Wesleyan University

Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered

Author(s): Alan Donagan
Reviewed work(s):
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1964), pp. 3-26
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell for Wesleyan University
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HISTORICAL EXPLANATION:
THE POPPER-HEMPEL THEORY RECONSIDERED

ALAN DONAGAN

For better or worse, the point of departure for most recent philosophical
investigations of historical explanation is a theory which has been lucidly
and succinctly propounded by Professors K. R. Popper and C. G. Hempel.'
Their theory has been vehemently assailed and defended; and Hempel himself has been prevailed upon to modify it. These controversies, especially
since the appearance of Professor W. H. Dray's Laws and Explanations in
History, have generated light as well as heat. We can now see what the theory
is clearly enough to appraise it.

? 1. Popper's Statement of the Theory

Popper's theory of historical explanation is a special application of his general
theory of causal explanation, which he formulated as follows: "To give a
causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes
it, using as premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together
with certain singular statements, the initial conditions" (Popper [20], 59).
Although it has sometimes been thought that Popper intended to offer a
theory of explanation in general, his own statement shows that he did not.
He mentioned no explanations except those which are both causal, and of
events. He did not pretend to analyze such things as explanations of the
symbolism of the Imperial regalia at a coronation, or of how a fielder could
catch a baseball twenty feet above the ground (cf. Scriven [24], 453; Dray
[8], 158), neither of which are causal. Nor did he pretend to treat of explanations of such things as why Kepler's laws of planetary motion hold,
which do not explain events. He was concerned solely with causal explanations of events: that is, with explanations which answer questions of the form,
"Why did the event E occur, rather than not occur?"
* This essay is based upon the first six parts of a paper delivered to Section L of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science at Denver, Colorado, on 30
December 1961.
1 For the origins of the theory, consult Popper [21], II, 364, and Hempel and Oppenheim [17], 324n. (Full titles of works referred to are listed at the end.)

ALAN DONAGAN

Since it would be tedious scrupulously to speak of "causal explanations of

events", even though explanations of no other kind are in question, whenever
in the remainder of this paper the word "explanation" is used, it should be
taken to mean "explanation of why a given event occurred", unless I expressly say otherwise.
Although Popper presented his theory as an analysis of what "to give a
causal explanation of an event" means, it matters little whether it is adequate
as a definition. Especially for historians, the important question is not whether
it exhausts all the characteristics of the explanations they seek, but whether
it correctly states some of them. It lays down two as fundamental. In order
to state them as clearly as possible, I shall follow recent philosophical practice in dividing an explanation into two parts: the explanandum, or statement of what is to be explained; and the explanans, or statement of what
explains it. In this terminology, the first characteristic which Poppe 's theory
declares to be essential to an explanation is:
(1) the explanandum must be deduced from the explanans.
This I shall call the deductive thesis. The second characteristic is:
(2) besides a statement of the initial conditions from which comes
about the event to be explained, the explanans must contain "one
or more universal laws".
Following Dray, I shall call this the "covering law" thesis.
Since Popper's term "universal law" is technical, it must be clarified.
Popper did not formally define it, but he laid down two conditions which all
putative universal laws must satisfy. First, they must be "strictly universal";
that is, they must be statements which purport to be true for any place and
any time, and "in which only universal names and no individual names
occur" (Popper [20], 68-70). Individual names are proper names or equivalent signs, such as demonstratives used in conjunction with ostensive gestures.
All references by means of spatio-temporal co-ordinates ultimately employ
either proper names or equivalent signs (Popper [20], 64-5). Secondly, universal laws must be empirically falsifiable (Popper [20], 69, 429). Hence an
"analytic", i.e., a logically necessary, truth cannot be a universal law. Both
these conditions are held to be necessary: whether they are sufficient we need
not inquire.
Popper distinguished the "historical sciences" from what he called the
"generalizing sciences", which he divided into theoretical sciences, like
physics, the object of which is to establish universal laws, and applied
sciences, like engineering, the object of which is prediction and control. The
historical sciences have to do* neither with bringing about desired future
events, nor with discovering laws. They indeed use the laws furnished by the
theoretical sciences, but not as the applied sciences use them. But there is
no difference in subject-matter between generalizing and historical sciences.
There are historical sciences of physical nature, e.g., geological history; and

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there are theoretical sciences of individual and social human activity, e.g.,
psychology and sociology (Popper [21] II, 265).
As long as his usage is intelligible and consistent, Popper may use the
term "historical sciences" as he pleases. But although quarrels about terminology are idle, it is not idle to point out that using the term "historical
sciences" as Popper does may obscure an important issue. A large number,
probably a large majority, of practising historians and philosophical students
of historiography, have in one way or another sharply distinguished between
human history and the study of past natural events (Collingwood [5], 215-6).
All works commonly recognized as "historical" are about human affairs;
they touch upon natural processes only as they affect and are affected by
human responses to them. We shall, therefore, consider Popper's theory only
in its application to the study of past human affairs. Yet it would be wrong to
assume either that the sciences which study human affairs differ in principle
from those which study natural processes, or that they do not. That is a
question to be answered, not begged.

? 2. Hempel's First Statement of the Theory

Hempel's first, and classical, attempt at a theory of historical explanation
closely resembles Popper's. According to it, the explanans must consist of "a
set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events C1 . . CII at certain times and places" and "a set of universal hypotheses"; all statements in
the explanans must be "reasonably well confirmed"; and, finally, the explanandum must be logically deducible from the explanans (Hempel [12], 345).
Some small differences between this formulation and Popper's merit attention. First, Hempel has slightly modified the deductive thesis. Instead of
demanding that the explanandum be deduced from the explanans, he requires
only that is can be so deduced. Here he makes explicit what Popper took for
granted, that historical explanations need not be set out in deductive form.
It is enough that the explanans be so presented that we can tell that the
explanandum can be deduced from it. Secondly, Hempel has added to the
conditions which Popper required a putative law to satisfy. Not only must it
be strictly universal, i.e., specify the events it is about by kind, as opposed
to naming them, but it must hold "in every case". This is stronger than
Popper's requirement that it "be true for any place and any time" because
it excludes statistical laws, which Popper's does not. In sum: Hempel's formulation of the deductive thesis is slightly weaker than Popper's; of the
covering law thesis, slightly stronger.
Even in 1942, however, Hempel recognized a form of historical explanation which assorts ill with his general theory. "Many an explanation offered
in history", he wrote, "seems to admit of an analysis of this kind: if fully

ALAN DONAGAN

and explicitlyformulated,it wouldstate certaininitialconditions,and certain

probabilityhypotheses,such that the occurrenceof the event to be explained
is made highly probableby the initial conditionsin view of the probability
hypotheses"(Hempel [12], 350-1). Such alleged explanationswould not
satisfy the deductivethesis; for the explanandumwould not be deducible
from the explanans.Nor would they satisfythe coveringlaw thesis in Hempel's own formulationof it; for probabilityhypothesesare not of the form,
"WheneverC then F", i.e., they do not hold "in every case" (Hempel
[12], 345).

