Journal of Contemporary European Studies

ISSN: 1478-2804 (Print) 1478-2790 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjea20

Strategic democratisation? A guide to

understanding AKP in power
Isabel David
To cite this article: Isabel David (2016): Strategic democratisation? A guide to
understanding AKP in power, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, DOI:
10.1080/14782804.2016.1235555
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2016.1235555

Published online: 29 Sep 2016.

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Date: 29 September 2016, At: 14:21

Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2016

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2016.1235555

Strategic democratisation? A guide to understanding AKP in

power
Isabel David
School of Social and Political Sciences, Universidade de Lisboa (University of Lisbon), Lisbon, Portugal

ABSTRACT

Turkeys recent drift towards authoritarianism has taken many by

surprise. Once hailed as a democratic model for the Middle East, the
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, AKP) has
increasingly islamised Turkish society, jailed journalists, monopolised
the judicial power and taken over the state apparatus. This article
discusses the partys behaviour, contending that Turkeys prospects
for democratisation are totally dependent on AKPs choices as the
dominant actor in Turkish politics and society. Using a theoretical
framework that combines rational choice institutionalism and the
role of elites in democratisation processes, the article argues that
AKPs particular characteristics and the institutional setting that
influences them makes democratisation a seemingly impossible
outcome. Given that EU accession and the necessary domestic
reforms to meet conditionality, namely the Copenhagen criteria,
equate a democratisation process, the main conclusion is that Turkeys
prospects for accession under AKP remain grim for purely domestic
causes.

KEYWORDS

AKP; democratisation; EU
accession; rational choice;
elites

Introduction
Turkey under the AKP was once hailed as model for the Middle East and the Muslim world
for its perceived success in combining liberal democracy and Islam. The AKP emerged in
2001 proclaiming to break with Turkeys party politics, with a programme that included:
democratisation, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, womens rights, the
rule of law, separation of powers, minority rights, market economy, intraparty democracy
and a new constitution. By aligning with the Copenhagen criteria, the AKP aimed at securing
EU accession and thus started to implement its programme in its first five years in office.
These reforms allowed the country to open formal accession negotiations with the EU in
October 2005.
After 2007, however, the pace of democratic reforms gradually subsided, giving way to
new, authoritarian, trends: growing Islamisation (e.g. changes in education (Hrriyet Daily
News 2012), the headscarf issue (see Lauria 2015), legislation on alcohol (Hrriyet Daily News
2011)); occupation of public office by pro-AKP cadres; instrumentalisation of the judiciary
branch; increasing censorship; imprisonment of journalists; personality cult of Recep Tayyip
CONTACT Isabel David

isabel.david@iscsp.ulisboa.pt

2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

I. David

Erdoan; attempts at a presidential system. All trends became evident and culminated in
the violent repression of the 2013 Gezi protests.
Bearing this in mind, the research question underlying this paper is the following: why
has the AKP backpedalled from democratisation? The study tries to answer by testing a
framework which applies Rationalist Institutionalism to the role of elites in democratisation.
An analysis of six hypotheses determines the prospects for democratisation or de-democratisation in Turkey and the impact thereof on EU accession. I argue AKP is the only actor
that can determine the democratisation path: the party has won all elections (legislative,
local and presidential) since 2002, controls the state apparatus and successfully restricted
the military. It is my contention that the AKP was never interested in pursuing democratisation, but rather to consolidate itself as the dominant actor in Turkey, hence its strategic
approach, cherry-picking the aspects of democratisation that best suited that end. As EU
accession and the necessary domestic reforms to meet conditionality equate a democratisation process, Turkeys prospects for accession under the AKP are grim and are thus completely dependent on domestic factors.
This framework is particularly suited to understanding the behaviour of the AKP as the
dominant actor driving democratisation. While everywhere parties compete for state
resources and domination, in a highly polarised, factionalised society like Turkey, there is no
incentive to democratise, as political competition is always a zero-sum game. As an actor
whose main members were defeated by the Kemalist apparatus emerging from the 1982
Constitution (Welfare Party was closed down due to anti-secularist activities, Erdoan was
imprisoned for incitement to religious hatred), it becomes easy to understand why the AKP
enthusiastically accelerated reforms in its first years in office, as EU conditionality allowed
the party to remove the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military from power and establish its
domination.
The article is organised as follows. In the first section, I develop a framework of analysis
that seeks to integrate Rational Choice Institutionalism and elite-led democratisation theories. Next, I discuss each of the six hypotheses forwarded in the theoretical section, analysing
the prospects each pose for Turkeys democratisation. The paper finishes with a summary
of substantive findings, contribution to the debate on Turkish democracy and implications
for future research.

