PM672

FinalProjectPaper

THEBOSTONBIGDIG

MdMustafizurRahman
ID#449770
AvilaUniversity

December10,2016
1

PROJECT SUMMARY
The Big Dig Tunnel, situated in Boston, MA, that diverted the central artery
(Interstate 93), through the heart of the Boston city, into a 3.5 mile from the
tunnel. It is considered as one of Americas foremost megaprojects; the
largest and most complex urban transportation project in the history of the
America The project also included the construction of the Ted Williams
Tunnel, which extends Interstate 90 to Logan International Airport, the
Leonard P. Zakim Bunker Hill Memorial Bridge over the Charles River, and the
Rose Kennedy Greenway in the space left by the Previous raised road I-93.
Originally, the plan was to also attach a rail line between the two major
Boston train terminals. The project concluded on December 31, 2007, when
collaboration between the program director and the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority was terminated.

The Big Dig has created both a positive and negative legacy for itself. From
an engineering perspective it is a big breakthrough as it devised new
techniques and methods for construction, replacing the congested six-lane
elevated

highway

with

technically

challenging

eight

to

ten

lane

underground expressway and new bridges. The completed and fully

operational project exceeded all set expectations of reducing traffic
congestion, therefore saving time. A study shows that the timesaving per

year worth $177 million, $120 million per year in new property tax revenue.
However, The Big Dig was the most expensive highway project in the US
history. However, the project was plagued by increased costs, overprogramming, leaks, design flaws, poor execution charges and the use of
substandard materials, criminal arrests, and even four deaths. The project
was scheduled to be completed in 1998 at an estimated cost of $2.8 billion.
The project was not completed until December 2007 at a cost of $14.6
billion. The Boston Globe estimates that, ultimately the project will cost $22
billion, including interest, and which will not be paid until 2038.

PROJECT GOAL AND PLANNING

The big dig was developed as a response to the chronic and tangled traffic
congestion on the central artery (I-93), which carried 75,000 vehicles a day
approximately and had an accident rate four times the national average for
urban interstates. Planning for the big dig official began in 1982 with a goal
to replace the elevated six-lane I-93 with an eight-lane, mainly underground
directly under the existing road, a new bridge crossing the Charles River and
construction of a new four-lane expressway to extend I-90 from downtown
eastward to the airport through a tunnel. The project involved a big, new I-93
interchange. Though only 7.5 miles in overall length, it encompassed 161
lane-miles of roadwork.

The original plan was conceived in the 1970s to replace the central artery
which was becoming quite rusty. The planning of Big dig officially started in
1982, but by the time all the concerning issues had been taken up and
reviewed, 4 years had passed. It was the year 1987, the bill to start the
project was passed, but again turned down by the president due to its
expensive costs. It then took another 4 years, for the decision to be reversed
and the project finally got a go-ahead signal. The government had good
support from the city people, especially the business community as it would
ease the travelling for all.

SCOPE MANAGEMENT
The Big dig projects scope management was maintained professionally
throughout the project. The scope of the project clearly defined in the
beginning of the project and project managers maintained it quite well. As it
is one of the biggest project in worlds history, there were ups and downs to
manage the whole project. Step by step, project managers completed their
specific task and at the end of the project achieved its the final goal and
objectives.

TIME MANAGEMENT
For megaproject like The Big dig, Project manager need to make sure Workbased schedules, work packages with estimates and a work breakdown

structure (WBS) dictionary for each part of the Project. Time management is
one of the worst aspects of the big dig project. The project was originally
scheduled to be completed in 1998 but the project completed in 2007 due to
many reasons. First of all, it took almost 5 years for the bill to be passed
from Federal government due to financial and political reasons. Then the
construction complexity played crucial role to delay the project in different
stage of the project such as The Ted Williams Tunnel 3.4 feet gap error,
tunneling under south Boston railway system, tunneling under subway
redline, work with city life, major water leakages and so on. As the old city
was already congested there were very little room to move construction
parts which also took time in a great deal.

COST MANAGEMENT
During its review in 1985, the project was initially estimated at around $2.8
billion dollars. By 1986, it rose to $3.2b and another year later $4.4b. But by
1990 it had gone up to approximately $5b. By then the officials had fleeting
doubts for the cost estimation to remain constant. They interpreted the cost
to inflate further and go up to significantly at least more than that of $10b.

The project planning started in the early 80s, but the actual execution began
in 1991. The expected time of completion given was 1998. Even after four
years after the expected time of completion, there was no sign of operation

except a magnanimous change in the cost estimation. It rose to a staggering

$14.6b. The project had an almost 200% increase in the budget over-run.

