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make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par.

e is akin to
temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree a
price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order the price
increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The
Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however, it
cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

Aratuc vs. COMELEC


88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa
were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in
Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao,
North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc
sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in
Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region
had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by
Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints
of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned
provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the
objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January
13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one
KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present
petition.

Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.


GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of prequalification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on
12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2
December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been
submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December, petitioners file a
complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming that although they
submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the
same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December, defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD No. 1818, which provides:
Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order in
any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project of the government to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing
the execution or implementation of any such project Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of
PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and
separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political
subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal
government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the
RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that
the building sought to be constructed was an infrastructure project of the government falling within
the coverage of PD 1818.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled
postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision
and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
G.R no. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no.
the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm
ERBs provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the
issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said
hearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated
due process for having been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.
HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the board
from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether or not: to

ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it would
necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if

not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCCs. The
same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to any agency
organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and colleges, and the
monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered
institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present
controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve
merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on
bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny
irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies in the present case.
Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and
the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.

also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. With
respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created
through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested
in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the
same decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the
composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On December 23, 1975,
PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority
which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry
of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status.
Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative
supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the Department
and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination. With
respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department
control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager
with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the
rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such
investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in
Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds
the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and
REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on
administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared
NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct
with dispatch its reinvestigation.

Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals


207 SCRA 689
FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in
1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General
Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave
dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively
suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for
region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December
13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for
dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under
preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as
administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for
appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present
evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the
ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the
motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the
dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative
cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.

Ursal vs. CTA


101 Phil. 209
FACTS: Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu in the exercise of his powers assessed for
taxation certain real properties of Consuelo Noel and Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu, and that
upon protest of the taxpayers, the Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the assessments.
It also shows he took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his valuation; but said
Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides, the assessor had no

HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but

personality to bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, which reads as
follows:

HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court sees no reason to
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Supreme Court will not set aside lightly the conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals
which, by the very nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax
problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an
abuse or improvident exercise of authority.

SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any person, association or corporation
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an
appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or
ruling.

Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err or gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for
review

ISSUE: Whether or not Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu have the personality to resort to
the Court of Tax Appeals on his valuation on the taxes of Consuelo and Jesusa Samson.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner has no
personality to bring before the CTA. Supreme Court stressed out that The rulings of the Board of
Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu 1 that had been
adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the
abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but the overruling
inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals was not created
to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies. Republic Act No.
1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals did not grant it blanket authority to decide any and all tax
disputes. Defining such special court's jurisdiction, the Act necessarily limited its authority to those
matters enumerated therein.

Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals
477 SCRA 49
FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company herein referred to as the petitioner is a domestic
banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. In the early
part of 1992, the Cavite Development Bank [CDB], also a domestic banking corporation, was
merged with Petitioner with the latter as its surviving entity [under] the merger. Petitioner being the
surviving entity, [it] acquired all [the] assets of CDB During the period from 1990 to 1991, CDB sold
some acquired assets in the course of which it allegedly withheld the creditable tax from the sales
proceeds which amounted to P755,715.00. In said years, CDB filed income tax returns which
reflected that CDB incurred negative taxable income or losses for both years. Since there was no
tax against which to credit or offset the taxes withheld by CDB, the result was that CDB, according
to petitioner, had excess creditable withholding tax. Thus, petitioner, being the surviving entity of
the merger, filed this Petition for Review after its administrative claim for refund was not acted
upon.

Sea-Land Service Inc. vs. Court of Appeals


357 SCRA 441
FACTS: Sea-Land Service Incorporated (SEA-LAND), an American international shipping
company licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines
entered into a contract with the United States Government to transport military household goods
and effects of U. S. military personnel assigned to the Subic Naval Base. From the aforesaid
contract, SEA-LAND derived an income for the taxable year 1984 amounting to P58,006,207.54.
During the taxable year in question, SEA-LAND filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
the corresponding corporate Income Tax Return (ITR) and paid the income tax due thereon of
1.5% as required in Section 25 (a) (2) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) in relation to
Article 9 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, amounting to P870,093.12. Claiming that it paid the
aforementioned income tax by mistake, a written claim for refund was filed with the BIR on 15 April
1987. However, before the said claim for refund could be acted upon by public respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner-appellant filed a petition for review with the CTA
docketed as CTA Case No. 4149, to judicially pursue its claim for refund and to stop the running of
the two-year prescriptive period under the then Section 243 of the NIRC. On 21 February 1995,
CTA rendered its decision denying SEA-LANDs claim for refund of the income tax it paid in 1984.
On March 30, 1995, petitioner appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of
Appeals. After due proceedings, on October 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals are not
based on Facts and the Law.
HELD: The petition is denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Court
stressed out that The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on
the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court,
especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final
arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a
party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which if
considered would justify a different conclusion
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp.
474 SCRA 258

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abused of discretion.

FACTS: Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the Corporation) is a duly


organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act, which
owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium
(the Condominium), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the
various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its
Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses,
capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the
Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. Proceeding from the premise
that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation
proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, business
is defined as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a
view to profit. It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was
organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage
the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the
Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of
incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from
the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The protest was rejected
by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected
primarily to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with the end in view of
getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium occupants and to command
better marketable prices for those occupants who would in the future sell their respective units.
Thus, she concluded since the chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas
of any condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor managed common
areas, the corporation activity is a profit venture making. The CA reversed the RTC and
declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati.

negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned
effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the
appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the
decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that
petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative
remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on considerations
of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative
agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 119761, August 29, 1996
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of
different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The initial
position of the CIR was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they
were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune
Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby
removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. RA No. 7654 was enacted and became
effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC. About a month after the
enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular
No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax, was issued by the
BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The
request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed
Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334. 00. On 03 August 1993,
Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA upheld the position of Fortune
Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium
corporations.
HELD: No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the
Makati Revenue Code (Revenue Code), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072. The
Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue Code
governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses which are
covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the Corporation, the RTC,
the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is the precise statutory basis
under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax on petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law.


HELD: A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has
been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or
merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within
the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have
them covered by RA 7654. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated
under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing,
and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court is convinced that the hastily
promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.

Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals


101 Phil. 490
FACTS: Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case
No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under
him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the
Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But
the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory

municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC
has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and
the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be
created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial
of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

Tio vs. Videogram


151 SCRA 208
FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987
entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the
National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales
tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has
adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessen the
revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if
videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise
by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b)
fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not
administrative.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.


HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads
or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period"
with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."
That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize
the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without
adequate remedy in law.

Tadlip vs. Borres, Jr.


474 SCRA 441

Pelaez vs. Auditor General


15 SCRA 569

FACTS: This case involves a parcel land of land situated in Mambajao, Camiguin which was
issued OCT No. P-106, Emancipation Patent No. A-028380 by the MAR to Eusebio Arce. The land
was formerly owned by Angel Madarieta. Subsequently, a Deed of Transfer under PD 27 was
executed by Angel Madarieta, as represented by his wife, Pelagia Madarieta and Eusebio
Arce. Six years later Arce died and was succeeded by two minors and Tadlip, his nephew,
assumed the responsibility of tilling the land. Tadlip caused the reallocation of the disputed land.
Respondent, as PARAD of DARAB issued an order dated 3 April 1998 granting the petition of
complainant reallocating the land to him and heirs of Arce. However, the title was never transferred
to the complainant and the heirs of Arce because unknown to them respondent rendered another

FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating
33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary,
or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other
political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovinces. The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special
civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said

Order dated 26 January 1999 cancelling the registration of the same OCT No. P-106 and ordering
the issuance of a TCT ex parte in favor of Madarieta. He also approved the motion of execution
filed by Madarieta.

since it has exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to
prosecute the same and to review their commendation or resolution of investigating officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exclusive power to prosecute election cases?

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.


HELD: Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to investigate
and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner
of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the
petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers,
has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the
assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government but as held in Margarejo vs. Escoses until
revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays

HELD: Respondent's non-observance of the DARAB Rules on notice and hearing and his grant to
Madarieta of her motion for execution pending appeal in effect deprived complainant of the land he
tills and the source of his income. Complainant woke up one day not knowing that the
emancipated land which he thought was already reallocated to him was lost by order of
respondent. He was not given the chance to defend his claim over the property. This is tantamount
to deprivation of property without due process of law, a constitutional guarantee available to every
individual. The actual review of the subject issuance of the respondent should be undertaken in
the proper judicial proceedings and not by this Court at this time via an administrative action.
Nevertheless, respondent's culpability under the Code of Professional Responsibility is
indubitable. As a lawyer, the IBP determined, and we subscribe to such determination, that
respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: Canon 1A
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes. While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws is an obligation
imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements
of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an exemplar
of others to emulate. A member of the bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on 21 June
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of the said Code. Lawyers in
government service are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct
is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of
the DARAB, was reposed with a higher gravamen of responsibility than a lawyer in private
practice. The recommended penalty of two months suspension is too light under the
circumstances, and a penalty of six (6) months' suspension more appropriate. As held in recent
cases, the penalty for a judge found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law is six (6) months.

Mauricio Cruz vs. Stanton Youngberg


GR No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibits the importation of
cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries.
The Act provides: SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing
contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be
strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign
countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the
concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part
if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased
to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.

COMELEC vs. Espaol


417 SCRA 554

ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers.

FACTS: During the May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista, Lakas candidate for Mayor of Kawit,
Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty.
Federico Hit Poblete and other candidate of violation of paragraphs(a) and (b) of Section 261 of
the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the
COMELEC.COMELECs Law Department filed an Information against the respondents with the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite. In the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed
a criminal complaint for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (vote selling)
against the witnesses of Florentino A. Bautista. An information was filed before the
RTC.COMELEC now claims that it has the exclusive power to review, motu proprio or through an
appeal, the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers in the preliminary investigation

HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to lift the
prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the legislature, if he should determine after
a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The lifting
of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the prescribed
contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the local livestock.

the second district of Manila and had won the race for 3 term. On his final term, an election protest
was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he was
removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995,
COMELEC ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply the
directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath
of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have suspended the
proclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646,
which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by the COMELEC pending final
judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving discretion to order the suspension
of the proclamation.

SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957
Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the
provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the
operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to
regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that
the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the
President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by
EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending
the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued
reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying
that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from
enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the
trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it did not
suspend the proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending final judgment of the
case filed against it.
HELD: It did not. The use of the word may in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the proclamation is
merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is merely mandatory,
according to the provision itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule
or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646, the law
which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed
the word may, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used
instead the word shall in its rules.

Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not
the said Executive Orders were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the President.
Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing
from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can
exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80
restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law.
For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the
promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets
that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed
necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to
the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but
show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of
issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

People vs. Maceren


79 SCRA 450
FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura,
Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the
morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. The lower court
held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or
poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a
substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court
further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly

Grego vs. COMELEC


GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy sheriff
by the court upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for councilor in

punish .electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June
28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.

that is violative of the non-delegation of legislative powers. However respondent contend that said
Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adapted pursuant to the land transportation and traffic code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 39 is ultra vires
HELD: Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held ultra vires as long as the fine imposed is not
less than ten or more than fifty pesos, as to the suspension of registration to the suspension of
registration, it is valid. However as to the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification, it
must be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the
procedure required by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission,
Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words,
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal
basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing;
(2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking
of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6)
other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot
delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law
itself.

Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong


187 SCRA 432
FACTS: On 10 August 1989, Lawyer Dante s. David filed a complaint before the regional Trial
Court alleging that the license plate of his car issued by the Land Transportation Commission now
Land Transportation Office, was removed by the agents of herein Petitioner while the car was
parked somewhere in Escolta, Manila. The complainant further alleged that the car was not
illegally parked. Ultimately complainant and private respondent David raised the issue that there
was no local ordinance or law to justify the removal of his car rear plate number, thus praying for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ f preliminary injunction by the court. On 14
August of the same year, prayer for the issuance of TRO was granted however, after series of
hearing, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Parties in-interest told to present their
respective memoranda before the ruling shall be issued. Subsequently, the respondent judge ruled
that LOI 43 in which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it to detach or remove or
confiscate the plates of any vehicle which are caught illegally parked outside of the designated
parking area (s), further declares that LOI 43 only authorizes the agents of MTC WTD to tow or
remove vehicles or motor vehicles whenever it causes traffic congestion. Undaunted of the defeat,
Petitioner brought the case before the Supreme Court when it should have been properly raise
first, before the Court of Appeals in which the latter has a concurrent jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Regional Trial Court when the validity of a statute is put into test. On the ground of
public interest, the highest tribunal had decided to take cognizance of the case. On 6 February
1990 a temporary restraining order was issued. Private respondent argued that Presidential
decree 1605(Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers Related to Traffic
Management, Providing Penalties, and for other Purposes) repeals letter-of-Instruction 43,
however the contention of petitioner herein was, the question statute remains in full- force despite
the issuance if PD 1605, and further contends that PD 1605 shall be considered as special law
because it is limited in territorial application.

Bautista vs. Juinio


127 SCRA 329
FACTS: Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979the response to the protracted oil
crisis that dates back to 1974 memorandum circular No. 39, provides fort the penalties. Letter of
Instruction No. 869 banning the use of the private vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and
on holidays 12am Saturday morning to 5am Monday morning, 1am of the holiday to 5am of the
day after the holiday. Memorandum Circular No. 39 has penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicles
and cancellation of registration. The exempted vehicles are service trucks, Diplomatic, Consular
Corps, and tourist cars. Petitioners contended that Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the
Minister of Public works, Transportation and Communications (Alfredo L. Juinio), and then
respondent Land Transportation Commissioners (Romeo Edu), is unconstitutional on the ground

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid? (2) Whether or not the removal or
confiscation of the plate number of any vehicle found to be illegally parked is sanctioned by LOI
43?
HELD: On the first issue, the highest tribunal resolves that, letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid.
However, applicable only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the streets due to some
involuntary reasons and not against those who intentionally breaks traffic laws. Resolving the

second issue, the Court holds that the applicable law to justify the removing and confiscating the
plate number of any vehicle intentionally parked by the owner in an area not designated as
parking sides is Presidential decree 1605. The court found out that the provisions of the two
statutes do not clash each other, LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on public
roads because of involuntary cause while PD 1605 deals with motor vehicles that have
deliberately parked in a place which is not designated as parking area.

Court stated that, LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of P50 a month emergency allowance for
employees of "enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30 for employees
of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million." While the determinative factor for the
amount of emergency allowance is simply the capitalization of the employer concerned. The
problem lies in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174 categorizes an enterprise
capitalized at P1 million as under both the P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency allowance.
This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174 issued by the
Department of Labor. Sec. 5 states that an employer has to pay the fifty-peso allowance "where
the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other
undertakings, exceeds P1 million" or thirty pesos "where the authorized capital stock of the
corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000 but not
more than P1 million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of employers required to
give a thirty-peso monthly emergency allowance under LOI No. 174 in view of the undisputed fact
that it is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws" with an
authorized capital stock of one million pesos. While said administrative interpretation of LOI No.
174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what LOI
No. 174 really means, said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin was adopted in P.D. No. 525 Sec. 7
of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D. No. 525 prescribes. Having been
based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by
the principle that an administrative agency like the Department of Labor cannot amend the law it
seeks to implement.

Accordingly, the petition was DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, branch 8,
Manila was affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on February 9
1990 was lifted.
LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION vs. CLAVE
209 SCRA 711, G.R. No. 51009, June 10, 1992
Facts: This special civil action of certiorari questions the administrative grant of an emergency
allowance of fifty pesos to the employees of a corporation with a capital stock of one million pesos.
The emergency allowance of employees in the private sector has its origin in Presidential Decree
No. 390, granting said allowance to government employees. Subsequent to the promulgation of
P.D. No. 390, then President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. 174 to implement the policy
enunciated in said decree in the private sector. He directed the Secretary of Labor "to take such
measures as may be necessary to ensure orderly and effective response by employers in the
private sector." To explain the meaning and scope of application of LOI No. 174, on March 11,
1974, the Department of Labor issued an Interpretative Bulletin. P.D. No. 525 was issued making
mandatory the payment of emergency allowance under LOI No. 174. petitioner, a corporation with
an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of P2,656,793.45 as of December 31,
1974, was named a respondent in a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance filed
before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in 1976 by the Luzon Polymers Labor
Union (FFW) on behalf of 185 of its members. Alleging that since February 1974, regular
employees of petitioner corporation who were members of the union had been receiving P1.15
daily or P30.00 monthly emergency allowance, complainant-union contended that its members
were entitled to P50.00 monthly emergency allowance inasmuch as their employer's total assets
were over and above P1 million. Petitioner claimed that since it had fully complied with LOI No.
174, it had not underpaid its employees. Noting that petitioner corporation had total assets of more
than one million in 1973 and 1974 or P1,920,529.04 and P2,676,793.45, respectively, Officer-inCharge and Assistant Secretary Vicente Leogardo, Jr. ruled that petitioner had not fully complied
with LOl No. 174. Petitioner appealed to Secretary Ople but the latter dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit in the order of February 21, 1978 and directed petitioner "to pay the difference of
P20.00 as awarded in the appealed order." Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the
President which, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, likewise dismissed the
appeal in an undated decision.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,


COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999
Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation
duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second
quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying
PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently,
however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in
its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year,
ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and
thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental
income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding
creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner
requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00
representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on
July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from
property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation
of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on
November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA
Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal

Issue: Whether or not the Department of Labor exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it
issued their interpretative bulletin.
Held: No. The second requisite for a valid administrative regulation was not complied with, which
says that it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature. The Supreme

Revenue." The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of
time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. This is in reference to the
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that
overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and
that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR
within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, through the Solicitor General, argues that the two-year prescriptive period for filing tax
cases in court concerning income tax payments of Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing
the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return, which is generally done on April 15 following the close of
the calendar year. Respondent Commissioner also states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax
Return of the petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on April 15, 1986, the
latter had only until April 15, 1988 to seek relief from the court. Further, respondent Commissioner
stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same
was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of action. A
motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied.
Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.

petition to annul the DO 16 and MC 30 and 37 thus, preventing the Department of Labor and
Employment and the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration to implement the
issuances.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of their rule-making authority in issuing the circulars? (2) Whether or not the issuances violates the
constitution and against the regimes of reasonableness, fairness and equality? (3) Whether or not
the issuances complies the requirement of publication for its validity?
HELD: Resolving the first issue, the court finds that the circulars are valid exercise of the rulemaking power of DOLE Secretary as delegated to the executive Branch of the Government.
Applying article 36 the regulatory power of the Secretary of Labor to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement as well as deployment of Filipino abroad. Executive order 797 issued
on May 01, 1982 further provides the DOLEs regulatory functions to regulate the deployment of
foreign Filipino workers. The issuances of those circulars are therefore valid exercise of quasilegislative power of the agency, it cannot be considered as unconstitutional or oppressive or
unreasonable. Resolving the last issue, the issuances are legally invalid, defective and it cannot
be enforced for lack of publication requirement as codified under section 2 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and section 3 and 4 chapter 2 of the administrative code of 1987. Lack of publication is
an essential requisite for the validity of the law. (Tanada v. Tuvera)

Issue: Whether or not the BIR exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 7-85.
Held: No. Supreme Court stated that the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 is clearly
inconsistent with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Further, the Supreme
Court said that A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer
with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place
the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same. A valid administrative regulation
must comply with the following requisites: (1) its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature; (2) it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (3) it must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and (4) it must be reasonable. In the
case at bar, the BIR have not complied with the second requisite as it was ultra vires with the
NIRC.

Accordingly, the prohibition was granted. The issuances were all suspended pending the
compliance of publications as required by law.
Philippine Interisland Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. CA, et al
G.R no. 100481
FACTS: Private respondent United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines is the umbrella
organization of groups rendering pilotage services in different ports of the country. The Philippine
Ports Authority is a government agency created pursuant to P.D 857, vested with the power to
control, supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any port district. It has also the power to
impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates charges or fees, for the services rendered
by the authority or by any private organization within the port. These consolidated petitions of
harbor pilots to secure enforcement of E.O 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage services and the
efforts of the PPA and its officials, petitioners herein, to block enforcement of the said E.O
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O 1088 issued by Pres. Marcos (for purpose of increasing existing
pilotage fees) is a valid statute and could not be revoked by the PPA, who has the power to
impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees.
HELD: YES, rate fixing orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate
legislation, promulgated by it is the exercise of delegated power. Hence, could be amended or
revised by law. President Marcos in the exercise of legislative powers could delegate the
ratemaking power to the PPA, so he can exercise it in specific instances without thereby
withdrawing the power vested by PD 857.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres


212 SCRA 298
FACTS: On 01 June 1991, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres as a result of published stories the
abuses suffered by Filipina housemaids particularly in Hong Kong suspended the placement and
recruitment by the private recruitment agencies. The DOLE itself and POEA took control of the
recruitment and deployment of Filipina helpers bound to Hong Kong. On 01 July 1991, DOLE
Secretary ordered the administrator of POEA to use the facilities of the agencies for the purpose.
On 10 July DOLE Secretary issued memorandum Circulars no. 30 series of 1991 seeking
accreditation by the Philippine government from recruitment agencies based in Hong Kong. On 01
August of the same year, POEA Administrator issued MC no.37 series of 1991 on the processing
of domestic helpers after the request for accreditation was responded positively by recruitment
agencies in based in Hong Kong. On 02, September 1991, petitioner, through its counsel, filed a

10

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE


HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-58289, July 24, 1982

motion to dimiss saying that the Secretary of the DILG is vested with the power of general
supervision of LGUs and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said
units. The RTC added that DILG circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant
to his rule-making power. Onon argues that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 signed
united Election of the National Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay contradicts the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga barangay
Officers and Directors and is therefore invalid, that the Liga is not a LGU, that the issuance of MC
No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules and guidelines for the conduct of the 1997 Liga election had
the effect of modifying, altering, and nullifying the rules prescribed by the National Liga Board.

Facts: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and
filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued
that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative
power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant
amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no
concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the
president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment
No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed
after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DILG has the power to issue a memorandum circular intended to
govern the election of the Liga.
HELD: NO. The Liga is a government organization, being an association federation, league or
union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected
government officials. Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG so far as it authorizes the
filing of a petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post
proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality.

Issue: Whether or not the President can validly grant tax amnesties without the concurrence of
the Batasan Pambansa in the exercise of his power to legislate.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it
did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution
which provides that The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty. The Supreme Court noted that Article 7, Sec. 11, applies only when
the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was
issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that
when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of
the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.

National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes


439 SCRA 130
Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng
mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in
the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set
aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs
of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge
contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different
leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory
power of the DILG.

Bito Onon vs. Fernandez


350 SCRA 732
FACTS: Petitioner Bito- Onon is the duly elected barangay chairman of Tacras, Narra, Palawan
and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President of the Municipality of Narra. Private respondent Elegio
Quejano Jr is the duly elected barangay chairman of Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President of the Municipality of Magsaysay. Both candidates were running
for the position of Executive Vice president in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng
Barangay Provincial Chapter of the Province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winner,
prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors
(BES), which was decided against him. Quejano then filed a petition for review with the RTC.
Onon moved to dismiss the petition claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction, that the
supplemental guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on
August 11, 1997 in its memorandum circular (MC) No. 97-193, providing for the review of
decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for
being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision
but rather an exercise of control over the Ligas internal organization. The RTC denied Onons

Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng
mga Barangay.
Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the
entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILGs authority is limited to seeing to it that the
rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify
or replace the same.
De Jesus vs. Civil Service Commission

11

471 SCRA 624

availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge. On the basis
of the said ERC decisions, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged Romeo P. Gerochi and
all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting
from the month of July 2003. Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR
which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. The
universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under
Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric endusers and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such,
the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is
unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that
the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the
latter complete discretionary legislative authority;2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and
determine where the funds collected should be used; 3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on
all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the
consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.

Facts: Sec. 13 of the Local Water utilities Administration (LWUA) Charter (PD 198, as amended)
expressly allowed the director of water districts to be granted per diems, and shall receive no other
compensation for services to the district.
CSC issued Resolution No. 95-4073 ruling that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee who
sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district to receive and collect any additional,
double or indirect compensation from said water districts except per diems pursuant to Sec. 13 of
PD 198 as amended.
CSC based its ruling on Sec.8, Art IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution which is deemed included the
power to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions.
Petitioners argue that CSC had no plenary jurisdiction to construe any provision of PD 198 on
matters pertaining to compensation and other benefits of water district directors based on Sec.8 of
the decree authorizing LWUA to appoint any of its personnel to sit on the board of director of a
water district that has availed financial assistance from LWUA and any such personnel so
appointed is entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to a regional director.

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
Held: No, there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. The EPIRA is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and it contains sufficient standards. Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and
therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount
nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided by the law itself when it
provided for the promulgation and enforcement of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution Code.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions,
the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In
such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting
as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary becomes the means or tool by which legislative
policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His
personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent
of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside
the findings of the Secretary and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact. If it is
exists, the Secretary, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President who
must impose the 12% VAT rate. There is no undue delegation of legislation power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law.

