European Security Review
Number 20
The Defence Deal in the
IGC
The European armaments
agency: a virtual reality
Developing civilian crisis
management capabilities
Operation Atlantia: A
ficitonal test for Berlin Plus
Iran: a test case in EU
non-proliferation policy
EU/member states pledge
5 Billion to tackle WMD
proliferation
The revised European
security strategy
ISIS Europe
Rue Archim è de 5
1000 Brussels
Belgium
Tel: +32 2 230 7446
Fax: +32 2 230 6113
Website:
www.isis-europe.org
Email:
info@isis -europe.org
ESR is edited by
Catriona Gourlay
.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce712/11/2003
Page 1 of 17
December 2003
The Defence Deal in the IGC
The Italian EU Presidency submitted a revised proposal on the
future of European defence to the Naples conclave on 29
November.1 This new draft prepared the ground for a deal,
resolving several contentious issues by the big three -- Germany,
France and the UK. While the other member states and accession
countries agree with the compromise text regarding the creation of
a ‘double-hatted’ Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and permanent
structured co-operation on defence, the proposal for a mutual
defence clause has met with stiff resistance from the neutral
countries and a compromise text is still being negotiated.
Agreement has, however, been reached on other issues that do
not require Treaty change, such as the development of EU
operational planning.
EU Foreign Minister
The position of a foreign minister was proposed by the
Convention to promote coherence in EU foreign policy and
provide an institutional bridge between the supranational
European Commission and the inter-governmental Council. The
Convention proposed that the position of EU Foreign Minister
should merge the position of Commissioner for External
Relations (1 st pillar) with the functions of the Council’s High
Representative of CFSP (2 nd pillar).2 This was met with
widespread agreement in principle but there was disagreement
over institutional details. For instance, Britain and France
wanted this minister to be more accountable to member states
and less to the Commission and this has been reflected in a
number of changes introduced to the text since October.
At the Luxemburg and Brussels IGC meetings held in mid -
October the principle that the Foreign Minister’s CFSP
responsibilities 'cannot be subject to the same obligation of
independence as the other members of the Commission' was
established. The Naples conclave 4 subsequently agreed that
Article 25 on the European Commission would be amended to
mention the exception that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is
mandated by the Council in the area of CFSP. A further
qualification was added to clarify that in the event that the
European Parliament exercised a vote of censure, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs would resign his duties regarding the exercise
of the Commission’s external relations (only). Similarly, Article
26 was amended to make it explicit that unlike other
Commissioners, the Foreign Minister would require the consent
of the Council to resign, if asked to do so by the President of
the Commission.
The powers of the Foreign Minister have also been clarified.
Article 27 on the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs now states
that the Foreign Minister will chair the General Affairs and
External Relations Council5 and that he/she will be tasked with
European Security Review Page 2 of 17

ensuring coherence between CFSP and the external actions of

the Commission (rather than simply ensuring coherence
between the different aspects of Community external
relations). Article III-197(3) confirms the intention that the
Foreign Minister be assisted by a new European External Action
Service, working in co-operation with the diplomatic services of
the Member States. The decision on the organisation of the
Service and how it relates to the Union's delegations has,
however, been left to a later decision of the European Council
and Commission (with the European Parliament offered the
opportunity to offer its opinion).
Structured co-operation

The issue of structured co -operation proved to be one of the most contentious defence
issues in the IGC. The Convention text proclaimed, ‘those member states whose military
capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one
another … shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework.’( Article 40).
Subsequent discussions revealed fears on the part of a number of member states that such
co-operation would be exclusive, leading to a sub-group of member states forging ahead
with defence integration, inevitably conducting exclusive missions in the name of the EU.
Recommendations introduced to the Naples conclave by the Italian Presidency sought to
make structured co -operation more inclusive and more closely aligned with the general
provisions governing ESDP. To this end, a number of amendments to the Article governing
the implementation of ESDP (Article III-213) were introduced that established more open
mechanisms for joining or leaving permanent structures. Moreover, it was clarified that
decisions to launch EU operations would be taken unanimously in accordance with the
established provisions for ‘enhanced’ co-operation (articles III 325 and III 326) by all 25
member states. An additional Protocol will be attached to the Treaty to clarify the objectives
of structured co -operation and outline under which conditions states will be able to engage
in such co-operation.

Both the criteria and objectives of membership are ‘capabilities driven’ where the
participating states are required ‘to engage more intensively in the development of defence
capabilities, including through the development of their national contributions and, where
appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in
the activity of the European Military Capabilities Agency.’ Moreover, participating states
‘must have the capacity to provide by 2007 at the latest, either at the national level or as
an essential part of multinational force packages, targeted combat units for the mission as
planned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elements
including transport and logistic, capable of carrying out the [Petersberg tasks] within a
period of 5-30 days, particularly in response to requests from the United Nations, to be
sustained for an initial period of 30 days with possible extensions to at least 120 days ’. Five
objectives of structured co -operation are specified. They include: co -operation on objectives
concerning the level of investments expenditure on defence equipment; bringing defence
apparatus into line (by increased harmonization of military needs, pooling, specializing and
co-operation in the field of logistics); undertaking concrete measures to enhance
availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces; addressing capability
shortfalls through the capability Development Mechanism; and developing, where
appropriate, major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the
European Defence Capabilities Agency.

Mutual Defence Clause

The final Convention text contained a solidarity clause stating that member states would
come to each other’s assistance in the event that a member state suffers a terrorist attack.
It did not, however, go so far as to bring into the framework of the EU any Article 5 type
collective defence commitments, previously agreed on by some member states in the
context of an amended Brussels Treaty establishing the Western European Union (WEU).
This issue has, however, been revisited in the IGC and at the Naples conclave; Britain,
France and Germany agreed to the Italian proposal to incorporate Article 5 style language
into Article 40 of the Treaty. The proposed mutual defence clause states that ‘If a Member
State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance
with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 3 of 17

with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be
consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those states which are member of it,
remain the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’. This
language accommodates the concerns of states such as the UK and Poland who wanted to
enshrine complementarity with NATO, but met with strong resistance from the four neutral
member states, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland. Such an Article would clearly
compromise their neutrality and in many cases would undermine national public support for
the Treaty. These states have demanded that the Article should constitute a voluntary
commitment only. The compromise text proposed by the Presidency takes the position of
the neutral countries into account in so far as it adds the clause that 'this does not affect
the specific character of the defence and security policy of certain member states'. At the
time of publication, Austria and Sweden had agreed to this formulation, but it was still not
certain that this compromise would be accepted by Ireland and Finland at the Summit.