? 3. Hempel's Modification of the Popper-Hempel Theory

Why did Hempel suffersuch exceptionsto his generaltheory?He gave only

one reason:thatboth historyandnaturalscienceaffordnumerousexamplesof
them. "Thus,e.g., if Tommy comes down with the measlestwo weeks after
his brother,and if he has not been in the companyof other personshaving
the measles, we accept the explanationthat he caughtthe disease from his
brother" (Hempel [12], 350). Examples like this have induced Hempel
thoroughlyto modify his original theory. Instead of maintainingthat all
explanationssatisfyboth the deductivethesis and the coveringlaw thesis, he
now dividesexplanationsinto two classes:the "deductive-nomological",
which
satisfy both; and the "inductive-probabilistic",
which do not satisfy the deductive thesis, but satisfy a weakened covering law thesis (Hempel [13],
[15], passim). He does, however,maintainthat all scientificexplanationsfall
into one of those two classes (Hempel[15], 113-6).
In analysinginductive-probabilistic
explanationHempel offers the following "model".It can be adaptedto any example,howevercomplex.
Given that an event of the kind A has occurred(Ai),
and that the statisticalprobabilityof an event of the kind B, givenAi,
is equal to 1 - E (whereE is small),
high inductiveprobabilityis conferredon the statementthat an event
of the kind B will occur. (Hempel[15], 110).
Except for observingthat inductiveprobability,which is mentionedin the
conclusion of the model, is distinct from statisticalprobability,which is
mentionedin its premises,it is unnecessaryfor our purposesto analysethe
model further.
Hempelofferedthis illustration.Supposethere to be 1,000 marblesin an
urn:one is black, and all the othersare white. If, blindfold,you shoulddraw
one, after they have been thoroughlystirred,the statisticalprobabilitythat
it would be white would be 0.999. Accordingto Hempel'smodel, it would
be legitimateto infer inductivelythat the marbleyou have drawnis white.
Supposethat it turns out to have been white. Would you deny that the de-

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scriptiongiven of the conditionsunderwhich you drew it, and the statement

of the statisticalprobabilityof drawinga white one, together explain that
what you drew was white?
How you might intuitivelyanswer such questionsis persuasive,but not
decisive. Hempel has thereforereinforcedintuitionwith scientific example.
Science,he contends,aboundswith examplesto whichhis inductive-statistical
model applies."[S]uchprobabilisticaccountsplay a fundamentallyimportant
role in such fields as statistical mechanics, quantum theory, and genetic
theory.For example,the explanationof certainuniformitiesthat hold at the
macrolevel in termsof assumptionsaboutstatisticaluniformitiesat the level
of the underlyingmicro phenomenahas basicallythe logical characterjust
considered. . ." (Hempel [15], 111).

? 4. Defense of the Deductive Thesis

In puttingforwardtheir originaltheory, neitherPopper nor Hempel offered

to prove the deductivethesis. The reasonsfor it are so plain that they may
have consideredthem self-evident.If your task is to explain why a given
event E occurred,ratherthan did not occur, then your explanansmust exclude the possibilitythat E did not occur; but, if your explanationis not
deductive,i.e., if its explanansdoes not logicallyentail its explanandum,then
it will not excludethat possibility,and so will not explainwhy E did occur.
As ProfessorBrodbeckhas put it: "Eitherthe explanationis deductiveor
else it does not justifywhat it is said to explain"(Brodbeck[3], 239).
This argumentis plainlyvalid, but are its premisestrue?Only one is open
to question, namely, that if your task is to explain why a given event E
occurred,then your explanansmust exclude the possibilitythat it did not
occur;and, as mightbe expected,Hempelhas rejectedthis conditionas "too
restrictive"(Hempel [15], 111). Althoughhe has not told us how anything
less restrictedcan possibly explain why E occurred rather than did not
occur, advocatesof the deductivethesis cannot maintaintheir cause unless
they dispose of his examples.
First, considerhis illustration.Is it the case that when you draw a marble
from an urn, the two facts: (1) that the urn contains 1,000 marbles,one
black and all the otherswhite, whichhave been well stirred;and (2) that the
statisticalprobabilitythat, given (1), you will draw a white marbleis 0.999;
togetherexplain the fact that the marbleyou draw is white? Is it the case
that when you bought a lottery ticket, which had only one chance in a
hundredthousandof winning, this fact explains why you lost? If it does,
was it not irrationalto buy the ticket at all? And what is to be said when,
againstthe odds, you draw a black ball or a winningticket?
In cases of this sort the obviousthingto say is that thereis no explanation

ALAN DONAGAN

of any individualoutcome.You will be deceivedinto imaginingthat there is

only if you confoundwhat it was reasonableto expect with what has been
explained.Reasonable expectationsand explanationsdiffer fundamentally.
It is more reasonableto expect at the first attemptto toss heads with a coin
than to win at rouletteon a given number;but the groundswhy it is more
reasonabledo not explainwhy you succeedin tossing heads and fail to win
at roulette.After all, you might have won at rouletteand tossed tails. With
respect to explanation,chance situationswhere the odds are equal do not
differfrom those wherethe odds are fifty to one or a thousandto one. You
cannotexplainluck.
Let us now turn to Hempel's examples from science. Here I think the
essential points have been made by ProfessorsBergmann,Brodbeck and
Nagel. First, there may be explanationswhich satisfy the deductivethesis
and which also rest on statisticallaws. However, they will explain, not individualevents falling under those statisticallaws, but "mass-events".Suppose we know, as we do not, that six percentof all cigarettesmokersdevelop
lung cancer, and that there are 100,000,000 American cigarette smokers,
then we can infer that 6,000,000 Americancigarettesmokerswill develop
lung cancer;and we may fairly claim that the "mass-event"that 6,000,000
of the present Americancigarettesmokers develop cancer is explainedby
the statisticallaw and the fact that there are now 100,000,000 American
cigarettesmokers.But, as Brodbeckprotests:"[T]helung-cancergeneralization says nothingabout any particularcigarettesmoker ... [N]eithercan we
explainan individualevent by referenceto such a law" (Brodbeck[3], 248).
The explanationof strict uniformitiesat the macro-level by statistical
uniformitiesat the micro-levelpresentsa more difficultproblem,the technical ramificationsof which I am incompetentto explore. Two sorts of
examplesappearto be significant.Let us say that the macro-eventto be explained is of kind B, and that the initial micro-conditionsfrom which it is
to be explainedare of kind A'. In examplesof the first sort, macro-events
of kind B can be interpretedas micro-massevents of kind B1, and there is a
statisticallaw which logicallyentailsthat, given micro-conditionsof kind Al,
there will be a micro-massevent of kind B1. Such explanationsobviously
satisfythe deductivethesis (cf. Bergmann[2], 123-4; Nagel [19], 312-5).
Examplesof the secondsort are more difficult.Supposethat the statistical
laws at your disposalentail only that it is overwhelminglyimprobablethat,
given the micro-conditionsof kind A', a micro-massevent of kind B' will
not occur. PresumablyEddingtonhad such a case in mind when he declared
that, if you lean on a table, there is a probability,"so excessivelysmall that
it can be neglected in everydaylife", that your elbow will go through it.
Given micro-conditionssuch as occur when you lean on a table, it is overwhelminglyimprobable,but not deductivelyexcluded, that a micro-mass
event will occur which can be interpretedas the macro-eventof your elbow