The present controversy originated from an administrative case filed with the SCS for violations of
RA 6713.
Issue: WON CSC has plenary jurisdiction to motu proprio construe PD 198 as amended.
Held: No. For the Court to sustain them would be to allow the board of an admin agency, by
merely issuing a resolution, to derogate the broad and extensive powers granted by the
Constitution to the CSC.

LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts, which it
may review to establish compliance with the provisions of PD 198.

FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION vs. ERC


G.R. 161113, August 9, 2005
Facts: Section 34 of RA 9136 (EPIRA), imposes Universal Charge upon end-users of electricity, a
charge imposed for the recovery of stranded cost. ERC issued its Implementing Rules and
Regulations defining Universal Charge refers to the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of
Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC and Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible
Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA.
National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share
for Missionary Electrification. The ERC decided the NPCs petition authorizing it to draw up to
P70, 000, 000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the

PCFI vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports


153 SCRA 622
FACTS: On 21 February 1987, the Task Force on Private Education under the Department of
Education Culture and Sports had recommended to the DECS several measures or courses of
actions congruent to the governments policy regulating private colleges in the country. On the said

12

proposal it stipulates that Private schools may increase school fees from 15-20% without a prior
approval from DECS provided that the school shall not exceed the total amount of school fees of
One Thousand Pesos. Petitioner herein, questioned AO 37 and sought for reconsideration on the
basis that the increase was too high or exorbitant. On 10 April 1987, on the basis that education is
a matter of right and considering the public clamor, DECS secretary issued a modified
administrative order authorizing back all Private Higher Educational Institutions (PHEI) to
implement an increase of 10-15% rate in the payment of school fees. Discontented with the
reconsideration prayed for, complainant-petitioner seeks for presidential intervention to suspend
the implementation of the modified AO 37 however; no response was made by the President of
the Philippines. On 20 May 1987, petitioner herein, elevates the matter to the Supreme Court
seeking to prevent the implementation of the said order. Thus, the filing of petition for prohibition
on the ground of public interest, seeking to resolve the following questions before the Supreme
Court;

HELD: The answer to the first issue is in the negative. The term otherwise provided as enshrined
in the Civil Code on the publication requirement, refers to the date of effectivity and not on the
publication. As to the second issue, all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary has legal basis?
(2)Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary curtailed the due process
clause enshrined in the constitution?

Rubenecia vs. CSC


244 SCRA 640

HELD: On the first issue, the court resolves that under section 57 Batas Pambansa Bilang. 232 or
the Education Act of 1982 empowers the Department of Education Culture and Sports to regulate
the educational systems in the country such as the power to promulgate, administer, supervise
educational systems. Furthermore, under Sec. 70 of the same act, contemplates on the RuleMaking power of the Minister of Education Culture and Sports. Ultimately the court holds that the
power to prescribe school fees is implied with the regulatory power exercised by the Secretary of
Education. To resolve the second issue, the court is in affirmative that in the exercise of the rulemaking (quasi-legislative) power of the secretary of education (formerly Minister of Education)
prior notice and hearing are not essential for the validity of the issuance.

FACTS: Teachers of Catarman National HS filed before MSPB administrative complaint against
petitioner Rubenecia, the School Principal: dishonesty, nepotism, oppression, and violation of Civil
Service Rules. MPSB investigation: charged Rubenecia, required him to answer. Rubenecia did
not file answer, requested instead to be furnished with copies of the documents submitted by
complainants. CSC Regional Director invited him to visit their office to identify and pick up the
document that he might need but he deferred, saying he still had enrollment problems. Later, CSC
Regional Office reiterated that he answer but he reiterated request that he be provided with copies
of supporting documents. Hearing scheduled but complainants did not appear, nor did he file his
answer though he was there. On the same day, Regional director issued order that the case was
deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the documents filed. Rubenecia wrote to
Chairman of CSC for his dismissal. Regional Director submitted to MSPB the investigation report
but before MSPB could render a decision, CSC issued RESOLUTION 93-2387 which provided,
among other things, that cases then pending before the MSPB were to be elevated to the
Commission for decision. In accordance with the Resolution, Rubenecias case was elevated to
CSC. CSC: GUILTY, dismissed from service. MR (lack of jurisdiction), denied "I. VIOLATION OF
CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS: The records show that Rubenecia committed the
said offense. He himself admitted that he did not accomplish his DTR but this was upon the
suggestion of the Administrative Officer. Rubenecia cannot use as an excuse the alleged
suggestion of an Administrative Officer. As the principal of a national high School, he is expected
to know the basic civil service law, rules and regulations. II. DISHONESTY: The Commission finds
Rubenecia liable. He was charged for misrepresenting that he was on 'Official Travel' to Baguio
City to attend a three-week seminar and making it appear in his CSC Form No. 7 for the month of
October 1988 that he has a perfect attendance for that month. Rubenecia in order to rebut the
same simply reiterated previous allegation that he attended the SEDP Training in Baguio City
during the questioned months without even an attempt on his part to adduce evidence
documentary or testimonial that would attest to the truth of his allegation that he was indeed in
Baguio during those weeks for training purposes. A mere allegation cannot obviously prevail over
a more direct and positive statement of Celedonio Layon, School Division Superintendent, Division

Accordingly, the petition for prohibition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the court
reiterates that the rule-making power of the Secretary of Education to prescribe school fees for
private school shall not be exercise unreasonably, further stressed that any issuances will be
subjected by the Supreme Court power of review.
Taada vs. Tuvera
146 SCRA 446
FACTS: This case involved a number of Presidential Decrees which the petitioners claim that had
not been published as required by law. The respondents argued that while publication is
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it is otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. On April
24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of the decrees. The petitioners went
to the Court for reconsideration or clarification of the said decision.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a law before it becomes effective need not be published when it is
otherwise provided; and (2) What are laws to be published?

13

of Northern Samar, when the latter certified that he had no official knowledge of the alleged 'official
travel' of Rubenecia. Moreover, verification with the Bureau of Secondary Schools reveals that no
training seminar for school principal was conducted by DECS during that time. It was also proven
by records that he caused one Mrs. Cecilia Vestra to render service as Secondary School Teacher
from January 19, 1990 to august 30, 1991 without any duly issued appointment by the appointing
authority. III. NEPOTISM: With respect to the charge of Nepotism, Rubenecia alleged that he is
not the appointing authority with regard to the appointment of his brother-in-law as Utilityman but
merely a recommending authority. With this statement, the commission finds Rubenecia guilty. it
should be noted that under the provision of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative Code, the
recommending authority is also prohibited from recommending the appointment to non-teaching
position of his relatives within the prohibited degree. IV. OPPRESSION: Rubenecia is also guilty of
Oppression. He did not give on time the money benefits due to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr.
Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers of CNHS, specifically their salary differentials for July to
December 1987, their salaries for the month of May and half of June 1988, their proportional
vacation salaries for the semester of 1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla, for the month of
June, 1987. Rubenecia did not even attempt to present countervailing evidence. Without being
specifically denied, they are deemed admitted by Rubenecia. V. INSUBORDINATION: He is not
liable for Insubordination arising from his alleged refusal to obey the 'Detail Order' by filing a sick
leave and vacation leave successively. The records show that the two applications for leave filed
by Rubenecia were duly approved by proper official, hence it cannot be considered an act of
Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia when he incurred absences based on an approved
application for leave of absence. Rubenecia is therefore found guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism,
Oppression and Violations of Civil Service Rules and Regulations. WHEREFORE, foregoing
premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of
Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Accordingly, he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service."

procedure made it difficult for cases to be finally resolved within a reasonable period of time. The
change, theretofore, was moved by the quite legitimate objective of simplifying the course that
administrative disciplinary cases, like those involving petitioner Rubenecia, must take. We
consider that petitioner Rubenecia had no vested right to a two-step administrative appeal
procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to an office of the Commission, the MSPB, and
thereafter a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself (i.e., the Chairman and the two
(2) Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission), a procedure which most frequently
consumed a prolonged period of time. It did not abolish the Merit System Protection Board, and if
it did, he is not an employee of MSPB to be a real-party-in interest. He cannot argue that he was
not notified that his case was elevated to CSC because (a) CSC Resolution 93-2387 did not
require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending before the
MSPB; (b) CSC Resolution 93-2387 was published in the Manila Standard so it would be deemed
substantially complied; and (c) it was Rubenecia himself who insisted on pleading before the
Commissioner (he filed MTD before commissioner and not before MSPB). History of the Merit
System Protection Board: PD 1409 created in the CSC the Merit Systems Board and gave it
power to hear and decide administrative cases. If the Board orders the removal of the public
officer, it would be subject to automatic review of the CSC. All other decisions of the Board are
subject to appeal to the CSC. 1987 Admin Code re-created the Merit System Board as Merit
System Protection Board (MSPB) which was intended to be an office of the Commission like any
other 13 offices in the CSC. MSPB was made a part of the internal structure and organization of
the CSC and thus a proper subject of organizational change which CSC is authorized to undertake
under SECTION 17 of the CIVIL SERVICE LAW. (2)YES. Due Process = Notice + Opportunity to
be heard. NOTICE: Formal charge which contained the essence of the complaint and the
documents in support thereof that had been furnished to Rubenecia + testimony of the principal
witnesses against him given during the preliminary hearing. ON THE NONFURNISH OF
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: he was given the opportunity to obtain those documents but he did
not avail of it + he sent a formal letter-answer to CSC Chair controverting the charges against him
and submitted voluminous documents in support of his claim of innocence. MR CURED
WHATEVER PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DEFECT: MR gave him opportunity to be heard. ON
FINDINGS OF THE CSC: The settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the finding of fact of an
administrative agency must be respected, so long as such findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is
not the task of an appellate court, like this Court, to weigh once more the evidence submitted
before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence. In the present case, in any event, after examination
of the record of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Civil Service Commission finding
Rubenecia guilty of the administrative charges prepared against him is supported by substantial
evidence.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and
assume jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner; and (2) Whether or not
petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition of CSC Resolution No. 940533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service.
HELD: (1) Yes it has authority to issue the said resolution and YES it has jurisdiction over the
administrative case.
RUBENECIA: Since MSPB was a creation of law, it could only be abolished by law and not by
CSC.
The questioned resolution in sum does the following:
1. Decision in administrative cases appealable to the Commission pursuant to Section 47 of the
present Civil Service Law may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and not to the
MSPB.
2. Administrative cases already pending on appeal before the MSPB or previously brought directly
to the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-2387, were required to be elevated
to the Commission for final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the determination of
administrative disciplinary cases were, in other words, re-allocated to the Commission itself. WHY
RELOCATE: to "streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn required the "simplification of
systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an] unnecessary bureaucratic layer." The previous

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs. COA


302 SCRA 241
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul
Decision No. 2447 dated July 27, 1992 of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying Philippine
International Trading Corporation's (PITC) appeal from the disallowances made by the resident

14

COA auditor on PITC's car plan benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998 of the
COA denying PITC's motion for reconsideration. The PITC is a government-owned and controlled
corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 252 on July 21, 1973, primarily for the
purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic
development. On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program for
qualified PITC officers. Under such car plan program, an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a
vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining
fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five
(5) years. Maximum value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) to Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00), depending on
the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition, PITC will reimburse the officer concerned
fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums and costs of registration of
the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date the vehicle was
purchased. The terms and conditions of the car plan are embodied in a "Car Loan Agreement".
Per PITC's car plan guidelines, the purpose of the plan is to provide financial assistance to
qualified employees in purchasing their own transportation facilities in the performance of their
work, for representation, and personal use. The plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility
during official trips especially within Metro Manila or the employee's principal place of assignment,
without having to rely on PITC vehicles, taxis or cars for hire. On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No.
6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides
for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates
save for certain additional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances
which were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate. Said section likewise provides
that other additional compensation being received by incumbents as by of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
The legislature has similarly adhered to this policy of non-diminution of pay when it provided for
the transition allowance under Section 17 of RA 6758 which reads: Sec. 17. Salaries of
Incumbents. Incumbents of position presently receiving salaries and additional
compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other
emoluments the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed,
shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition
allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the
incumbent shall receive in the future. Based on the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner correctly
pointed out that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits
being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the virtue of Sections 12 and
17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who availed of the subject car plan benefits
were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them to
continue enjoying said benefits within the five year period from date of purchase of the vehicle
allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of COA is not valid.

position classification system in the government including RA 6758. This is without prejudice,
however, as discussed above, to the non-diminution of pay of incumbents as of July 1, 1989 as
provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law. Wherefore, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the
assailed Decisions of the Commission of Audit are set aside. RA 6758 which is a law of general
application cannot repeal provisions of the Revised Charter of PITC and its a mandatory laws
expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being special laws. Our rules on statutory
construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication; that a statute, general in character as to its terms and application,
is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose
to do so is manifested; that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express i
Balbuna vs. Hon. Secretary of Education
GR No. L-14280, November 29, 1960
FACTS: The action was brought to enjoin enforce of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955 issued by
the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of compulsory flag
ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners, who are members of
the Jehova's Witnesses, contend that the said Department Order denied them freedom of worship
and speech, among others. They also contend that the order is not valid for it was not published in
the Official Gazette as required by law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Department Order is invalid.
2. Whether or not RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD: (1) No, the contention that assailed Department Order has no binding effect; not having
been published in the official gazette is without merit. The assailed order being addressed only to
the directors of Public and private schools and educational institutions under their supervision,
cannot be said to be of general application, requiring previous publication in the Official Gazette
before it could have binding force and effect. (2) No, the requirements constitute an adequate
standard.

Gregorio B. Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ


427 SCRA 46
FACTS: Before the Court is the motion filed by petitioner to cite respondent DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors (respondent for brevity) in contempt of court for alleged blatant
disregard and defiance of the agreement of the parties with this Court to maintain the status quo
before the filing of their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On September
22, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against respondents alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Panel for assuming jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the charge of coup detat against petitioner. Respondents filed their respective

HELD: The repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of "all corporate charters that exempt agencies from
the coverage of the System" was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes for
which the law was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in government
owned and/or controlled corporations to achieve "equal pay for substantially equal work".
Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as covered by laws prescribing a compensation and

15

comments and petitioner his reply thereto. An oral argument on the case was held on November
18, 2003. Parties submitted their respective memoranda as required by the Court. On April 13,
2004, the Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition and upholding the concurrent
jurisdiction of the respondent to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioner received a copy
of the decision on April 22, 2004, thus he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for
reconsideration.

declared CCC No. 10 as ineffective and unenforceable due to non-publication. Consequently, the
PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1856 directing the payment of COLA and
amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the service during the period July 1, 1989 to March 16,
1999, the date of publication of CCC No. 10. Doubting the validity of said Resolution, the PPA
Auditor requested the opinion of the General Counsel on the propriety of the payment of the
backpay. In fully concurring with the recommendation of the then Director, CAO II, the General
Counsel ruled that in order for a PPA employee to be entitled to backpay representing COLA and
amelioration pay equivalent to 40% and 10% respectively, of their basic salary, the following
conditions must concur: (1) he has to be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been
receiving the COLA and amelioration pay as of July 1, 1989. Aggrieved, PPA sought
reconsideration of the said advisory opinion which was denied by the General Counsel in a 1st
Endorsement dated September 13, 2001, since she found no cogent reason to set aside the
earlier opinion. The PPA Auditor accordingly ruled against the grant of the subject backpay. The
COA ruled that in the absence of effective integration of the COLA and amelioration allowance
into the basic salary in 1989, the inevitable conclusion is that they are deemed not integrated from
the time RA 6758 was promulgated until DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March 1999. During
that period, it thus disallowed the disputed allowances on the ground that these fell under the
second sentence of Section 12 of RA 6758. It held that only officials hired on or before July 1,
1989 was entitled to receive back pay equivalent to the additional compensation (COLA and
amelioration allowance) mentioned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on
petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513.
HELD: In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated November 18, 2003, respondent had
stopped from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation while the case is pending before
the court. Respondent issued its assailed order requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit
after receipt of the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 upholding respondents authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup detat against petitioner. Although the
Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final as of the date of the issuance of the said
assailed order, the court finds no contemptuous intent on the part of respondent to impede the
administration of justice. As respondent has explained in its Comment, the charges against
petitioner was filed with the DOJ in August 2003 and since then, the preliminary investigation has
been pending, thus with the Courts decision upholding their jurisdiction, respondent issued the
assailed order taking into account petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly,
respondents intention is to give respondent all the opportunity to controvert the accusation against
him and to adduce evidence in his behalf. The Court finds respondents explanation satisfactory
and does not see the act of respondent as contumacious, as herein earlier defined by the Court.
Petitioner asserts in his Motion that he received on April 22, 2004, a copy of the Courts decision
upholding respondents authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and that he has until May 7,
2004 to file his motion for reconsideration. However, verification with the Courts docket section
reveals that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration only on June 8, 2004, or thirty days late.
The Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 has already attained finality as of May 8, 2004. Hence,
there is no longer any impediment for respondent to proceed with the preliminary investigation and
for petitioner to comply with the respondents order to submit his counter-affidavit. Petitioners
motion to cite respondent in contempt of court is DENIED. Respondent is required to give
petitioner a fresh period from receipt of this Resolution to submit his counter-affidavit.

Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on
various dates after July 1, 1989 -- are entitled to the payment of back pay for cost of living
allowance (COLA) and amelioration allowance?
Held: Court held that the COLA of government employees from 1989 to 1999 was not deemed
integrated into their salaries. This means that the COLA during that period is a legally
demandable and enforceable right. Employees of government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether incumbent or not, are entitled to the COLA from 1989 to 1999 as a matter of right. Hence,
in consonance with the equal-protection clause of the Constitution, and considering that the
employees were all similarly situated as to the matter of the COLA and the amelioration allowance,
they should all be treated similarly. All -- not only incumbents as of July 1, 1989 -- should be
allowed to receive back pay corresponding to the said benefits, from July 1, 1989 to the new
effectivity date of DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The principle of equal protection is not a
barren concept that may be casually swept aside. While it does not demand absolute equality, it
requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike, both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Verily, equal protection and security shall be accorded every person under
identical or analogous circumstances.

PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA


469 SCRA 397

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Commission on Audit ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

Facts: PPA has been paying its officials and employees COLA and amelioration allowance
equivalent to 40% and 10%, respectively, of their basic salary pursuant to various legislative and
administrative issuances. During the last quarter of 1989, the PPA discontinued the payment
thereof in view of Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 prescribing the implementing
rules and regulations of R.A. No. 6758 otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law which
integrated said allowances into the basic salary effective July 1, 1989. However, the Supreme
Court in the case of Rodolfo de Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 109023 dated August 12, 1998,

Rodolfo S. De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit


294 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003
Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves
RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as

16

authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA
disallowed and ordered the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198,
the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.

information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch
to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by
law even if authorized by the LWUA.
Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters.
The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government
funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law,
PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that
payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.

People of the Phil. vs. Que Po Lay


94 Phil. 640
FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks
and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in
the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po
Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1, 000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.

Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita


GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power
by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its
legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials
and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and
the Philippine National Police (PNP).The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing
on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections,
wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not
able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by
its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for
the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquits the appellant, with costs de
oficio.
People vs. Veridiano II
132 SCRA 523
Facts: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation of BP 22. Before he could
be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the
information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of
the offense, w/c was about the 2nd week of May '79 (date of issue of the check), BP 22 has not
yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of
the dishonor of the check, 9/26/79, is the date of the commission of the offense. Resolving the
motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to
apply to the case. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review
respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid
and constitutional?
HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must,
as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress,
the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such

HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in May '79 (at the time he
issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing

17

check and not only the fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the
special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on 6/29/79. The copy editor of the OG made a
certification that the penal statute in question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the
printed date 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22. Before the
public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and
the people officially informed of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its
violation, then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and, consequently the
accused could not have committed the alleged crime. The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that
"This Act shall take effect 15 days after publication in the OG." The term "publication" in such
clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make known to the people in
general. If the legislature had intended to make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of
reference, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.

3. Is RMC No. 47-91 violative of the equal protection clause?


4. Are oil millers exempt from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)?
Held:
1. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not
considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of Section 103(b) of the
NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for
human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners
considered it so is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the contrary,
the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws. Under Section 103(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is
exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which
the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not
exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under Section 103(b) the sale of agricultural food
products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution
regardless of who the seller is. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the
exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under
Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary
238 SCRA 63
Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation
whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in
Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive branch
of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and collection of
taxes and other imposts. It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular
(RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax (VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra
was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue
Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. The petitioner
contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of Health and not the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) is the competent government agency to determine the proper classification
of food products. It cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the
effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is produced from coconut which is food
and 80% of coconut products are edible. The respondents, on the contrary, argue that the opinion
of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of the
tax laws, is entitled to great respect. Likewise, petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is
discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because while
coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell
copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT
payment of traders and dealers. Thus, the present petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to
nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue
officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization.

2. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In interpreting Section 103(a) and (b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict
construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is
entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on
the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."
3. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a material or substantial difference between
coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the
other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not
forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying
them differently.

Issues:
1. Is copra an agricultural food product for purposes of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), thus exempting the petitioner from payment of the Value Added Tax
(VAT)?

4. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to Section 102 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under Section 104 of
the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers,
but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT
exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the
sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the
producer.

2. Whether or not the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be accorded
respect in interpreting the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.

18

Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged do
not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts,
the information filed against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

People vs. Santos


62 Phil. 300

US vs. Panlilio
28 Phil. 300

Facts: The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested in him by
section 4 of Act No.4003 issued Administrative Order No. 2 Section 28 relative to fish and game
provides as follows:

Facts: The accused is charged for violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the
accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to
be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended
information was filed. It failed, however, to specify the section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have
been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial. The defendant was
notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture,
that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had
been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were
accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent
of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director
of Agriculture. It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses. for the prosecution that the
defendant fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to
remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them, from the quarantine in which they
had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the
commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work
animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined.

"28. Prohibited fishing areas. collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from
Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of the sore line of
islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of the
United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all
other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the
entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance:
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the
areas mentioned above only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be
granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or
naval authorities concerned.
"A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal
Code."
The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen
to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon III registered in his name and
to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over
which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Issues: Whether or not violation of Administrative orders issued by the department of agriculture
constitute a criminal offense.
Held: Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not
more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for
each offense." 'A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph
(c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act.

Issues: Whether or not violation of section 28 of administrative order No. 2 can give rise to
criminal prosecution.
Held: Act No. 4003 does not contain a provision prohibiting boats not subject to license to fish
within the stipulated areas without the written permission of the Secretary. Since the act itself
does not contain such prohibition, the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture to carry into effect the provisions of the law cannot incorporate such prohibition. For the
foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section
28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and
void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by
section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot
be delegated to him.

The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law,
are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal
offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal
offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
Pesigan vs. Angeles
129 SCRA 174

19

Facts: Executive Order 626-A, a law prohibiting the transportation of carabao and carabeef from
one province to another subject to confiscation and forfeitures by the government, was published
in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported
26 carabao and a calf from Camarines Sur to Batangas on April 2, 1982.

these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned government agencies, otherwise, the
authority given by law to these Regional Offices would become useless and said Regional Offices
can be rendered impotent by government agencies which can simply choose to ignore their
opinions and rulings on the convenient ground that they are not binding. In the present case, the
provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office of the CSC is Section 36 of P.D. No. 807
and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide that no officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
Hence, the ruling of the CSC Regional Office that the memorandum of Peralta, dated March 23,
1995, directing private respondent Nida Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties
and functions and advising her to go on leave with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil
Service law and rules, is binding upon petitioner.

Issue: WON an administrative regulation with a penal sanction not published is enforceable.
Held: No. An Executive Order prohibiting and penalizing transportation of carabaos from one
province to another cannot be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette. Said
Executive Order should not be enforced because it is a penal regulation published more than 2
months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art 2
of the Civil Code and Sec 11 of the Revised Admin. Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is denied.


Justice and fairness dictates that the public must be informed of that provision by means of
publication before violators of the Exec. Order can be bound thereby.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad
458 SCRA 441

Peralta vs. CA
462 SCRA 382

Facts: On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the
determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which
were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition
named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. After trial, the court rendered the judgment in
favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents DAR
and the LBP, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by
the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square
meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San
Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga. Respondent DAR is also ordered to pay petitioners the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.