Poor time management, considering environmental aspects, poor ground soil

and mud quality, shutting down work at night time to keep the city quiet are
some of the major reasons for over budgeting the project.

QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Project like The Big dig requires quality control plus active quality assurance
with continuous improvement effort for the processes that produce
deliverables for the best output. As we know, The bigger a project, the bigger
the chances for problems. The Big dig project failed to maintain its quality.
Water leaks, Fatal ceiling collapse, Substandard materials, Lighting fixtures
and many more made the work of Big dig questionable. Here some of the
Boston local newspaper news regarding the Big dig:

A yearlong Globe investigation determined that at least $1.1 billion in

Big Dig construction cost overruns, or two-thirds of the cost growth to

date, are tied to Bechtel mistakes. (Boston Globe 4/28/03)

Water gushed into the Central Artery's northbound tunnel for hours
from a small breach in the eastern wall, backing up afternoon rush-

hour traffic for miles. (Boston Globe, 9/16/04)

With a Big Dig flaw now responsible for a death, state officials rushed
to contain an unprecedented crisis of public confidence in the project.
(Boston Globe, 7/12/06)

Almost three years after state managers vowed to close thousands of

leaks in the Big Dig tunnels, nearly 2 million gallons of water flow each
month through the O'Neill Tunnel, an 18 percent increase over last
year, a Globe analysis shows. (Boston Globe, 7/1/07)

People and engineers are worried for future as the time goes engineers are
finding more errors in the project.

HUMAN RECOURSE MANAGEMENT

To making sure the best human resource staffing, acquisition and team
development for the Big dig plans, HRM should be fully detailed and must be
tie to gaps in the Requirements versus Capabilities analysis. According to
MassDOT,

to

build

the

largest,

most

complex,

and

technologically

challenging highway nearly 5,000 workers employed on the Big Dig in 2000.
Managing this huge team was not an easy task. For the big dig, one of the
most controversial issue was project labor agreement (PLA). The Big Dig, a
PLA project, is affectionately known by locals as The Big Swig due to union
workers visiting methadone clinics, sleeping and drinking heavily on the job.

COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT
The

Ideal

Communication

Plan

developed

for

meeting

stakeholders

communication needs and actively managing all stakeholders issues so they

are resolved. It is not a surprise to anyone that as projects grow larger in size
project

complexity

increases

and

more

complexity

needs

better

Communication management plan. Project researchers and analysts at

Boston University have seen poor communication management repeatedly in
the Big Dig project. For instances, when weak glue and insufficiently tested
design led to a fatality and substantial expenses, Project manager must
focus on Communication tools to manage and report quality, but it did not
happen.

However,

Partnering

program

was

created

to

increase

communication and help prevent conflict and misunderstanding. It is difficult

to quantify the impact that this form of risk management had in the Big Dig.
Many experts have concluded that because of its scope and complexity, the
Big dig Project would have been simply unmanageable without partnering.

RISK MANAGEMENT
For megaprojects project specialists suggest qualitative and quantitative
analysis with a risk response plan for several dozen risks and how to
overcome those risks. For the Big dig project risk analysts found several
unsolved risks. Such as the Massachusetts State and Massachusetts Highway
Departments Responsibility was not clear in terms of any accident or any
wrong doing, unreliable project Cost estimates, use of new technology, and
health and safety related risks.

To mitigate risk Project managers had plan. The effects of the project to local
business and homes were considered since the beginning. A few examples of
risk mitigation measures taken by the project were:

The backup measurements taken to ensure that Gillettes daily

operation would not be affected

The secondary utility systems that were put in place in case the
primary line was severed during excavation to protect residences in
the area, the Federal Reserve building, a financial center, and the

building of an international company.

Pre-construction videos and monitoring systems used during digging
and filling activities

PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT
In 1982, when the Big Dig was in its infancy, state construction laws
mandated that the Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) use DesignBid-Build as the project delivery method. This traditional design-bid-build
method is the most popular project delivery system. It is intended to
minimize risk to the contractor by defining all of the construction
requirements in the plans, specifications, and contract documents. In this
method, the project owner may contract with a consulting engineering firm
to design the complete facility and prepare the contract documents. The
contracting agency then solicits bids and awards a construction contract to
the lowest responsive bidder. Because of its wide use and acceptance, the
traditional design-bid-build system is well understood with well-established

and clearly defined roles for the contracting agency and the contracting
industry. However, in response to years of criticism regarding state
construction laws, Massachusetts legislators passed construction reform
legislation in 2004.