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going through the table. I do not think that this fact damages the deductive
thesis. Why should we not say that putative "inductive-probabilistic"explanations approach genuine explanations, in a measure as the statistical probability of the micro-mass events whose occurrence a genuine explanation must
exclude approaches zero? The gambler's odds on which most such alleged
explanations depend do not approach zero as closely as do the odds of
winning a lottery: and in micro-physics such odds would be worthless. When,
however, the odds against an untoward result are as long as they are in microphysics, the possibility of such a result may, as Eddington says, be "neglected". But to show that a possibility may be neglected does not explain
why it is not realized: rather, it shows that the need to explain it is negligible.
Other examples which may be advanced are less difficult. Hempel's own
original example: that of the boy who came down with the measles two weeks
after his brother, who had not been in the company of anybody else who
had them, and about whom "we accept the explanation that he caught the
disease from his brother", is manifestly not "causal" in Popper's and Hempel's sense. An explanation of how somebody came to catch a disease (he
was exposed to infection, or he was in a weakened condition, or the like) is
not by itself a causal explanation of why he caught it. It more resembles one
of Dray's "how possibly" explanations.2 All such apparent counter-examples
may be detected by submitting them to the test: Do they purport to be explanations of why the event explained occurred, raher than did not occur?
The deductive thesis is intended to apply only to examples which pass this
test. To offer as objections examples which fail to pass it is ignoratio elenchi.
For these reasons, Hempel's inductive-statistical model throws no light on
causal explanations of individual events. Besides being intrinsically interesting, it may be of use in analysing rational expectation and some kinds of
non-causal explanation. But, with respect to causal explanation. Hempel's
first thoughts were better than his last. The deductive thesis of the original
Popper-Hempel theory is not shaken by what he has said against it.
One final objection merits attention. Professor Scriven has argued that
since "explanations are practical, context-bound affairs", a certain explanans
may, in context, completely explain why an event occurred, even though,
taken by itself, it does not logically entail that that event did occur (Scriven
[25], 450). Here Scriven is plainly right; and if the deductive thesis implied
that explanations are incomplete unless they are explicitly thrown into deductive form, he would have established a valid objection to it. But neither
Popper nor Hempel demands that everything in an explanation be explicit
(Popper [21], II, 264-5; Hempel [12], 348). They contend only that a
thorough analysis of explanation must treat of what is implicit as well as of
what is explicit. Hence they include in the explanans not only what in an
This was pointed out by Dray in one of his two papers read at Indiana University
(25 and 26 April, 1963). See Dray [8].
2

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ALAN DONAGAN

ordinary context-bound explanation is explicit, but also what Scriven calls

its "role-justifying ground" (Scriven [25], 448), which usually is not. But this
divergence is verbal. The deductive thesis can be restated in Scriven's terminology without modifying it. So restated, it would run: The explanandum
must be shown to be deducible from the explicit explanans, when taken
together with a statement of the implicit context which justifies it.

? 5. Logical Relations between the Deductive Thesis and the

Covering Law Thesis
According to the original Popper-Hempel theory, the explanandum of an
historical explanation is a statement that a certain event occurred. Such a
statement will be what Popper calls a "singular statement", that is, one in
which proper names or equivalent signs occur indispensably as specifying
what it is about (Popper [20], 64). Furthermore, part of the explanans,
namely that in which the initial conditions are stated, is a singular statement
too. Now, except when the connection is a necessary one depending on the
meanings of their predicates (as in that between John is a brother and John
is male), one singular statement cannot logically entail another, except by the
mediation of some third statement. The deductive thesis, however, requires
that the explanans should logically entail the explanandum. It can only do
so if some further statement be added to the singular statement of the initial
conditions. Must this further statement be a universal law, as the covering law
thesis requires?
Some years ago, I argued, no doubt tediously, that it need not: that it is
logically possible to accept the deductive thesis while rejecting the covering
law thesis (Donagan [6], 433-9). Bartley has since derided me for dwelling on
the obvious and irrelevant (Bartley [1], 24-5). It was small consolation that
another critic used my rejection of the covering law thesis as part of her
evidence that I rejected the "deductive model" of explanation (Brodbeck
[3], 262).
In pure logic, it is beyond doubt that no universal law is needed to link
the statement of initial conditions with the statement of the event to be explained. For example, any statement will do which contains as a conjunct the
statement of the event to be explained. But such examples are frivolous. The
question is: What must be added to the statement of the initial conditions in
order to produce a result that will entail the explanandum, and at the same
time deserve serious consideration as an explanans? Advocates of the covering
law thesis often argue that only a covering law will fill this bill.
Yet that too may be doubted. Suppose the event to be explained to be that
John has fallen into a coma, and that somebody proposes as an explanation
that John has recently eaten a quarter of a pound of sugar. What must be

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11

added to this statement of initial conditions so that it may both entail the
explanandum and deserve serious consideration as an explanans?
A modest answer would be: you need add only the singular hypothetical
statement, If John eats a quarter of a pound or more of sugar, then soon
afterwards he falls into a coma. Even in the days before the nature and
symptoms of diabetes were known, there may have been individuals who
survived diabetic comas of whom such individual hypothetical statements
were known to hold. Suppose John to have been such an individual. Then
whoever explained John's coma by saying that he had recently eaten a
quarter of a pound of sugar might conform his explanation to the deductive
thesis as follows:
John some time ago ate a quarter of a pound of sugar
(initial condition),
If John eats a quarter of a pound or more of sugar then soon afterwards
he falls into a coma,
Therefore, John has fallen into a coma (explanandum).
This unquestionably fails to satisfy the covering law thesis, as Popper and
Hempel originally defined it (see above ? ? 1-2), because the individual
hypothetical statement which connects the initial conditions with the explanandum is not a "universal law" (Popper) or "universal hypothesis"
(Hempel). That is why, according to the Popper-Hempel theory, alleged
explanations like the one I have constructed are spurious.
Professed defenders of both the deductive thesis and the covering law
thesis who do not relish this conclusion have recently proposed to relax the
covering law thesis by abandoning Popper's and Hempel's requirement that
covering laws be strictly universal. Why, it may be asked, should advocates
of the Popper-Hempel theory scorn such a concession? They are importuned
to grant no more than that statements containing proper names or their
equivalents may qualify as laws. And is not that plausible? Was not Kepler's
elliptical orbit law originally asserted of the planet Mars; and even now do
not Kepler's laws refer only to the planets of the Sun? Do not Galileo's laws
of terrestrial motion implicitly refer to the earth, a named individual object
(Bartley [1], 27; Brodbeck [3], 264)? Why scruple over a modification enforced by both common usage and polemical advantage?