Facts: Petitioner Israel G. Peralta (PERALTA) is the Director/Officer-in-Charge of the PPA,


Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City. On the other hand, private respondent Nida Olegario
(OLEGARIO) holds a permanent position of Budget Officer I in the same office. On March 23,
1995, PERALTA issued an Order, directing OLEGARIO and a co-employee Visitacion U. Enilo, to
cease and desist from performing their duties and functions effective April 1, 1995 and to go on
leave with or without pay, as the case may be, on the ground of insufficiency in the release of
allotment under the plantilla of the office. On March 24, 1995, OLEGARIO sought the opinion of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Cotabato City, anent the legality of the aforesaid Order. In a
letter dated March 27, 1995, the CSC informed PERALTA that OLEGARIO, being a government
employee holding a permanent appointment, cannot be removed or separated from the service
without valid cause. In the same letter, the CSC declared that the assailed Order is illegal
because going on leave is a matter of personal choice and decision of the employee concerned.
The CSC further held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is not among the
valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the service. It also
advised PERALTA to cease and desist from enforcing the void Order.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs
valuation of their properties thus exhausting administrative remedies first before filing a petition for
the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.
Held: Petition Denied. The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact,
private respondents did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation
summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the
purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private
respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court. At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination
of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative
proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles
of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such

Issue: Whether or not, the authority to issue opinions and rulings by CSC regarding personnel
management for both national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction is binding to
the said government agencies.
Held: It is clear from the provisions of Section 13 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 16(15), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 that the Regional Offices of the CSC are empowered to
enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel management or personnel
actions of national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the
same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the conduct of public officers and
employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to issue opinions and rulings
regarding personnel management in both national and local government agencies. Moreover,

20

determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

FACTS: Federico Suntay (deceased) has filed a petition for fixing and payment of just
compensation of his land covered by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or the otherwise known as R.A. 6657. The initial
payment offered by DAR through the Land bank of the Philippines (LBP) is at Four Million Two
Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68),
however it was not agreed by Federico Suntay and appealed for a much higher compensation.
After a period of summary Administrative proceedings of the matter the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (RARAD) rendered a decision in favor of Mr. Suntay of the land valued at One
Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos &
30/100 (P157,541,951.30). However LBP contested the decision of the RARAD and filed a petition
for just compensation at the RTC of San Jose Occidental Mindoro against Mr. Suntay, DAR and
RARAD. Unfortunately the move of the LBP was not considered by RTC because LBP failed to
pay the docket fee as required by the court on a certain period before the court had to take action
on the matter.
On the other hand RARAD had issued writ of execution for the payment of Four Million Two
Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) by the
LBP to Mr. Suntay. Instead of paying the land compensation, LBP had filed a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction [16] before the
DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No.
0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the RARAD. On September 12,
2001, the DARAB issued an Order enjoining the RARAD from momentarily implementing its
January 24, 2001 Decision and directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of
determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction.
At this instance, On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay,
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The
petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further
proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil
actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubrica's prayer for a
temporary restraining order. This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the
other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB has to take cognizance to act in the Certiorari petition of the
LBP with regards to the writ of execution issued by the RARAD against the LBP.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court had held that the DARAD has no jurisdiction to act on any petition
on certiorari lodge on them because being a quasi-judicial court they have limited powers.
Jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action must exist as a
matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution
or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is
in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly designated. In the case at bar, the absence
of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the
DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over
Land Bank's petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rulemaking power justifies such self-conferment of authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA


322 SCRA 139
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, which are
covered by TCT Nos. T-38666, T-38667, T-6236, and T-27591. The lands were taken by the DAR
for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the R.A. No. 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of
the land made by respondents LBP and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for a determination
of the just compensation for its property. The petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which on February 23, 1995, dismissed the petition
on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB.
Issue: Whether or not the primary jurisdiction vested to DAR to adjudicate agrarian related
matters is in contrary to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Held: There is nothing contradictory between the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC over (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under
R.A. No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial
proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such determination
is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less
"original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law
may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the
courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of
administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly
dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
DARAB vs. Lubrica
457 SCRA 800 G.R. No. 159145, April 29, 2005

21

Powers of the PCGG


E.O. 1 created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the Marcoses, including sequestration and provisional takeover of all business
enterprises owned by them as well as conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by
subpoena, administer oaths, punish for contempt.
Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the President to recover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime.
Quasi-Judicial Function
As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have
no power to control the other. However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgmentof regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14
specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall
file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive
and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the
Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the
Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's
decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.

PCGG vs. Pea


159 SCRA 556, L-77663, April 12, 1988
Nature of quasi-judicial function
Powers of the PCGG
A body exercising quasi-judicial function is co-equal with the RTC
FACTS: This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through
E.O. 1, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration
of all business enterprises owned by them upon showing of a prima facie case.
March 25, 1986 PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of
two export garment manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation.
June 27, 1986 PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized
signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations.
Sept. 4, 1986 PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung Chun
Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo.
Feb. 3, 1987 Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon
finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a
mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter,
Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations for payment
of the salaries of the staffs.
Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action
for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the
Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questioning the aforesaid revocation of the
authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO.
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yims prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the
case. RTC judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss and granted Yims prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the
PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26
of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and
actions of the Commission.
Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their
Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether
civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan"
and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under
the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively
by the Supreme Court.

Cario vs. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)


204 SCRA 483 (G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to
them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at
the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order week, with more teachers
joining in the days that followed. Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were
the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila,
who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.
However, the Secretary of Department of Education Culture and Sport (DECS) were
administratively charged them on the basis of the principal's report and had given them five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807".They filed correspondingly to the Commission on Human
Rights for the DECS violation of their peaceful assembly and replacement of them by the other
teachers without validly informing them. The CHR summons the DECS personnel but the latter
declared that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the
case.

22

ISSUE: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency, which has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear
and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.

HELD: The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has
been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official
regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or
arise from, the performance of his official duty; it is enough that the act or omission was committed
by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal
mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. In the existence of his
power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sect. 31 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel
of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control. (Emphasis added)

HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

International Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) vs. Jalandoon


G.R. No. 148152, November 18, 2005

Lastimosa vs. Vasquez


243 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995

FACTS: Jose Jalandoon filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a petition to make his
claim of twenty percent (20%) of share stocks of IBC.

FACTS: Petitioner Lastimosa has urged the wisdom of this court to decide on the validity of the of
the preventive suspension order issued by the Honorable Ombudsman and his Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas against her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for allegedly failing to act
on the Ombudsman order to file Attempted rape charges against the Mayor of Santa Fe Rogelio
Ilustrisimo in Cebu based on complaint filed by Jessica Villacarlos-Dayon, a public health nurse of
Santa Fe, Cebu, for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct. The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who,
after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal
of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez,
disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with
attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court.
The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria
G. Lastimosa. However, the petitioner refused the order of the Ombudsman to file attempted rape
because based on her preliminary investigation it is only an act of lasciviousness that the Mayor of
Santa Fe will be charged accordingly. The Ombudsman by the continuous acts of defiant by the
petitioner issued preventive suspension order for grave misconduct and to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

However, the SEC refused to render decision because its jurisdiction to decide the case was now
transferred to RTC by virtue of R.A. 8799. The herein petitioner filed an appeal to the CA which
has acquired a favorable decision enjoining the SEC to render decision of the petitioners claimed.
The SEC and IBC eventually have filed a petition for judicial review or a review on certiorari on the
case at bar by this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has the jurisdiction to decide on the issue of the share of 20%
stocks claimed by the petitioner to the IBC
HELD: NO. the supreme court ruled that as of August 9, 2000 which is the effectivity of RA 8799,
the case was not considered pending because the SEC had not decided whether the Republic
who by virtue of the sequestration of the PCGG of the IBC will now be the new party to be
impleaded as party of interest.
In other words, the case will fall within the circumstances described in RA 8799 and thus, a
controversy considered as intra-corporate issues shall now lodge at the RTC pursuant to the
mandate under RA 8799.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to ask assistance or to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo.

23

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works


74 SCRA 212

Held: CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the power
rates to be charged by electric companies but the regular courts power to adjudicate cases
involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. CCM Gas did not
question the fact that the law (P.D 1206) vest upon the BOE Supervision, control and jurisdiction to
regulate and fix power rates, it also did not question the fact that the purchased power adjustment
was decided by the Board of Energy and it did not, before the Trial Court, question the purchased
power adjustment formulated by the BOE. Trial Court concluded that CCM Gas was not
questioning before it the purchased power adjustment in question but simply to demand a
breakdown and itemization on which MERALCO based the purchased power adjustment amount
of P213, 696.00 which it was trying to collect from CCM Gas, it is clear that the question of
determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way pertains to BOEs
supervision, control and jurisdiction. The question CCM Gas rose before the trial court is a matter
foreign to the functions of BOE because it falls within the field of judicial determination and
adjudication. Thus, it is the trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has jurisdiction to entertain
civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment therein.

Facts: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed three (3) separate complaints with Board of Power and
Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of
selling electricity without permit and franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their
electricity consumption in excess in the MERALCO rates. In her answer, Syquia questioned the
jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of the electric power but
merely passes to the apartments tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in
accordance with their lease contracts.
Issue: Whether or not the Board Power and Waterworks has Jurisdiction over the said case.
Held: Respondent Board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by the respondents against petitioner.
Respondent Board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioners contractual relations with
respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in
the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents complaints against being charged
the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a question
that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provision of the Civil
Code and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular
courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against the petitioner
and requiring her to absorb the additional rising cost of electricity consumed for the common areas
and elevator service even at a resultant loss of fifteen thousand (15,000.00) a year arrogated the
judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

RCPI vs. Board of Communications


80 SCRA 471
Facts: The case at bar is about two petitions from private respondent Diego Morales and Pacifico
Innocencio that prays for damages to petitioner RCPI for the non-delivery of telegrams informing
them of the deaths of close relatives which allegedly caused them inconveniences, mental
anguish and additional expenses. After hearing, the Board of Communications in both cases held
that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the
petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146.
Petitioner contest that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of
complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence and injury
caused by quasi delict which accordingly, it should be ventilated in the proper courts and not in the
Board of Communications.

Manila Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals


271 SCRA 417
Facts: Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation is a customer of petitioner Manila Electric
Company. On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272, 684.81 for electric consumption for the period of
April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984. The account was due on May 29, 1984, but CCM Gas withheld
payment until its question concerning the purchased power adjustment was answered. It
demanded to know how the item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213, 696.00
had been arrived at. As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court. On October 14, 1985, MERALCO filed, by leave of court, an amended
answer in which it raised, as special and affirmative defenses, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court. The trial court dismissed the case and lifted the injunction it had issued on the ground that
the court lacked jurisdiction. As basis for its holding that the matter was cognizable by the Board of
Energy, it cited allegations in the complaint that the purchased power adjustment was arbitrarily
and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the same was not
only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages
allegedly suffered by private respondent for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner
RCPI.
Held: The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communication
being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers
as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute. The functions of Public
Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power
as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As successor in interest
of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers,
jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service
Commission.

Issue: Whether or not Board of Energy has jurisdiction to question of determining the breakdown
and itemization of the purchased power adjustment billed by an Electric power company.

GLOBE Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

24

147 SCRA 269

on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction and that petitioner is guilty of forum Shopping and
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Facts: Private Respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz addressed a message to Maria Diaz in Madrid,
Spain filed with the Telegraph Office of the Bureau of Telecommunication which was forwarded to
petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for the transmission thereto. Petitioner sent it to American Cable
and Radio Corporation in New York which in turn transmitted to Empresa Nacional de
Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. However, the latter mislaid the message resulting to its nondelivery. Private Respondent sent to the Public Service Commissioner, Enrique Medina an
unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. Petitioner questioned the PSCs jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the
message to the addressee. PSC finds petitioner responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory
service complained which orders them to pay a fine amounting to P200,000.00 and likewise
required to refund to the remitter of the undelivered message.

Issue: Whether or not MGB has jurisdiction.


Held: The questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and between
WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one
entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or interest in
mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the questioned
agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the
very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law. Unavoidably,
there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from both the MGB and the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not Public Service Commission has jurisdiction.


Held: The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with
respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments
made or adhered to by the Philippines under Section 5 of RA 4630. Jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body. Too basic in the administrative law to need citation of
jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like
respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body, and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is
void and ineffective.

Boiser vs. Court of Appeals


122 SCRA 945
Facts: Boiser, the petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other
municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and
style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and
private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract
denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with
long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City,
Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive
long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the
world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities
provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and
otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement. On
February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit
authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to
terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone
system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the
aforecited "Interconnecting Agreement.", the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It
instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial
Court, for injunction and damages.

Petition is granted. Order was set aside.


Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd.
412 SCRA 101
Facts: On July 12, 2000, WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement,[4] sold to herein petitioner
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. for
$10,000,000.00. Petitioner requested the approval by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary of the transfer to and acquisition by it of WMCPs FTAA on account
of its (petitioners) purchase of WMCs shares of stock in WMCP. The Tampakan Companies
notified the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of the exercise of
their preemptive right to buy WMCs equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc., seeking at the same time
the MGB Directors formal expression of support for the stock transfer transaction. Petitioner wrote,
by letter the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for
the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares. WMCP and WMC, respondents herein, by
letters to the MGB, proffered their side. Several other letters or position papers were filed by the
parties with the MGB or the DENR. Petitioner filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against
herein respondents WMC, WMCP, and the three corporations comprising the Tampakan
Companies, for specific performance, annulment of contracts, contractual interference and
injunction. Defendants-herein respondents filed before the Makati RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss

Issue: whether or not respondent Judge has the authority in trying and hearing the case
considering the issue is of the complaint for which the said order was issued properly devolves
within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunication Commission.
Held: The petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is granted. The issuance of the order
devolves within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission and not with the
regular courts. The questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals is set aside.

25

127 SCRA 419


Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP
459 SCRA 491
Facts: This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order to annul the Resolution of public
respondent Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 98-343
and to restrain COSLAP from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction. Subject of the instant
petition is a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Nio, Tugbok,
Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman Cuison, Jr.
The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after
emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over
the property and subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T162663; and the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property subject of the
instant dispute (Cuison property). Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison
property for distribution to the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private respondents who are members of the Sto.
Nio Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and
Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents were individually
issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After compulsory acquisition
proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the names of the aforesaid organizations.
Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as urban/urbanizing and
therefore beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint docketed as DARAB Case
No. XI-10-12-DC-93 on September 23, 1993 with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. Named
respondents were the Regional Director for Region XI of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register
of Deeds of Davao City, SNFC, ARBA and NAMAR-FADC-KMP. Respondent officials therein and
SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property was agricultural as per certification issued
on June 30, 1990 by the Regional Officer of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city zoning ordinance classifying the Cuison property as
urban/urbanizing for being without the approval of the HLURB. Evidence presented by the Bank
consisted of a certification issued by the HLURB on October 13, 1993 correcting its prior
classification that the Cuison property was agricultural and a written official classification from the
Davao City Zoning Administrator stating that Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No. 363, series of
1982 categorized the Cuison property as urban/urbanizing.

Facts: Private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma then
of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view
that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor
and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was such an order dated
July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order
assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court
to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the
meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their
behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing,
impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's
Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way
leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless
a contrary order is issued by this Court. The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of
Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations
Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on
April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4 Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a
notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca,
president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and
"employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed
by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of
which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9,
1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers
and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners,
blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers
free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal
and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were
incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore
the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to
a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
Hence this petition is for certiorari.

Issue: whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction on the said case.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge has the authority in trying and hearing the said case.

Held: The petition for certiorari is granted. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory
Board (DARAB) has the jurisdiction over the case. The Cuison property was not agricultural land
and, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP.

Held: The writ of certiorari is granted. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for
damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters and not vested in regular courts.

National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma

26

Hydro Resources Contactors Corporation vs. National Irrigation Administration


441 SCRA 614

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Assoc. of the Phil.
465 SCRA 532

Facts: In a competitive bidding conducted by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) sometime
in August 1978, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (Hydro) was awarded Contract MPI-C2involving the main civil work of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract price for the
work was pegged at P1,489,146,473.72 with the peso component thereof amounting to
P1,041,884,766.99 and the US$ component valued at $60,657,992.37 at the exchange rate of
P7.3735 to the dollar or P447,361,706.73. On November 6, 1978, the parties signed Amendment
No. 1of the contract whereby NIA agreed to increase the foreign currency allocation for equipment
financing from US$28,000,000.00 for the first and second years of the contract to
US$38,000,000.00, to be made available in full during the first year of the contract to enable the
contractor to purchase the needed equipment and spare parts, as approved by NIA, for the
construction of the project. On April 9, 1980, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) whereby they agreed that Hydro may directly avail of the foreign currency component of
the contract for the sole purpose of purchasing necessary spare parts and equipment for the
project. This was made in order for the contractor to avoid further delays in the procurement of the
said spare parts and equipment. Work on the project progressed steadily until Hydro substantially
completed the project in 1982 and the final acceptance was made by NIA on February 14, 1984.
During the period of the execution of the contract, the foreign exchange value of the peso against
the US dollar declined and steadily deteriorated. Whenever Hydros availment of the foreign
currency component exceeded the amount of the foreign currency payable to Hydro for a
particular period, NIA charged interest in dollars based on the prevailing exchange rate instead of
the fixed exchange rate of P7.3735 to the dollar. Yet when Hydro received payments from NIA in
Philippine Pesos, NIA made deductions from Hydros foreign currency component at the fixed
exchange rate of P7.3735 to US$1.00 instead of the prevailing exchange rate. Upon completion of
the project, a final reconciliation of the total entitlement of Hydro to the foreign currency
component of the contract was made. The result of this final reconciliation showed that the total
entitlement of Hydro to the foreign currency component of the contract exceeded the amount of
US dollars required by Hydro to repay the advances made by NIA for its account in the importation
of new equipment, spare parts and tools. Hydro then requested a full and final payment due to the
underpayment of the foreign exchange portion caused by price escalations and extra work orders.
In 1983, NIA and Hydro prepared a joint computation denominated as the MPI-C-2 Dollar Rate
Differential on Foreign Component of Escalation. Based on said joint computation, Hydro was still
entitled to a foreign exchange differential of US$1,353,771.79 equivalent to P10,898,391.17. NIA
filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim raising laches, estoppel and lack of jurisdiction by
CIAC as its special defenses. NIA also submitted its six (6) nominees to the panel of arbitrators.
After appointment of the arbitrators, both parties agreed on the Terms of Reference as well as the
issues submitted for arbitration.

Facts: The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a
definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After
the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA, the DTI Secretary
then promulgated a Decision wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions
of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors application for
safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff
Commissions negative findings. Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by
filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set
aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court of
Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of
the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the
power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that
the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and
erroneous methodology. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision penned by Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion, partially granted Philcemcors petition. The
appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave
abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission, it also held
that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such
findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys discretionary
review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a
final decision on the Tariff Commissions recommendation. On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed
the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors
petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and;
that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions
warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was
cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that
that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his
deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination
that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered
serious injury as a result of the import surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard
measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in
the amount ofP20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.
Issue: Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction in the said case.
Held: The petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors
petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and;
that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions
warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.

Issue: whether or not Construction Industry Arbitration Commission has jurisdiction on the said
case.
Held: The petition is GRANTED. It would be preposterous for NIA to have the power of granting
claims without the authority to verify the computations of such claims

Angara v. Electoral Commission


63 PHIL 139

27

FACTS: In the election of September 17, 1935, petitioner Angara and the respondents Ynsua,
Castillo, and Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly
for the district of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed
Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On December
8, 1935, Ynsua filed before Electoral Commission a motion of protest against Angara and praying
among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected member of the National Assembly or
that the election of said position be nullified. On December 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution stating that the last day for filing protest is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the SC therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.

long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned
formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before
the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces
all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that
any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken
not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules of Proceedings adopted by the Electoral Commission in election
contest of which it was the sole judge is validly prescribed by such commission?
HELD: Yes, it is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power must be deemed by necessary application to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission. The Supreme Court emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as
the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral
Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava
105 Phil. 173

Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA


117 SCRA 369
FACTS: Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. organized by Guiang, Liceralde and six (6) others,
which was then issued a consolidated timber license. Guiang and Liceralde, due to some
differences with the majority group in the corporation, requested the Secretary of Agriculture and
National Resources that they be allowed to withdraw their respective forest areas under their
original timber licenses from the consolidated timber license of Agusmin and consolidated them
with he timber license of Pedreo B. De Jesus and Sulpicio Lagnoda. The request was referred to
the Director of Forestry who declared that the request is beyond his jurisdiction. Guiang, Liceralde
and De Jesus formed a corporation known as the P.B. De Jesus & Co., Inc. Agusmin interposed
and appealed from the decision of the Secretary stating that it was appealing said decision to the
Office of the President.

FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27,
1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice
of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a
matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the

ISSUE: Whether or not the right for procedural due process has been violated by the Executive
Secretary?
HELD: No, in deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly
enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable, little, if any, useful
purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction No. 172,
which ordered the cancelation of the timber issued to Agusmin, in effect, reversed and set aside
the said decision of the Executive Secretary before the same become final and enforceable. In
the words of the CA, the said decisions did not acquire and finality. Administrative rules of
procedure would be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in

28

obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.
There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

incriminatory questions but also to take the witness stand. While the matter there referred to an
administrative case, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The present case is not dissimilar.
The self-incrimination clause is applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of
the privilege to practice the medical profession.The Board is mistaken that the clause is limited to
allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability. That
is just one aspect of the right. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. In
Chavex v. CA, defendant has a right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness stand.

Carmelo vs. Ramos


6 SCRA 836
FACTS: The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies involving the license
inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer
and of the License and Permits Division of the said office. He named Jesus Carmelo as chairman.
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos requiring him to appear before it in connection
with an administrative case but Ramos refused to appear. Claiming that Ramos refusal tended to
impede or obstruct the administrative proceedings, petitioner filed with the CFI a petition to declare
Ramos in contempt. The trial court dismissed the petition. It held that there is no law empowering
committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand witnesses testify under
oath and that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination

Tolentino vs. Inciong


91 SCRA 563
Facts: Private respondent Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then NLRC charging
petitioner Arcadio Tolentino with violating the Constitution of the Batangas Labor Union (BLU) by
refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers. NLRC issued an order directing the
BLU to hold its election of officers within 20 days from receipt. BLU filed a petition with the CFI for
prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondent Cinco, NLRC and the
Sec. of Labor, seeking to annul and to prohibit NLRC and the Sec. of Labor from enforcing it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and ask for their
punishment in case of refusal

Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime Delos Angeles afterwards reserved his
resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. Private and
judge then was served a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Inciong requiring them to
appear at the NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old
society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the commission.

HELD: NO. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or
bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Issue: WON a labor official's power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to comply with its
order can be extended to trial court judges.
Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there is compliance with the law, which is the
essence of judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of
its jurisdiction, thus said judge reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal
questions raised after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for.

Pascual vs. Board of Examiners


28 SCRA 344
FACTS: In the initial hearing of the Board of Medical Examiners on the charge against Arsenio
Pascual, Jr., counsel for complainants announced that he would present Pascual as his first
witness. Pascual objected relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. The Board took note, but stated that he will still testify as such witness in the next
hearing. Pascual filed an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Board with the CFI of Manila. The complainants in the administrative case, Salvador Gatbonton
and Enriqueta Gatbonton, filed a motion for intervention. Lower court ruled in favor of Pascual.

The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the
court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred
on it. Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled
rules.

ISSUE: Whether in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged


malpractice, the Board can compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent.

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations


G.R. No. L-49496

HELD: No. The lower court's decision follows the principle in Cabal v. Kapunan, about an
adminstrative case, that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer

29

FACTS: This case involved a motion for new trial of the National Labor Union, Inc. The respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of the
Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers,
among others, that (1) Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; (2) the supposed lack of leather
materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army; (3) the National Worker's
Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal; and (4) the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Montemayor vs. Bundalian


405 SCRA 264
FACTS: Private respondent (Luis Bundalian) accused petitioner (Edillo Montemayor), of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, that results to
his dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highway. Petitioner
explained that in view of the unstable condition of the government service in 1991, his wife
inquired from her family in the US about their emigration. After the investigation, the PCAGC
concluded that a petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to
his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. That it recommended petitioners dismissal from
service.
ISSUE: Whether or not he was denied of due process in the investigation before the PCAGC

ISSUE: Whether or not the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations is granted.

HELD: We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 6In the case at bar, the PCAGC
exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not
be located.7 Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly
represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended
the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President
and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of
the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and
satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure
adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and
such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
1.

The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;

2.

The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3.

That of having something to support its decision;

4.

The evidence must be substantial;

5.

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

6.

Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;
and

7.

Should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.

Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs. Court of Appeals


94 SCRA 261
FACTS: Zambales Chromite Mining filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines
Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining
claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and
Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he
instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed
before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the
disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court)
does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he
had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM

30

did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no
evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM
appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozons finding and declared that ZCM had the
rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the
factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after
realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister
of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the
CAs earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be
reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service
Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA
Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who
between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be
adopted by the President of the Philippines.

Corona vs. CA
214 SCRA 378

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.

FACTS: On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25
creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability. Pursuant to the mandate of
A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating the
Administrative Action Board (AAB) to ac, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate
measures on cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in
the Department. In line with the said order series of complaints where then filed in the AAB.
Bungubung as one of the respondents filed his answer and questioned the jurisdictional
competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA who had
jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted
with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it
would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first
view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
PPA?
HELD: That the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC
Secretarys jurisdiction is circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and the
Civil Service Law which give him only appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary matters involving
personnel below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the power to initiate
proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the absurd
spectacle of the DOTC Secretary acing as complainant-initiator of an administrative case which
later falls upon him to review.

Anzaldo vs. Clave


119 SCRA 353
FACTS: Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for
28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed
as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The
position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr
Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos
appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado
and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave
was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree,
Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave
issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his
decision as the CSC chairman.