Operational military planning

Although the issue of the development of EU operational military planning structures is not
addressed in the IGC, it has been one of the most contested transatlantic issues linked to
debates on the future of Europe’s defence structures (see previous issue of the European
Security Review). At the Naples conclave, a compromise agreement was reached by the 'big
three'. While there is no publicly available text associated with the agreement, it was
reported that the deal consisted of an agreement to establish a permanent EU planning cell
within NATO’s operational headquarters, SHAPE. This cell would consist of staff seconded
from EU member states and would be responsible for operational planning in the case of
any EU-led operation using NATO assets. In the case of autonomous operations, not using
NATO assets, operational planning would take place in national headquarters, or, as a 'last
resort', at the EU headquarters in Brussels. Member states agreed that some officials
(aproximately 30) from member states would be attached to the EU Council Secretariat in
the Council’s Cortenberg building in Brussels so that it could run a military operation in this
event. The deal has not been openly criticized by the US, although it continues to assert the
primacy of the Berlin Plus framework agreement between the EU and NATO, which covers
the SHAPE and national headquarters operational planning options only.

All for nought?

Despite the fact that EU member states are close to agreement on most of the defence
issues in the IGC, the chances of the IGC being concluded by the summit on the 12th and
13 th of December remain slim given that there is still no agreement on crucial issues such
the voting system within the Council. The WEU Assembly has already seized upon the
prospect of IGC failure, proposing that the defence provisions be pursued outside the Union
framework in the context of the WEU and on the legal basis of the amended Treaty of
Brussels.6 This is, however, unlikely and all hopes are still pinned on the prospects of a last
minute deal being reached.

Catriona Gourlay and Joshua Kleymeyer

1. See 'The Convention: Conclusions without closure'. by Catriona Gourlay , European

Security Review, Number 17, May 2003.
2. COREPER document CIG 52/03, Brussels, 25 November 2003 ‘IGC 2003 – Naples
Ministerial Conclave: Presidency Proposal
http://www.euitaly2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/D3AF1BA8-3F8C-40AA-A8DD-
DBEC7C8C0251/0/ConclaveDoc52Add1.pdf .
3. COREPER document CIG 2/03, Brussels, 2 October 2003 ‘IGC 2003 – The Union Minister
for Foreign Affairs: Main Points http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00002.en03.pdf .
4. COREPER document CIG 57/03, Brussels, 2 December 2003 ‘IGC 2003 – Defence’
http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00057.en03.pdf Bulletin Quotidien Europe –
9/12/2003 .
5. COREPER document CIG 60/03 ADD 1, Brussels, 9 December 2003
http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/B6D8B2AC-707C-4FC8-AA34-
12FD3C396EC8/0/1209Cig60Add1_en.pdf .

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 4 of 17

6. Conclusions of the WEU Assembly [IV.1(b)90] http://www.assembly-

weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1841.html.

The European Armaments Agency: A Virtual Reality

At the November 17 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels,
agreement was reached on the principle to establish, under the authority of the Council, an
intergovernmental Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition
and armaments1 in the course of 2004. This decision helps maintain the momentum towards
the creation of a European Armaments/Defence Capabilities Agency and provides a framework
for further elaboration of the organisation of the Agency. However, it falls short of Italian
Presidency ambitions to reach agreement on a Joint Action establishing the agency. An interim
‘Establishment Team’ has now been tasked with addressing the outstanding technical issues,
and member states aim to agree a Joint Action to create the agency during the forthcoming Irish
Presidency.

An ongoing process

The present Agency discussions follow up on the Thessaloniki European Council conclusions,
which tasked the current Presidency with establishing an agency to:

1) develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis -management;

2) promote and enhance European armaments co -operation;
3) strengthen the European industrial and technological base;
4) create a competitive European defence equipment market as well as promoting, in
liaison with the Community’s research activities where appropriate, research aimed at
leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities.

An Informal Advisory Group, composed of representatives of national Defence Ministries,

was set up to take this work forward, and has subsequently been replaced, by a COREPER
decision dated September 4 th , by an Ad Hoc Preparatory Group.2 On October 28, after five
meetings, this Group submitted its final activities report to COREPER. The report included
guidelines on the role and the function of the Agency, but legal, institutional and financial
aspects were put to one side. The Council Working Group, Relex (Working Party of Foreign
Relations Counsellors) was then tasked by COREPER to examine technical issues concerning
the composition of the agency’s Steering Board, the legal status of the Agency and the
modalities by which it would report to COREPER, the Political and Security Committee (PSC)
and the Military Committee (EUMC).

Agreement on key issues examined by the preparatory group remained elusive, however,
leading to the 17 November GAERC agreement to continue negotiations and set up the
‘Establishment Team’ in January to address outstanding technical (legal and financial)
details. The Team would be composed of 12-15 experts from member states, the Council
Secretariat and the Commission and is expected to submit its recommendations for a Joint
Action establishing the Agency to COREPER in the spring of 2004.

The Agency's role

The mandate
The November 17 GAERC conclusions refer to an Agency that shall be responsible for the
development of European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and for the
promotion of European armaments co -operation. To achieve these objectives, the Agency
should be tasked with: identifying future defence capability requirements, both in
quantitative and qualitative terms (forces, equipments, interoperability and training);
continuing to work with NATO through the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM);
encouraging member states to meet their capability commitments in the ECAP process;
promoting the harmonisation of military requirements; pursuing collaborative activities to
make up shortfalls, and defining financial priorities for capability development and
acquisition. The Agency will also identify multilateral solutions for present and future
requirements of ESDP capabilities, and will promote cost-effective and efficient procurement

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 5 of 17

requirements of ESDP capabilities, and will promote cost-effective and efficient procurement
through co -operation programmes to be managed by the WEAG/WEAO (Western European
Armament Group/Western European Armament Organisation) and/or OCCAR (Organisation
Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement) or by the Agency on the basis of their
experience and the Letter of Intent (Framework Agreement) process.

A phased and progressive approach

The creation and development of the Agency will be an incremental process according to a
timetable yet to be defined, whereby it will progressively manage core functions identified in
the present framework until it reaches full operationality. Once established in 2004, the
Agency will act as co-ordinating focus for the existing network of bodies and agreements
with relevant competencies. It will work closely with the EU Military Committee (EUMC) that
is responsible for the management of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), as well
as with the member states’ representatives in the Headline Task Force (HTF) that work on
the ECAP process. It will also prepare the legal and operational framework for the
management of collaborative projects through OCCAR, and the adoption, where necessary,
of the Letter of Intent (Framework Agreement) procedures and WEAG/WEAO working
principles and practices. Once the Agency reaches its full operational potential, it should
have incorporated working practices and methods from all these existing arrangements and
organisations (OCCAR, LoI Framework Agreement, WEAG/WEAO), although it may still sub-
contract aspects of procurement management to external bodies such as OCCAR.

