions within six months after the laws effectivity; and that
in view of this law, the settlement of his delinquent contributions entitles him
to an acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mendoza should be acquitted.
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Ruling:
No. It is true that Mendozas case was pending before the SC when RA
9903 was passed. However, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007,
beyond the period provided for in the law which is 6 months after its
effectivity. By paying outside of the availment period, he placed himself
outside the benevolent sphere of RA 9903. The Court cannot amplify the
scope of RA 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit Mendoza and
other delinquent employers like him. It would be in essence an amendment of
RA 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle
separation of powers.
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL V. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S.
ABDULLAH, SHARIA CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY
A.M No. SCC-13-18-J July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J.
Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the
offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.
Facts:
Baguan Mamiscal had a heated argument with his wide, Adelaidah
Lomondot. In the heat of anger, Baguan decided to divorce his wife by
repudiating her (talaq). The repudiation was embodied in an agreement
(kapasdan) signed by Baguan and Adelaidah. A few days later however,
Baguan had a change of heart and decided to make peace with his wife but
efforts proved futile. Five months later, Adelaidah filed a Certificate of Divorce
(COD) with the office of Macalinog Abdullah, acting as local civil registrar for
muslim divorces, for registration. Abdullah issued a Certificate of Registration
of Divorce (CRD) to finalize the divorce between Baguan and Adelaidah.
Thereafter, Baguan filed an administrative complaint against Abdullah
alleging that the latter should not have acted upon the COD because
according to Muslim law, only males are allowed to file a COD.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative
sanction against Abdullah
Ruling:
No. CA No. 3753 is the primary law that governs the registry of civil
status of persons. With the promulgation of the Local Government Code, the
power of administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to
the municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units. While
he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a
Circuit Court, Abdullah is being charged pursuant to his function as local civil
registrar of muslim divorces. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not
the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.
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Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court
or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DIDAGEN
P. DILANGANEN
G.R. No. 178628 July 16, 2008, Carpio, J.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a
power only Congress can exercise.
Facts:
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created by RA
9054. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 allows ARMMs legislature, the ARMM
National Assembly, to create provinces. Thus it enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. Comelec and Didagen Dilanganen (Dilanganen) now questions
the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. They alleged that
such law entitles a province to have one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the
ARMM National Assembly the power to create provinces is constitutional
Ruling:
No. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI
and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION V. NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009, Chico-Nazario, J.
Laws are not bound to be applied in slavish obedience to their
language. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where
17 | P a g e

a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers
Facts:
In line with the restructuring of National Power Corporation (NPC), the
NPC board issued resolutions terminating all of its employees. The resolutions
were opposed by NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPCDAMA) by
praying to SC to declare null and void the resolutions. NPCDAMA succeeded
with their request; SC declared the resolutions null and void, issued an
injunction to enjoin the implementation of the resolutions, and declared that
all of the terminated employees be paid separation pay with backwages. NPC
was not able to comply with the order of the SC so NPCDAMA sought to
enforce the order by way of garnishment of assets of NPC including but not
limited to the assets of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM). PSALM opposed the garnishment contending that it is
not bound by the judgment as they are only mandated by law to privatize the
transferred NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets,
and to apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of all existing and
outstanding NPC financial obligations. Nothing in law allows garnishment and
levy of PSALMs assets to satisfy a judgment against NPC. NPCDAMA opposed
PSALMs contention by saying that it can be bound to satisfy judgment
against NPC since it is privy to NPC because PSALM was principally organized
to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation
assets, real estate and other disposable assets, with the objective of
liquidating all NPC financial obligations. Furthermore, PSALM is now the owner
of the financial obligations and liabilities of NPC and shall be considered as
one with NPC and the liability of the NPC shall attach to PSALM.
Issue:
Whether or not PSALM can be bound by a judgment against NPC.
Ruling:
Yes. PSALM is mandated to take ownership of all existing NPC
generation assets, liabilities, real estate and all other disposable assets.
PSALM therefore acquired ownership over said properties of NPC. PSALM
argued that the present judgment obligation of NPC arising from employeremployee relationship was neither an existing financial liability nor a
contractual liability of NPC at the time the law allowing privatization of NPC
took effect. The interpretation of the word existing should be understood in
light of PSALMs purpose and objective. It would be absurd to interpret the
word existing as referring to the assets and liabilities of NPC only existing at
the time when the law mandating the privatization of NPC was enacted. It
would be unfair and unjust if PSALM gets nearly all of NPCs assets but will
not pay for liabilities incurred by NPC during this privatization stage. A law
should not be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice. There are laws
which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Laws are not bound to be applied
in slavish obedience to their language.The court may consider the spirit and
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reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
Therefore, it is but reasonable for PSALM to assume the liabilities of NPC
during the privatization of the NPCs assets.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
MEMBERSHIP, ELECTION AND QUALIFICATIONS
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE
ROBREDO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED, et al.
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010, Perez, J.
While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
Facts:
Pursuant to RA 9716 (An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
and Second Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from Such Reapportionment), the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners (President Aquino and Secretary Jesse Robredo) sought the
nullification of RA 9716, contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population of 250,000 for
the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly, petitioners contend the
reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the first district of Camarines Sur with
less than 250,000 in population. On its part, respondents contend that the
250,000 population requirement applies only to the creation of legislative
districts in a city, and not in provinces.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9716 is Constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
provides: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative. The provision draws
a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
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mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province. The reapportionment or the
recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is less than 250,000.
Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district.
VICTORINA B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G.
MORADA, AND MINERVA ALDABAMORADA VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188078 March 15, 2010, Carpio, J.
The passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the
political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into
their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it
Facts:
RA 9591 was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. As
population indicators to satisfy the constitutional requirement as provided by
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the congress relied on the Certification of
Alberto Miranda, Region III Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos Citys
population in 2010 will reach more than 250,000. The congress also used
2007 Census of Population Progress Enumeration Report and Certification of
the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008, and Certification of
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008. The Comelec insists that these
population indicators are reliable and authoritative and thus cannot be
subject to judicial review.
Issue:
Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to judicial
review
Ruling:
Yes. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the
ambit of SCs judicial review, then there is more reason to hold justiciable
subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their
compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents
are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court
must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population
indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. It is well
settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within
the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into
20 | P a g e

their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To deny
the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to contend that
the Court has no power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government, a duty mandated under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, RENE O. MEDINA V.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011, Nachura, J.
Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a
province.
Facts:
Pursuant to RA 9355, a law creating the province of Dinagat Islands,
the Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province of Dinagat under the Local Government Code. The
plebiscite resulted in the approval by the people from the mother province
Surigao del Norte and the province of Dinagat. Thereafter, petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of RA 9355, contending that the province of
Dinagat did not meet the population and land area requisite for the creation
of a province under the Local Government Code. They alleged that Dinagat
had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, whereas, the LGC requires, among others, that the territory should
atleast be 2000 square kilometers with 250,000 inhabitants.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional
Ruling:
Yes. The central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and land
area, are all designed to accomplish these results. A perusal of the
congressional debate for the matter reveals that economic viability is the
primordial criterion. Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of
a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, which is four times more than
the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is
within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
21 | P a g e

the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
ANGEL G. NAVAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B.
JULIA
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014, Reyes, J.
The three-term limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible.
Facts:
From 2004 to 2010, Angel Naval had been elected and had served as a
member of Sanggunian, Second district, Camarines Sur. Sometime in 2009,
RA 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts of Camarines, was
enacted. Eight out of ten towns were taken from the second district of
Camarines Sur to create a third district. The second district was composed of
the remaining two towns, plus the town of Gainza and Milaor from the first
district. In the 2010 elections, Naval ran and won as a member of the
Sanggunian of the third district. In 2013, she ran again and was re-elected for
the same position. When Navals election was question on the ground of the
three-term rule, she argued that she only served as a member of the
Sanggunian for two terms. Her theory is that because of the reapportionment
of the province of Camarines Sur, she was, elected by another territorial
jurisdiction and by different inhabitants.
Issue:
Whether or not Navals election for the year 2013 is valid.
Ruling:
No. RA 9716 created a new second district for Camarines Sur, but it
merely renamed the third district which elected Naval into the position.
Therefore, she was elected by the same inhabitants in the same territorial
jurisdiction. The three-term limit rule provided by the Constitution is
inflexible. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political
power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people
the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called
statesmen.
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008, Brion, J.
No plebiscite is needed for the creation of a legislative district.
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Facts:
RA 9371 was enacted to increase Cagayan De Oros district from one to
two. However, Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned the constitutionality of such law
as well as Comelec resolutions to enforce it, because it was being
implemented without a plebiscited which is a requirement for the creation,
division, merger or abolition of a local government unit.
Issue:
Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary to create a legislative district.
Ruling:
No. Legislative districts are different from local government units.
Legislative districts are governed by Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution
while local government units are governed by Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution. The concern that leaps from Article VI, Section 5 is political
representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be effectively heard. The aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among
districts. Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered. Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial
coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in
implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local
government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. RA 9371 provides for
reapportionment of the legislative district of Cagayan De Oro, which is guided
by Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution. No plebiscite is required for
reapportionment of legislative districts.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013, Perez, J.
A member of the House of Representatives becomes so, only upon a
duly and legally based proclamation
Facts:
Regina Ongsiako Reyes won the elections and was proclaimed as the
representative of Marinduque. However, before the elections, Comelec
cancelled her certificate of candidacy for not being qualified to run for the
position as she was not a Filipino citizen. Regina opposed the jurisdiction of
the Comelec alleging that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that has exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications.
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Issue:
Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to look into Reginas
qualifications as representative of Marinduque
Ruling:
No. HRETs constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its
member, who becomes so, only upon a duly and legally based proclamation.
HRET has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the qualifications of its
members. However, Reginas proclamation is not valid since prior to the
elections, the decision of Comelec cancelling her certificate of candidacy
became final. Hence, there is no basis for her proclamation and thus she did
not become a member of the House of Representatives.
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO V. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
The decision of
Supreme Court, made
Reyes name in the
ministerial duty, which
the Comelec which attained finality, and that of the

the administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of
roll of members of House of Representatives, a
may be compelled by Mandamus.
Facts:
Lord Allan Jay Velasco filed a petition for Mandamus against Hon.
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. and Secretary General Marilyn Barua-Yap to
order them, respectively, to administer the oath of Velasco in the House of
Representatives, and to remove the name of Regina Ongsiako Reyes in the
roll of the members of the House of Representatives and replace it with
Velascos name. Before this petition was filed, a Comelec decision was
promulgated cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Reyes because she
lacks the citizenship requirement to be able to qualify to run for the
representative of Marinduque in the House of Representatives. Subsequently,
a petition was filed by Reyes with the Suprme Court, questioning Comelecs
jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications as a member of the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled against Reyes and enunciated that
her certificate of candidacy was validly cancelled and therefore there was no
basis for her proclamation in the House of Representatives, thus the Comelec
has jurisdiction to question her qualifications.
Issue:
Whether or not Speaker Belmonte and Sec Gen Yap can be compelled by
mandamus.
Ruling:
24 | P a g e

Yes. A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of
the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The decision of the Comelec
which attained finality, and that of the Supreme Court, made the
administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of Reyes name in the roll of
members of House of Representatives, a ministerial duty. The administration
of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no
longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
and Sec Gen Yap. They are legally bound to recognize Velasco as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by SC and the Comelecs ruling,
now both final and executory.
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY
G.R. No. 219603 January 26, 2016 CARPIO. J.
Libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment
imposed was reduced to a fine.
Facts:
Philip Pichay was convicted for libel, but in lieu of imprisonment, he
was sentenced to pay fine. Later on, he was elected as a congressman. A
petition for Quo Warranto was filed against him but was dismissed by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which concluded that his
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude, reasoning that Pichay was
not the author of the libelous articles but the president of the publishing
company.
Issue:
Whether or not HRET erred in concluding that his conviction for libel
did not involve moral turpitude.
Ruling:
Yes. Libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of
imprisonment imposed was reduced to a fine. The Revised Penal Codes
provision on libel did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the
nature or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of
libel.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his
certificate of candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay served his
sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period
25 | P a g e

shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a
Member of the House of Representatives until then. Thus, his representation
that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 CARPIO. J.
Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a partylist which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
shall be entitled to one seat.
Facts:
In July and August 2007, the Comelec, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and
apportioning their seats, the Comelec considered the following rules: (1) In
the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while
the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article
VI, 1987 Constitution); (2) Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in
the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; (3) If a party-list garners
at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs Comelec; (4) In no way
shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6%
of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the
formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11
of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution. BANAT also questioned if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would
be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of
party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which would be discuss later on).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also
raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
26 | P a g e

Issues:
1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
mandatory or a mere ceiling.
2. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
3. How are party-list seats allocated.
4. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections.
Ruling:
1. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of
the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
2. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the
votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility
to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. Instead, the 2% rule should mean
that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not qualified.
3. First, the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections. Then, the parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats. There shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at
least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then
deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 partylists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for
party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full
text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this
case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first,
the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats
for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
3. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major
political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the
party-list elections.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
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G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013 CARPIO, J.
Political parties can participate in the party-list system for as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution.
Facts:
The Comelec issued in October, November and December of 2012 a
resolution ruling that the party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do
not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of
the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they
intend to represent in Congress. The party-list
groups filed a petition to reverse the resolution by the Comelec disqualifying
them from the May 2013 party-list race.
Issue:
Whether or not political parties can participate in the party-list system.
Ruling:
Yes. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. Moreover,
political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
The Comelec excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the Comelec because as political or
regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may
have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
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COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein
by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013, LEONARDO DE-CASTRO. J.
If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the
parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization,
had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the Comelec En Banc. There
can be no disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees,
in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement.
Facts:
In May 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement,
entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the list of their candidates and
terms on sharing of their powers. It contained an agreement on who among
the candidates will serve the terms according to the power sharing
agreement. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as
member of the HR was cut short to 1 yr and 6 mos. In line with this, Kho
tendered his resignation to be effective on December 31, 2011. In the
interim, Comelec Resolution was promulgated on February 21, 2012.
Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that filing of vacancy as a
result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
groups/organizations shall not be allowed. On March 12, 2012, the Board of
Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS issued recalled the resignation of Kho and
allowed him to continue to represent the party-list. Despite of the recall of
resignation, Comelec found the term-sharing agreement contrary to public
policy and hence resolved to CANCEL the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS
under the Party-List System of Representation.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
disqualified and cancelled the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition
against term-sharing.
Ruling:
Yes. There was no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS
still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the termsharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group
insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his
term as a member of the House of Representatives.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually
implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a
party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the
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Comelec En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of
SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their
agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS
and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to
stand on.
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC
AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST
G.R. No. 205505 September 29, 2015 SERENO, J.
In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction
over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list
group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the
House of Representatives.
Facts:
After Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
groups, Isidro Lico who was the first nominee, subsequently took his oath of
office. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning partylist organisations, Ating Koop issued a Resolution which incorporated a termsharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner
Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the threeyear term. Then when held its Second National Convention, it introduced
amendments which would short the three-year term of the incumbent
members then was replaced by the Rimas group. Almost one year after
petitioner Lico had assumed office, a petition was filed expelling him from
Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and
corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the termsharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his
expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Comelec
Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner while Comelec en banc
dismissed the petition holding that it had no jurisdiction to expel
Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the
House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the petition. However, it upheld the validity
of his expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list organization.
Ruling:
No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET
with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
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Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of
the House of Representatives. In this case, the Comelec proclaimed Ating
Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not
the Comelec, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013, REYES, J.
Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record. It is sufficient
that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards
the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
Facts:
Comelec cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group.
It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in
uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely
offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May
2010 elections. It further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its
nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they
have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
ABANG LINGKODs registration under the party-list system for the latters
failure to prove its track record.
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to the Comelec's claim, sectoral parties or organizations,
such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further
the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the
sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which
they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist
that groups seeking registration under the party-list system still comply with
the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it
mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence
to show their track record as a group.
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DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010 ABAD, J.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the
House of Representatives.
Facts:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of
the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition
for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They
claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House
of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions
involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns
of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of
the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the
members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs),
former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the
HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list
Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee.
Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an
internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before
that party-list group, not before the HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
Ruling:
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Yes. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the
House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies
who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party
list.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since a partylist nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the Comelecs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, CARPIO, J.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an
office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Facts:
Petitioners Liban, et al. were officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, they filed with the Supreme Court what they
styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his
incumbency as Senator. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to
be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
Formerly, in its Decision in 2009, the Court held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of
the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate.
Ruling:
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No. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an
office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a
majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of
a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must
be government officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation by the government. Under this criterion, the government does
not own or control PNRC.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
ANTERO J. POBRE v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like
any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and
to maintain the respect due its members.
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech
delivered by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected
total disrespect towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other
members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. As such,
Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator. For her part, Senator Santiago averred that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust act of the JBC which
calls for future remedial legislation.
Issue:
Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is
actionable.
Ruling:
No. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution provides: A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.
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The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost
and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
Facts:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions for the conduct of an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal, a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), because Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head
of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
disclosed that the Comelec Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project; (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or
not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt. Neri did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of
the President invoking executive privilege. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical to the exercise of
their functions.
Ruling:
No. The three questions are not critical to the legislatures function. In
the case at bar, we are not confronted with a courts need for facts in order to
adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather with the Senates need for
information in relation to its legislative functions. The burden to show this is
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on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of
competence of the President in order to gather information which, according
to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed
that respondent Committees need for information in the exercise of this
function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry
is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely
an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of
respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by
privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in
nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and
corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it
bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and
"punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power
to expose for the sake of exposure.
GRECO BELGICA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA,
JR., et al.
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Facts:
Starting 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the
PDAF for being unconstitutional and the likely source of the congressmens
kickbacks. Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF has been a common exercise of unscrupulous
members of the congress, the petition was dismissed. In July 2013, the
National Bureau of Investigation began its probe into the allegations that the
government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years
by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel. After criminal investigations
were filed following the Napoles controversy, the Commission on Audit
released its own results of a three-year audit covering the legislators PDAF
from 2007 to 2009. The total releases amounting to billions of pesos spurred
several petitions to be lodged before the SC to declare the Pork Barrel
System as unconstitutional.
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Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate
the constitutional provision on the non-delegability of legislative power.
Ruling:
Yes. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which
is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor held that the power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in the
Bengzon case, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO AQUINO III, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, J. Bersamin
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of
the Treasury.
Facts:
Responding to Senator Jinggoy Estradas revelation that some
senators, including himself, had been allotted millions as an incentive for
voting in favor of Chief Justice Renato Coronas impeachment, Secretary
Florencio Abad explained in a statement that the funds released to the
senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
accelerate economic expansion. The DBM further listed the legal bases for
the DAPs use of savings and that it had been sourced from savings
generated by the government and from unprogrammed funds.
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Issue:
Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Ruling:
No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the
DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the
Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs,
Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the
Budget Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act by which Congress
designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public
revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general
object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or
expense. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more
than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to
the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws,
had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the
budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress
through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
NB: Notwithstanding the above discussion, certain DAP practices were
declared unconstitutional based on other grounds.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. v. CESAR PURISIMA, et al.
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, J. Corona
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
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Facts:
The core of this issue is the enactment of R.A. 9335, a law optimizing
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. This
law intends encourage the bureau officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions. The DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue IRRs of
R.A. 9335, which is to be approved by a congressional oversight committee
created for the purpose. The ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. invoke their
rights as taxpayers in filing this petition to challenge the validity of R.A. 9335,
a tax reform legislation. Among other contentions, they assail the creation of
the oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the committees
creation permits legal participation in an otherwise executive function.
Issue:
Whether or not the creation of a congressional oversight committee
violates the doctrine of separation of powers as its permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have
the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations
partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside
with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the
guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial
power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
ELECTION, IMMUNITY, PRIVILEGES AND INHIBITIONS
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MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES v. Comelec and ESTRELLA
ELAMPARO
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, J. Perez
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate:
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there
is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. Second is the fact
that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in
this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office. Third is the policy underlying the
prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections, the purpose of which
is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.
Facts:
A day after Senator Grace Poe-Llamanzares filed her COC for the
presidency for the May 2016 elections, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition to
deny due course or cancel said COC, contending that Poe committed
material representation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the May 9, 2016 elections.
Issue:
Whether or not the COC of Poe should be denied due course on the
exclusive ground that she made a false representation in her certificate.
Ruling:
No. All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of
Poe for her candidacy as President of the Republic, she has complied with
both. As to the first consideration, Poe was legally adopted. Under R.A. No.
8552, Poe was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate
"shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue." That law also
requires that "all records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in
the files of the court, the DWSD, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."
The law therefore allows Poe to state that her adoptive parents were her birth
parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And
given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, Poewas not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
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On the issue of residence, it is standing jurisprudence that it is the fact
of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for
election as president. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on
questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the
basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by Poe. It ignores, above all else, what We consider as a primary
reason why Poe cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator,
which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her
eligibility for Senator. When Poe made the declaration in her COC for Senator
that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the
residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her
declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments
before us that at the time the declaration for senator was made, Poe did not
have as yet any intention to vie for the presidency in 2016 and that the
general public was never made aware by Poe, by word or action, that she
would run for president in 2016.
ATTY. EVILLO PORMENTO v. JOSEPH ESTRADA