? 6. Grounds for the Strict Covering Law Thesis in Natural Science

Time Danacoset dona ferentes.
The strict covering law thesis lies at the heart of the Popper-Hempel theory;
if it is renounced, the theory itself cannot survive. Yet Popper and Hempel
have offered almost as little argument for it as they have for the deductive
thesis. Hempel has indeed argued that "in no other way than by reference to

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ALAN DONAGAN

empiricallaws [i.e., strictlyuniversalstatements]can the assertionof a causal

connexion between certain events be scientificallysubstantiated"(Hempel
[12], 347n.). Scientificsubstantiation,for Hempel, is a matter of deducing
otherconsequencesof an explanatoryhypothesisthanthat involvedin the explanationitself, andfindingwhetherthose consequencesare verified.Popper's
analysis of this process is admirable;and althoughhe has protestedthat
Hempel would disagreewith him (Popper [20], 374n.), their disagreement,
if it exists, does not bear on the present question.Popper has pointed out
that an explanatoryhypothesisis not "confirmed"by accumulatingfavorable
evidence, but "corroborated"by systematicallyseeking and failing to find
unfavorableevidence.A scientistshould not pronouncea theory to be well
corroborateduntil he has investigatedevery kind of consequence which
mightreasonablybe supposedto falsify it, and found none of them to do so
(Popper[20], 108-11, cf. 81-4).
But can the proposedexplanatoryhypothesis,If Johnshouldtake a quarter
of a pound or more of sugar then soon afterwards he would fall into a coma,

not be scientificallysubstantiated?I do not see why it cannot.Providedthat

you have a remedyfor John's coma, you may corroborateit by repeatedly
dosing him with a quarterof a pound of sugar,while systematicallyvarying
all other conditionsto which his coma might reasonablehave been ascribed.
Hempel thereforeoverstatedhis case in implyingthat non-universalhypothesescannotbe substantiated.If he had been right,Keplercould not have
substantiatedhis hypothesisthat the orbit of Mars is elliptical!Yet his overstatementdoes not invalidatea profoundinsightwhich underlayit.
That insightwas that no naturalscientistcould possibly rest content with
a causalexplanationthat dependedon a well-corroborated
hypothesismerely
about John's sugar eating or Mars's orbit. If John falls into a coma soon
after eating a certain amount of sugar, why do not Tom, Dick or Harry?
If Tom, Dick, and Harrydo not, then John'scoma was causednot by eating
sugar per se, but by eating sugar while being in a certain condition as yet
unspecified.Even after a number of individualshave been identifiedwho
fall into coma soon after eating more than a certain amount of sugar, it
wouldbe wrongto say that the coma of a given individualcould be explained
by the fact that he ate that amountof sugarand belongedto that group;for
whetheror not he is a memberof that groupwould be determinedsolely by
his fallinginto a coma soon after eating that amountof sugar.
The singular hypothetical, If John eats a quarter of a pound or more of
sugar, then soon afterwards he will fall into a coma, may be contrasted with
another, If John takes a large dose of arsenic, then soon afterwards he will
have burning pains in the throat. The latter is true of all men, unless they

have taken Mithridaticprecautions.It is merely a special case of the universal hypothetical, If x is a man in normal condition, and x takes a large
dose of arsenic, then soon afterwards x will have burning pains in the throat.

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13

Only when a singular hypothetical is presented as a special case of a universal

hypothetical is it accepted by natural scientists as explanatory. Only after
they had advanced from identifying individuals who fall into a coma after
eating sugar, to specifying the condition because of which they do so (i.e.,
being diabetic - suffering from a malfunctioning pancreas), would medical
scientists claim to explain why those individuals on certain occasions fall
into coma.
All acknowledged scientific laws the customary formulations of which include individual names, e.g., the laws of planetary and terrestrial motion,
resemble If John should take a large dose of arsenic, then soon afterwards
he will have burning pains in the throat rather than If John should eat a
quarter of a pound or more of sugar, then he will fall into a coma. That is,
they are put forward as special cases of laws that apply to all individuals of
the same kind as those named, and not solely to the individuals mentioned.
The very concept of a law of planetary motion applying to the planets of
our sun, but not to the planets of other suns, is unintelligible. If the orbits
of the planets of our sun were peculiar, then the Keplerian laws which describe them would be, not laws of planetary motion, but generalizations
about the motion of planets which, like those of our sun, have some as yet
unspecified peculiarity. They would resemble generalizations like tide tables,
which refer to individual regions of the earth's surface. Far from being laws,
such generalizations merely state local regularities which are explained by
bringing them under laws.
Putative psychological laws about a single named individual, or putative
sociological laws about a single named society, can no more be genuine laws
than can planetary "laws" about a single named solar system.
Hence the true objection to recognizing as covering laws generalizations
which apply only to named individuals is not that such generalizations cannot be scientifically substantiated. They can be. It is that scientists require
an explanation to exhibit a connection between the initial conditions and the
event to be explained, which generalizations applying only to named individuals cannot exhibit. The connection between John's taking arsenic and
John's having a pain in the throat is that John is a man; that between being
Mars and following an elliptical orbit is that Mars is a planet. It is because
such connections can only be expressed by strictly universal statements, that
the Popper-Hempel theory cannot recognize as a possible covering law any
statement which is not strictly universal.
It might be objected that my argument has been purely verbal: that I have,
with many a flourish, withheld the name "explanation" from any attempt to
connect an event with certain initial conditions by way of a generalization
that is not strictly universal. But does it violate correct usage to claim to
have explained John's coma by referring to the fact that he has eaten sugar,
even though I have said only that John, unlike others, regularly falls into a

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ALAN DONAGAN

coma after eating more than a certain amount of sugar? Here I confess that
I do not think that correct usage, whether of scientists or plain men, matters
a jot. The two kinds of thing which it is proposed to call "causal explanations" are different. It does not matter which you say: whether that an
alleged science which cannot provide explanations involving strictly universal
laws cannot explain anything; or merely that the explanations it can provide
are of a fundamentally inferior kind. The point of the Popper-Hempel theory
is that there is a difference between the two alleged kinds of explanation,
and that it is important.