Theoretical framework
This paper sees Rationalist Institutionalism as a valuable analytical tool in understanding
democratisation processes, particularly the role of elites therein. While literature on the role
of elites in democratisation processes is established (see e.g. ODonnell and Schmitter 1986;
DiPalma 1990; Higley and Gunther 1992; Bermeo 1998), analyses combining Rational Choice
Institutionalism and democratisation remain scarce (Colomer 1991, 1995; Przeworski 1991;
Lijphart and Waisman 1996).
Rationalist Institutionalism consists in the analysis of choices made by rational actors
under certain conditions of interdependence (Immergut 1998, 12). Political results are seen
as a function of three elements: the distribution of preferences (interests) among actors, the
distribution of resources (powers) and the constraints imposed by the rules of the game,
which are embedded in institutions (March and Olsen 1989). This logic is based on the
anticipation of consequences: actors behave in a totally instrumental, calculating and

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

strategic manner, so as to maximise the reach of their preferences and interests, using the
available resources. The gains of an actor correspond to the losses of others, in a zero-sum
game.
Turkeys accession to the EU and the reforms necessary to meet conditionality criteria
equate a democratisation process. The Copenhagen criteria constitute the specific translation
of democratic principles which member states must fulfil in order to become members,
specifically: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and the respect and the protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and
the capacity to cope with the pressure emerging from competition and the market forces
within the Union. Thus, commitment to democratisation holds the key to EU accession. This
democratisation process poses challenges to all political actors and affects the distribution
of power. Elites, and their interests and values in particular, play a crucial role. Elites can be
either the guarantors or the destroyers of democracy. This depends on the institutions they
create and on their respect for the democratic rules of the game.
Under a rational choice framework and under conditions of uncertainty associated with
the transition process and democracy itself, elites will only commit to democratisation if it
maximises their and their allies power. As Hinnebusch (2006, 387) argues, as rational actors,
elites will democratise if they anticipate that their vital interests will survive or will improve
or if the costs and risks of democratisation are lower than those of continued repression. As
such, elites do not necessarily need to be committed democrats to initiate democratisation
(Przeworski 1991). For the purposes of this paper, the term elite is restricted to the AKP.
In this context, the role of institutions is of paramount importance. Institutions change
the distribution of interests, resources and rules, creating new actors and identities: by dictating the criteria of success and failure, by constructing rules of appropriate behaviour and
by granting some actors and not others authority and other resources. Changes in institutions thus affect the distribution of power. The type, characteristics and nature of extant
institutions at the time of democratic transition influences the behaviour of actors driving
democratisation. As ODonnell (1996) contends, the elites commitment to the common
good and to democratic values is, to a large extent, contingent on the nature of existing
institutional arrangements. In the cases where these institutional arrangements are nonexistent or ineffective, there is wide scope for abusing office. On the other hand, these considerations will also influence the process of creating new institutions that will fit the democratic
nature of the new regime. In many cases, institutions will be created solely according to the
gains they provide to the actors driving democratisation processes.
In fact, democratisation and democracy present menaces/constraints to the power of
elites: by creating multiple actors (parties, economic agents, social movements, media) or
by giving voice to mute actors (e.g. minorities), by creating mechanisms of checks and balances, by rendering election results uncertain (particularly in crisis periods), by opening
multiple channels of access to the system, by avoiding concentration of power, by making
institutional change more difficult (e.g. constitutional changes), by imposing negotiation,
by reducing the possibility of the use of violence in order to impose ones view. All these
conditions imply more costs/resources (e.g. time, money) to secure ones power. In view of
these hindrances, signals of incomplete or ineffective processes of democratisation on the
part of elites reluctant to abdicate of their dominant position may include fraud, gerrymandering, nepotism, clientelism, patronage and violence as a last resort.
In view of these considerations, this paper presents a number of hypotheses to be tested:

I. David

(1)External actors and incentives (like the EU) play an important role in democratisation processes
Europeanisation has been coterminous with democratisation, particularly when applied
to Southern and Central European transitions, where accession helped stabilise newly formed
democracies. Keeping Europeanisation on track works best, according to Jacoby (2006),
when the EU is able to find a group or groups with which it can work and particularly helping
insider minority groups gain influence.
(2)If there is a dominant party, incentive for democratisation will be weaker
As Linz and Stepan (1996, 3) argue, democratisation requires open contestation over the
right to win control of the government. This, in turn, requires free competitive elections.
Political party competition and alternation, as Dolenec (2008) discovered when studying
transitions in Central Europe, played a vital role in securing democratisation. Dominant parties, under the framework of rationalist institutionalism, will not have an incentive to democratise, since power holders have access to more political, economic and state resources. This
was confirmed by Hellman (1998), who showed that opposition to liberalisation in post-communist states did not come from the transition losers but rather from the initial winners who
had gained from early reforms.
(3)If the democratisation process brings the emergence of adversary forces, incentive
will be lower
The emergence of new movements and forces inherent in democratisation processes can
always shift the regime-opposition balance. Well-known examples are Czechoslovakias Civic
Forum, which provided a unifying platform for student movements, trades unions and other
civic organisations opposing the communist regime, or the Argentinean Madres de la Plaza
de Mayo, whose fight to bring truth and justice for their disappeared leftist children helped
bring an end to the military dictatorship (19761983). Referring to the importance of civil
society, Linz and Stepan (1996, 9) remind us how these organisations can generate political
alternatives and monitor government activity. A rational actor will thus assess the costs and
benefits of engaging in democratisation in terms of the emergence of these forces.
(4)If there are strong cleavages (ethnic, social, political), democratisation will be harder
A fundamental condition for democratisation is agreement on what constitutes the common good and how to attain it. Deep disagreements over state structure, electoral systems,
form of government, territorial boundaries and citizenship issues make this agreement
extremely difficult (Linz and Stepan 1996, 4, 1687). While acknowledging that the existence
of a nation state does not necessarily generate democratisation or democracy, the authors
(ibid.) nonetheless argue that majoritarian groups craft structures, rules and policies according to their own needs and characteristics, thus neglecting minority views.
(5)Extant institutions at the time of democratic transition influence the behaviour of
elites driving the democratisation process
The issue of the usability of the previous bureaucracy and institutions by the new democratic regime is specifically mentioned by Linz and Stepan (1996, 11). Not only do the type
and characteristics of extant institutions at the time of democratic transition influence the
behaviour of actors driving democratisation, but also rational elites may consciously choose
to use those institutions for their own ends, particularly if they suit the elites goals.

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

(6)The personal beliefs of elites and their commitment to democratic values play a
fundamental role
Elites organised in political parties are ultimately the referees in political life by controlling
decision-making institutions. Different elites have different values, which, in turn, are translated into multiple courses of action. There are elites who are more sympathetic to democracy
than others, a condition which influences the democratisation path. This is argued by
Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel (2006), according to whom democratic consolidation
only occurs when the liberal elements of the political party system occupy the majority of
domestic political space.
These hypotheses are not ideal types in the Weberian sense; borders among them are
porous. This theoretical framework is useful for understanding why and how elites, as the
main actors driving democratisation, rationally conceive their opportunity structures and
how institutions constrain their options.

AKPs strategic approach to democratisation: an analysis

Explaining support for democratisation: EU conditionality unlocks the keys of
power
The AKPs initial commitment to EU accession provides perhaps the most interesting case
of the partys rational choice-driven/strategic democratisation: reforms aiming at complying
with the Copenhagen criteria directly targeted the very heart of Kemalist power (namely
the military, the judiciary, the Constitution/legal system and the Presidency) and were instrumental in securing the AKPs supremacy.
Civilianisation of politics was the most important gain. The military were the pillar of the
Kemalist establishment, seeing themselves as the protectors of the Republic and the
Constitution as stated in article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law. This
spirit led the military to stage coups dtats in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. This role was constitutionalised after the 1960 coup, with the creation of the National Security Council
(MilliGvenlik Kurulu MGK). As a response to EU conditionality, Turkish governments and
particularly the AKP enacted a series of reforms. One of them is the possibility of judicial
action against the military for offences committed in the course of their duties, thus
eliminating incentive for coups. The MGK became a merely consultative organ dependent
on political power. The military lost their prerogative to name a member of the Supervisory
Council on cinema, video and music, of the Council of Higher Education (YK), of the High
Audio Visual Board (RTK) and of the Council on the Protection of Minors. Military courts
have ceased to have jurisdiction in crimes committed by civilians in peace times. Armed
Forces property, budget, extra-budgetary resources and expenditures are now subject to
state auditing. From 2010, the decisions of the Supreme Military Council (YA) regarding the
firing of military personnel are subjected to civilian judicial review. Those who were fired are
allowed to retire with full benefits or get a job at a state institution (cf. Secretariat General
for EU Affairs 2007; European Commission 19982011).
Another fundamental reform that ensured the survival of the AKP concerns political party
legislation. The European Commission (19982014) and the Council of the European Union
(2001, 2003, 2006, 2008) have insisted Turkey align its legislation with EU countries practice,
particularly the provisions on party closure and banishment of party members from political