Caoile vs. Vivo


125 SCRA 87
FACTS: The case at bar involves five aliens namely Teban, Jose, Felipe, Vicente, Santos all
surnamed Caoile, who have wrongfully managed to enter and remain in the Philippines since
1961.The Philippine consul at HongKong issued certificates to enable them to travel directly to the
Philippines. The board allowed the admission into this country of the five alleged Caoile brothers
on the assumption that they are Filipinos under the principle of jus sanguinis. On January 24, 1962
the Secretary of Justice, acting in the public interest, pursuant to section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Memorandum Order No. 9. In that order, he directed that in view of
the fact that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of immigration has not yet
met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it, all decisions purporting

ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.


HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was
inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was
that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It
is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant

31

to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu proprio
of, decisions of the board of special inquiry were set aside. In compliance with the Secretarys
directive, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered an immigration officer to study and review the
proceeding and the evidence as to the admission of Teban, Felipe, Santos, and Vicente.

province of Batangas and the City of Lipa. The petitioners are holders of a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice-plant in the municipality of Bauan and to sell the ice produced
therein in the municipalities of Bauan and Mabini, province of Batangas. In assailing the validity of
the decision appealed from, the petitioners contend that the decision is null and void due to the
lack of the requisite notice of hearing. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that
petitioners may not complain that they were not notified of the hearing inasmuch as the notice of
hearing was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the province of Batangas; and
that the requirement of individual notices to the affected parties appearing in the list attached to
the notice of hearing could not have been complied with by the private respondents inasmuch as
no such list was attached to the notice of hearing issued by the hearing officer; besides, the usual
practice in the hearing of cases in the respondent Commission was not to send such individual
notices to affected parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion?


HELD: The complainants cannot say that there is grave abuse of discretion in this case. If the
petition were treated as one of the declaratory relief as to his rights or duties under the
Immigration Law, with the object of attaining curative or preventive justice, still it was premature
and anticipatory because in his case there was yet no controversy which was ripe for adjudication.
Before seeking judicial intervention, appeal to Minister of Justice from decision of immigration
board should have been sought. And since the Commissioners of Immigration are under the
Department of Justice and, in this case, they followed the Secretarys Order setting aside the
individual actions of the former Commissioners, the aggrieved parties should have exhausted their
administrative remedies by appealing to the Secretary before seeking judicial intervention.

Issues: Whether or not there was proper notice of hearing was published?
Held: Respondent applicant contends that the publication of the notice of hearing in 2 newspapers
of general circulation in the province of Zambales is notification not only to the interested parties,
but to the whole world in general. This is inaccurate. The order required, in addition to publication,
individual notice to the operators affected by the application and whose names appeared in the list
attached to the order. The requirement, therefore, is not in the alternative, but conjunctive. It
cannot be disputed that this requirement of the Public Service Commission itself in connection
with an application for a certificate of public convenience, is within the power of the Commission to
impose. The inadequate notification to the interested parties in this case, which resulted in the
oppositors' failure to be present during the hearing, deprived them of their day in court. The
decision rendered in disregard of said right, consequently, is null and void.

Cruz vs. Minister of Labor and Employment


120 SCRA 15, No. L-56591
Facts: On November 21, 1979, respondent bank Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of its remittance clerk, Ma. Lourdes
Cruz, for gross negligence which was opposed by the latter by filing a complaint for illegal
dismissal. On February 11, 1980, the Regional Director resolved the case by lifting petitioners
preventive suspension and directing the bank to reinstate her with full back-wages. In support of
his order, the Director held that the record is bereft of any substantial proof tending to show that
Lourdes Cruz has committed act of gross negligence as imputed to her.
Issues: Whether or not the petitioner was not given the chance to be heard and was she was
denied due process?
Held: Petitioner's claim that she was denied due process is likewise without basis. She was given
the chance to explain and exonerate herself of the charges during the investigation. It was
incumbent upon her to prove her innocence but she failed to do so. Her allegation in her complaint
that she acted only in obedience to her superior's order is an obvious after thought which should
not be given credence. She failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support her allegation.
Nevertheless, the courts agreed with respondent Minister's order of reinstating petitioner without
backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of backwages would sufficiently
penalize her for her infractions.

M.F Violago Oiler Tank Tracks vs. NLRC


117 SCRA 544, No. L-56950-51
Facts: Five drivers who used to work for the petitioner filed complaints with the Regional Office of
the National Labor Relations Commission at San Fernando, Pampanga for illegal dismissal,
reinstatement with backwages, and such other benefits as they may be entitled to under the law.
According to the complainants, Mr. Miguel F. Violago, proprietor of an oil-tank trucking business,
withdrew the trucks driven by them for no just cause and without prior clearance from the Ministry
of Labor. M. F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks alleged that all the charges filed by the complainant
against herein respondent are maliciously false and perjuriues, the truth of the matter being that
said complainants Teofilo de Leon, Ricardo Pasco, Amado Mariano were allegedly
suspected/caught by the Petrophil authorities of using device to cheat in receiving and delivering
fuel from the compound to the points of delivery and by reason thereof, they were prohibited or
banned from entering the Petrophil compound at Pandacan, Metro Manila, thus, as they were not
allowed anymore to enter the compound, they abandoned the trucks they were respectively

Cordero vs. Public Service Commission


121 SCRA 249, No. L32489
Facts: Petitioners have taken this appeal from a decision of the respondent Public Service
Commission authorizing the private respondents to sell ice and supply cold storage for the

32

operating. The respondent Commission rendered a decision on April 30, 1980 affirming the
arbiter's decision but deleting the awards of emergency living allowances to Felipe Cruz and
Zosimo Sacdalan and the award of service incentive leave pay to all complainants. Instead of the
award of separation pay, the petitioner was ordered to reinstate the complainants with full
backwages until actually reinstated.

Pefianco vs. Moral


322 SCRA 439, G.R No. 132248
Facts: Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against respondent for dishonesty and grave misconduct
due to pilferage of some historical documents and the keeping of it on the respondents
possession. Respondent then receive a copy of the resolution finding her guilty of administrative
offenses of dishonesty and was ordered dismissed from the service. Respondent did not appeal
the judgment and instead filed for Petition for the Production of the DECS investigation Committee
Report. The Petition was, however denied. She then filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee
Report and DECS Resolution, Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally
for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. The appellate
court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding
that -Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely.

Issues: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter violated due process in rendering the decision?
Held: Labor arbiter who scheduled a complaint for hearing and heard the same before the answer
was filed violates due process. We note that the respondent commission adopted the labor
arbiter's findings verbatim and merely added three short paragraphs in its decision which modified
the awards with one sentence justifications for each change. The court agreed with the petitioner
that the conclusions of the arbiter are "patently erroneous and devoid of logical and justifiable
consideration." The arbiter called the petitioner's defense that it never dismissed the complainants
from employment a mere "theory", inspite of the fact that this defense constituted the crucial issue
of the case before him.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to be informed of the findings of the
investigation against him?
Held: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against himhe is only entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence presented
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. There is no law or rule which
imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report.

Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana


458 SCRA 609, G.R. No. 157634
Facts: Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant is a single proprietor business registered in the name
of petitioner Pacita O. Po, whose mother, petitioner Josefa Po Lam, manages the
establishment.The hotel and restaurant employed about sixteen (16) employees. Due to the
expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the rented space occupied by the said hotel
and restaurant at Rizal Street, the hotel operations of the business were suspended on March 31,
1997. The operation of the restaurant was continued in its new location at Elizondo Street, Legazpi
City, while waiting for the construction of a new Mayon Hotel & Restaurant at Pearanda Street,
Legazpi City. Only nine (9) of the sixteen (16) employees continued working in the Mayon
Restaurant at its new site, the 16 employees filed complaints for underpayment of wages and
other money claims against petitioners. Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio L. Rivera, Jr. rendered a
Joint Decision in favor of the employees.

Police Commission vs. Lood


GR No. L-34637 February 24, 1984
Facts: Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the police service by the then Mayor Braulio
Sto. Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner commission finding him guilty of serious
irregularity in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee, Jr. Respondent thereafter filed his
complaint with respondent court seeking his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent
court.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Ibea was deprived of administrative due process.

Issues: Whether or not respondents illegally dismissed?


Held: No. The record amply shows that petitioners decision was supported by substantial
evidence consisting of the affidavit-complaint and the documentary evidence duly marked by the
board as exhibits for the complainant. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that
administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence on the record, or stated negatively, it is
sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. As expounded by
Justice Laurel in the leading case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, substantial
evidence is all that is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

Held: On this point, we note that the Labor Arbiter and the CA are in accord that at the time of the
filing of the complaint, respondents had no cause of action to file the case for illegal dismissal.
According to the CA and the Labor Arbiter, the lay-off of the respondents was merely temporary,
pending construction of the new building at Pearanda Street. But while the closure of the hotel
operations in April of 1997 may have been temporary, we hold that the evidence on record belie
any claim of petitioners that the lay-off of respondents on that same date was merely temporary.
On the contrary, we find substantial evidence that petitioners intended the termination to be
permanent.

33

Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank


G.R. No. 72977 December 21, 1988

adjustment, ECOLA, overtime pay and 13th month pay. On December 27, 1991, the Labor Arbiter
in Legazpi City forthwith issued a decision in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision.

Facts: Petitioner Bienvenido R. Batongbacal, a lawyer who was admitted to the Bar in 1952,
began his banking career in 1961 as manager of the Second Rizal Development Bank. On
November 2, 1966, he transferred to the Citizens Bank and Trust Company. He was appointed
assistant vice-president. On October 14, 1975, Citizens Bank and Trust Company merged with the
Associated Banking Corporation. On March 15,1983, the bank's board of directors met and
approved the resolution that the bank officers at the Head Office and the Branches with corporate
rank of manager and higher be required to submit immediately to the President their courtesy
resignations.
Issue: Whether or not an employer bank may legally dismiss its assistant vice-president for
refusal to tender his courtesy resignation which the bank required in line with its reorganization
plan.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Labor
Arbiters decision.
Held: It was speculative and conjectural on the part of the NLRC to declare petitioners' argument
as "mere alibi." The employment contract presented by petitioners, while admittedly defective, did
not refer to any of the private respondents. No evidence was presented to show that petitioners
engaged the services of private respondents. As regards the matter of evidence, it is clear that the
Labor Arbiter relied solely on the bare allegations of the parties in their position papers in
rendering his now assailed decision.

Held: While it may be said that the private respondent's call for courtesy resignations was
prompted by its determination to survive, we cannot lend legality to the manner by which it
pursued its goal. By directing its employees to submit letters of courtesy resignation, the bank in
effect forced upon its employees an act which they themselves should voluntarily do. It should be
emphasized that resignation per se means voluntary relinquishment of a position or office. Adding
the word "courtesy" did not change the essence of resignation. That courtesy resignations were
utilized in government reorganization did not give private respondent the right to use it as well in
its own reorganization and rehabilitation plan. There is no guarantee that all employers will not use
it to rid themselves arbitrarily of employees they do not like, in the guise of "streamlining" its
organization. On the other hand, employees would be unduly exposed to outright termination of
employment which is anathema to the constitutional mandate of security of tenure. The record fails
to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitioner. There are no proofs of
malfeasance or misfeasance committed by petitioner which jeopardized private respondent's
interest. The latter's allegations that petitioner was "purged" because he sabotaged the bank and
that he "contributed, directly or indirectly" to its downfall are mere subjective conclusions
unsubstantiated by hard facts. To clothe with legality petitioner's dismissal for his failure to submit
his letter of courtesy resignation is to add a ground for termination of employment to the provisions
of the Labor Code.

Velasquez vs. Hernandez


G.R. No. 150732 August 31, 2004
Facts: In a letter dated 25 September 1996, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the
DECS-CAR, (Cordillera Administrative Region) sent a letter to petitioner (in G.R. No. 150732)
Tomas G. Velasquez, informing him of the alleged infractions committed by respondent, Helen B.
Hernandez, such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer or
promotion of complainant teachers. Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez convened a factfinding committee to determine the veracity of the alleged violations of respondent and to render a
formal report and recommendation. On 15 November 1996, the Committee issued an Investigation
Report recommending the filing of administrative and criminal complaints against respondent.
After due proceedings, the CSC issued Resolution No. 00-1375, dated 13 June 2000, finding
respondent guilty of the charges against her and ordering her dismissal from the service.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the resolutions of the CSC.
Issue: Whether or not CSC erred in rendering judgment against her in violation of her right to due
process in administrative proceedings.

Progress Homes vs. NLRC


G.R. No. 106212 March 7, 1997

Held: Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt
in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As
defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal
proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
Ombudsman, in ordering the withdrawal of the criminal complaints against respondent was simply
saying that there is no evidence sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt which is
a condition sine qua non for conviction. Ergo, the dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose
administrative action against respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Progress Homes Subdivision (Progress Homes), is a housing project undertaken
by the Ermelo M. Almeda Foundation, Inc., a non-stock organization duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). When it engaged in constructing low-cost housing
units for low-income employees, it named its project "Progress Homes Subdivision" in Camarines
Sur. The other petitioner, Ermelo Almeda, is the President and General Manager of Progress
Homes and the owner of the land where the Progress Homes Subdivision is located. Private
respondents allegedly were among the workers employed by petitioners in their construction and
development of the subdivision from 1986 to 1988. They were paid varying salaries. Private
respondents filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch a petition for reinstatement, salary

34

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. With cost against petitioners.


Philippine Merchant Marine School vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112844 June 2, 1995
Facts: PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in
1950 to train and produce competent marine officers. It offers a two-year course in Marine
Engineering (A.M.E.) and a four-year course in Marine Transportation (B.S.M.T.). For several
times prior to 1985 respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved
petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition. Sometime in 1986 the DECS received a
complaint from Felixberto B. Galvez, president of petitioner's Faculty Association, NAFLU-KMU,
concerning the issuance of summer permit to petitioner and of its holding of classes for courses
not recognized by the Government. On 27 August 1991, DECS Secretary Cario issued a Closure
Order.

Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC


211 SCRA 565
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) en banc. The petitioner primarily assails the allegedly unauthorized action of Special
Prosecutor Norberto Ruiz of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of SEC, to decide the
consolidated petitions for revocation of certificate of registration. Mr. Ruiz, after studying the
substantial evidence, prepared a resolution and presented to PED Director Elnora Advento before
the Commission en banc, which approved the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed before
the PED, but was denied. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal. The motion was denied for lack of
merit.

Issue: Whether or not public respondents decisions have no substantial evidence to support
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC may delegate its authority to hear cases before it.
Held: Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. A perusal of the questioned resolutions of the
Office of the President reveals that they are based on the records of the case which constitute
substantial evidence, proving distinctly not only petitioner's consistent failure to meet the DECS'
minimum standards for maritime institutes and correct its deficiencies but also its continued
operation and offering of maritime courses despite the lack of permit.

HELD: In the consolidated cases, the Commission empowered the PED to conduct the hearing
and to decide on the revocation of the certificate of registration. The task was assigned to Mr. Ruiz
for and in behalf of the Commission. The Commission can validly delegate the authority to
exercise the specific powers assigned to it by law, by virtue of Section 6, PD No. 902-A.
Petition is dismissed for lack of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. The
order revoking and cancelling the certificate of registration of petitioner corporation is affirmed.

American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents


67 SCRA 286
Ablaza vs. CIR
126 SCRA 246

FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus, with preliminary injunction. The petition challenges the
validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases, as amended authorizing Director of Patents to designate ranking official of said
office to hear inter partes proceedings. Said rule likewise provides that all judgments determining
merits of case shall be personally and directly provided by the Director and signed by him. In
accordance with the amended rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners
cases to hearing officers, respondents herein. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of
the hearing officers.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to declare null and void the decision, order, and resolution
of respondent CIR. The Association filed a complaint before CIR, against Cerisco Blackcat
Trading, for salary differential, pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime pay, and
reinstatement of backwages. CIR declared Cerisco Blackcat Trading in default for failure to file its
answer or any responsive pleading within the reglementary period, provided by law. Petitioner,
Victoria Ablaza claimed she was totally unaware of the existence of any suit for a sum of money
against her as she has not been lawfully summoned and informed of any such case. She claimed
also Cerisco Blackcat Trading is a mere trade name and CIR never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of Rule 168 is illegal and void because under the law, the
Director must personally hear and decide the inter partes cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

HELD: The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issues such as regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary. In the
case at bar, while the hearing officers may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions
passed at hearings of cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all issues and questions is left
to the Director of Patents.

HELD: Section 9, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when persons associated in
business are sued under a common name, and service, may be effected upon all the defendants
by serving upon any of them or upon the person in-charge of office or place of business
maintained in the common name.

35

Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.


Javier vs. COMELEC
144 SCRA 194
Villadolid vs. Inciong
121 SCRA 205

FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy popular support, but the latter
had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections,
the bitter contest between the two came to a head when Severa, follower of the petitioner was
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latters men. Owing to what he claimed where attempts to
railroad the private respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to the COMELEC to question
the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent
was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner then went to court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because it was made only by a division and not by the
COMELEC en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile on the strength of his
proclamation the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to renew the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor affirming
the Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement with backwages issued by the Regional Director
Francisco Estrella. Villadolid claimed he was illegally dismissed and as premised by management
of JRM, affiliate of Copacabana, for breach of trust especially on an entrapment scheme of
relaying business transaction to competitor.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villadolid was deprived of due process of illegal dismissal.
HELD: The Court had occasion to hold that there is no violation of due process where the
Regional Director mere required the submission of position papers and resolved the case
summarily thereafter. The order of the Deputy Minister of Labor was not violative of Section 9,
Article 10 of the Constitution, which requires statement of facts and conclusion of law upon which
it is based. The Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of the fact by the Regional
Director; there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation made by the Second Division valid.
HELD: The questioned decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC dated July 23, 1984,
proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly elected assemblyman of Antique,
should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to
cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII (6) of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, the commission of the Second Division of COMELEC, Commissioner
Jaime Opinion, being a lawyer, and known law partner of the respondent, when ordered to inhibit,
refused to inhibit, thus divesting the second division of the necessary vote for the questioned and
rendering the proceeding null and void.

Both petitions for certiorari were denied. No costs.

NEECO II vs. NLRC


461 SCRA 169
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Resolution dated August 31, 2000 of the NLRC. Private respondent in 1978
was hired as a driver and assigned at petitioners sub-office at Quezon, Nueva Ecija. On January
15, 1996 Danilo de la Cruz, petitioners General Manager terminated private respondents services
on the ground of abandonment. On September 26, 1999, Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
declaring private respondent illegally dismissed. Petitioner filed its appeal memo with public
respondent; the latter dismissed it for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of Labor
Arbiter Faustino Darlucio, dated August 31, 2000, Reconsideration was met with equal lack of
success.

Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL


63 SCRA 524
FACTS: On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila
who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate this twenty passengers, PAL
required the aircraft operating flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to
Manila and pick up these passengers. Claiming that PAL should have first obtained permission of
the Civil Aeronautics Board before operating flag stop and that such failure is a violation of RA No.
776; the CAB imposed a fine of P5, 000.00 upon PAL in a resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Labor Arbiter abuse his discretion conferred upon him by the Rules in not
conducting a formal hearing on the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Board is authorized to impose penalty (fines).

HELD: Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, under said rule, the Labor
Arbiter is given the latitude to determine the necessity of a formal hearing.

HELD: The CAB shall have the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control
over air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise in so
far as may be necessary in so far as carrying the provisions of RA No. 776. It has the power to
issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend, or revoke, in whole or in part, upon

Instant petition denied with modification regarding monetary claims against petitioner.

36

petition on complaint, or upon its own initiative any temporary operating permit or certificate of
public convenience and necessity. The CAB can review, reverse, revise or modify or affirm on
appeal the administrative decisions of the civil aeronautics administrator on matters pertaining to
imposition of civil penalty or fine in connections to violation of any provision of this Act or rules and
regulations issues thereunder.

in the provincial government of Laguna who was initially detailed or transferred to another office,
then suspended and finally dismissed following his expos of certain anomalies and irregularities
committed by government employees in the province. Engineer Mariano L. Berroya, and been the
quarry superintendent in Laguna since May 31, 1959. In April and May, 1973, he denounced graft
and corrupt practices by employees of the provincial government of Laguna. On July 20, 1973,
Gov. Felicisimo San Luis, issued an order to transfer Berroya to the Office of the Provincial
Engineer. On October 25, 1973, the Civil Service Commission ordered that Berroya be reverted to
his regular position of quarry superintendent. But instead of complying with the order of the Civil
Service Commission, the governor on December 12, 1973, suspended Berroya for alleged gross
discourtesy, inefficiency and insubordination on February 26, 1974. The Civil Service Commission
reiterated its order for the immediate reversion of Berroya to his former position, and ruled the one
(1) year suspension illegal. In the interim, respondent-appellant provincial governor issued an
order on April 81, 1977 dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized
absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of office, which order
of dismissal was appealed by Berroya to the Civil Service Commission. On January 29, 1979, the
Civil Service Commission declared the dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of charges and
directing his reinstatement as quarry superintendent. Berroyas petition for reinstatement having
been denied by the governor despite orders for reinstatement by the Civil Service Commission
and despite factual antecedents aforestated he filed on May 27, 1980 the antecedent Civil Case
No. SL-1834 for Mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry superintendent with
basic salaries of the entire period of suspension and dismissal and for moral and exemplary
damages and expenses of suit.

Bautista vs. Board of Energy


169 SCRA 167
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside
(a) the order of respondent Board of Energy dated June 11, 1986 in BOE Case No. 86-133
authorizing respondent applicant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to adapt and implement
provisionally the revised rate schedules applied for and (b) the order of respondent BOE dated
June 18, 1986 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On May 30, 1986, MERALCO filed
with BOE a verified application for an upward revision rates. MERALCO also prayed for an ex
parte provisional approval of the proposed rates by reason that under its existing rate schedules, it
expects to incur a total deficit from its 1986 operations in the amount of P918,317,000.00 and that
its operating income is not enough to pay the interests and amortization of its foreign loans. On
June 9, 1986, petitioners Perla C. Bautista and Greater Manila Federation of Jeepney Operators
and Drivers Association filed an opposition to the application to the application for increase in
rates, and prayed that no provisional approval shall be granted by the BOE. They alleged that they
are adversely affected by the increase in rates of MERALCO. But on June 11, 1986, BOE ordered
the provisional increase in the rates of MERALCO. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on June
16, 1986 but were denied by BOE on June 18, 1986. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction on July 10, 1986. They agreed that the authority of the BOE to grant
provisional approval without hearing is not absolute, but subject to the due process clause of the
Constitution and that their opposition to the grant of provisional approval should be set for hearing
for MERALCO to present a prima facie case on the issue of urgent public need.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can review the facts or the decisions rendered by the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President.
HELD: Since the decision of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executor y the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well
established in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BOE acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it provisionally approved ex parte the application for increase in rates of
MERALCO in its order dated June 11, 1986.

Delfin vs. Inciong


192 SCRA 151

HELD: When the BOE provisionally authorized private respondent MERALCOs application
without hearing it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law. Energy Boards like he
Energy Regulatory Board are authorized by law to grant relief upon refilling of an application,
petition, or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without need of prior hearing but it shall call a
hearing within 30 days thereafter for determination of its final decision.

FACTS: On February 11, 1964 Atlantic Container Corporation (Atlantic) and Federation of
Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was
amended on August 31, 1964, claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent
Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the CBA, and its amendment, petitioners and FEDLU
struck on February 16, 1966 and filed a case with the CIR charging Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto and
Hedy Jacinto for unfair labor practices on November 16, 1972. CIR rendered its decision on the
case stating that Atlantic and Roberto Jacinto were guilty of unfair labor practices, to cease and
desist from committing the same and reinstate the striking complainants without loss of seniority
and privileges. Considering, however, that not all the complainants evinced their desire to
prosecute the case, the award is extended to only those who testified and presented their
respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action. Petitioners were ordered reinstated

San Luis vs. CA


174 SCRA 258
FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal by certiorari assails the
appellate courts ruling that mandamus lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry superintendent

37

on November 27, 1972 and December 6, 1972, the Atlantic Container Employees Organization
and FEDLU filed motions to reconsider aforesaid decisions for the reinstatement of all petitioners
herein, but the CIR denied the motions for being pro forma and for having been filed out of time.
When the CIR was abolished, their case was transferred to the NLRC where the NLRC Arbiter
Jose T. Collado rendered a decision that Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto, et al. were ordered jointly and
severally to reinstate complainants without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, but again
not all petitioners were included for reinstatement. The respondents filed an appeal with the
NLRC to set aside the decision of NLRC Arbiter Jose Collado and dismiss the complaint for unfair
labor practices which was gained by NLRC on September 15, 1976. The dismissal was based on
the following grounds: (1) res judicata in which their case to as barred by a prior judgment; (2) the
petitioners cause of action has prescribed; and (3) that Atlantic and Inland Industries, Inc. were
distinct and separate entities. The petitioners then appealed to the Secretary of Labor through
respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong, but the respondent affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
On July 3, 1989, petitioners filed petition charging public respondents NLRC and Minister Amado
Inciong with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering
the dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices.

