Jurisdiction of Courts in Petitions for Certiorari | 30

Things to Remember about Rule 65

General Rule: The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have
concurrent jurisdiction when it comes to petitions for certiorari.
Exception: De los Reyes vs. People, 480 SCRA 294 [ 2006]
Petition for certiorari to annul RTC orders filed with the SC should be dismissed. It should
have been filed with the CA, following the principle of hierarchy of courts.
[1] If aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a petition for certiorari.
[2] Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are not available under the Rule on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 19), in a petition for a writ of amparo (Sec. 19, Rule on the Writ
of Amparo), and in a petition for a writ of habeas data (Sec. 19, Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data), It is also not available in small claims cases (Sec. 14 (g). A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
[3] If involving acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition should be filed in CA
(Sec. 4).
[4] This writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
[5] Not available as a remedy for the correction of the acts performed by a sheriff during the
execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but are purely ministerial
functions. Prohibition is the proper remedy.
[6] Where the function is merely investigative and recommendatory with no power to
pronounce judgment on the controversy, it does not involve the exercise of judicial or quasijudicial power. Hence, the acts may not be challenged in a petition for certiorari.
[7] A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing than an error of judgment which may be reviewed by or corrected by
appeal.
[8] Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment. I think this is the
exception rather than the general rule. As a rule, interlocutory orders must not assailed on
certiorari during the pendency of the case except when the same is patently erroneous or is
cause for the miscarriage of justice.
[9] The ground for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[10] A court's denial of motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be

questioned by certiorari; it cannot be subject of appeal, until final order or judgment is

rendered. What this means is that if the court denying motion of A rendered a decision in
favor of A, there is no longer any reason for A to appeal. If, however, the decisions is
adverse to A, he can go up to the next court in hierarchy and attach as one of the issues to
be resolved or assign as one of the errors to be reviewer the denial of the motion.
Exceptions: Certiorari, Mandamus or Prohibition is appropriate:
DBP vs. La Campana Development Corp., 448 SCRA 384 [2005]
[a] When trial court issued the order without or excess of jurisdiction;
[b] When there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or,
[c] When appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy
as when an appeal would not promptly relieve defendants from
the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order.
[11] A mere denial of an application for an ex parte order for the seizure of evidence is not
indicative of grave abuse of discretion where petitioner failed to point out specific
instances where grave abuse of discretion was allegedly committed and how the
respondent court supposedly exercised its power in a despotic, capricious or
whimsical manner.
[12] A judge gravely abuses his discretion when he extends by twenty (20) days the 72-hour
restraining order he initially issued because "in no case shall the total period of effectivity of
the temporary restraining order exceed 20 day.".
[13] There is grave abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to determine a factual
controversy before issuing a writ of demolition. Failure to do so is todisregard basic
principles of due process because before demolition could be effected, the parties
concerned must be heard.
[14] For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to issue, the petitioner must have no other
recourse, appeal, for example, or any other remedy that makes the reparation of injury
plain, speedy and adequate .
[15] Under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal, the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor is final. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary
course of law. To file an appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 is an improper
remedy.
[16] The CA is empowered under its certiorari jurisdiction to annul and declare void the
questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, but only on two grounds lack of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The power to
reverse and set aside partakes of an appellate jurisdiction which the CA does not have over
judgments of the Secretary of Justice exercising quasi-judicial functions.
[17] A judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals on the petition for certiorari against the
Secretary of Justice is reviewable by the Supreme Court by a petition for review under Rule

45, not the original action for certiorari under Rule 65. It is elementary that a writ of certiorari
under Rule 65 where the remedy of appeal (like Rule 45) is available precludes certiorari.
[18] Generally, if appeal is available, certiorari cannot be resorted to. Appeal and certiorari
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
[19] Certiorari filed instead of appeal during period of appeal did not toll period or prevent
judgment from becoming final.
[20] Certiorari not substitute for lost appeal. Existence and availability of the right to appeal
prohibits the resort to certiorari even if the error ascribed to the court is lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or law set out in the decision.
[21] If remedy of appeal lost due to petitioners neglect or error in choice of remedies,
certiorari not substitute or tool to shield petitioner from adverse effects.
Exceptions:
[a] When public welfare and advancement of public policy dictate.
[b] When broader interest of justice so requires.
[c] When writs issued are null and void.
[d] When questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
[e] Where appeal is not adequate, speedy and effective.
[f] In any such instances, special civil action of certiorari may be availed of
Even during the pendency of the case or even after judgment, or