I. David

activities (European Commission 2009). Turkeys legislation on political parties was a legacy
of the 1980 coup. It allowed for the dissolution of a political party if it violated the independence of the State, its indivisibility, human rights, equality, the rule of law, sovereignty of the
nation, democracy, secularism, if they attempted to establish a dictatorship (of a class or of
a group) or if they incited citizens to commit a crime. In case of party closure, its members
could not engage in political activities for five years. Under these provisions, 23 political
parties have been banned since 1983. Reforms in response to conditionality allowed for
alternative sanctions to the permanent closure of political parties (such as the total or partial
deprivation of public funds). Restrictions in case of previous conviction for the crime of
incitement to hatred based on class, race, religion, sect or territory were eliminated. Party
closures now need a three-fifths majority in the Constitutional Court. The party at stake may
appeal from the decision (European Commission 19982014). These changes and also EU
pressure were instrumental in securing the AKPs survival in 2008, when a closure case was
presented against the party for violation of the secularism principle.
Domination of the state apparatus by the Kemalists was also based on control of the
administrative machinery. EU conditionality pointed to several problems, including corruption (not least in the recruitment process), favouritism, influence-peddling and, in relation
to this, demanded the end of administrative authorisation to try civil servants and state
officials and the end of pressure on the judiciary during their trials. Another issue in the EU
agenda is the independence of the judiciary. The judicial power was fundamental to the
application of legislation that maintained Kemalist hegemony. The importance of the public
sector extends well beyond. In a country where ca. 30% of registered employment was in
the wider public sector at the time the European Commission started to publish its regular
reports (in 1998), Turkey consistently failed to apply the principle of general prohibition of
discrimination by public authorities. Civil servants were one of the main pillars of Kemalism
(zbudun 2006, 135), with a strict secularist approach and continue to vote for Republican
Peoples Party (CHP). Modern clothing was also mandatory for those working in the audiovisual sector, according to RTK regulations. In response to EU conditionality, Turkey signed
protocol 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits discrimination
by public authorities. The selection method of civil servants was changed in 2002. Control
of the public administration by the AKP has been secured through restructuring, lowering
of the retirement age and legislation (e.g. the Civil Service Law, which changed principles
and procedures for the appointment, promotion, transfer or compulsory retirement of officials, workers and contract personnel employed in public institutions) (European Commission
2011).
For some, the credibility of EU accession began to wane in the mid 2000s, causing the
AKPs slow pace of reforms as early as 2005 (see e.g. Patton 2007; Independent Commission
on Turkey 2009; Narbone and Tocci 2009; Kubicek 2014; Brzel 2016). One of the major
arguments stems from the German Chancellor Angela Merkels and the former French
President Nicolas Sarkozys defence of a privileged partnership for Turkey, instead of full
accession (cf. The Jamestown Foundation 2009). Another point feeding discussion is the
Cyprus issue, which led to the blocking of negotiations on eight chapters since 2006. Further
talks of a Mediterranean Union, which would include Turkey, seemed to convince the AKP
leadership that the EU is seen by its main politicians as a Christian club. Another factor
feeding the discussion of waning EU credibility are the effects of the economic and financial
crisis in Southern and Eastern Europe and Turkeys relatively good economic performance

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

throughout this period. All of these arguments led to a steep decline of Turkish public opinion
support for EU accession.
In my view, these considerations do not sufficiently explain the AKPs lack of commitment
towards reforms. First, culturally based hostile visions of Turkeys accession are not new.
Second, many EU member states and officials support Turkeys accession (cf. The Jamestown
Foundation 2009). In this light, if the AKP continues with significant reforms, there will be
no valid reason for refusing Turkeys accession. Third, the EUs rejection of some of the AKPs
policies in 2004 (e.g. criminalisation of adultery and European Court of Human Rights ruling
supporting the expulsion of Leyla ahin from Istanbul University for wearing the headscarf )
sharpened anti-EU feelings in the party (cf. Hrriyet Daily News 2004; Jenkins 2008, 174, 178).
Fourth, and connected to the previous consideration, EU values differ sharply from the AKPs,
thus posing a challenge to its dominant status.
In light of these and of the considerations that follow in this paper, Turkeys accession has
been stalled solely by the AKPs lack of commitment to democratisation. As we shall see
below, the slow pace of reforms coincides with the AKP securing the presidency in 2007,
whose powers are fundamental for controlling Turkish politics.