Organisational structure
The Agency shall have the legal personality to carry out its functions under the authority of
the Council. A Steering Board, composed of representatives of participating EU member
states ‘authorised to commit their government’ 3 and a representative of the Commission,
will be responsible for formulating the Agency’s policies and budget.4 The PSC will receive
reports and provide guidelines on matters relating to CFSP and ESDP. The Steering Board
will be chaired by the Head of the Agency, which points to the present SG/HR, Javier Solana.
He/she will be assisted by a Chief Executive and supported by a permanent international
staff mainly selected from member states. There will also be a small number of seconded
Community officials who will be responsible for specific projects over a fixed period.

Outstanding issues

In addition to legal and financial details to be addressed by the Establishment Team and
the final outcome of IGC in relation to the role of the EU Foreign Minister and the future of
‘defence ’ in the common market,5 key organisational issues remain unresolved. With regard
to the composition of the Steering Board, traditional tensions at the national level between
Foreign and Defence Ministers were once more exposed, with internal resistance in some
countries to the proposal that member states should be represented by their Defence
Ministers. Moreover the modalities of decision-making within the Agency’s Steering Board
(unanimity or qualified majority voting) have yet to be decided and the relationship
between the Agency and existing Council bodies remains unclear. For example, the Military
Committee is currently responsible for the elaboration, assessment and the review of
capability objectives, and its future relationship with the Agency's role in this area requires
further negotiation. Similarly, it is not clear to what extent the Commission’s developing
role in defence R&D6 will relate to the Agency’s role in generating member state defence
capabilities.

Fundamental to the on-going debate is the fact that France and Britain hold diverging
visions on the Agency’s core competencies. Britain wants to maintain a focus upon
capabilities development and therefore stresses the central role of Defence Ministers in the
agency’s decision-making process. France prefers that the Agency focus on all four functions
included in the Thessaloniki mandate and insists that the final decision on the creation of
the Agency should only be taken after all technical and legal implications have been
explored. Moreover, France stresses that the multi-functional nature of the Agency should
be taken into account in the composition of the Steering Board. Unlike Britain, France would
like to ensure that the views of other ministries were represented where this is relevant,
namely in debating industrial or research questions. Germany has supported the French
position although it stressed the key importance of bringing member states’ Defence
Ministers and National Armaments Directors into the institutional framework of the Union.
The uncertainty over the exact title for the agency reflects this ongoing debate on the

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 6 of 17

The uncertainty over the exact title for the agency reflects this ongoing debate on the
functional priorities of the agency.

Moving beyond virtual reality

The November 17 announcement to establish an agency in the field of defence capabilities

development, research, acquisition and armaments in the course of 2004 has created an
Agency framework but not yet an Agency, as key issues have not been resolved. The
creation of an Establishment Team, a timeline that consciously enables key decisions in the
IGC to be built-in, and the avoidance of key discussions about the end-state of the Agency
in relation to the existing bodies such as OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO and the LoI process,
represent the framework within which the Agency will develop rather than a meaningful
final decision.

Over the coming months member states will need to reconcile their different visions about
how the agency will relate to other existing organisations and how it will be managed.
Moreover, member states also need to address the issue of how the Agency will link with
the work of the ECAP Project Groups and follow-up the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal II’ process,
reflecting the capability needs of the expanded Petersberg Tasks, and to be agreed by June
2004. Sustained political will is required if the Agency is to be equipped with a mandate and
structure that will enable it to generate ‘real’ solutions to short-term capability shortfalls
and generate capabilities suitable for longer term requirements.

Daniela Manca and Gerrard Quille

1. As yet no agreement has been reached on a name for the agency. The names mentioned
here are commonly used and are based on the original Franco-German proposal for an
Armaments Agency and the UK preference for a Defence Capabilities Agency.
2. This group met within the Council structures and was composed of senior representatives
of the Ministries of Defence of the member states and was chaired by the Italian Ltn Gen.
Gianni Botondi.
3. The question is particularly sensitive, especially for France who seeks to give the Steering
Board a multi-ministerial character. See below for more details.
4. The budget has represented another sticking point during negotiations. The original Ad
Hoc group proposal to provide the Agency with its own budget made up of national
contributions whilst member states would bear operational costs has been rejected. The
GAERC conclusions revert the issue to the establishment phase.
5. It is envisaged that the Joint Action establishing the Agency will be revised where
necessary according to the final outcome of the IGC.
6. The commission is opening Community research and development funding to the defence
sector for the first time with a Preparatory Action with a budget of 65 million Euros over
three years. A ‘group of personalities’ has been appointed and will meet twice and report
in the spring of 2004 to advise on priority projects. See MEMO/03/192, Brussels, 7
October 2003.

Developing Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities

There is widespread acknowledgment from within the EU institutions and member states that
the EU needs to strengthen its civilian crisis management capabilities and this is reflected in the
revised European Security Strategy, which states that ‘we need greater capacity to bring all
necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations’. A number of initiatives
are currently being undertaken to address capability shortfalls. This article reflects, in particular,
on recent attempts to bolster planning and mission support and develop new procedures for
training and recruitment for EU civilian operations.

Strengthening Planning and Mission Support

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 7 of 17

The Council recognizes that EU planning and mission support for civilian operations are
clearly inadequate and need reinforcement. The EU’s experience with its first ESDP mission,
the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia Herzegovina, first exposed capability shortfalls in all
aspects of administrative and logistical planning. These are set to become more acute now
that the Council has agreed that operation Concordia will be followed-up with the police
training mission Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council is also
actively considering a further mission to establish an integrated police unit in Kinshasa
(DRC) to be carried out concurrently, and other potential operations have also been
proposed. Indeed, the short history of ESDP suggests that the EU will most frequently be
called on to conduct civilian operations rather than high-end military ones.

This civilian capabilities gap is not surprising, however, given the procedures and staff of
the Council Secretariat have not yet been adapted to meet the needs of increasing pro -
active, planning and mission support functions. Whereas the Council Secretariat has been
augmented with some 150 Military staff to enable strategic-level planning for military
operations, there are only 15 staff working within the Council Secretariat that can take on
new tasks with regard to civilian operations. Moreover, while military operations rely on
national level or NATO headquarters for operational planning, EU staff working on civilian
operations in Brussels are responsible for strategic and operational planning as well as
mission support, and have no recourse to external planning entities. They deal with this by
delegating much of the detailed planning of missions to the head of mission and an advance
party. Moreover, some important elements of the planning and administration of civilian
missions are shared with the Commission (which notably has responsibility for legal issues,
budgetary management and procurement).