Even when appeal has been availed of

[22] Availability of appeal does not foreclose recourse to certiorari where appeal not
adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient.
[23] Rule may be relaxed when rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice.
[24] Where remedies not incompatible, filing of certiorari not abandonment of appeal.
Appeal is from decision in main case while certiorari is against order denying motion for new
trial.
[25] An appeal from a judgment does not bar a certiorari petition against the order granting
execution pending appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution.
[24] However, a party is not allowed to question a decision on the merits and also invoke
certiorari. Filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and ordinary appeal under Rule 41
cannot be allowed because one remedy would necessarily cancel each other.
[25] It is the danger of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all legal
remedies, that must determine the propriety of certiorari.
[26] In many instances, the Supreme Court has treated a petition for review under Rule 45
as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, where the subject of the recourse was one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse or
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction but when the petition denominated as

a Rule 45 petition neither involves any issue of jurisdiction nor a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals, it should be dismissed outright.
[27] A prior motion for reconsideration is required before certiorari can be filed.
[28] Although the RTC has the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertains
only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking
with such inferior courts. Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions
are beyond the RTCs control.
[29] Rule 43 refers to appeals from judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. On the other hand, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
specifically governs special civil actions for certiorari, Section 4 of which provides that if the
petition involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided
by law or the rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the CA.
[30] Cases to read:
1.
Alcaraz. vs. Gonzales. G.R. No. 164715, September 26, 2006
2.
Bermudez vs.Gonzales, 347 SCRA 611 [2000]
3.
Beso vs. Aballe, 326 SCRA 100 [2000]
4.
Buan vs. Matugas, G.R. No. 161179, August 7, 2007
5.
Bugarin vs. Palisoc, G.R. No. 157985, December 2, 2005,476 SCRA 587
6.
China Banking Corporation vs. Asian Construction and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 158271, April 8, 2008
7.
DBP vs. La Campana Development Corp., 448 SCRA 384 [2005]
8.
De los Reyes vs. People, 480 SCRA 294 [ 2006]
9.
Del Rosario vs. Galagot, 166 SCRA 429
10.
Doran vs. Luczon,G.R.No. 151344, September 26, 2006
11.
Estrera vs. CA, G.R. No. 154235, August 16, 2006
12.
Lansang, Jr. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 230
13.
Maacop vs. Equitable PCIBank, 468 SCRA 256
14.
Marawi Marantao General Hospital vs. CA, 349 SCRA 321
15.
Mejares vs. Reyes, 254 SCRA 425
16.
Microsoft Corporation vs. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 389 SCRA 615
[2002]
17.
Miguel vs. JCT Group, Inc., 458 SCRA 529 [2005]
18.
New Frontier Sugar Corporation vs. RTC of Iloilo, G.R. No. 165001, January 31,
2007
19.
Pamana, Inc. vs. CA, 460 SCRA 133 [2005]
20.
PNB vs. Sayoc, 292 SCRA 365
21.
Professional Regulations Commission vs. CA, 292 SCRA 155
22.
Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010

23.
Seven Brothers Shipping Corp. vs. CA, 246 SCRA 33 [1995]
24.
Spouses Balanguan vs. CA, G. R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008
25.
Springfield Development Corp. vs. Presiding Judge of RTC of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 40, G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007
26.
St. Peter Memorial Park vs. Campos, 63 SCRA 180
27.
Tan, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 292 SCRA 452

Three (3) Essential Dates In a Petition for Certiorari

under Rule 65
There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. They are:
[1] The date when notice of the judgment, final order or resolution was received,
[2] When a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed, and
[3] When notice of the denial thereof was received.

Seastar Marine Services, Inc. vs. Bul-an, Jr.