The dominant party condition

The AKP has secured victories in all elections (local, legislative and presidential) since 2002,
rendering it the dominant party in Turkish politics (see Ayan Musil 2015). Additionally, the
divisions of the opposition make it impossible to effectively dispute the supremacy of the
party (AKP).
Much has been written on the AKPs electorate a coalition of the pious, Anatolian bourgeoisie, gecekondu settlers, and Muslim intellectuals (see zbudun 2006; arkolu and
Kalaycolu 2007). The continued support of the so-called black Turks cannot be explained
solely as a protest vote against white Turks. Rather, that support has been secured through
a series of practices extensively used by many actors and parties since the Ottoman Empire
(see Mardin 1973), but perfected by the AKP.
The AKPs rule has been dubbed as neoliberal populism (Yldrm 2009): while implementing neoliberal policies, the party provides services to the impoverished population. The
provision of public health, education and transportation has greatly expanded since 2002:
public health insurance coverage leapt from 67.2 to 98% in 2012, primary education from
91 to 99% in 20122013, secondary education enrolment from 51 to 70% and higher education enrolment from 15 to 39% (Dorlach 2015).
The AKP has used a myriad of funds responsible for social assistance programmes. Most
of the resources are spent on in-kind assistance like food and coal and on the Conditional
Cash Transfer Programme, which introduced means-tested social assistance to poor families
on a per-child basis, on condition that children attend regular health check-ups and school
(see Ayta 2014). As Dorlach (2015) argues, the main targets of these policies are the urban
and rural poor, who had been previously left out of the welfare state mechanisms. State
funds now reach 13million Turks (Al Monitor 2016). Another constituency that is generated
by these schemes is the private sector, namely the construction companies eying the development of public transportation and health care and education providers (Dorlach 2015).
Since 2003, the municipalities assumed a greater role in providing social assistance (Eder
2010, 178) in the shape of soup-kitchens, iftar meals during Ramadan and in-kind assistance.

I. David

The returns of these policies are evident if one bears in mind that the countrys three largest
cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) account for one-third of Turkeys voters.
Many of the mechanisms used by the AKP configure the extensive use of patronage and
clientelism. Sayar (2011) describes how the former varies from the distribution of gifts in
election times, particularly in electoral districts where the party performs worse, to personal
appeals for jobs and financial help to President Abdullah Gl. Most importantly, the AKP
heavily relies on charitable religious civil society organisations, voluntary associations and
families for welfare provision (see Coar and Yeenolu 2009; Eder 2010; Bugra and Candas
2011; Bozkurt 2013; Gmen 2014). These practices serve as a palliative for the negative
effects of the AKPs neoliberal policies (poverty, inequality, unemployment) and are seen as
non-transparent and lacking a legal framework. In fact, while they lack the universality and
redistributive justice of the welfare state, there is usually a certain form of conditionality
attached, in the shape of community affiliation and loyalty (Bozkurt 2015). This practice,
initiated under the Welfare Party, mainly involves personal interactions between the women
workers of the AKP and their neighbours, configuring a different type of the traditionally
vertical clientelistic relationships, since they are based on the imece (mutual help) that is
characteristic of Turkish society (Sayar 2011).
What this data reveals is that, as the dominant party, the AKP has little incentive to democratise. The control of state resources and institutions has allowed the party to secure and
reinforce its power. Under a rational choice approach, the AKP is not interested in sharing
these resources with other parties. The extensive use of patronage and clientelism reveal a
lack of commitment towards democracy by vitiating the rules of the game, which should
be anchored on universality and impartiality.

The emergence of adversary forces condition

Democratisation necessarily brings about a multiplication of social, political and economic
actors. In Turkey, two of the major manifestations of a social and political spring are the Gezi
protests and the visibility of the Peoples Democratic Party (Halklarn Demokratik Partisi, HDP).
What started as an encampment protesting the privatisation of one of the few remaining
green spaces in Istanbul soon escalated into the most important mass mobilisation against
AKP rule (see David and Toktam 2015). Police brutality in evicting the few initial protesters
and Prime Minister Erdoans disproportionate reaction and criticism led to a heterogeneous
and unlikely movement composed of feminists, Kurds, Kemalists, nationalists, religious people, Alevis, LGBTI, football fans, who, during the days of occupation, crafted a spirit of union
and tolerance that provided a glimpse of what a future Turkey may look like. For the AKPs
constituency, Gezi was a conspiracy of the Kemalists/secularists and the protesters mere
looters, as the party remained incapable of interiorising how its exclusionary and majoritarian conception of democracy alienates a substantial proportion of the Turkish population.
The movements effective use of social media to mobilise and divulge information on the
protests and main actions only reminded the AKP how independent media can cause severe
damage to the party. Hence the AKPs concerted efforts to shut down social media (Twitter,
Youtube) and journalist outlets through buying, fining or simply taking over independent
actors, e.g. the recent appointment of a board of trustees for the once ally Glenist Zaman
group (Hrriyet Daily News 2016). That these subtler tactics are insufficient to shut down
dissent and avoid its proliferation can be attested by the increasingly frequent use of the