? 7. Historical Explanations do not Satisfy the Covering Law Thesis

The most striking fact about the Popper-Hempel theory is that few of the
innumerable historical explanations found in the writings of historians even
appear to accord with it. The reason why they do not is that few of them
are put forward as resting on covering laws, whether explicit or implicit. Of
the few that are so put forward, I shall argue that the putative covering laws
they contain are either spurious or untrue. In short, if the covering law thesis
be true, then no historian has yet succeeded in providing a genuine historical
explanation.
Hempel's grimly candid appraisal of "many explanations offered in history
or sociology" goes far to acknowledge this. He does, it is true, mention one
historical explanation (from Donald W. McConnell's Economic Behavior)
in which the three universal hypotheses underlying it are explicitly stated.
They are:
People who have jobs do not like to lose them;
Those who are habituatedto certain skills do not welcome change;
Those who have become accustomedto a certain kind of power do not like to relinquishcontrol, but want to develop greaterpower and prestige(Hempel[12], 349).
However, all three are obviously false. My charwoman would not mind
losing her job in the least; after becoming habituated to loading a fruitgrading machine during a summer vacation, I welcomed returning to study;
and power can disgust as well as corrupt. Although in this case he did not
offer such objections, in others Hempel cautiously conceded their point. "[I]t
would often," he wrote, "be very difficult to formulate the underlying assumptions explicitly with sufficient precision and at the same time in such a
way that they are in agreement with all the relevant empirical evidence
available" (Hempel [12], 349). I should add only: it is always difficult, and
it has never been done.
Hempel, indeed, did suggest that "frequently" historical explanations rest
on laws which are "tacitly taken for granted" because they belong to "individual or social psychology, which somehow is supposed to be familiar to

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everybodythrough his everyday experience"(Hempel [12], 349); and he

addedthat not only the other social sciences, but the naturalsciences, both
physical and biological, might also afford covering laws which historians
might use (Hempel [12], 355-6). Popperhas not only made similarclaims,
but has offered examples (Popper [22], 62-3, 143-7), as have Professors
Rescherand Joynt, in controversywith me (Rescherand Joynt [24], 386-7).
Since I cannot possibly examine every example which might be given, I
shall choose a few which are representative.
(i) Examples with laws from the natural sciences. Popper has offered

this: "If we say that the cause of the death of GiordanoBruno was being
burntat the stake,we do not need to mentionthe universallaw that all living
things die when exposed to intense heat" (Popper [22], 145). Here, indeed,
is an explanationwhich rests on a law from naturalscience;but it is not an
historical explanation,because Bruno's death, as such, was not an event
involvinghuman action. You cannot in such a way explain why Giordano
Bruno was sent to the stake, or why he defied his persecutors.A similar
point may be made about all explanationswhich employ laws from the
naturalsciences.
(ii) Examples with commonplaces as laws. Two apparentlynon-physical
examplesof commonplaceswhich historiansoccasionallyecho are Popper's,
"You cannot, without increasingproductivity,raise the real income of the
workingpopulation",and Acton's "Powertends to corrupt"(Popper [23],
282; [22], 62).
The formeris simplyfalse, as ancientRome showed by living on tribute;
but if you modify it to, "If the real income of the workingpopulationis to
be raised, assumingfull employment,that no new naturalresourcesare discovered,and that income cannotbe obtainedfrom outside, e.g., by begging,
borrowing,or stealing,then productivitymust be increased",you reduce it
to an applicationof the law of the conservationof energy.As such, it is not
about historicalevents, but about their physical conditions.Historianstake
accountof the physicallimitationsupon humanactions;but explainingthose
actionsis anotherthing. As for Acton's law, it also conflictswith numerous
examples(e.g., that of the Antonineemperorsin Rome) unless you transform
it into the analyticstatement."Poweroffers temptations(and opportunities)
which weaknessdoes not", which is not what Acton meant.
Generallyspeaking,the commonplaceswhich are commonlymistakenfor
laws turn out to fall into one of three classes:applicationsof laws of natural
science, whether physical or biological; analytic statements;or universal
statementswhich are either evidently false or evidently uncorroborated.
Those belongingto the second and thirdclasses cannotsupportany scientific
causal explanationat all; and those belongingto the first cannot support
those with which historiansare specificallyconcerned.

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ALAN DONAGAN

(iii) Examples with alleged laws from the social sciences. In The Poverty

of HistoricismPopper produceda whole page of alleged "sociologicallaws

or hypotheses"in orderto refuteMorrisR. Cohen'sdoubtwhethersuch laws
have been found (Popper[22], 62n.). In the same spirit,Rescher and Joynt
compiled a similarlist (Rescher and Joynt [24], 386-7). All three, I make
bold to say, have missed the point. For Popper conceded that "Nothingis
here assumedaboutthe strengthof the availableevidencein favour of these
hypotheseswhose formulationscertainlyleave much room for improvement"
(Popper [22], 63); and Rescher and Joynt conceded that "the case [they
were] endeavouringto make does not dependon whetherthe laws that have
been cited are correctlyenunciatedor wholly consonantwith currentevidence" (Rescher and Joynt [24], 387). In view of admissionsso sweeping
what need I say? If either Popperor Rescher and Joynt had known of even
one "correctlyenunciated"sociologicallaw that was "whollyconsonantwith
current evidence", I cannot believe that they would have refrainedfrom
statingit. I infer that they knew of no such law. Of the examplesthey have
given, I do not believe that any are scientificallywell corroborated;nor do
I believe that any are true, except those which are not strictlyuniversal,or
are covert applicationsof laws of naturalscience, or covert analytic statements.
For our purposes, it is unnecessaryto examine alleged statistical laws
whichhistoriansmightuse. As we have seen, statisticallaws cannot as a rule
be used to explainwhy individualevents occurred.Hence, even thoughthere
are statisticallaws which satisfy Popper'sdefinitionof a universallaw, they
have no place in historicalexplanations.Statisticalgeneralizationsapplying
to populationsdesignatedby individualnames or their equivalents,which
are excludedby both Popper'sand Hempel's definitionsof a coveringlaw,
are obviously irrelevant.For that reason, I shall not consider Professor
Nagel's extremelyinterestinganalysis of the use of such generalizationsin
sociology (Nagel [19], 503-20).
Professor Mandelbaum'selucidationsof the covering law thesis do not
affect these conclusions. It is true that, if any historical explanationsin
historyshould satisfythe coveringlaw thesis, they would not rest on simple
Humeanlaws directlyconnectingevents of the same kind as the initial conditionswith events of the same kind as the event to be explained.As in the
natural sciences, one would expect to find that the laws employed would
applyonly to factorsfound in the events explained;that an individualevent
to be explainedwould be analysedinto a numberof factors; and that the
occurrenceof one or more of those factors would be deducedfrom factors
in the initial conditions,in all probabilityby invokingseverallaws (Mandelbaum [18], 236-8, 241-2). Far from underminingmy conclusionthat historianshave providedno explanationswhich satisfy the coveringlaw thesis,
Mandelbaum'sanalysissupportsit. For in none of the examplesproduced

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by advocates of the Popper-Hempeltheory is an event explained by resolving it into its factors, eliciting those which are relevant, and deducing
their occurrence, according to well-corroboratedand exactly formulated
laws, from the occurrenceof other relevantfactors in the initial conditions.
By remindingus of what a genuine Popper-Hempelhistoricalexplanation
would be, if it could be got, Mandelbaumhas rubbed in the fact that we
have not got them.
To repeat and conclude: You cannot refute a denial that the sciences
(presumablypsychology and the social sciences) have furnishedhistorians
with coveringlaws which they may use in theirexplanationsby showingthat
there are "lawsor hypotheses".Nobody has ever doubtedthat some sociologists,for example,have propoundedsuch hypotheses.Whathas been doubted
is whetherany of them are true.The existenceof false sociologicalhypotheses
cannotshow that thereare truehistoricalexplanationswhichrest on covering
laws. And until examplesmore convincingthan any I am acquaintedwith
are produced,I shall continueto hold, with ProfessorEvans-Pritchard,that
"One has a right. . . to ask those who assert that the aim of social anthropology is to formulatesociologicallaws similar to the laws formulatedby
naturalscientists to produce formulationswhich resemble what are called
laws in those sciences. Up to the presentnothingeven remotelyresembling
what are called laws in the naturalsciences has been adduced- only rather
naive deterministic,teleological,and pragmaticassertions"(Evans-Pritchard
[11], 57).
? 8. Historical Explanation and the "Logic of the Situation"