G.R. No. 142609, November 25, 2004. 444 SCRA 140
Seastar Marine Services, Inc.'s petition was denied by the court.
The Supreme Court emphasized that there are three (3) essential dates that must be stated
in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65, which the Court enumerated and
discussed in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
1.
First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was received;
2.
Second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and
3.
Third, when notice of the denial thereof was received.
Since timeliness is sentential to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, setting forth the three
(3) dates in the petition under the Rules are required. Such a petition is required to be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be
assailed.
REMEMBER!
[1] There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
[2] The person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
[3] The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
[4] The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in
any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for

reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should
not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days.
Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are
provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
It must be stressed that certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to
avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.
A careful perusal of the records further shows that in their petition before the Court, the
petitioners aver that they received the resolution of the NLRC dated January 12, 1999
denying their motion for reconsideration only on April 28, 1999, "the date the NLRC officially
furnished petitioners a copy of said resolution as evidenced by a certified true copy issued
by the NLRC." However, in their petition before the appellate court, the petitioners made the
following admission:
To date, undersigned counsel for petitioners have not been furnished a copy of the second
questioned Resolution (Annex "B") despite the fact that undersigned counsel had previously
entered his appearance for the petitioners as early as 26 March 1998. Accordingly,
undersigned counsel had to procure a copy of said Resolution (Annex "B") from the NLRC,
on 15 February 1999, the date petitioners, through undersigned counsel, officially received
the same. Hence, the instant petition.
It is settled that a judicial admission is binding on the person who makes it, and absent any
showing that it was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset
such admission. Thus, the Court cannot countenance nor consider the petitioners claim of
actual receipt of the copy of the NLRC resolution on an altogether different date without
even an explanation therefor.
The Court notes with approval the following ratiocination of the appellate court when it
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration:
Movants contend that the timeliness of their petition can be determined from its Annex "B"
(which forms part of the petition) stating, among others, that they filed their motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision on December 10, 1998.
Assuming that movants contention is in order, still their petition is dismissible as it was filed
five days late.
We cannot give credence to movants claim that they received a copy of the assailed NLRC
resolution dated January 12, 1999 only on April 28, 1999 since the instant petition for
certiorari was filed earlier or on April 14, 1999. Indeed, here is an absurd situation where the
petition assailing the NLRC resolution was filed even before they received a copy thereof.
Even if the Court were to disregard the merits of the instant case, the petition is still
destined to fail.
The petitioners would want this Court to ascertain whether or not the findings of the NLRC,
as affirmed by the CA, are substantiated by the evidence on record; hence, requiring a
review of factual matters. However, the issues that can be delved into in a petition for review

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are limited to questions of law. The calibration
of the evidence of the parties statutorily belongs to the NLRC. Judicial review of labor cases
does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency upon which its labor officials findings
rest. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater
force in labor cases. Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve. Indeed, the findings
of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are accorded with respect, even finality, if
supported by substantial evidence.
Anent the petitioners allegation that the NLRC should have remanded the case to the labor
arbiter for further proceedings, the following pronouncement of the Court in Caete v.
National Labor Relations Commission is instructive:
It is clear that the labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether there is a need
for a formal hearing in a given case. [H]e or she may use all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities. The case may be decided
on the basis of the pleadings and other documentary evidence presented by the parties. In
the absence of any palpable error, arbitrariness or partiality, the method adopted by the
labor arbiter to decide a case must be respected by the NLRC.
Thus, a formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. In fact, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended,
outlines the procedure to be followed in cases before the labor arbiter, as follows:
Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum.
Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part,
during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters
taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to
simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.
Those verified position papers shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in
the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be
accompanied by all the supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective
witnesses which shall take the place of the latters direct testimony. The parties shall,
thereafter, not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to
and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers,
affidavits, and other documents. Unless otherwise requested in writing by both parties, the
Labor Arbiter shall direct both parties to submit simultaneously their position
papers/memorandum with the supporting documents and affidavits within fifteen (15)
calendar days from the date of the last conference, with proof of having furnished each
other with copies thereof.
Section 4. Determination of Necessity of Hearing. Immediately after the submission by the
parties of their position papers/memorandum, the Labor Arbiter shall motu proprio
determine whether there is a need for a formal trial or hearing. At this stage, he may, at his
discretion and for the purpose of making such determination, ask clarificatory questions to
further elicit facts or information, including but not limited to the subpoena of relevant
documentary evidence, if any from any party or witness.
Section 5. Period to Decide Case. (a) Should the Labor Arbiter find it necessary to