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

coercion instruments of the state. The recent imprisonment of Academics for Peace is an
additional example (Agos 2016).
If some question Gezis ability to transform the fabric of Turkish politics and the inability
of the opposition, particularly the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)
to capitalise on the protests (cf. ni 2014), nonetheless the movement had at least three
very important consequences. First, police violence against protestors and Erdoans justification thereof with the will of the majority (see Toktam 2015, 19, 20) shattered the AKPs
carefully constructed image of a liberal democratic party, particularly in the eyes of foreign
powers, namely the US and the EU. Second, it opened visible cracks among the AKPs support
groups, by shunning away liberals and, specifically, the Glenists, who are now being purged
from the state bureaucracy, particularly the police and the judicial system. Third, the Gezi
spirit decisively contributed to the excellent results of the HDP in the June 2015 elections,
with 13.2% of the votes, the first time a Kurdish party passed the 10% threshold, and to
Selahattin Demirtas 9.76% of the votes in the 2014 presidential elections (Hrriyet Daily
News 2014). The party programme defence of environmentalism, womens rights, minority
rights, participatory democracy (HDP n.d.) embodies the values of tolerance practised at
the park and transcends Kurdish sectarian discourse.
The HDPs rise is also significant in another three aspects. First, it prevented the AKP from
reaching the absolute majority, the first time this happened since 2002. Second, it placed
itself as the most credible opposition to AKP rule. Third, it attracted the votes of the Kurdish
electorate, one of the most important AKP constituencies, many of whom had been alienated
by the implicit AKP support for ISIS aggression in Kobane (see The New Arab 2015).
That (1) Erdoan used Egypts July 2013 coup against Morsi to justify the brutal repression
of Gezi protests (2) that he consistently prevented the parties represented at parliament to
reach a government agreement following the June 2015 elections (The Wall Street Journal
2015) and (3) the seeming end of the Kurdish peace process, sacrificed for an absolute majority in the November 2015 legislative elections, is telling of the AKPs rationalist/strategic
approach to democratisation: in this case, the party is intolerant towards any movement
that can imperil its dominant position.

The existence of cleavages

This hypothesis is closely related to the previous one. Turkish society and politics can be
characterised by Mardins (1973) centre-periphery conceptualisation, in which the periphery
is seen as counterculture. In my view, the main dichotomies are secularists vs. pious and
nationalism vs. minorities, both translated in political party competition. It is the role of
political parties to aggregate and defend values and preferences. Each of these four traits
denounces profound dissimilarities in their views of the state, the common good and the
values that should guide Turkey.
Concerning the first of these dichotomies, while the CHP (with its various recompositions
and denominations following the military coups) has represented and mobilised the secularists (and Alevis, weary of Sunnification policies and religiously motivated massacres),
several political parties have represented the aspirations and values of the pious, from Adnan
Menderess Democrat Party, to Sleyman Demirels Justice Party, from Necmettin Erbakans
Welfare Party to the AKP (see Lewis 1968; Ahmad 1993; arkolu and Kalaycolu 2007). The
AKP today embodies the reactionary forces that were terminated by the Kemalist apparatus,

10

I. David

either by law or by force. As many have noted (see e.g. Kalaycolu 2010, 43), the AKPs rankand-file and front bench are religious and some with past membership of Islamist movement
National Outlook (Milli Gr). The AKPs policies are in fact re-islamising Turkish society by
eliminating discriminatory legislation (e.g. the headscarf ban, mam Hatip middle schools
and mam Hatip graduates coefficients), by neighbourhood pressure (see Toprak 2009) and
by glamourising Islamic lifestyles (Gumuscu 2010, 843, 844).
The second dichotomy, nationalism vs. minorities, can be observed since the Ottoman
Empire began construction of the nation state in the nineteenth century and was further
accelerated in the Young Turk period and after the advent of the Republic, with population
exchanges with Greece and when multiple Kurdish rebellions against Kemalist nationalism
met with violent repression (see Mardin 1973). After promising steps towards reconciliation
with the Kurds (see Somer and Liaras 2010; iek 2011; Pusane 2014), the AKP has backpedalled and officially ceased negotiations in 2015. Much has been written on the reasons.
Political motivations refer to Erdoans power ambitions, particularly because of the results
of the June 2015 elections (The New Arab 2015; Rudaw 2016), and because of the effective
opposition mounted by the HDP to Erdoans aspirations for a presidential system (Al Monitor
2015). Others focus on the security dilemma (Karda and Balci 2016). While using the latter
reason as justification, President Erdoan nonetheless targeted the HDP, as he intended to
strip its MPs immunity from prosecution (Guardian 2015). The AKPs framing of relations
with Kurds and Alevis (who are subjected to a Sunnification policy) in religious terms is
exemplary as to how the party is incapable of conceiving different societal visions.
Both dichotomies have produced competing worldviews which are extremely difficult
to harmonise. As Erisen (2016, 49) rightfully argues, elites in Turkey produce and reproduce
issue-based divergences, creating ideologically entrenched groups. Dominating the agenda-setting, both the government and Erdoan formulate a rhetoric which is afterwards
matched by the opposition. The polarising rhetoric and the cleavages combine to produce
an environment of fear which, as Erisen (ibid., 55) claims, is conducive to popular support
for charismatic leadership Erdoan or the government, as the agents who are more able
to control the sources of threat and anxiety. This tool has been strategically used by the AKP
and Erdoan in their confrontations with the secularist establishment, by playing on the
victim card of the pious at the hands of the Kemalists, and now with the Kurdish
movement.