The fact that historianshave producedno explanationswhich satisfy it does

not, by itself, refute the coveringlaw thesis. It may be that historianshave
not yet producedany explanationsat all, but that, should they ever produce
them, they will rest on coveringlaws. This is impliedby Hempel'ssuggestion
that what "explanatoryanalysesof historicalevents offer is . . . in most cases
not an explanation... but somethingthat might be called an explanation
sketch" (Hempel [12], 351). In its applicationto historical explanation,
however,the coveringlaw thesis would be virtuallydemolished,if it could
be shownthathistorianshave scientificallyestablishedan abundanceof causal
explanationswhich do not rest on coveringlaws. And it is not difficultto
show it.
In a remarkablepassage, Popper has drawnattentionto the kind of explanationhistoriansoften succeedin establishing,and has largelyanticipated
the analysisof it that I propose to defend. "Ouractions",he wrote, "are to
a very large extent explicablein terms of the situationin which they occur"
(Popper[21], II, 97). To a large extent, but not wholly. As Popper added,

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"Theyare never fully explicablein terms of the situationalone; an explanation of the way in which a man, when crossing a street, dodges the cars
which move on it may go beyondthe situation,and may referto his motives,
to an "instinct"of self-preservation,or to his wish to avoid pain, etc. But
this psychologicalpart of the explanationis very often trivial, as compared
with the detaileddeterminationof his action by what we may call the logic
of the situation. . ." (Popper [21], II, 97).

I agree with Popper that, fundamentally,historicalexplanationsare explanationsby "the logic of the situation";and I offer only three objections
to his accountof them. First, what a man does dependson the situationas
he thinks it to be, ratherthan the situation as it is. Secondly, while what
Popper calls "the psychologicalpart" of such explanationsis very often
"trivial"in the sense of "obvious",it is not "trivial"in the sense of "unimportant".The informationthat a man in traffic seeks to avoid injuryand
not to commitsuicideis indispensable,even if it is often obvious,in explaining
the way he moves. Thirdly,Popper has neglectedto draw attentionto the
fact that what he calls "thepsychologicalpart"of such explanationscontains
no coveringlaw. He has indeed pointed out that "the method of applyinga
situationallogic ... is not based on any psychologicalassumptionconcerning
the rationality(or otherwise)of 'humannature'" (Popper[21], II, 97). That
is true, but insufficient.Whatis more importantis that it is not based on any
universalhypothesiswhatever.The informationthat this man seeks to avoid
injury, or that man to commit suicide, or yet another to sustain a minor
injuryin orderto obtain damages,is in no case a universalhypothesis.
Althoughhistoriansare not, as such, committedto any particularview of
human action, they practise a methodologicalscepticism which resembles
the scepticismof traditionalWesternmorality.The coveringlaw thesis implies that the intentionsascribedto historicalagentsin what Poppercalls the
"psychologicalpart" of historicalexplanationscan themselvesbe explained
by deducingtheir occurrence,accordingto universallaws, from the previous
states and circumstancesof those agents. Historiansdo not, indeed, deny
that an agent's intentionscan often be explained, by derivingthem from
some more general intention or intentionshe has and his estimate of his
situation.But such derivationscome to an end: for every agent, at a given
juncture,there are ultimateintentions,ultimateperceptualjudgements,and
ultimateinferences,which rest on nothingfurther.The coveringlaw thesis
implies that even such ultimates are in principle explicable accordingto
coveringlaws, whetherpsychologicalor sociological,or perhapseven, with
the aid of undiscoveredcompositionlaws, neuro-physiological.
Neither historiansnor philosophersof history are in a position to deny a
priori the possibility of such explanations.But most historianswould be
scepticalof a profferedexplanationin which it was assumedthat all agents
of the same psychologicaltype, or in the same sociologicalposition, when

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confrontedwith a situationof the same kind, will act in a certainkind of

way. They have encounteredtoo many cases in which a man hates somebody, but refrainsfrom injuringhim, or in which a man whose habits are
thoroughlydishonestdespite temptationkeeps his word. Althoughsuch examples are crude, competenthistorianswould suspect more refined ones
every bit as much: they would not easily be persuadedthat a certainfactor
in an agent'spsychologicaltype or sociologicalposition,taken togetherwith
certainfactorsin his situation,must give rise to certainfactorsin his response
to that situation. They take account of the possibility that, in the same
situation,a man may act differentlyfrom other men of the same emotional
dispositions,habits, character,psychologicaltype, or sociological situation
or status;and that he himselfmay act differentlyat differenttimes.
This methodologicalscepticismmay be formulatedas what I shall call
"the presuppositionof individualchoice". This presuppositionis negative.
It states simply that, in a situationof a given kind, a man's intentionsmust
not be assumedto be the same as those of any other man, whatevertheir
psychologicalor sociologicalsimilarities;or the same as his own intensions
in other situationsof the same kind. Hence it impliesthat what Popper calls
the "psychologicalpart"of an historicalexplanationwill be restrictedin two
ways: it will assert nothing about anybody except the individualhistorical
agentsconcerned;and it will not necessarilyimply that those agentshad the
same intentionsat any othertime. Yet, it does not imply that individualsare
unique.Historianspresupposeneitherthat individualsof a certain kind act
alike nor that they do not, but only that it is possiblethat they do not.
By affirmingthis possibility historians allow that the traditionalmoral
doctrinemay be true that a man ultimatelyhas an unconditionalpower to
choose how he will act. Thereis, of course,much in any man that he cannot
alter. In large measure,his emotionaldispositionsare no more a matterof
choice than the kind of body he has. Nor can habitsonce formedbe changed
except by vigilanteffort. The moraltraditionholds that a man is responsible,
not for everythingin his characteror inclinations,but for whathe does:hence
it denies that his characterand inclinationsfinally determinewhat in given
circumstanceshe will do. Accordingto it, a man simplychooses the ultimate
principleson whichhe will act, and he may choose them eitherin accordance
with or againsthis own inclinations,eitherreasonablyor unreasonably.Most
choices are explicable, because they are conditionedby prior choices; out
the only explanationof a man's ultimatechoice of principleis: that is how
he chose.3While historiansdo not as such affirmthis traditionaldoctrineof
free will, they proceed as though it could be true. They accept it methodologically, althoughthey may reject it philosophically.
Are historicalexplanationswhich accord with the presuppositionof in3 I have examined the purely philosophical grounds for this position elsewhere. See
Donagan [7], 289-97.