conduct a hearing, he shall issue an order to that effect setting the date or dates for the
same which shall be determined within ninety (90) days from initial hearing.
He shall render his decision within thirty (30) calendar days, without extension, after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision, even in the absence of stenographic
notes: Provided, however, that OFW cases shall be decided within ninety (90) calendar
days after the filing of the complaint and the acquisition by the labor arbiter of jurisdiction
over the parties.
(b) If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted
their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an Order to that effect and
shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefore. In any event, he shall render his
decision in the case within the same period provided in paragraph (a) hereof.

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 | 16 Basic

Things to Remember in Applying for an
Extraordinary Writ of Certiorari

How is this petition taken and what is the time for filing? (Secs. 1 & 4)
[1] Remember three things first:
[1] Verified petition
[2] Within 60 days
[3] From notice of judgment, order or resolution, or order denying motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
[2] Note: Period now inextendible. last paragraph of Section 4:
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reasons and
in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days has been DELETED by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
effective December 27, 2007.
Hence, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
A. M. No. 07-7-12 has also amended the second paragraph of Sec. 4:
[3] If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a (municipal)
corporation, board, officer or person, it shall be filed with theRegional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
[4] Certiorari in Aid of Appellate Jurisdiction: It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or with the Sandiganbayan if it
is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
[5] If the petition involves an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
[6] Certiorari to COMELEC in Aid of its Appellate Jurisdiction: In electioncases involving an
act or omission of a municipal or regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively
with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
[7] For election cases involving acts or omissions of a municipal or regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Comelec as ruled by the Supreme Court in
Relampagos vs. Comelec (243 SCRA 690, April 27, 1995).
Following the hierarchy of courts, no certiorari against the RTC shall be filed with the
Supreme Court. This will help prevent the clogging of the Supreme Courts dockets as
litigants will be discouraged from filing petitions directly with the Supreme Court.
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed
may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties

pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
The court may:
[a] Issue orders to expedite the proceedings
[b] Grant TROs
[c] Issue writs of PI
[d] No interrupt the course of the principal case, generally
[e] Interrupt the course of the principal case through injunction
Exception to [e]: Two courts of equal great cannot enjoin the other.
[8] The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the
filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to
proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
[9] Unless there is a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction issued by a higher
court, the main or principal case should proceed despite the filing of a petition for certiorari
questioning an act or omission of a court or tribunal
[10] Judicial courtesy, therefore, can no longer be used as an excuse by courts or tribunals
not to proceed with the principal case.
Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. - x x x However, the court may dismiss the
petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the
court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and
counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and
139-B of the Rules of Court.
[11] The Court may impose motu proprio, based on rep ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary
sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for
certiorari.
[12] This amendment seeks to discourage litigants and their counsel from filing baseless
petitions for certiorari.
Three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
[1] The date when notice of the judgment, final order or resolution was received,[2] When a
motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed, and[3] When notice of the denial thereof
was received.
[13] Don't be late in filing your petition for certiorari.
For being filed one day late, the Court of Appeals dismissed petition for certiorari of NLRC

decision. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. Deviations from the rule cannot be
tolerated. Its observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of the parties (LTS
Philippines Corp. vs. Maliwat).
[14] What are the documents to accompany the petition? (Caingat vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
154308, March 10, 2005)
[a] Certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition;
[b] Copies of all relevant pleadings and documents and
[c] Sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
[15] The requirement for certified true copies refers to the judgment, order or resolution (Air
Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006).
[16] The use of mere photocopies of certified true copies of judgments or orders subject
matter of a petition renders that petition deficient and subject to dismissal (Pinamakasarap
Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 155058, September 26, 2006).