G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, C.J. Corona
One of the requisites for the exercise of judicial power is an actual
case or controversy.
Facts:
The petition by Atty. Evillo Pormento asks whether Estrada is covered
by the ban on the president from any reelection. It should be noted that
Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general
elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the
general elections held on May 10, 2010. Atty. Pormento opposed this
candidacy by Estrada and filed a petition for his disqualification. The same
was denied. Thus, the instant petition for certiorari followed on May 7, 2010.
Issue:
Whether or not the president shall not be eligible for any reelection.
Ruling:
No. Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be
premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
41 | P a g e

conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case, no definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed
upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As
such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.
ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, J. Nachura
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with
the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary
to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
Facts:
In his petition to declare the establishment of the PET unconstitutional,
Atty. Romulo Macalintal invoked the Supreme Courts ruling on the
unconstitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). He stated
therein that if the president cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court cannot
likewise create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
Issue:
Whether or not the establishment of the PET is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court,
with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit
grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
Constitution readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme
Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise
thereof.
The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme
Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose. The conferment of full
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authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which We have affirmed on
numerous occasions.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

DENNIS FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, J. Villarama, Jr.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. This practice of
holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment.
Facts:
Dennis Funa argues in his petition that respondent Elena Bautistas
concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation
of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution, as explained in various cases. In
their defense, respondents aver that Bautista was merely designated as the
acting head of MARINA, and not appointed as the MARINA Administrator. Her
designation as OIC in a temporary capacity is for the purpose of preventing a
hiatus in the discharge of the posts official functions.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport
to which she had been appointed, violates the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices
or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended
to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
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government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of
DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by
law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC
of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil
Liberties Union. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of
the Authority, We are hardly persuaded by respondents submission that
respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an
imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime
Industry Board.
DENNIS FUNA v. ALBERTO AGRA

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, J. Bersamin
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary.
Facts:
Dennis Funa alleged that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Agnes Devanadera. Four days after which, President Arroyo designated Agra
as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. After two days, Funa
commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agras concurrent
appointments or designations.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional
and void for being in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
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Yes. It was of no moment that Agras designation was in an acting or
temporary capacity. The text of Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-owned or government
controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means
to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration
of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13
itself, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment
or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by
one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that
the avowed objective of Section 13, is to prevent the concentration of powers
in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To
construe differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of
an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the
guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."
ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and PRESIDENT

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010, J. Bersamin
The prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Facts:
The petitioners in these consolidated cases, as well as its intervenors,
argue that the proscription against the president or acting president, under
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitute, includes the
members of the Supreme Court, as a general rule. The OSG, on the other
hand, argues that the same provision does not apply to the Judiciary and that
the petitions should be dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not
yet decided at the time of the petitions were filed whether or not the
incumbent President has the power to appoint a new chief justice.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Constitutional Commission extended to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and
justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not
appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide,
Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o
avoid any further complication. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article
VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or
Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015, CARPIO, J.
The concurrence of all the elements of a valid appointment should
always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside,
just before, or during the appointment ban.
Facts:
Prior to the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued more than 800 appointments including the petitioners in several
government offices. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
for a ban on midnight appointments. For purposes of the 2010 elections,
March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day,
11 March 2010, was the start of the ban. An exception is provided under such
provision which allows temporary appointments to executive positions when
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continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this
exception. President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking
appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the
constitutional ban. The officers and employees who were affected by EO 2
were informed that they were terminated from service effective the next day.
Several petitions were filed seeking to declare the executive order as
unconstitutional and for the declaration of their appointment as legal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners' appointments are valid
Ruling:
No. The following elements should always concur in the making of a
valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the
authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or
during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should
always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment
if the process lacks even one step.
In this case, petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four
elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of
office during the appointment ban. The President's exercise of his power to
appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises
a discretion. There should be evidence that the President intended the
appointment paper to be issued. Release of the appointment paper through
the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its
issuance. For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence
and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks and
must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO. Also, an
appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be
made to an occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or
his appointment validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to
succeed him. Lastly, acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of
the appointment. The appointments made by President Arroyo are void.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON
STRAIT V. REYES
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G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The doctrine of qualified political agency states that the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Facts:
The Government of the Philippines entered into a contract called GSEC102 with JAPEX involving geological and geophysical studies of the Taon
Strait. Then, they formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of
petroleum resources within Taon Strait. Petitioners, the "Resident Marine
Mammals", are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in Taon Strait, joined by stewards.
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in
the Taon Strait, petitioners aver that a study made after the seismic survey
showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They
attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also
known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef." Respondents claim
that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited
in the petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the Service Contract No. 46 is valid.
Ruling:
No. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed
not only to PD No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. While PD
No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of
the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that
Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void. Public
respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their
acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this
case. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. While the
requirements in executing service contracts in the 1987 Constitution seem
like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As this
Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President
48 | P a g e

himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken
lightly. In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the
President had any participation in SC-46. Their arguments, absent proof of
her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter
into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but
in the Constitution itself. Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared null and
void.
ALMARIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute
the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an
obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power.
Facts:
A joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP
Board of Trustees was held to discuss the evaluation of the 2009 Order of
National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. A
final list of four names was agreed upon. Then, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors strongly endorsing
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The
Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and
submitted a memorandum recommending the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards,
as well as on private respondents. Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were
issued declaring respondents as National Artists. Petitioners instituted the
present petition alleging that by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA
and CCP Boards to select those who will be conferred the award.
Issue:
Whether or not the
respondents.
President validly conferred the award
to
Ruling:
No. The CCP and NCCA Board jointly administer the said award and,
upon their recommendation, the President confers the award. Thus, the
advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The
Presidents power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.
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In this case, the former President could not have properly considered
respondents as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards. There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment to
respondents The former Presidents constitutional duty to faithfully execute
the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the
CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of
National Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the
conferment of the said award. The conferment of the Order of National Artists
on said respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and
should be set aside.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, v. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN,

JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989, FERNAN, C.J.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that
office.
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion Monsanto, then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents. Monsanto appealed to this Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner made a request that
she be restored to her former post since the same was still vacant. The letter
was referred to the Finance Ministry which ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated. The OP, however, ruled that she is not entitled to an automatic
reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon and that she is liable for
the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. The petitioner claims
that when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an
acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President
has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly
dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
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Yes. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that.
To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. The better
considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's
innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding
of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. A pardon looks to the future. It
is not retrospective. Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and
benefits. In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we
are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of
a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a
presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we
do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were
innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we
cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate
a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly
maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. Pardon granted after
conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of
the true character and purpose of the privilege.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM PetitionerIntervenor, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
An absolute pardon fully restores all civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder. On Oct. 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada. Then, he ran for the presidency again but lost. Afterwards, he ran for
Manila City Mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the theory that the
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pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification.
Issue:
Whether or not the pardon granted to Estrada enables him to run for
mayor of Manila.
Ruling:
Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right
to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. The pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former President Estrada. The latter is the
principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence
that followed, which states that "he is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36
and 41, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al. v. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his

capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al.
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012, SERENO, J.
Only the President is vested
commander-in-chief of the Republic.
with
calling-out powers,
as
the
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group. In response thereto, a task force
was created by the ICRC and the PNP, which organized a parallel local group
later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee and convened under the
leadership of respondent Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. Also, Governor Tan
organized the Civilian Emergency Force. Governor Tan issued Proclamation 109 declaring a state of emergency using the kidnapping incident as a ground.
It also invoked Section 465 of the LGC which bestows on the Provincial
52 | P a g e

Governor the power to carry out emergency measures. Respondent Tan called
upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct
general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety. Petitioners filed the present petition contending that
Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent governor is authorized to declare a
state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation
1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures.
Ruling:
No. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency and the calling-out powers. There is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. There are certain acts which, by
their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the
State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief
powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The
Presidents Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the
legislative act of Congress. The Constitution bestows on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. In the case of Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out
powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief. Respondent
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called
upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the Local Government
Code
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
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Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al.
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, ABAD, J.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless

violence is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.
Facts:
The day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including
some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP
and the PNP to undertake measures as may be allowed by the Constitution
and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred.
Petitioners contended that the President unlawfully exercised emergency
powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the
places mentioned in the proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers
when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City.
Ruling:
No. The deployment of AFP and PNP personnel is not by itself an
exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only
a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same. Moreover, the Presidents call on the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court
may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above
power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court
acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly
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to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need
for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners,
v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and
President of the Republic of the Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J.
The President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power
to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Facts:
On Nov. 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried 57 innocent civilians in
Maguindanao. On Dec. 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. She submitted her report to Congress
stating that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up
arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The Congress, in
joint session, convened to review the validity of the Presidents action.
However, two days later or before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners challenge the
constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
Ruling:
The Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of
beating a dead horse. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power,
not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain
the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power
that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
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factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit
that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which
is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first
a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable
one in the hands of the Court. Since President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic
duty to review and validate or invalidate the same, then the petitions in these
cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of
martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al., petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J
The propriety of what may be done in the exercise of the political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision
Facts:
Petitioners are members of Malaya Lolas, an organization established
to provide aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War. They narrated that they civilians
were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered while the women were
repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused. They claimed that since 1998, they
already approached the Executive Department requesting assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the "comfort women" stations. However, the Executive
declined stating that the individual claims for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan.
Ruling:
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No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims
against Japan. Certain types of cases often have been found to present
political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations.
It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative,
'the political', departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision." Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, however, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts
to question.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners
cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise
provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private
claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. Moreover, the
Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners
claims. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court to order the Executive
Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al., petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines.
Facts:
Petitioners prayed that the Supreme Court reconsider its April 28, 2010
decision, and declare that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive
Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the
claims of Filipina comfort women. They also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. They argued that constitutional and jurisprudential
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histories have rejected the Courts ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives
ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited and such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party. Moreover, the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive
has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has
read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from
the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize
international human rights.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
Ruling:
No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse
petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot
interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by
the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner.
SAGUISAG V. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. No. 212426 and G.R. No.212444, January 12, 2016, SERENO, CJ.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding
through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress.
Facts:
The Philippines and the USA entered into their first military
arrangement pursuant to the Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA. In
view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines
and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their defense and security
relationship. However, the Senate rejected the proposed treaty. The
expiration of the MBA led to the suspension of the large-scale joint military
exercise but they agreed to hold joint exercises at a substantially reduced
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level. The military arrangements between them were revived in 1999 when
they concluded the first Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Then the two
countries entered into a second counterpart agreement. The Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) authorizes the U.S. military forces to
have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in
the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. The petitioners
question the constitutionality of the EDCA arguing that it should have been in
the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an executive agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in entering into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement.
Ruling:
No. The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in
executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions
which is also self-executory. In light of this constitutional duty, it is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests. Despite the President's roles as defender of
the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution
expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities. However, a plain textual reading
of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it applies
only to a proposed agreement between our government and a foreign
government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign
government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry" Philippine territory.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial
entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the
limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law,
and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The
VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines. The
power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without
Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction. One of
the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity
and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. This
distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading
(1961) which states that Treaties are formal documents which require
ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action without the need of
a vote by the Senate or by Congress. Thus, no court can tell the President
to desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody
an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within Article
VIII, Section 25.
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EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the
MDT and the VFA. The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian
personnel in Philippine territory are already allowed under the VFA, the
treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has effectively
done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations
in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VF
A. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the presence
of U.S. personnel in the country. Moreover, EDCA does not allow the
presence of U.S.-owned or -controlled military facilities and bases in the
Philippines. As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive
agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it
purports to implement.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE
OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, 31 July 2012, En Banc, Per Curiam
Under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
who, what, where, when and how the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of
the Courts granted power.
Facts:
The COA found that an underpayment resulted when five retired
Supreme Court Justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal
property assigned to them during their incumbency. The COA attributed the
underpayment to the use of the Supreme Court of the formula by the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 rather
than the formula found in COA Memorandum No 98-569-A.
Issue:
Whether the use of the CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 formula was
correct.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
who, what, where, when and how the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of
the Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
restrictions of the grant as grantor.
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The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is part
of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner
the granted retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of.
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are
exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional
duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154 REQUIIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY
OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
A.M. NO. 13-09-08-SC, 1 October 2013, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.
Facts:
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, requested the guidance/clarification on the
applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA No. 10154.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA No. 10154 is applicable to the Judiciary
Ruling:
No. The Rules should not be made to apply to employees of the
Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionallyenshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides,
retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of
the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement
contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION
OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY
UDK-145143, 21 January 2015, En Banc, Leonen, J.
There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality
of a proposed bill.
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Facts:
Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to
compel the Supreme Court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress which was raised
through a letter addressed to the Supreme Court. The letter implied that
certain acts of members of Congress and the President shows a threat to
judicial independence. Two house bills were filed which would require the
court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund to the national treasury and
one to create a Judicial Support Fund under the National Treasury to repeal PD
1949.
Issue:
Whether or not the court should exercise its powers to revoke/abrogate
and expunge whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting
the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review
before the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites
are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Petitioners failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the
outright dismissal of the petition.
Before the court may exercise its power of judicial review, there must
be an existing case or controversy that is ripe for determination. There can be
no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill.
The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted,
not before. Even assuming that there is an actual controversy that the Court
must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the
proposed bill. Petitioner has not shown that he has or will sustain a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial
independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite
standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only
affect the judiciary.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO AND REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
G.R. No. 202242, 16 April 2013, En Banc, Mendoza, J.
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It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether
with one whole vote of half of its, goes against that mandate.
Facts:
From the creation of the JBC under the 1987 Constitution, Congress
designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
members. The House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate
representatives to the JBC. In 1994, the composition of the JBC was
substantially altered. Instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC, one from each house, with each having one-half of a vote.
In 2000 and 2001, the JBC decided to allow the representatives from both
houses one full vote each.
Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions
with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress is valid.
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative
of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. It is clear that the Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any
inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half of its, goes
against that mandate.
By allowing both houses of Congress to have a representative in the
JBC and by giving each representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress,
as compared to the other members of the JBC, is accorded greater and
unwarranted influence in the appointment of judges. It is clear that the
Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half
of its, goes against that mandate.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014, En Banc, Mendoza, J.
Due process is the right to explain oneself, not to ensnare by surprise,
but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to
intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle
and futile exercise.
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Facts:
Francis Jardeleza was nominated as one of the candidates for the
vacated position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Jardeleza was
informed that Chief Justice Sereno was invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
(regarding integrity) against him. He was directed to make himself available
on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of the
objections to his integrity. Jardeleza filed a petition asking the Supreme Court
to direct the JBC to give him 5 working days written notice of any hearing
with the JBC. During the hearing, Jardeleza asked Chief Justice Sereno to
execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that the JBC defer
its meeting since the Court would meet to act on his petition. Later that
afternoon, the JBC proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the
shortlist. Jardeleza was not included due to the invocation of Section 2, Rule
10 of the JBC rules.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist of
nominees submitted to the President
Ruling:
Yes. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules
of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. The Supreme Court refuses
to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the
ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. Jardeleza has
no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
What set off the lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring
Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those
who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. However, he was not given a
reasonable chance to muster his defense. He was merely asked to appear in
a meeting where he would be subjected to an inquiry. Due process is the right
to explain oneself, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a
reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his
response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELANEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, En Banc, Reyes, J.
The JBC is the only constitutional body bestowed with the mandate and
competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general
categories of probity, integrity and independence.
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Facts:
MCTC Judge Ferdinand Villanueva assailed a JBC policy which requires
five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to second-level courts on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The
JBC did not include him in the list of candidates for the vacant position of RTC
judge since he had been a judge only for more than a year.
Issue:
Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to secondlevel courts is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. JBCs ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply fill
up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to
establish a set uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant
meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year
requirement policy applied by the JBC to the petitioners case is necessary
and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of
years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition.
The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven
competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors.
The JBC is the only constitutional body bestowed with the mandate and
competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general
categories of probity, integrity and independence.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF
LEGAL FEES
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, En Banc, Corona, J.
The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress.
Facts:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on
government-owned or controlled corporations under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, invoking Section 39 of its charter.
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Issue:
Whether or not the legislature may exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and
local government units.
Ruling:
No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is
an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 5(5) Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular,
it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Indeed, payment of legal fees is a jurisdictional requirement. It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Appellate docket and other lawful fees
are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. Payment
of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
safeguards of this Court's institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's
exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less with the Executive.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, 24 April 2012, En Banc, Velasco Jr., J.
A COA commissioner who serves for a period less than seven years
cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a
result of the expiration of the seven-year term of the predecessor. Such
appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee
will be allowed to serve more than seven years under the constitutional ban.
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo Carague as
Chairman of the COA, his term starting from Feb. 2, 2001 to end on Feb. 2,
2008. President Arroyo then appointed Reynaldo Villar as the third member of
the COA, his term starting from Feb. 2, 2004 until Feb. 2, 2011. From the
retirement of Carague in 2008, Villar was designated Acting Chairman and
was subsequently nominated and appointed as such. The appointment
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papers stated that his term shall be until February 2, 2011, the same as his
original term as commissioner. Villar contested the appointment, arguing that
he is entitled to a fresh seven-year term. Although Villar was already replaced
by a new appointee of President Aquino after his resignation, the Court still
acted upon the case since the situation calls for the promulgation of
principles that will guide the bench, the bar and the public should like
circumstances arise.
Issue:
Whether or not Villars appointment as COA chairman, after having
served four years of his seven-year term as COA commissioner, is valid in
light of the term limitations imposed under the Constitution
Ruling:
No. At the outset, the Constitution does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner
has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified that the
appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the
position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering
terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service
of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt
the rotational system in the commission prescribed in the Constitution.
In this case, Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as
COA chairman gave him a completely fresh seven-year term cannot be
sustained. No one can be a COA member, either as chairman of
commissioner, or mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than
seven years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate
seven-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it
would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession. A COA
commissioner like Villar who serves for a period less than 7 years cannot be
appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the
expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor. Such appointment to a full
term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than seven years under the constitutional ban.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014, En Banc, Bersamin, J.
The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is
under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested
in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
Facts:
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President Arroyo appointed Francisco Duque as Chairman of the CSC.
She then issued EO 864 which orders that the CSC Chairman shall sit as an
ex-officio member of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF. Petitioner filed the petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864
and the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Trustees of these
entities for being clear violations of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Duques designation impairs the independence of
the CSC and violates the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual
or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
Ruling:
Yes. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their
respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the
purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated
with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not
personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnelrelated or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he
may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived
from his position as CSC Chairman.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices,
Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over
all government offices in the Executive Branch. The PHILHEALTH and ECC are
attached to the DOH and DOLE while GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of
the President. The corporate powers of these entities are exercised through
their governing Boards, members of which are under the control of the
President. As such the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government
entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the
independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012, En Banc, Sereno, J.
There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a
pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies.
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Facts:
The COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of
government financial transactions. After the change of administration due to
the People Power in 1986, COA reinstated the pre-audit of selected
government transactions. When the political system and government
operations stabilized, COA again lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions. In 2006, petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana wrote to COA regarding
internal pre-audit service of the Department of Agriculture. The COA informed
petitioner of the lifting of the pre-audit. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court alleging that the pre-audit duty of the COA cannot be lifted by mere
circular since pre-audit is a constitutional mandate in Section 2, Article IX-D of
the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA is obliged to conduct a pre-audit for all
government transactions for all government agencies
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the COA to
conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in
Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a
situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special preaudit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the
Supreme Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is
in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation,
only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged
by the Court.
BILL OF RIGHTS
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), et al.
G.R. NO. 166494, June 29, 2007, J. Azcuna
While the Constitution protects property rights, the State, in the
exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
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Facts:
Petitioners, as domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines, assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 4(a) of the
Expanded Senior Citizens Act which grants a 20% discount in the purchase of
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. They argued that the
law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution
which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. They maintained that the reduction in their total revenues
resulting from the grant of discount is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit, for which they should be
entitled to a just compensation, but the law failed to provide a scheme
whereby they will be justly compensated.
Issue:
Whether the States imposition upon private establishments of the
burden of partly subsidizing a government program violates Art. III, Sec. 9 of
the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which has general
welfare for its object. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare. While the Constitution protects property rights, the
State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory
effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view
of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Thus, it is
incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount
is unduly oppressive to their business, because they have not been able to
show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly
to their disadvantage.
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR
OF MARIKINA CITY, et al. v. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE AND ST.
SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC.
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, J. Mendoza
Absent any reasonable relation between the purpose of the police
power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded even under the guise of protecting the public interest.
Facts:
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The City Government of Marikina enacted ordinances which required
the fences on the front yard of educational institutions to be of an open fence
type at 80% see-thru, and a five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a
parking area. In enforcing the ordinances, the City Government of Marikina
sent a letter to St. Scholasticas College and St. Scholasticas AcademyMarikina, Inc. ordering them to comply with the aforesaid ordinances. Without
complying with the demand, the schools filed a petition for prohibition.
Issue:
Whether the assailed ordinances are valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
No. The five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area
would tantamount to taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, in contravention to the Constitution, considering that it would
no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be
available for use by the general public on non-school days. Furthermore, the
ordinances are unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently
divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.
With respect to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, the enforcement
of the assailed ordinance would result in an undue interference with the
schools right to privacy and right to property, which necessarily includes
their right to decide how best to protect their property. Requiring the
exposure of the property via a see-thru fence is violative of the right to
privacy, considering that the property also served as a residence of the
Benedictine sisters, who were entitled to some sense of privacy in their
affairs. More importantly, such exposed premises could entice and tempt
would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier
to bypass and breach. Finally, there is no reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN,
REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, et al.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The mayor is empowered to order the closure and removal of illegally
constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
Pursuant to the general welfare clause, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
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Facts:
Boracay West Cove applied for the issuance of a building permit
covering the construction of a hotel over a parcel of land. However, its
application was denied on the ground that the proposed construction site was
within the no build zone. Meanwhile, it continued with the construction of
the resort hotel. Subsequently, the Office of the Mayor of Malay issued an
Executive Order, ordering the closure and demolition of the hotel.
Issue:
Whether the mayor can order the demolition of illegally constructed
establishments without resorting to judicial remedy.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code empowers the
mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. However, under
the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can order
their closure and demolition only after satisfying the requirement of due
notice and hearing. In this case at bar, Boracay West Cove admittedly failed
to secure the necessary permits before the construction of the hotel; and, the
due process requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied with
since the company received notices to comply with the ordinance and yet it
failed to do so.
In the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL
OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY
ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, J. Peralta
The levy of Socialized Housing Tax is primarily for urban development
and housing program; thus, for the general welfare of the entire city. It is
therefore in the exercise of police power implemented through taxation. In
the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
Facts:
The Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance which imposes upon real
properties a Socialized Housing Tax which shall accrue to the Socialized
Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. Jose Ferrer, a registered
owner of a residential property in Quezon City filed the instant petition for
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certiorari, assailing the subject ordinance. He asserts that it does not find
basis in the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution. For him, the
SHT cannot be viewed as a charity from real property owners since it is
forced, not voluntary; thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide
funds for housing of informal settlers.
Issue:
Whether the imposition of SHT shall be struck down for arbitrary
intrusion into private rights of real property owners.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of
property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute
to the common good. In this case, the imposition of SHT on real property is
primarily for urban development and housing program; thus, for the general
welfare. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their
property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure,
and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making
them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Consequently, the levy of SHT is primarily in the exercise of police
power for the general welfare of the entire city. In the exercise of police
power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. In this case, it is
taxation that made the implement of the states police power.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009, J. Corona
While the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is, as a
general rule, unlimited in its range, it must be exercised fairly, equally and
uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg."
Facts:
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a domestic corporation with a
net worth of P259 million. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent PHCPI
a final assessment notice demanding the payment of deficiency documentary
stamp taxes (DST) amounting to P376 million. PHCPI claimed that the
assessed DST to date which amounts to P376 million is way beyond its net
worth of P259 million.
Issue:
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Whether the exercise of the power of taxation in this case would be
oppressive.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, the power to tax
and is unlimited in its range. However, it is
exercised with caution to minimize injury to
taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally
collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg."
is an incident of sovereignty
so potent that it should be
the proprietary rights of a
and uniformly, lest the tax
Applying the aforesaid principle, imposing the DST on PHCPI would be

highly oppressive, given the reality that the DST is way beyond the
companys net worth. It is not the purpose of the government to throttle
private business. On the contrary, the government ought to encourage
private enterprise. PHCPI, just like any concern organized for a lawful
economic activity, has a right to maintain a legitimate business. Legitimate
enterprises enjoy the constitutional protection not to be taxed out of
existence. Incurring losses because of a tax imposition may be an acceptable
consequence but killing the business of an entity is another matter and
should not be allowed.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CITY OF CABANATUAN,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CITY MAYOR, HON. HONORATO PEREZ
G.R. No. 177332, October 01, 2014, J. Leonen
Taxes are not and should not be construed to drive businesses into
insolvency. A reasonable surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an
unreasonable one delays payment and engages government in unnecessary
litigation and expense.
Facts:
The City of Cabanatuan assessed the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) of franchise tax. NAPOCOR refused to pay, arguing that it is
exempt from paying the franchise tax. So, the City filed a complaint
demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due plus 25% surcharge and
interest. On appeal, the CA held that since the franchise tax due was
computed yearly, the 25% surcharge should also be computed yearly, that
means, the computation of the surcharge would be based on the total unpaid
tax for each year (proper tax for the year + unpaid tax of the previous
year/s). Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. NAPOCOR insisted on a onetime application of the 25% surcharge based on the total franchise tax due
and unpaid, not cumulative.
Issue:
Whether the yearly accrual of the 25% surcharge is unconscionable.
Ruling:
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Yes. The imposition of the 25% surcharge in this case resulted in an
aggregate penalty that is way higher than NAPOCORs basic tax liabilities.
Furthermore, it effectively exceeded the prescribed 72% ceiling for interest
under Section 168 of the Local Government Code. The law allows the local
government to collect an interest at the rate not exceeding 2% per month of
the unpaid taxes, fees, or charges including surcharges, but in no case shall
the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof should not exceed
thirty-six months or three years. In other words, the CIR cannot collect a total
interest on the unpaid tax including surcharge that is effectively higher than
72%. Here, the CIR applied the 25% cumulative surcharge for more than
three years. Its computation undoubtedly exceeded the 72% ceiling imposed
under Section 168 of the Local Government Code. Hence, CIR's computation
of the surcharge is oppressive and unconscionable.
Taxes and its surcharges and penalties cannot be construed in such a
way as to become oppressive and confiscatory. A healthy balance should be
maintained such that laws are interpreted in a way that these burdens do not
amount to a confiscatory outcome. Taxes are not and should not be construed
to drive businesses into insolvency. To a certain extent, a reasonable
surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an unreasonable one delays payment
and engages government in unnecessary litigation and expense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, J. Bidin
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional
proscription could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Facts:
Andre Marti carried four gift wrapped packages to Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders. He informed the clerk therein that he was sending the
packages to a friend. He also assured that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend. Before delivery to the
Customs, the proprietor of Forwarders, following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened the box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. So, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Thereafter, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the NBI to his place of
business. Upon inspection, the NBI agents found dried marijuana leaves
inside the packages. Subsequently, an Information was filed against Marti for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. On the other hand, Marti contended
that the evidence against him had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
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Issue:
Whether the evidence obtained by a private person, allegedly in
violation of constitutional rights may be invoked against the State.
Ruling:
No. The contraband in the case at bar came into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing Marti's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure. It was the proprietor of the forwarding
agency who made the search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure. Clearly, the NBI agents
made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Furthermore, the mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
the proprietor into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search. In view of the foregoing, the evidence
against Marti is admissible.
In conclusion, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
DUE PROCESS
JENNY M. AGABON AND VIRGILIO C. AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS,
INC. AND VICENTE ANGELES
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, J. Ynares-Santiago
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative
proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and
Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated
without just cause after notice and hearing.
Facts:
Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon were dismissed for abandonment of
work. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that their employer
refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw
basis. On the other hand, the employer maintained that both Agabons were
not dismissed but had abandoned their work. After trial and on appeal, it was
established that the terminations were for a just and valid cause. However,
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the employer did not send the requisite notices to the last known address of
the employees. It argued that the notices would be useless because the
employees did not reside there anymore.
Issue:
Whether the failure to render due notice and hearing prior to dismissal
for just cause constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to due process.
Ruling:
No. The Due Process Clause embodied in the Constitution is a
constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and
judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and
assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while
statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules
protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after
notice and hearing.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has
two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment
termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of
dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the
Implementing Rules of P.D. 442 of the Labor Code. Breaches of these due
process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore, statutory due
process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional
due process.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al. v.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.
G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010, J. Carpio-Morales
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid.
Statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
only 'as applied' to a particular defendant. Thus, absent an actual or
imminent charge against the petitioner, a vagueness analysis of the assailed
statute is legally impermissible.
Facts:
Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security
Act of 2007. They assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under the said
law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand"
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are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the
doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the
present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that
RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
Issue:
Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a
penal statute.
Ruling:
Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid.
In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only as applied to a particular defendant.
This means that in determining the constitutionality of a statute, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.
Absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible. Therefore,
in this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with violation of the
assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY, AND
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR
CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE,
ALL SURNAMED GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
Facts:
The Congress enacted RA 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. A husband,
Jesus Garcia, is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A.
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9262 as being violative of the equal protection for being discriminative
against men.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause enshrined
in the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class.
In this case, RA 9262 is based on a valid classification. The fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. Furthermore, the
distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children. Also,
the classification is not limited to existing conditions only, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
children are threatened by violence and abuse. Lastly, the law applies equally
to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. All told, the
assailed statute is constitutional.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of
employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of
US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per
month. On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines, serving only two months and seven days, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days. Upon complaint
filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared
illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision
of RA 8042, which provides: In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
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workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Serrano questioned the
constitutionality of the aforecited provision of RA 8042.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector.
Ruling:
1. No. The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the
ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being
of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
2. Yes. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity. Upon
cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to
all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs
with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with
employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis--vis local
workers with fixed-period employment; The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, the
subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection, hence it is
unconstitutional.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J.
The Court is possessed with the constitutional duty to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Facts:
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and
placement agency. Joy Cabiles was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co.
Ltd. to work as quality control for one year. Thereafter, without prior notice,
that she was terminated. This prompted Joy to sue Sameer for illegal
dismissal, asking for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for
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repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and
exemplary damages. When the case reached the CA, it applied RA 10022,
which reinstated the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less and awarded Cabiles NT$46,080.00 or the
three month equivalent of her salary, attorneys fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her
repatriation.
Issue:
Whether or not there is violation of equal protection clause.
Ruling:
Yes. Reiterating the Serrano case, the Court held that the reinstated
clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. In Serrano, the
Court identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It
distinguished between fixed-period overseas workers and fixed-period local
workers. It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment
contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year. Within the class of overseas workers with at
least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those
with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left
in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
AAA v. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union
and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON
G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the
judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor.
Facts:
Judge Carbonell dismissed a criminal case of rape for lack of probable
cause on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses failed to take
the witness stand to convince him that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
Issue:
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Whether or not Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes. The constitutional provision cited by Judge Carbonell does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the
judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor.
There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause
for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The
preliminary investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable ground
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense chargedis the function of
the investigating prosecutor.
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be
emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of
the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge
may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he
likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, PER CURIAM
Human remains can be a proper subject of a search warrant.
Facts:
PS/Supt. Fajardo applied with the RTC Manila for a warrant to search
caves located inside the Bienbenido Lauds compound in Davao City where
the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the Davao Death
Squad was buried. Applicant presented a witness who testified that he
personally witnessed the said killing. The RTC issued the warrant. Laud filed
an urgent motion to quash and suppress illegally seized evidence, claiming
that human remains sought to be seized are not proper subject of a search
warrant.
Issues:
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Whether or not human remains are personal property thus subject of a
search warrant.
Ruling:
Yes. Under section 3 rule 126, a search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen
or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense or used or intended
to be used as a means of committing an offense.
Considering that human remains can generally be transported from
place to place and considering further that they qualify under the phrase
subject of the offense (given that they prove the crimes corpus delicti), it
follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant under the criminal
procedure provision.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner v. DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
respondents.
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public
and defers to the state's exercise of police power.
Facts:
Sec. 36 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses. Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that it violates the constitutional right of a person against
unreasonable searches.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 36(c) and (d) of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 violates the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches, and therefore unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165
for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees,
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while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective
is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well-being of
the citizenry. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. US
jurisprudence is persuasive. What can be deduced from the US cases of
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. and
applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in
loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by
such jurisprudence, the Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions
to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for
the same reason. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.
Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police
power. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the
validity of a government search or intrusion. The first factor to consider in the
matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. The employees privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,
the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is,
under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
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by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Sec. 36 par. c and d
are declared constitutional.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, SERENO, CJ.
The drug test in Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of R.A. 9165
Facts:
According to the prosecution, the agents of NBI received a complaint
from Corazon and Charito that Ariel Escobido was picked up by several
unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling
drugs. An errand boy gave a number to them and they were instructed to go
to the Police where they met James who demanded from them P100,000,
later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The
complainants reported it to the NBI-CEVRO which verified the text messages
received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement
an entrapment operation. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by
using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made
part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner
underwent forensic examination and was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs. The
petitioner denied the charges and he said he was required to extract urine for
drug examination, but he refused. He was convicted for violating Sec. 15, Art.
II of RA 9165 because the following were established: (1) the accused was
arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory
test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Issue:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
Ruling:
No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II
of RA 9165. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act
of extortion. Making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in
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Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful
acts, not only under RA 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a
mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.
To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our
pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, which states that mandatory drug
testing can never be random and suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.The drug test was a violation of
petitioners right to privacy. The court cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is
being made. Petitioner is acquitted.
BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINODAVID

G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.
Government employees constitutional protection to privacy as to the
computers they used in the work place may vary on a case to case basis. And
in cases that there is reduced privacy expectation search incidental to workrelated investigations must comply with the reasonableness and scope test.
Facts:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was charged administratively and eventually
dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as evidence of
misconduct. Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched
pursuant to the anonymous letter complaint to the office of Chairperson
David. Pollo now assailed the validity of the search and resulting evidence
thereby being the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying
of his personal files without his knowledge and consent was reasonable
Ruling:
No. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must
balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy
against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the workplace. In our view, therefore, a probable cause
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requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable
burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the
agencys work, and ultimately to the public interest. Thus, public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for no investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion
must be reasonable. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves
a two-fold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at
its inception; and second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an
employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is
necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a
needed file. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
This to test was found to be fulfilled in the case at bar, considering the
damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the
same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was
justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode
and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point
in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature
of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button,
necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to
comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the
purpose of the wok-related investigation.
JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCA
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
is
still
applicable.
Facts:
Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC, alleging that he is the
son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus Lucas in
Manila. The RTC dismissed his petition, because he failed to establish
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compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely: (1) a prima facie case; (2)
affirmative defences; (3) presumption of legitimacy; and (4) physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.
Issue:
Whether a prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a
court can issue a DNA testing.
Ruling:
Yes. But it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented
by petitioner.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained:
Although a paternity action is civil, not
criminal,
the
constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but
those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving
party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to
the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing
must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to
protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE AND WRIT
OF HABEAS DATA
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F.
ZAMORA, G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994, J. PADILLA
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200.
Facts:
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Rafael Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with
damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on the ground of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the
exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes
of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons.
Issue:
Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
No. RA 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
andOther Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other
purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under RA 4200.
CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN
G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996. Mendoza, J.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. One
time, she entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in
the case filed against her husband.
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Ruling:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is
a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al.
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, Puno, J.
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by
emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees in our Constitution and laws create zones of privacy.
Facts:
Senator Blas Ople assailed the constitutionality of the AO 308 entitled
Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System on the following
grounds: (1) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to
be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of
legislative power of the congress to make laws; and (2) It impermissibly
intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not AO 308 is constitutional.
Ruling:
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No. The Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy
because its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to
privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. It also lacks of proper
safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people
through biometrics and other means. Thus, AO 308 may interfere with the
individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down
his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access
confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case
of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more
substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a
constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be
found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living
in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government
the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It
is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing
result could be that everyone will live burdened by an inerasable record of his
past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its recordkeeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006, Carpio, J.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID
systems by government entities.
Facts:
President Arroyo issued EO 420 that directs a unified ID system among
government agencies and GOCCs in order to have a uniform ID for all
government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and others assailed this executive
order for being a usurpation of legislative powers by the president and it
infringes the citizens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy
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Ruling:
No.
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other
government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that
the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There
have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the
collection and recording of personal identification data.
With the exception of eight specific data shown on the ID card, the
personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly
confidential under Sec. 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly
confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly
confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public
concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination
of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, EO 420
applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and
issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420
does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already
possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in
Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification
Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed
executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system
where none existed before.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA
v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN
DOES
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J.
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself. (US v. Gines-Perez)
Facts:
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita
Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. The photos
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reached the STC administration who found Tan and her classmates to have
violated the students handbook and banned them from the graduation
ceremonies. The parents of the girls filed a petition for the issuance of habeas
data. They also prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the
court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be
declared illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Ruling:
No. The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution
was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The
Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right
to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy;
and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals
to control information about themselves. Before one can have an expectation
of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking (OSN) activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures
to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Thus,
Thus, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant
or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.
Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that
if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or
her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only Me or a custom list so
that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these
privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of
the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her
private space. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this safety measures were
not utilized.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Facts:
Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee are common law partners. When
Ilagan visited Lee at her condominium unit, he accidentally left his digital
camera therein. As Lee found the said camera, she discovered that a sex
video of Ilagan with another woman was recorded therein, hence she
confronted Ilagan about it which the latter denied. Lee further alleged that
during the their confrontation, Ilagan slammed her head against a wall inside
his office and walked away. Thereafter, Lee utilized the said video as evidence
in filing criminal and administrative complaints against Ilagan. Thereafter,
Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data on the ground
that Lees acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute
the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the
internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but
also that of the other woman. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of
habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
Ruling:
No. In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor
are
vague
and
doubtful.
In this case, that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right
to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. In fact,
even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As
the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence
requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Francisco Chavez V. Raul M. Gonzales
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, Puno, C.J.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press
based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media.
Facts:
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an
audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of
the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec). The conversation was audiotaped
allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had
copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons
included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject
to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was
committed or was being committed in their presence. On June 11, 2005, the
NTC issued a press release giving fair warning to radio and television
owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping law and pertinent circulars on
program standards.
Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on
expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Respondents denied that the acts transgress the
Constitution, and questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition.
Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the fair warning issued
by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional
guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to
the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.It was also
stressed that most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even to this
date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between
the NTC and KBP.
Issue:
Whether the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and
11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation
between the President and other personalities constitute unconstitutional
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling:
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Yes. The Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger
test. With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must show
the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about
especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise
the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its
content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a
substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on
ground. As formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press
based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the
one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c)
the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the
quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at
bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the antiwiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and
confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version
and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on
the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the
manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of
the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the
tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security
of the State.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, et. al. v. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al.
G.R. No. 203335, G.R. No. 203299, G.R. No. 203306, G.R. No. 203359,
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G.R. No. 203515, G.R. No. 203518, February 11, 2014, Abad, J.
The cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of
communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment
regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the
constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that
use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social
media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could
arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Facts:
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation
for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with
the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who
would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of
cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. But petitioners claim that
the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. Hence,
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the certain provisions of the
cybercrime law.
Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Cyber Crime Law is
unconstitutional as it poses restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court declared void for being unconstitutional the following
provisions of the Cyber Crime Law:
Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications
Reason: The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited
commercial communications, also known as "spam." xxx The government
presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the
"efficiency of computers." These have never been outlawed as nuisance since
people might have interest in such ads.
(2) Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in
real-time;
Reason: xxx The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take
advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness
as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
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(3)Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to
restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
Reason: xxx Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot
substitute for judicial search warrant.
Further, the Court DECLARES: A. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive
the post and react to it.
Reason: Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation
constitutes "similar means" for committing libel. But the Courts
acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of
the libelous statement or article.
B. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission
of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)
(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System. Interference, Section
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)
(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2)
on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications,
and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.
Reason: Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into
account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a
chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in
violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA v. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, MENDOZA, J.
Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is
necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the
use of mass media for political advertising.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, seeking a re-examination of
the validity of 11(b) of RA 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
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prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections. They contended that when the Court upheld in NPC v. Comelec the
validity of Section 11(b) against claims that it abridged freedom of speech
and of the press, the said law exhibited undesirable effects because the ban
on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but
actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by
depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more
affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters like
airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 11(b) is unconstitutional as it poses restraint on
the exercise of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
No. The main purpose of Section 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on
speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for
political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is
limited both as to time and as to scope. There is no total ban on political ads,
much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print
space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the
disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate
governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
Comelec under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, which provides that the
commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They
only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates
but require the Comelec instead to procure space and time in the mass media
for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election
period, the Comelec takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the
commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the
candidates.
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SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v.
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza, J.
Under the OBrien test, even if a law furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Facts:
Comelec sought to enforce Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners brought
an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec from enforcing such provision,
claiming that it constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraints.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court applied the OBrien Test under, under which even if a
law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression
of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve
the governmental purpose in question.
Applying the OBrien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4
is invalid, because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than the suppression of freedom of expression. Contrary to the claim of
the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be
justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only
incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of
the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a
total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it
is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election
and seven (7) days immediately before a local election.
GMA NETWORK, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014, PERALTA, J.
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The adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing fielddoes not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech of
the candidates.
Facts:
Petitioners GMA Network, Incorporated (GMA), ABS-CBN Corporation
(ABS-CBN), ABC Development Corporation (ABC), et. al. are owners/operators
of radio and television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan
ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national organization of
broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio
and television stations and said stations themselves. They sent their
respective letters to Comelec questioning the constitutionality of Section 9 (a)
of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. During the previous May 2007
and 2010, Comelec issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting the
airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated
number of minutes "per station. For the May 2013 elections, however,
respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, changing the
interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for
political campaigns or advertisements from a per station basis, to a total
aggregate basis.
Petitioners contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable
broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections. However,
Comelec contended that its issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to
Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the Comelec the
power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and
other public utilities, as well as mass media
Issue:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of the assailed Comelec resolution
violates freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of
the aggregate-based airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press. It is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the aggregate-based airtime limitsleveling the playing field
does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
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substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for
the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what
the Comelec has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped
its wings. It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the
aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the
Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of
languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
At the heart of democracy is every advocates right to make known
what the people need to know, while the meaningful exercise of ones right of
suffrage includes the right of every voter to know what they need to know in
order to make their choice.
Facts:
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size, for public viewing within
the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins
stated: "Conscience Vote" and lists of candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team
Buhay with a check mark or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as
comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay.
When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to
Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it
was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election
propaganda material is only two feet (2) by three feet (3); otherwise, it will
be constrained to file an election offense against the latter.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise
of free speech, Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the
questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently
restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and hearing.
Issue:
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Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda
which the Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall
constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
No. It is not election propaganda. While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or partylist group. Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by
the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining
political advertisement or election propaganda.
The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on
the basis of a single issueand a complex piece of legislation at thatcan
easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and partylist organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were
expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to
follow the example of petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our
Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a
detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be
guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also
in judgment of the acts of others.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, J. Reyes
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible if
certain requisites are met.
Facts:
In 2013, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for
the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013
national and local elections and subsequent elections. One of the sections
enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda including the
posting of any election campaign or propaganda material in public utility
vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and
tricycles, whether motorized or not, and within the premises of public
transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers,
train stations, and the like.
Issue:
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Whether or not the provisions which prohibit the posting of any
election campaign or propaganda material in PUVs and public transport
terminals are constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Such prohibitions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the

people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to
express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material
in their property, and convince others to agree with them. The prohibition
constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs
and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible,
even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional
power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on
freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where
election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites
for a valid content-neutral regulation.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a
practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.
The "captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to
be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided. Thus, a government regulation based on
the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed "captive
audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The
prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced
or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the
messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they
may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC., v.
G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015, J. Leonen
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Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if
it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what
is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only.
Facts:
Comelec Resolution No. 9674 (Resolution) directed SWS, Pulse Asia and
other survey firms of similar circumstance to submit to Comelec the names of
all commissioners and payors of all surveys published from Feb. 12, 2013 to
April 23, 2013, including those of their subscribers. SWS and Pulse Asia
assailed the Resolution as having been issued ultra vires. They contended
that the Resolution is in excess of what the Fair Election Act requires.
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed
by the requirement to submit the names of their subscribers
Ruling:
No. The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys,
including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec.
5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the
exercise of police power and effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing
equal access to opportunities for public service. The nature of the speech
involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political
equality, calls into operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty
to express vis-a-vis equality of opportunities. In an equality-based approach,
politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation but regulation
promoting political equality prevails over speech.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if
it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak
as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be
provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least
restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no
situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its
content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with
or on private property.
SWS and Pulse Asias free speech rights must be weighed in relation to
the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore,
105 | P a g e

the speech of others who want to participate unencumbered in our political
spaces. On one hand, there are petitioners' right to publish and publications
which are attended by the interests of those who can employ published data
to their partisan ends. On the other, there is regulation that may affect
equality and, thus, strengthen the capacity of those on society's margins or
those who grope for resources to engage in the democratic dialogue. The
latter fosters the ideals of deliberative democracy. It does not trump the
former; rather, it provides the environment where the survey group's free
speech rights should reside.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et al.
G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007, J. Austria-Martinez
The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls
within the ambit of the term commercial speech.
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law
seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted
and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The DOH issued the assailed
RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Petitioner, representing its
members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of
breastmilk substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 20060012 (RIRR) should be struck down
Ruling:
Yes. The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly
falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech-that is, speech that
proposes an economic transaction. This is a separate category of speech
which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. An American jurisprudence provided a four-part analysis for
evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech: (1) The
commercial speech must concern lawful acitivity and not be misleading;
(2) The asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If both of these
requirements are met, it must next be determined whether the state
106 | P a g e

regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Applying the test in the case at bar, first, it is not claimed that the
advertisement at issue is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate. In fact, both
the International Code and the Milk Code recognize and concede that there
are instances when breastmilk substitutes may be necessary. Second, there is
no doubt that the government interest in providing safe and adequate
nutrition to infants and young children is substantial. This interest is
expressed as a national policy in no less than the fundamental law of our land
and is also embodied in various international agreements where we are a
party. Third, there is an undeniable causal relationship between the interest
of government and the advertising ban. Unquestionably, breastfeeding is the
tested and proven method of providing optimal nutrition to infants and young
children. The rationale of the absolute ban is to prevent mothers from
succumbing to suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda which
may be contained in advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. Fourth,
prescinding from these predicates, the critical inquiry is: whether
the complete suppression of the advertisement and promotion of breastmilk
substitutes is no more than necessary to further the interest of the state in
the protection and promotion of the right to health of infants and young
children. The absolute ban on advertising is unduly restrictive and is more
than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the
health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-evident, for instance,
that the advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts
too deep on free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent for the
promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the
absolute, overarching ban.
BAYAN, et al v. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. NO. 169838, April 25, 2006, J. Azcuna
It is a settled principle that the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances are not absolute and may be regulated.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed BP 880 which required a permit for staging a rally,
contending that it is a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
which the Philippines is a signatory. They argued that the law requires a
permit regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
Moreover, they said that the law is not content-neutral, because it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 880 is constitutional.
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Ruling:
Yes. It does not curtail or unduly restrict freedom, it merely regulates
the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far
from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not
the government. The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. Also, BP 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies.
However, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no
place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police
agents to justify abuses.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS
NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, H. HARRY L. ROQUE,
AND JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN v. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO"
ATIENZA
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, J. Carpio Morales
The freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
Facts:
The IBP, through its then National President Jose Cadiz, filed with the
Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at
the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to
be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multisectoral organizations. Mayor Atienza issued a permit dated June 16, 2006
allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza
Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP
received on June 19, 2006. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at
Mendiola Bridge. IBP alleged that the participants voluntarily dispersed after
the peaceful conduct of the program. The Manila Police District (MPD)
thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
Issue:
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Whether or not the modification by Mayor Atienza of the venue
indicated in the application violates IBPs constitutional right to freedom of
expression and public assembly
Ruling:
Yes. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal
or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If the Mayor is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the
matter.
In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his
discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been
heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. Respondent
failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears
repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 08, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech
and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.
Facts:
Thirty-seven (37) UP law professor were directed to show cause why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The letter written by
such professors made known to the Supreme Court their view that the
plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct
109 | P a g e

and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court,
and that in light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the
dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an
institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary,
Justice Del Castillo, to resign his position, without prejudice to any other
sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate. The professors alleged
that with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, the Supreme Court has
interfered with respondents' constitutionally mandated right to free speech
and expression. They contended that the Supreme Court is denying them the
right to criticize the Court's decisions and actions, and that it seeks to
silence respondent law professors' dissenting view on what they
characterize as a legitimate public issue.
Issue:
Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny the professors their
freedom of expression.
Ruling:
No. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it
was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court
nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated
the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in
the said pending case for the proper disposition and consideration of the
Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution made no
objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that
respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to
explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the
imagination could be considered as fair or constructive. The insult to the
members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted
sources," the Court's alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners in
the Vinuya case, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech
and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly,
for
every
right
carries
with
it
a
corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. Moreover, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain
portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be
deemed as protected free speech. Freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
110 | P a g e

and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection
and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within
the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIR,
DANTON REMOTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010, J. Del Castillo
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the Comelec but
it was was denied on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated
in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration. Comelec also ruled that Ang Ladlad tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. Furthermore, Comelec held that
should it grant the petition, it will be exposing our youth to an environment
that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Ang Ladlad argued that
the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion.
Issue:
Whether or not religion is a valid basis for the refusal of Comelec
to accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Ruling:
No. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
"government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. Hence, it
was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than
relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the Comelec is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. A law
could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but
it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification
111 | P a g e

to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. Recognizing the religious nature of
the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, GEN. LUNA, SURIGAO DEL NORTE
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012, J. Brion
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before
they can go on leave to travel abroad.
Facts:
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of judges and
court personnel, regardless of the number of days, must be with prior
permission from the Cuurt. A travel authority must be secured from the
OCA. The complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the
OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of travel. Judges and
personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the
OCA shall be subject to disciplinary action. Judge Macarine wrote the Court
Administrator requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family
for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his
65th birthday. He stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual
forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding application for
leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for
authority to travel remained unacted upon. He proceeded with his travel
abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. He was then
informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 915, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by
the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from
his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was absent, pursuant
to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.
Issue:
Whether or not the said OCA Circular restricts the right to travel
Ruling:
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No. Although the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the
exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health
as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed
as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over
lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates,
by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before
they can go on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a
person from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to
rule. To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the
administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who
wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of
absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a
certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the
OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his Certificate of Service for
the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date
of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS,

ET AL.
G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989, CORTES, J.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law
and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the
court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue
travel documents to former President Marcos and the immediate members of
his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses
to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President may impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that
113 | P a g e

under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by
the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a
distinct right under international law, independent from although related to
the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom
of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own.
Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others.
However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would
be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to
ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode
and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view that the right to return may
be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 130716, DECEMBER 9, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
The
state
policy
of
full
public
disclosure
extends only to transactions involving public interest and may also be subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The following are some of the
recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters,
and (4) other confidential information.
Facts:
114 | P a g e