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dividual choice scientifically acceptable? To be so, we have argued that they

must satisfy the deductive thesis and the two conditions which underlie the
covering law thesis, viz. that they must admit of scientific corroboration, and
that they must exhibit a connection between the initial conditions and the
event to be explained.
It is not difficult to show that historical explanations satisfy the deductive
thesis. Suppose an historian explains Brutus's decision to join Cassius's conspiracy by saying that Brutus had resolved to preserve the Republic at all
costs, and judged that the logic of his situation was that only by his joining
Cassius could the Republic be preserved. Those who object that this involves
the law, All men who resolve to achieve a certain end at all costs, and who
judge that only by doing a certain act can it be achieved, will do that act,
forget that laws must be empirically falsifiable. What they allege to be a law
is in fact an analytic truth; for if a man has refrained from a certain act
which he judges to be necessary to a certain end, it immediately follows that,
when he refrained, he was not resolved to achieve that end at all costs. He
might once have been so resolved, and have lost his resolution: but that is
something else. Hence the statement that Brutus was resolved at all costs to
preserve the Republic immediately entails the singular hypothetical: If Brutus
judged that to preserve the Republic it was necessary to perform a certain
act, he would perform that act. From this hypothetical, together with the
statement of initial conditions, Brutus judged that to preserve the Republic it
would be necessary to join Cassius's conspiracy, you can deduce the explanandum, that Brutus joined Cassius's conspiracy.
For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen an example in which it is not
necessary to reconstruct the agent's inference from his intention and his
appreciation of his situation. An agent who, given his intention to achieve a
certain end and his judgement that a certain act is necessary if he is to carry
out his intention, fails to infer that he must carry out that act, could hardly
be said to be capable of forming an intention to achieve an end. In more
complex cases, however, it is necessary to reconstruct the agent's actual
process of inference, as well as his intentions and his appreciation of his
situation. (See Collingwood [4], 290-5; and Donagan [7], 193-4.)
Can statements about historical agents' intentions, appreciations of their
situation, and processes of inference be scientifically corroborated? Since all
are statements about what certain individuals thought at certain dates, if it
can be shown that statements about agents' intentions can be corroborated,
there is no reason to doubt that statements about their appreciations of their
situation and processes of inference can be also.
The only way in which an hypothesis about an historical agent's intention
can be corroborated is to deduce falsifiable statements from it, and to investigate whether they are, in fact, falsified. One such statement, the explanandum, is known; are there others? In our example, from the statement

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that Brutus was resolved to preserve the Republic at all costs it follows, not
only that he would decide to join Cassius' conspiracy if he judged that only
by his doing so could the Republic be preserved, but also that if he believed
that to preserve the Republic it was necessary to murder Antonius, then he
would agree to murder Antonius. Since there is evidence that he did not
agree to murder Antonius, if you could show that he believed that to preserve
the Republic it was necessary to murder Antonius, you would falsify the
explanation of why he joined Cassius.4 Since you cannot show this, and can
present some evidence against it, the result of your attempt to falsify the
explanation would have been to corroborate it.
Dray has offered an interesting objection to this conception of the corroboration of historical explanations.5 If the presupposition of individual
choice is true, then an agent's intentions at one time do not determine his
intentions at another. It therefore appears to follow that Brutus's refusal to
murder Antonius could not be cited as falsifying an hypothesis about his
intention in joining Cassius's conspiracy, unless both events were simultaneous; for he could have changed his intention in the interval between them.
This appearance is delusive.
Suppose that you could show that Brutus believed that to save the Republic it was necessary to murder Antonius, then his refusal to sanction
Antonius' murder would falsify the hypothesis that, at that time, he intended
to save the Republic at all costs. The original hypothesis, that his intention
on joining Cassius's conspiracy was to save the Republic at all costs, might
indeed be rescued by supposing that Brutus changed his intention after joining the conspiracy. No competent historian, however, would protect his
hypothesis by such a device, unless he were unable to hit upon some other
hypothesis about Brutus's intentions which was consistent both with his
joining the conspiracy and with his refusing to sanction Antonius' murder.
The reason for this has been clearly explained by Popper. The hypothesis
that an historical agent held to a certain intention throughout a certain interval is more highly falsifiable than the hypothesis that during that interval
he changed his intention, which divides into two hypotheses, each about his
I It is importantthat such deductions be strict. In an earlier paper (Donagan [6], 432-3)
I occasioned some confusion by assertingthat, from the fact that the Danish invaders of
Saxon England were plunderers, it could be deduced that their literature and religion
(if any) would glorify war. I meant that this could be rigorously deduced from the
statement that they were plunderers, together with other statements about them which
there is reason to accept. However, I did not work out such a deduction; and I now
doubt whether there are any plausible premises from which it could be done which
would not render the premise that they were plunderers superfluous. Perceiving this,
Brodbeck boldly but wrongly concluded that I intended to embrace a context theory of
meaning, according to which having a certain kind of literature and religion was part
of the meaning of 'plunderer'(Brodbeck [3], 270-1). I have never held such a theory;
but I did make bad use of a bad example.
5 In one of his papers at Indiana.

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ALAN DONAGAN

intentionduringa part of that interval.For the former,potentialfalsifying

may be sought throughoutthe whole interval;but for the latter, falsifying
evidencemay be soughtfor each of its constituenthypothesesin only part of
that interval.As Popper maintains,good scientistsobservethe rule that no
auxiliaryhypothesisis acceptablewhich diminishesthe degreeof falsifiability
of the theory in question(Popper[20], 82-3). The auxiliaryhypothesisof a
change of mind necessarilyreduces the falsifiabilityof the theory that an
historicalagenthad a certainintention,by restrictingthe intervalfrom which
falsifyingevidence might be drawn.It does not, of course, follow that historiansmay never accept the hypothesisof a changeof mind;but only that
they may not do so when an unfalsifiedtheory is availablewhich does not
requireit. The presuppositionof individualchoice does not imply that all
historicalagentsare fickle.
It is indeed possible that a numberof proposedexplanationsof a given
event, all equally falsifiable,may none of them in fact be falsified. However, this is true of some causalexplanationsin naturalscience as well as of
somehistoricalexplanations.Judgementmustbe suspendedwhenthe evidence
at our disposal does not suffice to show that either of two alternativeand
equallyfalsifiableexplanationsis false. But in manycases a decisionis possible. Like naturalscientists,historiansdo not trouble their heads with every
logically possible hypothesis.When a highly falsifiablehypothesissurvives
an examinationof all the availableevidencethat mightbe supposedto falsify
it, they do not ask whethera less highlyfalsifiableone mightnot also survive
testing.More often than not, in most fields of historicalresearch,historians
discoverenoughevidenceto falsify all equallyhighly falsifiableexplanatory
hypothesesexcept one.
Even if it be grantedthat explanationswhich accordwith the presupposition of individualchoice both satisfy the deductive thesis, and admit of
scientificcorroboration,do they exhibita connectionbetweenthe initial conditions and the event to be explained?
Manifestly,they do not exhibit connectionsof the same kind as those
providedby naturalscience:thatis, such connectionsas are statedin universal
laws. But are such connectionsnecessary?Natural scientists object to the
allegedconnectionsprovidedby singularhypotheticalslike, If John eats more
thana quarterof a poundof sugarthenJohn soon after falls into a coma, on
the groundthat they are true in virtueof some undisclosedspecial condition
of the individualsthey are about. The same objectionmight be made if an
historianwere to offer the singularhypothetical,If Brutus judged that to
preservethe Republic it was necessaryto performa certain act, he would
performthat act, as sufficientby itself to connectthe initialcondition,Brutus
judgedthat to preservethe Republicit would be necessaryto join Cassius's
conspiracy,with the event to be explained,that Brutusjoined Cassius'sconspiracy.But no historianwould claim that by itself that hypotheticalwould