5 Bad Decisions of the Supreme Court of the

Philippines

As Justice Robert Jackson put it with eloquence, the Supreme Court is not final
because it is infallible; it is infallible because it is final. And because its decisions
are final, even if faulty, the Supreme Court has had much occasion to mention
that, "There must be every energy expended to ensure that the faulty decisions
are few and far between."

In fact, in that case of Spouses Sadik v. Casar (A. M. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2,
1997), it emphasized, "The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact
that it is able to administer justice, but also upon the perception and confidence
of the community that the people who run the system have done justice."

Although errors committed by the Supreme Court are only a few and are far
apart, lawyers, bar candidates and law students somehow have a way to trace
such errors and discuss them in academic forums. Below are a list of those
pieces of jurisprudence that just, with all due respect to the Supreme Court,
seem not right.

I.
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
This case is very popular in the field of legal and judicial ethics and conduct. This
particular pieces of jurisprudence dots the first pages of every book on Legal
Ethics. The reason here is that Cayetano v. Monsod defined "practice of law" in
the Philippines.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
What many lawyers and law students think is that this definition appears to be so broad that
it does not seem to reflect the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in using the
phrase "practice of law." Some even say that this particular landmark case has stretched
the meaning of the phrase beyond rational limits.

It appears, from a glance at this definition, that buying a piece of cake from a local bakery
can very well fall within the meaning of "practice of law" as defined in the Cayetano

case. Expressing legal opinions, another example, can also be considered to be within the
broad definition of practice of law. As a non-lawyer, such a person is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, which constitutes indirect contempt under the Rules of Court.

Justice Cruz gave a crisp critique of this definition by saying, "The effect of the definition
given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions."

II.
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
This case has opened the gates of hell allowing bail on humanitarian grounds
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Justice Leonen, a member of
the Supreme Court, picked the rights words when he said that this case would
bring us to the era of selective justice. Such era would be a time when decisions are no
longer be grounded on legal provisions but based on human compassion.

III.
Arturo Pascual vs. Honorable Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. L-11959, October 31, 1959
This case involves a 56-year-old doctrine that that clears an official of any administrative
liability if he is reelected in a subsequent election. This is called the doctrine of condonation
or the condonation doctrine.

Even Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno expressed her distaste of the doctrine, saying that it
could wreak havoc on the 1987 Philippine Constitution. She even went to the point of
saying, Isnt this tantamount to telling officials that they can commit all forms of offenses so
long as they get re-elected, because they cannot be held administratively liable?

IV.
MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
This case catapulted the existence of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus in the Philippines.

The writ of continuing mandamus is an extraordinary writ issued by the court commanding
the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied. To see to it
that judgment is indeed satisfied, the court may this writ requiring periodic reports to be
submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in
partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ
shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been
fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.

Does this not sound like a judicial oversight? Does this not violate the principle of separation
of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over
executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials?

Is it not that no matter how urgent and laudatory the cause of environment protection has
become, it cannot but yield to the higher mandate of separation of powers and the
mechanisms laid out by the people through the Constitution?

V.

Disini v. The Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
This case affirmed online libel as a crime.

Although it is true that the "libel" is indeed not only a legally repugnant act but also a morally
repulsive behavior, it must be pointed out that the Internet is completely different from its
predecessors - the radio, the television and the newspapers. The Internet hosts a market of
ideas and has become a "freedom park" for everyone.

To criminalize expressing one's self on the Internet creates a chilling effect on our
constitutionally guaranteed and preferred freedom of expression.

Justice Carpio's Dissenting Opinion splashes cold water on anyone who reads it. "Indeed,
the free flow of truthful and non-misleading commercial speech online should remain
unhampered to assure freedom of expression of protected speech. In cyberspace, the free
flow of truthful and non-misleading commercial speech does not obstruct the public view or
degrade the aesthetics of public space in the way that billboards and poster advertisements
mar the streets, highways, parks and other public places. True, commercial speech does
not enjoy the same protection as political speech in the hierarchy of our constitutional
values. However, any regulation of truthful and non-misleading commercial speech must still
have a legitimate government purpose. Regulating truthful and non-misleading commercial
speech does not result in "efficiency of commerce and technology" in cyberspace."