The reform included a new project delivery method

whereby authorized agencies

could use design-build instead of

traditional design-bid-build method for roads, bridges, and tunnels.

design-build,

instead

of

contracting

with

designers

and

the

Under

contractors

separately, owners contract with a single entity that is responsible for both
the project design and construction.

Saving time and reducing costs are

among the proposed advantages to the design-build delivery method.

CONTROLLING
The processes for monitoring and controlling have changed significantly over
the course of the Big dig project. During the 1990s a comprehensive project
database was developed, using state-of-the-art relational database software,
to enable the detailed tracking of individual contract tasks and the assembly
of cost reports. Since no off-the-shelf programs were capable of handling
such

mammoth

project

as

the

Big

dig,

management

consultant

Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB) developed a formidable constructioninformation system (CIS) using a commercial software system. The CIS,
which was not fully developed and available for use until about 5 years after
construction began, tracks almost every aspect of the project. That includes
all design and construction contracts and their funding sources, requests for

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information, change orders, submittals, design specifications, accounting and

budgeting, forecasting, staffing, scheduling, and reporting. However, there
continued to be major problems such as in the flow of information to
oversight groups, in the provision for adequate contingency, and in the
inconsistency between project scope and cost estimation. In 2000 the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) announced a substantial project
overrun, to the apparent surprise of the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) oversight group. Following that event, the monitoring and control
processes were modified to track budget and schedule progress to a fixed
project scope.

Using the CIS, the project team generates a large number of progress
reports, providing what the committee believes might be an excessive
amount of information for managing the project. Much of that information
lacks the strategic view needed to develop a reliable construction schedule,
though this information may serve a purpose during the operation and
maintenance of the highway system.

A monthly set of reports is produced to identify exceptions to the existing

budget and schedule. In addition, a set of month-end documents for each
contract is developed and reviewed by senior management and oversight
agencies to inform them of issues associated with contract modifications and
claims. For example, a Budget, Cost, Commitment and Forecast report is
prepared for financial review by oversight agencies. In addition, a Project

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Management Monthly report is prepared for senior management, oversight

agencies, and the public. It summarizes the status of budgets, cost
exposures, schedules, safety records, and employment-diversity records for
the entire project, but it does not include detail on the status of individual
contracts.

Cost control relies on a resource-loaded work-breakdown schedule. Each

contract is divided into specific tasks with required resources and schedule
milestones, and detailed information on specific tasks can be pinpointed or
aggregated. As contract modifications are implemented, additional tasks
may be added to the schedule and the work-breakdown structure.

Schedule control is maintained by monitoring work-in-progress and planning

future tasks. Contractors develop detailed schedules for their own work that
are aggregated into the overall project schedule, and milestones are set for
individual contracts and the project as a whole.

Control of the project scope is a critical issue on a large, complicated project

such as the Big dig. Since the original $2.6 billion estimate (in constant 1982
dollars), numerous additions have been made, especially for mitigation of
environmental or economic impacts and to adjust for unanticipated site
conditions.

EXECUTION

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As this megaproject is a collection of several big projects, it took over 20

years to complete the whole project. Project execution activities are given
bellow:

YEA

PROJECT EXECUTION ACTIVITIES

R
198

Work begins on Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report

2:

(FEIS/R)

198

Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report (FEIS/R) filed and

5:

approved early the next year.

198

Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff begins work as management

6:

consultant.

198

Congress approves funding and scope of Project.

7:

Building acquisition and business relocation process begins (no

private homes taken).

198

Final design process under way.

8:

Exploratory archaeology digs begin.

198

Preliminary/final design and environmental review continue.

9:
199

Congress allocates $755 million to project.

0:
199

Federal Highway Administration Issues Record of Decision, the

1:

construction go-ahead. Final Supplemental Environmental Impact

13

Statement/Report (FSEIS/R) approved. Construction contracts begin

to be advertised and awarded.
Construction begins on Ted Williams Tunnel and South Boston Haul
Road.
199

More than $1 billion in design and construction contracts under way.

2:

Dredging and blasting for the Ted Williams Tunnel ongoing.

Downtown utility relocation to clear path for Central Artery tunnel
construction begins.
Archaeologists find 17th and 18th century artifacts at a North End
dig.

199

South Boston Haul Road opens.

3:

All 12 tube sections for Ted Williams Tunnel are placed and
connected on harbor floor.

199

Charles River Crossing revised design and related FSEIS/R approved.

4:

New set of loop ramps open in Charlestown.