To address this gap, in November 2002 the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR)
was tasked by the Council to take forward work ‘as soon as possible ’ on establishing an
appropriate EU planning and mission support capability. This was to be based within the
Council General Secretariat (CGS), and build on synergies with the Commission. In July 2003
the SG/HR’s presented concrete recommendations to strengthen the mission support within
the CGS.1 The SG/HR identified shortages of personnel in all four priority areas in civilian
crisis management (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) and
horizontal mission support tasks, including operational back-up/communications, security
and safety management, and information and best practices/lessons learned. To fill this
gap, the SG/HR proposed that 27 new posts should be created within the CGS, with a
balance between permanent officials and seconded experts. These proposals were followed
up in mid October, when the Presidency responded to the SG/HR report with
recommendations regarding staffing solutions to address the most urgent shortfalls in
planning and mission support. Given that there are no provisions for employing additional
personnel in the 2004 budget, the Presidency’s proposals were limited and argued for the
creation of 18 new posts through the reallocation of existing resources within the CGS and
the request that member states and the Commission second additional staff to the CGS.

The Presidency’s proposals for an interim solution paid little heed to the Commission’s
response to the Council’s initial report. These were presented to the Council in September.
While the Commission shares the underlying objective of improving planning and mission
support for civilian operations, it disagreed that these capabilities should be developed
exclusively within the Council framework. The Commission argued that the SG/HR’s
proposals would effectively duplicate existing capacities within the Commission. It
highlighted its experience in managing electoral observation missions, the civil protection
mechanism and providing personnel and support to UN, OSCE and operations of other
partners in the fields of rule of law, civilian administration and police, and pointed to the
vital support that could be provided by the Commission’s 129 delegations and offices across
the world. It argued furthermore that strengthening the Commission’s mission support
capabilities with regard ESDP operations would effectively strengthen cross-pillar
integration in this area. Moreover, the Commission argued that this solution was also more
consistent with current budgetary arrangements (under which the Commission remains
responsible for the budgetary management of ESDP operations), stating that the
operational support requirements are the same for EC funded election monitoring, border
management and police operations as those to be conducted within the ESDP framework.
Given the current institutional architecture, and the operational need to bring budgetary
management and mission planning within the same structure, the Commission argues that
a joint service would be the most effective solution.

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 8 of 17

The contrasting views of the Council and Commission on how planning and mission support
for civilian missions should be strengthened is based on the fact that both institutions claim
competence in this area. The Commission has long been engaged in post-conflict institution
building and has developed mechanisms to expedite the delivery of support for crisis
management and post-conflict peace-building activities under the rapid reaction mechanism.
It does not, however, have experience in planning and supporting large-scale crisis
management operations, involving the deployment of EU personnel. The Council argues
that in order to develop an integrated civil-military approach to crisis management, civilian
operations must be managed from the Council, under the authority and control of member
states and, where possible, with their direct involvement.

The question of competence is further complicated by the fact that the term ‘civilian crisis
management’ means different things to different people. The Commission notes that while
EU civilian missions are a politically important tool, there are a whole range of tools for
civilian crisis management, the bulk of which are organised under the first pillar. While the
first ‘crisis management’ operation was launched in Bosnia, eight years after the Dayton
accords, first pillar assistance has been used to support the political stabilisation of the
country since the end of the conflict.

Given the bureaucratic and structural obstacles to developing an integrated planning and
support capability within the current institutional framework, both the SG/HR’s report and
the Commission’s response to it are relatively open to new institutional solutions. The
SG/HR cites one option as the creation of a flexible Mission Support Service, independent
from the CGS but under the SG/HR’s operational direction, while the Commission proposes
the establishment of an inter-institutional agency or service which would be compatible with
the future institutional architecture, in particular the proposed Joint External Service and the
EU Foreign Minister. Such an agency or service would provide a common platform for all EU
civilian missions, irrespective of the funding source, and could be tasked by the Council or
the Commission according to their respective mandates, and, in the future by the Foreign
Minister. Unlike parallel discussions on proposals to develop military operational planning
structures or an EU Armaments Agency, these proposals have received little to no press
attention and there is no formal process for their development.

Co-ordinating recruitment and training

Improving the quality and deployability of civilian personnel is evidently crucial for the
development of EU civilian crisis management capabilities. The de-centralised recruitment
process is currently very slow and it has proved difficult to find suitable, qualified personnel
for on-going civilian missions. Problematic features of the current system include the fact
that recruitment, which is a responsibility of member states, is procedurally diverse and, in
the absence of an efficient co -ordinating mechanism to help manage inputs from member
states, this can lead to delays and shortfalls. Moreover, while some member states
recruitment procedures include experts outside the civil service, many national systems are
geared to internal recruitment of civil servants and therefore non-governmental experts are
currently under-represented. More generally, the pool of potential personnel is still too
limited given the generic problems associated with extracting civilian experts from their
domestic duties and providing sufficient incentives for them to leave on foreign missions.
This also applies to selecting individuals to attend training courses. More specifically with
regard to training, it is widely agreed that civilian personnel should all have common core
skills and training background to improve co -ordination between national experts in EU
operations. While this may be necessary, it is hardly sufficient, and the EU also needs to
encourage member states to recognise the relevance of alternative practical experiences
and academic courses in their selection processes. Moroever, there is currently no link
between training courses and deployment, and mechanisms need to be introduced to
ensure that those trained are also willing and able to take part in EU operations.

Some of these issues are being addressed within the context of current EU training
initiatives. Two years ago the Commission launched an initiative on training for civilian
aspects of crisis management in order to improve the preparation and readiness of civilian
personnel. The initiative has now gone through its third phase. In its first phase, a
network of EU-wide training bodies developed proposals for a common approaches and
harmonised training programmes. In the second phase, these programmes started to be
implemented by an informal “EU Group on Training”, composed of project partners from 12

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 9 of 17

implemented by an informal “EU Group on Training”, composed of project partners from 12

member states. The second phase was evaluated at a conference in Rome 20-21 October
2003 and a broadly positive evaluation means that more resources will now be available for
training courses. Other outcomes of the evaluation include the recognition that EU training
should be better co -ordinated with that of the UN, OSCE and other international
organisations and that it should also be more closely integrated with military training for EU
operations. The Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy will launch the first training course in
which both civilian and military representatives will participate. A follow-on meeting in Berlin
has also been planned for February, at which the issue of more closely integrating civilian
and military training will be explored further.