HELD: It is sufficient if the employer has some bases to lose confidence or that employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position. On the other hand, the dropping qualified theft charges against Collado is not binding
upon a labor tribunal the sensitivity of Collado job or a security guard vis-a-vis the cause of his
dismissal cost him his to be rehired to the same position reinstatement is not proper where
termination of employment was due to breach of trust and confidence.

Medalla vs. Sayo


103 Phil. 587
FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of clinics of the Caloocan City general
Hospital, Caloocan city. Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician
thereat. When the position of assistant, hospital administrator of the Caloocan City general
hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan city mayor
Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as assistant hospital administrator
private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr,
Protested Dr. Mackay designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, chief
of clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank, the then acting city Mayor Virgililo P. Robles, who
succeeded former mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4 th endorsement dated
September 20,1978, sustained Mackay appointment state that as of April 18, 1978 when Dr.
Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospital administrator from his previous position
of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by reason of his having
completed all academic requirements for the certificate in Hospital administration contrary to the
claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and respondent Minister Amado Inciong acted with grave abuse
of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the dismissal of the unfair
labor practice complaint.
HELD: Since the judgment has become final and executory the subsequent filing of another unfair
labor practices charged against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its existence, is
barred by res judicata, the bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of
the union will not take out the case from ambit of the principle of res judicata.

Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. vs. NLRC


177 SCRA 93

ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as assistant hospital
Administrator is valid

FACTS: this case involved the alleged of thief wherein Private respondent Juanito Collado was
employed as security guard on September 9, 1970 he was assigned as 1st sergeant of the
NALCOs security force at Nasipit, in the course of Collado employment or on august 20 1976, four
crates of lawanit board containing 1,000 panel were stolen from petitioner premises, Collado was
implicated in the theft and was thereafter place under preventive suspension, on September
8,1976 NALCO file a petition for clearance to dismiss Collado with office of Regional Office No.
X, Collado filed a motion for the reconsideration on the ground not given an opportunity to rebut
the false finding or adduce evidence in his favor. But the acting Secretary of Labor Amadog
Enciong issued an order affirming the order of officer in charge Roy Seneres granting Petition
application for clearance to dismiss Collado. On October 9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before
the Butuan District Labor Officer for unjust dismiss and reinstatement with back wages and
benefit.

HELD: when a presidential act is challenged before the court of justice, it is not to be implied there
from that the executive is being made subject and subordinate to courts the legality of his acts are
under judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is
above the chief executive himself, and the court seek only to interpret, apply or implement it a
judicial review of the President decision of a case of an employee decided by the civil service
board of appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts should be
governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative act of all
administrative officer. The court may always examine into the exercise of power by a ministerial
officer to the extent of determining whether it is a legal power that could have been granted to him
and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. And under the civil service section 19 (3) of
the civil service PD no. 807 the recruitment of selection of employees for promotion is drawn from
the nix-in-rank.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the respondent Collado is valid


Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion
59 PHIL. 440

38

HELD: Before said action may be entertained in the court of justice, it must be shown that all the
administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted, and second that
the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that
the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. Therefore the respondent secretary his act must be nullified and the trial court
judgment upholding those acts must be set aside

FACTS: On January, 1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of
Land for the purchase of a tract of land situated in the Municipality of San Jose province of
Camarines Sur. An investigation conducted by the bureau of land but it was rejected on the ground
that the petitioner is a Chinese citizen, Fortunato Ortua contest that he was a Filipino citizen, born
in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur and being a natural son of Irene Demesa a Filipina and
Chinese father, but he was sent to china to study and return to the Philippine when he was 21
years of age.

Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Assoc. Inc.
461 SCRA 517

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner may Purchase of tract Public land, due to the question of his
citizenship

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa city, Branch 205 dismissing civil action no. 02-237 on the ground of litis pendentia any
forum shopping. The petitioner Sherwill development corporation is the registered owner of two
farce of land in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by transfer of certificate of title no. 131918
consisting of 8,774 square meters while lot 86, with an area of 16,766 square meters, is covered
by TCT no. 131919 both lots form part of the Muntinlupa estate, while the title thereon were issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on September 24, 1913. On October 16, 2002, the petitioner
filed a complaint for Quieting of title against respondent Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Association Inc.
(SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres and the lands management Bureau (LMB)

HELD: One condition for the purchase of a track of public agricultural land provided by the Public
land law, act no. 2874, in its section 23 and 88, is that the purchaser of land shall be a citizen of
lawful age of the Philippines Island or of the United States. One or born in the Philippines of a
Filipina mother and Chinese father, educated in china who returned in the Philippines when he
was 21 years of age is presumptively a Philippine citizen. Has not by his own acts expressly or
impliedly repudiated his Philippines citizenship and chosen Chinese citizenship, but has always
considered himself to a Filipino and has elected to remain as a Philippines citizen therefore that a
clear error of law resulted in not considering of a Philippine and so qualified under the Public land
and to Purchase Public agricultural land.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the fraud had been committed in securing such title.
2. Whether or not the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping insofar as SP
Civil No. 02-237 is concerned are applicable

Industrial Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sin Suat


160 SRCA 19

HELD: The director of lands original certificate of title over the same authority of the director of
lands to investigate conflicts over public and is derived from section 91 of the Public land act. In
fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duties to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in
securing patents and the corresponding title. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as
indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the
director of lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigations to
determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the government. As a rule then, courts have no
jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB. The court ruled
that the petitioner action was barred by the pendency of the proceedings before the LMB for litis
pendentia to lie; the following requisites must be satisfied 1.) Identity of parties or representation in
both cases; 2.) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; 3.) The relief must be founded on
the same facts and the same basis and identity of the two preceding particulars should be such
that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration. To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present or whether final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
pendentia barred the filing of SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly dismissed the same on
the additional ground of forum sopping.

FACTS: This case involve the bidding of 8 unit trucks, line construction, left hand drive, complete
and special factory build, series of 1965 brand new, for the use of the bureau of
telecommunication Pursuant to requisition no. 18792 dated march 9, 1965. The bidding took place
on May 15,1965, among the bidders were IPSI and DELTA, the bid deliberated on by the
committee on award, and authorized representative of the bureau of communication, and the
committee thereafter recommended the award to IPSA at 52,00 each. On june11, 1965 the DELTA
protested the award to IPSI by telegram sent to the bureau of communication claim that the truck
offered by IPSI were not factory build and the next move of DELTA was to filed with the office of
the secretary of general services a letter of protest against the Proposed award to IPSI
accompanied by a protest bond in the amount of 44, 000 executed by the meridian assurance
corporation, thereon acting secretary Puma Sin Suat indorse on September 3, 1965 to the director
of the bureau that only the DELTA corporation has complied with the technical specification
originally called for Requisition No. 1982792 dated 9,1965, only approved by Abad. The award
should be made to DELTA at a price equal to that offered by IPSI, IPSI filed with the Quezon city
court of first instance on September 21, 1965 with application for preliminary prohibition and
mandatory injunction which was docketed as case no Q 9477 and a bond in the amount of 100,
000 given by capitol insurance & surety co.INC.
ISSUE: Whether or not that the DELTA corporation has complied with the requisition no. 1982792

Abejo vs. Dela Cruz

39

149 SCRA 670, May 19, 1987

Supreme Court in the exercise of its certiorari decision. Consequently, a Collector of Customs
when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitute a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of
subject matter of such proceedings.

FACTS: Spouses Jose and Aurora Abejo are the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket
Bell Philippines, Inc. and the purchaser Telectronic Systems, Inc. of 133,000 minority
shareholdings (for 5 million) and of 63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and
covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her for P1,674.450.00 and Spouses
Agapito Braga and Virgina Braga, erstwhile majority stockholders holding 56% of the outstanding
stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell. In 1982, Telectronics requested the
corporate secretary to register and transfer to its name and those of its nominees the total 196,000
Pocket Bell shares but Norberto Braga (son of Agapito), the corporate secretary refused to register
the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate books asserting that their claim preemptive rights
over the Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Teletronics
but had lost the five stock certificates representing those shares. The intertwined actions between
the protagonists, centered on the question of jurisdiction over the dispute which were culminate in
filing two cases at bar.

GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation


470 SCRA 727, September 23, 2005
FACTS: On May 6, 2003, GMA, Inc. filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City against ABS-CBN, SKY CABLE, HOME CABLE AND SUN CABLE. Alleging that
respondents are engaged in unfair competition and that on February 1, 2003 the cable companies
re-channeled GMAs broadcast. In addition, the Sky and Sun cable are wholly owned subsidiaries
of Sky Vision Corp. which allegedly controlled by Lopez, Inc. and Home Cable wholly- owned
subsidiaries by Unilink, which is owned by Mediaquest Holding, Inc. controlled by PLDT Group. In
pursuant to a Master Consolidation Agreement, the ownership, rights and interest in Sky Vision
and Unilink were placed under a holding company owned by Benpres Group, owned by Lopez Inc.
and also Benpres and ABSCBN owned 33.5 % thereof is owned by PLDT Group. That the rechanneling of its cable television broadcast resulted to damages to GMA business operation. That
re-channeling of GMA from channel 12 to 14 in SKY CABLE AND SUN CABLE results to
noticeable dropouts and spillover of extraneous sound and in clear visual transmission resulting in
distorted and degraded visual presentation and also shows no signal and snowy reception and
that it did not occur in the shows of defendant ABS-CBN on the channels of the defendant cable
companies. On July 15 2003, Sky Cable and Sun Cable moved for dismissal of complaint on the
grounds of litis pendentia and forum-shopping that there was a similar case pending before
National Telecommunication Commission that involves same cause of action and same parties
except for ABS-CBN. Respondent Sky Cable and Sun Cable also asserted that the NTC has the
primary jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND SEC HAS THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS OF POCKET BELL.
HELD: Under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 902-A, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
said case clearly fall within the SEC. As stressed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the SEC,
the Court has held that Nowhere does the law (P.D. 902-A) empower any Court of Instance (RTC)
to interfere with the orders of the Commission and any ruling by the trial court on the issue of
ownership of the share of stock is not binding on the commission for want of jurisdiction.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro
No. L-33146, May 31, 1977
FACTS: Private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated are importers of 1,350
cartons of fresh fruits which importation was seized by the Bureau of Customs on November 4,
1966. Said importation was classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they are banned
by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289,294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary
to law and made subject to forfeiture proceedings by Petitioner Bureau of Customs. It was only on
January 12, 1967 that the warrant of seizure and detention was issued. The respondents contend
that the issuance of warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction
over the subject matter on the case. On March 7, 1967 respondent Judge Pedro S. Navarro
issued an order for the release of the articles in question, thus preventing Bureau of customs from
proceeding with the auction sale.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NTC HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER


PETITIONERS COMPLAINT.
HELD: The petition is denied. The complaint failed to state a cause of action against ABS-CBN
and the other respondents. The wrongful acts complained of and upon the damages prayed for
are based, have to do with the operation and ownership of the cable companies. So the factual
matters undoubtedly pertain to the NTC and not with the regular courts.
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
184 SCRA 426, April 18, 1990

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court acquires jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.

FACTS: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. was granted a coal operating contract by the Government
through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for exploration of two blocks in Eastern Samar
and IEI also applied with the Ministry of Energy for a coal operating contract in Giporos Area. That
later it was advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the countrys over all-coal supplydemand balance, the Giporos Area and Bagacay Area should be awarded to Mining and Industrial

HELD: No, The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and
then the commissioner of Customs. This is the field where the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A Court of First Instance
is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by the

40

Corporation (MMIC). Then on, IEC and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement, IEC
assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are
subject of IECs coal operating contract. However, IEC thereafter filed an action of rescission of
the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the Minister of Energy
Geronimo Velasco before the RTC Makati, branch 150.alleging that MMIC took over the subject
coal blocks even before the Memorandum had finalized and approved by BED. It found out that
the President of both IEC and MMIC is Jesus S. Cabarrus. In a summary judgment, coal operation
contract was in favor of IEC and ordered to BED to issue its written affirmation but the Court of
Appeals reverse RTCs decision that it is BED has the power to decide the controversies relative
to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.

Government Service Insurance System vs. CSC


204 SCRA 826, December 11, 1991
FACTS: Maria Asuncion Salazar was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer on 1963. She
became permanent as a designation of stenographer in 1974. Thereafter, she was promoted to
Confidential Technical Assistant Aide. On her GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was
appointed on December 9, 1975 in the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of
GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. Then was then
promoted to Technical Assistant III, but unfortunately the position she held were terminated by the
newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was
co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority. She filed a petition for reconsideration with
the GSIS Board of Trustees, but it was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration
of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion
Board and the CSC. In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with
back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her
petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988, the Board set aside its previous Order affirming her
dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The GSIS also filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative
appellate body on matters concerning of the removal of officers and employees from the service.
The Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the Civil Service
Commission. Then they appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE BUREAU OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT HAS JURISDICTION


OVER SAID ACTION AND NOT THE CIVIL COURT.
HELD: It was ruled that the cause of action by IEI is not merely the rescission of the Agreement
but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. That the decision of the
rescission of the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating
contract to IECs favor and directed to the BED to give due course are matters properly falling
within the domain of the BED, and not with the civil court.
Garments and Textile Export Board vs. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 114711. February 13, 1997
FACTS: American Inter-Fashion Corporation is a corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and exporting garments who were awarded initial export allocation quota. Before
AIFCs incorporation, private respondent in G.R no. 115889, Glorious Sun, engaged the same,
was also a recipient of export allocation quota, who was found guilty of misdeclaration and its
stockholders and officers were disqualified to engaged in export garment. As a result its export
quotas were given to AIFC. Glorious Sun filed for the annulment of registration with the SEC.
GTEB thereafter deferred the release of the export quota allocation. AIFC filed petition for the
restoration of the cancelled export authorization. Petitioner AIFC contends that, respondent GTEB
cancellation of AIFCs EQs is a confiscation of property without due process. It further argues that
E.O 537 did not gives the GTEB any powers, nor any jurisdiction to hear and decide actions and in
as much as the litigants were private (AIFC and Glorious Sun) it has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not GTEB have the power and authority to grant or cancel export
authorizations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to review the said case.
HELD: CSC has no jurisdiction over the said case, under Presidential Decree No. 1409 it states that
the Merit Systems Board provides a Merit Systems Board that has the function to Hear and Decide
cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of
appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other
personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses
arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system. It is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it is proved that another body is likewise vested
with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
PD No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from
parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission
therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409,
except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it
such power, to wit:

or

HELD: Yes, it has. GTEB as an administrative agency has in its favor the presumption that it has
regularly performed its official duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature, so much
so in the exercise of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Thus, the power and jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the questions of AIFCs entitlement to the export allocations (be it export quotas or
export authorization), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export
allocations, belongs solely to GTEB, and not to the regular courts.

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer
the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;

41

ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to
the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the
private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to
private respondents.
Issue: Whether an action for replevin to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of
an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held: Yes. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to
ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible
of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to
give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of
the case.

System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Govt. of Caloocan City
408 SCRA 406
FACTS: Petitioner System Plus Computer College was established in 1997. It is a non-profit and
non-stock educational institution, it enjoys tax exemption on its buildings from the local
government but it does not cover the parcels of land which petitioner is renting in the amount of
P5, 000.00 monthly from Consolidated Assembly, Inc. and Pair Management. Petitioner requested
to extend the tax exemption on the said parcels of land invoking Article VI, Sec. 28(3) of the 1987
Constitution and other provisions in Local Government Code. The request was denied by the
respondent on the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by Consolidated Agency
and Pair Management and that it is not used exclusively for educational purposes. On February,
1999 the petitioner entered into separate agreements from Contract of lease to donations. But still
respondent again denied the application for tax exemption. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for
Mandamus with the RTC.
ISSUE: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY AVAIL THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IN REGULAR COURTS. (2) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER VIOLATED THE
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
HELD: The court ruled that before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that
petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. The
petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek
redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without
violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for
remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief
to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated,
before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of
all the means afforded by the administrative processes.

Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York


85 Phil. 201 December 29, 1949
Facts: J. E. H. Stevenot, a citizen of the United States and of the State of California, died in New
Caledonia on June 8, 1943, while serving as an officer of the U. S. Army. He was survived by his
widow, Elma Kimball and two daughters, Myre Gene and Shirley Joanne, who are all at present in
the United States. For more than ten years immediately prior to his death, J. E. H. Stevenot had
been a resident of the Philippines and upon his death left real and personal properties situated
therein which he acquired during his married life. On April 19, 1943, while in California, Stevenot
executed a private written instrument in which he appointed himself as trustor or trustee of his
properties. The deed of trust provided that Stevenot should himself have a life interest in the trust
properties and that after his death the income and corpus should go principally to his wife and
family. The trust indenture provided finally that upon Stevenot's death, Wells Fargo Bank and
Union Trust Co. should succeed as trustee for the properties located in the United States and the
National City Bank of New York at Manila for the properties in the Philippines. Both of these
trustees accepted the trust. After Stevenot's death, administration proceedings were commenced
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, H. P. Hoskyns, plaintiff in the instant action, being
appointed as administrator. The action for declaratory relief prays that the court "determine the
question of construction or validity of the declaration of trust and for the declaration of the rights
and duties of the defendant hereunder."
Issue: Whether an aggrieved party may institute an action in court without first resorting to an
administrative remedy.

Paat vs. Court of Appeals


266 SCRA 167 January 10, 1997
Facts: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan was seized by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days
within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. However, private
respondent failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, the Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner of Layugans action of confiscation and

42

Held: No. The courts are given discretionary power to refuse to make a declaration of rights in
any case where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all the
circumstances. The reason for this rule is that a declaratory judgment proceeding is intended to
supplement, and not to be a substitute for, or supersede, other existing remedies, in use at the
time of the enactment of the declaratory judgments acts; it may be used as an alternative or
auxiliary to other proceedings for an executory judgment; and it is within the discretion of the court
to permit such an action or proceeding to be maintained where another remedy is available to
plaintiff. As a general rule, however, to justify such an action the situation must be such that
adequate relief is not presently available through the means of other existing forms of action or
proceeding, and, conversely, jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment ordinarily will not be
entertained where another equally adequate and appropriate remedy is already available for the
issues or rights sought to be determined and declared, as where another equally serviceable
statutory remedy has been specially provided in cases of similar import, and particularly where
such statutory remedy is exclusive.

Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary
now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect
to adjudication of pollution cases. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. Clearly, the claim of petitioners that their immediate recourse to the regular
courts is justified because the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief is without basis.
Batelec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. EIAB
447 SCRA 482 December 22, 2004
Facts: Petitioner BATELEC II is an electric cooperative authorized to distribute electric power in
Rosario, Province of Batangas. Private respondent Puyat Steel Corporation (PSC) is a galvanizing
steel sheet company in the Philippines having been established in 1956 embarked to build a
modern galvanizing plant utilizing a state-of-the-art non-oxidizing furnace-type process, the first of
its kind in the country. As this new plant would entail a delivery voltage of 69 kilovolts (kv), PSC
commenced negotiations for the supply of said energy requirement with BATELEC II. They
entered into an agreement wherein BATELEC II shall handle the construction of the needed 69 kv
transmission lines. BATELEC II vouched to complete the installation of the needed facilities by
April 1997 but botched in making good its part of the bargain and the scheduled completion was
never fulfilled even several months after the targeted date. Thus, on November 17, 1997, PSC
filed with the Bureau an application for direct connection with the NPC which granted PSCs
application and also made the determination that BATELEC II was neither technically nor
financially capable of supplying the 69 kv of power supply to PSC. Consequently, private
respondent PSC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas to enjoin petitioner BATELEC II from committing acts that would prevent direct power
connection between respondents PSC and the NPC. Displeased, BATELEC II filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Bureau for
issuing a resolution allegedly sans the benefit of a hearing and for its alleged failure to resolve
inter alia the issue of NPCs disqualification from distributing electric power directly to consumers
within the franchised area of BATELEC II. Said appeal was dismissed, one of the grounds is that
there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether the principle of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in
this case.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities to accord them the prior opportunity to decide controversies
within their competence before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will
decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore,
reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner availed of administrative
relief before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not appeal the Bureaus
Resolution dated 16 March 1998 to the Secretary of Energy, which under Section 8 in relation to

Estrada vs. Court of Appeals


442 SCRA 117 November 11, 2004
Facts: Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, filed on July 31, 1996, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a
complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI),
Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and
Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). They alleged that WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease
contract, which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor of BCC which is a violation of the
first lease because the cement plant is not related to the fish port business of WFPI and it is a
nuisance because it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and
deprive them of the full use and enjoyment of their properties. On the other hand, defendants
WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC both alleged that the complaint states no cause of action and the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
Issue: Whether the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to
administrative agencies need not be made before going to court.
Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made
with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the
administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative
officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A
premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and
dismissible on such ground. The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with.
The matter of determining whether there ispollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of

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Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 7638 has the power over the bureaus under the Department. It has not,
as well, suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to the Court of Appeals against the
Resolution in question. Neither has petitioner shown that the instant case falls among the
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, to set aside the November 5,
1970 order of Mayor Abalos as well as the resolution of respondent municipal council dated
December 16, 1970. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 2779 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio-Benguet. In their answer, petitioners, the respondents therein, sought the
dismissal of the case on ground of want of jurisdiction of the court for failure of respondent Oidi,
the petitioner therein, to exhaust all available administrative remedies. Respondent court, instead
of dismissing the case, conducted a hearing to determine the propriety of the issuance of the writ
prayed, and shortly after, it issued the challenged order granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P2,000.00. Frustrated in their move to
have the said order reconsidered,petitioner filed a petition.This petition seeks to annul and set
aside (1) the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent Court of First
Instance of Baguio- Benguet in Special Civil Action No. 2779, ordering petitioner Cipriano Abalos,
municipal mayor of La Trinidad, Benguet, to recognize respondent Dorothy Oidi "as the legitimate
assistant municipal treasurer of La Trinidad, Benguet, and to approve payment of her salaries from
November 6, 1970 to the present and thenceforward, " and (2) the order denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

Morcal vs. Lavia


476 SCRA 508 November 29, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Angelita Morcal, with her sister Ildefonsa and other members of their family
occupied, cleared and planted seasonal crops on a parcel of unregistered land with an area of
4,840 square meters, situated at Barangay Cagsiay, Mauban Quezon up to the time it was
declared as public land on May 14, 1941. Having been in possession of the said land for almost
forty (40) years, petitioner filed Free Patent Application No. (IV-3) 14661 in 1976. However, on
September 11, 1990, private respondents Antonio Lavia (now deceased) and Teresita Lavia
protested the free patent application. Subsequently, on August 10, 1993, Regional Office No. IV of
the DENR decreed that the patent applied by petitioner will cover only one-half 1/2 of the lot
particularly the southern portion thereof, as recommended by Land Management Officer III Dan
August S. Noche and directed The Spouses Antonio and Teresita Lavia are directed to file the
appropriate public land application covering the other half of the lot in question particularly the
northern portion thereof. Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court a civil action which later
on dismissed it then appealed to the Court of Appeals which also dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to the instant case.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made
to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
competence. This is because the administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct
any previous error committed in its forum.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, we see no urgent need for judicial intervention. Note that the
case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioners free patent application for the
subject unregistered agricultural land. Clearly, the matter comes within the exclusive primary
jurisdiction of the DENR in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The impugned Orders of the
DENR Regional Office are subject to review by the DENR Head Office. Petitioner cannot
circumvent this procedure by simply invoking a supposed loss of faith in the said agency.

ISSUES: Whether or not it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative
remedies have been exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should
not be entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief.
Whether or not the above rule is absolute.
HELD: While it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief, the rule is not absolute. It is subject
to certain exceptions. It is not applicable where the questions involved are essentially judicial,
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or where the respondent officer acted in utter disregard of due process.
The petition filed by respondent Oidi before respondent court contains allegations which remove
the case from the ambit of the general rule. She repeatedly asserted therein the want of authority
of Mayor Abalos to order her suspension from office and the similar lack of authority of the
members of the municipal council to conduct an administrative investigation against her and to
order her dismissal from the service. Said averments indisputably make out a legal question that is
properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body. What is
more, her claim that she was denied the right of due process makes the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies inapplicable.

Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio


123 SCRA 81
Valmonte vs. Belmonte
170 SCRA 256

FACTS: One Mario Damilo wrote Mayor Cipriano Abalos a letter- complaint charging respondent
Dorothy Oidi assistant municipal treasurer of La Trinidad, with "dishonesty and grave misconduct
in her business transactions with others and particularly against me." Upon receipt of the
complaint, Mayor Abalos issued an order dated November 5, 1970, suspending Oidi from office
effective November 6, 1970. Simultaneously, the mayor referred the complaint to petitioner
municipal council of La Trinidad for investigation. On December 16, 1970, the municipal council
issued a resolution declaring Dorothy Oidi "resigned from office for the good of the service,
effective November 6, 1970. Meanwhile, respondent Oidi instituted a petition for mandamus plus

FACTS: Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the
press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of
access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information. The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth
of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able

44

to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through
the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined
by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit. On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news
item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa,
including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS. Separate
comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In his
comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among
which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that
actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS.
Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted
that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not
they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

FACTS: On March 5, 1957, petitioner-appellee, Maria Natividad vda. de Tan filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila a verified petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the
respondent-appellant Veterans Back Pay Commission: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee
alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, entitled to backpay rights, privileges, and prerogatives
under Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897; and (2) to give due course to
the claim of petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her the corresponding
backpay certificate of indebtedness. The lower court rendered decision in favor of the Petitioner.
Against the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal averring once more, in its assignment
of errors, the special and affirmative defenses that the petitioner failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies; that the suit is, in effect, an action to enforce a money claim against the
government without its consent; that mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise of a
discretionary function; and that the Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 already referred to were never
intended to benefit aliens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner needs to exhaust Administrative Remedies before resorting to
court proceeding.
HELD: It is further contended by the Commission that the petitioner should have first exhausted
her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her failure to
do so is a bar to her action in court. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule,
considering that in its resolution reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the Commission
declared that the opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which
may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has
the court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in
her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of
administrative remedies.
HELD: Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to
resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to
settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial
Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA
210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised
by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the
GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of
this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted.