Francisco Chavez, in invoking his constitutional right to information,
demanded that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claimed that
any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue
of paramount public interest since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys
economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the
Filipino people. The PCGG, while admitting that a compromise is in the works,
claimed that Chavezs action is premature, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the agreements have not become effective and binding.
Issue:
May the PCGG be required to reveal the proposed terms of compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth?
Ruling:
Yes. The recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter
of public concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its
very nature, assumes a public character. The assets and properties referred
to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Thus, there is no question
that Chavez has a right to PCGG's disclosure of any agreement that may be
arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. The question
that remains is whether the constitutional provision likewise guarantee
access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the
final agreement. Reviewing the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, the Court held that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up
with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES
AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR
CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
OF THE JUDICIARY.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, MENDOZA, J.
The Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the
information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest.
Facts:
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Rowena Paraan and Karol Ilagan sought copies of the Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN), Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the
Curriculum Vitae(CV) of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals for the year 2008 for the purpose of updating their database of
information on government officials. In response to such request, the Court
created the Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over
the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to
requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of
members of the Judiciary. Meanwhile, several requests for the copies of the
SALN and other personal circumstances of the justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Justices of the Supreme Court are mandated by law
to release their SALN to the public.
Ruling:
Yes. The Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified
the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and
interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to
know. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter
is a permission. Hence, the duty on the part of members of the government
to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law. Like all
constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its
companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing
guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the peoples right
to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. This could only mean that while no
prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN,
the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF
ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON
A.M. NO. 1928 AUGUST 3, 1978, CASTRO, C.J.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory programthe lawyers. Such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
Facts:
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The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of
Marcial Edillos name from the Roll of Attorneys for his stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues. Edillon questioned the constitutionality of the
provisions of the Rules of Court and IBP By-Laws requiring membership dues,
claiming that they constitute an invasionof his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintain his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support to the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his
membership
fee
to
the
IBP.
Ruling:
Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer
must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which
membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of
Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognized then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not
void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction
over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. Thus, the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues. Marcial Edillon was disbarred and his name was
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
EMINENT DOMAIN
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171101, APRIL 24, 2012, VELASCO, JR. J.
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In determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at
the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government
shall be the basis. If the government takes possession of the land before the
institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the
time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
Facts:
The Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously to dismiss or deny the
petition filed by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and affirm with modifications the
resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoking HLIs
Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright
land distribution. The Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred
in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative
fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as
HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution. The parties thereafter
filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not, for the purpose of determining just compensation, the
date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs stock
distribution plan (SDP).
Ruling:
Yes. When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were transferred
by Tadeco (former owner thereof) to HLI in order to comply with CARP
through the stock distribution option scheme, sealed with the imprimatur of
PARC under PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco
was consequently dispossessed of the afore-mentioned attributes of
ownership. Notably, Tadeco and HLI are two different entities with separate
and distinct legal personalities. Ownership by one cannot be considered as
ownership by the other. Corollarily, it is the official act by the government,
that is, the PARCs approval of the Stock distributionProgram (SDP), which
should be considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the agricultural
lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of ownership over the
agricultural lands was made prior to the SDPs approval, it is this Courts
consistent view that these lands officially became subject of the agrarian
reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the
approval of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily
issued under compulsory acquisition.
By a vote of 8-6, the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of taking in
determining just compensation is November 21, 1989 when PARC approved
HLIs stock option plan.
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SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

v. SPOUSES TECSON G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013 PERALTA, J.
Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government.
Facts:
Spouses Tecson were the owners of a certain land which was among
the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 to be used for the
construction of the MacArthur Highway. The land was taken without their
consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings. The spouses
demanded the payment of the fair market value of the same but the DPWH
offered to pay at the rate of P0.70 per square meter only which was the value
of the property at the time of taking. Consequently, the spouses filed a
Complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed land with damages. The
RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling
and remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the
just compensation to be awarded to the spouses. The RTC found the amount
of P1,500.00 per square meter as the just compensation for the subject
property which was based on its current market value. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the determination made by the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the just compensation to be awarded is based on the
current market value of the property.
Ruling:
No. Just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking
that is controlling for purposes of compensation. Thus, the just compensation
due the Spouses Tecson in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940. The value of the
property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of
the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the filing of
the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the
public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a
natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the
time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of
private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is
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not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury.
And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is
taken x x x.
The fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq m.
Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500.00.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

v. SPOUSES TECSON
G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015, PERALTA, J.
The true measure of just compensation is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. The word just is used to modify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
Facts:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses
Tecson imploring the Supreme Court to take a second look at its Decision in
their complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed property with
damages in which the said court ordered that the valuation of the subject
property owned by them shall be P0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square
meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in
1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment. The spouses insist that
gross injustice will result if the amount that will be awarded today will be
based simply on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking.
Hence, they suggest that a happy middle ground be achieved by meeting the
need for doctrinal precision and the thirst for substantial justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
should be granted.
Ruling:
No. The assailed decision is maintained. The fair market value of the
property at the time of taking is controlling for purposes of computing just
compensation. Just compensation due respondents-movants in this case
should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of
taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not
One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, as valued
by the RTC and CA. While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may
appear inequitable to respondents-movants as they would be receiving such
outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be noted that the
purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property
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taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure
of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the
time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR

TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 176625, FEBRUARY 25, 2010, NACHURA, J.
The requirements of (1) public use and (2) just compensation in
eminent domain partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be
complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Facts:
Bernardo Lozada was the registered owner of Lot No. 88 located in
Lahug, Cebu City. In the early 1960s, the Republic sought to acquire by
expropriation said lot, among others, in connection with its program for the
improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport. The CFI rendered a
decision against the land owners, among whom was Lozada. During the
pendency of the latters appeal to the CA, the parties entered into a
compromise settlement to the effect that the subject property would be
resold to the original owner in the event that the Government abandons
the Lahug Airport. Thus, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. The projected
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport, however, failed to
materialize because former President Aquino directed the transfer of general
aviation operations at the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority. This prompted Lozada, et al. to repurchase their property
from the Republic.
Issue:
Whether or not Lozada and the other land owners may repurchase the
disputed property after the purpose for which the same was expropriated has
been abandoned.
Ruling:
Yes. The decision in the expropriation case provides that the
acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the
condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition
not having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former
owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments
power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that
it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to
the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied
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conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of
public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable
element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly,
the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and
the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and
equity.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON

G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.
The very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that
the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and
should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at
all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true
even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the
proceedings.
Facts:
In 1993, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered a property
owned by the heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power
Transmission Project. The entry to the said property was allegedly made
without the respondent heirs consent. In 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint
for expropriation seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over
a portion of the disputed land. The RTC determined the price payable as just
compensation using the date of filing of the complaint, which is May 5, 1995,
as its reference point because the evidence was bereft as to the actual date
of the taking. Accordingly, NAPOCOR was made to pay just compensation for
the whole area at the rate of P550.00/square meter. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling. During the pendency of NAPOCORs appeal before the SC, it filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings on the
ground that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary
for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission
lines installed on the respondents property. Accordingly, NAPOCOR contends
that the expropriation has become without basis for lack of public purpose as
a result of the retirement of the transmission lines;.
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Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued
or dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the
expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use.
That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action
cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public
use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any
other stage of the proceedings.
In this case, NAPOCOR admitted that the expropriation of the land in
question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been
made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now
appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is
not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a
motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage
of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint
should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from
further annoyance or litigation. However, expropriator who has taken
possession of the property subject of expropriation is obliged to pay
reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of such possession.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT

SANGKAY, namely: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA,
EDGAR, PUTRI, MONGKOY*, and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT
G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011 BERSAMIN, J.
It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
Facts:
NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to
generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the
Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser,
Manta, Edgar, Putri, Mongkoy and Amir, all surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of
Macabangkit), as the owners of land situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued
NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the
alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged,
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among others, that they belatedly discovered that one of the underground
tunnels of NPC traversed their land; that the underground tunnel had been
constructed without their knowledge and consent; and that the presence of
the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal,
CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether there was taking of land as to entitle the owners to just
compensation.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that
NPC was liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation
for land
traversed
by the
underground
tunnels:
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain
portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use.
Respondents, as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to
a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is
possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property.
In this case, there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding
that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled
that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need
not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators
action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy
but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the
owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the
property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands.
RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010 PEREZ, J.
Any inquiry he (Bantay Bayan) makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Facts:
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Antonio Lauga raped his 13-year-old daughter, AAA. Thereafter, AAA
relayed her harrowing experience to her grandmother. The two sought the
assistance of Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan. Banting found Lauga in
his house wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station,
to which the latter obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to Banting
that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. RTC found him
guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. The decision of the trial
court was affirmed with modifications by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Laugas extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy
Banting without the assistance of a counsel was in violation of his
constitutional right.
Ruling:
Yes. The bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in a certain
area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community. It is an
accredited auxiliary of the PNP. Also, it may be worthy to consider that
pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November
1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be
organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and
Order Council at the Barangay level. The composition of the Committee
includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of
existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non
Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.
Thus, any inquiry a Bantay Bayan makes has the color of a staterelated function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore,
the extrajudicial confession of Laug, for being made without the assistance of
a counsel, is inadmissible in evidence.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.
For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not
taken into consideration.
Facts:
The Ombudsman charged Juan Ponce Enrile and several others with
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plunder with the Sandiganbayan. On the same day that the warrant for his
arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police General Hospital. Thereafter, Enrile filed his
Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail,
claiming that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution
had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although
he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered. The
Sandiganbyan denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enriles motion.
Ruling:
No. For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is
not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in
the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical
condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are considered
in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing
that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE
MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR
ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC June 14, 2011 CARPIO MORALES, J.
The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press.
Facts:
Fifty-seven (57) people including 32 journalists and media practitioners
were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. The tragic
incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned
charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against
197 accused. Almost a year later, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc.,
relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and
members of the academe filed a petition before the SC praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed,
recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the
courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be
formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
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Issue:
Whether the petition should be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial
publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality
of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v.
Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in
the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, an aggrieved party has
ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment
arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed
out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of
venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for
disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when
necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and
issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases
apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the
parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and
other witnesses inside the courtroom. Thus, the Court partially granted pro
hac vice the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the
guidelines herein outlined.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO v. THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply
specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to
afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by
cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses.
Facts:
Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go (petitioners) were charged
before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of
Li Luen Ping, an old frail businessman from Laos, Cambodia who is the
prosecutions complaining witness. It was alleged that Li Luen Ping was being
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treated for lung infection in Laos, Cambodia and that he could not make the
long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Petitioners opposed the
motion, invoking their constitutional right of confrontation.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion should be granted.
Ruling:
No. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face
confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge
and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the
courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. The main and essential purpose of
requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent,
according to an eminent authority, demands confrontation, not for the idle
purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for
the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct
and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. There is
also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables
the judge as trier of facts to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence
of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral
effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally
that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony.
Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for
accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will
reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the
witness testifies orally in court.
The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2)
to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The constitutional
requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus
deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit
to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of
the witness and assess his credibility.
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO,
Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO
CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA
G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 SERENO, C.J.
As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be
exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law.
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Facts:
The Sandiganbayan found Reynaldo Jaylo, Edgardo Castro, William
Valenzona, and Antonio Habalo (petitioners) guilty of homicide. During the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayans judgment, none of the accused
appeared despite notice. Counsel for the three petitioners filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and
ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted
accused. In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the three
urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to and resolve the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration but to no avail. They argued that the right to file a
Motion for Reconsideration is a statutory grant and not merely a remedy
available in the Rules, as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the promulgation of
judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted in
the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Ruling:
Yes. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a
statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner
provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO, DATA AND KALIKASAN
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity
as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM
0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial
Office, Ilocos Norte
GR No. 193636 July 24, 2012 SERENO, J.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording
her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order
No. 275 (A.O. 275), creating a body which was later on referred to as the
Zearosa Commission. It was formed to investigate the existence of private
army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the
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10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. It
was broadcasted that Marynette R. Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos
Norte, was one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Contending
that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, she filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
She alleged, among others, that the PNP Ilocos Norte conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report. The
RTC dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data must be
granted.
Ruling:
No. Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained
in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened
her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected
to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus
had the power to request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording
her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to
update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that
the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in
place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and
accuracy.
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA v. MAGTANGGOL B.
GATDULA
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 LEONEN, J.
The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim
reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but
before final judgment is rendered.
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Facts:
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo against Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the NBI (DE LIMA, ET AL.
for brevity) in the RTC of Manila. The judge issued summons and ordered De
Lima, et al. to file an Answer and also set the case for hearing. Even without a
Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within five (5) working days after hearing. Later, the RTC
rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and the
interim reliefs prayed for. The MR filed by De Lima, et al was denied. Thus,
they filed before the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule
45.
Issue:
Whether Rule 45 is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
No. The Decision dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is
not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this
time. This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The
"Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that
temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together
with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders
are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition
but before final judgment is rendered.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the
interlocutory order denominated as Decision dated 20 March 2012. A
Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the
present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It
undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
were promulgated.
Thus, the Court nullified all orders that
issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
determine within forty-eight (48) hours from
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
petition and its attached affidavits.
are subject of this Resolution

respondent Gatdula filed the
and directed Judge Pampilo to
his receipt of this Resolution
is proper on the basis of the
Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.

CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM v. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D.
ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO
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G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
extralegal killingsand enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
Facts:
Ma. Christina Yusay Caram gave birth to Baby Julian out of an amorous
relationship without the benefit of marriage. Christina voluntarily surrendered
Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD in order
to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having
a second illegitimate son. Christina changed her mind about the adoption and
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon
City. RTC issued a Writ of Amparo commanding the four respondents to
produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled and to file their
verified written return to the writ. In one of its orders, it acknowledged that
Baby Julian was brought before the court and the Christina was allowed to
see him and take photographs of him. RTC dismissed the petition for issuance
of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in
court since Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her
child Baby Julian.
Issue:
Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.
Ruling:
No. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of extralegal killingsand enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
In this case, DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts.
In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum
explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses
when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her
petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented
Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August
5, 2010. There is therefore, no enforced disappearance as used in the
context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
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SELF-INCRIMINTION
JAIME DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, Sereno, C.J.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone
drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made.
Facts:
The agents of NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and
Charito Escobido claiming Ariel Escobido, the live-in partner of Corazon and
son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to
be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to
the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were
instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office. In the police office, they
met James who demanded from them P100,000 later lowered to P40,000, in
exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants
proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the
meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI, Charito received calls
supposedly from James instructing her to bring the money as soon as
possible. The investigators at the NBI verified the text messages received by
the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an
entrapment operation. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using
a pre-marked P500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part
of the amount demanded by James and handed by Corazon. Dela Cruz was
brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI where forensic examination was
done. He was required to submit his urine for drug testing which yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result. Dela Cruz, a Police Officer 2 of the PNP assigned in
the Security Service Group, was charged with a violation of Section 15, Article
II of R.A. 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon Dela Cruz is a violation of
his right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
Yes. We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion
and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where nontestimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of
evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material
to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when
they held that the extraction of petitioners urine for purposes of drug testing
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was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have
his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to
his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug
testing under those circumstances. In the face of these constitutional
guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TIRSO VELSCO AND HONORATO
GALVEZ
G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, Bellosillo, J.
The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the
same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Facts:
A shooting took place and claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and
seriously injured his brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their
uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right
arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it
remained until extracted by surgical procedure. Thus, three informations one for homicide and two for frustrated homicide - were filed against
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal
employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were
withdrawn and a new set filed against the accused upgrading the crimes to
murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was also charged with violation
of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence,
a fourth information had to be filed. The court found Diego guilty of murder
and double frustrated murder. However, Mayor Galvez was acquitted of the
crimes charged against him for insufficiency of evidence and finding that the
act of carrying of firearm was not a violation of law. The acquittal of Galvez is
now challenged by the Government in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution that the exculpation of Galvez from all
criminal responsibility by Judge Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, the judge deliberately and
wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial
indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the
evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not
transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
Issue:
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Whether or not elevating the issue of criminal culpability of Galvez
despite acquittal should be considered violative of the constitutional right of
the accused against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Yes. A remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before
the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of
mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72670, 12 September
1986). Thus, the doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after
trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a
sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the
criminal case was denied due process. In such case, the remand remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy. Philippine jurisprudence has been
consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has
viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the
extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of
grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of
respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into
the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced
by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent
judge considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among
others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis--vis the
accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and
the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation
thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it
nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered
and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writs limiting
requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper
object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of
judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
JASON IVLER v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO AND
EVANGELINE PONCE
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, Carpio, J.
Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365.
Facts:
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Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged before with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by Evangeline Ponce; and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
Evangeline's husband Nestor Ponce and damage to the Spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. Ivler
pleaded guilty to the charge in the first case and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the
Information in the second case for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not Ivlers constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in the criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes. Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
Hence, Ivlers prior conviction of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries bars a subsequent prosecution for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide as it arises from the same act
upon which the first prosecution was based.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA AND MANUEL
OPULENCIA
G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987, Feliciano, J.
For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all
the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense.
Facts:
The police and personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System
searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and
Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. They discovered that
electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government, and architecturally concealed
inside the walls of the building. These electric devices and contraptions were
designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said ice and cold storage
plant. Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the
installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter. An information against Opulencia was filed for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. Opulencia
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pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the
grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the
civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Batangas City Court to award. The court granted the motion to dismiss on
the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and
that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after
discovery of the offense. Then, the city fiscal filed another information
against Opulencia for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to
Article 309(1), of the RPC. Before Opulencia could be arraigned, he filed a
Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was
violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second information was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Yes. Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while
the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the
acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to
have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent
harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. By the same token,
acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused
by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral
unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many
different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes
that an enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that
In this case, the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that
such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused
of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
EX-POST FACTO LAWS
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SR. INSP. JERRY VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, Reyes, J.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application,
lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this
rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused.
Facts:
Jerry Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under P.D. 1866 in which he pleaded not guilty. The trial court
found Valeroso guilty sentencing him to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as
minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of
P15,000. The CA affirmed with modification the RTCs decision stating that
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is
modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed.
Ruling:
Yes. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time
petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294
amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with
the trial court. The present law now states that the of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application,
lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this
rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. Although an
additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment
is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
Applying
the
Indeterminate
Sentence
Law, prision
correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be
one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period
(two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and
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two [2] months). Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium,
as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as
maximum term.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) v. HON.
OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, et al.
G.R. No. 206357, November 25, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is
more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.
Facts:
President Ramos issued A.O. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans. The Ad Hoc Committee investigated the
loans of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC). RHC was incorporated in 1968 with
a paid-up capital of P1 million, was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a
Marcos business associate. RHC obtained loans to finance its projects from
DBP. RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans.
40% of the amount were converted into DBP's common shareholding in RHC,
and the balance was restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983
with arrearages of P1.97 million. The Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP's
total exposure as of 1986 amounted to P99.1 million. The Ad Hoc Committee
submitted a report to the President where it concluded that the RHC account
qualifies as behest in character. Hence, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent
directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections
3(e) and 3(g) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. PCGG filed a MR but was again dismissed by
the Ombudsman on the ground of prescription stating that In as much as the
record indicates that the instant complaint was filed with this office only on 6
January 2003, or more than ten years from the time the crimes were
discovered on 4 January 1993, the offenses charged herein had already
prescribed. Aggrieved, PCGG appealed claiming that the prescriptive period
should only commence to run it filed the Affidavit-Complaint Moreover,
Section 11 of RA 3019 sets the prescription of offenses under said law at
fifteen years and not ten years.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period for the filing of the case has
already prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under
said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to
fifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which
took effect on March 16, 1982. In the interpretation of the law on prescription
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of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. As
such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195
cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said
amending law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were
committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive
period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that
time. What is, then, left for determination is the reckoning point for the 10year period.
As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the
commission of the offense. If the date of the commission of the violation is
not known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof. In
determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply
in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative
to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or
records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to
the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the
date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent
the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed,
possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of
prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which
We have recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed
from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their
documentation, the second mode applies. We, therefore, count the running of
the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993,
when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the
President its findings and conclusions anent RHC's loans. This being the case,
the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of
discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al. v. HON.
MARGARITO TEVES, et al.
G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Facts:
Congress enacted RA 9335 which imposed a revenue collection quota
for BOC employees. It also provided a penalty of removal in case of failure to
meet the said quota. The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA)
question the constitutionality of the law, saying that its members and other
BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to
meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective
families' prejudice.
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Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9335 is a bill of attainder and hence,
unconstitutional because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or
class of officials and employees without trial.
Ruling:
No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential
to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of
individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack
of judicial trial.
In this case, RA 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It
merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or
employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic
processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned
employee are amply protected.
CITIZENSHIP
ERNESTO MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO AND THE
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, Mendoza, J.
Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance.
Facts:
Mercado, Manzano and Daza III were candidates for vice mayor in
Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano garnered the highest
votes however the proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US which was later
granted and the cancellation of the CoC on the ground that he is a dual
citizen was ordered. The Comelec's Second Division said that the petition is
based on the ground that Manzano is an American citizen based on the
record and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. Manzano
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the US and is considered
an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as
an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the
foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
Issue:
141 | P a g e