The second pillarisation of civilian crisis management?

The current trend appears to be in the direction of the ‘second pillarisation’ of civilian crisis
management with the Council declaring its ambitions for greater control over the
development of a co -ordinated EU Training Policy, encompassing both civilian and military
dimensions of ESDP. Member States already have control over the recruitment process and
the suggestion is that the Civilian Committee in the Council (CIVCOM) oversees both
training and recruitment. While the Commission continues to hold the purse strings and
fund common training activities, it appears to be loosing ground regarding the control of the
preparation and support of as well as training and recruitment for civilian crisis management
operations.

This trend risks undermining the link between short-term crisis management operations and
other external relations activities including longer-term post-conflict reconstruction efforts
managed by the Commission. The political focus on th deployment of EU civilian mission
may also risk a 'one size fits all' approach, where alternatives (such as working through a
UN framework, or a regional organisation such as the OSCE) are not fully taken into
account. Finally, there an important efficiency and accountability argument that has not
been addressed in the current debate: whereas the Commission has a high degree of
autonomy in making decisions about first pillar operations, second pillar operations are
subject to lengthy discussion in Council working groups with votes taken on the basis of
unanimity. How efficient is it for operational details to be discussed by 25
ambassadors? Moreover, how will these member states be held to account for spending on
these activities and operations, if this is managed in the second pillar framework? It
remains to be seen, however, if the post-IGC joint external service will provide a better
institutional solution to the development and effecient management of civilian crisis
management.

Malin Tappert
1. Council of the European Union General Secretariat ‘Planning and Mission Support
capability for Civilian Crisis Management’ 22 July 2003.

Operation Atlantia: A Fictional Test for Berlin Plus

From 19-29 November, the EU and NATO carried out their first joint crisis
management exercise to test EU planning procedures developed in the framework of
ESDP and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO. This article offers an overview of
the conduct of the exercise and reports some preliminary observations, although the
formal evaluation process has not yet been completed.1

The scenario and the players

The scenario for the CMX/CME 03 exercise was not new, but was initially elaborated by
the EU on the basis of the first CME 02 exercise, carried out in May 20022 . The crisis
was situated in fictitious Atlantic island, named ‘Atlantia’ which was experiencing
growing friction between two ethnic groups over a contested area. Given the geo-
strategic importance of the island for the EU and the risk of escalation of violence and
spillover, the Union had an interest in ensuring, through its diplomatic and economic
instruments, that a cease-fire was agreed between the parties. The deployment of
both military and civil personnel was envisaged to ensure the implementation of the

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 10 of 17

both military and civil personnel was envisaged to ensure the implementation of the
agreement and deter renewed hostility.

The exercise was carried out both in Brussels, with participants from member states’
delegations and EU/NATO relevant bodies, and in national capitals. In particular, on the
EU side the Political and Security Committee (PSC) had the overall responsibility for the
planning, conduct, evaluation and reporting of CME/CMX 03, while a core planning
team, composed of officials from the Presidency, the Council General Secretariat
(including the EU Military Staff) and the Commission, co-ordinated the activities of the
PSC and the working bodies (Civcom, Relex, Politico-Military Group). The Policy Unit,
the Military Committee, the Satellite Centre, the Secretary General/High
Representative and the Commission also participated, whilst EU acceding states had an
'active observers' status. On the NATO side, the exercise involved all Allies plus all 19
national delegations, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Secretary General3 , the
Military Committee (MC), the Strategic Commanders’ Headquarters (SHAPE), the
International Staff (IS) and the Policy co-ordination Group (PCG).

The planning procedures for the exercise also envisaged consultations with third
countries, namely with non-European NATO Members, to inform them of the EU’s
intentions. Similarly, consultations were conducted with Canada, Russia and Ukraine as
potential contributors. Representatives from the UN and the OSCE were also invited to
observe the exercise.

Testing Berlin Plus

The CME/CMX 03 exercise was elaborated within the framework of the EU Council’s
five-year Exercise Programme. The overall aim of the exercise was to:

1) test the interaction between the EU and NATO at the highest political-military
level on the basis of the ‘Berlin Plus’ standing arrangements for consultation and co-
operation in crisis management;

2) test the EU’s crisis management procedures and structures at the pre-decisional
phase of the decision-making process leading to the appointment of an Operation
Commander and EU tasking for military operational planning;

3) test the ability of the EU to mobilise in a comprehensive and co-ordinated

manner both military and civilian instruments.

Limited in its ambition and scope, CME/CMX focused on how the EU plans at the
strategic political level for an operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities,
where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Therefore, no troops were deployed on the
ground and the overall costs were confined to incremental (personnel travel and
communication) costs4 .

The exercise began when the EU Political and Security Committee tasked the Military
Committee to evaluate options for a EU-led operation in ‘Atlantia’, under a UN Security
Council mandate. Consultations with NATO were promptly established at different
levels in the event of an EU operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in
the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements. A joint meeting of the two Military
Committees took place on Thursday 20 to evaluate practical modalities for the transfer
of NATO capabilities to the EU, and was followed by joint meetings at the political level
(PSC-NAC and PMG-PCG). On Monday 24, the PSC approved the draft Joint Action
authorising the launching of the civil-military ‘Operation ATLANTIA’. The exercise ended
just before DSACEUR was due to formulate the operational requirements and convene a
'force generating conference' and a 'Committee of contributors' for countries that

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 11 of 17

'force generating conference' and a 'Committee of contributors' for countries that

pledged forces.

Provisions governing the consultations were based on a series of standing

arrangements completed between December 2002 and March 2003 that comprise the
Berlin Plus agreements. In line with these arrangements, the Operation Headquarters
were provided by NATO and based at SHAPE, which was also involved in the conduct
of the exercise. Similarly, DSACEUR was appointed the Operation Commander.

Assessment

In a statement released before the exercise, the EU SG/HR, Javier Solana, stated 'The
joint exercise is another important step in the close and concrete co-operation
between the EU and NATO' 5. Some EU officials similarly stressed the exercise’s
success regarding the work of the two organization’s Secretariats, whose level of co-
ordination contributed to the overall success of the exercise.

According to a joint pre-exercise press release, CME/CMX was also intended to

complement the lessons learned from the actual co-operation on the EU-led Operation
Concordia, conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. However, the
conduct of the exercise differs from that of Concordia since it concerns the full
decision-making process previous to the launching of the mission, whilst in FYROM the
EU took over a mission already begun by NATO. However, EU and NATO officials have
reportedly confirmed that CME/CMX 03, along with Operation Concordia, validated the
Berlin plus arrangements, at least as 'lignes directrices' for the EU-NATO interplay in
crisis management. It is in the EU Presidency’s and Council Secretariat’s responsibility
to implement them in the most appropriate way, according to contingent needs.