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suffice. It is advancedas an immediatecorollaryof a statementabout Brutus's intention:that he was resolvedto save the Republic at all costs. Only
because he accepts that statementdoes an historiango on to assertor presupposethe singularhypotheticalwhichis the logical link betweenthe initial
conditionand the event to be explained.
Anybody who denies that historicalexplanationsexhibit connectionsbetween initial conditionsand the events to be explainedmust deny that statements aboutagents'intentionsexhibitsuch connections.That denialcould be
justifiedonly by invokingsome naturalistor materialistmetaphysicaldoctrine, accordingto which deciding, intending, and other mental acts are
somehow reducibleto "natural"events, which are in principle explicable
accordingto the laws of the naturalsciences.While I believe that such doctrinescan be refuted(Donagan[7], 289-97), for the presentit is enoughthat
historiansin practicerejectthem.

? 9. "Rational Explanation": a Criticism by Hempel

In his Laws and Explanations in History, and in subsequentpapers,Profes-

sor Dray had proposeda theory of historicalexplanationin which the connectionbetweenthe initialconditionsand the act to be explainedis provided
by a statementthat that act was the (rational)thing to do in those circumstances(Dray [8], 131-7; [10], 108-10). My debt to Dray is so large that to
dwell on our differenceswould be as ungratefulas it is distasteful.However,
some clarificationis needed.
An historian achieves the understandinghe seeks, accordingto Dray,
"when[he] can see the reasonablenessof a man'sdoing what this agentdid,
given the beliefs and purposesreferredto; his action can then be explained
as havingbeen an 'appropriate'one" (Dray [10], 108). Hempelhas objected
that this is not enough.Even if it be concededthat it wouldbe reasonableto
do what the agentdid, given that he had certainbeliefs and purposes,it does
not follow that the agent acted reasonably.He may have done what he did
as a result of thinkingwhich was slipshod or even logically absurd (cf.
Scriven [27], 349-50). Hence Hempel has arguedthat a Dravian "rational
explanation"requiresa furtherassumption:that the agentwas rationalwhen
he acted (Hempel [14], 12).
If Hempel is right, the full schema of a Dravian rational explanation
would be:
A was in a situationof type C
A was a rationalagent
In a situationof type C a rationalagentwill do x
Therefore,A did x (Hempel[14], 12).
There are two strongobjectionsto this schema.First, as Hempelhas shown,

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there is no criterionof rationalitywhich uniquelysingles out one course of

action as "the thing to do" (Hempel [14], 10, 12). Secondly, there is no
reasonto believe that all historicalagents are rational,in any of the several
senses of "rational"which Hempelhas explored.
It should be recalledthat Popperinsistedthat "the methodof applyinga
situationallogic ... is not based on any psychologicalassumptionconcerning
the rationality(or otherwise)of 'humannature'" (Popper[21], II, 97). Nor
is the simple exampleof an historicalexplanationgiven in ? 8 above based
on such an assumption.The schemaof that explanationwouldbe as follows:
A was resolvedto achievethe end E at all costs
A judgedhis situationto be C
A judgedthat E could only be achievedin C if he did x
Therefore,A did x.
This does not presupposethat either A's resolutionor his judgementswere
"rational";for it does not evaluateA's thoughtsin any way at all. Considering what humanhistoryhas been, an historianwould be in a prettypass if
he were obliged to assumethat the only actions he may succeed in understandingwere rational.They must, indeed, be intelligible;but that is another thing.

? 10. ConcludingRemarks
Those who voice such views as are developedin this essay expect to be put
down as hostile to the advanceof the social sciences,if not to naturalscience
itself. ProfessorMandelbaumhas named us "reactionists",to signify that,
althoughnot idealists,we have reactedagainstPopper and Hempel; and he
has creditedus with assuming"that a properanalysisof historicalexplanation must conform to the statementswhich historians actually make...
(Mandelbaum[18], 229). He has even traced our lineage to "that newer
branchof analyticphilosophywhich may be called ordinary-usageanalysis",
which he distinguishesfrom "the science-orientedform of analysiswhich the
covering-lawtheoristsrepresented"(loc. cit., 230).
To oppose "ordinary-usageanalysis",which, if anything, is a method
of analysis,to "science-oriented"
analysis,which is the analysisof a certain
subject-matter,is a mistake.Nor do I think that Dray, any more than myself, holds that a properanalysisof historicalexplanationmust "conformto
the statementswhich historians actually make" in the sense of assuming
that historians always say exactly what they mean. The difference between the reactionistsand at least some advocatesof the coveringlaw thesis
is not that the latter are "science-oriented"
and the formernot, but that the
former respect the scientific status of historiographyas it is, whereas the
latter are so preoccupiedwith naturalscience that they will not acknowledge

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historiography to be scientific unless they first assimilate it to natural history.

Bartley, himself severe in his interpretations of those he criticizes, has
complained that criticisms of the Popper-Hempel theory "have seemed to
grow more barbed almost every quarter" (Bartley [I], 15). Now I hope that
my criticisms of the Popper-Hempel theory are not offensive, because I accept
so much of it, and owe so much to the work of both its authors. There are
only two matters on which my feelings are so strongly aroused that my
remarks may unwittingly have become barbed. The first is the belief that
common-sense and the social sciences do in fact provide historians with
laws they can employ in historical explanations. With all respect to the very
able men who hold that belief, I must confess that it seems to me an infatuation. The second is the advocacy, by those who hold the covering law
thesis, of the conception of the social sciences as "theoretical sciences" in
Popper's sense. Since to strive for the unattainable is in itself neither ignoble
nor harmful, I would prohibit no man from trying to construct such a theoretical sociology. But it is harmful to overlook the fundamental identity of
the social sciences with history, and to mutilate research into human affairs
by remodelling the social sciences into deformed likenesses of physics.
Indiana University
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1. W. W. Bartley III, 'Achilles, the Tortoise, and Explanation in Science and
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'Deductive-Nomologicalvs. Statistical Explanation',in H. Feigl and
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(Minneapolis, 1962).

26

ALAN DONAGAN

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The Open Society and its Enemies (3rd ed. London, 1957).
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