Laganapan vs. Asedillo


154 SCRA 377
FACTS: This is an appeal from the judgment, dated 16 October 1967, of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-719, which ordered the respondents to reinstate the
petitioner to his former position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries from his
dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of
police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna on 4 January 1960, with a compensation of
P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. On 1 July 1960, his salary was increased
to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an appointment which was approved as provisional
under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. However, on 16
February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent Mayor
Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil
service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his firearm and other office equipment to the
Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal on the
same day. Hence, on 16 March 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto
with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality
of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero, before the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. SC-719, seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages. In answer, respondents Mayor

Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission


105 Phil. 377

45

Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner, being merely
temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services could be
terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appoint power; and that the petitioner
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not that the petitioner must exhausted all administrative remedies before
coming to court, and that the lower court had not acquired no jurisdiction over the case.
Held: No. it appears from the petition that the reason for filing it without awaiting the final action on
the part of the respondent Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the automatic
reversion as of July 1, 1958, after the expiration of then current fiscal year, whatever action may
thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner would be of no avail after the
reversion of the funds appropriated for the purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims that to
require him to exhaust the administrative remedies would, in the circumstances of the case, in
effect amount to a nullification of his claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner needs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the
action for quo warranto and mandamus in court.
HELD: The appellants contend that the appellee should have first exhausted all administrative
remedies before he reported to the courts. They suggested that the appellee should have
appealed the order of dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil Service in view of the provisions of
Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16 of Republic Act No. 2260 which grant the Commissioner of Civil Service the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service; and to hear and determine appeals instituted
by any person believing himself to be aggrieved by an action or determination of any appointing
authority contrary to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules. While there are precedents
which hold that before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary that he first exhaust all
the remedies in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle
requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary,
whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter;
where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the
respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process. The rule does not also apply where
insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Cipriano vs. Marcelino


43 SCRA 291, February 28, 1972
Facts: Petitioner served as a clerk in the office of municipal treasurer from January 1, 1963 to
January 15, 1966, at a monthly salary of eighty pesos (P80). On the latter date she resigned.
Because the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her severance from service, refused to pay her
salary corresponding to the period from September 1, 1965 to January 15, 1966, inclusive (P349),
as well as the commutation equivalent of her accumulated vacation and sick leaves (P600).
Petitioner filed with the CFI for mandamus to compel the said municipal treasurer to pay her the
total amount of P949. She also asked for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost
suit.
Issue: Whether or not she can file such action without exhausting all administrative remedies.
Held: Yes, we held time and time again that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not without exception, not is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be
relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. It is altogether too obvious
that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on
appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total of nine hundred forty-nine pesos would not
only be oppressive but would patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been
decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her
claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.

Alzate vs. Aldana


107 SCRA 298
February 29, 1960
Facts: Petitioner, wrote to the respondent Director of Public Schools claiming that taking into
account his 24 years service he was entitled under R.A. 842 an automatic salary increase of 4
rates. The respondent denied the request, contending that in the adjustment, only the actual
number of years of service as such secondary principal would be considered and that he would
entitled to only one rate salary increase and such petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of
Public School Salary act. The endorsement of denial was receive by the petitioner on April 14,
1958, he requested for a reconsideration of the aforementioned ruling, this letter of
reconsideration by the respondent Bureau on May 23, 1958. It appears that on May 30, 1958 was
submitted to Dr. Aldana, Dr. Bernardino and Dr. Guiang of the same Bureau. On June 11, 1958,
petitioner, not having received any ruling on his request for reconsideration and fearing that the
amount appropriated for the payment, if not disbursed or committed before expiration of the fiscal
year on June 30, 1958, would reverted to the general funds of the Government, filed a mandamus
proceeding in the CFI for the purpose indicated.

De Lara, Jr. vs. Cloribel


14 SCRA 269, May 31, 1965
Facts: Plaintiff was granted a timber license to log over an area in Claveria, Misamis Oriental,
during the non-renewal of plaintiffs license, P & B Enterprises co., inc., filed a similar application.

46

Having been approved over a forest area also situated in Claveria, Misamis Oriental, immediately
constructed a logging road which extended partially within the area covered by the plaintiffs timber
concession. Plaintiff now secured for renewal of its timber license where the company protested
such approval as it would cause conflict to the portion of the area. The Director of Forestry
overruled the protest, hence the same appealed to the Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Pendency of the protest, plaintiff continued his logging operation and trespass the construction
made by the company. Hence, this instant action for injunction and damages before the court of
first instance which granted an ex parte writ of preliminary investigation.

truck services. On September 12, 1974, Sultan rent-a-car filed a petition with the respondent
board a license to operate, a similar services. Eight day after, the board issued an order granting
provisional permit to operate to Sultan rent-a-car. It was contested by the petitioner on the ground
that the issuance of permit is void due to absence of public hearing and publication.
Issue: whether or not the board order of permit to operate the private respondent is illegal and a
violation of procedural due process.
Held: according to this, the petition, to repeat, cannot prosper because of the following reasons:
1. The argument set forth, while impressed with plausibility; do not suffice to justify the grant of
certiorari. Moreover, the doctrine announced in the PLDT vs. Medina is a frail and substantial
support and gives way to decisions of this court that have an even more specific bearing on this
litigation.
2. The decision consideration is the existence of the public need. as shown in the case,
respondent board on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of the pressing necessity for
the grant of the provisional permit.
3. The procedural due process in the case at bar was equally explained based on the issuance of
execution order no. 101 as party stated hereunder:
xxxx it is the policy of the state, as swiftly as possible to improve the deplorable condition vehicular
traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor and eradicate the harmful and unlawful
trade of clandestine operators..xxxxx

Issue: Whether or not the court of first instance committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing
ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction.
Held: the court did not commit grave abuse of discretion as such general rule may be relaxed
when its application may cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise prevented
except by taking the opportune appropriate court action. The rule is inapplicable if it should appear
that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking
court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter.

National Development Company vs. The Collector of Customs


9 SCRA 429, October 31, 1963
Facts: Petitioner is engaged in shipping business is the owner of SS Doa Nati was penalized by
the collector of customs for not manifested a cargo of RCA victor tv set which they alleged a
violation under section 2521 of the tariff and custom code. According to the petitioner, the said
item is not considered cargo because it is a personal belonging of a medical doctor of SS Doa
Nati. The collector of customs denied their explanation instead penalized them with P5,000.00 and
thereafter threaten them of revocation or deny clearance of the vessel.

Tiangco vs. Lauchang


9 SCRA 125
FACTS: The case is all about a parcel of land located at Lot No. 10, Block No. 2 of the
Tambobong Estate in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, was
formerly leased by the Archbishop of Manila to one Matea Suarez. The lot contains an aggregate
area of 480 meters. On September 11, 1906, Matea Suarez sold her leasehold interest in the land
for the sum of P200.00 to Anacleto Lauchang, father of the plaintiff-appellee and appellant
Faustina Lauchang. When Anacleto died in 1923, his daughter, the plaintiff, took over and since
then has been occupying said property paying rents therefor to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila up to August 31, 1927 when further payment of rents was suspended because the
Archbishop of Manila sold the Tambobong Estate to the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. The evidence further shows that Asuncion Hizon had been occupying 82 square
meters of the lot in question in the northwestern portion since 1929; Jacinto Tiangco, 91 square
meters in the southwestern portion since 1938; and Jose Lazaro, 113 square meters in the
northeastern portion since 1940. Plaintiff appellee and appellant is occupying the southwestern
part of the lot containing an area of 194 square meters. All of the claimants-occupants have their
respective houses on the lot in question.

Issue: whether or not the collector of customs acted in utter disregard of the petitioner due
process.
Held: Yes. the respondent has committed grave abuse of discretion without giving the petitioner
proper due process as cited in the case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635 states that there are
cardinal rules to be followed and one of which is the conduct of the proper investigation. Moreover,
the court sustained the resort to judicial action without first appealing the collectors decision to the
commissioner of customs, saying that such appeal was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in ordinary course of law as would prevent petitioners from taking the present action.

Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation


63 SCRA 193, March 21, 1975

ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable.


HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Asuncion Hizon is a sub-lessee of Faustina Lauchang, the
plaintiff. With respect to Jacinto, the evidence shows that at first he used to pay Faustina
Lauchang P1.00 per month until he connected plaintiff's water pipe with his main water pipe in the

Facts: the petitioner and private respondent Sultan rent-a-car corp. are both domestic corp. The
former has a certificate of public convenience to operate public utility bus, air-conditioned and auto

47

middle of the year 1938. Since then Tiangco has not been paying any rental to the plaintiff. As to
Jose Lazaro, his testimony is to the effect that he had been occupying the portion of 113 square
meters upon an annual rent of P12.00. The Supreme court constrained to modify the decision
appealed from by (1) declaring plaintiff-appellee and appellant Faustina Lauchang to have the
preferential right to buy the whole of Lot No. 10 of Black No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate and (2)
ordering the Division of Landed Estates of the Bureau of Lands, successor of the Rural Progress
Administration which was abolished by Executive Order No. 376, the Land Tenure Administration,
or the agency or instrumentality of the Government concerned to sell said lot to her." The question
raised by the parties was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals in its amended decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed wherein the pertinent parts of the opinion of this Court rendered
in Santiago, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. L-8271-72, 29 December 1955, are quoted. The
proposition advanced by the petitioners that this Court should depart from the strict application of
the order of preference laid down in the cases decided by it cannot be sustained, because unlike
in this case where the respondent owns no other realty except an inchoate right over the lot in
litigation, in the case of Gutierrez vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-12253, 28 March 1960, the lessee had
four (4) lots the total area of which was 3,279 square meters, aside from the then litigated lot,
which was more than sufficient to answer for the needs of the lessee and his family. Furthermore,
the 480 square meters lot being inadequate for the needs of an already growing family of the
respondent (consisting of 7 children all of age and 7 grandchildren), petitioners Lazaro and
Tiangco bought or became co-owners of lots in Malabon, Rizal, as evidenced by TCT No. 58148
and 61615, issued by the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal. The contention of the
petitioners that the action brought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal should have been
dismissed for lack of cause of action, in view of respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies is untenable. It is well to recall that the lot, subject of the litigation, is not a part of the
public domain, but of private ownership acquired by the Government for resale to private persons,
and for that reason any aggrieved party may bring an action in court without the need of
exhausting all administrative remedies.

against respondent, and therefore respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated."


Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, the Monetary Board approved the following resolution: "After an
exhaustive and mature deliberation on the report of the aforesaid fact-finding committee in
conjunction with the entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and
respondent, through their respective counsel; and further, after a thorough review of the service
record of the respondent, particularly the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary
Board Res. No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involve fitness, discipline, etc. of
respondent; and moreover, upon formal statement of the Governor that he has lost confidence in
the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department
(such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board
finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial
to the best interests of the Central Bank and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the
date of his suspension."
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal of the Central Bank authorities to be clearly
untenable. In the first place, the loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be
predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject-matter of the
investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in
the record which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges;
it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement
of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein
that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the
charges upon which the investigation had proceeded. The court, therefore, cannot rely on the socalled "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal. And inasmuch as the charges against
petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to follow the mandate that
"No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)Since in the interest of the
service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature
important, such as those that are "highly technical", the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal
or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least demands that their dismissal for
alleged "loss of confidence", if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate
to show that said ground exists. In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores
the self-evident fact that the constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy determining,
primarily confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit and fitness as determined from
competitive examinations, but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the
operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII, that
"No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law." and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus propounded is
repeated almost verbatim in Section 132 of the Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides
in equally absolute terms that "No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil
Service law or regulations shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." It
is well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260) divides positions into
three categories: competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt
service, the last being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3, R. A.

Corpus vs. Cuaderno


4 SCRA 749
FACTS: On 7 March 1958, the petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, then holding the position of
"Special Assistant to the Governor, In-Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a
position declared by the President of the Philippines on 24 January 1957 as highly technical in
nature, and admitted as such by both the present litigants, was administratively charged by
several co-employees in the export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty
and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming a public official, and of violation of the
internal regulations of the Central Bank. On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Board suspended the
petitioner from office effective on said date and created a three-man investigating committee
composed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus, chairman, and Atty. Apolinar Tolentino, Assistant Fiscal of
the City of Manila, and Professor Gerardo Florendo, senior attorney of the Central Bank,
members. In its final report dated 5 May 1959, the investigating committee, "after most extensive
hearings on which both complainants and respondents were afforded all opportunity to submit
their evidence, and after a most exhaustive and conscientious study of the records and evidence
submitted in the case", made the following conclusion and recommendation: "In view of the
foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action

48

2260). In view of section 3 and 5 of the same law, providing that "SEC. 3 Positions Embraced is
the Civil Service. The Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, . . ."
"SEC. 5. The non-competitive service. The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be
composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified
service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature."
(R.A. 2260) it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil Service law and
regulations as a member of the non-competitive or unclassified service, and that his removal or
suspension must be for cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 53 Off. Gaz., 132; Arcel vs.
Osmea, L-14956, Feb. 27, 1961; Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L-19748, Sept. 13, 1962). The
tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public
functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is
different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The
Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply
the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation
expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary
technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may
not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist or a scientist of
avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be removable at any time,
without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. The entire objective of the Constitution in
establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit, would be thus negated. Of
course a position may be declared both highly technical and confidential, as the supreme interests
of the state may require. But the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category. The
decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, relied upon by the appellant Bank, is not
applicable, since said case involved the office of city engineer, that the court expressly found to be
"neither primarily confidential, policy determining nor highly technical" .

Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations.
The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner
and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly
ejected them from the classroom. Petitioners pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and
Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCSTs policy. On April
25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot
and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as
moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus
the costs of litigation and attorneys fees. On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents,
the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the
PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the
Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioners
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them,
the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs
academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative
body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to protect, foster and
promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate
steps to ensure that education is accessible to all. In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion
to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits
unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities
have been given the exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is
competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.
Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages.
Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. The exhaustion
doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within
the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the application
and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts . In
sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents,
and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding
respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by
the court a quo. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders
REVERSE

Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology


443 SCRA 56
FACTS: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family,
Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second
semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. In February
2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the
proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts. Each
student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly
implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations,
Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of
the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot
and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner,

Demaisip vs. CA
106 Phil. 237
FACTS: The first applicant for a fishpond permit covering Lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of
Dumangas Cadastre, Iloilo, was the late Geronimo Destacamento who filed his application on April
1, 1927. On Dec. 31, 1930, the Fishpond Permit No. F-624-B granted to the late Geronimo
Destacamento expired, because he failed to make any improvements on the lots and to pay the
required rentals. Before his death on December 19, 1928, Geronimo Destacamento without the

49

knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in
question in favor of Serafin Villanueva, an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the
permit granted him. In a letter dated December 19, 1928, the District Forester of Iloilo,
notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid deed of sale, requested Serafin Villanueva to apply
for a fishpond permit over the same lots. In spite of the request, Villanueva neglected and failed to
file his application for a fishpond permit, such that no permit was ever granted to him before or
after the expiration of the permit of the late Geronimo Destacamento. It appears that on October
15, 1935 the herein complainant Gaudencio G. Demaisip filed with the Fish and Game
Administration a fishpond permit application which was given No. 2285 for the same lots Nos. 233,
236 and 237 of Dumangas Cadastre, containing an area of 13.9859 hectares of public mangrove
forest land located in Sitios Buang and Balabag, barrio Buang, Dumangas, Iloilo. By March 6,
1936, the Demaisip had complied with all the pre- requisites necessary for the issuance of a
fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting of a surety bond in the sum
of P350. On March 19, 1936, when the fishpond permit in favor of Gaudencio Demaisip was ready
to be issued, Serafin Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favor of
the herein defendant Luis E. Buenaflor; shortly thereafter or in the same month, the latter started
to occupy the land, and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam 27 meters long,
4 meters high, across the Balabag River, worth P1,600. According to the result of an investigation
conducted by a representative of the Fish and Game Administration, the dam deprives other
fishponds leased from the government of fresh or flowing water and was illegally constructed
because it violated a rule of that Office prohibiting the introduction of any improvements on the
land applied for before the issuance of a permit. It was only on May 21, 1936, or 7 months after
Demaisip had filed an application, that Luis Buenaflor also filed his application for the area in
question with the Iloilo branch of the Fish and Game Administration, the Director of Fish and
Game Administration was called upon to decide who of the conflicting claimants Luis Buenaflor
or Gaudencio G. Demaisip had a better right to be regarded as the lessee of the land in
question pursuant to Section 63 of Act No. 4003.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable.

upon finality thereof homestead patent would be issued to Delfin C. Fuertes. His request for
reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands on 25 January 1957, Francisco C.
Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, docketed as DANR
case No. 1549. On 28 February 1958 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources modified
the opinion of the Director of Lands . . . in the sense that Delfin C. Fuertes should reimburse
Francisco C. Calo of the difference between the value of the improvements the latter introduced
on the land in controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom
within thirty (30) days from advice by the Director of Lands who is hereby directed to determine
the aforementioned difference within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision. Still
dissatisfied with the above opinion, Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to reconsider it but the latter denied reconsideration thereof. Hence, on 1
August 1958 Francisco C. Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but on 8 August 1958
he withdrew it before the President of the Philippines could act thereon. On 22 August 1958
Francisco C. Calo filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writ of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined; that if a bond be
needed for the purpose he was willing to file it; that after hearing the injunction be made final and
permanent; that the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes pay him P18,000 as damages and attorney's
fees and costs of the suit; that he be declared the owner entitled to possess the parcel of land
subject of the litigation; and for any other just and equitable relief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable.
HELD: The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not
appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last
step he should take in an administrative case. The appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are
also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter,
and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted all the
administrative remedies, is untenable. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is neither appeal nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from
an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. The judgment
appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner-appellant.

HELD: The plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of
Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be denied
and that of defendant Buenaflor be given due course upon compliance with certain requirements,
but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the
Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the
action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved
by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action should not be entertained because
he has failed to exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him.

Bartulata vs. Peralta


59 SCRA 7

Calo vs. Fuertes


5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393

Facts: In the case herein, petitioner began his service in the armed forces of the Philippines on
January 15, 1924 upon his enlistment in the Philippine Constabulary. When the Pacific war broke
out in 1941, he held the rank of sergeant in the Philippine Constabulary. When the order for
surrender to the enemy was issued by the high command of the USAFFE, he refused to surrender
and, instead, he joined the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, a guerrilla organization in
Mindanao. This guerrilla outfit was recognized on February 13, 1943 by the Headquarters,

FACTS: The case is all about a Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City, entitled Francisco C. Calo,
claimant- contestant, vs. H. A. No. 86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes, applicant-respondent, the
Director of Lands rendered on 12 April 1956 an opinion denying and dismissing former's claim and
contest against the Homestead Application No. 86871 (E-40476) of Delfin C. Fuertes, ordering him
to vacate the premises within sixty days from receipt of a copy of the opinion, and stating that

50

Philippine Ryukyus Command of the United States Armed Forces, which recognition was later
revised to take effect as of September 16, 1942. While in the service of the aforementioned
guerrilla outfit, petitioner Bartulata was promoted to the rank of third lieutenant effective November
1, 1942, and to second lieutenant effective April 1, 1943. His name, rank (2nd Lt.) and serial
number (0-24220 PA) appeared in the Roster of Reserve Officers in the Headquarters, Mindanao
Zone Military Police Command, Philippine Army, per General Order No. 358, dated June 28, 1946,
Army Headquarters APO 75. After the war, petitioner still carrying the rank of 2nd Lieutenant,
continued to render service under the postwar Philippine Army. He was assigned as Junior Officer
of the 62nd Military Police Command (PA). As second lieutenant he was paid his salaries and
allowances and was allowed to wear his uniform as such officer. His services ended when he was
honorably discharged, effective January 31, 1947, as a second lieutenant. On September 1, 1956,
petitioner Bartulata filed an application for retirement pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 340, as amended. Since he had rendered more than 25 years of continuous military service,
his application was approved and officially announced in paragraph 13, Special Order No. 126 of
General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, dated December 19, 1957, retiring him
with the rank of Staff Sergeant effective January 31, 1947, the date when he was separated from
the service. Contending that he should be retired as second lieutenant instead of staff sergeant,
petitioner Bartulata, on several occasions, requested re-adjustment of his retirement rank, but said
requests were denied by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and by the
Secretary of National Defense, upon the ground that his name does not appear in the approved
reconstructed roster of his guerrilla outfit, and as such it is "conclusive that his service was not
recognized or that the recognition of his guerrilla status was revoked. Thereupon, Bartulata
sought relief from the lower court, but the latter, on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted
by the parties and the other documents admitted by them, dismissed his petition as stated in the
beginning of this opinion. Hence, this appeal.

indicated a clear showing of the recognition of petitioner's guerrilla and post liberation services. It
will be noted that in Special Orders No. 126, which officially announced the approval of his
retirement, it is stated that he had completed 23 years and 15 days of service. And it will also be
noted that in the stipulation of facts, respondents admit that petitioner had rendered more than 23
years of continuous military service. These 23 years and 15 days of service cover the period from
January 15, 1924 (date of original enlistment) up to January 30, 1947 inclusive, as the records do
not show that he had rendered further military service. If the petitioner, as contended by the
respondents, had not served under the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, nor was he a member
thereof or that his guerrilla status was revoked, his wartime services, dating as early as October 1,
1942 and ending May 15, 1945, could not have been included in the computation of his military
service. The inclusion of the period from October 1, 1942 to May 15, 1945 in petitioner's military
service record simply means his guerrilla services with the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, the
only guerrilla outfit he was known and shown to have served in, was duly recognized by the
authorities of the Philippine Army. The fact that his name may not be included in the roster of
recognized guerrillas of the Philippines that is kept by the authorities of the United States
Government should not matter. What should matter are the records of the Philippine Government
regarding his military activities, including his services in the guerrilla during the last World War II.
We hold that on the basis of the evidence, amply and adequately showing the Philippine
government's due recognition of petitioner's guerrilla services, it is but fair and legal, that he be
accorded all the rights, the benefits and the privileges that are due him as a recognized guerrilla to
be retired with the rank of second lieutenant, which was his rank when the afore-quoted Executive
Order No. 121, confirming it, was promulgated, and which was the rank that he was holding when
honorably discharged from the Army. Respondents, however, would contend that the present
action should be dismissed because petitioner "has not exhausted all administrative remedies"
available to him before coming to court. Respondents would want petitioner to appeal his case to
the Office of the President before availing of court processes. In a long line of decisions, this Court
has held that the doctrine requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.
The present proceedings having been brought against the Secretary of National Defense,
respondents' contention is clearly untenable.

Issue: Whether or not he should be retired with the rank of staff sergeant as contended by
respondents, or with the rank of second lieutenant as claimed by petitioner?
Whether the petitioner must, exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him
before coming to court?
Held: this Court, speaking of the probative weight of the revised roster, said that the entries in the
Army's roster of recognized guerrillas, assuming them to be the official acts of duly authorized
public officers, are merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In other words, this
roster or list is not to be considered the sole and exclusive evidence of the government's
recognition of guerrilla services. As there is nothing in the law making inadmissible other proof of
such recognition, where they are material and relevant. Further, this Court said that the recognized
roster (drawn up primarily for backpay purposes) must yield to the initial roster (which in that case
showed that Aragon was already serving six months before the Leyte landing of the liberation
troops). In the case now before this Court, respondents' theory must be rejected. This Court holds
that the Philippine Government had recognized not only herein petitioner's wartime and postliberation services in the Army, but also his rank as 2nd lieutenant. The recognition was made
when his name was included in the initial roster of the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District; when
he was given backpay for services rendered as second lieutenant from April 1, 1943 to May 15,
1945; when he was paid his salaries and allowances as second lieutenant; when he was allowed
to wear the uniform as such officer; and when he was honorably discharged with the rank of
second lieutenant on January 31, 1947. Even the approval of petitioner's retirement application

Tan vs. Director of Forestry


125 SCRA 302
Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certain tract of forest
land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land consists of 6,240 hectares and located within the
former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland. Petitioner submitted his
application in due form along with nine other applicants. Thereafter, President Carlos P. Garcia
issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing the
said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids received for the issuance of
timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources sustained the
recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public
interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, the area was
awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for

51

reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared the license issued to petitioner by
Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies

enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void.