While there is general satisfaction that the exercise achieved its objectives, some EU
officials pointed out some outstanding obstacles revealed by the exercise that still
need to be worked on, particularly regarding the co-ordination of the EU civil and
military instruments, the EU-NATO consultation and communication procedures and
their security provisions. Some officials also made the point that the exercise, which
did not involve the operational planning phase, stopped short of testing the whole
range of consultation procedures. Moreover, the smooth conduct of the operation was
seen, in part, as due to the unrealistic fact that decision-makers were not required to
respond to unforeseen events.

Next steps

The EU is conducting a comprehensive evaluation process to guide the further

development of EU crisis management structures, procedures and arrangements, whilst
the EU-NATO aspects of the exercise will be evaluated first separately and then jointly
by the two organizations’ relevant bodies (PSC-NAC). The whole process may take a
few months. Meanwhile, the EU has already started planning the next CME 04 exercise,
scheduled for next year and based on a scenario for an EU-led operation without
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (on the Operation Artemis-type, in
Democratic Republic of Congo). This will complete the EU's testing programme of the
full range of procedures available for ESDP operations.

Daniela Manca
1. See article by Annalisa Monaco in the forthcoming NATO Notes for analysis of the NATO
perspective on this operation and the lessons learned from it.
2. See ESR 13, July 2002
3. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, was represented by a colleague, while Javier
Solana, the EU SG/HR did take part in the exercise.

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 12 of 17

4. Costs for CME/CMX are currently estimated at no more than 50.000 Euros.
5. See Javier Solana press release, Brussels, 19 November 2003.

Iran: A test case for EU Non Proliferation Policy

In response to Iran’s recent disclosure of its nuclear programme, European governments have
followed-up their renewed commitment to non-proliferation, elaborated at the Thessaloniki
European Council1 with the common, pro-active and swift engagement with Iran at the highest
political level. The EU stance throughout the recent crisis was consistent and builds on a policy
of constructive engagement, using both negative and positive incentives to promote co-
operation and compliance. Britain, France and Germany took the lead in negotiating a solution
with Teheran and in rallying the US behind it, but it is likely that US pressure within the IAEA
also played a role in Iran’s climbdown.

Between September 2002 and February 2003, Iran disclosed to the International Agency
for Atomic Energy (IAEA) details of its undeclared nuclear-enrichment program, active for the
past 18 years. This contravened Iran’s obligations under the Non Proliferation Treaty’s
(NPT) Safeguards Agreements.2 In the following months, Iran opened some of its sites to
IAEA’s inspections to prove the peaceful nature of the programme. However, IAEA
investigations found evidence of uranium enrichment activities and of plutonium generation,
igniting major concerns in the international community over Iran’s nuclear weapons
ambitions and threatening to escalate the crisis.

The US 'hard-cop' approach

Since the Clinton Administration, the United States have consistently adopted a
containment approach towards Iran, refusing to co -operate on its civilian nuclear
programme, even under IAEA safeguards, whilst exerting pressure on third parties to do
the same. US administration concerns about Russian technical assistance to the Bushehr
nuclear power plant program3 led Congress to pass the Iran Non-Proliferation Act in 2000,
which authorised sanctions against states or private companies that provided Iran with
missile or Weapons of Mass Destruction technology.4

Although Teheran has always stressed the peaceful nature of its programme and argued
that it is necessary to meet increased energy needs, for the US, its concealment for almost
two decades is evidence of more ominous nuclear ambitions. It therefore called for a tough
response, arguing that the UN Security Council should address the issue and respond with
sanctions.

EU conditional engagement: the 'soft-cop' approach

Since 2000, the EU has progressively distanced itself from the US policy, rather choosing to
pursue an active policy of engagement, involving, inter alia, new negotiations in 2002
between the European Commission and Teheran on a Trade and Co-operation Agreement
(TCA). The EU approach is predicated on the belief that the US-advocated hard -line position
serves to reinforce intransigent positions inside Iran with unpredictable consequences. In
contrast the EU approach, with its emphasis on conditional engagement, aims to secure co -
operation and compliance through a mix of positive and negative incentives. Thus, the EU
position envisages tighter economic and commercial ties contingent on Iran achieving
progress in key areas of concern, namely terrorism, human rights, support to the Middle
East Peace process and non-proliferation.

The three Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and United Kingdom – who, since June,
have been at the forefront in pursuing a diplomatic deal with Teheran - have consistently
reminded Teheran that trade talks and the nuclear issue are interdependent. In his visit to
Teheran in August 2003, the High Representative Javier Solana was even tougher in
warning of unwelcome effects on EU-Iran relations, should Teheran fail to meet the IAEA
demands. Moreover, the European Council Conclusions of September 29 assertively
reiterated the EU expectations that “more intense [EU-Iran] economic relations can be
achieved only if progress is reached in the four areas of concern”.5

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 13 of 17

These moves are consistent with the identification, in the new European Security Strategy,
that WMD proliferation is one of the principal threats facing the EU and international
security and complements new policy initiatives in the area agreed at the Thessaloniki
European Council in June 2003. These are described in two documents, - the Basic
Principles for an EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and an
Action Plan for their implementation. The EU’s stated approach for tackling the threat of the
proliferation of WMD, combines political and diplomatic preventive measures (including
positive and negative security assurances) while explicitly sanctioning the ultimate recourse
to coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in the case of non-compliance.

Brokering a deal with Iran

Despite the US pressures to immediately seize the Security Council, the September 12 IAEA
Governing Board’s resolution opted for granting Teheran an October 31 deadline to duly
sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocols to the Non Proliferation Treaty and to
suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities and any reprocessing activities, as
a confidence -building measure. These Protocols would establish a short-notice highly-
intrusive inspection process for IAEA experts, and Iranian conservatives responded by
rejecting the proposals, stating that such conditions were “extraordinary humiliating” and
undermined national sovereignty.6

In late September, despite US criticism, Britain, France and Germany made a first, concerted
approach to Teheran offering, in a joint letter, technical help to Iran’s civilian nuclear project
in return for full co-operation and transparency with the IAEA. These three Ministers
travelled to Teheran on October 21 and successfully brokered an agreement. In the jointly
agreed statement, Iran pledged to sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and to
suspend its nuclear-enrichment program in exchange for Europe providing technical
assistance to Iran’s civilian nuclear programme and co-operating with Iran to eliminate the
causes of its security concerns in the Middle East region (read Israel and Pakistan), ideally
with a view to establishing a nuclear weapons-free region.