On the other hand, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago likewise expressed her sentiments
against Online Libel. She said that it must be stricken down for being vague and for being
overly broad and sweeping.

Differences: Rule 103, RA 9048 and Rule 108

Rule 103
Rule or Law

Change of
Name

Rule 108

R.A. 9048

Cancellation/ Clerical Error Act

Correction
of Entries in the
Civil
Registry

Subject Matter Change of full Cancellation or Change of first

name or
name or
correction of
family name
civil
nickname and
(substantial
registry entries correction of
corrections)
civil
(substantial
corrections)
registry entries
(only
typographical or
clerical
errors)
Who may File

A person
desiring to

Any person
interested in

Any person
having

change his
name.

any act, event,

order or

direct and
personal

(Section 1)

decree
concerning the

interest in the
correction

civil status of
persons

of a clerical or

which has been

typographical
error in an

recorded in the
civil

entry and/or
change of

register.
(Section 1)

first name or
nickname.
(Section 3)

Venue

RTC of the
province in
which
petitioner

RTC of city or
province

1. Local civil
registry

where the
office of the city
corresponding or municipality

resided for 3
years prior to
filing.

civil

where the

registry is
located.

record being
sought to
be corrected or
changed is kept;
2. Local civil
registrar of
the place where
the
interested party
is
presently
residing or
domiciled;
3. Philippine
Consulate

Contents of
petition

(a) That
petitioner has

(a) Facts
necessary to

been a bona
fide

establish the
merits of

resident of the
province

petition;

where the
petition is
filed for at least
three
(3) years prior
to the
date of such
filing;
(b) The cause
for which
the change of
petitioner's
name is

(b) Particular
erroneous
entry or entries,
which
are sought to be
corrected and/or
the
change sought
to be
made.
Petition shall be
supported by the
following

sought;

documents:

(c) The name

asked for.

(1) A certified
true

(Section 2)

machine copy of
the
certificate or of
the page
of the registry
book
containing the
entry or
entries sought to
be
corrected or
changed;
(2) At least two
(2)
public or private
documents
showing the
correct entry or
entries
upon which the
correction or
change
shall be based;
and
(3) Other
documents
which petitioner
or the
city or municipal
civil
registrar or the
consul

general may
consider
relevant and
necessary
for the approval
of
petition. (Section
5)
Grounds

1. Name is
ridiculous,

Upon good and

valid

1. Petitioner
finds the

tainted with
dishonor

grounds.

first name or
nickname

and extremely
difficult to

to be ridiculous,
tainted

write of
pronounce;

with dishonor or

2. Consequence
of
change of
status;
3. Necessity to
avoid
confusion;
4. Having
continuously
used and been
known
since childhood
by a
Filipino name,
unaware
of her alien
parentage;
5. A sincere
desire to
adopt a Filipino

extremely
difficult to
write or
pronounce;
2. The new first
name or
nickname has
been
habitually and
continuously
used by
petitioner and
he has
been publicly
known by
that first name
or
nickname in the
community; or
3. The change

name to

will avoid

erase signs of
former

confusion.
(Section 4)

alienage all in
good faith
and without
prejudicing
anybody.
Kind of
proceeding

Judicial
Proceeding

Judicial
Proceeding

Administrative
Proceeding

Adversarial in
nature
because
involves
substantial
changes and
affects the
status of an
individual
What to file

File a signed
and

File a verified
petition

verified
petition.

for the
cancellation or

File an affidavit.

correction of
any entry.
Notice and
Publication

At least once a At least once a

week for
week for

At least once a
week for

three
consecutive

three
consecutive

two consecutive
weeks

weeks in a
newspaper

weeks in a
newspaper

(publish the
whole

circulation
(notice of

of general
circulation

affidavit) in
change of

hearing)

(notice of
hearing)

first name or
nickname

Posting

No posting
required

No posting
required

Duty of the civil

registrar
or Consul to post
petition in a
conspicuous
place for
10 consecutive
days

Who
participates on
the
part of the
Government

The Solicitor
General or

The Civil
Registrar.

the proper
provincial or

The Civil
Registrar or
Consul.

city fiscal shall

appear
on behalf of the
Government of
the
Republic.

