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respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect
to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioners son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). In
view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in
his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under
this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith. Such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2.) R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997, which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits,
sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by
the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations
of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or
caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions
or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work
except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the
GSIS.
Morevoer, the AFP argues, the AFP cannot be forced to segregate the
pension benefits of Charles as they still remain public funds.
The Supreme Court:
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However,
if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should
be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated
that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares
that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically
remitted directly to the woman [n]otwithstanding other laws to the
contrary.
xxx
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term employer, which
includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus,
Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is
a support enforcement legislation. In the United States, provisions of the
Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain federal funds
where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child
support. As these provisions were designed to avoid sovereign immunity
problems and provide that moneys payable by the Government to any
individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings, the law is
clearly intended to create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that
state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government agencies
attaching funds in their possession.
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not
violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon[ the issue of
constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an
injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order
issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real
substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the
unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias
and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of
the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and
other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically
address one form of violence committed against women economic abuse.
B.
DOLINA,
DOCTRINE:
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation.
FACTS:
In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a
temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged
woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl
added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer
on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera s employer, to
withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially
one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child
abuses, that he was not the childs father and that the signature in the birth
certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit
intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give
financial support.
RTC dismissed petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary
protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child?
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The
object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and
safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although
the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes
that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case
neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based on her
claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013, KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN
DIEGO, VS. PETITIONER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59,
ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE
MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
Orders of the (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 which denied petitioner's
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262
before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information: x x x the abovenamed accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence [on] the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth
and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act
9262. RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of
arrest. The latter posted a cash bond and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July
13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent;
hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private respondent
admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that she sought payment of the money she had lent to
petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he
was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted.
Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict
on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied
petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties'
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident.
ISSUES:
W/n the act of petitioner which resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not
their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was
only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of
Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act
or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her
child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has
or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child;
and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime
of violence against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The
offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6rl1
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule
on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether
the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to
the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the
rule of lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would
necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA
9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is
sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly,
the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the
offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have
or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in
view of promoting the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary
elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner
and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner;
and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered
by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with
Sec. 7 of the said law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional
Trial
Court,
Imus,
Cavite;
and
ROSSANA
HONRADO-TUA,
Respondents.
Facts:
Rosanna married Ralph in 1998. They have three children. On May 20, 2005,
Rosanna filed a verified petition for issuance of protection order for herself
and her children, against his husband Ralph. According to her, there was a
time when Ralph pointed a gun at her and cocked it to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed against him; there was also
an instance when Ralph fed her children with chicken which her youngest
child spat out; to make his children stop crying, he would threaten them with
a belt; when she told him to stop coming to the house as she and her
children were afraid of him, he threatened to cut off financial support to
them, among others. Acting on the verified petition, the trial court issued a
Temporary Protection Order good for 30 days and required Ralph to comment
on the petition. In his comment questioning the propriety of the temporary
protection order, he maintained that Rosanna had been staying with another
man; she surreptitiously moved her children out of their abode despite their
written agreement; and Rosanna is psychologically, emotionally and mentally
unfit to keep the children in her custody.
Without waiting for his Comment to be resolved by the trial court, Ralph filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, with a prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. In order
not to render the petition moot, the CA issued a temporary restraining order
for the parties to enjoin them implementing the temporary protection order.
Ralph later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, to restrain the RTC from conducting proceedings therein.
The CA later dismissed his petition for certiorari. It ruled that the petition is
still pending with the RTC, hence the factual matters could be raised thereon.
The RTC validly issued the TPO; As to Ralphs contention that RA 9262 is
unconstitutional, since the issue raised in the CA was the alleged grave
abuse of disruption by the RTC in issuing the TPO, the issue could be
resolved without ruling on the constitutionality of Republic Act 9262, which is
not the very lis mota of the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, RA 9262, particularly Section 15 thereof which allows the
grant of protection orders, is unconstitutional, since it deprives the
respondent of due process before issuance. It is also an invalid delegation of
powers by Congress to the courts.
Held:
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the
court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. To be heard does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
xxx
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress
shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is
primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us
with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
intercourse with Franz at his bidding, even in the presence of other people.
She followed his orders for fear that he would inflict physical harm on her.
At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances
surrounding their employment at the Golden Lotus. It was only after they
agreed to stay there for employment that they were forced to become sex
workers to earn money and pay off the debts they incurred from their travel
from Zamboanga City to Labuan, Malaysia. Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13
July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women.
On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota
Kinabalu, Malaysia. She sought his help for her return to the Philippines, and
he agreed. The following day, the Golden Lotus was raided by the
Immigration Officers of Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and the prostituted Filipino
women, including AAA and BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police
Department) in Labuan until all the women were deported to the Philippines.
Accused-appellant denied having offered BBB a job in Malaysia, a denial
corroborated by Majujie Jailya Misuari. Accused-appellant also denied
knowing AAA and Franz. She claimed that she only met AAA when the latter,
together with BBB, visited her in jail and offered to withdraw the case if
accused-appellant would give them money. Co-accused Franz merely denied
knowing AAA, BBB or accused-appellant.
On 27 June 2008, after trial on the merits, the RTC of Zamboanga City
rendered a Decision finding both accused Nurfrasir Hashim and Bernadette
Pansacala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment
as principals by direct participation, committed by a syndicate. Each of said
accused were sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P 1,000,000.00 each;and to pay each of the above victims P
50,000.00 as moral damages; P 300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the former
assailed Decision, but modified the award of damages by reducing the
exemplary damages to P 25,000.00 each.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hashim and Pansacala are guilty of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate?
HELD: The appeal is unmeritorious.
LABOR LAW
To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate,
the following elements must occur:
and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that
accused-appellant Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had
conspired to bring the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the
very least, through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and
Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was
their financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the
former would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting the victims to
Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution house where the
victims worked. The concerted efforts of all these persons resulted in the
oppression of the victims.
Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant,
together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit
the felony and decided to commit it. It is not necessary to show that two or
more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement laying
down the details of how an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated; or from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
CIVIL LAW
The Court increased the award of moral damages from P 50,000.00 to
P500,000 each and also that of the exemplary damages from P 25,000.00
each to P100,000.00 when it found that the crime of Trafficking in Persons as
a prostitute was committed.
On 12 May 2003, Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act. This law was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically, only a few days after,
private complainants found themselves in a situation that this law had
sought to prevent.
In Lalli, the Court increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages
from P 50,000 to P 500,000 and from P 50,000 to P 100,000, respectively,
having convicted the accused therein of the crime of trafficking in persons.
The payment of P 500,000 as moral damages and P 100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
xxx
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
xxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous
case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In
fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one consent and to
be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is
horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was
trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons
was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary
damages is likewise justified.
There is no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and
exemplary damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any logical reason to
differentiate between the victims herein and those in that case, when the
circumstances are frighteningly similar. To do so would be to say that we
discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have been the
victims of unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others.
While it is true that accused-appellant was not tried and convicted of the
crime of trafficking in persons, this Court based its award of damages on the
Civil Code, and not on the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, as clearly explained
in Lalli.
CA AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.