Whether or not Manzano is disqualified from the position of vice-mayor.
Ruling:
No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers
to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual
allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, Manzanos oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE
D. CHING
B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999, Kapunan, J.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can
be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
Facts:
Vicente Ching, son of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was born in
La Union in 1964. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. Ching
passed the Bar Examinations but was not allowed to take his oath and was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. The OSG commented that
Ching, being the legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship in strict compliance with the provisions of CA No. 625. The OSG
also pointed out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the reasonable time
142 | P a g e

allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation
of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period"
and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Issue:
Whether or not Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time.
Ruling:
No. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within three years from reaching the age of
majority. However, jurisprudence states that the three-year period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. However, such extension is not
indefinite.
In this case, Ching was already 35 years old (or over 14 years after
reaching the age of majority) when he elected Filipino citizenship. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's
election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can
be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from
his grasp.
ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001, J. Kapunan
The act of repatriation allows one to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Facts.
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps, took an oath of allegiance to the
143 | P a g e

US, and as a consequence lost his Filipino citizenship. In 1990, Cruz became
a naturalized US citizen in connection with his service in the US Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Filipino citizenship through repatriation under RA
No. 2630. Thereafter, he ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan. Antonio Bengson, his opponent, filed a
case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam before the HRET, claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he
is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.
Issue.
Whether or not a natural-born citizen who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Held.
Yes. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having
thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the law, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. The
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and retain
to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Facts:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he
became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, David and his
wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot where they constructed a
144 | P a g e

residential house, a part of which is a public land. Renato David filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Agreement (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR
and CENRO. In the said application, David indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents against David. Meanwhile,
David reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he
had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in disregarding the fact that
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by reacquiring the same
status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost
it.
Ruling:
No. The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine Citizenship, the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and retain
to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both reacquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends C.A. No. 63 by doing away with the
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing
dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship
by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship,
he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required
oath of allegiance.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA
145 | P a g e

G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, CJ. Sereno
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship
is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but
it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino
citizenship as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a US citizen.
Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again
took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Thereafter, Arnado filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Linog Balua, another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition seeking Arnados disqualification and/or
cancellation of Arnados CoC contending that Arnado is a foreigner. To bolster
his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented evidence indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines even after his repatriation and execution of affidavit of
renunciation. Petitioner Casan Maquiling intervened in the instant case after
having garnered the second highest number of votes during the elections.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made and affects ones
qualifications to run for public office.
Ruling:
Yes. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not
one of the acts enumerated in C.A. No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss
of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very
oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen
of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
In this case, when Arnado used his US passport just eleven days after
he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation
146 | P a g e

that he absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to
the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and that he divest(s) [him]self of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ESTRELLA ELAMPARO
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD and AMADO V. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos. 221698-221700, 8 March 2016, J. Perez
Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
Facts.
Petitioner Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo, by a certain Edgardo Militar, who took custody of
her. When Poe reached the age of five, celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr.
and Susan Roces formally adopted her via a petition for adoption with the
MTC of San Juan. Poe became a naturalized American citizen and obtained a
US passport after marrying her husband who was a citizen of both the
Philippines and the US. Poe eventually resettled in the Philippines after the
untimely demise of her father and took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
pursuant to R.A. No. 9225. Poe filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections where she declared that she is a
natural-born citizen. Private respondents filed these cases against her for the
alleged misrepresentation Poe made in stating that she is a natural-born
Filipino on account of being a foundling.
Issue.
Whether or not a foundling like Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Held.
Yes. The fact is that petitioners blood relationship with a Filipino citizen
is demonstrable. There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the
burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that her parents
were aliens. Poes admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden
to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if
not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
147 | P a g e

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is
no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
Deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. Though the Rafols
amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection
to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention.
In
international law, foundlings are likewise presumed to have the nationality of
the country of birth. While international conventions providing this principle
are yet unratified by the Philippines, they are nevertheless generally
accepted principles of international law.
THE REPUBLIC THE PHILIPPINES v. NORA FE SAGUN
G.R. No. 187567, 15 February 2012, J. Villarama, Jr.
The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the
election of Filipino citizenship should be made generally within three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority.
Facts.
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 and
did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. It was
only after she married Alex Sagun, at the age of 33, did she execute an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This document was, however,
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar. Respondent
thereafter applied for a Philippine passport but the same was denied due to
her fathers citizenship and there being no annotation on her birth certificate
that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a
judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on
her birth certificate.
Issue.
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve years
after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made within a
reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence.
Held.
No. Respondent failed to
valid election. Specifically, the
election of Philippine citizenship.
by respondent in support of her
comply with the legal requirements for a

execution of a sworn statement of her
The only documentary evidence submitted
claim of alleged election was her oath of
148 | P a g e

allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which
was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution
was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of
majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required
under Section 1 of CA No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three
years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory
explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register
with the nearest local civil registry.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
THE CIVIL SERVICE
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. ODESLA-IAD, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V.
PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an exofficio member of the Monetary Board
G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under EO 292 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency.
Facts:
President Benigno Aquino III issued EO 13 abolishing the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly
to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of EO 13, alleging that the President is
not authorized under any existing law to create the IAD-ODESLA, and that by
creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial
functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to
create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions
to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the
legislature to create a public office.
Ruling:
No. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department or the offices under him as stated in Section 31 of EO 292 in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective
149 | P a g e

and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of
its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly
within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated
legislative authority to reorganize his own office pursuant to EO 292.
The Reorganization did not entail the creation of a new, separate and
distinct Office. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a
new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained
to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which
is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper.
The
reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative
structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division (the
IAD) through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been
tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. Neither did the President delegate quasijudicial functions to administrative agency by the creation of IAD-ODESLA.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with
quasi-judicial powers. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY
G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999, J. Pardo
To constitute nepotism, where the official is the chief of the bureau or
the person exercising immediate supervision, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the said official.
Facts:
George Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice President, filed with the CSC
Quezon City a complaint against Pedro Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness,
misconduct, and nepotism. The CSC conducted a formal investigation and
promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the
charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. Dacoycoy was, however,
found guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his
two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively,
and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the
Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. After his MR was
denied, Dacoycoy filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction. The CA reversed and set aside the CSCs resolution,
ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and
Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is
the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is
he who performs the prohibited act.
150 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not the CSC correctly found the respondent guilty of
nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from service.
Ruling:
Yes. One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the
bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two
mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the
positions of driver and utility worker in Balicuatro. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag,
Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the
appointment of Rito. However, Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the
appointment of first level positions for short durations of three to six months
was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional
Director. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro
O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended
the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under
respondents immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of
the school. Both positions are career positions. To our mind, the unseen but
obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is
guilty of nepotism.
PRUDENCIO QUIMBO v. ACTING OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO GERVACIO
and DIRECTRESS MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO OF THE OMBUDSMAN
OFFICE
G.R. No. 155620, 9 August 2005, J. Carpio-Morales
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. It is not a penalty as such it is not
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension.
Facts:
Provincial Engineer Prudencio Quimbo was administratively charged for
harassment and oppression by Elmo Padaon, a general foreman detailed to
the Motor Pool Division, Provincial Engineering. During the pendency of the
administrative case before the Ombudsman, Quimbo was placed under
preventive suspension without pay to commence upon receipt of the order
and until such time that it is lifted but in no case beyond 6 months. The
151 | P a g e

Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension after Quimbo presented on
direct examination his last two witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman in its
decision found Quimbo guilty of oppression; this decision was later on
modified to simple misconduct only and he was suspended from office for a
period of two months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
pointing out that he was already preventively suspended and praying that the
period be taken into consideration as part of the final penalty imposed. The
Ombudsman found this contention untenable and clarified that preventive
suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; [and
that] [i]f after such investigation, the charge is established and the person
investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then
he shall accordingly be penalized. Likewise, the CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Quimbo.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed reversible error when it dismissed his
petition.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners argument that the dismissal of his petition is in
violation of the doctrine enunciated in Gloria v. Court of Appeals and the rule
on equity that a person should not be punished twice nor be made to suffer
the suspension penalty after [he] had [served] the same is untenable.
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between
suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction,
by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable
as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is
merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly
provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of E.O. No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. Not being a penalty,
the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered
part of the actual penalty of suspension as provided under Section 25 of the
same Rule XIV.
RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF RETIRED JUDGE MOSLEMEN T.
MACARAMBON UNDER R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 9946
A.M. No. 14061, 19 June 2012, J. Brion
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Resignation under RA 910
to discharge the duties of the office.
must
be
by
reason
of
incapacity
Facts:
Judge Moslemen Macarambon was an RTC Judge who was appointed as
Comelec Commissioner before reaching the optional retirement age of 60.
He requested that he be allowed to retire under Sec. 1 of RA 910. The Judge
asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of
the RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his
office. Citing the case of Re: Associate Justice Britanico, he posits that his
appointment as Comelec Commissioner incapacitated him to discharge his
duties as an RTC judge on account of his submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power. As an alternative, he appeals that he be
allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1 considering that he
has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and
a total of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while
he was short of the minimum age requirement of 60, he believes that the
Courts ruling in Re: Pineda is applicable to his case where the Court brushed
aside such requirement and considered the retirees career which was marked
with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned
from his judicial office before reaching the optional retirement age to receive
retirement benefits under RA 910.
Ruling:
No. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying
different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an
employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with
certain
age
and
service
requirements
specified
by
law
and
jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition
to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of
law. Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is
the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We
have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for
certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to
grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA 910, as amended must be by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. Resignation
contemplated under the law must have the element of involuntariness on the
part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to
discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent
of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial
employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors
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beyond his/her control. In either of the two instances, Judge Macarambons
case does not render him eligible to retire under RA 910.
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO
FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS
COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, BRION, J.
Longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for
each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the
judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or
justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post
and then he returned to the judiciary.
Facts:
This case involves the letter-requests of CA Associate Justice Remedios
Salazar-Fernando, CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and CA Associate
Justice Vicente Veloso for their claim of longevity pay for services rendered
within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package. They
anchored their claim under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 and the Court's ruling
in In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. In such case, Justice Pardo was
an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and
was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC,
without any interruption in his service. Accordingly, the court considered
Justice Pardos one-time service outside of the judiciary as part of his service
in the judiciary for purposes of determining his longevity pay.
Issue:
Whether or not they are entitled to longevity pay for their services
rendered outside the judiciary.
Ruling:
No. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that longevity pay should be
given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous,
efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside
of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in
the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single nonjudicial governmental post and then he returned to the judiciary.
Hence, in this case, Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando was an
incumbent MTC Judge, then she served as Chairman of LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC,
then she was appointed as Commissioner of COMELEC, then as a consultant
of COMELEC, and only then that she was appointed as Associate Justice of CA.
Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened which did not comply
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with the requirement of service in a single non-judicial position. On the other
hand, Associate Justices Gacutan and Veloso served as Commissioners of
NLRC before they were appointed in the CA. However, NLRC is an agency
attached to the DOLE, an Executive Department, and hence such is not
considered as continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary
for the purpose of longevity pay.
EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, MANUEL A.
BARCELONA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012, BRION, J.
An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.
Facts:
President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the
petitioners Fetalino and Calderon as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term
of seven (7) years. Eleven days later, Pres. Ramos renewed the their ad
interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned
before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on
presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer
re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, they merely served as
Comelec Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, they applied for their retirement benefits and monthly
pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. Accordingly, the
Comelec granted their pro-rated gratuity and pension. The petitioners asked
for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the ground that they are
entitled to lump sum benefit and not a pro-rated one. But Comelec
disapproved on the ground that one whose ad interim appointment expires
cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to entitle him to a
lump sum benefit.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to the lump sum gratuity provided
for by R.A. No. 1568.
Ruling:
No. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to
the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service
after having completed his term of office. The term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period
from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
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neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean
that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the Comelec without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the
confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.
Therefore, in this case, the petitioners can never be considered to have
retired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term,
but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office" as
required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568.
MELINDA L. OCAMPO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G. R. No. 188716, June 10, 2013, PEREZ, J.
Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against
the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the
same services and on the same creditable period. However, in this case, RA
1568, only allows payment of only a single gratuity and a single annuity out
of a single compensable retirement from any one of the covered agencies.
Facts:
Petitioner Melinda Ocampo was appointed as Board Member of the
Energy Regulatory After serving for two years and four months, she tendered
her retirement. She then availed of the five year lump sum benefit and
monthly pension under R.A.1568. After that, she was again appointed as
Chairman of ERB with a term of four years. However, she was only able to
serve two years of such term following the abolishment of ERB. She sought
the same retirement payment and monthly pension.
The Commission on Audit approved her first lump sum benefit and
monthly pension for the position of Board Member. However, as to her second
retirement as Chairman, COA opined that she was only entitled to pro-rated
benefits in accordance to the service period she actually have served. This
decision of COA is anchored on the prohibition against double pension.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the retirement claims of Ocampo amount to double
pension.
2. Whether or not Ocampo is entitled to the payment of two lump sum
payments, and payment thereafter of two monthly pensions.
Rulings:
1. No. Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition
against the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly
the same services and on the same creditable period. In this case, Ocampo is
not claiming two sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable
period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of
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her two retirements from the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement
benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct creditable periods, one for
her term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of the
same agency.
2. No. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 172 extends to members and
chairmen of the ERB similar retirement benefits that retiring members and
chairmen of the COA and COMELEC are entitled to under the law. Accordingly,
R.A. No. 1568 provides that a retiring chairmen and members of COA and of
COMELEC are entitled to five year lump sum benefit and monthly pension.
However, It is worth stressing that R.A.No. 1568 is a law that, first and
foremost, was intended to cover the retirement benefits of the chairmen and
members of the COA and of the COMELEC and that it has been the consistent
policy of the State to prohibit any appointment of more than one term in the
said constitutional bodies. Hence, R.A. No. 1568 cannot be said to have
sanctioned the payment of more than one set of retirement benefits to a
retiree as a consequence of multiple retirements in one agency. The mere
circumstance that members and chairmen of the ERB may be appointed to
serve therein for more than one term does not mean that they would be
entitled a set of retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568 for each of their
completed term.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA
G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
When Sec. 2, Article XI of the Constitution includes Ombudsman as one
of the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office.
Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an
investigation for allegations of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression
against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo Mojica. Consequently, the Office of
Ombudsman ordered that a separate criminal and administrative case be
filed against Mojica. Aggrieved, Mojica filed a petition before the CA. The CA
dismissed the complaints against Mojica, holding that Deputy Ombudsman is
a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for
the office held by him and removable only by impeachment, therefore he
cannot be charged with disbarment during his incumbency. Instead, he
should be impeached first before he may be held answerable to disbarment
proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.
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Ruling:
No. As enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only
the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the
members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman. When it includes Ombudsman as one of
the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office.
Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et. al
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.
The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment
complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice.
Facts:
Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez,
both were based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the
Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of
Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of
Representative Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both
complaints sufficient in form and substance. Consequently, Ombudsman
Gutierrez contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year bar
provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar
provision when it issued the Resolution
Ruling:
No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides
that, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year. The act of initiating the complaint
means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House
Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is
reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR
Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution
when it accepted the second impeachment complaint after the first
impeachment complaint was filed.
Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in
finding the complaints sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment
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Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et. al.
G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from
office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.
Facts:
This case involves two consolidated petitions filed by Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell BarrerasSulit. The petition of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales involves the Decision of
the Office of the President finding him guilty of inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of rules of procedure by allowing PSI Rolando Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without
any justification. He was then dismissed from his office. On the other hand,
the petition of Special Prosecutor Sulit involves the order of the Office of the
President initiating a Preliminary Investigation and requiring him to submit a
written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting
serious/grave.
Consequently, they filed their separate petitions assailing the act of the
President of removing them from their office. They both claim that the
President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the
Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional
independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President has the power to remove and
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.
Ruling:
Yes. Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to
discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them,
including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is
equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with
respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. For, while Section 21 declares
the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section
8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
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The manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions, Section 8(2)
and Section 21, was to provide for an external authority, through the person
of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over
all government officials and employees.
Moreover, following the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint
carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers
appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this
is when the law expressly provides otherwise. Therefore, in giving the
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid
officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et. al.
G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, BRION, J.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously
place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the Supreme
Court in the consolidated case of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales III and
Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. In such case, Gonzales and
Barreras Sulit assailed the power to remove and disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the President. In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President
has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which grants President
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed its prior pronouncement
and votes to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with
respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this conclusion does not
apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office
of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Constitution.
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Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are
subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place
at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all
of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is
what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly
collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to
the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and
balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true
for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of
their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete
trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
However, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys
under the Constitution.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN
v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.
BINAY, JR.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati, accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.
Pursuant to this, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay. Consequently, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order,
and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation. The CA granted the application for TRO, and subsequently
issued a WPI.
Hence, the Ombudsman filed this present petition assailing the issuance
of the TRO on the ground that of lack of jurisdiction. First, the Ombudsman
argues that Section 14 of RA 6770, or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," states
that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's
investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter
thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction. Second, it contends that it was
inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine in the
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issuance of the injunctive writ since it was a matter of defense which should
have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative
disciplinary proceedings.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. 6770 aims to shield Ombudsman from judicial
intervention as to secure its independence.
2. Whether or not CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the injunctive
order against the preventive suspension order.
Ruling:
1. No. The independent constitutional commissions have been
consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. Evidently, its
independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the insidious tentacles of
politics. That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence
cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the
Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power
- that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order
- clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from
political harassment or pressure.
2. No. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation
doctrine. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation
doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained good law, it cannot be
concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its
legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's
preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
On preventive suspension
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a
preventive measure. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure,
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the
suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him. The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order, under Section
24, RA 6770 are as follows: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either
of the following circumstances co-exist with the first a) The charge involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or c) The
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.
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On the Condonation Doctrine
The condonation doctrine is a jurisprudential creation, which states that
if it were established the acts subject of the administrative complaint were
indeed committed during the officials prior term, then he can no longer be
administratively charged for such act. The reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct,
if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. However, in this
case, the Court simply finds that it is high time to abandon the condonation
doctrine. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012, SERENO, J.
The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination.
Facts:
COA issued a Circular order which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions. With that, Petitioner dela Llana, in his capacity as taxpayer,
wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal
pre-audit service. However, the COA replied informing him of the circular
order which listed the pre-audit system. Consequently, dela Llana this Petition
for Certiorari alleging that that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA
cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by
a mere circular.
Ruling:
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No. There is nothing in the Constitution provision that requires the COA
to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in
Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a
situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special preaudit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this
Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line
with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
ELECTION LAW
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, et. al. v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws
to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.
Facts:
President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 which
mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration
system for new voters. RA 10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013,
and took effect fifteen (15) days after. Pursuant to that, the COMELEC issued
resolutions which commenced the mandatory biometric system of
registration and implemented the NoBio-NoBoto policy.
Consequently, herein petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolutions related thereto. They contend that
the said law violates the right to suffrage on grounds that it rises to the level
of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of
deactivation and biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated by the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution related
thereto, unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law.
The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory
disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount
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to a literacy, property or other substantive requirement. Moreover, the
concept of a "qualification" should be distinguished from the concept of
"registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which
a person's qualifications to vote is determined. The act of registering is only
one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the
citizen a qualified voter and one may be a qualified voter without exercising
the right to vote. Registration is a form of regulation and not as a qualification
for the right of suffrage.
Therefore, the State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may
then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a
literacy, property or other substantive requirement, the same cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, Sereno, J.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties,
organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means shall be denied registration.
Facts:
Magdalo Sa Pagbabago (Magdalo) filed a petition with Comelec,
seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party.
However, Comelec denied the petition for registration by taking judicial
notice that the party organizer and Chairman of Magdalo, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the Oakwood Mutiny thereby
employing violence and unlawful means to achieve the goals of the party.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec acted in grave abuse of discretion in
denying the registration of Magdalo.
Ruling:
No. At the outset, the Court held that Comelec properly took judicial
notice of the Oakwood incident, because I was widely known and extensively
covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Under
Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means
shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of
B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
Moreover, the finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through
violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of the criminal
proceedings against several member of Magdalo. The power vested by Article
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IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the Comelec
to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate
in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this
authority, the Comelec only has to assess whether the party or organization
seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
In the case at bar, the challenged Comelec Resolutions were issued
pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to
join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence is applicable. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the
Comelec only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence
adequate to support this conclusion.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DAN ERASMO, SR.,
G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012, ABAD, J.
A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification
for public office.
Facts:
After 26 years of being an Australian Citizen, Rommel Jalosjos returned
to the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the Republic and renounced
his Australian citizenship. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. However, Dan Erasmo moved to cancel the
COC of Jalosjos on the ground of material misrepresentation since the latter
failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement of the Local
Government Code. Apparently, Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient
visitor in his brothers house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil,
Zamboanga as his domicile.
Issue:
Whether or not Jalosjos has complied with the residency requirement.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates
compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a
question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b)
where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one;
and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
When Jalosjos came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with
his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that he did so with intent to
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change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition
of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But
this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where
he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is
that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA
ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N.
ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT,
ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO
G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As petitioners disqualification to run for public office had already been
settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent
upon the Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it
be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
Facts:
Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness. His conviction carried with it the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Thereafter, his prison term was
commuted by the President to 16 years. After serving the same, he was
discharged from prison. Jalosjos then filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC)
for mayor. In response thereto, five petitions to cancel his CoC were filed with
the Comelec. Pending resolution of the petitions, the Comelec En Banc issued
motu proprio Resolution No. 9613, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due
course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga
City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement.
Issue:
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Whether the Comelec En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it
issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioners
right to due process.
Ruling:
No. Comelec En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when
it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions.
Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws
in cancelling petitioners CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute
disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final
conviction. In this regard, the Comelec En Banc was exercising its
administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for
reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since
the Comelec En Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. As
petitioners disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in
a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss
in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election.
Also, it was held that Jalosjos perpetual absolute disqualification had