199

Ted Williams Tunnel opens to commercial traffic.

5:
199

Downtown slurry work under way for I-93 tunnels.

6:
199

Overall utility work 80 percent complete.

7:
199

Enter peak construction years.

8:

Construction begins on the Charles River Crossing.

199

Overall construction 50 percent complete.

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9:

New Broadway Bridge opens.

Leverett Circle Connector Bridge opens.

200

Nearly 5,000 workers employed on the Big Dig

0:
200

Overall construction 70 percent complete.

1:
200

Leonard P. Zakim Bunker Hill Bridge completed.

2:
200

I-90 Connector from South Boston to Rt. 1A in East Boston opens in

3:

January.
I-93 Northbound opens in March.
I-93 Southbound opens in December.

200

Dismantling of the elevated Central Artery (I-93).

4:
Opening of the tunnel from Storrow Drive to Leverett Circle
Connector, which provides access to I-93 North and Tobin Bridge.
200

Full opening of I-93 South.

5:
The opening of the completely renovated Dewey Square Tunnel,
including new exit and entrance ramps.
Opening of the two cantilevered lanes on Leonard P. Zakim Bunker
Hill Bridge.
Opening of permanent ramps and roadways at I-90/I-93 Interchange

15

and in other areas.

200

Reached substantial completion of the Central Artery/Tunnel Project

6:

in January.
Spectacle Island Park opens to the public.

200

Restoration of Boston city streets.

7:
Continued construction of the Rose Kennedy Greenway and other
parks.
Construction on development parcels will continue after the Central
Artery/Tunnel Project is finished.

In terms of stakeholders expectations, journalists and researchers found a

mixer of feelings. The People of Boston, MA are proud to host such a
magnificent art of modern engineering. However, they are skeptical about
the quality of work and $15 billion cost. Most of the people are very happy to
see the new outlooks of Bostons downtown area. They got open grassland
instead of crowdy elevated expressway. Moreover, Leonard P. Zakim Bunker
Hill Bridge becomes an icon for Boston. They also got The Rose Fitzgerald
Kennedy Greenway snakes along parks, open space and amenities, public
art, food trucks, farmers markets, a fountain, carousel, and Harbor Islands
visitor center and lots of fresh air. Nonetheless, Bostonians get rid of boring
and time consuming traffic jam in rush hours and before the Big Dig, the

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central artery carried not only north-south traffic, but much of this to west
traffic, a major cause of its all-day congestion which is gone now. However,
almost everybody criticizes about the over-budgeted cost of this project
which is very legitimate argument. Because authority failed to proper use of
$15 billion taxpayers money. Even some of the critics are very negative
about future outcome because of the technical and mechanical errors of the
Big dig. But as a whole, the Big dig improves the quality of life in the City of
Boston, MA.
From Project managements viewpoint I find out some positive aspects in this
project. Execution of such a gigantic project is always challenging. The good
thing of this project is there were low injury and fatality rate even though at
its peak level some 5000 workers worked every day. Additionally, this huge
project did not evacuate a single house or business establishment for project
purpose. Most interestingly, workers completed the whole project through
busy, live and narrow downtown area without shutting down any major
highways.

CONCLUSION
Mega projects will always struggle with unforeseen events, massive
regulatory requirements, technical complexities, community concerns, and a
challenging political environment. The Big Dig after completion was
successful in its overall project goal of reducing traffic congestion, the

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biggest negative to the Big Dig is the huge financial debt it has place on the
tax payer/state. The biggest lesson learnt from this megaproject is to shift
the risk to the investor, as this will produce a high degree of focus on the
project. Other lessons we have learnt from this project is that carrying out
functional activities the way they have been done in other constructed
projects does not work for megaprojects one size does fit all, appropriate
bid management system should be used in screening and selecting
contractors, also project integration is critical to success and while a system
integrator will greatly help in combining capabilities to develop the system,
reduce chaos, it is not a substitute for good management and leadership.

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REFERENCE
Data Retrieved from bellow websites:

https://www.scribd.com/doc/125274214/Big-Dig
http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/highway/thebigdig.aspx
http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/highway/TheBigDig/FactsFigures.aspx
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nyldEaA5SJ0
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Dig
http://www.bechtel.com/getmedia/0202bc86-abaa-42ab-8d90-

db5224d31f4f/BigDig_KeyFacts_Dec2006/
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/04jul/08.cfm
https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2015/12/29/years-later-did-

big-dig-deliver/tSb8PIMS4QJUETsMpA7SpI/story.html
https://www.nap.edu/read/10629/chapter/6

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