The institutional setting

Kemalists were able to maintain their hegemony both by means of the military and of civilian
institutions. The pillar of the Kemalist establishment is the 1982 Constitution, whose
anti-democratic nature is patent on its provisions on minority rights, secularism, political
parties and the possibility of suspending fundamental rights. As much as the AKP wants to
write a new Constitution, namely to create a presidential system (Presidency of the Republic
of Turkey 2016), the fact is that the party has successfully instrumentalised both the extant
Constitution and the state institutions for its own purposes in what constitutes another
example of strategic approach to democratisation.
One of the most important institutions is the presidency, given the powers invested in
the office: to appoint the Chief of General Staff; to proclaim the state of emergency and the
martial law; to appoint the members of YK, of the Constitutional Court, of the Supreme

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

11

Military Administrative Court, of the Supreme Board of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK)
and the university rectors; to promulgate laws or appeal to the Constitutional Court for their
annulment. These powers make clear why the Kemalist establishment (namely the military,
the judiciary and the CHP) tried at all costs to avoid an AKP candidate from winning the 2007
elections, either by appealing to the Constitutional Court or through the publication of the
so-called e-Memorandum on the website of the Chief of Staff, threatening to make use of
the duty conferred upon the law to protect secularism.1 It was through the vetoing powers
of the presidential office that secularist Ahmet Necdet Sezer was able to prevent the AKP
from passing many reforms, particularly those affecting secularism or Kemalist hegemony,
or appointing its cohort to public office until 2007 (see Jenkins 2008, 177; Rabasa and
Larrabee 2008, 60). In October that year, the AKP made sure such constraints were eliminated
by calling a referendum that deeply changed the office: the election of the President by
direct and universal suffrage, with a renewable term of five years.
Not accidentally, I argue, the AKPs control of the presidency coincided with the partys
disengagement from democratisation. Soon afterwards, the AKP penetrated the judicial and
bureaucratic apparatus: the Constitutional Court, the HSYK, YK and Academy of Sciences.
The government also lowered the age of retirement of civil servants in order to place its
followers into key positions.
Another example of successful appropriation of Kemalist institutions is legislation punishing freedom of expression: Article 301 of the 2005 Penal Code, which establishes prison
sentences for Turkish citizens who insult the nation, the state, the National Assembly, the
judiciary, the military and police, is a faithful reproduction of article 159 of the 1926 Kemalist
Penal Code. It was used, e.g., in a highly publicised case, to convict Orhan Pamuk (Amnesty
International 2013). Law No. 5816 (insults to the memory of Atatrk) was used to ban several
websites, including YouTube, between May 2008 and November 2010 (OSCE n.d.).
Another notorious example of instrumentalisation of Kemalist institutions is the 10%
electoral threshold. The threshold severely limits the emergence of political parties and,
consequently, the emergence of an organised opposition and the sharing of state funding
and state resources with other actors. The threshold also creates obstacles to intra-party
competition: party members who deviate from the party line are excluded from the partyand
subsequently from political competition, feeding leader domination of both the party
andthe country (ni 2014, 6, 7; Ayan Musil 2015).
This connects to another Kemalist institutional feature: the law on political parties. The
law prevents intra-party democracy, feeding authoritarianism in three ways (Ayan 2010).
First, it makes the parties dependent on state resources, triggering cartelisation in order to
avoid that other parties get public funding. The parties unable to access these resources
tend to weaken and eventually disappear. These dynamics also affect intra-party democracy,
as privileged access to state resources detaches the leadership from the party bases (Katz
and Mair 1995). Second, the law leaves the decision to select candidates to the party central
committee, which is traditionally dominated by the party leader. Third, the law regulates the
organisational features of the parties by creating a standardised and hierarchical model of
conventions and elected executive committees at the national, provincial and district levels.
It also determines the function of party branches and the method of intra-party elections.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this section is the undeniable influence of
Turkish institutions on the conduct of all actors and, in particular, on the AKP. The data show
that authoritarian institutions produce authoritarian actors.