not been removed by the Local Government Code (LGC), because Sec. 40(a)
of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provisionsuch as
Article 41 in this casedirectly and specifically prohibits the convict from
running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from
petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines.
Facts:
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Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio Caballeros certificate
of candidacy (COC) on the ground of false representation. It was alleged that
Caballero was actually a Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for mayor.
Caballero argued that he already took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
and has renounced his Canadian citizenship.
Comelec nevertheless cancelled the Caballeros COC for failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement, reasoning that Caballeros
naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Caballero insisted that the requirement
of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for
public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he
seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his
constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months
of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial
compliance with the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile.
Ruling:
Yes. The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile
or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned
by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
In this case, Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and
raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of
origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in Caballero's
case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of
Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in
Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
Moreover, it was held that Caballeros retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a
Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
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Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he
made it as such.
ALROBEN J. GOH, v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014, CARPIO, J.
When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its Current
Operating Expenditures, such appropriation includes expenditures to carry
out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
Facts:
Alroben Goh filed a recall petition against Mayor Lucilo Bayron due to
loss of trust and confidence anchored on the alleged violations of Bayron of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9864
finding the petition sufficient in form and substance. However, the Comelec
resolved not to continue with any proceedings relative to recall as it does not
have a line item budget or legal authority to commit public funds for the
purpose. According to Comelec, until a law is passed by Congress
appropriating funds for recall elections, any proceeding relative to the
petition should be suspended.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2014 GAA provided the line item appropriation to
allow the Comelec to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall
elections.
Ruling:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the Comelec with the
power to [e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The
1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the Comelec's fiscal autonomy, but
also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its
appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to
the Comelec Chairman, contrary to what Resolution No. 9882 said. This is
found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the Comelec
admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a line item for the 'Conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites. In addition,
one of the specific constitutional functions of the Comelec is to conduct recall
elections. When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its
"Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures
to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall
elections. Thus, in Socrates v. Comelec, recall elections were conducted even
without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA.
Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, there is no reason why the
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Comelec is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of recall.. Should
the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the
Comelec Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item
appropriation from the Comelec's existing savings, as this augmentation is
expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, v. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI,
SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES,
JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT
G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, SARMIENTO, J.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation.
Facts:
Sultan Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly of Central Mindanao. The Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs invited Limbona to attend the dialogues regarding the issues affecting
the region. Consistent with the said invitation, Limbona announced that there
will be no session for that day as their presence is required by the
Committee. However, the Assembly held session in defiance of Limbona's
advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum, all assemblymen moved to
declare the seat of Speaker Limbona vacant.
Issue:
Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are
now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?
Ruling:
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618,
in the first place, mandates that [t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second
place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services.
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It was also held that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook," but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on
[sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess
called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess
of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the
respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment
and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when
arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out
informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. The Court agrees with
the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short
intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not
have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. Hence, there can
be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while
this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it
was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place,
the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought.
Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear
that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that
instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent
act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this
reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014, LEONEN, J.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot
be taxed by local government units.
Facts:
PEZA was created to manage economic zones in the country. The City
of Lapu-Lapu demanded real property taxes from PEZAs properties in Mactan
Economic Zone. The City anchors its demand on the Local Government Code
which withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously granted to
entities. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Government,
the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA under the
Local Government Code.
Issue:
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Whether or not the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national
government, hence, exempt from payment of real property taxes.
Ruling:
Yes. An instrumentality is any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. As an instrumentality of the national government, the
PEZA is vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created
the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic
zones in the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly
developed or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial,
industrial tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial
centers. By operating, administering, managing, and developing special
economic zones which attract investments and promote use of domestic
labor, the PEZA carries out the policy of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot
be taxed by local government units. Although a body corporate vested with
some corporate powers, the PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation taxable for real property taxes.
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,
REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE
RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Facts:
Respondent Province decided to build a Jetty Port and Passenger
Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay in the
Malay Municipality. However, Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, Malay
Municipality, issued a Resolution manifesting its strong opposition to said
application. Consequently, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province
approved a resolution formally authorizing Governor Marquez to represent
the renovation/rehabilitation of the Caticlan/Cagban Passenger Terminal
Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (b) reclamation of a portion of Caticlan
foreshore for commercial purposes. During the course of the negotiation,
respondent Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original
proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to
maximize the utilization of its resources and as a response to the findings of
the Preliminary Geohazard Assessment study which showed that the
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recession and retreat of the shoreline caused by coastal erosion and scouring
should be the first major concern in the project site and nearby coastal area.
But still, the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay refused to give the favourable
endorsement to the Province of Aklan. As a result, the petitioner contends
that the respondent province failed to conduct the required consultation
procedures as required by the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the prior consultation is a requirement before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented.
Ruling:
Yes. Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of
these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. Based
on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required
by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent Province.
The project in this case can be classified as a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities,
because the commercial establishments to be built on phase 1, as described
in the EPRMP quoted above, could cause pollution as it could generate
garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel discharge. Hence, it is covered by
the requirements found in Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
provisions that are quoted below:
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON v. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,
G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, CORONA, J.
The Mayor has the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code
to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel Manila
Mayor Jose Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified a certain
area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area and would be
adversely affected are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
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Later on, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies.
They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most
viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU
in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that
the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity
of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to
issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for mandamus was proper.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. The court also held that the court
need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent
with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the
Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions
which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly
gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, Feb.
13, 2008), the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 was questioned by the oil
companies. But the Supreme Court held that it was a valid exercise of police
power, because it was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents
of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack
on
the
Pandacan
Terminals. Towards
this
objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial
to commercial. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular
class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there
is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It
therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the
threat.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO v. ALFREDO S. LIM,
in his capacity as mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014, PEREZ, J.
There is truly no such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the
general welfare of the people is concerned.
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Facts:
The present case is a sequel of the Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.
(2008). During the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim),
who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 8187 which repealed Ordinance No. 8027, thus allowing, once
again, the operation of the oil companies in the Pandacan area.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations
of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely
depending on the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the general welfare of
the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true
sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to which particular sector
among its constituents it wishes to favor. Now that the City of Manila, through
the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on the matter,
favoring the citys economic related benefits, through the continued stay of
the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its
constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final determination on
the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific right of the inhabitants
of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals that
there is truly no such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the general
welfare of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say
when the judiciary mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, March
10, 2015), the Supreme Court denied the oil companies motion for
reconsideration, ruling in this wise: There are overwhelming reasons stated
in the Decision to support the Courts pronouncement that the very nature of
depots has no place in a densely populated area, among others, the very
history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread over the entire City of
Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December 194114 and
the other incident of explosion, which were both considered in G.R. No.
156052.
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SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et. al.
G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996, HERMOSISIMA, JR.,
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.
Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago claiming that Santiago
could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income
for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls
below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00).
They contend that in the computation of the average annual income of
Santiago, the IRAs should be excluded. The certification issued by the Bureau
of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which
indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is
allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded
from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually
income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government
and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
Issue:
Whether or not annual income of a local government unit includes
IRAs.
Ruling:
Yes. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth
utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and
are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the
same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing
rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the
IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. As such, for purposes
of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the
income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in
the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This
is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to
be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross
accretions of funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action
on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which
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the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds.
AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V.
VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
The Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec.
453 under the Local Government Code to mean the qualified voters not only
in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the
political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec.
453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a resolution
requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city
(HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued a Presidential
Proclamation proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in
Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Comelec issued a
proclamation resolving that registered residents of Cabanatuan City should
participate in the said plebiscite.
The governor of Nueva Ecija filed a motion for reconsideration
maintaining that the qualified voters of the province should be included in the
said plebiscite. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the
LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units
directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded.
Issue:
Whether or not only the qualified registered voters of Cabanatuan City
can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city into an HUC.
Ruling:
No. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. Creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominatormaterial change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected
as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly
affected. The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly affected by
Cabanatuan Citys conversion. As a consequence, all the qualified registered
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voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite
called for that purpose.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the
President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented
by the SENATE PRESIDENT, et. al.
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, NACHURA, J.
The exemption from the land area requirement of local government
units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections
442 and 450 of the LGC.
Facts:
The President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). After complying with the
required plebiscite, the President appointed the interim set of provincial
officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the
May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set
of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. The former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 arguing that
Dinagat failed to comply with the required land area based on Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9355 is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The exemption from the land area requirement of local
government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated
under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of
municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with
respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was
filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. With the formulation of
the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction
of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in
place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to
immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be
found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its
plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
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ARNOLD D. VICENCIO VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND HON.
JUANITO G. ESPINO JR.
G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012, SERENO, J.
There is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that
provided for the city mayor.
Facts:
A city ordinance Ordinance No. 15-2003 was passed granting the Vice
Mayor of Malabon, Jay Jay Yambao, to negotiate and enter into contract for
consultancy services for consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat tasked to
function in their respective areas of concern. Later on, petitioner Arnold
Vicencio was elected as Vice Mayor of Malabon, and he deemed it necessary
to hire the services of consultants with the end view of augmenting and
upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of the
legislative machinery of the city. After the funds were appropriated, an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount of three
hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (384,980) for
being an improper disbursement. The Petitioner appealed to the Adjudication
and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA, but the latter denied the petition.
The COA affirmed the decision of the ASB.
Issue:
Whether or not the contracts entered into by Vice Mayor Arnold
Vicencio are valid.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 456 of the Local Government Code, there is no
inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts
on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city
mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf
of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance
No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into
contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under
the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be
construed as a continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of
the Vice- Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
ROMEO J. GAMBOA JR. VS. MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., AND JUAN Y
ARANETA
G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the
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duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge
them.
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. was elected as the Vice Governor of
Negros Occidental while respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta
were elected as Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) members. The governor had
an official trip abroad and designated petitioner as acting governor until his
return. However, during the regular session, the respondents questioned the
authority of the petitioner and subsequently filed a petition for declaratory
relief and prohibition. The trial court rendered a decision and declared
petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of
the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.
Issue:
Whether or not the Vice Governor has the authority to preside over SP
sessions while he is exercising the powers and duties of the Office of the
Governor.
Ruling:
No. It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is
considered effectively absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of
the mayor during the latters absence. This doctrine should equally apply to
the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it
is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet this
term should be reasonably construed to mean effective absence, that is, one
that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge
the powers and prerogatives of his office. There is no vacancy whenever the
office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is
a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and
exercise at present the duties of the office. By virtue of the foregoing
definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or assumption of
the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency.
Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession
provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the
Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy
occurring in the same office. This is so because in the eyes of the law, the
office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to
exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the
duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge
them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear
rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in
both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a
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temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter
acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes
an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to
preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the
remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the
election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting
Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended
so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the
inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session,
the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN
v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.
BINAY, JR
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
Facts:
A complaint for plunder and violation of RA 3019 was filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati in connection with the five (5)
phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City. Therafter, the
Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order and copy of the preventive
suspension order was received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s
staff.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance
of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued
that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project
since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and
that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic. The CA issued a TRO
he CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for,
i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati
Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.
Issue:
Whether or not the condonation doctrine is applicable.
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Ruling:
No. the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term
of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning
an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. Further, Nothing in Section 66 (b) of the
Local Government Code states that the elective local official's administrative
liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, CORTES, J.
The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220
which created the Cordillera Administrative Region which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province
and the City of Baguio on the primary ground that it pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act
through a plebiscite. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region was
enacted and signed into law. It recognizes the CAR and the offices and
agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in
Art. XXI of RA 6766.
Issue:
Whether or not the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Ruling:
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No. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that
are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be
sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the
covered areas.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, et al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et
al.
G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, BRION, J.
RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant
the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM.
Facts:
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.
10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents
power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. Datu
Michael Abas Kida, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration assailing
constitutionality of R.A. 10153 on the ground that the constitution gave
ARMM a special status and is separate and distinct from the ordinary local
government units.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM
regional elections with national and local elections.
2. Whether or not by granting the President the power to appoint OICs
violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative
and executive offices.
3. Whether or not ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in
their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no
specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective
officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
Ruling:
1. Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to
synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred
from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which states that the first elections of Members of the Congress
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under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The
first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,
which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the
Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. The framers of the Constitution
during the deliberation, through Davide could not have expressed their
objective more clearly that there will be a single election in 1992 for all
elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials.
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or
shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
2. No. Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which mandates the President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The above-quoted provision did not change the basic structure of the ARMM
regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the
basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the
offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall
temporarily assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices.
3. No. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy
their offices. It is established that elective ARMM officials are also local
officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of
amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the threeyear term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed
by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, BRION, J.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office

holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the
failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term
when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for
reasons established by law.
Facts:
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Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms,
respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position. This prompted Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo
B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due
course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth
term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. Commission on Elections
(Comelec) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption
because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete
service for the full term.
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule
under RA 7160, or the Local Government Code.
Ruling:
No.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states that the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of
title to office and elective official must have involuntarily left his office. Thus,
based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is
an effective interruption of service within a term, while on the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective
post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of
a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office. The office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.
In cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the
meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office since loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Thus. Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayanimposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not
interrupt an elective officials term.
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MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO R. VEGA
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates a

rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Facts:
For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral
derby, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner
one Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010 elections where Abundo
and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the
formers disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term
limit rule. Comelec First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a
quo warranto action before the RTCto unseat Abundo on essentially the same
grounds Torres raised. The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as
municipal mayor because he has already served three consecutive terms.
Comelecs second division and en banc affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive
terms.
Ruling:
No. Pursuant to Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec.
43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent
elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining service
for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
During the period of one year and ten months, title to hold such office
and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to
his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually
held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his
declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate
for only a little over one year and one month. The reality on the ground is
that Abundo actually served less. The almost two-year period during which
Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered
an involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary
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interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. It
cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his
election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since
his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the
elective position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the
finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office
and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, v. HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from

acquiring lands of the public domain.
Facts:
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines. The spouses bought a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of Elena Muller. However, due
to incompatibilities and Helmut Mullers alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. Helmut Muller filed a
petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime
of absolute
community of
property between
them.
With
regard to
the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the Helmut Muller and he cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution. Helmut Muller appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that he
is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement, that the funds were given to Elena in trust that the funds
paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage, and
that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of
his personal funds. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Helmut Muller.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds
used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property.
Ruling:
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No. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
Helmut Mullers disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute under the Constitution. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. To allow reimbursement would
in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not
allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, v. PR BUILDERS, INC.,