The US welcomed the initiative, but differences in approach were again revealed in the
negotiation, at the November 20 IAEA Board meeting, of a new resolution. Washington
promptly rejected a first draft drawn up by Britain, France and Germany, on the grounds
that it was too loose, and reaffirmed US intentions to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the
Security Council, recommending sanctions. The compromise IAEA resolution agreed on
November 26, expressed deep concern for Iran’s past failures and breaches in disclosing its
nuclear programme, while recognizing Iran’s shift towards a more co -operative and open
stance. It calls on Teheran to 'undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective
measures on an urgent basis ' 7 and establishes a fast-track procedure for the Board of
Governors to seize the Security Council, should any further serious Iranian failures come to
light.

Lessons learned

The Iran crisis has been major test for the EU nascent strategy against WMD
proliferation. The EU’s concerted diplomatic efforts and combined use of incentives
(European assistance in Iran’s civil nuclear program) and disincentives (halt of TCA
negotiations and Iran’s isolation) appear to have affected positive policy change within Iran
and led to its agreement to the new IAEA protocols. However, the role played by the US
calls for negative sanctions in influencing Iran’s climbdown should not be underestimated
and it remains likely that both approaches have had a significant impact. While both the EU
and the US remain convinced of the effectiveness of their respective good-cop/bad-cop
approaches, it is perhaps the combination of the two that is most effective. It is, in any
case, premature to draw any conclusions. The true test of these policies is whether Iran
abides by its commitment to sign the NPT’s additional protocols and, in practice, suspends
all nuclear related activities.

Daniela Manca
1. See the Action Plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003.

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 14 of 17

of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003.

2. With the NPT’s Safeguards Agreements, parties have committed to promptly declare to the agency the
starting of a nuclear program, before the conduct of nuclear-enrichment related activities, in order for the
Agency to establish procedures for the timely detection of facilities being diverted from peaceful nuclear
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
3. In 1995, Russia had signed a contract under which it provided $ 800 millon to complete one unit of the
Bushehr project. Later, Russian co-operation to Iran nuclear program included as well the supply of
uranium enrichment centrifuge plant. On 29 October 2003, Russia and Iran agreed to sign a protocol
providing for the return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia.
4. See 'Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program', ICG report, 27 October 2003.
5. External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 September 2003.
6. See Dan De Luce, ‘Europeans fail to end Iranian nuclear crisis’, The Guardian, 20th September 2003
7. See 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran',
Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 26 November 2003.

EU/Member States Pledge 5 Billion Euro to Tackle WMD Proliferation

Although the issue of WMD non-proliferation and disarmament in Iraq has caused
strains within Europe and in transatlantic relations, a multilateral approach to tackling
the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction from Russia and the
New Independent States (NIS) is proving highly effective. The “G8 Global Partnership
against the Proliferation of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction” is illustrative
of this co-operation. In this framework, the European Commission co-hosted a G8
Inter-Parliamentary Conference with the European Parliament, in Strasbourg on
November 20-21 2003, to bring to the attention of G8 members’ legislators the
important work being done on threat reduction and to introduce them to the new role
of the European Union in this field.

The conference was attended by over 200 senior government officials from the EU ‘25’
and the remaining non-EU G8, their parliamentarians, members of the European
Parliament, representatives of twenty-one think tanks, and the media. Over two days
presentations were given by high level government officials from the US, European
Commission, the Council, the member states, and third parties such as the
International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC), the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy
Association (IAEA). Keynote speakers included US Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control John Bolton and the father of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Senator Sam
Nunn.

The Commission's work is carried out on the basis of an EU 1999 Joint Action to
support Co-operative WMD non-proliferation and disarmament programmes in the
Russian Federation.1 This Joint Action has recently been extended for one year to run
until mid-2004. Presentations at the conference focussed on the work carried out on
the basis of the Joint Action, the implementation of which falls under the Commission’s
competence but is often conducted through member states, for instance:
· With Germany: to destroy Lewisite in Gorny and Kambarka;
· With the UK: to destroy chemical weapons nerve agents at Schuschye;
· With France: to support the nuclear weapons plutonium disposition projects.

The Commission also funds the non-proliferation of expertise under its TACIS
programme in its support to the International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC)
in Moscow and Kiev.

Current and future funding

The US has pledged 10 billion dollars over 10 years to the G8 global partnership for the

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 15 of 17

The US has pledged 10 billion dollars over 10 years to the G8 global partnership for the
non-proliferation of WMD. The EU G8 member states (France, Germany, Italy and the
UK) have pledged a total of 4 billion Euros (approximately 1 billion each) in the same
context and timeframe and the European Commission has committed a further 1 billion
Euros. However, confusion reigns as to how much the Commission actually spends on
non-proliferation due to the fact that relevant projects fall under diverse budget lines.
Global figures for the EC contributions, including the TACIS nuclear environmental
projects, amount 150 million euros per year between 2003-2006. This would total 450
million over three years, and if continued at the same level, would mean that the
Commission exceeded its 1 billion pledge. However, a senior Commission official
highlighted that the real figure on ‘non-proliferation and disarmament programmes’ may
be far lower. Discounting nuclear environmental projects, EC spending over the period
2003-2006 is made up of the EU Joint Action and TACIS contributions to the Nordic
Dimension Environmental Plan, to bilateral projects in North West Russia, to nuclear
safeguards projects and to the ISTCs. The sum of this spending is around 140 million
euros over the three years. If funding continues at the same levels, this would amount
to less than half of the 1 billion Community commitment made to the G8 at Kananaskis.

How to make up the shortfall?

The idea of establishing a Community CFSP budget line that includes ‘non-proliferation
and disarmament only’ projects was floated at the conference by a number of
participants. This would add stability and provide follow-on funding to the present Joint
Action which has only been extended for one year until mid-2004. The idea received
vocal support from some parliamentarians, who saw such a concrete initiative as a
measure of European commitment to this important issue. One parliamentarian called
for the idea to be incorporated into the manifestos of the European Parliament’s
political groups in order for the issue to be taken up as a priority with the new
parliament in the fall of 2004. A single CFSP budget line would help the Community
meet its G8 commitment to the Global Partnership and serve as a measure of progress
towards achieving this objective. Practical disarmament is about more than money,
however. Creating a single CFSP budget line for ‘non-proliferation and disarmament’
would also serve to clarify and improve the transparency of project priorities, and
enable the assessment of projects against stated European and G8 priorities.