Where to
appeal:

Appeal decision Appeal decision Appeal decision

to the
to the
to the
Court of
Appeals.

Court of
Appeals.

Civil Registrar
General
(head of NCSO).

Difference between Production or Inspection

Orders and Subpoena Duces Tecum

Nature:
Essentially a mode of discovery
Subject of the order:
The Rules are limited to the parties to the action.
Time:
May be asked before or during trial
Resolution of the motion:
The order under this Rule is issued only upon motion with notice to the adverse party.

Differences between Injunction & Prohibition

Below is a table showing a comparison between a writ of injunction and a writ of prohibition.

Against whom?
Generally directed against a party
On what ground?
Does not involve the jurisdiction of the court
Nature of the action?
May be the main action or provisional remedy only

Difference between Preliminary Attachment &

Replevin
Here's a table showing a the differences between a writ of preliminary attachment and a
write of replevin.

Availability:
Available even if recovery of personal property is only incidental relief in the action
Condition of the Property:
Can be resorted to even if personal property is in the custody of a third person
Character of the Property:
Extends to all kinds of property
Purpose:

To recover possession of personal property unjustly detained; Presupposes that it is being conceal
Limitation:
Can be resorted to even if property is in custodia legis

The Writ of Prohibition

The writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since
in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the National Government Administration
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the
scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification,
an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an
exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Read the following cases:
1.
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006
2.
Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Erminta, G.R. No. 184740, 2010 February
11, 2010

Top 6 Supreme Court Decisions on Writ of

Mandamus
The following are landmark cases/pieces of jurisprudence in the issue of the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. They are essential for a full
understanding and appreciation of the rules, doctrines and principles that govern
this court order.
1.
Henares, Jr. vs. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, G.R. No.
158290, October 23, 2006
2.
Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Primex Coco Products, Inc., G.R. No. 163088, July
20, 2006
3.
Antolin vs. Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010
4.
FGU Insurance Corp. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, G.R. No. 161282, 2011
February 23, 2011
5.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents Of Manila Bay,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 2011 February 15, 2011
6.
Froilan Dejuras vs. Villa, G.R. No. 173428, November 22, 2010

The Extraordinary Writ of Mandamus: All You Need

to Know
Henares, Jr. v. LTFRB
A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined
by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked
by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the
DOTC surveys
Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and
not when it is doubtful.The writ will not be granted where its issuance would be unavailing,
nugatory, or useless. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial.
Philippine Coconut v. Primex Coco
There is no doubt that under E.O. No. 826, Administrative Order No. 003, Series of 1981,
and Administrative Order No. 002, Series of 1991, petitioner is vested with discretion on
whether or not to grant an application for the establishment of a new plant, the expansion of
capacity, the relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut processing
plant. Relative to the renewal of a certificate of registration, petitioner may refuse a
registration unless the applicant has complied with the procedural and substantive
requirements for renewal. However, once the requirements are complied with, the renewal
of registration becomes a ministerial function of petitioner.
Antolin v. Domondon
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain
legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be equally clear. No such clarity exists here; neither does petitioners right
to demand a revision of her examination results. And despite petitioners assertions that she
has not made any demand for re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second
Amended Petition and her prayer that the respondents make the appropriate revisions on
the results of her examination belies this claim.
FGU Insurance Corp. v. RTC
A writ of mandamus lies to compel a judge to issue a writ of execution when the judgment

had already become final and executory and the prevailing party is entitled to the same as a
matter of right.
MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay
The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms defined in the
law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act
involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but
not to act one way or the other. This is the end of any participation by the Court, if it is
authorized to participate at all.
Froilan Dejuras v. Villar
Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of mandamus generally lies to compel
the performance of a ministerial duty, but not the performance of an official act or duty which
necessarily involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the act sought to be performed
involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to
act but not to act in one way or the other. It is, nonetheless, also available to compel action,
when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the
proper remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
palpable excess of authority.
Read the following cases:
1.
Henares, Jr. vs. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, G.R. No.
158290, October 23, 2006
2.
Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Primex Coco Products, Inc., G.R. No. 163088, July
20, 2006
3.
Antolin vs. Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010
4.
FGU Insurance Corp. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, G.R. No. 161282, 2011
February 23, 2011
5.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents Of Manila Bay,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 2011 February 15, 2011
6.
Froilan Dejuras vs. Villa, G.R. No. 173428, November 22, 2010