G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens
owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to
Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused
the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed
transferring ownership.
Facts:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his spouse, Dutch nationals, entered into a
Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. for the purchase of a 210-sq m
residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan,
Laurel, Batangas. When PR Builders failed to comply with its verbal promise
to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed before the HLURB a complaint
for rescission of contract. HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of
spouses Hulst and order to reimburse the purchase price paid by the
complainants to P.R. Builders with damages and attorneys fees. HLURB
Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution and the Sheriff levied on PR Buikder's 15
parcels of land and sold it to an auction sale. CA reversed the decision and
set aside the levy on the ground that the subject properties cannot be owned
by Hulst being a foreign national.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Contract to Sell is valid.
2. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to reimbursement.
3. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to recover damages and attorneys
fees.
Ruling:
1. No. Sec. 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that save
in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Since petitioner and his wife,
189 | P a g e

being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring
and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered
into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void.
2. Yes. Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of
the because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault. In pari delicto
is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law,
from an illegal contract. No suit can be maintained for its specific
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the
money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation and where the parties
are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against
the other. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions one of which is Uuder
Article 1414 which states that,one who repudiates the agreement and
demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to
recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid.
3. No.
Hulst is entitled to the recovery only of the amount
of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. A void
contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. No damages may be
recovered on the basis of a void contract. Being nonexistent, the agreement
produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is
not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
WILSON P. GAMBOA, v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES,
et al.
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, CARPIO, J.
The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus
only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. The 40% foreign
ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial
ownership and the controlling interest.
Facts:
General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26% of the outstanding
common shares of PLDT to PTIC. Subsequently, First Pacific, a Bermudaregistered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the remaining 54% of
the outstanding capital stock of PTIC.
Aside from that, Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it
would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125% of the outstanding capital
stock of PTIC, through a public bidding. First Pacific, through its subsidiary,
MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the
111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC,
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with the Philippine Government. With the sale, First Pacifics common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 %to 3 %, thereby increasing the
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This allegedly
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits
foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.
Gamboa submits that the 40% foreign equity limitation in domestic
public utilities refers only to common shares because such shares are entitled
to vote and it is through voting that control over a corporation is exercised.
Gamboa posits that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers to the ownership of common capital stock subscribed and
outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of PLDT,
can vote and elect members of the board of directors. It is undisputed that
PLDTs non-voting preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino citizens. This
arose from Presidential Decree No. 217, issued on 16 June 1973 by then
President Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone
line to subscribe to non-voting preferred shares to pay for the investment
cost of installing the telephone line. Secretary Teves, on the other hand, do
not offer any definition of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and Pangilinan
of PLDT do not dispute that more than 40 % of the common shares of PLDT
are held by foreigners.
Issue:
Whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers to the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital
stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a
public utility.
Ruling:
The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Section 11,
Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution
mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, it explicitly reserves to Filipino
citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of
the 1987 Constitution, to conserve and develop our patrimony and ensure a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. Thus the 40% foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed
by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote,
which are common shares, considering that it is through voting that control is
being exercised. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote
in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors.
PLDTs holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to
vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation state that
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"each holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each
share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the
stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the
exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other purposes."
In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors,
meaning only common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely,
holders of preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the election of
directors, do not have any control over PLDT.
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.), et al. v. POWER
SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
(PSALM), et al.
G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, VILLARAMA, J.
Once water is removed from its natural source, it ceases to be a part
of the natural resources of the country and may be subject of ordinary
commerce and may even be acquired by foreigners.
Facts:
PSALM, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001" (EPIRA) manages the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets. Thereafter, PSALM
commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in
San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, a portion of which is co-owned by NPC.
After the post-bid evaluation, PSALMs Board of Directors approved and
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water.
Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and
Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS) et al.
alleging that K-Water which is a foreign corporation, thus PSALM clearly
violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of
water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the
Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are
at least 60% Filipino-owned. PSALM countered the nationality issue raised,
citing previous opinions rendered by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
consistently holding that the utilization of water by a hydroelectric power
plant does not constitute appropriation of water from its natural source
considering that the source of water (dam) that enters the intake gate of the
power plant is an artificial structure.
Issue:
Whether the utilization of water by the power plant to be owned and
operated by a foreign-owned corporation will violate the provisions of the
Constitution and Water Code.
Ruling:
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No. Art. 15 of The Water Code of the Philippines states that only
citizens of the Philippines, of legal age, as well as juridical persons, who are
duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, may apply for
water permits. It is clear that the law limits the grant of water rights only to
Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly qualified by law to exploit and
develop water resources, including private corporations with sixty percent of
their capital owned by Filipinos.
The nationality requirement imposed by the Water Code refers to the
privilege to appropriate and use water and has interpreted this phrase to
mean the extraction of water directly from its natural source (Secretary of
Justice Opinion No. 14, s. 1995). Natural is defined as that which is
produced without aid of stop, valves, slides, or other supplementary means.
The water that is used by the power plant could not enter the intake gate
without the dam, which is a man-made structure. Such being the case, the
source of the water that enters the power plant is of artificial character rather
than natural. Once water is removed from its natural source, it ceases to be a
part of the natural resources of the country and may be the subject of
ordinary commerce and may even be acquired by foreigners.
NPCs water rights remain an integral aspect of its jurisdiction and
control over the dam and reservoir. That the EPIRA itself did not ordain any
transfer of water rights leads us to infer that Congress intended NPC to
continue exercising full supervision over the dam, reservoir and, more
importantly, to remain in complete control of the extraction or diversion of
water from the Angat River. In this way, the States full supervision and
control over the countrys water resources is also assured notwithstanding
the privatized power generation business
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC. v. REDMONT
CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
Facts:
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur,
Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a
100% Canadian corporation. In addition to that since Nara et al. capital
stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from
engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for
Filipino citizens. In their answer Nara et al. averred that they were qualified
persons under Section 3(aq) of R.A. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
which provides that any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or
a corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or
authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical and financial
capability to undertake mineral resources development and duly registered in
accordance with law at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital of which is
owned by citizens of the Philippines. Provided, That a legally organized
foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of
granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or
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mineral processing permit. Additionally, they stated that their nationality as
applicants is immaterial because they also applied for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements, which are granted to foreign-owned corporations.
Nevertheless, they asserted that though MBMI owns 40% of the shares of
PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which
owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in
turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro), the shares of MBMI will not make it the
owner of at least 60% of the capital stock of each of corporations. They
added that the best tool used in determining the nationality of a corporation
is the "control test. Mining Adjudication Board ruled in favor of Narra et al.
However, RTC and CA reversed the said ruling. In reaching the conclusion, the
court applied the Grandfather Rule as a supplement to the Control Test.
Issue:
Whether or not the Grandfather Rule can be applied in determining the
nationality of the corporation.
Ruling:
Yes. The use of the Grandfather Rule as a supplement to the Control
Test is not proscribed by the Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
The Grandfather Rule was originally conceived to look into the citizenship of
the individuals who ultimately own and control the shares of stock of a
corporation for purposes of determining compliance with the constitutional
requirement of Filipino ownership. From the excerpts in the Record of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it was shown that the framers of the
Constitution have not foreclosed the Grandfather Rule as a tool in verifying
the nationality of corporations for purposes of ascertaining their right to
participate in nationalized or partly nationalized activities. However, it is only
when the Control Test is first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be
applied. Put in another manner, if the subject corporations Filipino equity
falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately considered
foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule
disappears. As a corollary rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity
ratio is apparently met by the subject or investee corporation, a resort to the
Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of the beneficial
ownership and control. On the case at hand, the fact that MBMI had
practically provided all the funds in Tesoro, McArthur and Narra creates
serious doubt as to the true extent of its control and ownership over the said
corporations.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON
STRAIT V. REYES
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration,
development, and use of natural resources, but only through either financial
agreements or technical ones.
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Facts:
Resident Marine Mammals are the toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in Taon
Strait, joined by stewards.
Initially, the Government of the Philippines entered into a contract with
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) involving geological and
geophysical studies of the Taon Strait. Then, they converted it into a Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46) which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Taon Strait. Protesting the
adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon
Strait, Resident Marine and Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center et
al. assert that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the 1987
Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned. It further asserts that
SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial assistance
agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Service Contract No. 46 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country.
Foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration,
development, and use of natural resources, but only through either financial
agreements or technical ones. SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law
allowing its activities. SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but
also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered
that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Taon Strait being a
protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234 requires that the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly
covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose. No law
was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and
conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Taon Strait
and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under
SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear
that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape
such as Taon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL.
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G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006, CARPIO, J.
Land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus
cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) located in Paranaque City. The
Offi cers of the City of Paranaque sent notices to MIAA due to real
estate tax delinquency. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the
said offi cers threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and
buildings of MIAA which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary
period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for a TRO with the
Supreme Court a day before the public auction which the court granted but
the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public
auction. MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the
land and building are with MIAA, still, the ownership is with the Republic
of the Philippines. That as the said properties are of public dominion,
they cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
Ruling:
Yes. Art 420 of the Civil Code provides, to wit: Art 420. The following
things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;. No one can
dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the
Civil Code are owned by the State. The term "ports" includes seaports and
airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port" constructed
by the State. Hence, the same are properties of public dominion and thus
owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA
collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the
character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The
charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the
property whether it is of public dominion or not.
As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
outside the commerce of man. Unless the President issues a proclamation
withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public use, these properties
remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable. Since the disputed
properties are of public dominion, they are not subject to levy on execution or
foreclosure sale.
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DANTE LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD GORDON
G.R. NO. 175352, JANUARY 18, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The PNRCs structure is sui generis.
Facts:
Liban, et al. filed with the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard
J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate for having been elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors
during his incumbency as Senator in violation of Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution. It was advanced by Liban, et al. that the PNRC is a GOCC.
Formerly, the Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in
Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit
his legislative seat. The Court, however, held further that the PNRC Charter
(R.A 95) is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation which
the Congress cannot create. Hence, it directed the PNRC to incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Issue:
What is the nature of PNRC?
Ruling:
The PNRCs structure is sui generis. Although the PNRC is neither a
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a
subsidiary thereof, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC
is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution that must be organized under the Corporation Code. In sum, the
PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments
under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize
its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties.
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177131, JUNE 7, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation created by law
for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and
Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987.
Facts:
In 1999, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued a resolution stating
that the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a GOCC subject to auditing
jurisdiction of COA. The BSP argued that the provisions of RA 7278 suggest
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that governance of BSP has come to be overwhelmingly a private affair or
nature, with government participation restricted to the seat of the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports.
Issue:
Whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the
auditing jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
Ruling:
Yes. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or
controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists
another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are
otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by
law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject
to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional
policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the
government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the
BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to
the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is
required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically
viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test
would
only
apply
if
the
corporation
is
engaged
in
some
economic activity or business function for the government, which is not the
case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall
under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA VS HON. EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R No. 187167, JULY 16, 2011, CARPIO, J.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Facts:
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In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic
baselines of the Philippines was enacted (Baselines Law). This law was meant
to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984. Professor
Merlin Magallona, et al. questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines
hence the law is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9522 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is
not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has
nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the
Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of
territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. The law did not
decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old
law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines
enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square
nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to
586,210 sq. na. mi. If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et al. v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO et al.
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
Facts:
As a result of the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the
Second World War, Vinuya et al, all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, sought
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the assistance of the respondent in filing their claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who are responsible for the so called "comfort
women" system. However, the officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners and stated that compensation for the victims have
already been complied with by virtue of the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Dissatisfied, Vinuya et al., filed this present petition for certiorari with
an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the respondents.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims
for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them.
Ruling:
No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims
against Japan. Certain types of cases often have been found to present
political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations.
It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative
'the political'departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision.
The question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts
to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by
the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners
cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by
a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed.
Moreover, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to
espouse petitioners claims. Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the
right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of
states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be
200 | P a g e

influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the
particular claim. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its
protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.
It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be
determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the
particular case.
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al.
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, PUNO J.
Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate and the role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Facts:
In this petition, Senator Pimentel et al, sought to compel the officials of
the executive branch to transmit the text of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine Mission to the Senate for ratification for the Statute
specifically requires that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory states. Senator Pimentel et al., contends that it is the
function of the Senate to ratify treaties pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution and that the executive branch is obliged to transmit
the signed copy of the Statute to the Senate. It further alleged that since the
provision of the Rome Statute forms part of the customary international law,
the Senate has the ministerial duty to ratify the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive branch has a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute even without the signature of the
President.
Ruling:
No. It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to
ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should
not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in
the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the
writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction
201 | P a g e

to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed
text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK
B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, Melo, J.
Facts:
The Philippines has an extradition treaty with the USA. In 1999, the DOJ
received from US a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez. Pending evaluation of the extradition docuements, Jimenez
requested copies of the extradition request, but the DOJ denied such request
on the ground that the extradition treaty states that the formal request for
extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy
rules under United States law. According to the DOJ, such denial is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in
any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue:
Whether or not granting Jimenez the rights of notice and hearing would
be considered a breach of the extradition treaty with the US.
are granted to the prospective extraditee despite the silence of the
extradition treaty.
Ruling:
No. US. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions
of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted
to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance of the
Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision.
In this case, there is no such conflict between international law and
municipal law. Instead, there is a void in the provisions of the treaty as
regards the basic due process of the prospective extraditee. In the absence of
a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of
the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the
treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Petitioner contends that
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the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation
that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable
during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot
be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, CARPIO
MORALES, J.
The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly
included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
Facts:
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
petitioners sought to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD. Petitioners alleged that respondents exceeded their
authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the President, in the course of peace negotiations may agree
to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional
amendments.
Ruling:
Yes. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations
with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not
mean that she has no such authority. The Presidents power to conduct peace
negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has
the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted
pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly
successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of
an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is
to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to
achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to
explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require
changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested
with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the
203 | P a g e

President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their
grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions
that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting
them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act
upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment
and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to
Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the
recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional
convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, et al. v. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al.
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J.
Facts:
The Senate ratified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement,
which improves the countrys access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. The WTO is said to provide new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country.
Petitioners, however, assailed the ratification, contending that the WTO
agreement impairs the Philippine economic sovereignty, legislative power
and the Filipino First policy under the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate gravely abused its discretion in ratifying the
WTO agreement.
Held:
No. The Philippine Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations. Applying the Doctrine of Incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international
agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Moreover, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its
charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the
"concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.
204 | P a g e

What the Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine
whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation
of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic
self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in
his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction.
Facts:
Jeffrey Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development

Bank (ADB). He was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Thereafter, MeTC judge received an
"office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. As a result,
MeTc judge dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest.
Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement.
Ruling:
No. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers
and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity from legal
process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned therein
205 | P a g e

is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official
capacity. Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity agreement
because Philippines laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as

Commander of the US 7th Fleet et al
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears to prohibit
only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties.
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to Indonesia
when it ran aground the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift, US 7 th Fleet Commander expressed regret for
the incident in a press statement. Three months later, the US Navy-led
salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
the coral reef. The petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials, claiming that the grounding and
salvaging operations caused and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect several provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao.
They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident. Only the Philippine respondents filed a comment to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued without its
consent. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
206 | P a g e

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while
they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
207 | P a g e

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Digested by: DC 2016 Members

Political Law Review

The Philippine Constitution

National Territory and the Archipelagic Doctrine 5

General Principles and State Policies

Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances 13

Membership, Election and Qualifications 17

Election, Immunity, Privileges and Inhibitions

Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights 62

Equal Protection Clause

Searches and Seizure

Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data

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Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Data and Kalikasan

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Accountability of Public Officers

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National Economy and Patrimony

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THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

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ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

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the Comelec which attained finality, and that of the

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ELECTION, IMMUNITY, PRIVILEGES AND INHIBITIONS

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