Making EU commitments concrete

Making progress in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament is clearly a priority for
the member states and the EU institutions as expressed in the newly emerging EU
Strategy on WMD defined in the EU Security Strategy and the two documents
mentioned in the Thessaloniki conclusions: the ‘Basic Principles’ and the ‘Action Plan to
implement the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.’ Achieving a single CFSP budget line on ‘non-proliferation and
disarmament’ would be an important measure of this commitment and serve to build on
the achievements of the Community in this area. As one senior Commission stated at
the conference, ‘we can not afford to stall in our political commitment because … what
is at stake is the credibility and the visibility of the EU and, in particular the European
Community, in a field which, after the dramatic events of the 11 September 2001, has
become central to the security of our people.’

Gerrard Quille
1. See previous articles in issues 16 and 18 of the European Security Review, at www.isis-europe.org.

The Revised European Security Strategy

The European Council on 12-13 is set to approve the second draft of the European Security Strategy

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 16 of 17

The European Council on 12-13 is set to approve the second draft of the European Security Strategy
document 'A secure Europe in a Better World' drafted by the High Representative/Secretary General,
Javier Solana. The first draft was presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 19-20 June
2004 (and was reviewed in issue 18 of this publication) and the revised draft, draws on inputs from
member and acceding states as well as independent experts provided in the intervening months. The
principal changes from the first draft are described below.

The security environment: global challenges and key threats

The first section of the paper sets out the global challenges and key threats in the security
environment. Additions to the description of todays global challenges include the observation that
'internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked', that some 'have perceived
globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice' and that 'in much of the developing world,
poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns.' The
subsection on 'new threats' has been renamed key threats. As before, these include 'terrorism' and
the 'proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', which is now 'potentially' the greatest threat to our
security rather than 'the single most important threat'. The dangers of attacks using biological,
chemical and radiological materials are also spelled out further. Whereas in the first draft the third
threat was 'failed states and organised crime', the new version deal elaborates on these issues and
deals with them separately, identifying key threats as 'regional conflicts', 'state failure' and 'organised
crime'. Nevertheless, the links between these threats are explained in more detail, with new mention
made of how criminal activities can 'fuel the weakening of state structures' and how 'revenues from
trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world'. Moreover,
regional conflicts and new threats are linked with sentences such as 'The most practical way to tackle
the often elusive new threats wil sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.'

Strategic Objectives

The second section on strategic objectives, begins (rather than ends) with the objective of
addressing the threats. It elaborates on the relevance of the EU's current work and, in the case of
non-proliferation, includes the statement that 'the EU is committed to achieving universal adherence
to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification
provisions'. The second objective of building security in our neighbourhood, includes the
statement that 'Europeanisation [of the Balkans] is both a strategic objective and an incentive for
reform'. With regard to the Arab/Israeli conflict, it reaffirms its commitment to 'remain engaged and
ready to the problem until it is solved [by] the two state solution'. The third strategic, objective, an
international order based on effective multlateralism, remains unchanged in substance with
the exception that the sentence 'We are committed to upholding and developing International Law'
has been inserted, and the controversial sentence of the first draft 'Pre-emptive engagement can
avoid more serious problems in the future' has been taken out.

Policy Implications for Europe

The third and final section on policy implications for Europe, additional language is introduced in the
section describing how the EU should become more active. It is made explicit that being more active
'applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our
disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities'.
Moreover, the preventive dimension of such engagement is given greater prominance. The sub-
section concludes 'We need to be able to act before countries around us deterioriate, when signs of
proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can
avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and
which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.' When describing ways in
which the Union can become more capable, mention is made of the fact that the establishment of a
defence agency 'takes us in the right direction'. The EU-NATO permanent (Berlin Plus) arrangements
are also mentioned as enhancing the EU's operational capability and providing 'the framework for the
strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management.' In regard to identifying
how the Union should become more coherent, the revised draft mentions that this also has a
regional dimension. It states that 'coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003
European Security Review Page 17 of 17

regional dimension. It states that 'coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing
with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in
different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa has shown'. Finally, the paper explores
the policy implications of working with partners. With regard to the transatlantic relationship, the
new draft states that 'our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA [and] for
this reason as well, the EU must further build up capabilities and increase coherence'. It is
acknowledged that 'Russia is a major factor in our security and prosperity' and that 'respect for
common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.' For those regions that were
not specifically mentioned in the first draft, the second draft has something for everybody in the
recognition that 'our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world:
our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, Latin America and in Asia. These
relationships are an important asset to build on'.

In conclusion

Unlike the first draft, the new version has a brief conclusion which ends by stating that 'an active and
capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to
an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.' This positive tone
reflects a slight change in emphasis between the first and second drafts of the strategy. The revised
version leans slightly more towards the traditional EU (and UN) approaches to tackling global security
challenges, with more emphasis on preventive engagement to address old and new challenges and
threats using the entire spectrum of the EU's external instruments. While little new text has been
added, much has been rearranged, and the overrall impression is of a more coherent document, with
something for everyone, and which the European Council is bound to endorse. The real challenge,
however, will be its follow-up. While the strategy contains noble aspirations which all will subscribe
to, it is unclear whether the IGC will equip the EU, operating in pursuit of 25 national interests, with
the institutional means and the political will to realise these objectives through concrete, coherent
and common actions.

Catriona Gourlay

News in Brief

Euro-Mediterranean countries take partnership forward

The VI Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers took place in Naples
on 2-3 December. Three major initiatives resulted from the meeting: the creation of a
Euro-Med Foundation for Dialogue and Culture; the establishment of a Euro-
Mediterranean bank; and the setting up of a Euro-Med Inter-Parliamentary Assembly,
to meet at least once a year as a consultative body in the framework of the Barcelona
process. This followed recommendations from the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary
Forum to increase visibility and transparency of the Barcelona Process. The need to
ratify all the Association Agreements by the next EU enlargement (May 2004) was also
stressed as a further step towards regional integration and the creation of a free-trade
area.

In the Political and Security pillar of the Euro-Med Partnership, Ministers underlined the
need to tackle the new security challenges through a concerted approach. Beyond the
existing political and security dialogues, Ministers agreed further complementary
measures in the fields of maritime safety, environment, civilian crisis management
training, and co-operation among civil protection authorities. Senior officials
were charged with taking this work forward.

Annual report on Arms Exports agreed

The Council approved the fifth annual report on the implementation of the EU Code of
Conduct on Arms Exports on 8 December 2003.

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce 12/11/2003