12

I. David

Personal values and commitment to democracy

Ultimately, the choice to democratise depends on elites personal values. Turkish politics has
been prone to generate providential, charismatic leaders idolised by the masses and who
are more important than party programmes or institutions (Yavuz 2009, 98). An analysis of
Erdoans personality and actions leaves little doubt of his feeble commitment to liberal
democracy. Erdoan characterises himself as a black Turk (Pope 2012) for his humble
socio-economic origins in Kasmpaa, a trait which certainly helps the masses, who call him
Bizim Tayyip, to identify with him, not least because he represents the image of the selfmade man they dream of. Erdoans rhetoric against the elite aims at capitalising the support
of these masses (traditionally excluded from the centre by the Kemalists), who nickname
him as kabaday, someone who stands out for his reputation, authority and honour, the
protector of the weak and oppressed against an unjust power structure (Yavuz 2009, 118,
119). This reputation is certainly connected to his catering to the needs of the people through
the clientelistic practices mentioned before. The fact that Erdoan, like the masses, is an
outsider to the system, only lends him accrued credibility (Ayta and ni 2014). The outsider
status was further reinforced by his conviction and imprisonment for incitement to religious
hatred in 1998, which turned him into a martyr (mazlum).
These traits help understand why Erdoans anti-centre politics is firmly anchored on a
majoritarian conception of democracy the will of the nation as expressed in the ballot box
that aims at excluding those with opposing views. The erosion of the checks and balances
that comes attached to the AKPs penetration of the state apparatus and its majoritarian
conception of democracy and its associated values have further contributed to the polarisation of Turkish society and politics. This exclusionary vision had been forwarded several
years ago in 1993 by Erdoan himself: there is no room for Kemalism or any other official
ideology in Turkeys future and democracy is a vehicle which you ride as far as you want to
go and then get off (Sever and Dizdar 1993 quoted in Jenkins 2008, 166).
The lack of democratic culture can also be assessed by the personality cult to Erdoan
within the party, where he concentrates all authority and decisions and eliminates internal
dissidence (Tepe 2006, 115118). Personal relations in the shape of loyalty to the leader is
the ultimate value of the party (cf. Ayan 2010). Yavuz (2009, 127, 129, 130) attributes Erdoans
type of leadership both to an inferiority complex Erdoans intellectual weakness (he does
not speak any foreign languages and there are doubts as to whether he holds a university
degree) and to his megalomania (he sees himself as Gods chosen to rule). In short, the
AKP is Erdoan.

Conclusions
This article has tested a framework that applies rationalist institutionalism to elite-driven
democratisation processes. The framework allows for a better understanding of why AKPdriven democratisation in Turkey has been backpedalling since 2007. While democratisation
processes are elite-driven, a rationalist approach is necessary in order to account for the
twists and turns of democratisation and, in the case of Turkey, of the AKPs choices of areas
where reforms were more thorough than in others. Thus, democratisation was extensive in
areas such as civilianisation of politics, legislation on political parties and public administration. The reason behind this assertiveness was that these areas had, since 1982, allowed for

Journal of Contemporary European Studies

13

the banishment of anti-systemic political parties and political leaders (including Erdoan)
and for strict enforcement of secularism. This theoretical framework also provides a better
understanding of why the AKP has disengaged from reforms in areas liable of producing
resistance to its dominant status or even of threatening that status: in areas liable of producing resources for competing political parties and social movements, freedom of the
media and the authoritarian institutional scenario inherited from the 1982 Constitution,
now used by the AKP in its favour. It is in this sense that I argue that the AKPs democratisation
has been strategic.
This framework thus proves that external factors accounting for Turkeys problems with
democratisation such as the waning credibility of EU conditionality, the most sought explanation for Turkeys stalled reforms are manifestly inadequate to explain the AKPs backpedalling from reforms and hence the countrys worsened prospects for EU accession. As
such, research should instead focus on domestic factors, namely the AKPs stakes and interests as the dominant party. As things stand in Turkish politics, the AKP has no interest in
making further reforms, especially those than can jeopardise its dominant position.
At the time of this writing, Turkey experienced a failed coup attempt on 15 July. Being
still too early to assess the future direction of Turkeys politics, ongoing events suggest the
creation of a consensus among political parties represented in parliament around democracy
and firm opposition to military takeovers of power. In this context, future research should
further delve into the domestic factors of Turkeys democratisation, especially analysing the
AKPs actions following the coup. The direction taken by the AKP following the 15 July coup
should provide us with a definitive account of the partys strategy and intentions.

Note
1.
Excerpts from the memorandum available from BBC News, April 28, 2007. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCiD
Isabel David

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1734-6457

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