Interpleader, Rule 62
Are petitioners entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader
case) as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a deed of sale has
already been executed in their favor?
The answer is in the negative.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances:
[1] Land registration proceedings;
[2] Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property;
[3] Judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third
party has intervened, and;
[4] Execution sales.
Maglente v. Padilla
Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the
execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a
case. It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The
execution of the deed of sale in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual
acquisition of the property.
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty
Petitioners did not pay rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment
should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the
case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right
to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to
protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of
the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.
Read more:
1.
Maglente vs. Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, March 7, 2007
2.
Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 136409, March 14, 2008

Declaratory Relief, Rule 63

Rule 63 covers two types of actions:
[1] petition for declaratory relief, and;
[2] similar remedies.
The similar remedies are:
[1] action for reformation of instrument;[2] action to quiet title; and,[3] action to consolidate
ownership under Art; 1607 of the Civil Code.

Jurisdiction
I.
A petition for declaratory relief should be brought in the appropriate regional trial court.
The purpose of the petition is to ask the court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the subject matter thereof , and for the declaration of rights and duties
thereunder. Hence, the subject matter of such petition raises issues which are not capable
of pecuniary estimation and must be filed in the RTC (Sec. 19 [1], BP 129; Sec. 1, Rule 63).
It would be error to file the petition the petition with the Supreme Court which has no original
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief.
However, where the action is for quieting of title which is a similar remedy under the second
paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63, the jurisdiction will depend upon the assessed value of the
property.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is
erroneous. Actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real
property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
II.
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall
exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." The law is emphatic that in determining which
court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be
computed. In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject
properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction
over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
III.
Under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or
violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order,
regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. Petitioners actual suspension
of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of

their supposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance. The purpose of the action is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of
action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the
court to explain or clarify, short of a judgment or final order.
IV.
Gov. Garcias petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it was
instituted after the COA had already found her in violation of Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160.
One of the important requirements for a petition for declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court is that it be filed before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract,
other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation. Thus, the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the action
despite the fact that the subject thereof had already been breached by Gov. Garcia prior to
the filing of the action. Nonetheless, the conversion of the petition into an ordinary civil
action is warranted under Sec. 6, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
[1] The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
[2] The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
[3] There must have been no breach of the documents in question;
[4] There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;
[5] The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
[6] Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
V.
There is a marked difference between the reliefs sought under an action for declaratory
relief and an action for injunction. While an action for declaratory relief seeks a declaration
of rights or duties, or the determination of any question or validity arising under a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, or under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, under which his rights are affected, and
before breach or violation, an action for injunction ultimately seeks to enjoin or to compel a
party to perform certain acts.
VI.
The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to quieting of title.
In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction
of these documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioners rights and duties

thereunder. Being in the nature of declaratory relief, this special civil action presupposes
that there has yet been no breach or violation of the instruments involved.

Read more:
Ortega vs. Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 161400, September 2, 2005
Concha, Sr. vs. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007
Martelino vs. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 160208, June
30, 2008
Quisumbing vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527, December 8, 2008 En Banc

Ferrer vs. Roco, G.R. No. 174129, July 5, 2010

Republic of the Philippines vs. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) vs. Philippine Countryside Rural

Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 176438, January 24, 2011

Certiorari against COMELEC & COA, Rule 64

This provision (Art. IX, Sec. 7 of the Constitution) means final orders, rulings and decisions
of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections. The mode by which a decision, order or ruling
of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
SEC. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
While original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus is shared with the Court of Appeals and the
RTCs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Among
the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to the
rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our
nations lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed.
Bagabuyo vs. Comelec
The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised
among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro
City as a local government unit are reasons enough for considering it an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the
COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371
decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a
stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.
1.
2.

Jumamil vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167989-93, March 6, 2007 En Banc

Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008 En Banc