Held: YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of

Issue: 1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid


2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available

them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox
copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from

the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies. From the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Held: (1) NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of

Resources complained of, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing to

cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express

the Chief Executive. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again, it being a time

provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be

honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must exhaust the

deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of

administrative remedies available.

Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote
to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants
him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such

Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng


Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez
205 SCRA 92

powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These
powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution. (2) NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where

Facts: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a

the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the

contract with petitioner for the latters management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public

implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political

Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner

agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal

terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio

the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.

Bunye, Mayor Carlos successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the

Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions,

agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and

such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned

the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal

act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter

Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a

shown, is correct.

complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM

Valencia vs. Court of Appeals


401 SCRA 666

officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The matter was
elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, Amado
Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and

Facts: In the case herein, petitioner acquired two parcels of land which he entered into civil law
leases with Glicerio Henson and Fr. Andres Flores. Henson instituted Crescenciano and Mariano
Friasto to work on the property while Fr. Flores appointed the Friases, plus some others, as
farmhands. However, in Fr. Flores lease contract, there was a stipulation that he was prohibited
from installing a leasehold tenant thereon. No such prohibition existed in Hensons contract. When
Fr. Flores lease period expired, Valencia ordered his farmhands to vacate the lot. The farmhands
refused to do so, and actually even secured CLTs over the land in their names. Catalino Mantac,

his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market. On October 1998,
respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters heavily armed men
forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the
Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and

52

one of the farmhands, subsequently entered into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit
sharing agreement with Valencia. After 12 years, DAR investigated the matter and found that the
right of the farmhands to the land ceased upon termination of the lease contracts except to as
regards to Mantac, with whom Valencia entered into a tenancy agreement. As such, it was
recommended that the CLTs given to the other farmhands be cancelled. However, the regional
office disregards the investigation report and ruled that the farmhands had a right to continue on
the land until otherwise ordered by the court. On appeal to the office of the president, then
Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona upheld the ruling of the DAR, with the modification that is
acquired by Valencia as homestead be excluded from the coverage of PD 27. Valencia then
appealed to the CA contending that the Exec. Sec. erred in recognizing the farmhands as tenants,
and disallowing him and his 7 compulsory heirs from exercising their right of retention under R.A
6657. However, the CA dismissed the case.

legal relationship. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by
tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The act of subletting to third
persons extinguishes the agricultural leasehold relations, as this constitutes an abandonment of
the landholding due to the absence of personal cultivation. Obiter: Social justice is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is never justified
to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they
are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the mandate
of law. Interpretare et concordare legeslegibus est optimus interpret and imodus. Interpreting
and harmonizing the laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.

Land Car Inc. vs. Bachelor Express


417 SCRA 307

Issue: Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a
tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement.

Facts: In the case herein, petitioner filed with the Regional Office of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), Region XII, a verified application to operate a public
utility bus service from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City. Respondents,
themselves grantees of certificates of public convenience, opposed petitioners application alleging
that the route applied for was sufficiently being served by them, and that cutthroat competition
would only result if petitioners application were to be favorably acted upon. On 29 October 1999,
the LTFRB rendered its decision granting petitioners application and directing the issuance of the
corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience. Respondents motion for reconsideration was
denied in the boards resolution of 27 January 2000. Respondents then appealed to the Office of
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). On 05 June 2000,
the DOTC Secretary reversed the decision of the LTFRB. This time, it was petitioners turn to move
for reconsideration of the DOTC Secretarys resolution. The motion, however, was denied by the
DOTC Secretary in his order of 30 August 2000. Respondents thereupon moved for the immediate
implementation by the LTFRB of the decision of the DOTC Secretary. On 03 October 2000, the
LTFRB granted respondents motion and directed petitioner to cease and desist from operating its
buses along the contested route. On 07 October 2000, petitioner filed a letter-appeal to the Office
of the President seeking to set aside the resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August
2000, respectively, of the DOTC Secretary. Petitioner then likewise filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed C.A.-G.R. SP No. 61159, questioning the same
resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary subject of the letter-appeal addressed to the Office of
the President. Upon advice of its new counsel, however, petitioner filed a notice of withdrawal of its
petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 61159) pending with the appellate court. The appellate
court did not act upon the notice of withdrawal of the petition (C.A. G.R. SP No. 61159) but,
instead, dismissed, in its resolution of 09 November 2000, the petition for failure of compliance
with Section 1, Rule 42, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on non-forum shopping. On 20
October 2000, the Office of the President issued a memorandum directing that the execution of
the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000,
respectively, be meanwhile stayed. On 15 January 2001, respondents filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 62619, assailing the Memorandum Order of the Office of the President.
Respondents argued that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to issue the assailed order

Held: YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a
tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. A
different interpretation would be most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who
entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on the he can no longer
gain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee. On the
other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the civil code, the lessee cannot assign the
lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case
before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary, the lessee is expressly prohibited from
subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the
right to do so is an attribute of ownership.
Doctrine: The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of landowner, except as many be
provided by law. Inherent in the right of landholders to install tenant is their authority to do so;
otherwise, without such authority civil law lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the
landholding tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. Deforciants cannot
install lawful tenants who are entitled to security of tenure. A contract of civil law lease can prohibit
a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement.
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;(2)
The subject is agricultural land;(3) There is consent;(4) The purpose is agricultural production;(5)
There is personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of the harvests between the parties. An
allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian
dispute. Claims that one is a tenant do no not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The
elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. The
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a
purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a

53

in the absence of any law providing for an appeal from the DOTC to the Office of the President,
adding that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping in addressing a letter-appeal to the Office of
the President. On 18 June 2001, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition for certiorari
basically on the ground that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping. It ordered the dismissal of
the appeal filed by petitioner before the Office of the President and reinstated the resolution
and order of the DOTC Secretary enjoining petitioner from operating its buses along the contested
route.

the appeal pending with the Office of the President could well constitute an undue intrusion into a
valid exercise of jurisdiction by the President over acts of subordinates within that office.

Issue: whether or not appellate court has decided a question in a way not in accord with
applicable jurisprudence

FACTS: In 1990, RA 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar
and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law for he figured that
it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975
weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the
PNP thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the
PNP were placed.

Antonio Carpio vs. The Executive Secretary


GR No. 96409, February 14, 1992

Held: In order to deter the evils of forum shopping, Circular 28-91, dated 08 February 1994,
issued by the Supreme Court requires that every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals must be accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping. Administrative Circular
04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, expands the certification requirement to include cases
filed in court and quasi-judicial agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to
become Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, to curb the
malpractice of forum shopping, the rule ordains that a violation thereof would constitute contempt
of court and be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. Undeniably, there is identity of
cause of action and reliefs sought between the petitioners letter-appeal filed with the Office of the
President and the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. SP No. 61159).
The DOTC resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000, respectively, were
sought to be set aside in both appeals filed by petitioner. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President to review any determination or
disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an administrative decision
to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be
elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the courts
judicial power is invoked. The appellate court correctly ruled that the action of a department head
bears only the implied approval of the President, and the latter is not precluded from exercising
the power to review the decision of the former pursuant to the Presidents power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. The Office of the President validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of the appeal by herein petitioner, and said
jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by the petitioner of the certiorari proceedings
before the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction which has attached in the first instance continues until the
final resolution of the case. Incongruently, the appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Office of the President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending
with the said office based on forum shopping. The decision of the appellate court ordering the
dismissal of the appeal taken to the Office of the President is clearly flawed. It is the latter, not the
appellate court, which could dismiss the case pending before that office. It also behooves courts of
justice, if only for reasons of comity and convenience, to shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress is completed so as to give the administrative office every opportunity to
correct its error and to properly dispose of the case. In fact, the appellate courts order to dismiss

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue
of RA 6975.
HELD: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to
the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have
to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive."
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members
of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department."
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of
the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. vs. Wilfredo Hervilla
GR No. L-65718, June 30, 1987

54

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs Hon. FULGENCIO


S. FACTORAN, JR., and ASTERIO BUQUERON
GR no. 75501, September 15, 1987

FACTS: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed on
December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a total
area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest
of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former], filed with
the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application for
the said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant, filed with the Bureau
of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural plants. On April 27, 1968,
Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of Candido de Pedro. Counsel
of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for the investigation of the said lots, to which a
report was rendered and an order was issued as to the adjustment of the said title numbers. The
trial court dismissed the action for recovery, to which was appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the trial court decision and declared that the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of
Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void.. A motion for reconsideration was filed and
subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the purpose of submitting original certificate of
titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-in-interest by the Bureau of Lands while the
case was pending. The two motions were denied. Thus this petition for review on certiorari.

FACTS: On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered
the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On
September 10, 1973, private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location
of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On
October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V.
Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder.
Boquerns "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were
duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application
was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post. During the said period
of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on the
ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated April 17, 1978, which give
preferential rights to Buqueron in his claim except the areas covered by the adverse claim to which
Atlas Consolidated has preferential rights. Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources
who rendered a decision on November 10, 1978 reversing the decision of the Director of Mines.
Subsequently this matter was appealed to the Executive Secretary, which reversed the decision of
the Minister and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines. Thus this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving recovery of possession declare
null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case?
HELD: In the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of
Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival
claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The
jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of
who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry
cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases
before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at bar, the petitioners
possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of Free Patents in favor
of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue. Thus, the
private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the
Director of Lands. Defendants' possession of the lands disputed, for purposes of the free patents,
has been confirmed in the administrative case. The administrative branch of the government has
thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed into finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is
lost. Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in
dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of
the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our
mind, is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The
Courts may no longer interfere with such decision. The decision of the Appellate court is reversed
and set aside.

ISSUE: Whether or not findings on facts based on substantial evidence by an administrative


official can be disturbed or overturned during appeals?
HELD: This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative
official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for
instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial
evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or
fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led
to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case
at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which
were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing
principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that
was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must
be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. This petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby AFFIRMED.

55

works for 5 days in a week, to which the Bureau of Labor Standard. The Regional Director,
considered the employees as falling under group 4 where the rest day is not considered paid, thus
dismissing the complaint. The decision was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and employment,
who through the Undersecretary reversed the order of the Regional director, stating that the
respondents-petitioner were under paid and they are classified as monthly employees. Thus this
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and urgent prayer for restraining order.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR) vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE


AND SPORTS (DECS)
GR No. 158228, March 23, 2004
FACTS: In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of
189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna,
Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the
late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education). Consequently, titles
thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
167175.On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for
10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The
contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several
others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of
Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and
inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. 6 Then, MARO Piosa
submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional
Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor and Employment in issuing a order awarding the private respondent salary
and allowance differentials?
HELD: No, it is Well established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases do not go so far as
to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Deputy Minister and the Regional
Director based their determinations but are limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion For Certiorari to lie, there must be capricious arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power,
the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and
common law traditions. The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically (Purefoods Corp. v. NLRC, 171 SCRA
415 [1989]; Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., 131 SCRA 151 [1984]), which is not obtaining in the present
case. The petition is dismissed and appealed order is affirmed.

On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the recommendation.
DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the
Regional Director. Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Sierra Madre Trust vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources


121 SCRA 384
Facts: On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim
against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral
claims, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio
Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The Director of mines
dismissed the claim, and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision the
latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Private Agricultural lots donated to the Department of Education is subject
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and can be distributed to farmer-beneficiaries
identified by the administrative agency?
HELD: Yes, agricultural lots previously held as alienable and disposable subsequently donated to
the DECS which is not exclusively for educational purposes but was leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation is not exempted from the coverage of the CARP but is subject to distribution for
farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR, the administrative agency authorized to do so. the
petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is
REINSTATED.

Issue: Whether or not the Director of Mines lapsed in validly locating the mining claims.
Held: No. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law
have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved.
Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests
of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation
by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his
decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity
with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly
located, surveyed and registered."

OSIAS ACADEMY and MONICA R. DE CASTRO vs THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND


EMPLOYMENT, et al. GR No. 83257-58; December 21, 1990
FACTS: on January 19 & 21, 1981, the respondents, Eva Cayetano et al, filed a complaint for
money claim with the Department of Labor against Osias Academy for underpayment of ECOLA.
An inquiry was forwarded to the Bureau of Labor Standard as to the correct wages to teacher who

Lacuesta vs. Herrera

56

62 SCRA 115

trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth
(December 11, 1901) of the petitioner. They argue that these records were made only because it
was thought that the pre-war records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records
had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as
controlling and that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner was born on
November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court.

Facts: On a disputed fishpond by the petitioners and respondents, the court rendered judgment
that they are partners of the said fishpond having contributed money, property and effort thereto in
pursuance of their partnership agreement. The respondents then appealed to the office of the
President, said office dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision appealed from.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources is binding in the courts.

Issue: Whether or not the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts.
Held: Yes. Factual findings of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by
substantial evidence. It is a settled rule of administrative law, but whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this
case. The school official based his determination of the petitioner's age on the pre-war records in
the preparation of which the petitioner does not appear to have taken a part. On the other hand,
the petitioner post-war records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his birth.

Held: Yes. When there is no showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the President or a department head, (such as the
Secretary of Agriculture ad Natural Resources in the present case), in rendering their questioned
decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative
decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts.

Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority


339 SCRA 434

Dangan vs. NLRC


127 SCRA 706

Facts: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) conducted bidding for the private sector, to
develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within Subic Bay Freeport Zone. After
review and evaluation, petitioner Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) was awarded as the
winning bidder. The office of the president set aside the award and ordered a new bidding.

Facts: The petitioner started her employment with the respondent Tierra Factors Corporation.
From July 20, 1981 to October 1, 1981, the petitioner went on maternity leave. On October 3,
1981, the corporation transferred Dangan from her temporary assignment in the Billing Section to
Secretary to the Technical Training Senior Manager with office at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. It
was at this juncture that she filed the first complaint for illegal demotion. The Arbiter dismissed the
case and was affirmed by the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the President can set aside award made by SBMA.
Held: The SBMA Board of directors and other officers are subject to the control and supervision of
the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President
of the Philippines under Letter of Instruction No. 620, which places SBMA under its ambit as an
instrumentality. Even when it is declared as the winning bidder, it cannot be considered as final
and unassailable. The approval of the Office of the President is necessary.

Issue: Whether or not the findings of the quasi judicial agencies can be accorded with finality.
Held: Yes, when supported with substantial evidence. It is perhaps timely to reiterate well-settled
principles involving decisions of administrative agencies. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
Gravador vs. Mamigo
20 SCRA 742

Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor vs. NLRC


G.R. No. 112923, May 5, 1997

Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in
Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised of his separation from the service on
the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. The controversy on the
petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Division of Schools of
Negros Oriental. The pre-war records show his date of birth to be November 26, 1897. On the
other hand, the post-war records, state that the petitioner was born on Dec. 11, 1901. According to
the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the
correct date of birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901. The respondents now contend that the

FACTS: The case stemmed from a deadlock in negotiations between the Union and private
respondents regarding the formers demand for an increase of P25.00 daily wages, as mandated
by the minimum wage law, which the latter refused to grant. Thus, the Union filed a notice of strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on account of deadlock
in collective bargaining, violation of labor standards, and unfair labor practices. Consequently,
under the auspices of NCMB Executive Conciliator/Mediator Pilar Tamboboy, conciliation
proceedings were conducted. She invited the parties for a series of talks wherein private
respondent Eduardo Yap indicated to petitioners that the demands set forth in their proposal could

57

not be accommodated without reducing manpower and that Trendline would be forced to cease
operations if retrenchment is not resorted to. The Union thereafter proposed the following amounts
as retrenchment payment, to wit: (a) payment of one month salary for every year of service; (b)
payment of 13th month pay; and (c) salary payment for the month of July based on the number of
days worked. Respondent Yap accepted this proposal in spite of limited resources, and as proof of
his intention to comply with his part of the bargain, he even secured loans from the bank and other
creditors to pay the retrenchment benefits of all union officers and members. When the details of
the retrenchment program had been finally ironed out, respondent alleged that the union officers
and members abandoned their work and waited for the payment of their respective retrenchment
benefits. Twenty-six of them, including the President, Treasurer and three Directors accepted,
upon execution of quitclaim and release waivers, the grant under the supervised payment
conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation and Mediation Board. However, private
respondents interpreted this act as an abandonment of work and thus were constructively
dismissed. The Union filed before the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City, a complaint
against private respondents for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for damages
and attorneys fees. Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan upheld the validity of petitioners
dismissal. On appeal, this was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. Their motion having been denied,
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.

bad faith on the part of private respondents which should not be countenanced as being
prejudicial and oppressive to labor. In view of the foregoing finding that retrenchment was
unnecessary to prevent alleged business losses which were never adequately proved by private
respondents, the Court no longer finds any need to discuss whether the remaining requisites
outlined under Article 238 are present.
Hence, the petition was granted. The challenged decision of respondent NLRC and that of
Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan are set aside.
Tres Reyes vs. Maxims Tea House
G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003
FACTS: Maxims Tea House had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as driver, and he was assigned to its
M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila Branch. Among his duties was to fetch and bring to their
respective homes the employees after the restaurant closed for the day. In the wee hours of the
morning of September 27, 1997, he was sent to fetch some employees of Savannah Moon, a
ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon City to which he complied. But while cruising at
the speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour towards Meralco Avenue, he noticed a ten-wheeler truck
coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the latters lane had a red signal light on. He
maneuvered to avoid a collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a
result, seven of his passengers including him sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were
damaged. The management of Maxims required Ariel Tres Reyes to submit, within forty-eight
hours, a written explanation as to what happened. He complied but his employer found his
explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was preventively suspended for thirty (30) days and
eventually terminated for cause. Thus, Ariel Tres Reyes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the National Labor Relations Commission in the National Capital Region, an action which he was
entitled to avail under the Labor Code of the Philippines. The Labor Arbiter sustained the validity of
his dismissal and found that he was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision. This decision
of the Labor Arbiter led to his filing of a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, instead of filing the
requisite pleading for appeal, with the National Labor Relations Commission, whereby, the NLRC
opted to treat his motion as an appeal. In its decision, the NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no negligence on his part. Respondents moved for
reconsideration of the decision, but said motion was denied by the Commission. This led the
respondents to file a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and the appellate
court decided in favor of the employer. Hence, Ariel Tres Reyes file a petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the decision of the Third Division, National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).

ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of NLRC, being a quasi-judicial agency, are supported
by substantial evidence.
HELD: According to the Supreme Court, It should be stressed, to the point of being repetitive,
that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded, not only
respect but, at times, finality if such are supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, the
Court is compelled to deviate from this well-established rule on the ground that the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC misappreciated the facts, thereby impairing petitioners right to security of tenure as
guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Petitioners argue that they never abandoned
their jobs; instead, they were prevented by security guards from entering the workplace. This
assertion was completely rejected by Labor Arbiter Palangan when he stated that security guards
are not appropriate officials to make a decision for the management of respondent and the
petitioners allegation was refuted by the joint affidavit of the security concerned. He also denied
petitioners imputation of partiality when he gave more credence to said joint affidavit than the
sworn complaint of the individual employees. There is, however, nothing on record which would
justify the Labor Arbiters conclusions. He glossed over the fact that the security guards were
under the control of private respondents who alone could have authorized their actions. The
security guards may not be the appropriate officials but, certainly, they acted as agents of the
respondents. For a retrenchment to be valid, three requisites must concur, as provided for under
Article 283 of the Labor Code, namely: (1) The retrenchment is necessary to prevent loses and the
same is proven; (2) Written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month prior to
the intended date thereof; and (3) Payment of separation pay equivalent to one month or at least
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, the respondent quasijudicial agency failed to establish substantial evidence due to the following: (1) Private respondent
failed to prove the existence of a just and valid cause for dismissing petitioners;(2) Conciliator
Tamboboy took the statement at its face value and never required Yap to substantiate his claim;
(3) What it shows is that private respondents led its employees to believe that the company was
suffering losses when this allegation has not at all been substantiated; and (4) Evidently, there was

ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of NLRC as a quasi-judicial body coincide with those of
the Labor Arbiter and supported by substantial evidence.
HELD: The findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory in this case, so the
Supreme Court delved into the records and examined for itself the questioned findings. Even
though factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with
those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and
even finality by the Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court, the record shows that the

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proceedings before the Labor Arbiter primarily involved the submission of position papers by the
parties. No trial-type hearing was conducted at all by the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the latter was in a better position to evaluate the evidence as he had the
better position to evaluate the evidence as he had the better opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the parties at the hearing has no leg to stand on. Moreover, based on the police traffic accident
investigation report, we are convinced that the accident was the fault of the ten-wheeler trucks
driver. On seeing the signal light change to red, this driver stepped on his brake, not just once but
three times, but his truck could not stop. Since the truck was on the wrong lane, petitioners van,
which was in its proper lane with the green light smashed into the out-of-control truck. This
episode led to petitioners dismissal which, in our view, is unjustified. Furthermore the court said
that, in sustaining the Labor Arbiters finding the petitioner was grossly negligent, the appellate
court stressed that the cited episode was the second vehicular accident involving the petitioner,
and as such it may clearly reflect against his attitudinal character as a driver. We note, however,
that the Commission found that in the first vehicular accident involving petitioner he was the victim
of the reckless and negligent act of a fellow driver. We agree with the NLRC that an imputation of
habitual negligence cannot be drawn against petitioner, since the earlier accident was not of his
own making.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs as an administrative body is allowed to resolve
questions of law in the exercise of it quasi-judicial function as an incident to its power of regulation.
HELD: According to the Supreme Court Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office
charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the
construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or
principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to several
factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are
the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely
to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences, or improvements in the statute; x x
x. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
De Jesus vs. People
No. L-61998, February 22, 1983

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs


No. L-19337, September 30, 1969

FACTS: Ananias Hibo was a defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor
of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon, in the local elections of January 18, 1980. He filed with
the COMELEC a complaint charging Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC Registrar of Casiguran,
with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to the Ministry of
Justice (now Department of Justice) which endorsed the same to the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon
for investigation. Noting that Rogelio De Jesus was being charged in relation to his office, Asst.
Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors,
conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal Genova issued a resolution, finding the existence of
a prima facie case against Rogelio De Jesus for violation of Section 29 and Subsections[x] and
[mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978. The case was raffled to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. Rogelio De Jesus filed a motion to quash the information, contending that
neither the Tanodbayan nor Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the
offense charged in the information, the same being an election offense over which the power to
investigate, prosecute and try is lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In
its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and
consequently, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against Rogelio De
Jesus. The COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case, entered its appearance as
amicus curiae, and through its law department manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez, Jr. submitted a
memorandum supporting Rogelio De Jesus stand. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan issued the
questioned resolution denying the motion to quash. Rogelio de Jesus motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.

FACTS: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. was engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal
sugar for export, the produced sugar was being placed in container known as jute bag which were
not locally made. Thus, in 1957, it made two importations of jute bags. There were 44,800 jute
bags in the first importation, and 75,200 in the second importation. These importations were made
free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioners filing of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond conditioned upon the exportation of jute bags within one year from date
of importation. The first was imported on January 8, 1957 and the second on February 8, 1957.
But it only exported 33,647 out of 120,000 jute bags that it imported. The remaining 86,353 jute
bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their
importation contrary to the Administrative Order 66 and 389 issued by the Bureau of Customs.
Due to the petitioners failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags
within one year from their importation, the collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to pay the
amount of 28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which
amount paid under protest. The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the
ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and that its failure
to export the jute bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the
vessel on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line.
Alternatively, it asked for refund of the same amount in the form of a draw back under section
106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and Custom Code. On June 21, 1960, the collector
of Customs of Iloilo, after hearing, rendered judgment denying the claim for refund. Because of
this judgment the petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who upheld the decision of
the Collector. Eventually, a petition for review was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.

ISSUE: Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses
committed by a public officer in relation to his office the Commission on Elections and the Court
of First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan?

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HELD: Only the Commission on Elections is exclusively vested with the power to investigate,
prosecute and try election cases committed by a public officer in relation to his office. The grant to
the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to ensure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people
and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To
divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.

same as a denial of a petition itself, Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued an Omnibus Order
directing petitioners to submit immediately the supporting affidavits and other evidence in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having failed to secure a reconsideration of said Omnibus Order,
petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits and documents in order to avoid further delay in
the prosecution of these cases. This move on the part of the petitioners would have rendered the
instant petition moot and academic. But while Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva gave due
course to some of said cases either by issuing the warrants of arrest or taking some other
appropriate action, he refused to issue warrants in five (5) Criminal Cases, and instead ordered
the records thereof remanded to the City Fiscal. Petitioners therefore filed a motion with the
Supreme Court to restrain Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva from enforcing the orders subject
of the main petition and compel him to accept, and take cognizance of, all the informations in his
court.

Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan and dismissed
the Criminal Case against Rogelio De Jesus. The COMELEC was directed to forthwith conduct an
investigation, and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against Rogelio De
Jesus before the proper court of first instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge is compelled to issue warrants of based on fiscals certification
of the existence of probable cause as provided by P.D. 911.
HELD: According to the Supreme Court, There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon
the fiscals certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. But does such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We
answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. As provided by the
provisions of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

Placer vs. Villanueva


Nos. L-60349-62, December 29, 1983
FACTS: The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan the
informations regarding the fourteen (14) Criminal Cases. These informations, except the last four,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12219, 12220, 12221 and 12222, were certified to by the
respective investigating fiscals. The infromations in Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 and 12220 bore
the certification of 3rd Assistant Fiscal Felixberto Guiritan, while the information in Criminal Cases
Nos. 12221 and 12222 were certified to by 2 nd Assistant Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy. Following
receipt of said informations, the Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued an order setting the
hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued
the questioned orders, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the
exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners
filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that under P.D. Nos. 77
and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary
examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient
basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva
denied said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and
other documents within five (5) days from notice. Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari
and mandamus to set aside the aforesaid orders and to compel Hon. Judge Napoleon D.
Villanueva to issue the warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 11209-12222. Meanwhile, Hon.
Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva, in addition to his duties as presiding judge of Branch I of the City
Court of Butuan, was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said court, since the judge of said
sala had retired from service. The informations filed by petitioners in Branch II likewise remained
dormant because of Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanuevas firm refusal to issue the corresponding
warrants of arrest for want of affidavits of the witnesses. Petitioners urgent motion disclosed that
no warrants had been issued in 113 informations. Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva received
the Supreme Court Resolution requiring him to comment on the petition. However, interpreting the

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG


GR Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2, 1990
FACTS: This case is about the power of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG) to conduct a preliminary investigation. On November 28, 1989, President Corazon C.
Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut
levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a
thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy
funds. On January 12, 1990, the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent
PCGG. The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary
investigation. The latter scheduled both cases for hearing. Del Rosario prepared a subpoena
dated January 16, 1990 setting the preliminary investigation on January 29, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon as to respondents Maria Clara Lobregat, Jose Eleazar, Felix Duenas Jr., and
Salvador Escudero, III, and on January 31, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon as to petitioner
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Rolando de la Cuesta, and Hermenegildo Zayco. At the scheduled
preliminary investigation on January 31, 1990 petitioner appeared through counsel. Instead of
filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two motions addressed to the
PCGG, namely; (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2)
motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG

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alternatively, motion to dismiss. Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the
proceedings closed and the cases submitted for resolution. On February 27, 1990, the PCGG
issued an order denying petitioner's motions and required him, together with all the respondents in
I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 to submit counter-affidavits within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Petitioner
did not submit the required counter-affidavit. Instead, he filed in this Court on March 12, 1990 the
herein petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction. He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the
complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and
equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary
investigation. Likewise, on July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Motion to Admit Petition to Intervene wherein they ask that the
PCGG desist from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 77, 79,
80, 81, 82, 83, and 84 charging the intervenors and other respondents, including petitioner, with
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in connection with
the, coconut levy funds. The intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the said cases. They maintain that even assuming that the PCGG has
such authority; the same cannot be delegated to a prosecutor or his assistants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power
to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor
General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut
levy funds.

also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. On 7 March 1988, Warrants of
Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On the same date, the Board
of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a
Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification by the CID
physician that petitioners were healthy. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a
Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he
be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before
he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry III allowed
provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the
same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had
already filed the present Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners detention is valid notwithstanding that there is no provision in
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
HELD: Yes. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance
with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien Section 37(a) is not
constitutionally proscribed. The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which
are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation
proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never
construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. Moreover, The requirement of
probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. There
need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation
proceeding. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended
to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of
counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign
power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or
excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines
except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be
informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. The denial

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and
Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to investigate
and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and associates,
and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to be
filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG
includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, it is also noted that under
Section 15(11) of Republic Act No. 6770, among the powers vested on the Ombudsman is to
investigate and to initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. The
Court agrees with the contention of the public respondent PCGG that this provision is a tacit
recognition that the authority of the PCGG to conduct preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth
and/or unexplained wealth amassed before February 25, 1986 is maintained.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
GR No. 82544 June 27, 1994
FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on 27 February 1988 by agents of the CID by virtue of Mission
Orders issued by respondent Commissioner. Petitioners were suspected alien pedophiles. Seized
during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child
prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were

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by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by
the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the
grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional
guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.

Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644
defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to
be approved by the President before they become effective.
2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by
the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not
afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not
adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the number
of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut
Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the number of
existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival of the
remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing processing
plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants for the above
purpose. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the
questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing
plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls
theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring"
compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the
PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of
standards there would be nothing much it would do. Instead of determining the qualifications of
market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies
entirely on competition with all its wastefulness and inefficiency to do the weeding out, in its
naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free
enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the
production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of
the coconut industry.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT


AUTHORITY
GR No. 110526 February 10, 1998
FACTS: On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the
APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain
applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged
that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02,
series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested"
under the administrative order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA
from processing and issuing licenses. Subsequently and while the case was pending in the
Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No.
018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the
coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product
processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and
administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration"
to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal
to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in
question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply
from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the
PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.

PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared
NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority
to adopt or issue.

Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal


G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011
FACTS: This is case involved the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
Petitioner herein, who is a member of the Philippine Bar, contends that Section 4 of Article 7 of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and that the PET violates Section 12 of
Article 8 of the Constitution. To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the
constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring opinion
of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be created

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not PCAs Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue
exercise of legislative power by an administrative body.
2. Whether or not the PCA is authorized to renounce the power to regulate implicit in the
law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.
HELD: 1. No. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making
or legislative power. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the

62

by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner
submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the
Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature. However,
the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is "on firm footing on
the basis of the grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all election
contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner next claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its
members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Province of Bulacan, between him and the respondent Pagdanganan, without due regard to his
fundamental due process rights of notice and participation.
The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not
require notice to and the participation of the contending parties.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.
Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is constitutional; (2) Whether or not
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal performs a quasi-judicial function.

The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a
court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its
jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence,
ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties,
and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the
exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election
contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court
exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as
it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.

HELD: As to the first issue, the Court ruled that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. Thus, a plain reading of Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority
is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, through the PET, is a derivative of Section 4, Article 7 of the
Constitution. As to the second issue, when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. the present
Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial
power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.

Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional
administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and
administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of
regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower
ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the
promulgation of its rules of procedure).

Section 4, Paragraph 7 of Article 7 of the Constitution provides:


The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

Cerezo vs. People


G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011

Section 12, of Article 8 provides:

FACTS: This case involved a complaint for libel filed against private respondents (Juliet Yaneza,
Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente Afulugencia). Finding probable cause to indict the
respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding information
against them. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Reevaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution dated November 20, 2003,
the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.
Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on
December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents
were arraigned, and they pleaded not guilty. In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the
RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed (March 17, 2004 Order). Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not
yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before
the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.

Mendoza vs. Comelec


GR 188308, October 15, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Mendoza asserts that the COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted
proceedings in the election contest within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the

63

resolution of the DOJ. On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution
reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to
re-file the earlier Information for libel. On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order
granting petitioners motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary. The respondents filed a petition to the Court of Appeals, which the latter rendered a
decision stating that the RTC violated respondents right against double jeopardy. Hence, the
instant petition.

was no showing of any reversible error. Respondent, after having his motion for reconsideration
denied, he filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The CA, in its decision
(September 5, 2008) set aside the DOJ Secretarys Resolution, holding that it committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without
therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The petitioner alleged that the requirement in Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice; and that the
constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as
the DOJ.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid termination of the case on the basis of the Order of the
Trial Court dated 17 March 2004.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution extends to decisions or rulings of
executive departments such as the DOJ.
HELD: The Court ruled that, in resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information,
the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the
motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While
the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is
not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC,
dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether
or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the
manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more
circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially
so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict
respondents. The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated
the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution
of the DOJ Secretary. By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the
resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform
a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion
and violated the complainants right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever. The case was remanded to the RTC for evaluation on whether
probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused." A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that
of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on
the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or
inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial
nature may be taken. Thus, the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution
via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ
is not a quasi-judicial body." Henceforth, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus
extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
Republic vs. Extelcom
373 SCRA 316
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional
authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative
applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.

Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio


G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010

Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative
were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.

FACTS: Respondent bought a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential


Estates, a project of Fil-Estate. After finding that the said lot sold to him was inexistent, respondent
filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice
Odchigue-Bondoc. In the Counter-Affidavit of petitioner, the latter negated the allegations of the
respondent in his Complaint. On the basis of petitioners allegations in her Counter-Affidavit,
respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner, before the Pasig City Prosecutors
Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 2004 for insufficiency of evidence, and denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice, which the latter motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there

Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and
effect in granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the
rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The
National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official

64

Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules
and regulations can take effect.

agreement is a result of the PNB failing to withhold the 15% final tax on the interest earnings
and/or yields from the money placements of PNOC with the said bank, in violation of PD No. 1931,
which withdrew all tax exemptions of GOCCs. The BIR also demanded from the PNB, as
withholding agent, for the payment of the final tax interest earnings and/or yields from PNOCs
money placement with the bank, from 15 October 1984 to 15 October 1986, in the total amount of
P376, 301, 133.33. BIR Commissioner Tan explained that the compromise was in accordance with
the provisions of EO No. 44, Revenue Memorandum Order No. 39-86, and RMO No. 4-87. Private
respondent Tirso Savellano then filed a petition for review ad cautelam with the CTA and claimed
therein that BIR Commissioner Tan acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or whimsical
exercise of jurisdiction. PNOC averred that the BIR Commissioners discretionary act in entering
into the compromise agreement had legal basis under EO No. 44 and RMO No. 39-86 and RMO
No. 4-87. The PNB asserted that the BIR Commissioners decision to accept the compromise was
discretionary on his part and, therefore, cannot be reviewed or interfered with by the courts.
Subsequently, the new BIR Commissioner Jose Ong demanded that PNB pay deficiency
withholding tax on the interest earnings and/or yields from PNOCs money placements, in the
amount of P294, 958, 450.73. PNB filed a Motion to Suspend the Collection of Tax by the BIR. It
alleged that despite its request for reconsideration of the deficiency withholding tax assessment,
BIR Commissioner Ong sent another letter demanding payment of the P294, 958, 450.73. The
CTA rendered a decision declaring the compromise agreement between the BIR and the PNOC
and PNB as without force effect and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to enforce
the assessment against PNB which has become final and unappealable by collecting the
deficiency withholding tax, plus interest totaling P294, 958, 450.73. The CTA denied the Motions
for Reconsideration filed by PNOC and PNB and the CA affirmed the decision.

Gonzales vs. Rosas


GR 145363, February 23, 2004
Facts: Sec. 9 RA 4670 provides that administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard
initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a
duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor.
Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies should be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Gonzales, a public school teacher was facing a complaint for grave misconduct,
dishonesty and estafa. Respondent Rosas, then DECS-National Capital Region Director
dismissed petitioner from the service based from the initial administrative proceeding conducted
by Nagpacan, the Administrative Officer III of City Schools
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for violation of Sec. 9 of the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers against the respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman instead of a judicial
relief for resolution of the jurisdictional issue and declaration of nullity of the administrative
proceeding.
Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the Ombudsman
acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting Director Baliton's memorandum recommending
the dismissal of her complaint against the DECS officials for want of merit. The CA dismissed the
case as the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner contends that she could not file a petition for review under Rule 43 as it only
pertains to appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals, implying that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a quasi-judicial agency.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not deficiency taxes of PNOC could not be the subject of a compromise
under EO No. 44.
2. Whether or not the CTA has no jurisdiction to question the compromise agreement
entered into by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
3. Whether or not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot unilaterally annul tax
compromises validly entered into by his predecessor.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency.

HELD: 1. Yes. E.O. No. 44 granted the BIR Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives
the power to compromise any disputed assessment or delinquent account pending as of 31
December 1985, upon the payment of an amount equal to 30% of the basic tax assessed; in
which case, the corresponding interests and penalties shall be condoned. PNOC's tax liability
could not be considered a delinquent account since (1) it was not self-assessed, because the BIR
conducted an investigation and assessment of PNOC and PNB after obtaining information
regarding the non-withholding of tax from private respondent Savellano; and (2) the demand letter,
issued against it on 08 August 1986, could not have been a deficiency assessment that became
final and executory by 31 December 1985. Given that PNOC's tax liability did not constitute a
delinquent account or a disputed assessment as of 31 December 1985, then it could not be
compromised under E.O. No. 44.

Held: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency covered by the procedure
outlined in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As a rule, appeals from decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the ombudsman, in administrative disciplinary cases,
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
Philippine National Oil Company vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
GR No. 109976 April 26, 2005
FACTS: Then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan entered into a compromise agreement with
PNOC for the payment of the latter of P93, 955, 479.12 total tax payment on the earnings and/or
yields from PNOCs money placements with PNB, which represents 30% of the basic tax. The

65

2. No. It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions by the administrative
officer is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the courts
to set matters right, with the Supreme Court having the last say on the matter. The discretionary
power of the BIR Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior over the power of
judicial review by the courts. In this case, the BIR Commissioner's authority to compromise,
whether under E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, can only be
exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said statutes. The BIR
Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the parameters set by the law, and in
case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may correct such abuse if the matter is appealed to them.

Chapter 3 Powers of Administrative Agencies


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Smart Communications, Inc. vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 678


Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Amante, 453 SCRA 432
Tio vs. VRB, 151 SCRA 208
Associated Communications & Wireless Services-United Broadcasting Networks vs. NTC,
397 SCRA 574
6. United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1
7. Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
8. Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
9. Tadlip vs. Borres, 474 SCRA 441
10. COMELEC vs. Espaol, 417 SCRA 554

3. No. The new BIR Commissioner, Commissioner Ong, had acted well within his powers
when he set aside the compromise agreement, dated 22 June 1987, after finding that the said
compromise agreement was without legal basis. It had been declared in Hilado v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, et al. that an administrative officer, such as the BIR Commissioner, may revoke,
repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office. The construction of a
statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if, thereafter, the latter becomes
satisfied that a different construction should be given.

Chapter 4 The Quasi-Legislative Power


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

APPENDICES

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

APPENDIX A
Case List for Administrative Law
Prepared by: Leo Angelo Lacar
Chapter 1 General Considerations
1.
2.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251


Maceda vs. ERB, GR Nos. 95203-05, Dec. 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 363

Chapter 2 Administrative Agencies


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516


Beja, Sr. vs. CA, 207 SCRA 689
Ursal vs. CTA, 101 Phil. 209
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. CA, 477 SCRA 49
Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. CA, 357 SCRA 441
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490

28.

66

Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234


Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328
Grego vs. COMELEC, 247 SCRA 481
People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450
Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329
Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong, 187 SCRA 432
Luzon Polymers Corporation vs. Clave, 209 SCRA 711
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 SCRA
241
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298
Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. CA, 266 SCRA 489
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418
Bito-onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732
National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130
De Jesus vs. CSC, 471 SCRA 624
Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC, 432 SCRA 157
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA
622
Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
Rubenecia vs. CSC, 244 SCRA 640
Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177
Balbuna vs. Sec. of Education, 110 Phil. 150
Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, 427 SCRA 46
PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA, 469 SCRA 397
De Jesus vs. COA, 294 SCRA 152
Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640
People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary,
238 SCRA 63
TOMMI vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597

29.
30.
31.
32.

People vs. Santos, 62 Phil. 300


US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 300
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174
Peralta vs. CA, 462 SCRA 382

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Chapter 5 The Quasi-Judicial Power


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441


Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139
DARAB vs. Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800
PCGG vs. Pea, 159 SCRA 556
Cario vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483
Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497
International Broadcasting Corporation vs. Jalandoni, 475 SCRA 446
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212
Manila Electric Company vs. CA, 271 SCRA 417
RCPI vs. Board of Communications, 80 SCRA 471
Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission, 174 SCRA 269
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd., 412
SCRA 101
Boiser vs. CA, 122 SCRA 945
Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP, 459 SCRA 491
National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419
Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. NIA, 441 SCRA 614
Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the
Philippines, 465 SCRA 532
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
Phil. Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173
Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 117 SCRA 369
Carmelo vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 836
Pascual vs. Board of Examiners, 28 SCRA 344
Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 268
Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563
Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478
PLDT vs. Tiamson, 474 SCRA 761
Uichio vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 35
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264
Zambales Chromite vs. CA, 94 SCRA 261
Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353
Corona vs. CA, 214 SCRA 378
Caoile vs. Vivo, 125 SCRA 87
Cruz and RCBC vs. MLE, 120 SCRA 15
Cordero vs. Phil. Service Commission, 121 SCRA 249
M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks vs. NLRC, 117 SCRA 544
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana, 458 SCRA 609
Pefiano vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439

Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757


Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600
Progress Homes vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 274
Velasquez vs. Hernandez, 437 SCRA 357
Phil. Merchant Marine School Inc. vs. CA, 244 SCRA 770
American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 286
Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC, 211 SCRA 565
Ablaza vs. CIR, 126 SCRA 246
Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205
NEECO II vs. NLRC, 461 SCRA 169
Javier vs. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194
Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL, 63 SCRA 524
Bautista vs. Board of Energy, 169 SCRA 167
San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258
Delfin vs. Inciong, 192 SCRA 151
Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93

Chapter 6 Judicial Review


1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

67

Medalla vs. Sayo, 103 Phil. 587


Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440
Industrial Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19
Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc., 461
SCRA 517
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, 149 SCRA 670
Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 264
GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 470 SCRA 727
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426
Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA, 268 SCRA 258
GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826
System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Govt. of Caloocan City, 408
SCRA 406
Paat vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167
Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York, 85 Phil. 201
Estrada vs. CA, 442 SCRA 117
Batalec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. EIAB, 447 SCRA 482
Morcal vs. Lavia, 476 SCRA 508
Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio, 123 SCRA 81
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256
Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377
Mangubat vs. Osmea, 105 Phil. 1308
Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377
Alzate vs. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298
Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291
De Lara vs. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269
National Development Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429
Arrow Transportation Corporation vs. BOT, 63 SCRA 193

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Tiangco vs. Lauchang, 9 SCRA 125


Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749
Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA 56
Demaisip vs. CA, 106 Phil. 237
Calo vs. Fuertes, 5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393
Bartulata vs. Peralta, 59 SCRA 7
Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Domiguez, 205 SCRA 92
Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666
Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, Inc., 417 SCRA 307
Carpio vs. The Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
National Development Company vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49
DAR vs. DECS, 426 SCRA 217
Osias Academy vs. DOLE, 192 SCRA 612
Sierra Madre Trust vs. Sec. of Agrarian and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384
Lacuesta vs. Herrera, 62 SCRA 115
Dangan vs. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706
Gravador vs. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742
Hutchinson Ports Philippines Ltd. vs. SBMA, 339 SCRA 434
Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor vs. NLRC,
272 SCRA 172
Tres Reyes vs. Maxims Tea House, 398 SCRA 288
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617
De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760
Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463
Oceanic Bic Division vs. Romero, 130 SCRA 392

10. Gonzales vs. Rosas, GR No. 145363 (Feb. 23, 2004); and
11. PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32

APPENDIX B
Case Assignment for Administrative Law Cases
Prepared by Leo Angelo N. Lacar
Aballe:
Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
Beja, Sr. vs. CA, 207 SCRA 689
Ursal vs. CTA, 101 Phil. 209
Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. CA, 357 SCRA 441
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. CA, 477 SCRA 49
Abilla:
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 678
ACWSU Broadcasting Networks vs. NTC, 397 SCRA 574
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
TOMMI vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597
Roman Cruz vs. People, GR No. 110436, June 27, 1994
Albrecht:
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236
Tadlip vs. Borres, 474 SCRA 441
COMELEC vs. Espaol, 417 SCRA 554
Alzate:
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. CIR, 302 SCRA 241
Luzon Polymers Corporation vs. Clave, 209 SCRA 711
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418
Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC, 432 SCRA 157
Antanani:
Rubenecia vs. CSC, 244 SCRA 640
Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177
Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, 427 SCRA 46
Balbuna vs. Sec. of Education, 110 Phil. 150
Arbison:
PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA, 469 SCRA 397
De Jesus vs. COA, 294 SCRA 152
Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523

Additional Cases:
1.
2.

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, GR Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2, 1990;


Roman Cruz vs. People, GR No. 110436, June 27, 1994;

3.

Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988;

4.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PHILCOA, GR No. 110526, February


10, 1998

5.

Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, GR No. 191618 (June 7, 2011);

6.

Mendoza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188308 (Oct. 15, 2009);

7.

Cerezo vs. People, GR No. 185230 (June 1, 2011);

8.

Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio, GR No. 186652 (Oct. 6, 2010);

9.

RP vs. EXTELCO, GR No. 147036 (Jan. 15, 2002);

68

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary,
238 SCRA 63
Asistido:
People vs. Santos, 62 Phil. 300
US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 300
Peralta vs. CA, 462 SCRA 382
Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441
Bucoy:
Tio vs. VRB, 151 SCRA 208
Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640
Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732
Cabreros:
DARAB vs. Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800
PCGG vs. Pea, 159 SCRA 556
Cario vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483
International Broadcasting Corporation vs. Jalandoni, 475 SCRA 447
Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 496

Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. NIA, 441 SCRA 614


Jamsuri:
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
Phil. Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173
Pascual vs. Board of Examiners, 28 SCRA 344
Carmelo vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 836
Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 117 SCRA 369
Kalbit:
Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 268
Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478
Uichio vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 35
PLDT vs. Tiamson, 474 SCRA 761
Oceanic Bic Division vs. Romero, 130 SCRA 392
Lacar:
People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450
Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, GR Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2, 1990
Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio, GR No. 186652 (Oct. 6, 2010)
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, GR No. 191618 (June 7, 2011)
Cerezo vs. People, GR No. 185230 (June 1, 2011)
Lacastesantos:
Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264
Zambales Chromite vs. CA, 94 SCRA 261
Caoile vs. Vivo, 125 SCRA 87
Corona vs. CA, 214 SCRA 378
Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353
Ladjabassal:
Cruz and RCBC vs. MLE, 120 SCRA 15
Cordero vs. Phil. Service Commission, 121 SCRA 249
Pefiano vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana, 458 SCRA 609
M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks vs. NLRC, 117 SCRA 544
Lee:
Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757
Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600
Phil. Merchant Marine School Inc. vs. CA, 244 SCRA 770
Velasquez vs. Hernandez, 437 SCRA 357
Progress Homes vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 274
Lopez:
American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 286
Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC, 211 SCRA 565
NEECO II vs. NLRC, 461 SCRA 169
Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205
Ablaza vs. CIR, 126 SCRA 246
Manuel:
PCFI vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622

Cemine:
Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516
Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234
Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988
Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators vs. PHILCOA, GR No. 110526, February 10, 1998
PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32
Hussin:
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212
Manila Electric Company vs. CA, 271 SCRA 417
RCPI vs. Board of Communications, 80 SCRA 471
Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission, 174 SCRA 269
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd., 412
SCRA 101
Indig:
Maceda vs. ERB, GR Nos. 95203-05, Dec. 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 363
Grego vs. COMELEC, 247 SCRA 481
Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. CA, 266 SCRA 489
Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA, 268 SCRA 258
Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 264
Ishmael:
Boiser vs. CA, 122 SCRA 945
Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP, 459 SCRA 491
Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the
Philippines, 465 SCRA 532
National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419

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United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1


Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong, 187 SCRA 432
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Amante, 453 SCRA 432
Mariano:
Javier vs. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194
Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL, 63 SCRA 524
Delfin vs. Inciong, 192 SCRA 151
San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258
Bautista vs. Board of Energy, 169 SCRA 167
Morados:
De Jesus vs. CSC, 471 SCRA 624
National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174
Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563
Mendoza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188308 (Oct. 15, 2009)
Gonzales vs. Rosas, GR No. 145363 (Feb. 23, 2004)
RP vs. EXTELCO, GR No. 147036 (Jan. 15, 2002)
Nillas:
Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93
Medalla vs. Sayo, 103 Phil. 587
Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440
Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc., 461
SCRA 517
Industrial Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19
Oliveros:
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, 149 SCRA 670
GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 470 SCRA 727
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426
GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826
System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Govt. of Caloocan City, 408
SCRA 406
Saguin:
Paat vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167
Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York, 85 Phil. 201
Estrada vs. CA, 442 SCRA 117
Morcal vs. Lavia, 476 SCRA 508
Batalec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. EIAB, 447 SCRA 482
Seosa:
Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio, 123 SCRA 81
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256
Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377
Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377
Mangubat vs. Osmea, 105 Phil. 1308
Usin:
Alzate vs. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298
Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291

De Lara vs. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269


Arrow Transportation Corporation vs. BOT, 63 SCRA 193
National Development Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429
Uy:
Tiangco vs. Lauchang, 9 SCRA 125
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749
Calo vs. Fuertes, 5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393
Demaisip vs. CA, 106 Phil. 237
Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA 56
Vega:
Bartulata vs. Peralta, 59 SCRA 7
Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302
Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, Inc., 417 SCRA 307
Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Domiguez, 205 SCRA 92
Wee:
Carpio vs. The Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
National Development Company vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520
Osias Academy vs. DOLE, 192 SCRA 612
DAR vs. DECS, 426 SCRA 217
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49
Yu:
Sierra Madre Trust vs. Sec. of Agrarian and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384
Lacuesta vs. Herrera, 62 SCRA 115
Hutchinson Ports Philippines Ltd. vs. SBMA, 339 SCRA 434
Gravador vs. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742
Dangan vs. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706
Zambales:
Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor vs. NLRC,
272 SCRA 172
Tres Reyes vs. Maxims Tea House, 398 SCRA 288
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617
Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463
De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760

70